Text

301 ADAMS 2A-3
	ML22089A176
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	03/30/2022
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Duke Energy Carolinas
References
	50-369/22-301, 50-370/22-301 50-369/OL-22, 50-370/OL-22
	Download: ML22089A176 (51)
	v • d • e

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 (Rev_113021)

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Facility:

McGuire Date of Examination:

2/2022 Examination Level:

RO Operating Test Number:

N22-1 Administrative Topic (see Note)

Type Code*

Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations M, R 2.1.7 (4.4)

Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation JPM:

Manual AFD Calculation Conduct of Operations M, R 2.1.4 (3.3)

Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, no-solo operation, maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, etc.

JPM:

Determine License Status Equipment Control D, R 2.2.37 (3.6)

Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.

JPM:

D/G Fuel Oil Assessment Radiation Control D, R 2.3.4 (3.2)

Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

JPM:

Determine Required Dose Extensions NOTE:

All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

Type Codes & Criteria:

(C)ontrol room, (0) (S)imulator, (0) or Class(R)oom (4)

(D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (2)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1) (2)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected) (0)

ML22089A176

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 (Rev_113021)

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 RO Admin JPM Summary A1a This is a modified Bank JPM. The operator will be told that Unit 1 is at 90% power, the OAC has been out of service for 30 minutes, that PT/1/A/4600/021 A (Loss of Operator Aid Computer While in Mode 1) is being performed, and that the Main Control Board AFD meters are INOPERABLE. The operator will be given the present current values for the Power Range upper and lower detectors and directed to calculate AFD per PT/1/A/4600/021A (Loss of Operator Aid Computer while in Mode 1), Step 12.12 for current plant conditions and verify that AFD is within the limits specified in the COLR. The operator will be expected to manually calculate AFD and determine that the AFD calculated for N41 and N43 is in excess of the limits allowed by the COLR.

A1b This is a modified Bank JPM. The operator will be told that they are a Licensed Reactor Operator who is currently assigned to the day shift staff for a special project, and not routinely standing watch in the Control Room, that the assignment has continued since 8/1/21, that during this time their license became inactive, and was reactivated on 12/1/21, and that their supervisor has directed them to stand watch as needed to maintain your license active. They will be provided with a work history for the last three months and directed to complete any paperwork necessary to track the maintenance of their license, and to identify the MINIMUM requirements that must be met going forward to maintain their license active (Including number of watches, required watch positions, and any time restraints). The operator will record the completion of the watches stood as the U2 OATC on 2/3/22 and U1 BOP on 2/10/22 on Attachment 1 of AD-OP-ALL-0107 in accordance with the attached KEY, and identify that 3 additional 12-hour shifts must be stood as either the U1 RO, U1 BOP, U2 RO or U2 BOP by 3/31/22 to maintain the license active.

A2 This is a Bank JPM. The operator will be told that Unit 1 is preparing to conduct a 24-hour run of the 1A Diesel Generator per PT/1/A/4350/036A (1A D/G 24 Hour Run), that (1A D/G Startup Checklist) is in progress, that 1FDMT5140 (1A D/G Fuel Oil Storage Tank Level Display) is indicating in Inches ONLY, and that 1FDMT5140 (1A D/G Fuel Oil Storage Tank Level Display) currently is reading 118 Inches. The operator will be directed to perform Steps 2.2 and 2.3 of Attachment 3 of PT/1/A/4350/036A (1A D/G 24 Hour Run) and determine the following: (1) The current volume of fuel in the 1A Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank, (2) The approximate time into the test at which the 1A Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank is expected to drop below the Technical Specification Minimum required level, (3) The approximate volume of fuel in the 1A Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank expected at the completion of the surveillance assuming that the 1A D/G is run for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , and (4) Any procedurally required action upon the 1A Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank dropping below the Technical Specification Minimum required level. The operator will be expected to determine the level of the 1A Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank to be 42,000 +/- 500 gallons, the approximate time into the test at which the 1A Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank is expected to drop below the Technical Specification Minimum required level to be 6.67-10 hours (8.33 hours3.819444e-4 days 0.00917 hours 5.456349e-5 weeks 1.25565e-5 months ), the approximate volume of the 1A Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank expected at the completion of the surveillance assuming that the 1A D/G is run for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to be 34,800 +/- 500 gallons, and that as soon as the 1A Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank level drops below the minimum required level, the operator must Ensure Fuel Oil delivery is scheduled within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months and 1A D/G is in an action statement.

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 (Rev_113021)

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 A3 This is a Bank JPM. The operator will be told that Unit 1 is in a Refueling Outage, be provided with a personal annual dose history, and be provided with expected dose rates and time estimates for a maintenance task. The operator will be directed to (1) Predict the MAXIMUM dose expected to be received while completing this task; (2) Identify any dose limit extensions that might be required, and (3) If any dose limit extensions are required, identify who must approve them. The operator will be expected to determine that the MAXIMUM expected dose to be received is 105 mrem, that the operator will require a dose limit extension, and that the operators dose limit extension must be approved by the Requesting Manager and the Radiation Protection Manager only.

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 (Rev_012822)

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Facility:

McGuire Date of Examination:

2/2022 Examination Level:

SRO Operating Test Number:

N22-1 Administrative Topic (see Note)

Type Code*

Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations M, R 2.1.20 (4.6)

Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

JPM:

SGTL Action Levels Conduct of Operations D, R 2.1.7 (4.7)

Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgements based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior and instrument interpretation.

JPM:

Review a Completed Procedure Equipment Control D, R 2.2.40 (4.7)

Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system.

JPM:

Respond to a Fire Detection System Trouble Alarm Radiation Control D, R 2.3.15 (3.1)

Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

JPM:

Evaluate the Impact of EMF-36 Failure on the Plant Vent System and a Planned Waste Gas Decay Tank Release Emergency Procedures/Plan D, R 2.4.38 (4.4)

Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator if required.

JPM:

Assess Unplanned Loss of Emergency Response Equipment NOTE:

All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

Type Codes & Criteria:

(C)ontrol room, (0) (S)imulator, (0) or Class(R)oom (5)

(D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (4)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1) (1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected) (0)

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 (Rev_012822)

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 SRO Admin JPM Summary A1a This is a modified Bank JPM. The operator will be told that it is 2100 on 1/6/22 and that Unit 1 is operating at 30% power. The operator will be provided with 6 days of historical data concerning a progressively larger Steam Generator Tube Leak; and directed to evaluate the S/G Primary to Secondary Leakage Monitoring Data Sheet provided, and use PT/1/A/4150 001C (Primary to Secondary Leak Monitoring) to identify the applicable Enclosure in use at 4 historical times. The operator will be expected to identify the applicable Enclosure of PT/1/A/4150 001C (Primary to Secondary Leak Monitoring) that was being performed at 4 distinct historical times in accordance with the attached KEY and determine Tech. Spec. 3.4.13 Condition B, Required Actions B1 and B2 are required in accordance with the attached KEY.

A1b This is a Bank JPM (Modified to accommodate changes within the procedure since last used). The operator will be told that Unit 1 is in Mode 4 during a plant startup, provided with the current EFPD and NC System pressure, told that PT/1/A/4600/003D, Monthly Surveillance Items, Attachment 4, NC Boron Concentration Checklist, has been performed prior to entry into Mode 3, and that the completed Attachment 4 is now ready for review.

The operator will be directed to review the completed procedure and identify (1) whether Mode 1 can be entered, and (2) any discrepancies that may exist. The operator will review completed Attachment 4 of PT/1/A/4600/003D and identify that the Surveillance performer has entered an incorrect value for the minimum value of the Cold Leg Accumulator Boron Concentration; and correct this entry. Then when the correction is made, the operator will determine that the 1A through 1C CLA are within the allowable Boron concentration range, but that the 1D CLA is outside of the allowable range. The operator will identify that Mode 3 cannot be entered in accordance with an attached KEY.

A2 This is a Bank JPM. The operator will be told that Annunciator 1AD-13 E3, FIRE DET SYS ALERT, has alarmed, the crew has entered OP/0/A/6400/002C (Fire Detection System), it is determined that the Smoke Detector within Fire Detector Zone 120 is not FUNCTIONAL, and the fire protection impairment program is not available. However, the WCC SROs turnover package indicates that the last entry in the Fire Protection Impairment Log is 22-03, and that Work Request 56743829 has been generated to troubleshoot and correct the failure. The operator will be directed to evaluate the SLCs for this condition and complete Form 316-1. The operator will identify that SLC 16.9.6 Condition D exists and that ACTION D.1 OR D.2 OR D.3 must be taken, and complete Form 316-1 in accordance with the attached KEY.

A3 This is a Bank JPM. The operator will be told that the Unit 1 is at 100% power, that a VQ release is in progress, that a Waste Gas Decay Tank B release is being planned, that 0EMF50(L) (EMF-50L Waste Gas Disch Rad Monitor), is de-energized and declared non-functional for preventative maintenance that will require 2 more hours, and must be completed before it can be returned to service, and that the BOP reports that 1EMF36(L)

(Unit Vent Gas Low Range EMF Det), has just failed LOW. The operator will also be told that I&E has indicated that it will take at least four hours to troubleshoot and correct the failure, and that the RP Manager has stated that he will NOT authorize any alternative monitoring methods. The operator will be directed to determine the required REMEDIAL ACTIONS concerning the Plant Vent System release based on the failure of 1EMF36(L);

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 (Rev_012822)

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 to determine the earliest time at which the B Waste Gas Decay Tank release can start, and to identify any REMEDIAL ACTIONS that will be required to start the release. The operator will be expected to determine that SLC 16.11.7 REMEDIAL ACTION E.1, E.2 and E.3 must be taken within their Completion Time when 1EMF36 is declared non-functional; and determine that the earliest that the B Waste Gas Decay Tank release can start is 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months from now, and identifies that NO REMEDIAL ACTIONS will be required to start the release.

A4 This is a Bank JPM. The operator will be told that Unit 1 and Unit 2 are both at 100%

power, that MCB Annunciator 1AD-13, E-7, O.B.E. EXCEEDED has alarmed, that investigation has revealed that the Seismic Monitor (1IEECS1000) and Tri-Axial Accelerometer (1IEE-9000) have failed and have been determined to be not FUNCTIONAL, and that the System Engineer has submitted Work Request 12345678 to troubleshoot and repair the system. The operator will be directed to evaluate the inoperability of the 1IEECS1000 per RP/0/B/5700/031, Equipment Important to Emergency Response, including the identification of (1) Any required TS/SLC ACTION, (2) Whether the failure is reportable, (3) If Reportable, within what time frame, (4) Any internal personnel that must be notified, and (5) Priority given to Work Request 12345678.

The operator will be expected to determine that SLC 16.7.2 ACTION A.1 or A.2 must be taken, that the failure is reportable within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , that the OPS Duty Manager, Site Duty Manager, EP Duty Person, and Regulatory Affairs Duty Person must be notified of the failure, and that Work Request 12345678 must be given Priority 1 (Or HIGH) status.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 (REV_092321)

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Facility:

McGuire Date of Examination:

2/2022 Exam Level (circle one):

RO (only) / SRO(I) / SRO (U)

Operating Test No.:

N22-1 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U)

System / JPM Title Type Code*

Safety Function A.

013 ESF Actuation System [013 A4.01 (4.5/4.8)]

Respond to Failed ESF Actuation S, M, A 2

B.

026 Containment Spray System [026 A4.01 (4.5/4.3)]

Align the Containment Spray System to Cold Leg Recirculation S,P,D,A,EN,L 5

C.

E02 SI Termination [E02 EA1.1 (4.0/3.9)]

Isolate the NV S/I Flowpath While Terminating Safety Injection S, D, A, EN, L 3

D.

APE 024 Emergency Boration [APE 024 AA1.17 (3.9/3.9)]

Emergency Borate in Mode 6 S, P, D, A, L 1

E.

EPE E05 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink [E05 EA1.1 (4.1/4.0)]

Establish NC System Feed and Bleed S, M, A, EN 4P F.

APE 077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances [077 AA2.06 (3.4/3.5)]

Separate From the Electrical Grid Due to Low Grid Frequency S, D 6

G.

073 Process Radiation Monitoring System [073 A4.02 (3.7/3.7)]

Respond to the 1EMF-35 Trip 2 Alarm S, D 7

H.

075 Circulating Water System [075 A2.02 (2.5/2.7)]

Isolate the Circulating Water System During Turbine Building Flooding S, D 8

In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U I.

EPE E05 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink [E05 EA1.1 (4.1/4.0)]

Manually Fail Open 2SA-48ABC and 2SA-49AB D, E 4S J.

APE 058 Loss of DC Power [APE 058 AA1.03 (3.1/3.3)]

Swap Battery Charger EVCA Power Supply from Unit 1 to Unit 2 P, D, R, E 6

K.

068 Control Room Evacuation [068 AA1.23 (4.3/4.4)]

Locally Trip Unit 2 Main Turbine and Both Unit 2 FWPT's D, E 8

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 (REV_092321)

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 (5) /4-6 (5) / 2-3 (3)

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9 (9) / 8 (8) / 4 (4)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 (3) / 1 (3) / 1 (2)

(EN)gineered Safety Feature 1 (3) / 1 (3)/ 1 (2) (Control Room System)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1 (3) / 1 (3) / 1 (2)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2 (2) / 2 (2) / 1 (1)

(P)revious 2 exams 3 (3) / 3 (3)/ 2 (2) (Randomly Selected)

(R)CA 1 (1)/ 1 (1) / 1 (1)

(S)imulator JPM Summary JPM A This is a Modified Bank JPM. The operator will be told that Unit 1 has experienced an ATWS and an inadvertent Train B Safety Injection actuation, and the crew is presently performing EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1 (Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS). The operator will be directed to perform Enclosure 3 (Subsequent S/I Actions) of EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1 (Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS), while the crew continues with the actions of EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1. The operator will be required to manually actuate the A Train of SI which is expected to start the 1A RN Pump, the operator will observe that the 1A RN Pump has tripped (Alternate Path). The operator will be expected to complete the required actions of Enclosure 3 including manually actuating A Train of SI and Phase A CIS, stopping all NC pumps, resetting A Train SI and Sequencer and dispatching an operator to stop the A Diesel Generator using the Emergency Stop Pushbutton.

JPM B This is a Bank JPM. The operator will be told that a High Energy Line Break has occurred inside Containment, EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.3 (Transfer To Cold Leg Recirc) has been implemented and completed through step 6, and FWST Level is approximately 80 inches and lowering. The operator will be directed to perform Steps 7 and 8 of EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.3 (Transfer To Cold Leg Recirc). The operator will be expected to attempt to align the 1A NS Pump for operation until it is observed that 1NS-18A has failed to open (Alternate Path). The operator will then be expected to align the 1B NS Train for operation, and secure the 1A NS Train operation. This JPM appeared on the 2018 Initial License Exam and was randomly selected for the 2022 Exam.

JPM C This is a Bank JPM. The operator will be told that a plant transient on Unit 1 has resulted in a reactor trip from power and a Safety Injection actuation. Safety Injection Termination criteria has been met and the crew is implementing EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 (Safety Injection Termination). The operator will be directed to isolate the NV S/I flowpath in accordance with Step 6 of EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 (Safety Injection Termination). While performing this task the operator will recognize that one NV Pump Recirculation Valve cannot be opened (Alternate Path). The operator will be expected to attempt to isolate NV S/I flow per EP/1/A/500/ES-1.1, recognize that this cannot be accomplished and complete Generic Enclosure 18 (Aligning Normal Charging With NV

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 (REV_092321)

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 Recirc Path Isolated) to realign the NV system for normal charging, close the SI Injection valves and then maintain a minimum amount of charging flow to avoid overheating the NV Pumps.

JPM D This is a Bank JPM. The operator will be told that the plant is in Mode 6 with Core Alterations in progress. Chemistry has just reported that a boron sample taken 30 minutes ago indicates that the RCS boron concentration is less than that required for Mode 6 indicating an NCS boron dilution may be occurring, and MCB Annunciator 1AD-2/D3, S/R HI FLUX AT SHUTDOWN, has just alarmed. The operator will also be told that the 1B BA Transfer Pump is available. However, due to elevated vibration levels, the 1A BA Transfer Pump is preferred. The operator will be directed to perform AP/1/A/5500/38, (Emergency Boration and Response to Inadvertent Dilution). The operator will be expected to perform steps 1-12 of AP/1/A5500/38, initiate emergency boration using the 1A BA Transfer Pump, and reinitiate emergency boration using the 1B BA Transfer Pump when 1ELXA de-energizes (Alternate Path). This JPM appeared on the 2018 Initial License Exam and was randomly selected for the 2022 Exam.

JPM E This is a Modified Bank JPM. The operator will be told that a Reactor Trip on Lo-Lo S/G Level has occurred due to the loss of both Main Feedwater Pumps, the CA System will not start, EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1 (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) has been implemented, and Feed and Bleed initiation criteria has been met. The operator will be directed to initiate an NC System Feed and Bleed by performing Steps 22 through 28 of EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1 (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink). When the operator attempts to verify that two Pzr PORVs and associated isolation valves are open, it will be observed that only one Pzr PORV is open (NC-34A will open, NC-32B and NC-36B fail to open)

(Alternate Path). The operator will be expected to attempt to get two Pzr PORVs open and then open one train of head vents to establish an NC system bleed path.

JPM F This is a Bank JPM. With the plant at 77% power, the operator will be told that the crew has entered AP/1/A/5500/05 (Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances) due to low Electrical Grid frequency, and the procedure is completed up to Step 15. The operator will be directed to separate from the Electrical Grid without delay in accordance with Step 15 of AP/1/A/5500/05 (Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances).

Since plant power is greater than 60%, the operator will be required to reduce load. The operator will be expected to lower turbine load in OPERATOR AUTO, and then disconnect the Turbine Generator from the Electrical Grid per Step 15 of AP/1/A/5500/05 (Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances).

JPM G This is a Bank JPM. The operator will be told that Unit 1 is at 100% power. The operator will be directed to respond to plant conditions. Shortly after the JPM is initiated MCB Annunciator 1RAD2 A1, 1EMF-35 UNIT VENT PART HI RAD, will alarm. The operator will be expected to respond to MCB Annunciator 1RAD-2, A-1, using the Annunciator Response Procedure and place the Aux Building Filtered Exhaust System in operation and the Train B Outside Air Pressure Filter Train in service (The Outside Air Pressure Filter Train will be initially aligned with each of the Outside Air Intake Valves CLOSED).

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 (REV_092321)

NUREG-1021, Revision 11 JPM H This is a Bank JPM. The operator will be told that there is massive flooding in the Turbine Building and the crew has implemented AP/0/A/5500/44 (Plant Flooding), (Unit 1 Turbine Bldg Flooding). The operator will be directed to isolate the RC System by continuing with Enclosure 1 of AP/0/A/5500/44, step 6.d, while the crew continues with EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip and/or Safety Injection). The operator will be expected to take actions to isolate the Unit 1 RC System in accordance with of AP/0/A/5500/44. This task was chosen because Internal Flooding events are a large PRA contributor (15% CDF). This is a Time Critical JPM.

JPM I This is a Bank JPM. The operator will be told that Unit 2 was at 100% power when a spurious Feedwater Isolation signal caused a Reactor trip, that the 2A CA pump is tagged out for motor replacement, that the 2B CA pump started and tripped on overload, that the crew has transitioned from EP/2/A/5000/E-0 to EP/2/A/5000/FR-H.1 (Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink), that the TDCA Pump is not running, and that both 2SA-48ABC and 2SA-49AB are closed. The operator will be directed to fail the air supplies to 2SA-48ABC and 2SA-49AB per EP/2/A/5000/FR-H.1, RNOs 7.d.1 and 7.d.2.

The operator will be expected to fail the air supplies to 2SA-48ABC and 2SA-49AB per EP/2/A/5000/FR-H.1, RNOs 7.d.1 and 7.d.2.

JPM J This is a Bank JPM. The operator will be told that Unit 1 has just experienced a Loss of Offsite Power, that the 1A D/G will not start, and that 1ETA is de-energized.

AP/1/A/5500/07, Loss of Electrical Power, Case 1 has been implemented. The operator will be directed to swap power supplies to the EVCA Battery Charger from Unit 1 to Unit 2 in accordance with Enclosure 22 (Swapping Battery Charger Power Supplies) of AP/1/A/5500/07, (Loss of Electrical Power). The operator will be expected to place Battery Charger EVCA in service with power being supplied from Unit 2 within 15 minutes of dispatch. This is a Time Critical JPM.

JPM K This is a Bank JPM. The operator will be told that a loss of control room has occurred, AP/2/A/5500/17 (Loss Of Control Room) has been implemented and is complete through step 10.b, the operator has been dispatched to standby at the Unit 2 Main Turbine, and that communications have been established between them and the SRO at the Unit 2 Aux. Shutdown panel. The operator will be directed to perform the local actions of Step 10.c.1-3 of AP/1/A/550/17 Loss of Control Room). The operator will be expected to trip the Unit 2 Main Turbine locally, and trip any of the available "trip" mechanisms on both FWPT's such that 2SP-1 and 2SP-2 are closed.

ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Facility: McGuire Exam Date: Feb 2022 1

2 3

Attributes 4

Job Content 5

6 Admin JPMs ADMIN Topic and K/A LOD (1-5)

U/E/S Explanation I/C Cues Critical Scope Overlap Perf.

Key Minutia Job Link Focus Steps (N/B)

Std.

A1a - RO Ok 2-4 E

Comments attached.

A1b - RO Ok 2-4 U ?

A2 - RO Ok 2-4 E

A3 - RO Ok 2-4 S

A1a - SRO Ok 2-4 E

A1b - SRO Ok 2-4 E

A2 - SRO Ok 2-4 E

A3 - SRO Ok 2-4 S

A4 - SRO Ok 2-4 S

1 Simulator/In-Plant Safety Function and K/A JPMs A

2 2-4 S

B 5

2-4 S

C 3

2-4

?

E Comment attached.

D 1

2-4 S

E 4P 2-4 S

F 6

2-4 S

G 7

2-4 S

H 8

2-4 S

I 4S 2-4 S

J 6

2-4 S

K 8

2-4 S

ES-301 2

Form ES-301-7 Instructions for Completing This Table:

Check or mark any item(s) requiring a comment and explain the issue in the space provided using the guide below.

1.

Check each JPM for appropriate administrative topic requirements (COO, EC, Rad, and EP) or safety function requirements and corresponding K/A. Mark in column 1.

(ES-301, D.3 and D.4)

2.

Determine the level of difficulty (LOD) using an established 1-5 rating scale. Levels 1 and 5 represent an inappropriate (low or high) discriminatory level for the license that is being tested. Mark in column 2 (Appendix D, C.1.f)

3.

In column 3, Attributes, check the appropriate box when an attribute is not met:

The initial conditions and/or initiating cue is clear to ensure the operator understands the task and how to begin. (Appendix C, B.4)

The JPM contains appropriate cues that clearly indicate when they should be provided to the examinee. Cues are objective and not leading. (Appendix C, D.1)

All critical steps (elements) are properly identified.

The scope of the task is not too narrow (N) or too broad (B).

Excessive overlap does not occur with other parts of the operating test or written examination. (ES-301, D.1.a, and ES-301, D.2.a)

The task performance standard clearly describes the expected outcome (i.e., end state). Each performance step identifies a standard for successful completion of the step.

A valid marked up key was provided (e.g., graph interpretation, initialed steps for handouts).

4.

For column 4, Job Content, check the appropriate box if the job content flaw does not meet the following elements:

Topics are linked to the job content (e.g., not a disguised task, task required in real job).

The JPM has meaningful performance requirements that will provide a legitimate basis for evaluating the applicant's understanding and ability to safely operate the plant. (ES-301, D.2.c)

5.

Based on the reviewers judgment, is the JPM as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 5.

6.

In column 6, provide a brief description of any (U)nacceptable or (E)nhancement rating from column 5.

Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound JPM is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.

ES-301 3

Form ES-301-7 Facility: McGuire Scenario: 1 Exam Date: Feb 2022 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 Event Realism/Cred.

Required Actions Verifiable actions LOD TS CTs Scen.

Overlap U/E/S Explanation 1

X S

Comments attached.

2 X

X S

3 X

S 4

X X

S 5

X S

6 X

S 7

X S

8 X

S 9

X S

10

ES-301 4

Form ES-301-7 Facility: McGuire Scenario: 2 Exam Date: Feb 2022 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 Event Realism/Cred.

Required Actions Verifiable actions LOD TS CTs Scen.

Overlap U/E/S Explanation 1

S Comments attached.

2 S

3 2

S 4

X S

5 S

6 2

S 7

S 8

S

ES-301 5

Form ES-301-7 Facility: McGuire Scenario: 3 Exam Date: Feb 2022 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 Event Realism/Cred.

Required Actions Verifiable actions LOD TS CTs Scen.

Overlap U/E/S Explanation 1

S Comments attached.

2 X

X S

3 X

S 4

X S

5 S

6 S

7 S

8 S

9 S

10 S

11 X

S

ES-301 6

Form ES-301-7 Instructions for Completing This Table:

Use this table for each scenario for evaluation.

2 Check this box if the events are not related (e.g., seismic event followed by a pipe rupture) OR if the events do not obey the laws of physics and thermodynamics.

3, 4 In columns 3 and 4, check the box if there is no verifiable or required action, as applicable. Examples of required actions are as follows: (ES-301, D.5f) opening, closing, and throttling valves starting and stopping equipment raising and lowering level, flow, and pressure making decisions and giving directions acknowledging or verifying key alarms and automatic actions (Uncomplicated events that require no operator action beyond this should not be included on the operating test unless they are necessary to set the stage for subsequent events. (Appendix D, B.3).)

5 Check this box if the level of difficulty is not appropriate.

6 Check this box if the event has a TS.

7 Check this box if the event has a critical task (CT). If the same CT covers more than one event, check the event where the CT started only.

8 Check this box if the event overlaps with another event on any of the last two NRC examinations. (Appendix D, C.1.f) 9 Based on the reviewers judgment, is the event as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 9.

10 Record any explanations of the events here.

In the shaded boxes, sum the number of check marks in each column.

In column 1, sum the number of events.

In columns 2-4, record the total number of check marks for each column.

In column 5, based on the reviewer's judgement, place a checkmark only if the scenario's LOD is not appropriate.

In column 6, TS are required to be 2 for each scenario. (ES-301, D.5.d)

In column 7, preidentified CTs should be 2 for each scenario. (Appendix D; ES-301, D.5.d; ES-301-4)

In column 8, record the number of events not used on the two previous NRC initial licensing exams. A scenario is considered unsatisfactory if there is < 2 new events. (ES-301, D.5.b; Appendix D, C.1.f)

In column 9, record whether the scenario as written (U)nacceptable, in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory from column 11 of the simulator scenario table.

ES-301 7

Form ES-301-7 Facility: McGuire Exam Date: Feb 2022 Scenario 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 11 Event Totals Events Unsat.

TS Total TS Unsat.

CT Total CT Unsat.

% Unsat.

Scenario Elements U/E/S Explanation 1

10 0

2 0

3 0

0 S

2 8

0 2

0 0

S 3

11 0

2 0

0 S

Instructions for Completing This Table:

Check or mark any item(s) requiring comment and explain the issue in the space provided.

1, 3, 5 For each simulator scenario, enter the total number of events (column 1), TS entries/actions (column 3), and CTs (column 5).

This number should match the respective scenario from the event-based scenario tables (the sum from columns 1, 6, and 7, respectively).

2, 4, 6 For each simulator scenario, evaluate each event, TS, and CT as (S)atisfactory, (E)nhance, or (U)nsatisfactory based on the following criteria:

a.

Events. Each event is described on a Form ES-D-2, including all switch manipulations, pertinent alarms, and verifiable actions. Event actions are balanced between at-the-controls and balance-of-plant applicants during the scenario. All event-related attributes on Form ES-301-4 are met. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory events in column 2.

b.

TS. A scenario includes at least two TS entries/actions across at least two different events. TS entries and actions are detailed on Form ES-D-2. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory TS entries/actions in column 4. (ES-301, D.5d)

c.

CT. Check that a scenario includes at least two preidentified CTs. This criterion is a target quantitative attribute, not an absolute minimum requirement. Check that each CT is explicitly bounded on Form ES-D-2 with measurable performance standards (see Appendix D). Enter the total number of unsatisfactory CTs in column 6.

7 In column 7, calculate the percentage of unsatisfactory scenario elements:

8 If the value in column 7 is > 20%, mark the scenario as (U)nsatisfactory in column 8. If column 7 is 20%, annotate with (E)nhancement or (S)atisfactory.

9 In column 9, explain each unsatisfactory event, TS, and CT. Editorial comments can also be added here.

Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.

2 + 4 + 6 1 + 3 + 5100%

ES-301 8

Form ES-301-7 Site name: McGuire Exam Date: Feb 2022 OPERATING TEST TOTALS Total Total Unsat.

Total Total Unsat.

Explanation Edits Sat.

Admin.

JPMs 9

0 5

4 Sim./In-Plant JPMs 11 0

1 10 Scenarios 3

0 0

0 Op. Test Totals:

23 0

6 14 0

Instructions for Completing This Table:

Update data for this table from quality reviews and totals in the previous tables and then calculate the percentage of total items that are unsatisfactory and give an explanation in the space provided.

1.

Enter the total number of items submitted for the operating test in the Total column. For example, if nine administrative JPMs were submitted, enter 9 in the Total items column for administrative JPMs.

For scenarios, enter the total number of simulator scenarios.

2.

Enter the total number of (U)nsatisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the two JPMs column 5 and simulator scenarios column 8 in the previous tables. Provide an explanation in the space provided.

3.

Enter totals for (E)nhancements needed and (S)atisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the previous tables. This task is for tracking only.

4.

Total each column and enter the amounts in the Op. Test Totals row.

5.

Calculate the percentage of the operating test that is (U)nsatisfactory (Op. Test Total Unsat.)/(Op. Test Total) and place this value in the bolded % Unsat. cell.

Refer to ES-501, E.3.a, to rate the overall operating test as follows:

satisfactory, if the Op. Test Total % Unsat. is 20%

unsatisfactory, if Op. Test Total % Unsat. is > 20%

6.

Update this table and the tables above with post-exam changes if the as-administered operating test required content changes, including the following:

The JPM performance standards were incorrect.

The administrative JPM tasks/keys were incorrect.

CTs were incorrect in the scenarios (not including postscenario critical tasks defined in Appendix D).

The EOP strategy was incorrect in a scenario(s).

TS entries/actions were determined to be incorrect in a scenario(s).

Post exam comments did not affect the determination of exam quality as it pertains to this form. Statistics were not updated because they would not have changed the determination that the submittal was well within the quality standards stated in NUREG-1021.

Systems JPMs

1. JPM C: Should JPM Step 5 be designated as a Critical Step? - Corrected. MAB Admin JPMs

1. RO A1a: Discuss whether it is operationally valid to tell the applicants to use 2 significant digits to the right of the decimal. If plant procedures do not tell them to do this, then the JPM likely should not tell them to do this. And if plant procedures actually do tell them to do this, then the JPM should not cue them to do it. - Corrected. MAB

2. RO A1b: Task Standard should state that incorrect identification of additional items will be considered a failed critical step. - JPM replaced. MAB

3. RO A1b: I will need to evaluate level of difficulty during validation week. On the surface, simply looking up a procedure revision number does not appear to be very discriminating. It is operationally valid, but it might be LOD=1. This comment is made as a reminder for us to evaluate LOD. Perhaps discussion can also help educate us on the LOD. - JPM replaced. MAB

4. RO A2: The Initiating Cue asks for the volume of the tank before and after; however, the correct question would be to ask for the volume of fuel. I dont want an applicant to give me the actual tank volume, which does not change. - Corrected. MAB

5. SRO A1a: On 1/3/22 at 2000, the applicant would get the correct answer even if they used the wrong parameter. Discuss the possibility of making M1P0188 less than 30 gpd, so that using the wrong parameter would yield the wrong Enclosure. - Addressed to ensure wrong parameter will yield wrong answer. MAB

6. SRO A1b: Typo in Step 1 (2364 vs 2329) - Corrected. MAB

7. SRO A2: Should this JPM be Time Critical if a fire tour watch must be established within an hour? - Task is Time Critical and now it is stated on the Cue Sheet. MAB

Scenario Comments - Draft Submittal

1. Scenario 1 / Event 2: CT 1 - Slight modification to CT criteria required. Change before a reactor Protection System actuation occurs to to avoid a Reactor Protection Actuation. It is a nuance in the wording, but we have seen where applicants do something before the Rx Trip, but it is not timely enough to prevent the Rx Trip. - Corrected. MAB

2. Scenario 1 / Event 4: CT 2 - Same comment as #1 above - to avoid vs. before - Corrected.

MAB

3. Scenario 1 / Event 7: CT 3 - Same comment as #1 above - to avoid vs. before - Corrected.

MAB

4. Scenario 2 / Event 6-8: CT 2 - Same comment as #1 above - to avoid vs. before - Corrected.

MAB

5. Scenario 3 / Event 2: CT 1 - Place as part of the bolded criteria: to avoid RPS actuation. -

Incorporated. MAB

6. Scenario 3: Does this scenario have a Manual Control of an Auto Function for the OATC? If not, is there a way to add it? - maybe pzr level control in manual to begin scenario, or something else? - Designated as spare scenario. MAB

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: McGuire Date of Exam: February 2022 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

Total A2 G*

Total

1.

Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1

4 3

3 N/A 3

3 N/A 2

18 3

3 6

2 0

1 3

2 2

1 9

2 2

4 Tier Totals 4

4 6

5 5

3 27 5

5 10

2.

Plant Systems 1

2 3

3 4

2 2

3 2

2 3

2 28 3

2 5

2 2

0 0

1 2

0 1

1 1

10 N/A 2

1 3

Tier Totals 4

3 3

5 4

2 4

3 3

4 3

38 5

3 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1

2 3

4 10 1

2 3

4 7

3 3

2 2

1 2

Note: 1.

Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outline sections (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only section, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 radiation control K/A is allowed if it is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 category.)

2.

The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points, and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3.

Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the outline. Systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification. Operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4.

Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible. Sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5.

Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6.

Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7.

The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8.

On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics IRs for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. If fuel-handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2. (Note 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9.

For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

G* Generic K/As These systems/evolutions must be included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan. They are not required to be included when using earlier revisions of the K/A catalog.

These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.

ES-401 2

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000007 (EPE 7; BW E02&E10; CE E02)

Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery / 1 R

R: EK2.03 Knowledge of the interrelations between a reactor trip and the following: Reactor trip status panel.

3.5 R

000008 (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 R

R: AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to a Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident:

Thermodynamics and flow characteristics of open or leaking valves.

3.2 R

000009 (EPE 9) Small Break LOCA / 3 R

R: EK2.03 Knowledge of the interrelations between the small break LOCA and the following: S/Gs 3.0 R

000011 (EPE 11) Large Break LOCA / 3 R

S R: EK3.04 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Large Break LOCA: Placing containment fan cooler in accident position S: G2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. G2.4.45 4.0 4.0 4.3 R

S 000015 (APE 15) Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions / 4 R

R: AA1.15 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): High-power/low-flow reactor trip block status lights.

3.5 R

000022 (APE 22) Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup / 2 R

R: AA2.03 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Failures of flow control valve or controller.

3.1 R

000025 (APE 25) Loss of Residual Heat Removal System / 4 S

S: AA2.04 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Location and isolability of leaks.

3.6 S

000026 (APE 26) Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 R

R: G2.4.31 Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures.

4.2 R

000027 (APE 27) Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 R

R: AK1.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions:

Expansion of liquids as temperature increases.

2.8 R

000029 (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient Without Scram / 1 R

R: EK2.06 Knowledge of the interrelations between an ATWS and the following: Breakers, relays, and disconnects.

2.9 R

000038 (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube Rupture / 3 S

S: G2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies. 4.7 S

000040 (APE 40; BW E05; CE E05; W E12)

Steam Line RuptureExcessive Heat Transfer / 4 R

R: AA1.16 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture:

Reactor coolant loop delta temperature gauges.

3.4 R

000054 (APE 54; CE E06) Loss of Main Feedwater /4 R

R: AA2.08 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): Steam flow-feed trend recorder.

2.9 R

000055 (EPE 55) Station Blackout / 6 S

S: EA2.04 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Station Blackout:

Instruments and controls operable with only DC battery power available.

4.1 S

000056 (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power / 6 R

R: AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Offsite Power: Principle of cooling by natural convection.

3.7 R

ES-401 3

Form ES-401-2 000057 (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus / 6 R*

R: AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital ac electrical bus. (*note AK2 had no KAs of 2.5 or above) 4.1 R

000058 (APE 58) Loss of DC Power / 6 R

R: AK3.02 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to Loss of DC Power: Actions contained in EOP for loss of DC power.

4.0 R

000062 (APE 62) Loss of Nuclear Service Water / 4 R

R: AA1.06 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water (SWS): Control of flow rates to components cooled by the SWS.

2.9 R

000065 (APE 65) Loss of Instrument Air / 8 R

R: AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: Cause and effect of low-pressure instrument air alarm.

2.9 R

000077 (APE 77) Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 R

R: G2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

4.6 R

(W E04) LOCA Outside Containment / 3 S

S: G2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

4.7 S

(W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation / 4 R

R: EK1.3 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation): Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation).

3.6 R

(BW E04; W E05) Inadequate Heat TransferLoss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 S

S: EA2.1 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink): Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

4.4 S

K/A Category Totals (RO):

4 3

3 3

3 2

Group Point Total (RO):

18 K/A Category Totals (SRO):

3 3

Group Point Total (SRO):

6

ES-401 4

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 000001 (APE 1) Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 (APE 3) Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 (APE 5) Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 R

R: AK3.04 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to Inoperable / Stuck Control Rods:

Tech-Spec limits for inoperable rods 3.4 R

000024 (APE 24) Emergency Boration / 1 R

R: AA1.04 Ability to operate and /

or monitor the following as they apply to Emergency Boration:

Manual boration valve 3.6 R

000028 (APE 28) Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction / 2 R

R: AA2.12 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: Cause for PZR level deviation alarm:

Controller malfunction or other instrumentation malfunction.

3.1 R

000032 (APE 32) Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 S

S: G2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

4.7 S

000033 (APE 33) Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation / 7 000036 (APE 36; BW/A08) Fuel-Handling Incidents / 8 S

S: AA2.03 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Fuel Handling Incidents:

Magnitude of potential radioactive release.

4.2 S

000037 (APE 37) Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 R

R: G2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

4.6 R

000051 (APE 51) Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 R*

R: AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum:

Loss of steam dump capability upon loss of condenser vacuum.

(*Note: no K1 topics with IR 2.5 or greater.)

2.8 R

000059 (APE 59) Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release / 9 000060 (APE 60) Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9 000061 (APE 61) Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms

/ 7 000067 (APE 67) Plant Fire On Site / 8 S

S: G2.2.37 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.

4.6 S

000068 (APE 68; BW A06) Control Room Evacuation / 8 R

R: AK2.03 Knowledge of the interrelations between the Control Room Evacuation and the following: Controllers and positioners.

2.9 R

000069 (APE 69; W E14) Loss of Containment Integrity / 5

ES-401 5

Form ES-401-2 000074 (EPE 74; W E06 & E07) Inadequate Core Cooling /

4 R

R: WE07 - Saturated Core Cooling / EK3.3 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Saturated Core Cooling):

Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

3.8 R

000076 (APE 76) High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 000078 (APE 78*) RCS Leak / 3 (W E01 & E02) Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 (W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure / 4 (W E15) Containment Flooding / 5 S

S: EA2.2 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Containment Flooding): Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments.

3.3 S

(W E16) High Containment Radiation /9 (BW A01) Plant Runback / 1 (BW A02 & A03) Loss of NNI-X/Y/7 (BW A04) Turbine Trip / 4 (BW A05) Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 (BW A07) Flooding / 8 (BW E03) Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 (BW E08; W E03) LOCA CooldownDepressurization / 4 R

R: EA1.1 Ability to operate and /

or monitor the following as they apply to the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization):

Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, inerlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

4.0 R

(BW E09; CE A13**; W E09 & E10) Natural Circulation/4 (BW E13 & E14) EOP Rules and Enclosures (CE A11**; W E08) RCS OvercoolingPressurized Thermal Shock / 4 R

R: EA2.1 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock): Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

3.4 R

(CE A16) Excess RCS Leakage / 2 (CE E09) Functional Recovery (CE E13*) Loss of Forced Circulation/LOOP/Blackout / 4 K/A Category Point Totals (RO):

0 1

3 2

2 1

Group Point Total (RO):

9 K/A Category Point Totals (SRO):

2 2

Group Point Total (SRO):

4

ES-401 6

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 003 (SF4P RCP) Reactor Coolant Pump R

R: A1.03 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCPS controls including: RCP motor stator winding temperatures.

2.6 R

004 (SF1; SF2 CVCS) Chemical and Volume Control R

R R: A2.18 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: High VCT level.

R: K5.44 3.1 3.2 R

R 005 (SF4P RHR) Residual Heat Removal R*

R: A4.02 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Heat exchanger bypass flow control.

(*Note: No A3 topics) 3.4 R

006 (SF2; SF3 ECCS) Emergency Core Cooling S

R R: A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Pumps S: A2.08 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Effect of electric power loss on valve position.

4.1 3.3 R

S 007 (SF5 PRTS) Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank R

R R: G2.4.45 Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm.

R: K5.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to PRTS: Method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR.

4.1 3.1 R

R 008 (SF8 CCW) Component Cooling Water R

R: K1.03 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationship between the CCWS and the following systems:

PRMS.

2.8 R

010 (SF3 PZR PCS) Pressurizer Pressure Control R

R: K2.02 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Controller for PZR spray valve 2.5 R

012 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection R R R: K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: RPS channels, components, and interconnections.

R: K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RPS will have on the following: CRDS 3.3 3.9 R

R 013 (SF2 ESFAS) Engineered Safety Features Actuation R

S R: K4.02 Knowledge of ESFAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Containment integrity system reset.

S: G2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

3.9 4.1 R

S

ES-401 7

Form ES-401-2 022 (SF5 CCS) Containment Cooling R*

S R: K4.05 Knowledge of CCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Containment cooling after LOCA destroys ventilation ducts. (*Note: no K5 topics with IR 2.5 or greater.)

S: A2.05 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Major leak in CCS.

2.6 3.5 R

S 025 (SF5 ICE) Ice Condenser R

R R: K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ice condenser system will have on the following: Containment.

R: K6.01 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ice condenser system: Upper and lower doors of the ice condenser.

3.8 3.4 R

R 026 (SF5 CSS) Containment Spray R

R R: K4.01 Knowledge of CSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Source of water for CSS, including recirculation phase after LOCA.

R: A1.03 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CSS controls including: Containment sump level.

4.2 3.5 R

R 039 (SF4S MSS) Main and Reheat Steam R

S R: A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Malfunctioning steam dump.

S: G2.4.8 Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.

3.4 4.5 R

S 059 (SF4S MFW) Main Feedwater R

R: A3.06 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MFW, including: Feedwater isolation.

3.2 R

061 (SF4S AFW)

Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater R*

S R: K5.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to AFW: Relationship between AFW flow and RCS heat transfer.(*Note: there was no A4 topic to choose)

S: A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the AFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: pump failure or improper operation.

3.6 3.8 R

R 062 (SF6 ED AC) AC Electrical Distribution R R: G2.2.36 Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.

3.1 R

063 (SF6 ED DC) DC Electrical Distribution R

R: K1.03 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the DC electrical system and the following systems: Battery charger and battery 2.9 R

ES-401 8

Form ES-401-2 064 (SF6 EDG) Emergency Diesel Generator R

R*

R: K2.03 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Control power.

R: K6.07 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ED/G system: Air receivers.

(*Note: No K5 topics with IR of 2.5 or above) 3.2 2.7 R

R 073 (SF7 PRM) Process Radiation Monitoring R

R: K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PRM system will have on the following: Radioactive effluent releases.

3.6 076 (SF4S SW) Service Water R

R*

R: K4.06 Knowledge of SWS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Service water train separation.

R: A3.02 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the SWS, including: Emergency heat loads.

(*No K6 topics with IR of 2.5 or greater) 2.8 3.7 R

R 078 (SF8 IAS) Instrument Air R*

R: A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Pressure gauges.

(*Note: No K5 topics with IR of 2.5 or more) 3.1 R

103 (SF5 CNT) Containment R*

R: A1.01 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the containment system controls including:

Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity.

(*No K6 topics with IR of 2.5 or greater) 3.7 R

053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*) Integrated Control K/A Category Point Totals (RO):

2 3

3 4

2 2

3 2

2 3

2 Group Point Total (RO):

28 K/A Category Point Totals (SRO):

3 2

Group Point Total (SRO):

5

ES-401 9

Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR 001 (SF1 CRDS) Control Rod Drive 002 (SF2; SF4P RCS) Reactor Coolant R

R: A1.06 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCS controls including: Reactor power.

4.0 R

011 (SF2 PZR LCS) Pressurizer Level Control 014 (SF1 RPI) Rod Position Indication R

R: A2.05 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPIS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Reactor trip.

3.9 R

015 (SF7 NI) Nuclear Instrumentation 016 (SF7 NNI) Nonnuclear Instrumentation 017 (SF7 ITM) In-Core Temperature Monitor S

S: A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ITM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Core Damage 4.1 R

027 (SF5 CIRS) Containment Iodine Removal 028 (SF5 HRPS) Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control R*

R: K5.02 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the HRPS: Flammable hydrogen concentration.

(*Note: No A3 topics.)

3.4 R

029 (SF8 CPS) Containment Purge S

S: G2.1.27 Knowledge of system purpose and/or function.

S: G2.1.23 4.0 4.4 S

033 (SF8 SFPCS) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling R*

R: A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System including: Temperature control valves

(*Note: No A4 topics with IR of 2.5 or above) 2.5 R

034 (SF8 FHS) Fuel-Handling Equipment R R: G2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions.

3.8 R

035 (SF 4P SG) Steam Generator 041 (SF4S SDS) Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control R

R: K1.06 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the SDS and the following systems:

Condenser.

2.6 R

045 (SF 4S MTG) Main Turbine Generator R*

R: K5.18 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the MT/B System: Purpose of low-power reactor trips (limited to 25% power).

(*Note: No K2 topics with IR of 2.5 or above).

R: K5.01 2.7 2.8 R

055 (SF4S CARS) Condenser Air Removal

ES-401 10 Form ES-401-2 056 (SF4S CDS) Condensate R*

R: K1.03 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationship between the Condensate System and the following systems: MFW.

(*Note: No K3 topics with IR of 2.5 or above) 2.6 R

068 (SF9 LRS) Liquid Radwaste S

S: A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Liquid Radwaste System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Lack of tank recirculation prior to release 2.8 S

071 (SF9 WGS) Waste Gas Disposal R

R: K4.06 Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Sampling and monitoring of waste gas release tanks.

2.7 R

072 (SF7 ARM) Area Radiation Monitoring 075 (SF8 CW) Circulating Water R*

R: A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Emergency/essential SWS pumps.

(*Note: No K5 topics with IR 2.5 or above) 3.2 R

079 (SF8 SAS**) Station Air 086 Fire Protection 050 (SF 9 CRV*) Control Room Ventilation K/A Category Point Totals RO:

2 0

0 1

2 0

1 1

1 Group Point Total (RO):

10 K/A Category Point Totals SRO:

2 1

Group Point Total (SRO):

3

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

Form ES-401-3 Facility: McGuire Date of Exam: February 2022 Category K/A #

Topic RO SRO-only IR IR

1. Conduct of Operations 2.1.18 R: Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, records, status boards, and reports.

3.6 1

2.1.7 R: Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operational characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

4.4 1

2.1.26 R: Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen.)

3.4 1

2.1.39 S: knowledge of conservative decision making practices.

4.3 1

2.1.13 S: Knowledge of facility requirements for controlling vital/controlled access.

3.2 1

Subtotal 3

2

2. Equipment Control 2.2.14 R: Knowldege of the process for controlling equipment configuration or status.

3.9 1

2.2.35 R: Ability to determine Technical Specification Mode of Operation.

3.6 1

2.2.12 R: Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

3.7 1

2.2.37 S: Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.

4.6 1

2.2.23 S: Ability to track Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations.

4.6 1

Subtotal 3

2

3. Radiation Control 2.3.15 R: Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

2.9 1

2.3.5 R: Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

2.9 1

2.3.4 S: Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

3.7 1

Subtotal 2

1

4. Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.28 R: Knowledge of procedures relating to a security event (non-safeguards information).

3.2 1

2.4.34 R: Knowledge of RO tasks performed outside the main control room during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

4.2 1

2.4.9 S: Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g.,

loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.

4.2 1

2.4.50 S: Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual.

4.0 1

Subtotal 2

2 Tier 3 Point Total 10 7

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier /

Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection T2 / G1 007K5.02 (IR=3.2)

Replaced with randomly selected 004K5.44. Could not write a Q to original K/A because there is no relationship between drawing a bubble in the pressurizer and the PRT. (13APR2021 MAB) 004K5.44 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to CVCS: Pressure response in PZR during in-and-out surge.

T2 / G2 045K5.18 (IR=2.8)

Replaced with randomly selected 045K5.01. Could not write a Q to original K/A because it was not possible to link the purpose of the low power reactor trips back to the MT/B. (13APR2021 MAB) 045K5.01 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the MT/B system: Possible presence of explosive mixture in generator if hydrogen purity deteriorates.

T2 / G2 SRO 029G2.1.27 (IR=4.0)

Replaced with randomly selected 029G2.1.23. Provided the facility with new K/A due to difficulties writing a discriminating SRO question that met the K/A. (13AUG2021).

029G2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

T1 / G1 SRO 011G2.4.18 (IR=4.0)

Facility could not write a discriminating question for LBLOCA at the SRO-only level. After multiple unsuccessful attempts with facility reference material, a new K/A was randomly selected.

011G2.4.45 Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm. (29NOV2021 MAB)

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4

MB MB MB MB MB MB MB MB MB MB MB Mark A. Bates / Mark A. Bates 2/3/22 Gerald J. McCoy / Gerald J. McCoy 2/3/22

1 McGuire 2022-301 Q

1.

2.

3. Psychomeric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

B, M, N

7.

U, E,

S

8. Explanation LOK (F/H)

LOD (1-5)

Stem Focus Cues T

/

F Cred.

Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia Unit Back ward Q -

K/A SRO Only General Comment: Keep track of the (+)/(-) count on the binary question format. For purposes of communication, the questions that use the (IS)/(IS NOT) or (DOES)/(DOES NOT), etc, are sometimes referred to as questions with a binary choice. It is important to track how many of these questions are written in the affirmative and how many in the negative. The exam should be balanced. Some questions can usually be modified to make the other choice correct, if needed. This will help reduce the ability of a test taker to predict the answer by choosing the affirmative if the test favors affirmative choices. (I track this statistic with my (+)

and (-) signs under the question number on the 401-9. I am not looking for a 50/50 split - I just need enough balance to not be predictable.

RO (+): 22 RO (-): 13 SRO (+): 7 SRO (-): 4 Balance of Coverage Evaluation Total number of RO questions that test emergency/abnormal procedures: 33 11 total unsat questions: <20%.

RO EXAM 1

F 2<D<4 x

x M

E S

SYS003A1.03 (2013 MNS NRC - Bank 5234)

Stem Focus: Do the winding temps increase linearly in real life? If this does not actually occur, then the premise of the question lacks operational validity. One way to address this is to just ask for the setpoint because that is essentially the only nuclear power plant knowledge that is being tested. It would still test the K/A because knowing the setpoint is necessary to adequately monitor.

Cred Dist: Provide explanation of why 305 F is plausible. It seems like 5F above the Hi-Hi setpoint was randomly

2 Q

1.

2.

3. Psychomeric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

B, M, N

7.

U, E,

S

8. Explanation LOK (F/H)

LOD (1-5)

Stem Focus Cues T

/

F Cred.

Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia Unit Back ward Q -

K/A SRO Only chosen. Why would 305 F be a credible number for the applicants?

All comments addressed. MAB 2

(+)

H 2<D<4 M

S SYS059A3.06 (MNS NRC 2005 - Bank 4370)

Q is sat.

3

(+)

H 2<D<4 B

S SYS078A4.01 (MNS NRC 2018 - Bank 7425)

Q is sat.

4 H

2<D<4 x

x N

U S

SYS004A2.18 Stem Focus: The applicant must make an assumption for the reason the alarm annunciates. It is true that level was rising, but that is not the only reason the alarm could come in -

perhaps an instrument failed? Maybe the question needs to state, based on continued level rise?

Stem Focus: Is 2NV-137A a 3-way valve that either sends water to the VCT or diverts all, or a portion, to the RHT? If this is the case, then what does FULL OPEN mean as stated in the question? Full open to the RHT? Full open to the VCT?

Cred Dist: As implied in the question, level continues to go up

- so the abnormal level alarm must be due to a high level.

This does not leave an acceptable amount of credibility for believing that flow is aligned to the VCT.

All comments addressed. MAB 5

H 2<D<4 x

B E

S SYS005A4.02 (MNS NRC 2013 [GWL] - Bank 5156)

Cred Dist: A may not be plausible. The stem states that letdown is through 2NV-121, so how is a loss of VI to 2NV-459 plausible? The only way it would be plausible is if the applicant had to know something about allowable system configurations or somethingin this case the question tells the applicant what letdown path is being used.

3 Q

1.

2.

3. Psychomeric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

B, M, N

7.

U, E,

S

8. Explanation LOK (F/H)

LOD (1-5)

Stem Focus Cues T

/

F Cred.

Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia Unit Back ward Q -

K/A SRO Only Comment addressed. MAB 6

H 2<D<4 B

S SYS006A4.01 (2008 MNS NRC - Bank 3222)

Q is sat.

7 H

2<D<4 B

S SYS007G2.4.45 (2007 MNS NRC - Bank 3452)

Q is sat.

8 H

2<D<4 B

S SYS004K5.44 (2016 CNS NRC - Bank 6334)

Q is sat.

9 F

2<D<4 B

S SYS008K1.03 (2003 MNS Audit - Bank 3802)

In one question statement the component is referred to as a vent and in the other it is referred to as a valve. Neither is incorrect - but consider being consistent with the wording.

Comment addressed. MAB 10

(+)

H 2<D<4 N

S SYS010K2.02 Q is sat.

11 F

2<D<4 N

S SYS012K2.01 Q is sat.

12 H

2<D<4 B

S SYS012K3.01 (2008 MNS NRC - Bank 3030)

Stem Focus: Consider wording the question as which failure could cause this.

Comment addressed. MAB 13

(+)

H 2<D<4 B

S SYS013K4.02 (2016 CNS NRC - Bank 7051)

Q is sat.

14 H

2<D<4 M

S SYS022K4.05 (Bank 91)

4 Q

1.

2.

3. Psychomeric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

B, M, N

7.

U, E,

S

8. Explanation LOK (F/H)

LOD (1-5)

Stem Focus Cues T

/

F Cred.

Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia Unit Back ward Q -

K/A SRO Only

(+)

Q is sat.

15 H

1 x

B U

S (2018 MNS Audit - Bank 7513)

Cred Dist: C is not credible because of the interplay between the two parts of the answer choices. If sublimation rates lower, then peak pressure would not be higher. In other words - It does not make sense to believe that you have more ice, so peak pressure will be higher.

Cred Dist: Sublimation rates lowering with elevated temperatures does not appear to be plausible.

Cred Dist: A2 and B2 do not appear to be plausible. If sublimation is either higher or lower, it seems unrealistic that peak pressure would not be impacted. If sublimation does not impact peak containment pressure, then why would there be a need to train on it?

All comments addressed. MAB 16

(-)

(+)

F 2<D<4 x

M E

S SYS025K6.01 (2017 CNS NRC (MAB) - Bank 8045)

Significant differences exist between the approved Bank Question from 2017 and this question. This question would be more accurately rated as Modified.

Cred Dist: There is not that much plausibility in 3.6.12. No data or parameters are provided for the applicant to analyze compliance with the Ice Bed LCO conditions. If you have a SLC related to Ice Condenser Door Monitoring System, then that may be an acceptable alternative to using 3.6.12 for Ice Bed operability. (Perhaps 2017 CNS should not have used TS 3.6.12 either, but it only appeared in one answer choice).

All comments addressed. MAB 17

(-)

H 2<D<4 B

S SYS026K4.01 (2015 MNS Audit - Bank 6036)

Q is sat.

5 Q

1.

2.

3. Psychomeric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

B, M, N

7.

U, E,

S

8. Explanation LOK (F/H)

LOD (1-5)

Stem Focus Cues T

/

F Cred.

Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia Unit Back ward Q -

K/A SRO Only 18 F

2<D<4 B

S SYS026A1.03 (Bank 548)

Q is sat.

19 F

1 M

S SYS039A2.04 (2020 MNS NRC Retake [MGD] - Bank 8938)

Significant differences exist between the 2020 exam and this question. This question would be more accurately designated as Modified. (The 2020 retake question asked if manual operator action would be needed to lower temp to 557F).

Comment addressed. MAB 20

(-)

H 1

x B

M U

S SYS061K5.01 (2020 MNS Audit Retake - Bank 8823)

Cred Dist: Maintaining a required level band in a SG would serve the purpose of ensuring a required heat sink; therefore, a subset issue has been introduced to the answer choices.

In other words - the logic statement goes as follows - IF maintaining a level band is correct, THEN maintaining a required heat sink would also be correct. This results in A2 and D2 not being credible. To address this you could test specifics the level AFW would start, etc.

Comment addressed. MAB 21 F

2<D<4 x

x

?

B U

S SYS062G2.2.36 (2015 MNS Audit - Bank 6024)

Stem Focus: Recommend testing when the Unit is required to be in Mode 3, versus when it should be in Mode 3.

SRO-Only: Application of Tech Specs beyond 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months actions are often reserved for SRO-only questions for written exam questions, as well as JPMs. Discuss.

Cred. Dist: The distractors that rely on not adding the 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to get to Mode 3 are not credible when they have the reference to look at.

Comments addressed. MAB

6 Q

1.

2.

3. Psychomeric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

B, M, N

7.

U, E,

S

8. Explanation LOK (F/H)

LOD (1-5)

Stem Focus Cues T

/

F Cred.

Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia Unit Back ward Q -

K/A SRO Only 22

(-)

H 2<D<4 M

S SYS063K1.03 (2014 MNS Audit - Bank 5251)

Q is sat.

23 F

2<D<4 N

S SYS064K2.03 Q is sat.

24 F

2<D<4 B

S SYS064K6.07 (2015 MNS Audit - Bank 5854)

Q is sat.

25 H

2<D<4 B

S SYS073K3.01 (2020 MNS Audit Retake - Bank 8827)

Q is sat.

26 H

2<D<4 B

S SYS076K4.06 (2018 MNS NRC - Bank 7424)

Q is sat.

27 H

2<D<4 B

S SYS076A3.02 (2009 MNS NRC - Bank 3059)

Q is sat.

28 H

2<D<4 B

S SYS103A1.01 (2020 MNS Audit Retake - Bank 8830)

Q is sat.

29 H

2<D<4 x

N U

E S

SYS002A1.06 (2018 MNS NRC [JB/MAB] - Bank 7427)

The design limits aspect of the KA is not being tested.

Recommend modifying question to test a design limit. This will accomplish a better K/A match and it will also test a site-specific knowledge item rather than just GFE knowledge.

Comments addressed. MAB 30

(+)

(-)

H 2<D<4 x

N E

S SYS014A2.05 Stem Focus: Is the wording of the first question statement the same as E-0 Step 2 RNO? In other words, does cycle the rx

7 Q

1.

2.

3. Psychomeric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

B, M, N

7.

U, E,

S

8. Explanation LOK (F/H)

LOD (1-5)

Stem Focus Cues T

/

F Cred.

Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia Unit Back ward Q -

K/A SRO Only trip bkrs have the exact same meaning as trip the reactor?

This question is asked to ensure that the supporting reference, E-0, accurately reflects the wording in the question.

Comment addressed. MAB 31 F

2<D<4 B

S SYS028K5.02 (2020 MNS NRC Retake - Bank 8936)

Q is sat.

32 F

2<D<4 B

S SYS033A3.01 (2020 MNS Audit Retake - Ban 8836)

Q is sat.

33

(+)

H 2<D<4 x

B U

S SYS034G2.1.32 (2020 MNS Audit Retake - Bank 8837)

Cred Dist: A1 and B1 do not appear to be credible. From a common-sense perspective, it does not make sense that they could move fuel for an hour without the EMF being available. Consider testing other aspects of the immediate actions such as whether fuel movement can be recommenced with either a portable monitor or HP coverage.

Comment addressed. MAB 34 H

2<D<4 B

S SYS041K1.06 (2015 MNS Audit - Bank 5850)

Q is sat.

35 F

2<D<4 N

S SYS045K5.01 Q is sat.

36 F

2<D<4 B

S SYS056K1.03 (2014 MNS Audit - Bank 5262)

Q is sat.

37

(+)

F 2<D<4 B

S SYS071K4.06 (2010 MNS NRC - Bank 4968)

Q is sat.

8 Q

1.

2.

3. Psychomeric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

B, M, N

7.

U, E,

S

8. Explanation LOK (F/H)

LOD (1-5)

Stem Focus Cues T

/

F Cred.

Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia Unit Back ward Q -

K/A SRO Only 38 H

2<D<4 x

M N

U S

SYS075A4.01 (Bank - 1202)

K/A: Question requires testing Emergency or Essential Service Water Pumps as they relate to the Circ Water System. Many plants will share an intake basin for Service Water and Circ Water.

The question is sat with the exception of the K/A match. If this K/A does not apply due to plant design, then the K/A can be replaced.

Comments addressed. MAB 39

(+)

F 2<D<4 x

M U

S EPE007EK2.03 (2015 MNS Audit - Bank 5866)

Cred Dist: The turbine will trip whenever the reactor is tripped. If the reactor is not making heat it is common sense that you would not want the turbine pulling heat from the reactor. A2 and B2 are not credible.

Comment addressed. MAB 40 H

2<D<4 B

S APE008AK1.01 (2019 RNP NRC - Bank 8704)

Q is sat.

41 F

2<D<4 N

S EPE009EK2.03 Q is sat.

42

(+)

H 2<D<4 x

M S

EPE011EK3.04 (2018 MNS Audit - Bank 7512)

Q is sat.

43

(+)

H 2<D<4 B

S APE015/017AA1.15 (2008 MNS NRC - Bank 3261)

Q is sat.

44 H

2<D<4 N

S APE022AA2.03 Q is sat.

9 Q

1.

2.

3. Psychomeric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

B, M, N

7.

U, E,

S

8. Explanation LOK (F/H)

LOD (1-5)

Stem Focus Cues T

/

F Cred.

Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia Unit Back ward Q -

K/A SRO Only 45 F

2<D<4 B

S APE026G2.4.31 (2012 MNS Audit - Bank 4702)

Q is sat.

46

(-)

H 2<D<4 B

S APE027AK1.02 (2018 MNS NRC - Bank 7444)

Q is sat.

47 F

2<D<4 B

S EPE029EK2.06 (2019 RNP NRC - Bank 8711)

Q is sat.

48 F

2<D<4 N

S APE040AA1.16 Q is sat.

49 H

2<D<4 N

S APE054AA2.08 Q is sat.

50

(+)

(-)

F 2<D<4 M

S APE056AK1.01 (2018 MNS NRC - Bank 7450)

Q is sat.

51 F

2<D<4 M

S APE057AK3.01 (2020 MNS NRC - Bank 7854)

Q is sat.

52 H

2<D<4 M

S APE058AK3.02 (2015 MNS Audit - Bank 6042)

Q is sat.

53 H

2<D<4 B

S APE062AA1.06 (2018 MNS Audit - Bank 7525)

Q is sat.

54

(+)

H 2<D<4 N

S APE065AA2.01 Q is sat.

55 H

2<D<4 x

N E

APE077G2.1.20

10 Q

1.

2.

3. Psychomeric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

B, M, N

7.

U, E,

S

8. Explanation LOK (F/H)

LOD (1-5)

Stem Focus Cues T

/

F Cred.

Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia Unit Back ward Q -

K/A SRO Only S

Stem Focus: The MVAR conditions in the stem do not matter for the question with the way it is asked. Is there a way to ask the question to make the MVAR conditions in the stem meaningful? The 45% has meaning, but the MVAR question is independent of anything in the stem and is a subtle way of introducing a T/F flaw.

Comments addressed. MAB 56

(+)

H 2<D<4 B

S WE11EK1.3 (2020 MNS Audit Retake - Bank 8859)

Q is sat.

57 F

2<D<4 N

S APE005AK3.04 Q is sat.

58 H

2<D<4 x

M E

S APE024AA1.04 (2018 MNS Audit - Bank 7590)

Cred Dist: A2 and C2 are not plausible because they can be eliminated by applying basic nuclear plant design criteria of redundancy. Plants are designed to only require one of two trains. It might help to ask more specifically for how many pumps AP-38 directs starting. This will help to add plausibility because it steers the question away from what is required for emergency boration and asks more specifically about an AP-38 requirement. The question sort of already does this because it states, iaw AP-38. This will strengthen the plausibility argument as it applies to both pumps being required for S.1.

Comments addressed. MAB 59

(-)

H 2<D<4 M

S APE028AA2.12 (2015 CNS Audit - Bank 6561)

Q is sat.

60 F

2<D<4 B

S APE037G2.1.20 (2020 MNS Audit Retake)

Q is sat.

61 F

2<D<4 B

E APE051AK3.01 (2018 MNS Audit - Bank 7559)

11 Q

1.

2.

3. Psychomeric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

B, M, N

7.

U, E,

S

8. Explanation LOK (F/H)

LOD (1-5)

Stem Focus Cues T

/

F Cred.

Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia Unit Back ward Q -

K/A SRO Only S

The first question statement states, Based on the conditions above. But the first question does not appear to depend on the conditions above.

Comment addressed. MAB 62 F

2<D<4 M

S APE068AK2.03 (2020 MNS NRC Retake - Bank 8965)

Q is sat.

63 H

2<D<4 M

S WE07EK3.3 (2012 MNS NRC - Bank 5751)

Q is sat.

64 H

2<D<4 x

B E

S WE03EA1.1 (2020 MNS Audit Retake - Bank 8865)

Cred Dist: What conditions in the stem would cause an applicant to doubt whether sprays would be available?

PORVs work as a distractor only if there is a condition for the applicants to doubt whether sprays will work. Sprays would always be favored as a first choice over PORVs. Would phase B be a consideration for plausibility of sprays not being available? If so, maybe mention that in the analysis for plausibility of PORVs.

Comment addressed. MAB 65

(+)

H 2<D<4 x

N E

S WE08EA2.1 AD-OP-MNS-1001, page 25 of 58, states that status trees should be monitored continuously for Red/Orange safety function. The question is asked as if it is required. The question statement needs to reflect the procedure wording to ensure there is a correct answer. I.E. AD-OP-MNS-110 states that CSF status trees should be monitored

[continuously/every 10-15 minutes].

Comment addressed. MAB 66

(-)

F 2<D<4 B

S G2.1.18 (2018 MNS NRC - Bank 7464)

12 Q

1.

2.

3. Psychomeric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

B, M, N

7.

U, E,

S

8. Explanation LOK (F/H)

LOD (1-5)

Stem Focus Cues T

/

F Cred.

Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia Unit Back ward Q -

K/A SRO Only Q is sat.

67 F

2<D<4 B

S G2.1.7 (2019 CNS NRC - Bank)

Q is sat.

68

(-)

F 2<D<4 B

S G2.1.26 (2020 MNS NRC - Bank 7870)

Q is sat.

69

(+)

F 2<D<4 M

S G2.2.14 (2020 MNS Audit Retake - Bank 8873)

Q is sat.

70 H

2<D<4 N

S G2.2.35 Q is sat.

71 F

2<D<4 x

x N

U S

G2.2.12 The question needs to be asked at a specific point in time.

The stem indicates that the last time the surveillance was completed, but it does not state whether the surveillance was missed and they are just discovering the missed surveillance or if it is not yet due and they are trying to figure out when it is due. Addressing this comment may render one or more distractors (as they are currently written) non-plausible. I.E. -

if the question is asked from a point in time after the surveillance was due, as in a missed surveillance, then A would not be credible and maybe B too.

Cred Dist: C and D are not plausible. As written, if the surveillance has not yet been missed, then 24 and 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months past the missed surveillance do not contain much credibility.

Similar to Q21 - it is common to see application of Tech Spec rules of usage for SRO-only questions. It is okay to ask them to ROs if your facility requires this of an RO. However, keep in mind that we need to maintain consistency of RO vs. SRO-only knowledge items.

Comments addressed. MAB

13 Q

1.

2.

3. Psychomeric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

B, M, N

7.

U, E,

S

8. Explanation LOK (F/H)

LOD (1-5)

Stem Focus Cues T

/

F Cred.

Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia Unit Back ward Q -

K/A SRO Only 72 F

2<D<4 x

N E

S G2.3.15 Partial: I could not find controlled documents that require a minimum time to perform a frisk. The supplied references appear to only be training material, and even at that, they state that the frisk will take about 3 minutes. If there is an official requirement, please let me know where to look and I will re-evaluate the question. Otherwise, the second part of the question will need some revision to tighten the correctness. It would also be a good idea to have a procedure requirement for the first part of the question.

Comments addressed. MAB 73

(+)

F 1

x M

U S

G2.3.5 (2018 MNS NRC - Bank 7469)

Cred Dist: A1 and B1 are not plausible because the question asked for a MINIMUM, but then the answer choices give two values. This mismatch of the question and answers undermines the plausibility of these choices. Consider slight modification to just once per hour because that would be the minimum.

Comment addressed. MAB 74

(+)

F 2<D<4 B

S G2.4.28 (2018 MNS NRC - Bank 7473)

Q is sat.

75

(-)

F 2<D<4 N

S G2.4.34 Q is sat.

SRO EXAM 76 H

2<D<4 x

M U

S EPE011G2.4.18 (2015 MNS NRC - Bank 5980)

K/A: By definition a Large Break LOCA does not allow the RCS to hold pressure. Therefore, the depress of SGs is performed to mitigate a Small Break LOCA. Acuum would auto discharge on LBLOCA.

Are ROs required to know why they are depressing SGs?

14 Q

1.

2.

3. Psychomeric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

B, M, N

7.

U, E,

S

8. Explanation LOK (F/H)

LOD (1-5)

Stem Focus Cues T

/

F Cred.

Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia Unit Back ward Q -

K/A SRO Only Comments addressed. MAB 77

(+)

H 2<D<4 x

M E

S APE025AA2.04 (2014 CNS NRC - Bank 6973)

Partial: If steps prior to Step 13 in AP-19 are being performed, then it would be correct to continue performing actions in AP-19 until they reach Step 13, at which point they would transition to AP-34. Therefore, an alternate correct answer could be argued unless the stem can place them at Step 13. Another option would be to test whether AP-19 DOES/DOES NOT direct performance of AP-34 if the leak location is identified to be in containment.

General Discussion Typo: Step 13 directs AP-34 (not Step 19).

Comments addressed. MAB 78 H

2<D<4 N

S EPE038G2.4.6 Q is sat.

79

(+)

H 2<D<4 M

S EPE055EA2.04 (2015 CNS Audit - Bank 6587)

Q is sat.

80 F

2<D<4 x

B E

S WE04G2.1.7 (2020 MNS NRC Retake - Bank 8991)

Partial: Discuss the possibility of re-criticality being an alternate correct answer. The supporting material appears to state that the procedural temperature will ensure that criticality is not a concern. It appears that using this temperature value in the procedure will ensure that neither PTS or re-criticality will be an issue. Discussion is needed to ensure that there is one and only one correct answer.

Comments addressed. MAB 81 F

2<D<4 M

S WE05EA2.1 (2019 CNS NRC - Bank 8384)

Q is sat.

15 Q

1.

2.

3. Psychomeric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

B, M, N

7.

U, E,

S

8. Explanation LOK (F/H)

LOD (1-5)

Stem Focus Cues T

/

F Cred.

Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia Unit Back ward Q -

K/A SRO Only 82

(+)

H 2<D<4 x

M E

S APE032G2.2.22 (2010 Catawba NRC - Bank 7078)

Partial: Could someone successfully argue that precluding any power escalation would at the same time place the core in a more stable condition? If so, then there could be two correct answers. I understand that you used words in the Basis for J.1, but J.1 also states that with RTBs open. I think it would be easy to argue that precluding a power escalation also results in a more stable core.

The facilitys response is accepted. MAB 83

(+)

F 2<D<4 M

S APE036AA2.03 (2015 MNS NRC - Bank 5775)

Q is sat.

84 F

2<D<4 M

S APE067G2.2.37 (2014 MNS NRC - Bank 5777)

Q is sat.

85 H

2<D<4 x

B U

S WE15EA2.2 Q was written to the wrong K/A, WE14EA2.2 may have been incorrectly transferred to their exam development program instead of WE15EA2.2.

Q written for correct K/A. Q now sat. MAB 86 H

2<D<4 M

S SYS006A2.08 (2017 RNP NRC - Bank 8490)

Q is sat.

87 H

2<D<4 M

S SYS013G2.2.12 (Bank 2216)

Q is sat.

88 H

2<D<4 M

S SYS022A2.05 (2008 MNS NRC - Bank 3230)

Q is sat.

89 H

2<D<4 N

S SYS039G2.4.8

16 Q

1.

2.

3. Psychomeric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

B, M, N

7.

U, E,

S

8. Explanation LOK (F/H)

LOD (1-5)

Stem Focus Cues T

/

F Cred.

Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia Unit Back ward Q -

K/A SRO Only

(-)

Q is sat.

90

(-)

H 2<D<4 B

S SYS061A2.04 (2020 MNS Audit Retake - Bank 8891)

Q is sat.

91 H

2<D<4 B

S SYS017A2.02 (2007 MNS NRC - Bank 3612)

Q is sat.

92

(-)

H 2<D<4 M

S SYS029G2.1.23 (2020 MNS NRC - Bank 7885)

Q is sat.

93 F

2<D<4 M

S SYS068A2.02 (2020 MNS NRC - Bank 7886)

Q is sat.

94 F

2<D<4 x

x N

S G2.1.39 Q is sat.

95

(-)

(+)

F 2<D<4 B

S G2.1.13 (2016 MNS Audit - Bank 6098) 96 H

2<D<4 B

S G2.2.37 (2018 MNS NRC - Bank 7495)

Q is sat.

97

(+)

H 2<D<4 B

S G2.2.23 (2018 MNS NRC - Bank 7494)

Q is sat.

98

(+)

F 2<D<4 M

S G2.3.4 (2019 CNS NRC - Bank 8400)

Q is sat.

99

(+)

H 2<D<4 N

S G2.4.9 Q is sat.

17 Q

1.

2.

3. Psychomeric Flaws

4. Job Content Flaws

5. Other

6.

B, M, N

7.

U, E,

S

8. Explanation LOK (F/H)

LOD (1-5)

Stem Focus Cues T

/

F Cred.

Dist Partial Job-Link Minutia Unit Back ward Q -

K/A SRO Only 100 H

2<D<4 M

S G2.4.50 (2016 MNS Audit - Bank 6103)

Q is sat

ML22089A176

Text

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