Text

301 Draft SRO Written Exam
	ML15203A965
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	07/22/2015
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Duke Energy Carolinas
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	Download: ML15203A965 (295)
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FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 1 SYS003 K4.04 - Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS) 1 B Knowledge of RCPS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following : (CFR: 41.7)

Adequate cooling of RCP motor and seals ...........................

Regarding the NC pump motor coolers,

1) cooling water is supplied from the system.

2) upon initiation of an signal, the cooling water supply will be isolated.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. RN

2. Ss (Safety Injection)

B. 1. RN

2. Sp (Phase B)

C. 1. KC

2. Ss (Safety Injection)

D. 1. KC

2. Sp (Phase B)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 1 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 1 1 B General Discussion The RN Reactor Building non-essential header is not redundant and is isolated on an SP (Phase B ) signal, when it is being supplied from the A RN header. This header contains the NCP motor coolers. Loss of RN to the NCP motor cooler(s) requires the operator to trip the effected NCP(s).

The RN Auxiliary Building non-essential header is not redundant and is isolated on an SS signal.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since it is true for the Auxiliary Bldg Non-essential header, but not the Rx Bldg Non-essential header.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since KC cools the NCP upper and lower bearing oil coolers as well as the NCP thermal barrier Hx.

Second part is plausible since it is true for the Auxiliary Bldg Non-essential header, but not the Rx Bldg Non-essential header.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since KC cools the NCP upper and lower bearing oil coolers as well as the NCP thermal barrier Hx.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the design features of reactor coolant pumps relative to adequate cooling (what system cools various parts of the NCPs).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2008 CNS RO NRC Retake Examination NRC Q28 (Bank 1728)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PSS-RN LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-PSS-RN Objectives 8 & 10 SYS003 K4.04 - Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

Knowledge of RCPS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following : (CFR: 41.7)

Adequate cooling of RCP motor and seals ...........................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 2 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 1 1 B Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 3 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 2 SYS003 K6.14 - Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS) 2 B Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the RCPS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45/5)

Starting requirements .............................................

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

NCS Tavg is 215°F

NCS pressure is 250 PSIG

VCT pressure is 28 PSIG

The 1A NC pump is to be started for a unit heatup Subsequently:

The 1A2 Oil Lift pump is started

Oil Lift pressure is 580 PSIG Based on the conditions above,

1) the MINIMUM required #1 Seal differential pressure for starting the NC pump met.

2) the 1A NC pump start.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. is

2. will B. 1. is

2. will NOT C. 1. is NOT

2. will D. 1. is NOT

2. will NOT Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 4 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 2 2 B General Discussion The minimum #1 Seal D/P for starting an NC pump is 200 PSID as stated in OP/1/A/6150/002 A (NCP Operation).

The NC Pump will not start (safety breaker will not close) unless oil lift pressure is greater than 600 psig.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct and therefore plausible.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant does not recall there is a bearing oil lift pressure interlock for starting an NCP.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant does not recall 200 PSID is the minimum required #1 seal differential pressure required by OP/1/A/6150/002 A. It is also typical for #1 seal differential pressure to be greater than 300 PSID during an NC pump start.

Part 2 is plausible since the 1A NCP can be started with low #1 seal differential pressure. However, the bearing oil lift interlock pressure for starting an NCP is not met.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant does not recall 200 PSID is the minimum required #1 seal differential pressure required by OP/1/A/6150/002 A. It is also typical for #1 seal differential pressure to be greater than 300 PSID during an NC pump start.

Part 2 is correct and therefore plausible .

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the starting requirements for an NC pump to be able to identify when a malfunction has occurred that would effect whether or not an NC pump could be started.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicant is required to perform more than one mental step. First the applicant must analyze the parameters given in the stem and then calculate NCP seal d/p.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-NCP Section 2.1 & Section 2.3.2 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-PS-NCP Objectives 6 & 12 OP/1/A/6150/002 A (NCP Operation) Encl. 4.1 pg 7 of 17 SYS003 K6.14 - Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the RCPS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45/5)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 5 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 2 Starting requirements .............................................

2 B 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 6 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 3 SYS004 A1.09 - Chemical and Volume Control System 3 A Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

RCS pressure and temperature .....................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is in solid operations while cooling down

Both trains of ND are in service

A NV pump is in service

Letdown is through 2NV-121 Subsequently:

2A1 KC pump trips Per OP/2/A/6100/SD-8 (WATER SOLID OPERATIONS) which ONE (1) of the following describes the operator actions required to respond to the failure?

COMPONENT LEGEND:

2NV-121 (ND LETDOWN CONTROL) 2NV-241 (SEAL INJECTION FLOW CONTROL)

A. Throttle CLOSED 2NV-241 OR OPEN 2NV-121 B. Throttle OPEN 2NV-241 OR OPEN 2NV-121 C. Throttle CLOSED 2NV-241 OR CLOSE 2NV-121 D. Throttle OPEN 2NV-241 OR CLOSE 2NV-121 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 7 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 3 3 A General Discussion When 2A1 KC trips, less KC flow (cooling) is supplied to the ND Hx. With less cooling provided, NC system temperature will go up. While solid this causes NC system pressure to go up.

Decreasing the mass input or increasing the letdown will reduce the pressure increase.

Per SD-8, opening 2NV-241 will raise charging flow and reduce NC Pump seal flows and closing 2NV-241 will reduce charging flow and raise NC Pump seal flows.

Raising letdown flow (opening 2NV-121) will cause NC System pressure decrease and Reducing letdown flow (closing 2NV-121) will cause NC System pressure increase.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if applicant concludes operation of 2NV-241 in the OPEN direction will reduce charging flow and thus NC system pressure.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible if applicant concludes operation of 2NV-121 in the CLOSED direction will lower NC system pressure.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if applicant concludes operation of 2NV-241 in the OPEN direction will reduce charging flow and thus NC system pressure.

Second part is plausible if applicant concludes operation of 2NV-121 in the CLOSED direction will lower NC system pressure.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched since the applicants are required to predict changes in NC system pressure, during solid plant conditions, when operating NV system valves 2NV-121 (Low Pressure Letdown Pressure Control) and 2NV-241(Seal Injection Flow Control).

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicants are required to analyze the malfunction of the 2A1 KC pump and determine the effect it will have on NC system temperature and pressure and then determine the correct NV system manipulations required to mitigate the event.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2007 MNS NRC SRO Retake Examination NRC Q29 (Bank 3449)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

OP/2/A/6100/SD-8 (Water Solid Operations) Encl. 4.2 pg 1 of 1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

NONE SYS004 A1.09 - Chemical and Volume Control System Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 8 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 3 including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5) 3 A RCS pressure and temperature .....................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 9 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 4 SYS005 A2.02 - Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) 4 C Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RHRS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Pressure transient protection during cold shutdown ....................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is in MODE 5

NC temperature is 112°F

LTOP is in service

1A NV pump is running

A special test procedure is planned which requires the 1A NI pump to be run and aligned to inject into the NC system Per Technical Specification 3.4.12 (LTOP SYSTEM),

1) securing and removing power from the 1A NV pump allow the LCO to be met for this evolution.

2) LCO relief valve requirements can be met by having two PORVs with a lift setting of less than or equal to PSIG.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. will

2. 450 B. 1. will NOT

2. 450 C. 1. will

2. 385 D. 1. will NOT

2. 385 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 10 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 4 4 C General Discussion Per TS LCO 3.4.12 (LTOP), an LTOP system shall be OPERABLE with a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump or one safety injection pump capable of injecting into the RCS and the accumulators isolated and one of the below:

Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with lift setting less than or equal to 385 PSIG or The RCS depressurized and an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 2.75 square inches.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct and therefore plausible.

Part 2 is plausible because ND system suction relief valve set point is 450 psig.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant concludes that LCO 3.4.12 allows one NV and one NI pump instead of one NV or one NI pump.

Part 2 is plausible because ND system suction relief valve set point is 450 psig.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant concludes that LCO 3.4.12 allows one NV and one NI pump instead of one NV or one NI pump.

Part 2 is correct and therefore plausible.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because an operation is about to occur (operation of one NI pump and one NV pump at the same time) that would result in a pressure transient in the RHR/NC system during cold shutdown. The applicant is asked to predict the possible impacts and use T.S LCO 3.4.12 to correct/control the consequences.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because it requires the applicant to first analyze the given information to determine if both pumps may be operated simultaneously. Then the applicant must recall from memory the LCO relief valve requirements.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED CNS ILT 2013 PreAudit 3 SRO Examination Q77 (Bank 5007)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Tech Spec 3.4.12 (LTOP System)

OP-MC-PS-ND (Residual Heat Removal System) Section 2.3 (Valves)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-PS-ND Objective 11 SYS005 A2.02 - Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RHRS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Pressure transient protection during cold shutdown ....................

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 11 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 4 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 4 C Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 12 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 5 SYS005 K5.02 - Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) 5 D Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply the RHRS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Need for adequate subcooling ......................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is in Mode 4 with a cooldown in progress

Both ND trains are in operation

ND pump suction pressure is 30 PSIG

ND pump suction header temperature is 226°F Subsequently:

NC system and ND system temperatures begin to increase due to a reduction of KC flow to the ND heat exchangers Based on the indications above, ND pump cavitation will occur if ND pump suction temperature increases by a MINIMUM of (1) °F.

One indication that the ND pump is cavitating would be that motor amps are (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. 25

2. high B. 1. 48

2. high C. 1. 25

2. fluctuating D. 1. 48

2. fluctuating Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 13 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 5 5 D General Discussion The ND pumps will cavitate if ND pump suction increases above the saturation temperature for the current ND pump suction pressure.

At a suction pressure of 30 PSIG (44.7 PSIA), saturation temperature would be 273.72°F. With current ND system pump suction temperature at 226°F, the water at the pump suction is 47.72°F subcooled. Therefore, if ND pump suction temperature increases by 48°F, cavitation will begin to occur at the ND pump suction.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant uses 30 PSIA instead of converting the indicated suction pressure to PSIA before reading the Steam Tables. If so, they would determine that saturation temperature is 250.34°F. Therefore, if ND pump suction temperature increased by a minimum of 31°F (250.34 - 226 = 24.34), pump cavitation will occur.

The second part is plausible if the applicant confuses the indications of pump cavitation with pump runout.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible if the applicant confuses the indications of pump cavitation with pump runout.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant uses 30 PSIA instead of converting the indicated suction pressure to PSIA before reading the Steam Tables. If so, they would determine that saturation temperature is 250.34°F. Therefore, if ND pump suction temperature increased by a minimum of 31°F (250.34 - 226 = 24.34), pump cavitation will occur.

The second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA KA is matched because the applicant must be able to determine the amount of subcooling at the ND pump suction and the operational implications of the loss of subcooling.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is comprehension level because the applicant must use the Steam Tables to determine subcooling at the ND pump suction (calculation) and must recall from memory the indications associated with pump runout and pump cavitation.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2013 MNS NRC Exam Q42 (Bank 5188)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Steam Tables Lesson Plan OP-BNT-CP04 Section 3.0 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

CP04006, CP04009, CP04033, CP04039, & CP04044 SYS005 K5.02 - Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 14 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 SYS005 MNSHeat K5.02 - Residual SRO Removal NRC System Examination (RHRS) QUESTION 5 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply the RHRS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) 5 D Need for adequate subcooling ......................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 15 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 6 SYS006 A4.08 - Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) 6 B Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

ESF system, including reset .......................................

Given the following:

At time 08:10:00, an inadvertent Reactor Trip/Safety Injection occurs due to IAE testing At time 08:10:30, SI (1) be reset.

Following Safety Injection RESET, safeguards equipment (2) start upon receipt of an AUTOMATIC actuation signal. (ASSUME NO OTHER ACTIONS ARE TAKEN)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. can NOT

2. will B. 1. can NOT

2. will NOT C. 1. can

2. will D. 1. can

2. will NOT Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 16 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 6 6 B General Discussion Each train has a Safety Injection Reset pushbutton on the Control Board. In order to reset safety injection, one minute must have passed since the actuation (60 second timer has timed out) and the train related reactor trip breaker must be open (P-4). Following depression of the safety injection reset pushbutton, only manual safety injection actuation is available. To reinstate the automatic actuation the reactor trip breakers must be reclosed.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since manual actuation of SI is available after depressing SI reset PBs (after the 60 second time delay). However, the RTBs must be cycled for Automatic actuation of SI.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since other ESF actuations such as Phase A and Phase B containment isolation may be reset immediately following actuation.

Second part is plausible since manual actuation of SI is available after depressing SI reset PBs (after the 60 second time delay). However, the RTBs must be cycled for Automatic actuation of SI.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since other ESF actuations such as Phase A and Phase B containment isolation may be reset immediately following actuation.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must understand the consequences of manual action taken (Ability to manually operate and/or monitor) with regards to depressing the SI reset pushbuttons and the impact on ESFAS initiation capability.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK CNS ILT 2013 PreAudit 2 SRO Examination AUDIT Q39 (Bank 4869)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-ECC-ISE (Engineered Safeguards Actuation System) Section 3.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-ECC-ISE Objective 11 SYS006 A4.08 - Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

ESF system, including reset .......................................

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 17 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 6 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 6 B Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 18 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 7 SYS006 K5.04 - Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) 7 A Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to ECCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Brittle fracture, including causes and preventative actions ..............

Unit 2 was operating at 100% power. Given the following:

A large steam line break occurred 20 minutes ago

All MSIVs are stuck open

NC cold leg temperatures are 300°F and lowering

The crew has implemented E-2 (FAULTED S/G ISOLATION)

Based on current conditions, the reactor vessel is most susceptible to failure during the (1) because total stress on the (2) wall of the vessel is higher at this time.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. initial cooldown

2. inner B. 1. initial cooldown

2. outer C. 1. subsequent heatup after the S/Gs depressurize

2. inner D. 1. subsequent heatup after the S/Gs depressurize

2. outer Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 19 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 7 7 A General Discussion During the cooldown, the tensile stress on the inner wall due to the Delta T reinforces the tensile stress due to pressure. This causes higher total tensile stress on the vessel inner wall and therefore the vessel is closer to allowable stress values.

On the subsequent heatup, the tensile stress profile is reversed and offsets somewhat on the inner wall and the overall stress is higher on the outer wall. However, it is not as limiting as during the cooldown.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct and therefore plausible.

The second part is plausible since the applicant may conclude that total stress from the cooldown is higher on the outer wall.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because pressure is higher as the system heats up, so it may be logically concluded it will be the highest stress, but the vessel is most susceptible to failure during the initial cooldown which is actually the highest stress. The statement is correct, but does not correctly answer the question.

The second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because pressure is higher as the system heats up, so it may be logically concluded it will be the highest stress, but the vessel is most susceptible to failure during the initial cooldown which is actually the highest stress. The statement is correct, but does not correctly answer the question.

The second part is plausible since the applicant may conclude that total stress from the cooldown is higher on the outer wall.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must understand the reasons/causes for the stress profiles on the reactor vessel during cooldown and heatup and based on those, determine which results in the greater stress on the Rx vessel and therefore the highest likelihood for failure (operational implications).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2009 CNS RO NRC Examination NRC Q24 (Bank 1624)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees)

Lesson Plan BNT-TH10 Rev5 (Brittle Fracture)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

SYS006 K5.04 - Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to ECCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Brittle fracture, including causes and preventative actions ..............

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 20 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 7 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 7 A Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 21 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 8 SYS007 K5.02 - Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS) 8 D Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to PRTS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR ........................

Given the following on Unit 2:

The Unit has completed OP/2/A/6100/SU-6 (VENTING THE NC SYSTEM)

2B NCP is in service

All Pzr Backup heaters are in "MAN" and ON

The crew is preparing to draw a Pzr bubble In accordance with SLC 16.5.8 (PRESSURIZER) the heatup limit for the Pressurizer is a MAXIMUM of (1) °F/hr.

In accordance with OP/2/A/6100/SU-8 (HEATUP TO 200°F), when cycling Reactor Vessel Head vents to remove voids, the vents should be closed when (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 75

2. PRT temperature equalizes with PZR steam space temperature B. 1. 75

2. PRT level increases WITHOUT an APPRECIABLE increase in pressure C. 1. 100

2. PRT temperature equalizes with PZR steam space temperature D. 1. 100

2. PRT level increases WITHOUT an APPRECIABLE increase in pressure Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 22 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 8 8 D General Discussion PZR heatup rate per OP/2/A/6100/SU-8 is 75 degrees F in any 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months period. (Administrative rate)

PZR heatup rate per SLC 16.5-8 is 100 degrees F in any 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months period.

PRT pressure and level indications are used to determine when all voids have been vented from the reactor vessel head area. Venting is considered complete when PRT pressure does not increase with a corresponding PRT level increase.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since the administrative limit for Pzr heatup rate is 75 °F in any 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months period.

Second part is plausible since PRT temperature would be equal to Pzr steam space temperature if steaming the Pzr to the PRT.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since the administrative limit for Pzr heatup rate is 75 °F in any 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months period.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since PRT temperature would be equal to Pzr steam space temperature if steaming the Pzr to the PRT.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because at MNS cycling the Reactor Vessel Head vents to remove voids is part of the prerequisite actions performed for preparing the NC system for drawing a PZR bubble.

NOTE: There is not a direct relationship between the PRT and the methodology for drawing a bubble at MNS.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK ILT 2013 PreAudit 3 SRO Examination AUDIT Q7 (Bank 4937)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

OP/2/A/6100/SU-6 (Venting the NC System)

OP/2/A/6100/SU-8 (Heatup to 200°F)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

SYS007 K5.02 - Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to PRTS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Method of forming a steam bubble in the PZR ........................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Consider sending to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 23 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 8 8 Question sent to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review on D

1/22/15. HCF Chief Examiner Early Submittal Comments:

K/A SYS007 K5.02 Question was submitted for preliminary review.

Do not believe that distractors A(2) and C(2) are plausible. The parameters have different units.

Understand that you do not use the PRT for drawing a bubble.

Will provide a different K/A if desired.

Facility Response:

Agree with Chief examiner. Distractors A2 and C2 were replaced with plausible distractors. SLM 030215 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 24 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 9 SYS008 A1.03 - Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) 9 A Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CCWS controls including : (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

CCW pressure ...................................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

'B' Train components are in service

The OAC alarm for U1 KC PUMPS B DISCHARGE HEADER PRESSURE comes in

KC Header pressure indicates 55 PSIG and stable Based on the conditions above,

1) the OAC alarm was caused by a condition in the KC system. (Assume no other malfunction)

2) this condition can result in .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. High flow

2. pump runout B. 1. High flow

2. heat exchanger tube vibration C. 1. Low flow

2. pump cavitation D. 1. Low flow

2. loss of mini-flow protection Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 25 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 9 9 A General Discussion Correct answer is based on the student knowing that 60psig is a low pressure, high flow condition in the KC system.

Due to fouling concerns, RN is on the tube side of the HX. Therefore, high KC flow would not cause a concern with HX tube vibration.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible if the applicant concludes KC is on the tube side of the Hx. However, Hx vibration is a concern on the RN side.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if applicant concludes low flow would cause low discharge pressure condition.

Second part is plausible since cavitation would be a concern if there was a low flow condition.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if applicant concludes low flow would cause low discharge pressure condition.

Second part is plausible since low flow condition could lead to a loss of mini-flow protection and pump damage.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicants are required to predict/monitor changes in KC system parameters( flow/amps, discharge pressure) that will occur to the KC system due to a high flow condition.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2012 MNS Audit Q6 (Bank 3646)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

BNT-CP04 Rev12 (Pumps)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

CP04038 SYS008 A1.03 - Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CCWS controls including : (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

CCW pressure ...................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 26 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 9 9 A Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 27 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 10 SYS010 A4.02 - Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) 10 C Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

PZR heaters .....................................................

The Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller soft controls indicate as follows:

With the current ERROR signal, "C" Pzr heaters will be energized (1) of the time.

The Pzr Backup heaters energize at a PRESSURE ERROR of (2) PSIG.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 17%

2. (-) 25 B. 1. 17%

2. (-) 17 C. 1. 83%

2. (-) 25 D. 1. 83%

2. (-) 17 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 28 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 10 10 C General Discussion

'C' Heater Group control is always in Automatic. The SCR power controller is controlled by the Pressure Master Controller. The length of time the "C" heaters are energized is ramped linearly from 0% to 100% as the Pressure Master Controller output goes from -15 psig (Error) to

+15psig (Error), regardless of system pressure.

At a PZR Pressure Error of -10.0 PSIG, the Bank 'C' Demand can be calculated as follows:

50% Demand for the Heaters occurs at a Pressure Error of 0 PSIG. 100% Demand occurs at a Pressure Error of -15 PSIG. Therefore, there is a 50% increase in Demand over a -15 PSIG change in Pressure Error. Therefore:

50/-15 = x/-10 -15x = -500 x = 33.3 (change in demand from 50%)

Starting from an initial Demand of 50% the final Demand = 50% + 33.3% = 83.3%

Therefore, 83% of the time, full power is going to "C" heaters (energized)

The Backup heaters energize when the pressure error signal is -25 PSIG and de-energize when the pressure error signal increases to -17 PSIG.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant calculates the Demand based on a +10 Pressure Error signal as 17% Demand would be correct.

Part 2 is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant calculates the Demand based on a +10 Pressure Error signal as 17% Demand would be correct.

Part 2 is plausible since this is the error signal at which the Backup heaters de-energize.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct and therefore plausible.

Part 2 is plausible because this is the error signal at which the Backup heaters de-energize.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the PZR PCS controls have been operated resulting in a change in NC system pressure. Based on the change in NC system pressure and the indications affected (ability to monitor) by that change (Pressurizer Pressure Error) the applicant must determine the status of the Pressurizer Heaters. Once the Operator determines what the demand for the Bank 'C' Heaters should be, they can compare that to the actual demand signal on the soft panel to determine if the PCS is operating as required.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because Part 1 of the question requires the applicant to calculate the 'C' Bank Heater Demand based on the Pressurizer Pressure Error signal. Part 2 of the question is memory.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2010 MNS NRC Q9 (Bank 2509)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 29 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 10 Development References Student References Provided 10 C

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-IPE-DCS Section 2.4 & 2.5 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-PS-IPE-DCS Objective 5 SYS010 A4.02 - Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

PZR heaters .....................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 30 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 11 SYS012 K2.01 - Reactor Protection System (RPS) 11 B Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

RPS channels, components, and interconnections .....................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is at 100% RTP

All SSPS Channel I bistable status lights simultaneously illuminate

Power Range NI Channel N-41 indication is lost

Intermediate Range Channel N-35 indication is lost

Power Range Channels N-42, N-43, and N-44 indicate 100%

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the failure that has occurred, AND the response of the Reactor Protection System?

A. Loss of DC Bus DCA; Train A SSPS General Warning Alarm is received.

B. Loss of 120 VAC Bus 2EKVA; Train A SSPS General Warning Alarm is received.

C. Loss of DC Bus DCA; PCS Power Supply Failure, Protection Cabinet 1 & 2 alarms are received.

D. Loss of 120 VAC Bus 2EKVA; PCS Power Supply Failure, Protection Cabinet 1 & 2 alarms are received.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 31 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 11 11 B General Discussion The General Warning will occur on Train A due to the loss of 2EKVA.

With channel 1 SSPS illuminated, a loss of channel A power supply is indicated.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because a loss of 48 VDC or 15 VDC power supply WILL cause SSPS General Warning (IC-IPE, pg 39).

The second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because a loss of 48 VDC or 15 VDC power supply WILL cause SSPS General Warning (IC-IPE, pg 39).

The second part is plausible because it is reasonable to misunderstand which failure affects both channels of Train A power and which failure does not.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because it is reasonable to misunderstand which failure affects both channels of Train A power and which failure does not.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the power supplies to be able to evaluate the effect on RPS on loss of the power supply.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because it requires the applicant to analyze the conditions given to determine the cause of the indications. The applicant must then determine based on the cause of the indications what alarm will be received. Since the question requires more than one mental step, it is higher cognitive level.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS Audit SRO Examination AUDIT Q3 (Bank 3118)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-IPE Section 2.6 and Figure 7.5 AP-15 Loss of Vital or Aux Control Power)

OP/2/A/6100/010C (Annuncaitor Response for 2AD-2) C7 & D7 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-IC-IPE Objectives 4 & 5 SYS012 K2.01 - Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

RPS channels, components, and interconnections .....................

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 32 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 11 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 11 B Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 33 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 12 SYS013 K3.03 - Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) 12 D Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ESFAS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Containment ....................................................

Given the following:

Unit 1 is at 100% power

A LBLOCA inside containment occurs

Containment pressure is 3.7 PSIG and stable

Safety Injection Train "B" fails to actuate Based on the conditions above AND PRIOR TO any operator actions,

1) Phase A, Train "B" containment isolation valves automatically CLOSE.

2) Phase B containment isolation valves on will automatically CLOSE.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. will

2. Train A ONLY B. 1. will

2. both Trains C. 1. will NOT

2. Train A ONLY D. 1. will NOT

2. both Trains Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 34 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 12 12 D General Discussion Phase "A" Containment Isolation (St) is actuated by a Safety Injection (SS) or Manually (1/2 pushbuttons).

Phase "B" Containment Isolation (Sp) is actuated by Hi Hi Containment Pressure (Sp) or Manually (1/2 pushbuttons).

Since 1B Safety Injection failed to actuate, B Train Phase A isolation also will not be actuated. Therefore, no B Train Phase A valves will close.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant concludes the 1.0 psig in containment signal that generated the SI signal would also generate the Phase A isolation signal. However, the Phase A isolation signal is generated by the SI signal, not the containment pressure signal.

Second part is plausible if applicant confuses initiation signals for Phase A and B isolation.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant concludes the 1.0 psig in containment signal that generated the SI signal would also generate the Phase A isolation signal. However, the Phase A isolation signal is generated by the SI signal, not the containment pressure signal.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible if applicant confuses initiation signals for Phase A and B isolation.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of how a malfunction of the ESFAS (SI Train B to actuate) would affect containment. Specifically, the ability to isolate containment.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicant is required to analyze the conditions in the stem to determine which ESFAS signals should be generated, and then determine what affect partial SI initiation will have on containment isolation.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED CNS ILT 2013 PreAudit 1 SRO Examination AUDIT Q55 (Bank 4785)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-ECC-ISE Section 3.1 (Normal Operation)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-ECC-ISE Objective 7 SYS013 K3.03 - Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ESFAS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Containment ....................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 35 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 12 12 D Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 36 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 13 SYS022 A3.01 - Containment Cooling System (CCS) 13 B Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CCS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

Initiation of safeguards mode of operation ...........................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A LOCA has occurred

Containment pressure is 2.6 PSIG and stable Which ONE (1) of the following describes the operation of the Containment Cooling system based on these conditions?

A. All VU units have started and RV containment isolation valves are open.

B. All VU units have shunt tripped off and RV containment isolation valves are open.

C. All VU units have started and RV containment isolation valves are closed.

D. All VU units have shunt tripped off and RV containment isolation valves are closed.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 37 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 13 13 B General Discussion The VU units, Return Air Fans, and the Pipe Tunnel Booster Fans are shunt tripped off on the SS signal. Control power and indication is lost to all these fans when the shunt trip opens the respective breakers.

RV containment isolation valves are normally open. They will automatically close upon receipt of a Containment High-High Pressure signal (SP/Phase B Isolation) from either Unit 1 or Unit 2.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible if the candidate confuses the operation of the VU units with the VL units. The VL units would start on the Safety Injection signal. RV containment isolation valves would be open.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible if the candidate confuses the operation of the VU units with the VL units. The VL units would start on the Safety Injection signal. The candidate may also confuse the operation of the RV containment isolation valves during a Phase A with the operation during a Phase B.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible if the candidate confuses the operation of the RV containment isolation valves during a Phase A with the operation during a Phase B.

Also, plausible because the VU fans do shunt trip off due to the Ss signal.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant is required to demonstrate the ability to monitor automatic operation of the Containment Cooling system by determining the status of the VU fans and RV system containment isolation valves after initiation of a safety injection.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is a higher cognitive question because the applicant must analyze the conditions in the stem to determine which safeguards actuations have occurred due to containment pressure and then determine the status of the RV system containment isolation valves.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2009 MNS NRC SRO Examination NRC Q74 (Bank 3089)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CNT-VUL Section 3.2.2. (Safety Injection)

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CNT-RV Section 2.6.6 (Containment Isolation Valves)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-CNT-RV Objective 7 OP-MC-CNT-VUL Objective 5 SYS022 A3.01 - Containment Cooling System (CCS)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CCS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

Initiation of safeguards mode of operation ...........................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 38 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 13 13 B Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 39 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 14 SYS025 A2.02 - Ice Condenser System 14 A Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ice condenser system; correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

High/low floor cooling temperature .................................

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

NCS temperature is 325°F

A plant heatup to full operating temperature is in progress Subsequently,

Annunciator 1AD-9 / B5 (ICE BED RTD ABNORMAL TEMP) alarms

The Ice Condenser Chart Recorder (1NPCR-5000) indicates temperatures for the affected ice bed range from 27°F to 29°F and are slowly increasing Based on the conditions above,

1) Technical Specification 3.6.12 (ICE BED) LCO actions required to be taken.

2) the primary concern with the increasing ice bed temperature is .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. are

2. increased ice bed sublimation B. 1. are NOT

2. increased ice bed sublimation C. 1. are

2. blockage of air flow due to volumetric expansion of the ice beds D. 1. are NOT

2. blockage of air flow due to volumetric expansion of the ice beds Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 40 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 14 14 A General Discussion Per TS 3.6.12 (Ice Bed), ice bed operability is affected by temperature, chemical composition, mass, structural integrity of the ice baskets, and blockage of flow channels through the ice bed.

In the conditions presented, ice bed temperature has reached the Tech Spec limit (27°F). With ice bed temperature increasing, the applicant should determine Tech Spec LCO actions are required.

Per lesson plan, OP-MC-CNT-NF, section 3.1.2, operation of the NF system with elevated ice condenser temperatures increases sublimation of the ice.

Blockage of air through the NF AHUs due to ice buildup is NOT a concern with increased temperature. Per CNT-NF, section 2.2.3, Air passing through the AHUs will gradually deposit a layer of ice on the coils. To keep the AHUs from "icing up" internally (reduces airflow through the AHU), a Defrost cycle is used.

DBD MCTC-1558.NF-E001-01 MNS FSAR Volume 3, Section 6.2.2.6.1

1) Ice Sublimation Ice sublimation and mass transfer is reduced to the lowest possible limits by maintaining essentially isothermal conditions within the ice bed and by minimizing local temperature gradients.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant fails to recognize 27 degrees F as the surveillance requirement limit or fails to determine that LCO 3.6.12 is applicable in the current mode.

The second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible if the applicant does not understand the relationship of ice temperature to the volumetric expansion of ice. Volumetric expansion of ice occurs as ice gets colder and it would reduce the free volume within the ice beds. However, even as the ice gets colder volumetric expansion is not a concern relative to the blockage of air flow.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant fails to recognize 27 degrees F as the surveillance requirement limit or fails to determine that LCO 3.6.12 is applicable in the current mode.

Second part is plausible if the applicant does not understand the relationship of ice temperature to the volumetric expansion of ice. Volumetric expansion of ice occurs as ice gets colder and it would reduce the free volume within the ice beds. However, even as the ice gets colder volumetric expansion is not a concern relative to the blockage of air flow.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant is given a set of conditions where Ice Condenser temperatures are exceeding the TS surveillance requirement limit and must predict the consequence of this elevated temperature condition (i.e. increased sublimation) and use procedures (Tech Specs) to mitigate the consequences of the event.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicant must analyze conditions given in the stem to determine 1) if SR limits have been exceeded and 2) current mode and then determine if a TS LCO is applicable in that mode.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 41 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 14 Basis for SRO only 14 A Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2013 MNS Audit SRO Q15 (Bank 5714)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Tech Spec 3.6.12 (Ice Bed)

Tech Spec 3.6.12 Basis Lesson Plan OP-MC-CNT-NF Sections 2.1 & 3.1.2.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-CNT-NF Objective 21 SYS025 A2.02 - Ice Condenser System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ice condenser system; correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

High/low floor cooling temperature .................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 42 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 15 SYS026 K1.01 - Containment Spray System (CSS) 15 D Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CSS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

ECCS ..........................................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

A Large Break LOCA has occurred

"B" train of NS has been aligned per ES-1.3 (TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRC)

2NI-185A (2A ND PUMP SUCTION FROM CONT SUMP ISOL) failed to OPEN from the control room

The crew is aligning ND aux spray Based on the conditions above,

1) 2NS-43A (2A ND HX OUTLET TO NS CONT OUTSIDE ISOL) OPEN from the control room.

2) with 2NS-43A OPEN, when containment pressure decreases to less than 0.35 PSIG, 2NS-43A .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. will

2. will CLOSE automatically B. 1. will

2. must be CLOSED manually C. 1. will NOT

2. will CLOSE automatically D. 1. will NOT

2. must be CLOSED manually Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 43 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 15 15 D General Discussion The ND spray header isolation valves (NS38 & 43) are manually aligned by the operator (if required) after establishing cold-leg recirculation.

An interlock prevents opening the header supply valves unless the containment sump valves (NI184 & 185) are open. Since these valves do not receive any automatic open/close signals, they must be manually closed by the operator when containment pressure decreases.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since other NS containment isolation valves (NS-12,15,29 and 32) ONLY require that a CPCS signal of 0.35psig be met.

NS-38 and 49 are the only two valves that are interlocked with the containment sump valves.

Second part is plausible because four of the six NS Containment Isolation Valves (NS12, 15, 29, 32) will automatically open and close.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since other NS containment isolation valves (NS-12,15,29 and 32) ONLY require that a CPCS signal of 0.35psig be met.

NS-38 and 49 are the only two valves that are interlocked with the containment sump valves.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible because four of the six NS Containment Isolation Valves (NS12, 15, 29, 32) will automatically open and close.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have knowledge of the cause-effect relationship between containment sump isolation valves and the ability to align ND aux spray to the spray header.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicant is required to analyze the conditions in the stem and then determine the affect those conditions will have on making the ND aux spray alignment.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-ECC-NS Section 2.6 (Containment Isolation Valves)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-ECC-NS Objectives 4 & 6 SYS026 K1.01 - Containment Spray System (CSS)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CSS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

ECCS ..........................................................

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 44 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 15 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 15 D Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 45 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 16 SYS039 K4.06 - Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS) 16 C Knowledge of MRSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Prevent reverse steam flow on steam line break .......................

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

Unit is at 75% RTP Subsequently,

A small steam leak develops on 1A S/G

NC system pressure is 2210 PSIG and STABLE Based on the conditions above,

1) a Main Steam Isolation will occur if the 1A S/G pressure decreases to less than a MINIMUM of PSIG.

2) if a Main Steam Isolation occurs, in addition to closing the MSIVs, the

.will also close.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 775

2. MSIV Bypasses ONLY B. 1. 875

2. MSIV Bypasses ONLY C. 1. 775

2. MSIV Bypass AND SM PORVs D. 1. 875

2. MSIV Bypass AND SM PORVs Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 46 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 16 16 C General Discussion With NC system pressure greater than P-11 (1955 PSIG) a Main Steam Isolation (MSI) will occur if SG pressure decreases to less than 775 PSIG.

A Main Steam Isolation Signal will close:

- MSIVs

- MSIV Bypasses

- SM PORVs Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Since the SM PORVs do not directly provide for reverse flow protection on a steam break or provide for isolation of the SG from the lines downstream or the other SG's, the applicant could conclude that there is no reason for the SM PORVs to receive a MSI signal. Therefore, part 2 of the question is plausible.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible because this is the setpoint for the SG LO STEAM PRESSURE annunciator alarm (1AD-4 / B5).

Since the SM PORVs do not directly provide for reverse flow protection on a steam break or provide for isolation of the SG from the lines downstream or the other SG's, the applicant could conclude that there is no reason for the SM PORVs to receive a MSI signal. Therefore, part 2 of the question is plausible.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible because this is the setpoint for the SG LO STEAM PRESSURE annunciator alarm (1AD-4 / B5).

Part 2 is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant demonstrates the ability to monitor automatic isolation of the MRSS by demonstrating a knowledge of when a MSI signal occurs and what valves are isolated on a MSI signal.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only N/A Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2013 MNS NRC Exam Q15 (Bank 5245)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-ECC-ISE Section 3.1 (Normal Operation)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-ECC-ISE Objective 13 SYS039 K4.06 - Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)

Knowledge of MRSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Prevent reverse steam flow on steam line break .......................

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 47 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 16 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 16 C As far as reverse flow protection on a steam line break, MNS does NOT have check valves in the Main Steam Lines like some Westinghouse plants. So, we must rely on the Main Steam Isolation signal or a manually initiated Main Steam Isolation for reverse flow protection.

Consider sending to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review.

Question sent to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review on 1/22/15. HCF Chief Examiner Early Submittal Comments:

K/A SYS039 K4.06 Question was submitted for preliminary review.

There is a basis given for a Hi Cog, but the cognitive level is listed as Memory in the table below.

The first part question meets the K/A.

The second part question about the SM PORVs is not an exact match for the K/A. Although this is normally allowable if there are no other options since it is fairly closely related. There are, however, several other possibilities in this case. For example, you could also give a rate of pressure decrease and ask if the isolation would be on rate or pressure. There could be several variations, with that considered, that would exactly match the K/A. We just want to minimize the amount of two part questions that stray away from the K/A on the second part.

Facility Response:

This is a memory question. Hi cog statement has been removed.

Exam team believes knowing which valves close due to a MSI signal is knowledge of the design feature and therefore Q2 also matches the K/A. SLM030215 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 48 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 17 SYS059 K3.04 - Main Feedwater (MFW) System 17 D Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MFW will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

RCS ...........................................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

A loss of all feedwater has occurred

2A S/G is faulted inside Containment

Containment pressure has peaked at 2.8 PSIG and is stable

NO CA flow is available

FR-H.1 (RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK) has been implemented Given the following parameters:

TIME SG WR Level 1515 1530 2A S/G 10% 10%

2B S/G 37% 25%

2C S/G 33% 21%

2D S/G 35% 23%

Per FR-H.1 foldout page, the EARLIEST time that the crew is required to implement NC System Feed and Bleed is (1) .

Per FR-H.1, a MINIMUM of (2) PZR PORV(s) must be opened to establish NC system Feed and Bleed.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 1515

2. ONE B. 1. 1515

2. TWO C. 1. 1530

2. ONE D. 1. 1530

2. TWO Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 49 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 17 17 D General Discussion Per FR-H.1 foldout page, Feed and Bleed must be implemented if WR level in at least three S/Gs goes below 24% (36% ACC).

Per FR-H.1step 26, Select open on two Pzr PORVs that have an open isolation valve. (steps 23 thru 27 establish NC system feed and bleed).

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible (1515) if the applicant concludes that Adverse Containment numbers apply. If so, because 2A, 2C, and 2D S/Gs are less than 36%, they would determine that feed and bleed criteria is met.

Second part is plausible because in most cases one PZR PORV has sufficient relieving capablility to reduce NC system pressure.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible (1515) if the applicant concludes that Adverse Containment numbers apply. If so, because 2A, 2C, and 2D S/Gs are less than 36%, they would determine that feed and bleed criteria is met.

Second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because in most cases one PZR PORV has sufficient relieving capablility to reduce NC system pressure.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because a loss of feedwater has occurred and the applicant must identify the effect on the NC system (i.e. when feed and bleed must be initiated and how many PZR PORVs must be opened to establish an adequate bleed path).

Basis for Hi Cog This question is high cog since the applicant is required to analyze current plant conditions and trends, then determine when actions are required to be taken to provide heat removal.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2014 MNS NRC Exam Q55 MODIFIED Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

FR-H.1 (Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

EPFRH006 SYS059 K3.04 - Main Feedwater (MFW) System Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MFW will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

RCS ...........................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 50 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 17 17 D Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 51 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 18 SYS061 K6.01 - Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System 18 A Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the AFW components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Controllers and positioners ........................................

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is at 98% RTP

In preparation for a Unit 1 TDCA pump performance test the following flow control valves are positioned as follows:

1CA-64AB (TD CA PUMP TO 1A S/G) -- CLOSED 1CA-52AB (TD CA PUMP TO 1B S/G) -- CLOSED 1CA-48AB (TD CA PUMP TO 1C S/G) -- OPEN 1CA-36AB (TD CA PUMP TO 1D S/G) -- OPEN Subsequently,

An IAE technician inadvertently generates a U1 TDCA pump auto start signal Based on the conditions above,

1) the U1 TDCA Flow Control valves will .

2) the crew will FIRST be required to CLOSE any OPEN U1 TDCA Flow Control valves in accordance with .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. all OPEN

2. the Control Room Crew Expectations Manual B. 1. all OPEN

2. OP/1/A/6250/002 (AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM)

C. 1. remain AS IS

2. the Control Room Crew Expectations Manual D. 1. remain AS IS

2. OP/1/A/6250/002 (AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 52 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 18 18 A General Discussion The TDCA pump is capable of feeding all four S/G's via the four flow control valves listed, two of which are not in their normal full open alignment. During an auto start, these valves are designed to fail open providing full design flow to all S/G's. In this scenario, an auto start has occurred therefore the flow control valves would open.

Per the Control Room Crew Expectations Manual, the operator should take action to control CA flow as soon as practical without the use of a procedure.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since the OP does contain the desired actions to close the flow control valves. However, due to the critical nature of getting these valves closed in a timely manner, the Crew Expectations manual provides guidance to prevent waiting on the OP.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since this would be true if the TDCA pump start were due to inadvertent opening of steam supply valves SA-48ABC, SA-49AB. This would start the TDCA pump. However, since no "autostart" signal is generated, the flow control valves would not reposition.

Also plausible in that two of these valves are OPEN initially, actions to CLOSE these two valves or all four would be required to mitigate the consequences of the event.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since this would be true if the TDCA pump start were due to inadvertent opening of steam supply valves SA-48ABC, SA-49AB. This would start the TDCA pump. However, since no "autostart" signal is generated, the flow control valves would not reposition.

Second part is plausible since the OP does contain the desired actions to close the flow control valves. However, due to the critical nature of getting these valves closed in a timely manner, the Crew Expectations manual provides guidance to prevent waiting on the OP.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the effect of a malfunction/mis-operation of the TDCA pump on the TDCA flow control valves that are positioned in an abnormal alignment.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive since the applicant must evaluate the initial valve positions in the stem and determine if the inadvertent TDCA start would result in the associated flow control valves failing to their full open position. The applicant is given an abnormal alignment and required to predict an outcome.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2009 MNS NRC SRO Examination NRC Q75 (Bank 3090)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CF-CA Section 3.2.2. (CA Pumps Discharge Control Valves)

Control Room Crew Expectations Manual Learning Objectives:

SYS061 K6.01 - Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 53 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 SYS061 MNS /SRO K6.01 - Auxiliary Emergency NRC Feedwater Examination (AFW) System QUESTION 18 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the AFW components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 18 A Controllers and positioners ........................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 54 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 19 SYS062 A1.01 - AC Electrical Distribution System 19 A Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ac distribution system controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Significance of D/G load limits ....................................

Given the following on Unit 2:

Unit 2 is at 100% RTP

2A D/G has been started per PT/2/A/4350/002 A (DIESEL GENERATOR 2A OPERABILITY TEST)

2A D/G has been running idle for 45 minutes Based on the conditions above, the 2A D/G should be loaded to a MINIMUM of 3000 kW AND run for one hour to ensure (1) .

The 2A D/G load limit for CONTINUOUS OPERATION is a MAXIMUM of (2) kW.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. injector tips are clean

2. 4000 B. 1. burnout of excess fuel in cylinders

2. 4000 C. 1. injector tips are clean

2. 4400 D. 1. burnout of excess fuel in cylinders

2. 4400 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 55 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 19 19 A General Discussion Per PT/2/A/4350/002 A (D/G 2A Operability Test) Limits and Precautions, if D/G is idled for greater than 30 minutes, D/G should be loaded to at least 3000 kW AND run for one hour or greater to clean injector tips.

The maximum CONTINUOUS load limit for the DG is 4000 MW. The DG can be loaded to a maximum of 4400 MW for 2 hrs out of a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since it is a requirement to run the D/G for a minimum of one minute following any start to ensure burnout of any excess fuel admitted to the cylinders during start.

Second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because the DG is allowed to be loaded to a maximum of 4400 KW for 2 hrs. out of a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since it is a requirement to run the D/G for a minimum of one minute following any start to ensure burnout of any excess fuel admitted to the cylinders during start.

Second part is plausible because the DG is allowed to be loaded to a maximum of 4400 KW for 2 hrs. out of a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched since the applicant is required to predict the change in a parameter (kW) that the D/G must be loaded to (operation of the D/G controls) in order to prevent exceeding design limits of the D/G.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

PT/2/A/4350/002 A (Diesel Generator 2A Operability Test) pg 4 of 7 Lesson Plan OP-MC-DG-DG Section 3.1 (Limits and Precautions)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-DG-DG Objective 8 SYS062 A1.01 - AC Electrical Distribution System Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ac distribution system controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Significance of D/G load limits ....................................

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 56 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 19 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 19 A Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 57 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 20 SYS062 K3.01 - AC Electrical Distribution System 20 D Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ac distribution system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Major system loads ..............................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is in MODE 3

All NCPs are running and powered from their normal sources

A Generator-Switchyard protective lockout occurs on 2A Bus Line

AUTO / MAN mode selector switches are in AUTO Based on the conditions above,

1) NCP 2A .

2) Bus 2TA automatically transfers to its alternate power supply.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. trips

2. slow B. 1. trips

2. fast C. 1. continues to run

2. slow D. 1. continues to run

2. fast Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 58 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 20 20 D General Discussion An Automatic Fast Bus Transfer will operate in 8 cycles if the following conditions are met:

1. The normal incoming breaker is tripped by a generator-switchyard protective lockout (86A/1A, 86A/1B, 86B/1A, 86B/1B, 86TTA/1A, 86TTA/1B, 86TTB/1A, or 86TTB/1B).

2. The (AUTO/MANUAL) Mode select switches on the main control board in the control must be in AUTO

3. The Normal and Standby sources are in synchronization. (Synchronism is determined automatically in the transfer circuit by the position of breakers auxiliary contacts. These contacts reflect the position of the unit generator/switchyard circuit breakers.)

4. The NC Pumps on the two affected switchgear are both operating.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible since the normal supply breaker to the bus has tripped. Therefore, the applicant could conclude that the NC pump trips also.

The second part is plausible if the applicant does not understand the requirements for a fast bus transfer or slow bus transfer. If so, it would be reasonable for the applicant to conclude that a slow bus transfer has occurred.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible since the normal supply breaker to the bus has tripped. Therefore, the applicant could conclude that the NC pump trips also.

The second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible if the applicant does not understand the requirements for a fast bus transfer or slow bus transfer. If so, it would be reasonable for the applicant to conclude that a slow bus transfer has occurred.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the effect that a Generator-Switchyard protective lockout will have on the busline and the NC pumps powered from that busline.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must first recall from memory the requirements for a fast bus and slow bus transfer. The applicant must then apply the recalled memory to the given conditions and analyze each answer based on that analysis to determine the correct response.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2014 MNS NRC Q19 Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EL-EP Section 2.5 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 59 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 20 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

20 D OP-MC-EL-EP, Objectives 23, 24, 25 SYS062 K3.01 - AC Electrical Distribution System Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ac distribution system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Major system loads ..............................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 60 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 21 SYS063 2.4.11 - DC Electrical Distribution System 21 C SYS063 GENERIC Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

A BLACKOUT has occurred on 2ETB

D/G '2B' failed to start due to an 86N relay actuation

2AD-11 / F4 (BATT EVCD UNDERVOLTAGE) is in alarm

EVDD bus voltage is 110 VDC and lowering slowly In accordance with AP-07 (LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER), the action required to restore bus EVDD is to .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. cross tie Bus EVDB to Bus EVDD B. align Battery Charger EVCS to Bus EVDD C. swap Battery Charger EVCD power supply to 1EMXB D. swap Battery Charger EVCD power supply to 2EMXH Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 61 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 21 21 C General Discussion Battery Chargers EVCA and EVCB are normally supplied by 1ETA (via 1EMXA) and 1ETB (via 1EMXB) respectively. Battery Chargers EVCC and EVCD are normally supplied by 2ETA (via 2EMXA) and 2ETB (via 2EMXB) respectively.

However, each of the Battery Chargers can be supplied by the same EMX bus on the opposite unit should it's normal bus be unavailable.

For the example given, EVDD is normally supplied by Battery Charger EVCD which is normally powered from 2EMXB. Since 2EMXB is unavailable (due to the loss of 2ETB), AP-07 will direct the crew to restore power to the EVCD Battery Charger from 1EMXB.

Additionally, Battery Charger EVCS is available to supply any one DC Bus (one at a time). Battery Charger EVCS can be powered from either 1EMXH or 2EMXH (making 2EMXH a plausible distracter).

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since this is a correct alignment that can be made to supply Bus EVDD if removing battery EVCD for maintenance or for equalizing charge.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since this a correct alignment that can be made to supply Bus EVDD anytime battery EVCD is removed from service.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible because 2EMXH can supply power to Battery Charger EVCS which can supply EVDD. However, the strategy in AP-07 is to restore power to the normal Battery Charger (EVCD) which cannot receive power from 2EMXH.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of AP-07 related to the actions for a loss of a Vital DC Battery Charger.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. First, it requires the applicant to diagnose the event based on the conditions given to determine why EVDD bus voltage is lowering. Next, the applicant must recall from memory the mitigating strategy from AP-07 (Loss of Electrical Power) for restoring power to a Battery Charger which has lost power. Finally, the applicant must associate the two pieces of information to determine the correct response.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2007 MNS NRC SRO Examination NRC Q52 (Bank 3573) MODIFIED Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

AP-07 (Loss of Electrical Power)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

NONE SYS063 2.4.11 - DC Electrical Distribution System SYS063 GENERIC Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 62 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 21 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 21 C Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 63 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 22 SYS064 A3.07 - Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System 22 C Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ED/G system, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

Load sequencing .................................................

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 2:

A loss of voltage has occurred on 2ETA

Blackout loading is in progress Subsequently:

A Safety Injection signal is received before Blackout loading is completed on 2ETA Based on the conditions above, the Blackout load sequence (1) , 2ETA is cleared of (2) loads, and the SI load sequence is actuated.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. stops

2. all B. 1. is completed

2. all C. 1. stops

2. all non-SI D. 1. is completed

2. all non-SI Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 64 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 22 22 C General Discussion When a Blackout has occurred and load sequencing is in progress, if an SI signal is received, the Blackout sequence stops, the affected bus is cleared of non-SI loads, and the SI load sequence is actuated.

SI loads which were previously running continue to operate.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct and therefore plausible.

The second part is plausible since the applicant may conclude that all loads are cleared from the bus after the SI sequencer actuation, which does occur after a Blackout sequencer actuation.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant misunderstands the function of the Blackout sequencer and concludes that the Blackout sequence must be complete to ensure full restoration of power to the Emergency Bus.

The second part is plausible since the applicant may conclude that all loads are cleared from the bus after the SI sequencer actuation, which does occur after a Blackout sequencer actuation.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant misunderstands the function of the Blackout sequencer and concludes that the Blackout sequence must be complete to ensure full restoration of power to the Emergency Bus.

The second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the candidate must possess the ability to monitor the automatic loading of safety-related equipment during all possible load sequence scenarios and determine that the sequencer has operated properly using Main Control Board indications for the various sequencer loads.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2009 MNS NRC SRO Examination NRC Q59 (Bank 3024)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-DG-EQB (Diesel Generator Load Sequencer) Section 3.5 (Safety Injection Actuation during a Blackout)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-DG-EQB, Objective 7 SYS064 A3.07 - Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ED/G system, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

Load sequencing .................................................

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 65 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 22 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 22 C Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 66 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 23 SYS064 K1.02 - Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System 23 B Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ED/G system and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

D/G cooling water system .........................................

Regarding Diesel Generator Auxiliaries:

1) Which ONE (1) of the following is a heat load that is cooled by the DG Cooling Water (KD) System?

2) Which ONE (1) of the following is the MIMIMUM KD Surge Tank level required to perform a MANUAL MODE start?

A. 1. VG After Coolers

2. 11.5 inches B. 1. Air Intake System Intercooler

2. 11.5 inches C. 1. VG After Coolers

2. 25 inches D. 1. Air Intake System Intercooler

2. 25 inches Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 67 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 23 23 B General Discussion The following are loads supplied by the DG KD system:

- Engine Jackets

- Turbocharger Jacket

- Mechanical Governor Oil Cooler

- Intercooler

- Lube Oil Cooler If KD Surge Tank level is less than 11.5 inches, the DG will not start in MANUAL MODE. The KD Surge Tank Low Level alarm annunciates at 25 inches.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible since the VG After Coolers are supplied by RN which is the source of assured makeup to the KD Surge tank.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible since the VG After Coolers are supplied by RN which is the source of assured makeup to the KD Surge tank.

Part 2 is plausible since 25 inches is the Low Level alarm for the Surge Tank.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Part 2 is plausible since 25 inches is the Low Level alarm for the Surge Tank.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because by knowing the loads that are cooled by the DG Cooling Water system (KD), the applicant demonstrates a knowledge of the physical connections associated with DG Cooling Water System. Also, by knowing the MANUAL MODE starting interlock for Diesel Generator KD Surge Tank level the applicant demonstrates a knowledge of the cause-effect relationship between the DG and the DG Cooling Water system.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2011 MNS SRO NRC Q24 Bank 4375 Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-DG-DGA Section 2.4 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-DG-DGA Objectives 21 & 29 SYS064 K1.02 - Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 68 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE SYS064ILT-31 MNS SRO K1.02 - Emergency NRC Examination Diesel Generator (ED/G) System QUESTION 23 23 B Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ED/G system and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

D/G cooling water system .........................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 69 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 24 SYS073 A2.02 - Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System 24 D Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to cor- rect, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Detector failure .................................................

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

Unit is at 100% RTP

A leak on the RC piping in the turbine building basement has occurred

All TB Sump pumps are in Manual and ON, maintaining sump level stable Subsequently:

A detector failure occurs due to a failed power supply on 1EMF-31 (TURBINE BUILDING SUMP MONITOR)

Based on the conditions above,

1) the Unit 1TB Sump pumps trip automatically.

2) to continue with the leak mitigation, the crew will be required to .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements below?

A. 1. will NOT

2. open 1WP-35 (WMT & VUCDT TO RC CONTROL)

B. 1. will

2. clear the EMF-31 Trip 2 signal and restart the TB sump pumps C. 1. will NOT

2. open 1WP-6 (U1 TB SUMP PUMPS DISCH TO WC ISOL)

D. 1. will

2. place the HI RAD INH/BYP switch in BYP and restart the TB sump pumps Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 70 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 24 24 D General Discussion 1(2) EMF-31 (Turbine Building Sump Monitor) has a "High Rad Inhibit/Bypass" key operated switch located on the TB Sump Control Panel.

During normal operation, the switch is In the INH position. If during a WP pumping operation an EMF-31 Trip II alarm is actuated, the WP pumps will trip off and the High Radiation light on the TB Sump pump Control Panel will light. This interlock will secure both WP pumps regardless of their control switch position. Placing the key switch to Bypass allows the TB sump pumps to run with an EMF-31 trip II signal present.

The RP-86A (Control Room EMF) modules are fail-safe and actuate Trip 1 and Trip 2 during a loss of power. The High Rad alarm will sound and lock in until reset (once power comes back). When power is restored, it takes operator action to depress clear CLR to reset the loss of power failure screen, and then depress CLR again to reset the trips.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if applicant concludes that the TB sump pumps will not trip due to the control switch being in the manual and ON position.

Second part is plausible if applicant concludes that the compensatory action that occurred due to the failed power supply on EMF-31closed 1WP-35 which does close as a compensatory action for EMF-44 and 49. Also plausible since TB sump discharge is aligned to discharge through this path if any activity is detected in the sump.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible if the applicant concludes that the EMF-31 trip 2 signal must be cleared before a reset can occur, allowing a restart of TB sump pumps.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if applicant concludes that the TB sump pumps will not trip due to the control switch being in the manual and ON position.

Second part is plausible if applicant concludes that the compensatory action that occurred due to the failed power supply on EMF-31closed the pump discharge to WC as the case on various other monitored streams.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant is required to predict the impacts of a failed detector (loss of power supply) and then use procedural knowledge to determine the correct actions to control the consequences of the failure.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicant is required to analyze the failure method of the detector and then determine which compensatory actions (if any) have occurred and what procedural actions are required to regain control of the system to continue leak mitigation.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED CNS ILT 2013 PreAudit 2 SRO Examination AUDIT Q51 (Bank 4881)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-SS-WPU Section 2.1.1 (Motor Driven Sump Pumps) & Section 2.1.4 (EMF-31 Controls)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 71 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 24 OP-MC-SS-WPU Objectives 3 & 5 24 D SYS073 A2.02 - Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to cor- rect, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Detector failure .................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 72 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 25 SYS076 K2.01 - Service Water System (SWS) 25 C Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Service water ....................................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

I&E has requested that the 1A Nuclear Service Water Pump breaker be racked out for lubrication To which ONE (1) of the following locations should an Operator be dispatched to rack out the breaker?

A. 1TA B. 1TD C. 1ETA D. 1ETB Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 73 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 25 25 C General Discussion The 1A Nuclear Service Water Pump is powered from emergency bus 1ETA.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible because 1TA normally supplies 1ETA which supplies the 1A RN pump.

Answer B Discussion NCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible because 1TD normally supplies 1ETB which supplies the 1B RN pump.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible because it is the correct unit and 1ETB is the supply to the 1B RN pump.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must know the power supply for the Nuclear Service Water pumps.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2014 MNS NRC SRO Q37 Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PSS-RN Section 2.2 (RN Pumps, Strainers, Mini-Flow)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-PSS-RN Objective 3 SYS076 K2.01 - Service Water System (SWS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Service water ....................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 74 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 26 SYS078 2.1.30 - Instrument Air System (IAS) 26 D SYS078 GENERIC Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls. (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Given the following:

Both Units are at 100% RTP

VI system pressure switch 0VIPS-5381 fails Based on the conditions above, 1VI-1812 (VI AIR DRYER BYPASS FILTER ISOL) solenoid will vent the actuator when VI system pressure decreases to a MAXIMUM of (1) PSIG.

WHEN the failed pressure switch is replaced, RESET must be depressed on the local VI (2) to CLOSE 1VI-1812.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 90

2. Sequencer Control Panel B. 1. 90

2. Reflash Panel C. 1. 85

2. Sequencer Control Panel D. 1. 85

2. Reflash Panel Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 75 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 26 26 D General Discussion 1VI-1812 is installed between the Dryer System Manual Bypass Valves 1VI-093 and 1VI-094. This valve is designed to fail open on a loss of power or loss of air.

A solenoid operator associated with valve 1VI-1812 is connected to pressure switch 0VIPS5381. The solenoid is set to vent the actuator upon receipt of a VI System Low Pressure signal (85#).

There is local indication of valve position and RESET and OVERRIDE capabilities provided at the Reflash Panel. By depressing RESET, 1VI-1812 will close, and by depressing OVERRIDE, 1VI-1812 can be manually opened.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since various other automatic actions will occur with VI pressure at 90 psig decreasing (i.e. G & H diesel VI compressors starting, VI dryer purge exhaust valves closing and VI-820 closing).

Second part is plausible since there are other control switches for VI valves and components located on the VI Sequencer Control Panel.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since various other automatic actions will occur with VI pressure at 90 psig decreasing (i.e. G & H diesel VI compressors starting, VI dryer purge exhaust valves closing and VI-820 closing).

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since there are other control switches for VI valves and components located on the VI Sequencer Control Panel.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because by demonstrating what is required to regain control of the VI dryer bypass valve, the applicant demonstrates the ability to operate instrument air system components locally.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-SS-VI Section 1.2.13 (VI System Air Dryers A, B, and C)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

NONE SYS078 2.1.30 - Instrument Air System (IAS)

SYS078 GENERIC Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls. (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 76 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 26 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 26 D Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 77 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 27 SYS078 K4.01 - Instrument Air System (IAS) 27 D Knowledge of IAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Manual/automatic transfers of control ...............................

Given the following initial conditions:

Both Units are at 100% RTP

VI (INSTRUMENT AIR) compressors are in a D, E, F alignment Subsequently:

A VI header rupture occurs

Annunciators 1AD-12 / C1 (VI/VS LO PRESSURE) AND 1AD-12 / D1 (VI/VS LO LO PRESSURE) are in alarm What effect will this event have on the VS (STATION AIR) system?

A. Check valves in the VI - VS cross-connect line will close to isolate VS system pressure.

B. VS pressure in the Fire Protection Pressurizer Tank will be lost until a VS air compressor can be started.

C. VI-820 will auto-close as VI pressure decreases below 85 PSIG and the VS air compressor will start automatically to maintain VS pressure.

D. VI-820 will auto-close as VI pressure decreases below 90 PSIG and the VS air compressor can be manually started to maintain VS pressure.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 78 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 27 27 D General Discussion The VI System normally supplies the Low Pressure VS System through control valve 1VI-820. This valve is normally in the AUTO position and will automatically close should VI System Pressure decrease to <90 psig.

Since the Low Pressure Station Air System is normally supplied by the VI System, through control valve 1VI-820, the Low Pressure Station Air Compressor does not operate very often. In fact, the Low Pressure VS Compressor Mode Selector Switch is normally selected to the OFF position.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since this is another possible method to prevent depressurizing a system or portion of a system used in other MNS plant systems.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since the Fire Protection Pressurizer tank is pressurized with VS air. However it is normally isolated from the normal VS header and has its own compressors to maintain tank pressure.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since there are other automatic actions in the VI system that will occur at 85 psig decreasing (such as bypassing the VI dryers) There is a separate VS air compressor, which has an automatic startup feature but is normally in "off" and requires operator action to start.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have knowledge of the automatic and manual actions required to regain control of VS system pressure on a loss of VI.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicant is required to analyze the conditions in the stem and determine from the alarming annunciators that VI pressure is 82 psig and lowering and then determine what effect this will have on the VS system.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK MNS Bank 3828 (Not Previously Used)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-SS-VI Section 1.2.12 (1VI-820 VI to VS Control Valve) and Section 2.2.1 (VS Low Pressure Air Compressor)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-SS-VI Objectives 3 & 4 SYS078 K4.01 - Instrument Air System (IAS)

Knowledge of IAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Manual/automatic transfers of control ...............................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 79 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 27 27 D Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 80 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 28 SYS103 A3.01 - Containment System 28 B Ability to monitor automatic operation of the containment system, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

Containment isolation ............................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A Reactor Trip and Safety Injection have occurred

NC pressure is 1700 PSIG

Tavg is 548°F

Containment pressure is 2.9 PSIG

S/G pressures are 1000 PSIG Which ONE (1) of the following indicates the ESF actuation(s) that has/have occurred?

A. Phase A ONLY B. Phase A and Containment Ventilation Isolation ONLY C. Phase A and Main Steam Isolation ONLY D. Phase A, Containment Ventilation Isolation, AND Main Steam Isolation Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 81 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 28 28 B General Discussion Containment Ventilation Isolation (SH) is generated by:

- Safety Injection (SS), (any signal)

- Manual Phase "A" Containment Isolation (St)

- Manual Phase "B" Containment Isolation (Sp)

- Trip 2 on EMF-38, 39, or 40 Phase A containment isolation (St) is generated by:

- any Safety Injection signal

- Manual pushbutton Main Steam Isolation Signal is generated by:

- Hi Hi Containment pressure (>3.0 PSIG)

- Low Steam Pressure (<775 PSIG when >P-11)

- Hi Steam Line Pressure Negative Rate (-100 PSIG/sec when <P-11 & Lo Press Steam Line Isolation is blocked)

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because Phase A is correct and the applicant may not recall that a Containment Ventilation isolation is initated by a Safety Injection signal.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because Phase A is correct and a Main Steam Isolation is initiated by high containment pressure. If the applicant does not recall that it is the 3.0 PSIG containment pressure as opposed to the 1.0 PSIG containment pressure signal, they would conclude that this is the correct answer.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The answer is plausible because Phase A and Containment Ventilation Isolation are correct and the applicant could incorrectly recall the containment pressure required to initiate a Main Steam Isolation (i.e. 1.0 PSIG as opposed to 3.0 PSIG).

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant demonstrates the ability to monitor automatic operation of the containment system relative to containment isolations by demonstrating the ability to evaluate a given set of conditions and determine what automatic containment isolation should have occurred.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. First, the applicant must recall from memory all of the isolation signals related to containment and the parameters and values associated with those isolations. The applicant must then evaluate the conditions given in the stem and compare the results of that analysis with the recalled information to determine the correct response.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 82 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 28 Development References Student References Provided 28 B

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-ECC-ISE Section 2.0 (Detailed Description)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-ECC-ISE Objective 5 SYS103 A3.01 - Containment System Ability to monitor automatic operation of the containment system, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

Containment isolation ............................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 83 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 29 SYS001 K6.11 - Control Rod Drive System 29 B Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following CRDS components: (CFR: 41.7/45.7)

Location and operation of CRDS fault detection (trouble alarms) and reset system, including rod control annunciator ............................

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is at 100% RTP

Control Rod M12 (CB D, Group 1) drops into the core

The crew implements AP-14 (ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION) Enclosure 1 (RESPONSE TO DROPPED OR MISALIGNED ROD)

Subsequently:

Approximately 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months have elapsed since the occurrence of the dropped rod

The cause of the dropped rod has been corrected

The unit is at 45% RTP

Lift coil disconnect switches have been operated as directed by AP-14 Enclosure 1 in preparation for recovery of the dropped rod

CRD BANK SELECTOR has been transferred to the CB D position Based on the conditions above,

1) as soon as the OATC commences rod withdrawal, a ROD CONTROL FAILURE alarm is received.

2) the cause of the alarm is a Regulation Failure in the power cabinet serving Control Bank D rods.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. URGENT

2. Group 1 B. 1. URGENT

2. Group 2 C. 1. NON-URGENT

2. Group 1 D. 1. NON-URGENT

2. Group 2 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 84 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 29 29 B General Discussion The cause of the Urgent Failure alarm is due to a Regulation Failure in the power cabinet for the "unaffected" rod group. Because all of the lift coil disconnect switches have been opened in the affected bank (with the exception of the dropped rod), in the power cabinet supplying the "unaffected" group, and Urgent Failure occurs because a signal is sent to move the control rods in the group and no reponse occurs. As long as one rod in a group responds appropriately to the demand for movement, an Urgent Failure is not generated therefore, no Urgent Failure is generated for CBD Group 1 but, IS generated for CBD Group 2.

AP-14 Enclosure 1 explains that the Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm is expected during dropped rod recovery and that when it is received, the crew will acknowledge the alarm and continue rod movement.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because this group has the dropped rod.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the applicant could conclude that since the actions are being directed procedurally and because rod motion will continue, that it is a non-urgent alarm (i.e. normally with an Urgent Failure alarm continued rod motion is stopped or procedurally prohibited).

The second part is plausible because this group has the dropped rod.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the applicant could conclude that since the actions are being directed procedurally and because rod motion will continue, that it is a non-urgent alarm (i.e. normally with an Urgent Failure alarm continued rod motion is stopped or procedurally prohibited).

The second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of the Urgent Failure alarm (i.e. CRDS fault detection) and what causes the alarm.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. First, the applicant must recall from memory that AP-14 indicates that this is an expected alarm for a dropped rod recovery. Second the applicant must analyze the given conditions to determine which rod group is causing the alarm.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

AP-14 (Rod Control Malfunction) Background Document AP-14 (Rod Control Malfunction) Enclosure 1 (Response to Dropped or Misaligned Rod)

Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-IRE (Rod Control System)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-IC-IRE Objective 10 SYS001 K6.11 - Control Rod Drive System Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following CRDS components: (CFR: 41.7/45.7)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 85 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 29 29 Location and operation of CRDS fault detection (trouble alarms) and reset system, including rod control annunciator ............................

B 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Need to ask Chief Examiner for suggestions or a new K/A.

New K/A provided 10/15/14 HCF Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 86 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 30 SYS002 K4.07 - Reactor Coolant System (RCS) 30 D Knowledge of RCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following : (CFR: 41.7)

Contraction and expansion during heatup and cooldown.. ...............

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

Unit is at 25% RTP

Power ascension to 50% RTP is in progress

"A" Pzr heaters are ON Subsequently,

A DCS malfunction occurs in the Pzr Level Median Select for Selected Pzr Level 1

Selected Pzr Level 1 fails at its current output

No operator action is taken Which ONE (1) of the following statements describes the plant response as the power ascension continues?

A. Charging flow decreases Letdown isolates B. Charging flow increases Pzr backup heaters energize C. Charging flow decreases Letdown will NOT isolate D. Charging flow increases Pzr backup heaters will NOT energize Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 87 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 30 30 D General Discussion As load is increased, Program Tave will increase. As Program Tave increases, Program Pressurizer level will increase. The Pzr level master controller will see the controlling channel maintaining a constant level and a positive delta between program level and selected level will result.

Pzr level master controller will output to increase charging in an effort to increase actual Pzr level to program level. Actual level in the Pzr will increase.

If INDICATED level should increase to greater than 5% above program level an Annunciator alarm, PZR HI LEVEL DEV CONTROL, is generated and the back-up heaters come on so that the subcooled water which has just surged into the PZR can be heated to saturation temperature. In this case, Actual level in the Pzr is increasing. However, indicated (measured) Pzr level is not changing due the failure of SPP-1, therefore, Pzr backup heaters will not energize.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible if applicant concludes the effect of Selected Pzr Level 1 failure on output of Pzr Level Master would result in charging flow decreasing which would lead to Letdown isolation.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible if applicant concludes that indicated (measured) Pzr Level is increasing as ACTUAL level in the PZR increases. When a (+)5% error signal between indicated and program level occurs, all back up heaters energize.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible if applicant concludes the effect of Selected Pzr Level 1 failure on output of Pzr Level Master would result in charging flow decreasing and concludes Selected Pzr Level 1 failing as is would not allow letdown isolation at 17% Pzr level. Selected Pzr Level 2 (independently generated signal form actual Pzr level) would isolate letdown.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of an NC system design feature (Pressurizer and Pressurizer level control) that allow and control NC system expansion during plant heatup.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicant must analyze the conditions in the stem to determine what effect the failure will have on the plant as power ascension continues.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-ILE-DCS LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-PS-ILE Objective 3 SYS002 K4.07 - Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

Knowledge of RCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following : (CFR: 41.7)

Contraction and expansion during heatup and cooldown.. ...............

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 88 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 30 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 30 D Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 89 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 31 SYS011 K2.02 - Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS) 31 C Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

PZR heaters .....................................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A Loss of Offsite Power has occurred

1ETA and 1ETB are energized from their respective DGs Based on the conditions above, power can be restored to Pressurizer Heater Group(s)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. D ONLY B. C ONLY C. A and B ONLY D. C and D ONLY Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 90 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 31 31 C General Discussion Due to the Blackout and the ETA busses being energized from their respective DGs, Pressurizer heater groups A & B are the only groups that have power available. Groups A & B have safety related power supplies (ELXA & ELXB) and are required by Tech Specs.

The supply breakers on 1MC-5 would have been closed by procedure. However, due to the loss of offsite power, Group D heaters would have no power available. Group D has non-safety power supply (6 Banks from LXG, 1 Bank from SMXG at the SSF).

C Heater Group has variable power control. The capacity of the C Heaters totals 484 KW. There are two power sources available for the C Heaters, LXF (normal) and LXC (Alt.). The supply breakers on 1MC-10 would have been closed by procedure.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible because a portion of group D heaters are powered from the SSF and the applicant could conclude that in a LOOP condition D heaters would be powered by the SSF D/G. Also, by procedure the heater breaker on 1MC-5 is closed which makes it plausible for the applicant to conclude that power is also available to Group D.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible because Group C heaters are used by the Pressurizer Pressure Master for variable control of Pzr pressure, so the applicant may conclude that C heaters receive emergency power from the D/G's to allow for NCS pressure control. Also, by procedure the heater supply breaker on 1MC-10 is closed which makes it plausible for the applicant to conclude that power is also available to Group C.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible because Group C heaters are use by the Pressurizer Pressure Master for variable control of Pzr pressure, so the applicant may conclude that C heaters receive emergency power from the D/G's to allow for NCS pressure control. Also, by procedure the heater supply breaker on 1MC-10 is closed which makes it plausible for the applicant to conclude that power is also available to Group C.

Plausible because a portion of group D heaters are powered from the SSF and the applicant could conclude that in a LOOP condition D heaters would be powered by the SSF D/G. Also, by procedure the heater breaker on 1MC-5 is closed which makes it plausible for the applicant to conclude that power is also available to Group D.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because it requires the applicant to know the power supplies to the pressurizer heaters as well as the conditions under which power may or may not be available.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must first recall from memory the power supply to all of the Pressurizer heaters and then analyze the given conditions to determine which heaters have power.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2011 MNS SRO NRC Q30 (Bank 4380)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-IPE-DCS Section 2.4 and 2.5 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

NONE SYS011 K2.02 - Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 91 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 31 PZR heaters .....................................................

31 C 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 92 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 32 SYS014 K5.01 - Rod Position Indication System (RPIS) 32 B Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RPIS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Reasons for differences between RPIS and step counter ................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

Rod M-4 has dropped due to a blown fuse

AP-14 (ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION) has been implemented

The blown fuse has been replaced

The dropped rod has been realigned with the rods in CB D

DRPI indicates all CB D rods at 178 steps The Pulse-to-Analog Converter did NOT get reset to the correct bank step position.

As a result of this, the "Control Bank Lo-Lo" annunciator will alarm (1) than required because the RIL function of the OAC is calculating CB D rods to be (2) . than actual.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. LATER

2. LOWER B. 1. LATER 2 HIGHER C. 1. SOONER

2. HIGHER D. 1. SOONER

2. LOWER Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 93 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 32 32 B General Discussion Per direction in AP/14, the dropped rod is retrieved by opening the lift coil disconnects on the unaffected rods in the associated bank and then the misaligned rod is pulled out and realigned. During this evolution, the P/A converter continues to "count pulses". The Rod Insertion Limit computer utilizes this pulse count from the P/A converter to determine the "Actual" rod height. If the converter is not reset to reflect the actual bank position after the retrieval of the dropped rod, the RIL computer will see the control banks further out than they actually are. The "Control Bank Lo-Lo Limit" Annunciator alarms based on a comparison of actual rod position (P/A Converter) and Reactor Power (Auctioneered High Delta T) required Rod Insertion Limit rod Position. This error would result in this Annunciator alarms LATER than required.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since the applicant may conclude that the RIL computer now has an input indicating that the rods are approximately 200 steps lower than actual. This would be the magnitude of the error present if the effect of not resetting the P/A converter was reversed.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because in order to correctly answer this question it is required to have an in-depth understanding of both the function of the P/A converter and the function of the RIL computer. It would be understandable to reverse these effects.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because in order to correctly answer this question it is required to have an in-depth understanding of both the function of the P/A converter and the function of the RIL computer. It would be understandable to reverse these effects.

Second part is plausible since the applicant may conclude that the RIL computer now has an input indicating that the rods are approximately 200 steps lower than actual. This would be the magnitude of the error present if the effect of not resetting the P/A converter was reversed.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the implications to the CRDS ( Rod Insertion Limit output) due to the pulse to analog converter not being reset. Therefore creating a difference in where DRPI and step counters think the rods are.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive level because more than one mental process is required. First, the applicant must be able to conclude that the P/A Converter not resetting means that the TOTAL number of steps counted will be higher than normal.

Second, the applicant must comprehend that the rod position input to the RIL Computer will be higher than actual.

Then the applicant can correctly conclude that the RIL alarms will occur at a bank position that is higher than actual (i.e. LATER during a rod insertion).

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2010 MNS RO Audit Examination AUDIT Q29 (Bank 2929)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

AP-14 (Rod Control Malfunction) Bkgrd Doc Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-IRE (Rod Control System) Section 2.2.5 (Pulse-to-Analog Converter (P/A))

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 94 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE NONE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 32 32 B SYS014 K5.01 - Rod Position Indication System (RPIS)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RPIS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Reasons for differences between RPIS and step counter ................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 95 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 33 SYS017 A1.01 - In-Core Temperature Monitor (ITM) System 33 C Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ITM system controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Core exit temperature ............................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A Large Break LOCA has occurred

Subcooling based on the 5 HI T/C AVG indicates negative (-) 4°F on the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor (ICCM)

On the ICCM, Subcooling based on the 5 HI T/C AVG (1) be displayed in reverse video.

The range of indication for 5 HI T/C AVG is (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. will

2. 0°F to 2300°F B. 1. will NOT

2. 0°F to 2300°F C. 1. will

2. 32°F to 2300°F D. 1. will NOT

2. 32°F to 2300°F Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 96 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 33 33 C General Discussion Subcooling based on the 5 HI T/C AVG is displayed on the Core Cooling display section of the Vessel Level summary page of ICCM. If subcooling decreases to less than or equal to 0°F, the ICCM display will be shown in reverse video.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE First part is correct.

Second part is plausible since zero is the lower end of the indicating range for most instruments on the control boards.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE The first part is plausible if the applicant does not recall which parameters on the ICCM will display in reverse video or at what value those parameters appear in reverse video.

Second part is plausible since zero is the lower end of the indicating range for most instruments on the control boards.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE The first part is plausible if the applicant does not recall which parameters on the ICCM will display in reverse video or at what value those parameters appear in reverse video.

Second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant's demonstration of their ability to monitor subcooling indications using the 5 High T/C Subcooling indication on the ICCM also demonstrates an ability to control the plant using the ICCM indications to prevent exceeding design limit (i.e. in this specific case, to prevent exceeding subcooling margin limits).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2013 MNS NRC Exam Q31 (Bank 5180)

Development References Student References Provided

References:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-ICM (Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor) Section 2.4.2 (Vessel Level Summary Display Page)

Learning Objectives:

OP-MC-IC-ICM Objective 11 SYS017 A1.01 - In-Core Temperature Monitor (ITM) System Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ITM system controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Core exit temperature ............................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 97 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 33 33 C Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 98 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 34 SYS027 A4.04 - Containment Iodine Removal System (CIRS) 34 A Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Filter temperature ................................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

PT/1/A/4450/003 A (ANNULUS VENTILATION SYSTEM TRAIN A OPERABILITY TEST) is being performed

During the test, a VE filter pre-heater malfunctions When the 1A VE Filter temperature rises to a MINIMUM of (1) °F, annunciator 0AD-12 / F2 (1A VE FILTER HI TEMP) will alarm.

As a result of this alarm, the (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 220

2. 1A VE pre-heaters trip ONLY B. 1. 220

2. 1A VE pre-heaters and 1A VE Fan trip C. 1. 325

2. 1A VE pre-heaters trip ONLY D. 1. 325

2. 1A VE pre-heaters and 1A VE Fan trip Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 99 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 34 34 A General Discussion There are two (2) preheaters per train that automatically energize when the fan starts. If the charcoal bed reaches 220°F, a HVAC Panel alarm (VE FILTER HI TEMP - >220°F) will be received and the preheaters will de-energize.

The fans will trip, if any of eight Carbon Bed (charcoal filter) fire detection temperatures switches indicate temperatures above 325°F. This also generates a HVAC Panel alarm (VE FILTER FIRE - > 325°F). If the fans are not running they will not start until the fire detection signal clears.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since the VE fans will trip if filter temperature rises to 325 deg. F.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since a (VE Filter Fire) alarm will be generated on the HVAC panel when temperatures rise to 325 degrees F.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since a (VE Filter Fire) alarm will be generated on the HVAC panel when temperatures rise to 325 degrees F.

Second part is plausible since the VE fans will trip if filter temperature rises to 325 deg. F.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must demonstrate the ability to monitor the VE system filter temperatures by monitoring annunciator alarms and subsequent automatic system alignments based on those alarms.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CNT-VE (Annulus Ventilation System) Section 2.2 (Filter Trains)

OP/0/A/6100/010 P (Annunciator Response for HVAC Panel )AD-12) F2 (1A VE Filter Hi Temp)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-CNT-VE Objective 8 SYS027 A4.04 - Containment Iodine Removal System (CIRS)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Filter temperature ................................................

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 100 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 34 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 34 A Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 101 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 35 SYS029 2.1.31 - Containment Purge System (CPS) 35 C SYS029 GENERIC Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup. (CFR:

41.10 / 45.12)

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 2:

Unit is in Mode 6

VP (CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM) is in service and refueling is in progress Subsequently:

A Trip 2 alarm on 2EMF-38(L) (CONTAINMENT PARTICULATE) is received Based on the conditions above,

1) the VP Supply and Exhaust .

2) to regain control of VP components, 2EMF-38 must be reset and the Containment Ventilation (SH) Reset push button located on must be depressed.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. fans will be "OFF" ONLY

2. 2MC-11 B. 1. fans will be "OFF" ONLY

2. Unit 2 HVAC panel C. 1. fans will be "OFF" AND dampers will be CLOSED

2. 2MC-11 D. 1. fans will be "OFF" AND dampers will be CLOSED

2. Unit 2 HVAC panel Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 102 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 35 35 C General Discussion These will shutdown on a SH signal from either train:

-VP Supply Fans A & B

-VP Exhaust Fans A & B

-Incore Instrument Room Fans These close on a SH signal from either train:

-Containment Purge Supply Supply Damper

-Containment Purge Exhaust Exhaust Damper To "Reset" Containment Ventilation following an EMF 38, 39, 40 Trip II, the EMF must be reset, then the Containment Ventilation "Reset" Pushbuttons must be depressed.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since other ventilation streams, such as VA (Aux bldg ventilation), have EMF compensatory actions where only the supply and exhaust fans will trip on a Trip 2 condition.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since other ventilation streams, such as VA (Aux bldg ventilation), have EMF compensatory actions where only the supply and exhaust fans will trip on a Trip 2 condition.

Second part is plausible since all other ventilation system resets (VE, VX, etc.) are located on the respective unit's HVAC panel. Also, all VP components are manipulated from the respective unit's HVAC panel.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since all other ventilation system resets (VE, VX, etc.) are located on the respective unit's HVAC panel. Also, all VP components are manipulated from the respective unit's HVAC panel.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must be able to locate the containment ventilation reset pushbutton and also be able to determine the position of containment purge system components following a containment ventilation isolation signal (EMF Trip2).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CNT-VP (Containment Purge System) Section 2.2 (Containment Purge Exhaust) and Section 3.1 (Normal Operation)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 103 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 35 Sim Guide OP-MC-SF-C16 (Engineered Safeguards) 35 C LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-CNT-VP Objective 4 SYS029 2.1.31 - Containment Purge System (CPS)

SYS029 GENERIC Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup. (CFR:

41.10 / 45.12) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 104 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 36 SYS033 K3.02 - Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFPCS) 36 C Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Area and ventilation radiation monitoring systems .....................

Given the following on Unit 2:

The unit is at 100% RTP

The "SPENT FUEL POOL LEVEL LO" alarm is received on the Unit 2 OAC

1) Which ONE (1) of the following is the FIRST EMF that will alarm to confirm a leak on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system?

2) Which ONE (1) of the following is an AUTOMATIC action that will occur due to a Trip 2 signal on the Fuel Handling Building Ventilation (VF) system EMF?

COMPONENT LEGEND:

2EMF-4 (SPENT FUEL BLDG REFUEL BRDG) 2EMF-42 (UNIT 2 FUEL BUILDING VENTILATION)

A. 1. 2EMF-4

2. The VF Supply and Exhaust Fans will stop B. 1. 2EMF-42

2. The VF Supply and Exhaust Fans will stop C. 1. 2EMF-4

2. The Exhaust Filter Bypass Damper (D-5) will close D. 1. 2EMF-42

2. The Exhaust Filter Bypass Damper (D-5) will close Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 105 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 36 36 C General Discussion On decreasing Spent Fuel Pool level, a reduction in shield between the spent fuel and the Spent Fuel Building Refueling Bridge radiation monitor (2EMF-4) occurs. As level in the Spent Fuel Pool decreases, radiation levels on 2EMF-4 will increase until the monitor goes into alarm.

Decreasing Spent Fuel Pool level could eventually lead to increasing radiation levels or an alarm on 2EMF-42. However, this would only occur if level decreased to the point that damage to the fuel in the SFP occurred (since 2EMF-42 is a beta gas detector).

If 2EMF-42 reaches its Trip 2 setpoint, the Filter Train Bypass Damper (D-5) will close which places the Filter Train Unit in the FILTRATION MODE of operation.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since stopping the VF Supply and Exhaust fans would terminate any release from the Spent Fuel Pool area.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First Part is plausible since 2EMF-42 could potentially alarm if Spent Fuel Pool level decreased to the point that damage to the spent fuel occurred.

Second part is plausible since stopping the VF Supply and Exhaust fans would terminate any release from the Spent Fuel Pool area. Also the automatic actions associated with the VF system are caused by a Trip 2 on 2EMF-42.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since 2EMF-42 could potentially alarm if Spent Fuel Pool level decreased to the point that damage to the spent fuel occurred.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must demonstrate knowledge of the effect that a SFP cooling loss or malfunction (Leak) will have on the SFP area and ventilation system radiation monitors.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because it requires more than one mental step. First the applicant must analyze the given conditions to determine which EMF would FIRST alarm to confirm a Spent Fuel Pool Cooling leak. The applicant must then recall from memory what automatic actions occur on a high radiation alarm.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2011 MNS SRO NRC Exam Q34 (Bank 4384)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-WE-EMF Section 2.1.4 (Spent Fuel Building Ventilation Monitor)

Lesson Plan OP-MC-FH-FC Section 3.2 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 106 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 36 36 C LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-WE-EMF Objective 3 OP-MC-FH-FC Objective 6 SYS033 K3.02 - Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFPCS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Area and ventilation radiation monitoring systems .....................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 107 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 37 SYS035 A2.05 - Steam Generator System (S/GS) 37 B Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following mal- functions or operations on the GS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)

Unbalanced flows to the 5/Gs ......................................

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

The unit was at 100% RTP

A load reduction to 80% RTP for planned maintenance is in progress

During the load decrease, a DCS malfunction causes the SLIMs for 1CF-17AB (1D S/G CF CONTROL) and 1CF-107AB (1D S/G CF CONTROL BYPASS) to swap to manual Currently:

The load decrease is on hold at 85% RTP

NR Level for S/Gs 1A, 1B, and 1C are at program level

NR Level for S/G 1D S/G indicates 64% and STABLE Based on current conditions, annunciator 1AD-4 / B4 (S/G D LEVEL DEVIATION (1) LIT.

In accordance with AP-06 (S/G FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION), the crew will manually adjust 1D S/G feedwater flow to (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. is

2. restore 1D S/G NR level to program B. 1. is NOT

2. restore 1D S/G NR level to program C. 1. is

2. match 1D S/G feedwater flow to steam flow D. 1. is NOT

2. match 1D S/G feedwater flow to steam flow Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 108 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 37 37 B General Discussion Based on the conditions given, S/G program level is approximately 61%. In accordance with the annunciator response procedure for 1AD-4, a S/G A-D Level Deviation alarm will occur if S/G NR level deviates from program by +/- 5%. Since current level in the 1D S/G is 64%, the level deviation alarm will NOT be lit.

In accordance with AP-06 (S/G Feedwater Malfunction), if the CF Control Valves is not functioning properly, the crew will manually adjust feedwater flow to "restore S/G level to program".

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant incorrectly calculates program level OR incorrectly recalls the NR level deviation required for the annunciator to alarm.

Second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible if the applicant incorrectly calculates program level OR incorrectly recalls the NR level deviation required for the annunciator to alarm.

Second part is plausible because it is a common practice for operators to take manual control of feedwater flow and match feed flow to steam flow during a S/G level control transient when the cause of the transient is unknown.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because it is a common practice for operators to take manual control of feedwater flow and match feed flow to steam flow during a S/G level control transient when the cause of the transient is unknown.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must predict the impact of the unbalanced feedwater flow to the 1D S/G (i.e. whether the level deviation alarm is lit) and determine the correct response to the unbalanced feedwater flow in accordance with the appropriate procedure (AP-06).

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicant is required to first analyze the conditions in the stem and then determine what effect this will have on the S/G system and determine which procedure will be used to mitigate this event based on current reactor power.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

AP-06 (S/G Feedwater Malfunction)

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CF-IFC LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-ECC-ISE Objective 13 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 109 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 37 SYS035 A2.05 - Steam Generator System (S/GS) 37 B Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following mal- functions or operations on the GS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)

Unbalanced flows to the 5/Gs ......................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Consider sending to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review.

Question sent to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review on 1/22/15. HCF Chief Examiner Early Submittal Comments:

K/A SYS035 A2.05 Question was submitted for preliminary review.

Do not believe that the combination of distractors C(1) and C(2) are plausible. How could you lose feed to all steam generators and rule out a reactor trip.

Without giving a trend, it is not apparent that flows are not balanced at the given time. Levels are just different.

Mechanically binding a FRV during a power change would cause unbalanced flows. Then you could test setpoints and procedural actions.

Facility Response:

Took Chief Examiner's suggestion and provided applicants with a condtion where a FRV failed to change position during a power change (i.e. FRV failed to manual during power decrease). Then, tested alarm setpoint knowledge (S/G Level Deviation alarm) and procedure actions from AP-06 (S/G Feedwater Malfunction). HCF 03/02/2015 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 110 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 38 SYS068 K1.07 - Liquid Radwaste System (LRS) 38 C Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the Liquid Radwaste System and the following systems:

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

Sources of liquid wastes for LRS ...................................

Regarding the CF&E (CONTAINMENT FLOOR AND EQUIPMENT) Sumps,

1) one input into the CF&E sumps is .

2) the CF&E sumps discharge is aligned to the .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. VU AHU drains

2. FDT (Floor Drain Tank)

B. 1. VU AHU drains

2. WMT (Waste Monitoring Tank)

C. 1. Ice Condenser Drains

2. FDT (Floor Drain Tank)

D. 1. Ice Condenser Drains

2. WMT (Waste Monitoring Tank)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 111 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 38 38 C General Discussion Per OP-MC-WE-WL drawing 7.7 one input into the CF&E sumps is ice condenser drains and the discharge of the CF&E sumps is aligned to the FDT.

Per OP-MC-WE-WL drawing 7.9 one input into the (VUCDT) Ventilation Unit Condensate Drain Tank is VU ahu drains.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since VU ahu drains is a source of containment waste collected in a Liquid Waste system tank.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since VU ahu drains is a source of containment waste collected in a Liquid Waste system tank.

Second part is plausible since the WMT is a Liquid Waste system storage tank that is capable of receiving contaminated liquids .

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since the WMT is a Liquid Waste system storage tank that is capable of receiving contaminated liquids .

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of input sources to particular tanks/sumps in the Liquid Waste system and also where these tanks/sumps are pumped to.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-WE-WL Drawing 7.7 Lesson Plan OP-MC-WE-WL Drawing 7.9 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-WE-WL Objective 2 SYS068 K1.07 - Liquid Radwaste System (LRS)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the Liquid Radwaste System and the following systems:

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

Sources of liquid wastes for LRS ...................................

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 112 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 38 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 38 C Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 113 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 39 EPE007 EA1.03 - Reactor Trip 39 C Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a reactor trip: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

RCS pressure and temperature .....................................

Given the following on Unit 1:

A Loss of Offsite power has occurred

1A and 1B D/Gs are supplying the 4160V busses

The crew has completed E-0 (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION) and entered ES-0.1 (REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE)

NCS Tavg is 552°F and slowly lowering Based on the conditions above,

1) all Feedwater Isolation status lights on 1SI-4 be lit.

2) ES-0.1 will check NC system stable or trending to 557°F.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. will

2. Tavg B. 1. will NOT

2. Tavg C. 1. will

2. Tcolds D. 1. will NOT

2. Tcolds Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 114 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 39 39 C General Discussion ES-0.1 Step 5 will check NC temperatures to see if a cooldown is occurring.

If ANY NC pump is ON, NC Tavg will be checked - stable or trending to 557°F.

If ALL NC pumps are OFF, NC Tcolds will be checked - stable or trending to 557°F.

Since a loss of offsite power has occurred, the 4160V essential busses are the only busses that have power. All 6900V busses are de-energized and therefore NCPs are tripped.

Since a reactor trip has occurred and T-ave is 552°F, the conditions for a FWI have been met and all Feedwater Isolation status lights on 1SI-4 will be lit.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since this would be correct if ANY NCP was operating.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since applicant may confuse Rx trip with low Tavg FWI setpoint (553 degrees F) with minimum temperature for criticality setpoint (551 degrees F).

Second part is plausible since this would be correct if ANY NCP was operating.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since applicant may confuse Rx trip with low Tavg FWI setpoint (553 degrees F) with minimum temperature for criticality setpoint (551 degrees F).

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant demonstrates the ability to monitor NCS temperature by selecting which NCS temperature will be monitored to determine if an NCS cooldown is occurring.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicant must first analyze the conditions in the stem to determine the status of plant equipment and then determine what effect this will have on NCS temperature monitoring requirements.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-ECC-ISE (Engineered Safeguards Actuation System) Section 2.1 (Safety Signal Setpoints) and Section 3.1 (Normal Operation)

E- 0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

ES-0.1 (Reactor Trip Response)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 115 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 39 EPE007 EA1.03 - Reactor Trip 39 C Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a reactor trip: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

RCS pressure and temperature .....................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 116 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 40 APE008 AK2.01 - Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open) 40 C Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Valves .........................................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is operating at 100% RTP

One PZR PORV is leaking past its seat

Pressurizer pressure is 2235 PSIG

Pressurizer Steam Space temperature is 653°F

PRT pressure is 15 PSIG Which ONE (1) of the following is the approximate expected temperature downstream of the leaking PZR PORV?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 220°F B. 240°F C. 250°F D. 300°F Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 117 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 40 40 C General Discussion With Pressuizer pressure at 2235 PSIG (2250 PSIA), the enthalpy of the saturated vapor in the pressurizer steam space is approximately 1118 BTU/lbm. Using the Mollier Diagram, we would first follow the 1118 BTU/lbm line horizontally across to the Constant Pressure line associated with PRT pressure (15 PSIG or 30 PSIA). Since this point occurs in the area below the Saturation Curve, we know that the mixture exiting the Code Safety is a wet vapor. Therefore, to determine the temperature at the exit of the Code Safety we follow the Constant Pressure line up to the saturation line to determine the exit temperature. This yields a temperature of 250°F.

Alternatively, once the applicant determines that the intersection of the constant enthalpy line and constant pressure line occurs in the wet vapor area of the T-S curve, they could simply look up the saturation temperature associated with a saturation pressure of 30 PSIA (or 250.34°F).

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The temperature is plausible because if the applicant uses the 15 PSIA constant pressure line as opposed to the 30 PSIA constant pressure line and follows the 15 PSIA line to the saturation line.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant locates the intersection of the constant enthalpy line and the 15 PSIA line (instead of the 30 PSIA line) and then goes straight up vertically to the saturation line.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant correctly locates the intersection of the constant enthalpy line and the 30 PSIA constant pressure line but then incorrectly goes straight up vertically to the saturation line.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the difference between an isentropic and isenthalpic process to determine why temperature downstream of the Code Safety is less than Pressurizer temperature.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires multiple mental steps. The first part requires the applicant to analyze the given conditions and apply those to the Mollier diagram to determine the temperature downstream of the Code Safety valve. The applicant must then recall from memory what type of process results in the temperature being less than Pressurizer temperature.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2012 MNS NRC Q40 (Bank 5732)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Steam Tables OP-BNT-TH04 (Thermodynamic Processes) Section 5.6 (Throttling)

Mollier Diagram LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-BNT-TH04 Objectives 29 and 31 APE008 AK2.01 - Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open)

Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Valves .........................................................

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 118 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 40 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 40 C Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 119 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 41 EPE009 EA2.02 - Small Break LOCA 41 B Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

Possible leak paths ...............................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

Unit is at 100% RTP

2B KC surge tank level is slowly trending up

2EMF-46B (COMPONENT COOLING TRAIN B) is in a Trip 2 condition The indications above can be caused by a leak on the (1) heat exchanger.

When 2EMF-46B Trip 2 clears, 2KC-122 (KC SURGE TANK VENT VALVE)

(2) .automatically re-OPEN.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Letdown

2. will NOT B. 1. Letdown

2. will C. 1. Seal Water Return

2. will NOT D. 1. Seal Water Return

2. will Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 120 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 41 41 B General Discussion The Component Cooling Water System (KC) supplies cooling water to various essential and non-essential heat exchangers within the Auxiliary and Reactor Buildings and serves as a boundary (buffer) between the Reactor Coolant and Nuclear Service Water Systems.

The seal water heat exchanger is cooled by Component Cooling (KC) water circulated through shell side of the heat exchanger.

The letdown heat exchanger cools the letdown flow to the operating temperature of the mixed bed demineralizers. Letdown flow is through the tube side of the heat exchanger and KC (Component Cooling) flows through the shell side.

Since L/D pressure is approximately 350 psig at the L/D Hx and KC system pressure is approximately 110 psig, leakage of NC into the KC system could occur.

NCP Seal Water Return Hx returns to the VCT at a pressure of 25 to 35 psig, therefore leakage in this Hx would be from KC into the seal return line.

A high radiation alarm on 2EMF-46A or 2EMF-46B will automatically close 2KC122.

It is normally open and receives a close signal on EMF-46A & B alarm. The OPEN position latches in so when the EMF signal clears, the valve will re-open.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since EMF-46 trip 2 comp actions close the KC surge tank vent valve and it can only be operated by a local/manual control station, one could conclude that local /mnaual operation is required to open the valve.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since KC does cool the Seal Water HX . However, due to the KC system being at a higher pressure than the seal water return line, if any leakage occurred it would be KC into the seal return line.

Second part is plausible since EMF-46 trip 2 comp actions close the KC surge tank vent valve and it can only be operated by a local/manual control station, one could conclude that local /mnaual operation is required to open the valve.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since KC does cool the Seal Water HX . However, due to the KC system being at a higher pressure than the seal water return line, if any leakage occurred it would be KC into the seal return line.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant, given a set of specific plant conditions, is required to demonstrate the ability to identify potential NC system leak paths.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicant is required to analyze conditions in the stem and the determine possible NC system leak paths based on those conditions.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 121 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 41 Development References Student References Provided 41 B

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-NV-DCS Lesson Plan OP-MC-PSS-KC Lesson Plan OP-MC-WE-EMF LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

EPE009 EA2.02 - Small Break LOCA Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

Possible leak paths ...............................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 122 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 42 APE022 AA1.07 - Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup 42 D Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Excess letdown containment isolation valve switches and indicators . . . . .

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

Unit was operating at 90% RTP

1NV-7B (L/D CONT OUTSIDE ISOL) failed CLOSED

The operators entered AP-12 (LOSS OF LETDOWN, CHARGING OR SEAL INJECTION)

Excess L/D has been placed in service 1NV-24B (C NC LOOP TO EXS L/D HX ISOL) and 1NV-25B (C NC LOOP TO EXS L/D HX ISOL) can be controlled from the C/R AND the (1) .

Per AP-12, when placing Excess L/D in service, 1NV-26B (U1 EXCESS L/D HX OUTLET CNTRL) is cycled OPEN for two minutes and then CLOSED to (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. SSF

2. minimize possible reactivity excursions B. 1. ASP

2. minimize possible reactivity excursions C. 1. SSF

2. reduce the possibility of water hammers D. 1. ASP

2. reduce the possibility of water hammers Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 123 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 42 42 D General Discussion NV-24B and NV-25B - The NC Loop to Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves are controlled by "Open-Close" pushbuttons on MC-

10. They may also be controlled from the ASP.

NOTE in AP-12:

Opening and then closing 1NV-26B (U1 Excess L/D Hx Outlet Cntrl) in the next steps will reduce the possibility of water hammer by ensuring that the excess letdown line is filled with water.

Per AP-12 bkgd document:

NV-26 is then cycled open and then closed to back charge the Excess L/D line. This is prudent since a long run of Excess L/D line is prior to the Hx, at NC temperatures the last time it was in service. When secured, this line is bottled up. When this long run of piping cools from NC temperatures to ambient temperatures, enough contraction can take place to cause voiding.

When the Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger is placed into service, the boron concentration of the fluid in the heat exchanger and associated piping (approximately 25 gallons) is the concentration of the NC system the last time the heat exchanger was in service. This has the potential to cause a reactivity excursion.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since NV-94AC and NV-95B are located at the SSF. These valves must be open to allow excess letdown to return to the VCT using the NCP seal return line.

Second part is plausible since a reactivity excursion will occur when excess L/D is aligned due to the fluid in the heat exchanger and associated piping (approximately 25 gallons) is the concentration of the NC system the last time the heat exchanger was in service.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since a reactivity excursion will occur when excess L/D is aligned due to the fluid in the heat exchanger and associated piping (approximately 25 gallons) is the concentration of the NC system the last time the heat exchanger was in service.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since NV-94AC and NV-95B are located at the SSF. These valves must be open to allow excess letdown to return to the VCT using the NCP seal return line.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must demonstrate knowledge of where the excess L/D inlet isolation valves (1NV-24A and 1NV-25B) can be operated from. (ability, location of isolation valve switches). Additionally, the applicant is required to understand the reason for specific actions taken to align excess letdown.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 124 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 42 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source 42 D RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-NV-DCS AP-12 (Loss of Letdown, Chargeing or Seal Injection)

AP-12 Background Document LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

APE022 AA1.07 - Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Excess letdown containment isolation valve switches and indicators . . . . .

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 125 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 43 APE025 AK2.01 - Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) 43 B Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

RHR heat exchangers .............................................

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 2 :

Both trains of Residual Heat Removal (ND) are in service

ND heat exchanger outlet valves are throttled to 2000 GPM each

NC system cooldown rate is 25°F per hour Subsequently:

The air line for 2ND-34 (2A & 2B ND HX BYP ISOL) breaks off Which ONE (1) of the following indicates the INITIAL ND system response to this event?

TOTAL ND SYSTEM NC SYSTEM FLOW COOLDOWN RATE A. INCREASES INCREASES B. INCREASES DECREASES C. DECREASES INCREASES D. DECREASES DECREASES Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 126 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 43 43 B General Discussion The ND HX bypass valve ND-34 is a fail open valve. Therefore, when the valve fails open, total ND system flow rate increases. However, since more flow is now bypass the ND HXs, the NC system cooldown rate decreases.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because normally an increase in total ND system flow rate would be associated with an increase in NC system cooldown rate (since is presumed that this means an increase in flow through the ND HXs).

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant concludes that ND-34 fails closed and this is a common misconception among licensed operators at MNS.

If the applicant concludes that ND-34 fails closed, they would naturally conclude that since there is no flow through the bypass line that all ND flow is now being forced through the ND HXs causing an increase in the NC system cooldown rate.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant concludes that ND-34 fails closed and this is a common misconception among licensed operators at MNS.

If the applicant concludes that ND-34 has failed closed, they might also conclude that the associated reduction in total ND system flow would also cause the NC system cooldown rate to decrease. This makes the second part plausible.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the interrelationship between the ND HXs and loss of ND system cooling capability. By demonstrating the ability to analyze various ND system component failures and their effect on ND system cooling capability, the applicant demonstrates this knowledge.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. First the applicant must recall from memory the fail position of 2ND-34 and the arrangement of the ND system piping related to the HXs and the bypass valve.

The applicant must then analyze the conditions given and associated the results of that analysis with the recalled information to determine the correct response.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-ND (Residual Heat Removal) Section 2.3.6 (ND-34)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

NONE APE025 AK2.01 - Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 127 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 43 RHR heat exchangers .............................................

43 B 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 128 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 44 APE027 2.4.46 - Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) Malfunction 44 A APE027 GENERIC Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.12)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

An internal failure of the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller has occurred

1AD-2 / E8 (DCS TROUBLE) is in alarm

Actual Pressurizer Pressure is 2250 PSIG and decreasing

The Pressurizer Pressure Calculated Error observed on the Soft Panel has failed to +100 PSIG Which ONE (1) of the following indicates the status of the Pressurizer Pressure Control system?

A. PORV 1NC-34A is OPEN PZR Spray Valves are OPEN B. PORV 1NC-34A is OPEN PZR Spray Valves are CLOSED C. PORV 1NC-34A is CLOSED PZR Spray Valves are OPEN D. PORV 1NC-34A is CLOSED PZR Spray Valves are CLOSED Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 129 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 44 44 A General Discussion Pzr Spray valves will begin to open with a Pzr Master Controller developed error signal of +25 PSIG and be full open at +75 PSIG error signal.

NC-34A wil open with a Pzr Master Controller developed error signal of +100 PSIG.

If actual Pzr pressure is less than 2177 PSIG, a signal will be sent to block the opening of 1NC-34A regardless of developed error signal.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct and the second part is plausible since the applicant may conclude that the 2177 PSIG block applies to the Spray valves.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The second part is correct and the first part is plausible since the applicant may conclude that the actual Pzr pressure has exceeded the setpoint that would block the opening of NC-34A.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible since the applicant may conclude that the actual Pzr pressure has exceeded the setpoint that would block the opening of NC-34A. the second part is plausible since the applicant may conclude that the 2177 PSIG block applies to the Spray valves.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because a malfunction has occurred on the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller and the applicant must determine the effect on the Pressurizer Pressure Control System based on instrument indications and annunciator/OAC alarms.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must first analyze the given conditions and determine that 1NC-34A and the Spray Valves have an OPEN signal. The applicant must then determine if 1NC-34A has received a block signal that would prevent it from opening.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2014 MNS SRO AUDIT Q44 Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-PS-IPE (Pressurizer Pressure Control) Drawing 7.7 (Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller Output Vs Function)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-PS-IPE Objective 5 APE027 2.4.46 - Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) Malfunction APE027 GENERIC Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.12) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 130 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 44 44 A Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 131 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 45 EPE029 2.4.21 - Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) 45 B EPE029 GENERIC Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc. (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

A valid First Out annunciator is LIT on Annunciator Panel 2FO-1

Both Reactor Trip breakers indicate OPEN

IR SUR meters indicate +0.5 DPM

All WR Neutron flux indications are stable

The STA is manually evaluating the Critical Safety Function Status Trees (CSFSTs) because SPDS in not working Based on the conditions above, the CSFSTs require implementation of FR-S.1 (RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR GENERATION / ATWS) if indicated power is greater than a MINIMUM of (1) OR if WR Neutron Flux indicates greater than a MINIMUM of (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. 5 %

2. 10-3 %

B. 1. 5 %

2. 10-5 %

C. 1. 10 %

2. 10-3 %

D. 1. 10 %

2. 10-5 %

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 132 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 45 45 B General Discussion Based on the conditions given, a RED PATH condition will be met on Subcriticality if indicated power is greater than 5%.

Additionally, if indicated power is less than 5%, with SUR being positive, an ORANGE PATH condition will be met on Subcriticality if WR Neutron Flux is greater than or equal to 10E-05 %.

In either case (RED or ORANGE) the CSFSTs require implementation of FR-S.1.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because 10E-03% is the approximate level at which critical data is taken with the new NIs (4 x 10E-03).

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because numerous control and interlock functions occur at 10%.

Second part is plausible because 10E-03% is the approximate level at which critical data is taken with the new Nis (4 x 10E-03).

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because numerous control and interlock functions occur at 10%.

Second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is met because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of specific parameter values used to determine whether a RED Path condition is met on Subcriticality (i.e. entry into FR-S.1 based on an ATWS condition).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

FR-S.1 (Response to Nuclear Generation / ATWS)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

EPFRS002 EPE029 2.4.21 - Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)

EPE029 GENERIC Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc. (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 133 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 45 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 45 B Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 134 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 46 EPE038 EK3.01 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) 46 A Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the SGTR: (CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Equalizing pressure on primary and secondary sides of ruptured S/G ......

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The 1D S/G is ruptured

E-3 (STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE) has been implemented

The first NC system depressurization was stopped with the following indications:

NC system pressure 1250 PSIG 1D S/G pressure 1050 PSIG

SI has been terminated and the crew is preparing for a second NC system depressurization In accordance with the SGTR mitigating strategy,

1) the second NC system depressurization is performed to .

2) the reason for initially establishing a minimum level in the ruptured S/G is to prevent .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. prevent S/G over-fill

2. ruptured S/G depressurization B. 1. establish indicated level in the PZR

2. ruptured S/G depressurization C. 1. prevent S/G over-fill

2. additional damage of ruptured S/G tubes D. 1. establish indicated level in the PZR

2. additional damage of ruptured S/G tubes Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 135 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 46 46 A General Discussion There are two NC system depressurizations performed in E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture).

The first depressurization is performed to establish indicated level in the Pressurizer and to allow SI termination.

The second depressurization is performed to minimize or stop primary-to-secondary leakage and to prevent S/G overfill.

The reason for establishing an initial minimum level in the ruptured S/G is to establish a thermal stratification layer in the S/G to prevent depressurization of the ruptured S/G. Ruptured S/G depressurization would complicate the mitigation strategy and the recovery efforts.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible since the purpose of the first depressurization performed in E-3 is to establish indicated level in the Pzr.

The second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct and therefore plausible.

The second part is plausible since establishing a minimum level in the ruptured S/G prevents the tubes from being uncovered.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible since the purpose of the first depressurization performed in E-3 is to establish indicated level in the Pzr.

The second part is plausible since establishing a minimum level in the ruptured S/G prevents the tubes from being uncovered.

Basis for meeting the KA In E-3, the first depressurization is performed for the express purpose of terminating SI. However, the second depressurization is performed to equalize pressure on the primary and secondary sides of the ruptured S/G to prevent S/G overfill. By demonstraing a knowledge of the reason for this mitigative strategy the applicant demonstrates a knowledge of the reason for equalizing pressures in the S/G. Therefore, the K/A is matched.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

OP-MC-EP-E3 Background Document LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

EPE3003 EPE038 EK3.01 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the SGTR: (CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Equalizing pressure on primary and secondary sides of ruptured S/G ......

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 136 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 46 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 46 A Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 137 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 47 APE040 AK3.04 - Steam Line Rupture 47 D Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Actions contained in EOPs for steam line rupture .....................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A Steam line break has occurred

NC pressure is 1700 PSIG

Tavg is 518°F

Containment pressure is 2.9 PSIG on 3 channels and 3.1 PSIG on 1 channel

SG pressures are 755 PSIG Based on the conditions above,

1) MSIV and MSIV Bypass valves are .

2) The purpose of CLOSING MSIVs and MSIV Bypass valves in E-2 (FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION) is to .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. OPEN

2. terminate an uncontrolled cooldown B. 1. OPEN

2. isolate a faulted S/G from the non-faulted S/Gs C. 1. CLOSED

2. terminate an uncontrolled cooldown D. 1. CLOSED

2. isolate a faulted S/G from the non-faulted S/Gs Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 138 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 47 47 D General Discussion A Main Steam Isolation (MSI) signal closes the MSIV's, MSIV bypasses and the PORV's. It can be actuated by any one of the following signals:

Manually1/2 pushbuttons Hi Hi Containment Pressure> 3.0 psig2/4 channels Low Steam Pressure< 775 psig2/3 channels on 1/4 S/G> P-11 High steamline pressure negative rate(-)100 psig/sec2/3 channels on 1/4 S/Gbelow P-11 if the Lo Press Stm Line Isol is blocked.

Per E-2 background document, the MSIVs and Bypass valves are checked closed in an attempt to isolate the break and to isolate the S/Gs from each other.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since applicant may conclude a MSI has not occurred due to containment pressure. However, a MSI should have occurred due to S/G pressures.

Second part is plausible since this would be a reason for closing the MSIVs and Bypass valves if the steam break were not inside containment.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since applicant may conclude a MSI has not occurred due to containment pressure. However, a MSI should have occurred due to S/G pressures.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since this would be a reason for closing the MSIVs and Bypass valves if the steam break were not inside containment.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the reasons for closing MSIVs and MSIV Bypass valves per E-2 (Faulted S/G Isolation).

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicant is required to analyze the conditions in the stem to determine whether or not a MSI signal has been generated and where the location of the steam break is, then recall from memory the reason for closing MSIVs and Bypass valves per E-2.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-ECC-ISE E-2 (Faulted S/G Isolation) Background Document LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

MC-OP-ECC-ISE Objective 13 EPE2003 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 139 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 47 APE040 AK3.04 - Steam Line Rupture 47 D Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Actions contained in EOPs for steam line rupture .....................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 140 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 48 APE054 AA2.03 - Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW) 48 C Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Conditions and reasons for AFW pump startup ........................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A unit shutdown is in progress

0200 both Main Feedwater pumps trip Subsequently, the following conditions are observed:

TIME CONDITION 0200 0205 0210 0215 NCS Temp (°F) 557 558 558 559 NCS Press (PSIG) 1965 1960 1976 1991 NR SG A (%) 19 18 19 19 NR SG B (%) 20 18 17 16 NR SG C (%) 20 19 18 16 NR SG D (%) 18 16 18 19 Based on the conditions above,

1) the EARLIEST time that the MD CA pumps will be running is .

2) the EARLIEST time that the TD CA pump will be running is .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 0200

2. 0205 B. 1. 0205

2. 0205 C. 1. 0200

2. 0215 D. 1. 0205

2. 0215 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 141 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 48 48 C General Discussion Since NC pressure remains above the P-11 setpoint (1955 PSIG) during the entire event, Auto-Start Defeat could not have been initiated for the MD CA pumps. Therefore, as soon as both Main Feedwater pumps trip the MD CA pumps will auto-start.

The TD CA pump will auto-start when two (2) SG NR levels are less than 17%.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant concludes that the TD CA pump will start when one SG NR level is less than 17%.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 if the applicant does not understand that the MD CA pumps would have started as soon as both MFW pumps tripped. If not, the applicant would conclude that the pumps started as soon as one (1) SG NR level was less than 17%.

Part 2 is plausible if the applicant concludes that the TD CA pump will start when one (1) SG NR level is less than 17%.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 if the applicant does not understand that the MD CA pumps would have started as soon as both MFW pumps tripped. If not, the applicant would conclude that the pumps started as soon as one (1) SG NR level was less than 17%.

Part 2 is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must analyze plant conditions during a Loss of Feedwater event and determine when the AFW (CA) pumps start during the event. The applicant must have an understanding of the "conditions" that will result in an auto-start of the pumps and in doing so demonstrates a knowledge of the "reasons" for the pumps starting when they did.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because it is an analysis level question where the applicant must analyze the plant conditions at each time during the event to determine the correct auto-start time for the TD and MD CA pumps.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2011 MNS SRO NRC Q50 (Bank 4403)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CF-CA (Auxiliary Feedwater System) Section 2.1 (Motor Driven CA Pumps) and 2.2 (Turbine Driven CA Pump)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-CF-CA Objective 4 APE054 AA2.03 - Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW)

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Conditions and reasons for AFW pump startup ........................

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 142 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 48 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 48 C Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 143 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 49 EPE055 EK1.01 - Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout) 49 B Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Station Blackout : (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Effect of battery discharge rates on capacity ..........................

Given the following conditions:

McGuire has experienced a Station Blackout

The 1A D/G fails to start

The 1B D/G started and tripped on low lube oil pressure Based on the conditions above,

1) the vital DC batteries that should be monitored for decaying voltage are .

2) the vital DC batteries discharge rate will until the design battery capacity is exhausted.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. EVCA and EVCB

2. remain constant B. 1. EVCA and EVCB

2. increase steadily C. 1. EVCC and EVCD

2. remain constant D. 1. EVCC and EVCD

2. increase steadily Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 144 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 49 49 B General Discussion The normal electrical alignment for the vital DC Chargers is: 1A D/G for EVCA. 2A for EVCC, 1B for EVCB and 2B for EVCD.

The battery will be removed from service if its voltage decreases to 105 Volts. The reason for this is that as voltage decreases, current will increase.

Additionally, the operator should recognize that as the battery voltage decreases and the current increases, the battery discharge rate will increase steadily until the battery is exhausted.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible because the actual loads tied to the vital DC batteries has not changed. Since the amount of load on the batteries has not changed, it is logical for the applicant to conclude that the discharge rate will remain constant.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since this would be true had the 2A and 2B EDG failed to supply power to their busses. Unit 1A and B EDGs are also the backup power supply to EVCC and EVCD.

Second part is plausible because the actual loads tied to the vital DC batteries has not changed. Since the amount of load on the batteries has not changed, it is logical for the applicant to conclude that the discharge rate will remain constant.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since this would be true had the 2A and 2B EDG failed to supply power to their busses. Unit 1A and B EDGs are also the backup power supply to EVCC and EVCD.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must demonstrate knowledge of the operational implication (which vital DC busses are effected) of the vital battery discharge rates following a station blackout.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2005 MNS NRC SRO Examination NRC Q12 (Bank 3622)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EL-EPL LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-EL-EPL Objectives 2 & 23 EPE055 EK1.01 - Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Station Blackout : (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 145 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 49 Effect of battery discharge rates on capacity ..........................

49 B 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 146 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 50 APE056 2.4.47 - Loss of Offsite Power 50 D APE056 GENERIC Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material. (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

A Loss of Offsite Power has occurred

The crew has verified natural circulation flow per EP/1A/5000/ G-1 (Generic Enclosures) Enclosure 33 (NATURAL CIRCULATION PARAMETERS)

Subsequently:

The Core Exit thermocouple input to both ICCM display panels malfunctions Which ONE (1) of the following sets of trends would validate that natural circulation is occurring in accordance with G-1, Enclosure 33?

NC System Cold Leg NC System Hot Leg Temperatures: Temperatures:

A. Going DOWN Going DOWN B. At saturation temperature for At saturation temperature for S/G pressure S/G pressure C. Going DOWN At saturation temperature for S/G pressure D. At saturation temperature for Going DOWN S/G pressure Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 147 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 50 50 D General Discussion The indications of Natural Circulation are:

1. NC Subcooling - Greater than 0°F

2. S/G Pressures - Stable or going down

3. NC T-Hots - Stable or going down

4. Core Exit T/Cs - Stable or going down

5. NC T-Colds - At saturation temperature for S/G pressure Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant confuses Cold Leg Temperature indication and concludes that it should be the same as Hot Leg Temperature.

The second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible if the applicant confuses Hot Leg Temperature indication and concludes that it should be the same as Cold Leg Temperature.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant reverses the correct indications for Cold Leg Temperatures and Hot Leg Temperatures.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA This KA is matched because the applicant is required to recognize trends associated with Natural Circulation conditions (as a result of a LOOP) using control room instruments and/or chart recorders due to the loss of the ICCM panels.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2013 MNS SRO AUDIT Q52 (Bank 5743)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 33 (Natural Circulation Parameters)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

EPGE003 APE056 2.4.47 - Loss of Offsite Power APE056 GENERIC Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 148 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 50 50 D Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material. (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 149 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 51 APE057 AA1.05 - Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus 51 C Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Backup instrument indications .....................................

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 2:

Both CFPT's tripped causing a Rx Trip 15 minutes ago

The crew has completed E-0 (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION) and transitioned to ES-0.1 (REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE)

Subsequently:

EVDA output breaker to 2EVIA inverter trips OPEN Based on the conditions above,

1) which ONE (1) of the following indicates the impact on the CA system instrumentation?

2) what alternate indication can be used to determine the status of the CA pumps?

A. 1. 2A S/G CA flow fails low

2. 2A S/G CA flow computer point (OAC)

B. 1. 2D S/G CA flow fails low

2. 2D S/G CA flow computer point (OAC)

C. 1. 2A S/G CA flow fails low

2. 2A CA Pump amps and breaker indicating lights D. 1. 2D S/G CA flow fails low

2. 2B CA Pump amps and breaker indicating lights Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 150 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 51 51 C General Discussion Per AP-15 (Loss of Vital or Aux Control Power), a loss of Vital AC bus 2EKVA will cause 2CAP-5090 (Aux Feedwater Flow to 2A S/G) to fail low.

Also per AP-15, a loss of Vital AC bus 2EKVD will cause 2CAFT-5121 (Aux Feedwater Flow to 2D S/G) to fail low.

With the flow transmitter failed low, the OAC indication will also be low due to being fed from the same transmitter.

Verification of CA pump operation (and therefore flow) can be done by using alternate indications such as, pump amps and breaker indicating lights.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since the CA flow computer point would be a good alternate indication . However, the OAC point is fed from the same transmitter as the control board indication.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since this would be correct had Vital AC bus 2EKVD de-energized. Applicant may confuse which loads are from each vital bus.

Second part is plausible since the CA flow computer point would be a good alternate indication . However, the OAC point is fed from the same transmitter as the control board indication.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since this would be correct had Vital AC bus 2EKVD de-energized. Applicant may confuse which loads are from each vital bus.

Second part is plausible since 2B CA pump feeds S/G's C and D and is true if 2D S/G CA flow had been lost due to loss of 2EKVD.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because it requires the applicant to determine the status of CA flow to A S/G by an alternate means ( using backup indications to determine the status of the CA pumps) due to the loss of vital AC instrument bus 2EKVA.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is high cognitive because the applicant must first analyze the conditions in the stem and determine that 2EKVA is de-energized since inverter 2EVIA has no 'AUTO" swap to alternate power supply, then dtermine how the CA system will be affected on a loss of Vital bus and what alternate indications can be used to verify CA flow.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

AP-15 (Loss of Vital or Aux Control Power)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

NONE APE057 AA1.05 - Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 151 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 51 Backup instrument indications .....................................

51 C 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 152 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 52 APE058 AA2.03 - Loss of DC Power 52 D Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

DC loads lost; impact on ability to operate and monitor plant systems ....

Given the following on Unit 1:

Unit is at 100% RTP

125VDC Battery CXB is aligned for an "equalizing charge" Subsequently:

A fault on bus DCB causes the CXB Battery charger output breaker and the DCA -DCB cross tie breakers to OPEN Based on the conditions above and per AP-15 (LOSS OF VITAL OR AUX CONTROL POWER),

1) switch indication on any component powered from 6.9 kV switchgear will be DARK.

2) IF an "AMSAC" actuation or "LOSS of BOTH CF PUMPS" event were to occur, the 1B MDCA pump auto start.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 1TA OR 1TC

2. will B. 1. 1TB OR 1TD

2. will C. 1. 1TA OR 1TC

2. will NOT D. 1. 1TB OR 1TD

2. will NOT Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 153 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 52 52 D General Discussion Per AP-15, Step 39 Check both of the following Aux Control Power DC busses energized as follows:

For DCA:

Switch indication on any component powered from 6900V switchgear 1TA or 1TC - LIT.

For DCB:

Switch indication on any component powered from 6900V switchgear 1TB or 1TD - LIT.

Per AP-15, ENCL. 20 1B CA pump will not autostart on "AMSAC" or "LOSS OF BOTH CF PUMPS".

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since this would be true if bus DCA had been lost.

Second part is plausible since the applicant may conclude an autostart will still be available since pump power is available.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since the applicant may conclude an autostart will still be available since pump power is available.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since this would be true if bus DCA had been lost.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant is required to determine a major DC load that is lost and its impact on continued plant operation.

Applicant is also required to use alternate indications to validate the loss of DC power.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicant must first analyze the conditions in the stem and determine that bus DCB is de-energized, then determine how the CF system will be affected on a reactor trip with a loss of bus DCB and what alternate indications can be used to verify DCB has lost power.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

AP-15 (Loss of Vital or Aux Control Power)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

NONE APE058 AA2.03 - Loss of DC Power Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 154 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE APE058ILT-31 AA2.03 -MNSLoss of DCSRO PowerNRC Examination QUESTION Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 52 52 D DC loads lost; impact on ability to operate and monitor plant systems ....

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 155 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 53 APE077 AK1.03 - Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances 53 B Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: (CFR:

41.4, 41.5, 41.7, 41.10 / 45.8)

Under-excitation............................................................................

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

Unit power ascension is in progress

Unit is at 660 MW Subsequently:

MVARs decrease to (-) 375

The operating crew enters AP-05 (GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRICAL GRID DISTURBANCES)

Based on the conditions above,

1) if the crew is unable to control leading MVARs using Unit 1 voltage regulator, then a generator load (MW) will also reduce leading MVARs.

2) per AP-05, if unable to maintain MVARs within limits of the generator capability curve, then the crew will .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

PROCEDURE LEGEND:

AP-02 (TURBINE TRIP)

E-0 (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION)

A. 1. decrease

2. trip Unit 1 Turbine AND GO TO AP-02 B. 1. decrease

2. trip Unit 1 Reactor AND GO TO E-0 C. 1. increase

2. trip Unit 1 Turbine AND GO TO AP-02 D. 1. increase

2. trip Unit 1 Reactor AND GO TO E-0 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 156 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 53 53 B General Discussion Increasing voltage SHOULD decrease leading MVARs and bring operation back within the APPLICABLE Capability Curve. Reduction of Generator Load (MWs) will also reduce leading MVARs and bring operation back within the APPLICABLE Capability Curve.

Per AP-05, IF unable to maintain MVARs within limits, THEN remove Generator from service as follows:

IF greater than P8, THEN perform the following:

Trip reactor. GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

IF less than P8, THEN perform the following:

Trip turbine. GO TO AP/1/A/5500/02 (Turbine Generator Trip).

With MW output at 660 MW unit is at approximately 55% RTP. The crew would be required to trip the reactor and go to E-0.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since this action would be correct for a RTP of less than 48%. Applicant may incorrectly convert MW to RTP.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since applicant could confuse how a power reduction/increase will effect MVARs.

Second part is plausible since this action would be correct for a RTP of less than 48%. Applicant may incorrectly convert MW to RTP.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since applicant could confuse how a power reduction/increase will effect MVARs.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of what actions may be taken to correct an under-excited (leading) condition and the operational impacts if the condition can not be corrected.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicant must first analyze the conditions in the stem and convert Mwe to %RTP, then recall the actions required based on current power level to mitigate the event.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-GEN-MG-U2 AP-05 (Generator Voltage and Grid Disturbances)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-AP-05 Objective 6 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 157 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 53 APE077 AK1.03 - Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances 53 B Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: (CFR:

41.4, 41.5, 41.7, 41.10 / 45.8)

Under-excitation............................................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 158 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 54 WE04 EK3.4 - LOCA Outside Containment 54 C Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (LOCA Outside Containment)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

ECA-1.2 (LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT) has been implemented

NC System pressure is 1700 psig and stable In accordance with ECA-1.2,

1) the crew will FIRST stop and isolate the pumps from the FWST.

2) the overall mitigating strategy includes cooldown and depressurization of the NCS to allow the .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. ND

2. Cold Leg Accumulators to inject B. 1. NI

2. Cold Leg Accumulators to inject C. 1. ND

2. ND isolation valves (1NI-173A and 1NI-178B) to close D. 1. NI

2. ND isolation valves (1NI-173A and 1NI-178B) to close Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 159 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 54 54 C General Discussion The first Major action in ECA-1.2 is to stop and isolate ND pumps from FWST.

The objective of ECA-1.2 is to provide actions to identify and isolate a LOCA outside containment. For a LOCA on the Residual Heat Removal (ND) system, the valves used to do this isolation are NI-173A /178B (ND to Cold Legs Cont Isol). These valves are not designed to close against the DP that could be seen during an ISLOCA. To meet the intent of ECA-1.2 to isolate a break on low pressure ND piping, this EP includes actions to cooldown and depressurize the NC system to the point where the isolation valves are capable of closing.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct and therefore plausible.

The second part is plausible because if the ND leak cannot be isolated before depleting the FWST, a transition to ECA-1.1 (Loss of ECR) would occur, and then the NCS is depressurized to allow CLA injection.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the high pressure injection lines will be checked later in ECA-1.2 to attempt to identify and isolate the break.

The second part is plausible because if the ND leak cannot be isolated before depleting the FWST, a transition to ECA-1.1 (Loss of ECR) would occur, and then the NCS is depressurized to allow CLA injection.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT:

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the high pressure injection lines will be checked later in ECA-1.2 to attempt to identify and isolate the break.

The second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must demonstrate knowledge of the reasons for the procedural direction to cooldown and depressurize the NCS to allow cycling of NI-173A/NI-178B to ensure these valves will provide leak isolation, since these valves are not designed to close against the DP that could be seen during an ISLOCA.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2013 MNS SRO AUDIT Q55 (Bank 5745)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-EP-E1 (Basis Document for ECA-1.2 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

EPE1003 OP-MC-EP-E1 Objective 3 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 160 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 54 WE04 EK3.4 - LOCA Outside Containment 54 C Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (LOCA Outside Containment)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Consider sending to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review.

Question sent to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review on 1/22/15. HCF Chief Examiners Early Submittal comments:

K/A WE04 EK3.4 Question was submitted for preliminary review.

The first bullet is a cue and is not needed.

May need to add plant pressure to the initial conditions (>450 psig).

Facility Response:

Removed first bullet from stem and added NCS pressure to stem per chief examiners comments. SLM030215 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 161 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 55 WE05 EK1.3 - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink 55 D Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink).

Given the following condition on Unit 1:

S/G's 1C & 1D are indicating 30% Narrow Range Level

S/G's 1A & 1B are faulted and indicating <5% Wide Range Level

All CA is unavailable

Containment Pressure is 3.5 PSIG

E-0 (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION) has been completed Based on the conditions above, which ONE (1) of the following indicates the NEXT procedure to be implemented AND the action(s) required?

PROCEDURE LEGEND:

E-2 (FAULTED S/G ISOLATION)

FR-H.1 (RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK)

A. Go to E-2; Isolate C & D S/G's B. Go to FR-H.1; Commence NCS feed and bleed C. Go to E-2; Close all MSIVs and MSIV bypasses D. Go to FR-H.1; Restore feed water flow to C & D S/G's Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 162 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 55 55 D General Discussion With the indications given, a valid red path exists for Heat Sink due to a loss of all Aux Feedwater (CA) and all S/G level less than 32% NR (ACC Values). The Containment pressure given is greater than 3 PSIG which requires the use of ACC numbers. The crew would be required to implement FR-H.1 (Loss of Heat Sink) and regain feedwater flow to C&D S/G's.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because indications are provided that 2 S/G's are faulted and if a transition to a FRP is required this would be the correct procedural flowpath. The minimum S/G level required for heat sink is 11% NR. If applicant fails to realize that ACC values are required (32%)

this would be a reasonable choice.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because transition to FR H.1 is correct and if applicant confuses the indicated S/G with WR level this would be the correct answer. Maximum S/G levels given in the stem are 30% and the level requiring the initiation of feed and bleed in FR H.1 is 36% WR level. If the applicant applies the feed and bleed criteria and confuses the NR level indications with the WR level criteria this would be reasonable answer.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because indications are provided that 2 S/G's are faulted and if a transition to a FRP is required this would be the correct procedural flowpath. The minimum S/G level required for heat sink is 11% NR. If applicant fails to realize that ACC values are required (32%)

this would be a reasonable choice. Closing the MSIVs and MSIV bypasses is one of the major actions taken in E-2 for faulted SGs.

CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because applicant is required to evaluate indications of a loss of secondary heat sink and demonstrate knowledge of the required procedural transition and actions required. (Operational implications).

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicant must perform a level of analysis concerning the given indications and select a course of action.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2011 MNS SRO NRC Q56 (Bank 4409)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

OP-MC-EP-FRH (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Background Document)

FR H.1 (Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-EP-FRH Objective #2 & #3 WE05 EK1.3 - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 163 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 55 (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3) 55 D Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink).

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 164 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 56 WE11 EK2.1 - Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation 56 C Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

Large Break LOCA has occurred inside Containment

Control room crew has implemented ECA-1.1 (LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRC)

Containment pressure is 8 PSIG and slowly rising

FWST level is 105 inches and lowering Per ECA-1.1 Foldout Page, when FWST level decreases to less than a MAXIMUM of (1) inches ALL ECCS pumps must be secured.

When the FWST Low level setpoint is reached 1NI-184B (1B ND PUMP SUCTION FROM CONT SUMP ISOL) AND 1NI-185A (1A ND PUMP SUCTIONFROM CONT SUMP ISOL) (2) automatically OPEN.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 95

2. will B. 1. 95

2. will NOT C. 1. 20

2. will D. 1. 20

2. will NOT Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 165 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 56 56 C General Discussion There are five levels which are important to proper FWST operation:

Low-Low20"

Low95"

Pre-Low Level 135"

Makeup475"

High483"

Overflow484" The Low and Low-Low levels are used for post accident monitoring. Redundant annunciators alarm at each point. Valves NI-184B and NI-185A automatically open at the Low level setpoint.

Valves NI-184B and NI-185A are part of the ECCS System. They are controlled from the Control Room and are normally closed. These valves automatically open on a 2/3 low level in conjunction with a Safety Injection Signal.

IF FWST level goes below "FWST LEVEL LO-LO" alarm setpoint (20 inches), THEN stop all pumps taking suction from the FWST.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since 95 inches is the setpoint for FWST Level Low.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since 95 inches is the setpoint for FWST Level Low.

Second part is plausible since all other actions to align to the Reactor bldg. sump are not performed until after the FWST reaches the Low-Low setpoint. However, automatic opening of the Reactor bldg. sump valves occurs at the FWST Low level setpoint.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since all other actions to align to the Reactor bldg. sump are not performed until after the FWST reaches the Low-Low setpoint. However, automatic opening of the Reactor bldg. sump valves occurs at the FWST Low level setpoint.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant is required to know the interrelations between FWST level and all ECCS systems (when to secure pumps to prevent damage) and the interlocks between FWST level and the containment sump valves.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2014 MNS SRO NRC Q54 (Not yet in MNS Bank)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

OP-MC-FH-FW Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 166 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 56 ECA-1.1 (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc) 56 C LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

WE11 EK2.1 - Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 167 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 57 APE005 AA1.01 - Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod 57 B Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

CRDS ..........................................................

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

A Unit runback has occurred

Rods are inserting in AUTO

Rod M-12 in Control Bank D is NOT inserting with its bank Subsequently:

A Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm is received

Unit1 Control Rod Bank Select is taken to MANUAL

I&E determines source of alarm is Power Cabinet 1BD Due to the Power Cabinet Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm, Group 1 rods in Control Banks B and D will NOT move in (1) .

When Unit 1 OATC attempts to continue control rod insertion, all other rods (2) insert.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. AUTO ONLY

2. will B. 1. AUTO OR MANUAL

2. will C. 1. AUTO ONLY

2. will NOT D. 1. AUTO OR MANUAL

2. will NOT Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 168 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 57 57 B General Discussion Power Cabinet 1BD supplies Shutdown Bank B-Group 1, Control Bank B-Group 1, and Control Bank D-Group 1.

If Power Cabinet Urgent Failure is in power cabinet 1BD, then Group 1 of Bank B and D will not move. However rod motion in manual or automatic or individual bank selection is still possible in Group 2 of Bank B or D and in all groups of the other banks.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since it is true that Group 1 rods in Control Bank D will not move in auto. However, they also will not move in manual.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since it is true that Group 1 rods in Control Bank D will not move in auto. However, they also will not move in manual.

Second part is plausible since a Logic Cabinet Urgent Failure would stop all rod motion in Auto and Manual.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible since a Logic Cabinet Urgent Failure would stop all rod motion in Auto and Manual.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant is required to demonstrate the ability to operate control rods after a Rod Control Urgent Failure that was generated by a stuck rod.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicant must analyze the conditions in the stem and then determine what effect these conditions will have on rod movement overall and specifically rod movement for the rods in Control bank D, Group 1.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension MODIFIED 2008 MNS NRC SRO Examination NRC Q57 (Bank 3275)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-IC-IRE (Rod Control System) Section 2.4.3 (Control Room Annunciators)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-IC-IRE Objective 10 APE005 AA1.01 - Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

CRDS ..........................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 169 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 57 57 B Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 170 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 58 APE028 AK3.03 - Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction 58 A Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 /

45.13)

False indication of PZR level when PORV or spray valve is open and RCS saturated .........................................

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is at 100% RTP

A loss of ALL offsite power occurs coincident with a SGTR

The crew has transitioned from E-3 (STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE) to ES-3.1 (POST-SGTR COOLDOWN USING BACKFILL)

Ruptured S/G pressure = 350 PSIG and stable

Core exit TC = 448°F, slowly decreasing

NC system pressure = 400 PSIG and stable

PZR Level = 4% and stable

Total SI Flow = 600 GPM Subsequently:

The crew reaches the step in ES-3.1 to depressurize the NC system to initiate backfill

Immediately after the BOP opens one PZR PORV, Pressurizer level begins increasing rapidly and SI flow increases to 650 GPM Which ONE (1) of the following is the cause of these indications?

A. Voiding in the reactor vessel head is forcing water up the surge line.

B. Backflow has been established from the ruptured S/G to the NC system.

C. Safety injection flow is driving the NC system to a water - solid condition.

D. PZR level instruments are not calibrated for temperatures less than 600°F.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 171 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 58 58 A General Discussion Per the note prior to Step 13 in ES-3.1 (Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill), if all NC pumps are off, the upper head region may void during NC System depressurization which will cause Pzr level to rise rapidly.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because the reason for opening the PORV is to initiate backfill to restore pressurizer level.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because the SI system is providing a large amount of flow into the NC system and the reason for performing the steps in ES-3.1 is to refill the Pressurizer.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because, with the exception of Pressurizer Cold Cal, all Pressurizer level instruments are calibrated at normal operating temperature in the Pressurizer (approximately 650°F).

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because conditions have occurred that have resulted in a false PZR level indication and the applicant must diagnose the cause based on plant conditons.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires the applicant to analyze the plant conditions and diagnose the cause of the increasing PZR level indications based on that diagnosis.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2012 Watts Bar NRC Exam Q38 Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

ES-3.1 (Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

APE028 AK3.03 - Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 /

45.13)

False indication of PZR level when PORV or spray valve is open and RCS saturated .........................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 172 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 59 APE032 2.2.36 - Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation 59 D APE032 GENERIC Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations. (CFR:

41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

Shutdown Bank Rods are withdrawn in preparation for a Reactor startup

The startup is on hold while I&E completes an inspection of the Channel 1 Nuclear Instrument cabinet Based on the conditions above, (1) channel(s) of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation is/are currently required to be operable.

If, during the NI cabinet inspection, the I&E technician grounds a terminal that results in a loss of power to Source Range Channel N31, the crew (2) required to IMMEDIATELY open the Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs).

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. ONE

2. is B. 1. ONE

2. is NOT C. 1. BOTH

2. is D. 1. BOTH

2. is NOT Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 173 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 59 59 D General Discussion The unit is currently in MODE 3 with the reactor trip breakers closed. Under the current conditions, BOTH Source Range Nuclear Instruments are required to be OPERABLE.

If during maintenance, the I&E technician causes a loss of one of the Source Ranges, the crew is required to restore the channel to service with 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months OR open the reactor trip breakers. However, they are NOT required to IMMEDIATELY open the reactor trip breakers.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because if the crew was in MODE 3 with the reactor trip breakers open, only one Source Range Nuclear Instrument is required to be OPERABLE.

The second part is plausible because opening the reactor trip breakers is one of the available options to the crew to correct the situation (in accordance with Tech Specs).

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because if the crew was in MODE 3 with the reactor trip breakers open, only one Source Range Nuclear Instrument is required to be OPERABLE.

The second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because opening the reactor trip breakers is one of the available options to the crew to correct the situation (in accordance with Tech Specs).

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because maintenance activities have resulted in a loss of power to a source range and the applicant must evaluate the Tech Spec implications.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. First, the applicant must evaluate the given conditions to determine the exact condition of the plant. Next, the applicant must recall from memory the Tech Spec actions related to Source Range Nuclear Instrument operability in different MODES. Finally, the applicant must associate the analyzed data and the information recalled from memory to determine the correct answer.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Tech Spec 3.3.1 (RTS Instrumentation) Pages 1-15 Tech Spec 3.3.1 (RTS Instrumentation)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

ICIPE014 APE032 2.2.36 - Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation APE032 GENERIC Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations. (CFR:

41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 174 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 59 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 59 D Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 175 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 60 APE033 AK3.01 - Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation 60 D Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Termination of startup following loss of intermediate range instrumentation .............................................

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 2:

A reactor startup is being performed per OP/2/A/6100/003 (CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATION)

Reactor power increase to allow taking critical rod height data is in progress

Reactor power is 7X10-6 % (IR)

Subsequently:

The IR Signal Processor for detector channel N32/36 fails Based on the conditions above,

1) per Tech Spec 3.3.1 (RTS INSTRUMENTATION), the power increase

2) Reactor power indication on has been lost.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. can continue

2. N36 ONLY B. 1. must be suspended

2. N36 ONLY C. 1. can continue

2. N32 AND N36 D. 1. must be suspended

2. N32 AND N36 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 176 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 60 60 D General Discussion The two channels of Source and Intermediate range each use a common detector assembly which consists of two (2) redundant fission chambers. Both fission chambers provide input to the SR channel for increased sensitivity. One of the two chambers provides the input to the IR channel.

The source range signal processor receives its signals from the IR signal processor.

Since the SR signal is processed in the IR signal processor, a failure of the IR signal processor will result in the loss of SR and IR indication.

Per the initial conditions, reactor power is slightly below the P-6 setpoint. Therefore, the actions in condition H (IR) and I (SR)of TS 3.3.1 are applicable. Condition I requires suspending positive reactivity additions.

We are fully aware that the applicants are provided with a portion of TS 3.3.1 as a reference to Q59. The portion they will be getting does not include the Permissives/Interlocks and their nominal setpoints. The applicant CANNOT answer this question correctly given the reference in Q59. The applicant must know the setpoint for P-6 (new setpoint after NI mod) to determine if current power is above or below that value before they can determine what actions of TS 3.3.1are required.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since this would be true if the applicant concludes power is above the P-6 setpoint (1 x 10-5 %)

Second part is plausible since the IR and SR detectors developed separate signals that fed separate processors prior to installing the new (Thermo-Scientific) fission chamber detectors we have now (MOD complete after Fall 2014 outage).

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since the IR and SR detectors developed separate signals that fed separate processors prior to installing the new (Thermo-Scientific) fission chamber detectors we have now (MOD complete after Fall 2014 outage).

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since this would be true if the applicant concludes power is above the P-6 setpoint (1 x 10-5 %)

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the effect that a failure of the IR signal processor will have on the SR and IR detectors and thus "why" (reason) the startup must be terminated.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicant is required to perform more than one mental process. The applicant must first analyze the conditions in the stem and determine unit mode and whether power is greater than or less than the P-6 setpoint, then apply TS 3.3.1 actions based on those conclusions.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 177 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 60 Development References Student References Provided 60 D

REFERENCES:

T.S. 3.3.1 (Instrumentation) condition F, G, H and I OP-MC-IC-ENB (Excore Nuclear Instrument System) Unit 2 pgs 9 & 10, figure 7.2 and figure 7.4 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

ICIPE014 APE033 AK3.01 - Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Termination of startup following loss of intermediate range instrumentation .............................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Need to ask Chief Examiner for new K/A.

New K/A provided 10/15/14 HCF Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 178 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 61 APE060 AA1.01 - Accidental Gaseous-Waste Release 61 D Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Area radiation monitors ...........................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

2EMF-59 (EQUIPMENT STAGING BUILDING VENTILATION MONITOR) is in Trip 2 alarm due to a release in the building

The VK (EQUIPMENT STAGING BUILDING VENT) system selector switch is in the "ON" position Which ONE (1) of the following describes the actions, if any, that will occur as a result of the Trip 2 alarm on 2EMF-59?

A. The VK Supply fans ONLY will trip B. The VK Exhaust AND Supply fans will trip C. The VK exhaust filter bypass damper will CLOSE D. NO automatic actions will occur Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 179 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 61 61 D General Discussion 2EMF-59 is used to monitor gaseous activity exhausted to the atmosphere from the Equipment Staging building. If VK System selector switch is selected to "Auto", a Trip 2 condition will trip the supply and exhaust fans, if VK system selector switch is selected to "ON", no automatic actions will occur.

The position of the VK selector switch is crucial to how the area radiation monitor will operate on a trip 2 condition.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant concludes the automatic actions due to 2EMF-59 Trip 2 signal only secures the Supply fans. This is reasonable since it would ensure that the building remains at a negative pressure and prevents an unmonitored release.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible since it is the correct actions that would occur if the VK selector switch was in the "auto" position.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible since the automatic actions for a trip 2 condition on other ventilation systems, such as the VF (Fuel Pool Ventilation) does close the bypass damper around the exhaust filter.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched since the applicant must be able to monitor the position of the VK selector switch to determine what changes, if any, will occur in the ventilation alignment.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2013 MNS NRC Exam Q38 (Bank 5185) MODIFIED Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-WE-EMF Section 2.1.20 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-WE-EMF Objective 3 APE060 AA1.01 - Accidental Gaseous-Waste Release Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Area radiation monitors ...........................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 180 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 62 APE067 AA2.03 - Plant Fire On Site 62 A Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Fire alarm ......................................................

In accordance with RP-25 (FIRE BRIGADE RESPONSE), in addition to making an announcement on the Fire Brigade Radio AND activating the Fire Brigade Pagers, a Plant PA announcement (1) required when dispatching the Fire Brigade.

For a fire in the McGuire Unit 1 Switchyard, primary firefighting responsibilities will be handled by (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. is

2. offsite fire departments B. 1. is

2. onsite fire brigade C. 1. is NOT

2. offsite fire departments D. 1. is NOT

2. onsite fire brigade Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 181 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 62 62 A General Discussion In accordance with RP-025, the fire bridage is dispatched via a Plant PA announcement, activating the Fire Brigade pagers, and making an announcement on the Fire Brigade radio system.

In accordance with AP-25, the Fire Brigade may only respond if resources allow. Primary fire fighting responsibilities are handled by offsite fire departments.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible since the fire brigade leader is required to respond to all fires on site. However the onsite fire brigade is not required to respond to fires outside the protected area unless requested as a backup resource.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the announcement on the Fire Brigade Radio and activating the Fire Brigade Pagers is more than adequate to dispatch the Fire Brigade. Making an announcement on the PA does not necessarily provide any additional assurance that all Fire Brigade members will respond. However, it does ensure that personnel not on the Fire Brigade stay clear of the area and it is required by RP-025.

The second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the announcement on the Fire Brigade Radio and activating the Fire Brigade Pagers is more than adequate to dispatch the Fire Brigade. Making an announcement on the PA does not necessarily provide any additional assurance that all Fire Brigade members will respond. However, it does ensure that personnel not on the Fire Brigade stay clear of the area and it is required by RP-025.

The second part is plausible since the fire brigade leader is required to respond to all fires on site. However the onsite fire brigade is not required to respond to fires outside the protected area unless requested as a backup resource.

Basis for meeting the KA Unlike many plants, MNS does not have a specific plant fire alarm. The plant fire alarm would normally be used to alert the plant staff of the presence of a fire and to dispatch the fire brigade. In lieu of sounding a plant fire alarm, at MNS alerting the plant staff to the presense of a fire and dispatching the fire brigade is done by a PA announcement, initiating the Fire Brigade pagers, and an announcement over the Fire Brigade radios. Therefore, these methods constitute the plant fire alarm at MNS. By demonstrating a knowledge of the methods used to dispatch the fire brigade, the applicant demonstrates the ability to "interpret the fire alarm" at MNS. Therefore, the KA is matched.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2014 MNS NRC Exam Q74 (Bank 5752) MODIFIED Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

RP/0/A/5700/025 (Fire Brigade Response)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 182 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 62 62 A LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

NONE APE067 AA2.03 - Plant Fire On Site Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Fire alarm ......................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 183 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 63 APE076 2.4.50 - High Reactor Coolant Activity 63 B APE076 GENERIC Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is at 100% RTP

2EMF-6 (REACTOR COOLANT FILTER 2B) is in Trip 2 alarm

2EMF-48 (REACTOR COOLANT HI RAD) is also in Trip 2 alarm

The crew has implemented AP-18 (HIGH ACTIVITY IN REACTOR COOLANT)

Chemistry has reported that the cause of the high activity is due to FAILED FUEL In accordance with the mitigating strategy for AP-18, the crew will (1) .

The reason for performing this action is because it (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. ensure that a mixed bed demineralizer is in service

2. causes a pH change that prevents further fuel degradation B. 1. ensure that a mixed bed demineralizer is in service

2. facilitates the removal of fission products resulting from the failed fuel C. 1. increase letdown to 120 GPM

2. increases the effectiveness of the fission product gas removal by the VCT D. 1. increase letdown to 120 GPM

2. increases the removal rate of fission products resulting from the failed fuel Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 184 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 63 63 B General Discussion The applicant is presented with indications or high activity associated with the reactor coolant system (NC). These include indications of high radiation on ARM 1EMF-18 (Reactor Coolant Filter 1A) and 1EMF-48 (Reactor Coolant Hi Rad). The alarm response procedure for both of these monitors refers the crew to AP/18 (High Activity In Reactor Coolant). This procedure directs the crew to contact Chemistry to perform an isotopic analysis to determine if the high activity is from a crud burst or from failed fuel. These results are provided in that the cause has been determined to be from failed fuel. Per AP/18, if the activity is from failed fuel the crew is instructed to ensure that a mixed bed demineralizer is in service.

The mixed bed demineralizer removes both ion types produced by failed fuel (halogens and soluble metel ions). That is why AP-18 ensures a mixed bed demineralizer is in service during a failed fuel event.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part (1) is correct and therefore plausible.

Part (2) is plausible because during a failed fuel event, Chemistry may request that a Cation Bed Demineralizer be placed in service. One of the effects of placing a Cation Bed demineralizer in service is a change in pH. Consequently, the applicant may conclude that the actions taken for failed fuel in AP-18 result in a pH change.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part (1) is plausible because if the cause of the high activity was determined to be from a crud burst this would be the correct action directed by AP-18. It is possible that he applicant could confuse the actions required for crud burst with those for failed fuel.

Part (2) is plausible because Step 8 of AP-18 directs the crew to notify Radwaste to ensure VCT purge flow is established. The purpose of this step is to facilitate removal of fission gases from the NC system. The second part of this distracter is a correct statement so it would be reasonable to for the applicant to consider this a correct answer when paired with the increase in L/D flow.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part (1) is plausible because if the cause of the high activity was determined to be from a crud burst this would be the correct action directed by AP/18. It is possible that he applicant could confuse the actions required for crud burst with those for failed fuel.

Part (2) is plausible because increase in L/D flow would greatly increase the rate of fission produce removal as well as any ionic impurity in the reactor coolant system but this is only procedurally directed for a crud burst.

Basis for meeting the KA This K/A is met because the Annunciator Response Procedures for 2EMF-6 and 2EMF-48 direct the crew to implement AP-18. No other actions are described in the ARP that would allow testing the ability to verify setpoints/operate controls. Therefore, knowledge of the actions in AP-18 demonstrates the ability to operate controls identified in the alarm response manual (in this case AP-18).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2011 MNS NRC Q60 (Bank 4413)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 185 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 63 Development References Student References Provided 63 B

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CH-PC Pg 39 of 89 From AP/18 (High Activity In Reactor Coolant) Pg 2 & 3 of 5 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-CH-PC Objective #7 Lesson Plan OP-MC-AP-18 Objective 3 APE076 2.4.50 - High Reactor Coolant Activity APE076 GENERIC Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Consider sending to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review.

Question sent to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review on 1/22/15. HCF Chief Examiner's Comments from Early Submittal:

K/A APE 076 G2.4.50 Question was submitted for preliminary review.

Per AP-18, placing a cation bed demineralizer in service is an IAAT step that is only done when requested by chemistry during failed fuel. You ensure that a mixed bed demineralizer is in service for failed fuel at all times.

You could give a value for DEI in the initial conditions and require the applicants to determine if the alarms are due to a crud burst or failed fuel. Then you could ask which component should be adjusted to increase letdown flow or ensured open for mixed bed demineralizer to be in service for whichever case is given by the initial conditions.

Facility Response:

Agreed with Chief Examiner's first comment that placing a Cation Bed demineralizer in service is only done at the request of Chemistry. Since ensuring a mixed bed demin is in service is done regardless of Chemistry's request for a cation bed, changed A1 and B1 to "ensure that a mixed bed demin is in service".

Regarding the Chief Examiner's second comment, the question cannot be revised based on giving the applicants a DEI and expecting them to determine whether the high activity is due to failed fuel or crud burst. If DEI values are above the Action Level 3 value, the AP actions for failed fuel are taken. However, if the DEI values are below the Action Level 3 values, the failed fuel actions are not taken but, that does not identify the cause of the high radiation levels to be a crud burst. The only way to conclusively identify the difference between a crud burst and failed fuel is by isotopic analysis. Knowledge of isotopes present during a crud burst (Cobalt and Manganese) or failed fuel (Iodine and Cesium) is SRO-level knowledge. HCF 03/02/2015 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 186 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 64 WE08 EK1.1 - Pressurized Thermal Shock 64 C Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The operating crew initiated a manual SI due to a small break LOCA

Equipment failures resulted in a RED condition on the Integrity CSF Status Tree

NC Cooldown rate was approximately 220°F/hr

NC System temperature is currently 240°F

The crew is performing a soak in accordance with FR-P.1 (RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION)

Based on the conditions given, which ONE (1) of the following actions is permitted by FR-P.1 during the soak?

A. Energize PZR heaters B. Start an additional NV Pump C. Place Auxiliary Spray in service D. Initiate a cooldown at less than 50°F per hour Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 187 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 64 64 C General Discussion When the step in FR-P.1 requiring performance of a soak is reached, the procedure allows performance of other procedures that do not cool down the NC system or increase NC system pressure.

For this particular condition placing Auxiliary Spray in service could be performed because the effect would be to reduce NC system pressure.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant concludes that energizing the PZR heaters to establish normal pressure control is a desirable condition.

Under other circumstances it would be a desired action.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not understand the effect of starting an NV pump on NC system temperature.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because this is an action that is directed by FR-P.1 within the same step that directs the soak to be performed. However, it is directed after the soak is completed.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of actions that are performed (i.e. soak requirements) when PTS limits have been exceeded.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires the applicant to analyze each of the answers to determine the overall effect of that action on NC system temperature and pressure.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2012 MNS NRC Q41 (Bank 5733)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

FR-P.1 (Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition)

FR-P.1 Bckgd document pg 18 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-EP-FRP Objective 3 WE08 EK1.1 - Pressurized Thermal Shock Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 188 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 64 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 64 C Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 189 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 65 WE10 EK2.1 - Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without 65 B Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

Unit tripped from 100% RTP

A Loss of Off-Site Power has occurred

ES-0.2 (NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN) has been implemented One action the crew must perform in ES-0.2 prior to implementing ES-0.3 (NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN WITH STEAM VOID IN VESSEL) is to (1) .

The FIRST Major Action associated with ES-0.3 is (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. block auto Safety Injection

2. initiate an NCS Cooldown B. 1. block auto Safety Injection

2. try to start an NC pump C. 1. lock out Safety Injection systems

2. initiate an NCS Cooldown D. 1. lock out Safety Injection systems

2. try to start an NC pump Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 190 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 65 65 B General Discussion ES-0.3 provides actions to continue plant cooldown and depressurization to Cold Shutdown, with no accident in progress, under conditions that allow for the potential formation of a void in the upper head region with a vessel level system available to monitor void growth. This procedure can only be entered from ES-0.2, after Auto SI has been blocked. The recovery/restoration technique of ES-0.3 includes the following five major action categories; (1) Try to start a NC pump, (2) Cool down and depressurize the NC while monitoring void growth, (3) Lock out S/I systems, (4) Place the ND system in service, and (5) Cool down to cold shutdown.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since initiating and NCS cooldown is a major action in ES-0.3. However, it is the second major action.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since locking out safety injection systems (isolating CLAs and racking out high head injection pumps) is a major action of ES-0.3.

Second part is plausible since initiating and NCS cooldown is a major action in ES-0.3. However, it is the second major action.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since locking out safety injection systems (isolating CLAs and racking out high head injection pumps) is a major action of ES-0.3.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must know that ES-0.3 cannot be entered until Auto SI is blocked per ES-0.2. (demonstrates knowledge of the interrelation between ES-0.3 and the function of safety system signals, manual and auto features ).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2009 MNS Audit SRO Examination AUDIT Q64 (Bank 3182)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

OP-MC-EP-E0 pgs 64 & 84 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

EPE0005 WE10 EK2.1 - Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 191 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 65 manual features.

65 B 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 192 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 66 GEN2.1 2.1.37 - GENERIC - Conduct of Operations 66 A Conduct of Operations Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management. (CFR: 41.1 / 43.6 / 45.6)

Concerning AD-OP-ALL-0203 (REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT) during abnormal operating conditions,

1) a reactor trip should be initiated if the cause of a power change is not understood and reactor power level exceeds the pre-transient power level by greater than a MINIMUM of .

2) the ROs shall inform the CRS of .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 5%

2. all MANUAL control rod withdrawals B. 1. 5%

2. the first MANUAL control rod withdrawal ONLY C. 1. 10%

2. all MANUAL control rod withdrawals D. 1. 10%

2. the first MANUAL control rod withdrawal ONLY Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 193 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 66 66 A General Discussion Per AD-OP-ALL-0203, During abnormal operating conditions a manual reactor trip shall be initiated if any of the following conditions occur:

(1) Reactor power level approaches any operating limit (2) Reactor power level exceeds the pre-transient power level by greater than 5% and the cause of the power change is not understood, or is not controllable.

During abnormal conditions requiring manual control of the reactor, ROs shall inform the CRS of the following (notification to the CRS is not required prior to taking the action):

(1) The first manual control rod insertion (2) All manual control rod withdrawals Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since it is correct for rod insertions and the applicant may conclude that it is also the standard for rod withdrawals.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since power changes of 10% are used to define significant core power/reactivity activities for work execution .

Second part is correct and therefore plausible .

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since power changes of 10% are used to define significant core power/reactivity activities for work execution .

Second part is plausible since it is correct for rod insertions and the applicant may conclude that it is also the standard for rod withdrawals.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have knowledge of procedure guidelines and limitations associated with reactivity management.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

AD-OP-ALL-0203 pgs 44 & 45 of 90 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

NONE GEN2.1 2.1.37 - GENERIC - Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management. (CFR: 41.1 / 43.6 / 45.6)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 194 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 66 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 66 A Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 195 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 67 GEN2.1 2.1.42 - GENERIC - Conduct of Operations 67 D Conduct of Operations Knowledge of new and sepnt fuel movement procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.7 / 45.13)

When performing a normal fuel reload from the spent fuel pool to a core location, PT/0/A/4150/033 (TOTAL CORE RELOADING) requires the Reactor Building Bridge operator to obtain permission from the to PLACE a fuel assembly into a core location.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. Fuel Handling SRO B. Site Refueling Supervisor C. Fuel Handling Reactor Engineer D. Refueling Support Reactor Operator Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 196 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 67 67 D General Discussion Per PT/0/A/4150/033, the following abbreviations are used to designate the person performing the actions in Step 12.4:

FH SRO - Fuel Handling SRO

FH FB - Fuel Handling Personnel, Fuel Building

FH RB - Fuel Handling Personnel, Reactor Building

RBS - Refueling Booth Support Personnel, Control Room Area (RO)

Per step 12.4.2 (S) of PT/0/A/4150/033 (FH SRO) - IF cont rate is stable, direct fuel handling personnel, Reactor Building, to unlatch assembly and continue. .

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since the Fuel Handling SRO is required to give permission to UNLATCH from a fuel assembly once it has been lowered into a core location.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since the Site Refueling Supervisor is responsible for maintaining control of all activities in the fuel handling areas.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since the Reactor Engineer is the event coordinator for this task and they must approve the sequence of fuel movements.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have knowledge of responsibilities outlined in PT//0/A/4150/033 (Total Core Reloading).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

PT/0/A/4150/033 (Total Core Reloading) Step 12.4.2.P & Note on pg 14 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

NONE GEN2.1 2.1.42 - GENERIC - Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations Knowledge of new and sepnt fuel movement procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.7 / 45.13) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 197 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 67 67 D Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 198 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 68 GEN2.2 2.2.39 - GENERIC - Equipment Control 68 B Equipment Control Knowledge of less than or equal to one hour Technical Specification action statements for systems. (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13)

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 2:

Unit is at 4% RTP conducting a plant startup Subsequently:

One control bank A rod drops fully into the core

NCS temperature decreases to 550°F Based on the conditions above, the MOST limiting Tech Spec required action is to (1) within (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. restore rod to within alignment limits

2. 30 minutes B. 1. be in MODE 2 with Keff less than 1.0

2. 30 minutes C. 1. restore rod to within alignment limits

2. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months D. 1. be in MODE 2 with Keff less than 1.0

2. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 199 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 68 68 B General Discussion Per TS 3.4.2 Minimum Temperature for Criticality), If Tavg in one or more RCS loops not within limit (greater than or equal to 551 degrees F),

then be in Mode 2 with Keff less than 1.0 within 30 minutes.

Per TS 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment Limits), If one rod not within alignment limits (individual rod indicated position within 12 steps of the step counters), then restore rod to within alignment limits within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since it is required per TS 3.1.4 to restore the rod back to within alignment limits.

Second part is corect and therefore plausible.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since it is required per TS 3.1.4 to restore the rod back to within alignment limits.

Second part is plausible since it is correct for restoring a rod to within alignment limits. However it is not the most limiting TS required action.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since it is correct for restoring a rod to within alignment limits. However, it is not correct for recovering temperature after violating minimum temperature for criticality.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of action statements for two different one hour or less Tech. Specs.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive because the applicant must analyze the conditions in the stem to determine current unit mode (TS mode applicability) and then determine which Tech. Spec has the correct and most limiting action and completion time.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK CNS 2009 SRO PRE-AUDIT 1 Q15 (Bank 4505)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Tech Spec 3.4.2 (RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality)

Tech Spec 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment Limits)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-PS-NC Objective 24 OP-MC-IC-IRE Objective 14 GEN2.2 2.2.39 - GENERIC - Equipment Control Equipment Control Knowledge of less than or equal to one hour Technical Specification action statements for systems. (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 200 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 68 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 68 B Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 201 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 69 GEN2.2 2.2.4 - GENERIC - Equipment Control 69 B Equipment Control (multi-unit license) Ability to explain the variations in control board/control room layouts, systems, instrumentation, and procedural actions between units at a facility. (CFR: 41.6 / 41.7 / 41.10 / 45.1 / 45.13)

Given the following initial plant conditions:

Both units are operating at 100% RTP

The following alarms are lit on each unit:

o 1AD-11 C-5 (XFMR A URGENT ALARM) o 2AD-11 C-5 (XFMR A URGENT ALARM)

Subsequently:

An AO reports a loss of BOTH Cooling Groups has occurred on each transformer To prevent a turbine runback to <56% RTP, cooling to the (1) Main Transformer must be restored within a MAXIMUM of (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. 1A

2. 8 minutes, 45 seconds B. 1. 2A

2. 8 minutes, 45 seconds C. 1. 1A

2. 28 minutes, 45 seconds D. 1. 2A

2. 28 minutes, 45 seconds Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 202 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 69 69 B General Discussion Per ARP for 2AD-11 C5, A Runback occurs in 8 minutes 45 seconds on loss of power to BOTH cooling groups.

A Runback occurs in 28 minutes 45 seconds on loss of power to ONE cooling groups.

There is no auto runback associated with the loss of cooling to the 1A Main Transformer. (UNIT DIFFERENCE))

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since a loss of cooling groups associated with the 2A Main Transformer will require restoration to prevent a runback.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since a loss of cooling groups associated with the 2A Main Transformer will require restoration to prevent a runback .

Second part is plausible since this would be the correct time for a loss of ONE cooling group.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since this would be the correct time for a loss of ONE cooling group.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the differences in procedural actions (ARPs) that are required upon receiving the same annunciator on each unit simultaneously (actions differ depending on the unit).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2009 MNS NRC SRO Examination NRC Q73 (Bank 3088)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

OP-MC-GEN-EHC - Unit2 (Rev 01) Section 2.6 (Turbine Runbacks)

OP/2/A/6100/010 L 2AD-11/C5 pg 35 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-GEN-EHC Obj: 13 GEN2.2 2.2.4 - GENERIC - Equipment Control Equipment Control (multi-unit license) Ability to explain the variations in control board/control room layouts, systems, instrumentation, and procedural actions between units at a facility. (CFR: 41.6 / 41.7 / 41.10 / 45.1 / 45.13)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 203 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 69 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 69 B Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 204 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 70 GEN2.3 2.3.14 - GENERIC - Radiation Control 70 B Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities. (CFR: 41.12 /

43.4 / 45.10)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

You are to perform a valve lineup in the Letdown Heat Exchanger Room

The dose rate in the room is 3000 mREM/HR

Your total exposure for the year is 1000 mREM In accordance with PD-RP-ALL-0001 (RADIATION PROTECTION):

The Letdown Heat Exchanger Room must be posted as a (1) Area.

The MAXIMUM amount of time you can spend in the room before reaching your EXCLUDE exposure limit is (2) minutes.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Locked High Radiation

2. 12 B. 1. Locked High Radiation

2. 16 C. 1. Very High Radiation

2. 12 D. 1. Very High Radiation

2. 16 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 205 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 70 70 B General Discussion In accordance with PD-RP-ALL-0001, areas with dose rates greater than 1000 mREM in one hour shall be posted as Locked High Radiation areas.

In accordance with PD-RP-ALL-0001, areas with dose rates greater than 500 RAD in one hour shall be posted as a Very High Radiation areas.

The EXCLUDE exposure limit is 90% of the Duke Annual Administrative exposure limit (2000 mREM). Therefore, the EXCLUDE limit is 1800 mREM.

The ALERT exposure limit is 80% of the Duke Annual Administrative exposure limit. Therefore, the ALERT limit is 1600 mREM.

If an individuals exposure for the year is already 1000 mREM, they could receive an additional 800 mREM before reaching the EXCLUDE limit. At 3000 mREM / hr it would take 16 minutes to accumulate 800 mREM of exposure. It would take 12 minutes to accumulate 600 mREM and reach the ALERT exposure limit.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because 12 minutes would be correct if it was the time to reach the ALERT exposure limit.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because it is common for individuals to confuse the difference between a Locked High Radiation area and a Very High Radiation area. Also, "LOCKED" has an implied connotation that leads one to believe that a Locked High Radiation area has higher radiation levels than a Very High Radiation area.

Second part is plausible because 12 minutes would be correct if it was the time to reach the ALERT exposure limit.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because it is common for individuals to confuse the difference between a Locked High Radiation area and a Very High Radiation area. Also, "LOCKED" has an implied connotation that leads one to believe that a Locked High Radiation area has higher radiation levels than a Very High Radiation area.

Second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must determine the radiation hazard associated with performing a normal evolution (valve lineup) in a Locked High Radiation area.

Basis for Hi Cog The question is analysis level since the candidate must use the data given to calculate their exposure and determine when they would reach a specific exposure limit.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

PD-RP-ALL-0001 (Radiation Protection) Section 3.0 (Definitions) & Section 5.3.5 (Dose Monitoring Warning Flags and ED Alarms)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 206 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 70 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

70 B NONE OP-MC-RAD-RP, Obj. 60 GEN2.3 2.3.14 - GENERIC - Radiation Control Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities. (CFR: 41.12 /

43.4 / 45.10) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 207 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 71 GEN2.3 2.3.15 - GENERIC - Radiation Control 71 D Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc. (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9)

Given the following conditions:

An RO is performing a valve lineup in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building pipe chase

The RO receives a Dose Rate alarm on his Electronic Dosimeter (ED)

The possibility of Dose Rate alarms was discussed during the RP brief In accordance with PD-RP-ALL-0001 (RADIATION WORKER RESPONSIBILITIES),

1) the Dose Rate alarm will .

2) based on the conditions above, the RO .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. NOT clear until the ED is reset

2. must stop work and exit the area B. 1. NOT clear until the ED is reset

2. will reset the dose rate alarm and continue to work until two additional dose rate alarms are received C. 1. automatically clear when dose rate drops below 80% of alarm setpoint

2. must stop work and exit the area D. 1. automatically clear when dose rate drops below 80% of alarm setpoint

2. may continue to work until two additional dose rate alarms are received Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 208 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 71 71 D General Discussion For Dose Rate alarms, the Electronic Dosimeter (ED) alarm will automatically clear when the dose rate decrease to less than 80% of the Dose Rate alarm setpoint.

If a Dose Rate alarm is received while transiting to a work area, the individual may continue following the travel path provided the alarm clears prior to arriving at the work area.

If a Dose Rate alarm is anticipated (i.e. it has been discussed during the RP brief prior to beginning work) the individual may continue work.

However, if a third anticipated Dose Rate alarm is received, the worker must exit the area and notify RP.

For any unexpected Dose Rate alarm, the worker is expected to stop work, exit the area, and notify RP immediately.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since this is a true statement had the alarm been a Dose alarm vs. a Dose Rate alarm.

Second part is plausible since it would be correct if the Dose Rate alarm had not been discussed during RP brief.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since this is a true statement had the alarm been a Dose alarm vs. a Dose Rate alarm.

Second part is plausible since the possibility of dose rate alarms was discussed during the RP brief.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Second part is plausible since it would be correct if the Dose Rate alarm had not been discussed during RP brief.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the use Electronic Dosimeters (i.e. personnel monitoring equipment) and the actions required to respond to an ED alarm.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory MODIFIED 2014 MNS SRO NRC Q72 Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

PD-RP-ALL-0001 (Radiation Worker Responsibilities) Section 5.3.5 (Dose Monitoring Warning Flags and ED Alarms)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

NONE GEN2.3 2.3.15 - GENERIC - Radiation Control Radiation Control Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 209 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 71 71 D Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc. (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 210 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 72 GEN2.3 2.3.4 - GENERIC - Radiation Control 72 D Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

Mode 4 valve checklist PT is being performed

The PT calls for independent verification of a single valve located in a room with a general dose rate of 110 mREM/hr

Estimated time to independently verify the valve's position is 5 minutes In accordance with NSD-700 (VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES), independent verification of the valve above (1) be waived because (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. can

2. the general area dose rate is greater than 100 mREM/hr B. 1. can NOT

2. the general area dose rate is less than 500 mREM/hr C. 1. can

2. the radiation exposure for a single verification exceeds the allowable limit D. 1. can NOT

2. the radiation exposure for a single verification is within the allowable limit Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 211 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 72 72 D General Discussion According to NSD-700, Independent and/or Concurrent Verification may be waived if the exposure to an individual of greater than 10 mrem for a single verification would occur or if dose rate in the room is >1 R/hr. This waiver requires supervisory approval and documentation.

The total exposure would be 9.17 mR which is less than the dose limit of 10mR for a single verification.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because per NSD 700, IV may be waived when dose rate in an area is greater than 1 R/hr, not 100mR /hr.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because this statement is a true statement, but the NSD 700 limit is 1R/hr not 500 mR/hr.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the applicant does not recall the guideline of 10 mrem for a single verification criteria or miscalculates the potential exposure.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA This KA is met because the applicant must evaluate a potential exposure hazard and determine which requirement applies to that potential exposure.

Basis for Hi Cog This is an analysis question because the applicant is required to calculate the potential exposure and then apply a limit recalled from memory to correctly answer the question.

Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Comprehension BANK 2014 MNS Audit Q72 (Bank 5287)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

NSD-700 Section 700.8 (Exceptions)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-ADM-DIR Objective 23 GEN2.3 2.3.4 - GENERIC - Radiation Control Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 212 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 73 GEN2.4 2.4.19 - GENERIC - Emergency Procedures / Plan 73 B Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of EOP layout, symbols, and icons. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Related to Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) rules of usage,

1) the step below is a (an) action step.

2) steps which may be performed in any order are designated by .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. immediate

2. asterisks B. 1. immediate

2. bullets C. 1. continuous

2. asterisks D. 1. continuous

2. bullets Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 213 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 73 73 B General Discussion In accordance with the EOP Writer's Guide, immediate action steps are designated by a circle around the step number.

Steps which may be performed in any order are designated by bullets.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because asterisks are frequently used at Westinghouse plants to designate immediate action steps.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because Westinghouse plants frequently use some type of designator for continuous action steps that are not IF/THEN steps.

Second part is plausible because asterisks are frequently used at Westinghouse plants to designate immediate action steps.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because Westinghouse plants frequently use some type of designator for continuous action steps that are not IF/THEN steps.

Second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of symbols used in the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Writer's Guide for Emergency and Abnormal Procedures (Catawba Nuclear Station and McGuire Nuclear Station)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

NONE GEN2.4 2.4.19 - GENERIC - Emergency Procedures / Plan Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of EOP layout, symbols, and icons. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 214 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 73 73 B Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 215 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 74 GEN2.4 2.4.26 - GENERIC - Emergency Procedures / Plan 74 B Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of facility protection requirements, including fire brigade andportable fire fighting equipment usage. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Given the following plant conditions:

A fire has been reported on a small oil cooled transformer

The transformer may be energized Which ONE (1) of the following indicates the fire class ratings of the portable fire extinguishers that must be used in this situation?

A. A and B B. B and C C. C and D D. A and D Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 216 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 74 74 B General Discussion Since the fire is both and oil and energized electrical fire, it would be appropriate to use a Class B (Flammable Liquid) or Class C (Energized Electrical) extinguisher on the fire.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Class A is plausible because the primary extinguishing agent in a Class A extinguisher is water. In accordance with standard fire fighting practices, use of a fire hose with a fog nozzle is acceptable for fighting an electrical fire. Based on that, an applicant could conclude that using a water-based extinguisher on an electrical fire is acceptable.

Class B is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Class C is correct.

If the applicant concludes that the conductors in the transformer wiring constitute a combustible metal, they would also conclude that a Class D (Combustible Metals) extinguisher would be appropriate for this fire.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Class A is plausible because the primary extinguishing agent in a Class A extinguisher is water. In accordance with standard fire fighting practices, use of a fire hose with a fog nozzle is acceptable for fighting an electrical fire. Based on that, an applicant could conclude that using a water-based extinguisher on an electrical fire is acceptable.

If the applicant concludes that the conductors in the transformer wiring constitute a combustible metal, they would also conclude that a Class D (Combustible Metals) extinguisher would be appropriate for this fire.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the different types of fire extinguishes used on different types of fires.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan NGD-FB-03 (Initial Fire Brigade Training Materials - Portable Fire Extinguishers)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

NGD-FB-03 Objective 3 GEN2.4 2.4.26 - GENERIC - Emergency Procedures / Plan Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of facility protection requirements, including fire brigade andportable fire fighting equipment usage. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 217 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 74 74 B Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 218 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 75 GEN2.4 2.4.39 - GENERIC - Emergency Procedures / Plan 75 A Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of RO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.11)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A Site Area Emergency has been declared

A Site Assembly is being conducted in accordance with RP/0/A/5700/011 (CONDUCTING A SITE ASSEMBLY, SITE EVACUATION, OR CONTAINMENT EVACUATION)

Per Enclosure 4.3 (OSM ACTIONS FOR SITE ASSEMBLY),

1) the announcement for the Site Assembly shall be repeated every

.minutes until notification that the Site Assembly has been completed.

2) the Site Assembly shall be completed within a MAXIMUM of minutes.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 10

2. 30 B. 1. 20

2. 30 C. 1. 10

2. 60 D. 1. 20

2. 60 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 219 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 75 75 A General Discussion In accordance with RP/0/A/5700/011, the Site Assembly should be completed within 30 minutes of initiation and the announcement for Site Assembly is repeated every 10 minutes until notification is received that the Site Assembly has been completed.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT. See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since Enclosure 4.3 discusses supervisors calling Security with a report regarding the site assembly approximately 20 minutes after initiation of the Site Assembly.

Second part is correct and therefore plausible.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct and therefore plausible.

Part 2 is plausible as this is the time requirement for followup notifications during a Site Area Emergency.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT. See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since Enclosure 4.3 discusses supervisors calling Security with a report regarding the site assembly approximately 20 minutes after initiation of the Site Assembly.

Part 2 is plausible as this is the time requirement for followup notifications during a Site Area Emergency.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because Ros typically make the announcements for Site Assemblies from the Control Room and therefore need to know the requirements for Site Assemblies and for making announcements.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source RO Memory BANK 2010 MNS RO NRC Examination NRC Q74 (Bank 2774)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

RP/0/A/5700/011 (Conducting a Site Assembly, Site Evacuation, or Containment Evacuation) Enclosure 4.1 (Site Assembly)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-EP-EMP Objective 9 GEN2.4 2.4.39 - GENERIC - Emergency Procedures / Plan Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of RO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.11) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 220 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 75 75 A Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 221 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 76 EPE007 2.4.20 - Reactor Trip 76 C EPE007 GENERIC Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 2:

The unit was at 100% RTP when a LOCA occurs

Safety Injection has been initiated

The Reactor failed to trip automatically

Manual attempts to trip the reactor were unsuccessful Current conditions:

FR-S.1 (RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR GENERATION / ATWS) has been implemented and the crew is at the step to check CA pump status

Containment pressure is 3.1 PSIG and INCREASING

NC system pressure is 1460 PSIG and DECREASING

NC subcooling is (-)1°F

Reactor power is 9% and DECREASING Based on the conditions above, the crew (1) trip the NC pumps because (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. should

2. SI has been initiated and subcooling has been lost B. 1. should NOT

2. immediate actions of FR-S.1 have not been completed C. 1. should NOT

2. reduced NC system heat removal could challenge fuel integrity D. 1. should

2. the normal support systems for running NC pumps are not satisfied Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 222 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 76 76 C General Discussion Because an ATWS is in progress, a caution in FR-S.1 directs the operators to not trip the NC pumps if power is greater than 5%. Normally, all procedures which direct stopping an NC pump at power, the direction is given to trip the reactor first and then trip the NC pumps.

The basis for not stopping the NC pumps until <5% power is not described in any of the procedures which direct stopping NC pumps at power.

It is only found in the EOP basis documents and in the WOG background document that continued heat generation during an ATWS event could jeopardize the integrity of the fuel and therefore the NC pumps must remain running for added heat removal capability even if reactor coolant pump trip criteria is met.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because the normal trip criteria for the NC pumps based on Safety Injection pumps running and loss of subcooling is met.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because the step to check CA pump status in FR-S.1 is immediately after the last immediate action step in FR-S.1.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because a Phase B isolation has occurred and therefore NC pump motor cooling has been lost. Under most conditions, the crew would immediately stop the NC pumps when it is recognized that a Phase B isolation has occurred.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the operator must demonstrate the ability to understand detailed procedure knowledge related to the use of FR-S.1 related to the reactor trip and operation of components based on knowledge of the procedure basis.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level because it requires more than one mental step. It requires the applicant to diagnose the status of plant and determine current plant condition based on the conditions given. It then requires the applicant to determine the correct procedural course of action based on the diagnosis of given conditions.

Basis for SRO only The question is SRO-Only because the question cannot be answered by knowing system knowledge alone, immediate operator actions, or EOP Entry conditions, but rather requires that the operator assess plant conditions, and then operate plant equipment based on the diagnosis of plant conditions and knowledge of the appropriate procedure basis.

Under normal circumstances, it would be expected that an RO should know that NC pumps should not be tripped until Reactor power has decreased to less than 5%. However, it is not expected that ROs know the basis for leaving NC pumps in service until reactor power is less than 5%. Additionally, when faced with conditions where Safety Injection has actuated, subcooling has been lost, and Reactor power remains greater than 5%, it is NOT expected that an RO would possess the requisite knowledge to make the correct decision as to whether to trip the NC pumps or leave them running. This knowledge only comes with an in-depth knowledge of the EOP basis and WOG background documents in that the applicant must understand that regardless of the fact that standard NC pump trip criteria is met (i.e. Safety Injection pumps running and Subcooling less than 0°F), in FR-S.1 the NC pumps MUST remain in service to prevent fuel damage as the result of continued power generation.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension BANK 2013 Watts Bar SRO Examination Q92 Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

FR-S.1 (Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS)

FR-S.1 Background Document Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 223 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 76 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

76 C EPFRS007 EPE007 2.4.20 - Reactor Trip EPE007 GENERIC Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 224 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 77 EPE009 2.1.7 - Small Break LOCA 77 B EPE009 GENERIC Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A reactor trip and Safety Injection have occurred

The crew completed E-0 (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION)

Pzr level is off-scale low

NC System pressure is 1700 PSIG and lowering slowly

Containment pressure is 1.7 PSIG and rising slowly

NC pumps have been secured

SG pressures are 1050 PSIG and stable

CA flow is 600 GPM

FWST level is 135 inches and lowering at 1.0 inches per minute

The operators have just transitioned to E-1 (LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT)

PROCEDURE LEGEND:

ES-1.2 (POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION)

ES-1.3 (TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION)

The basis for stopping NC pumps in E-0 is to (1) .

Based on the conditions above, the next procedure transition will be to (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. minimize heat input into the NC system

2. ES-1.2 B. 1. minimize mass loss from the NC system

2. ES-1.2 C. 1. minimize heat input into the NC system

2. ES-1.3 D. 1. minimize mass loss from the NC system

2. ES-1.3 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 225 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 77 77 B General Discussion Based on the indications provided a Small Break LOCA is in progress.

The NC pumps are stopped in E-0 when at least one NI or NV pump is running and injecting into the NC system and NC system subcooling is lost. This is done to minimize the inventory loss from the NC system.

Since a small break LOCA is in progress E-1 will direct the operators to transaction to ES-1.2 (Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization).

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because there are several other instances in the EOP network where the NC pumps are stopped to minimize heat input to the NC system (e.g. FR-H.1, FR-C.1).

The second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because there are several other instances in the EOP network where the NC pumps are stopped to minimize heat input to the NC system (e.g. FR-H.1, FR-C.1).

The second part is plausible because the FWST Pre-Low Level annunciator alarms at 135 inches. Entry into ES-1.3 occurs when FWST Low Level annunciator alarms at 95 inches. Also plausible because if the leak was larger, transition would be made to ES-1.3 instead of ES-1.2.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because the FWST Pre-Low Level annunciator alarms at 135 inches. Entry into ES-1.3 occurs when FWST Low Level annunciator alarms at 95 inches. Also plausible because if the leak was larger, transition would be made to ES-1.3 instead of ES-1.2.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to diagnose the conditions given and make a decision (operational judgement) regarding the next procedure transition.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires the applicant to analyze the given plant conditions to determine the correct procedure transition.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

This question requires the applicant to demonstrate detailed knowledge of the EOPs and their basis and can NOT be answered with systems knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

This question does not relate to EOP or AOP immediate actions.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

This question is not related to entry conditions for AOPs and is not related to direct entry EOPs. This question relates to procedure transition criteria within the body of the EOPs.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is detailed knowledge of procedure transition criteria based on analysis of plant conditions.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 226 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 77

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

77 B Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension BANK 2013 MNS NRC Q84 (Bank # Not Yet Assigned)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

E-1 (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)

E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection) Background Document LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

MC-OP-EP-E0 Objective 6 EPE009 2.1.7 - Small Break LOCA EPE009 GENERIC Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 227 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 78 EPE011 2.4.21 - Large Break LOCA 78 C EPE011 GENERIC Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc. (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit has experienced a Large Break LOCA

Containment pressure is currently 4.5 PSIG Based on the conditions above, entry into FR-C.1 (RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING) per the CSF status trees is required if CETs are greater than 700°F and RVLIS LR level is less than or equal to a MINIMUM of (1) .

After S/Gs have been depressurized to atmospheric in FR-C.1, one of the MINIMUM conditions which must be met to allow FR-C.1 to be exited to E-1 (LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT) is (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 39%

2. NC T-Colds less than 350°F B. 1. 60%

2. NC T-Colds less than 350°F C. 1. 39%

2. CET's less than 1200°F D. 1. 60%

2. CETs less than 1200°F Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 228 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 78 78 C General Discussion CSF red path uses Core Exit T/C, subcooling, NC pump status, and LR RVLIS level. Based on IC, NCPs should be off, and subcooling < 0° F.

Therefore, with CETs greater than 700°F and RVLIS LR less than or equal to 39%, CSFST conditions are met for a RED PATH on Core Cooling and entry into FR-C.1 (Response to Inadequate Core Cooling).

After the S/Gs are depressurized to atmospheric conditions, FR-C.1 may be exited to E-1 (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant) if Core Exit T/Cs are less than 1200°F, at least two NC T-Hots are less than 350°F, and RVLIS LR Level is greater than 60%.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because 350°F on T-Hots is one of the exit conditions.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because RVLIS LR level greater than 60% is one of the minimum criteria for exiting FR-C.1 to E-1.

The second part is plausible because 350°F on T-Hots is one of the exit conditions.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because RVLIS LR level greater than 60% is one of the minimum criteria for exiting FR-C.1 to E-1.

The second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA This question matches the K/A because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the Core Cooling Safety Function as it relates to a Large Break LOCA.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step.

First, the applicant must assess the conditions given to determine which path through the Core Cooling CSFST is applicable. Then, the applicant must recall from memory the parameters used to assess the Core Cooling CSF.

Next, the applicant must recall from memory the specific requirements listed in FR-C.1 that allow the procedure to be exited with transition to E-1 (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant).

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

Neither part of this question is related to systems level knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

FR-C.1 does not have any immediate actions.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

The first part of the question is RO level knowledge. The second part of the question is related to conditions which allow transition out of the procedure.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 229 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 78 This is detailed knowledge of procedure content related to procedure transition.

78 C

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content and conditions which must be met to transition out of the procedure to another recovery procedure. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees)

FR-C.1 (Response to Inadequate Core Cooling)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-EP-FRC Objective 2 EPE011 2.4.21 - Large Break LOCA EPE011 GENERIC Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc. (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 230 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 79 APE026 AA2.06 - Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) 79 C Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

The length of time after the loss of CCW flow to a component before that component may be damaged .............................

Given the following initial conditions on Unit 1:

Unit is at 100% RTP

KC Surge Tank level is going down

AP-21 (LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE) has been implemented

All NC Pump Motor Bearing LO KC Flow annunciators are LIT

All NC Pump Motor Bearing temperatures are 170°F and increasing at 1°F / min

An AO has been dispatched to initiate YM makeup to the KC Surge Tank Based on the conditions above, the NC pumps must be stopped in a MAXIMUM of (1) minutes.

In accordance with the AP-21 Background Document, YM makeup will be sufficient to maintain KC Surge Tank level provided the leak is less than or equal to the Design Basis leak size of (2) GPM.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 20

2. 50 B. 1. 20

2. 100 C. 1. 25

2. 50 D. 1. 25

2. 100 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 231 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 79 79 C General Discussion The NC pumps must be stopped if the motor bearing temperatures reach 195°F. With the motor bearing temperatures at 170°F initially and increasing at a rate of 1°F / minutue, it will take 25 minutes for the limit to be reached.

In accordance with the AP-21 Background Document, YM makeup is sufficient to maintain KC Surge Tank level provided the leak size is less than the Design Basis Leak size of 50 GPM.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since this is the time it will take to reach the Hi Hi Temperature alarm setpoint of 190°F.

Second part is correct.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible since this is the time it will take to reach the Hi Hi Temperature alarm setpoint of 190°F.

Second part is plausible since the YM makeup piping size to the KC Surge Tank is designed for a maximum flow rate of 100 GPM.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible since the YM makeup piping size to the KC Surge Tank is designed for a maximum flow rate of 100 GPM.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must demonstrate the ability to determine the length of time it will take to reach an NC pump motor bearing temperature limit during a reduction in KC system cooling capability.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. First, the applicant must recall from memory the NC Pump Motor Bearing temperature limit. Next, the applicant must calculate the time to reach the NC Pump Motor Bearing temperature limit based on the rate of temperature increase. Finally, the applicant must recall from memory the Design Basis leak size which the KC system YM makeup with maintain.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

The first part of the question is systems level knowledge that would be expected knowledge for an RO. The second part of the question is stated as part of a note in the KC system lesson plan. However, at MNS, the Design Basis leak size for the KC system is NOT expected RO knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

This question does not relate to EOP or AOP immediate actions.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

This question is not related to entry conditions for AOPs and is not related to direct entry EOPs.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This question is not part of the purpose, sequence of events, or mitigative strategy of AP-21.

5) The question requires to knowledge of the background document for AP-21. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 232 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 79 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source 79 C SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

AP-08 (Malfunction of NC Pump)

AP-21 (Loss of KC or KC System Leakage)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

APE026 AA2.06 - Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW)

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

The length of time after the loss of CCW flow to a component before that component may be damaged .............................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 233 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 80 APE056 AA2.73 - Loss of Offsite Power 80 C Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

PZR heater on/off ................................................

Given the following initial conditions:

A Blackout has occurred on Unit 2

AP-07 (LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER) Case I (LOSS OF NORMAL POWER TO BOTH 2ETA OR 2ETB) has been implemented

The 2A D/G is running with the Emergency breaker closed

2B D/G is tripped and SATB is faulted In accordance with Tech Spec 3.4.9 (PRESSURIZER) basis, Backup Heater Group

'2A' is (1) .

In accordance with Tech Spec 3.4.9, the Pressurizer is (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. OPERABLE

2. OPERABLE B. 1. INOPERABLE

2. OPERABLE C. 1. OPERABLE

2. INOPERABLE D. 1. INOPERABLE

2. INOPERABLE Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 234 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 80 80 C General Discussion In accordance with Tech Spec 3.4.9 Basis, for the Tech Spec required heaters to be OPERABLE they must be capable of being powered from EITHER offsite power or emergency power. Therefore, 2A Pressurizer Backup Group is OPERABLE.

For the Pressurizer to be considered operable, two banks of Pressurizer heaters each with a capacity of 150KW must be operable. Since 2ETB is inoperable and cannot be energized from offsite or emergency power, 2B Pressurizer Back Group is INOPERABLE. Therefore, the Pressurizer is INOPERABLE.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible if the applicant incorrectly analyzes the given conditions and concludes that 2B Heater Group can be energized.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant concludes that both normal and emergency power must be operable for the heater group to remain operable.

The second part is plausible if the applicant incorrectly analyzes the given conditions and concludes that 2B Heater Group can be energized.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible if the applicant concludes that both normal and emergency power must be operable for the heater group to remain operable.

The second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because a Loss of Offsite Power has occurred on Unit 2 and the applicant must demonstrate a knowledge of Pressurizer heater power supplies related to Pressurizer heater operability.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. First the applicant must analyze the given conditions to determine whether conditions support Pressurizer heater operability. Then the applicant must recall from memory the operability requirements for the Presssurizer.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(2) (Tech Specs):

1) This question can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs.

Neither part of this question is related to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs.

2) This question can NOT be answered by knowing information listed "above-the-line".

The second part of the question is "above-the-line" knowledge and is therefore RO. The first part of the question is knowledge only found in the Tech Spec Basis and is therefore SRO.

3) This question can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

The question is not related to TS Safety Limits.

4) This question requires the applicant to analyze the conditions given and apply knowledge of the TS basis to a complex set of conditions to arrive at the correct answer. Therefore, it is SRO level knowledge.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 235 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 80 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source 80 C SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Tech Spec 3.4.9 (Pzr)

Tech Spec 3.4.9 (Pzr) Basis LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-PS-NC Objective 24 APE056 AA2.73 - Loss of Offsite Power Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

PZR heater on/off ................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status This K/A is really RO level knowledge. Will need some latitude on the K/A match here to get this question to the SRO level.

Consider sending to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review.

Question sent to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review on 1/22/15. HCF Chief Examiners Early Submittal comments:

K/A APE 056 AA2.73 Question was submitted for preliminary review.

Question is a close enough match to the K/A and is Satisfactory.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 236 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 81 APE062 AA2.04 - Loss of Nuclear Service Water 81 C Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

The normal values and upper limits for the temperatures of the components cooled by SWS ..................................

Given the following initial plant conditions:

A seismic event caused a loss of both switchyards

All four D/Gs started and loaded normally Subsequently:

Flooding occurs in the 1B D/G Room due to a rupture of the RN piping in the room

The rupture is on the KD Heat Exchanger Inlet piping

D/G room sump pumps are running and sump level is RISING

1B D/G Lube Oil Temperature is 180°F and RISING

ES-0.1 (REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE) has been implemented on both units

AP-44 (PLANT FLOODING) is being performed concurrently on Unit 1 PROCEDURE LEGEND:

AP-44 (PLANT FLOODING), Enclosure 7 (AUXILIARY BLDG FLOODING)

OP/1/A/6350/002 (Diesel Generator), Enclosure 4.4 (1B D/G Shutdown)

In accordance with AP-44, Enclosure 7, the 1B D/G will be shut down (1) .

If 1B D/G Lube Oil Temperature exceeds the trip setpoint before it is manually secured by the crew, the diesel (2) trip.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. using the Emergency Stop pushbutton

2. WILL B. 1. in accordance with OP/1/A/6350/002, Enclosure 4.4

2. WILL C. 1. using the Emergency Stop pushbutton

2. WILL NOT D. 1. in accordance with OP/1/A/6350/002, Enclosure 4.4

2. WILL NOT Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 237 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 81 81 C General Discussion According to AP-44 (Plant Flooding) Enclosure 7 (Auxiliary Bldg Flooding), based on the conditions given, the D/G will be stopped using the Emergency Stop pushbutton.

Because the D/Gs received an automatic start signal, the 1B D/G will not trip if Lube Oil Temperature exceeds the trip setpoint (190°F).

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible because the D/Gs rarely run on an auto start signal. Most often the D/Gs are started in manual mode in which case the D/G would trip if Lube Oil temperature exceeded 190°F.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because if RN flow was sufficient to provide adequate cooling, the crew would stop the D/G IAW with OP instead of using the Emergency Stop pushbutton.

Second part is plausible because the D/Gs rarely run on an auto start signal. Most often the D/Gs are started in manual mode in which case the D/G would trip if Lube Oil temperature exceeded 190°F.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because if RN flow was sufficient to provide adequate cooling, the crew would stop the D/G IAW with OP instead of using the Emergency Stop pushbutton.

Second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the applicant must demonstrate the ability to determine the effect of the loss of RN on the D/Gs.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step.

First, the applicant must diagnose the conditions given to determine if the D/G will trip when the High Lube Oil Temperature setpoint is reached.

Second, the applicant must recall from memory the procedural requirements related to specific D/G indications.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is detailed knowledge of procedure content and not sequence of events, purpose, or mitigating strategy of the procedure.

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content required for procedure selection (i.e. whether to shut down the D/G in accordance with the OP or in accordance with the AP). Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 238 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 81 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source 81 C SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

AP-44 (Plant Flooding)

Lesson Plan OP-MC-DG-DG LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-AP-44 Objectives 2 & 5 APE062 AA2.04 - Loss of Nuclear Service Water Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

The normal values and upper limits for the temperatures of the components cooled by SWS ..................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Consider sending to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review.

Sent to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review on 01/22/15. HCF Chief Examiner's Comments from Early Submittal:

UNSAT K/A APE062 AA2.04 Question was submitted for preliminary review.

Do not believe that this is an SRO only question. It seems that an RO could easily determine that the breakers would need to be opened due to systems knowledge of the safety signals present and the components that open because of those signals. The second part question is clearly RO knowledge.

Normally like to have the K/A match directly at the SRO level.

In this case it is more of a match on the second part of the question which is definitely RO level. If the question is set up as is discussed below, Could set up the question initial conditions such that sump pumps not keeping up with the leak and lube oil temperatures were at a certain value and rising. You could then ask how the diesel would be secured (choice between two consecutive RNO steps). This would be SRO procedure selection. Then you could ask a question about lube oil temperature and the trip.

Would it be more plausible to have the leak on the inlet piping to the heat exchanger? Especially since AP-44 would secure the diesel before the valves were isolated. A leak on the outlet could possibly cause more cooling of the lube oil.

Facility Response:

The facility did not initially believe that this K/A could be directly matched at the SRO. Hence the reason for early submittal.

The facility concurs with the Chief Examiner's comments and agrees that the Chief Examiner's suggestion provides an acceptable resolution to matching the K/A at the SRO level.

Consequently, the facility has changed the question per the Chief Examiner's suggestion. HCF 03/02/2015 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 239 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 81 81 C Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 240 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 82 APE003 AA2.03 - Dropped Control Rod 82 A Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Dropped rod, using in-core/ex-core instrumentation, in-core or loop temperature measurements ........................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is operating at 100% RTP

Rod control is in AUTOMATIC

Annunciator 2AD-2 / D9 (RPI AT BOTTOM ROD DROP) alarms

DRPI indicates that rod M14 (adjacent to Power Range N-44) has dropped Based on the conditions above, over the next several hours the overall core QPTR will (1) .

To comply with the requirements of Tech Spec 3.1.4 (ROD GROUP ALIGNMENT LIMITS), power must be reduced to less than a MAXIMUM of (2) within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. increase

2. 75%

B. 1. increase

2. 50%

C. 1. decrease

2. 75%

D. 1. decrease

2. 50%

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 241 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 82 82 A General Discussion As a result of the dropped rod, indication on N-44 will decrease and be less than the indicated power on the other three power ranges. This will result in an indicated power tilt in that quadrant. Over the next several hours, Xenon will build in at the dropped rod assembly further suppressing power in that location (and that quadrant) and thus INCREASING the severity of the quadrant power tilt.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because AP-14 specifies that power must be reduced to less than 50% RTP to recover a dropped rod.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because actual indication on the NI channel will decrease. If the applicant confuses NI indication with what happens to QPTR, they will conclude that this is the correct response. Also, the applicant could confuse overall core QPTR with QPT in the affected quadrant. The QPT in the effected quadrant will decrease while the overall core QPTR will increase.

The second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because actual indication on the NI channel will decrease. If the applicant confuses NI indication with what happens to QPTR, they will conclude that this is the correct response. Also, the applicant could confuse overall core QPTR with QPT in the affected quadrant. The QPT in the effected quadrant will decrease while the overall core QPTR will increase.

The second part is plausible because AP-14 specifies that power must be reduced to less than 50% RTP to recover a dropped rod.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant is presented with a situation where a dropped rod is indicated. The applicant demonstrates the ability to determine if an actual dropped rod has occurred by identifying how the ex-core nuclear instruments and also identifies the correct response in accordance with Tech Specs.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The applicant must analyze the conditions given to determine the effect of a dropped rod on QPTR. Then the applicant must recall from memory the TS required action to comply with TS 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment Limits).

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(2) (Tech Specs):

1) This question can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs.

The second part of the question is related to a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Tech Spec requirement.

2) This question can NOT be answered by knowing information listed "above-the-line".

Neither part of this question is related to "above-the-line" information in Tech Specs.

3) This question can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

Neither part of this question is related to Tech Spec Safety Limits.

4) This question requires the applicant to have knowledge related to actions which are "below-the-line" in Tech Spec 3.1.4 and actions which are greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Therefore, this is SRO-level knowledge.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 242 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 82 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source 82 A SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Tech Spec 3.1.4 (Rod Group Alignment Limits)

AP-14 ENCL. 1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-IC-IRE Objective 14 APE003 AA2.03 - Dropped Control Rod Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Dropped rod, using in-core/ex-core instrumentation, in-core or loop temperature measurements ........................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 243 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 83 APE036 2.2.37 - Fuel Handling Incidents 83 B APE036 GENERIC Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment. (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Loading of a Dry Storage Cask is complete, the cask lid has been welded shut, and the crew is preparing to move the cask to the Vertical Concrete Cask (VCC).

Per Tech Spec 3.7.12 (FUEL HANDLING VENTILATION EXHAUST SYSTEM (FHVES)), the VF System (1) required to be OPERABLE and in operation in the Filter Mode when the cask is moved using the 125 -Ton Overhead Crane with the rollup door closed?

Per Tech Spec 3.7.12 Bases, total system failure could result in the atmospheric release from the fuel handling building exceeding the (2) limits in the event of a fuel handling accident.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. is

2. 10 CFR 50 B. 1. is

2. 10 CFR 100 C. 1. is NOT

2. 10 CFR 50 D. 1. is NOT

2. 10 CFR 100 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 244 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 83 83 B General Discussion Tech Spec 3.7.12 (Fuel Handling Ventilation Exhaust Sytem) requires the VF system to be OPERABLE and in operation in Filter Mode when irradiated fuel is being moved in the fuel handling building. In order to determine what constitutes evolutions requiring the FHVES to be OPERABLE, the applicant must recall from T.S. 3.7.12 basis the evolutions defined there which are considered "fuel movements". One of the evolutions defined there is:

"Movement of a loaded dry storage cask in the fuel handling building with the 125 ton overhead crane. This specifically excludes the movement of a loaded cask into or out of the fuel handling building when the fuel handling building roll-up door is raised."

Normally, Tech Spec equipment operability of this nature would fall within the required knowledge of a Reactor Operator. However, the quoted knowledge above is only found in the Tech Spec 3.7.12 Basis document, is necessary to be able to determine equipment operability under the given conditions, and is what makes Part 1 of this question SRO-level knowledge.

In accordance with the Tech Spec 3.7.12 Bases, the FHVES is designed to prevent exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 100 in the event of a fuel handling accident.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part correct.

The second part is plausible because 10 CFR 50 is mentioned in the basis for Tech Spec 3.7.12 related to the requirement to have Tech Specs associated with the FHVES system.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part plausible because if the movement were a loaded cask being moved into or out of the fuel handling building with the roll-up door RAISED, the FHVES would NOT be required to be operable.

The second part is plausible because 10 CFR 50 is mentioned in the basis for Tech Spec 3.7.12 related to the requirement to have Tech Specs associated with the FHVES system.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part plausible because if the movement were a loaded cask being moved into or out of the fuel handling building with the roll-up door RAISED, the FHVES would NOT be required to be operable.

Second part correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of the magnitude of a potential offsite release relative to the basis for offsite dose limits during a design basis fuel handling incident.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(2) (Tech Specs):

1) This question can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs

2) This question can NOT be answered solely by knowing information listed "above-the-line".

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 245 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 83 83

3) This question can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases. This question is not related to TS Safety Limits.

B

4) This question requires the applicant to recall information from the TS basis. In order to determine the correct response, the applicant must be able to determine what constitutes evolutions requiring the FHVES to be OPERABLE. To do so, the applicant must recall from T.S. 3.7.12 basis, the evolutions defined there which are considered "fuel movements". One of the evolutions defined there is:

"Movement of a loaded dry storage cask in the fuel handling building with the 125 ton overhead crane. This specifically excludes the movement of a loaded cask into or out of the fuel handling building when the fuel handling building roll-up door is raised."

The only way this knowledge is learned is through study of the TS 3.7.12 Basis. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

The second part of the question is also from the TS Basis and is therefore SRO-only knowledge.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory BANK 2012 MNS NRC Exam Q90 (Bank 5775)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Tech Spec 3.7.12 (Fuel Handling Ventilation Exhaust Sytem)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-FH-FC Objective 7 APE036 2.2.37 - Fuel Handling Incidents APE036 GENERIC Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment. (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 246 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 84 APE037 AA2.14 - Steam Generator (S/G) Tube Leak 84 A Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Actions to be taken if S/G goes solid and water enters steam lines .......

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

A Reactor trip and Safety Injection have occurred due to a SGTR on the 2B S/G

E-3 (STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE) has been implemented In accordance with E-3, transition to a contingency procedure (ECA) is required if ruptured S/G pressure cannot be maintained above a MINUMUM of (1) PSIG.

In accordance with the E-3 Background Document, if Steam Generator overfill becomes a concern, the contingency procedure which will be most effective at preventing an overfill condition is (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

PROCEDURE LEGEND:

ECA-3.1 (SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED)

ECA-3.2 (SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SATURATED RECOVERY DESIRED)

A. 1. 280

2. ECA-3.2 B. 1. 300

2. ECA-3.2 C. 1. 280

2. ECA-3.1 D. 1. 300

2. ECA-3.1 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 247 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 84 84 A General Discussion In accordance with E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) if ruptured S/G pressure cannot be maintained above 280 PSIG, transition to ECA-3.1 (SGTR With Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired) is required.

In accordance with the E-3 Background Document, if transition to one of the E-3 contingency procedures is required and Steam Generator overfill becomes a concern, ECA-3.2 (SGTR With Loss of Reactor Coolant - Saturated Recovery) will be most effective at preventing an overfill conditon because the rapid depressurization (as compared to ECA-3.1) will shorten the time to stop primary-to-secondary leakage.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because 300 PSIG is a ruptured S/G pressure in E-3 used for determining required CET temperature for initial cooldown if the ruptured S/G SM PORV is open (i.e. "WHEN selecting target temperature in Step 9, THEN assume ruptured S/G pressure is between 280 PSIG and 299 PSIG, until ruptured S/G pressure recovers to greater than 300 PSIG.")

The second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because ECA-3.1 creates less of a transient on the plant. The applicant could conclude that minimizing transients (i.e. maintaining the plant closer to stable conditions) will minimize the possibility of S/G overfill.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because 300 PSIG is a ruptured S/G pressure in E-3 used for determining required CET temperature for initial cooldown if the ruptured S/G SM PORV is open (i.e. "WHEN selecting target temperature in Step 9, THEN assume ruptured S/G pressure is between 280 PSIG and 299 PSIG, until ruptured S/G pressure recovers to greater than 300 PSIG.")

The second part is plausible because ECA-3.1 creates less of a transient on the plant. The applicant could conclude that minimizing transients (i.e. maintaining the plant closer to stable conditions) will minimize the possibility of S/G overfill.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of the actions required to prevent an overfill condition (i.e. which procedure to implement).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

Neither part of this question is related to systems knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

There are no immediate actions associated with E-3, ECA-3.1, or ECA-3.2.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

Both parts of this questions are related to procedure transition requirements and not procedure entry requirements.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

Neither part of this question is related to purpose, overall sequence of events or procedure mitigative strategy.

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of the E-3 Background Document and procedure transition requirements . Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 248 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 84 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source 84 A SRO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

E-3 Background Document LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-EP-E3 Objective 6 APE037 AA2.14 - Steam Generator (S/G) Tube Leak Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Actions to be taken if S/G goes solid and water enters steam lines .......

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Need to ask Chief Examiner for new K/A.

New K/A provided 10/15/14 HCF Chief Examiner okay with asking question related to actions prior to an actual overfill condition. For example, ruptured S/G level >83% NR but prior to overfill.

Consider sending this question to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review. HCF 10/30/14.

Question sent to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review on 1/22/15. HCF Chief Examiners Early Submittal comments:

K/A APE037 AA2.14 Question was submitted for preliminary review.

Need to look at your specific E-3 background document and verify that it discusses ECA-3.2 as stated in the question stem.

Otherwise question is Satisfactory.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 249 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 85 APE067 2.1.23 - Plant Fire On Site 85 C APE067 GENERIC Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6)

Given the following plant conditions:

Both units are in MODE 1 at 100% RTP

Welding activities in the Control Room ceiling has dropped hot slag onto the control boards and started a fire (Active)

The fire has generated toxic gas, rendering the Control Room uninhabitable

AP-45 (PLANT FIRE) has been implemented

A plant cooldown is required due to the extent of the fire damage AP-45 is designed to protect the (1) for the pending shutdown/cooldown of the plant.

The next procedure the CRS will implement as directed by AP-45 is (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

PROCEDURE LEGEND:

AP-17 (LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM)

AP-24 (LOSS OF PLANT CONTROL DUE TO FIRE OR SABOTAGE)

A. 1. TD CA pump

2. AP-17 B. 1. Standby Makeup pump

2. AP-17 C. 1. TD CA pump

2. AP-24 D. 1. Standby Makeup pump

2. AP-24 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 250 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 85 85 C General Discussion Actions in AP-45 are designed to protect the "SSS" as the protected train. The TDCA pump will be required for the pending shutdown/cooldown of the plant.

The SBMU Pump is located at the SSF but will be used to provide seal cooling to the NCPs if a loss of NCP seal cooling occurs due to the loss of all AC power.

The purpose of AP-24 is to describe steps to be taken to achieve and maintain Hot Standby following a fire event that results or could result in a loss of plant control from the Control Room or Aux Shutdown Panel.

This procedure will also be used following security events that could result in a loss of plant control from the Control Room or Aux Shutdown Panel.

The purpose of AP-17 is to describe the steps to be taken to achieve and maintain Hot Standby in the event of a Control Room evacuation, except if a plant fire is preventing use of the Control Room to safely shutdown the plant or a security event in a vital area has the potential to damage controls required to safely shutdown the plant.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Part 2 is plausible since the plant can be shutdown and cooled down from either the Auxillary Shutdown Panel (AP-17) or the Safe Shutdown Facility (AP-24).

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible since the Standby Makeup Pump is controlled from the SSF and required if we have a loss of seal cooling to the Reactor Coolant Pumps. Not required for shutdown/cooldown with no other anomalies.

Part 2 is plausible since the plant can be shutdown and cooled down from either the Auxillary Shutdown Panel (AP-17) or the Safe Shutdown Facility (AP-24).

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible since the Standby Makeup Pump is controlled from the SSF and required if we have a loss of seal cooling to the Reactor Coolant Pumps. Not required for shutdown/cooldown with no other anomalies.

Part 2 is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of procedure related to a plant fire.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

Neither part of this question is related to systems knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

There are no immediate actions associated with AP-45, AP-24, or AP-17.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

Neither part of this question is related to direct entry conditions for the APs. The second part of the question is related to procedure transition from AP-45 to either AP-24 or AP-17 based on specific conditions.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 251 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 85 85 C

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

The first part of the question is based on knowledge of the basis document for AP-45. The second part of the question is based on procedure transition from AP-45 to another AP.

5) The question requires knowledge of the AP bases and AP transition requirements. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory BANK 2012 MNS Audit Exam Q91 (Bank 3506)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

AP-45 (Plant Fire)

AP-17 (Loss of Control Room)

AP-24 (Loss of Plant Control Due to Fire or Sabotage)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

AP45002 APE067 2.1.23 - Plant Fire On Site APE067 GENERIC Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 252 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 86 SYS006 2.4.9 - Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) 86 D SYS006 GENERIC Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Given the following sequence of events on Unit 2:

04/05/15 @ 0100 - Reactor trip breaker opened per shutdown procedure in preparation for Refueling Outage

04/08/15 @ 0100 - Unit enters MODE 5

04/14/15 @ 0100 - AP-19 (LOSS OF ND OR ND SYSTEM LEAKAGE) implemented after running ND pump (2B) trips on overcurrent Current conditions 04/14/15 @ 0115:

NC system is open to atmosphere

FWST temperature 80°F

2A NI pump is available to start

Attempts are being made to start the 2A ND pump If NC system temperature cannot be controlled, AP-19 will direct the crew to initiate NC system feed and bleed within 10 minutes of NC system temperature reaching (1) °F.

If NC system feed and bleed is initiated, the MINIMUM amount of required makeup flow is (2) GPM. (Assume NC system conditions are approaching saturation)

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. 200

2. 600 B. 1. 200

2. 660 C. 1. 212

2. 600 D. 1. 212

2. 660 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 253 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 86 86 D General Discussion In accordance with AP-19 (Loss of ND or ND System Leakage), the crew is directed to initiate NC system feed and bleed if NC system temperature is within 10 minutes of reaching 212°F.

To determine the required flowrate, the applicant will first determine that the time after shutdown is 9 days (i.e. 0100 on 04/05 to 0100 on 04/14).

Reading the graph on page 1 of Table 2.10.4, the applicant will determine that the required flowrate is 600 GPM. The applicant will then multiply 600 GPM by the 1.10 correction factor per the instructions on page 2 of Table 2.10.4 to determine that the required makeup flow is 660 GPM.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible since 200°F is used extensively throughout AP-19 (i.e. efforts in AP-19 are focused on maintaining NC system temperature less than 200°F).

The second part is plausible if the applicant does not apply the 1.10 multiplier as directed in the instructions on page 2 of Table 2.10.4. If so, they would obtain 600 GPM by reading the required flow directly from the graph on page 1.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible since 200°F is used extensively throughout AP-19 (i.e. efforts in AP-19 are focused on maintaining NC system temperature less than 200°F).

The second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible if the applicant does not apply the 1.10 multiplier as directed in the instructions on page 2 of Table 2.10.4. If so, they would obtain 600 GPM by reading the required flow directly from the graph on page 1.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of AP-19 related to actions associated with time-to-boil during a loss of RHR.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. First, the applicant must recall from memory the required temperature for initiation of NC system feed and bleed. Next, the applicant must use Table 2.10.4 to determine the required minimum makeup flow to prevent boiling.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

Neither part of this question is related to systems level knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

There are no immediate actions associated with AP-19.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

Neither part of this question is related to AP-19 entry conditions.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 254 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 86 This is detailed knowledge of procedural requirements related to initation of feed and bleed.

86 D

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Data Book Table 2.10.4 AP-19 (Loss of ND or ND System Leakage)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-AP-19 Objective 6 SYS006 2.4.9 - Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

SYS006 GENERIC Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 255 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 87 SYS022 2.4.35 - Containment Cooling System (CCS) 87 D SYS022 GENERIC Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

A LOCA has occurred inside Containment

E-1 (LOSS OR REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT) has been implemented

The crew has reached the step in E-1 to dispatch an operator to stop all NF AHUs (ICE CONDENSER AIR HANDLING UNITS)

In accordance with the E-1 Background Document, the reason for stopping the NF AHUs is because (1) .

As part of the E-1 mitigating strategy, the NF AHUs are stopped (2) the H2 Igniters are placed in service.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. operation of the NF AHUs results in erroneous H2 Analyzer indication

2. after B. 1. operation of the NF AHUs was not included in the Containment H2 combustion analysis

2. after C. 1. operation of the NF AHUs results in erroneous H2 Analyzer indication

2. before D. 1. operation of the NF AHUs was not included in the Containment H2 combustion analysis

2. before Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 256 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 87 87 D General Discussion In accordance with the E-0 Background Document, operation of the NF AHUs was not included in the Post-LOCA Containment H2 combustion analysis. This is essentially the same as not having the NF AHUs in service. Therefore, to ensure that Containment remains within the bounds of the Post-LOCA accident analysis, the NF AHUs are stopped.

To ensure a controlled burn of hydrogen in the Containment atmosphere, the NF AHUs are secured prior to the production of significant amounts of H2 in the Containment atmosphere and prior to placing the H2 igniters in service.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the H2 Analyzers are typically placed in service at approximately the same time as the NF AHUs are secured.

Therefore, it is plausible for the applicant to conclude that the reason the NF AHUs are secured is to ensure proper operation of the H2 Analyzers.

The second part is plausible because in E-0, the step to secure the NF AHUs comes after the step to place the H2 igniters in service.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because in E-0, the step to secure the NF AHUs comes after the step to place the H2 igniters in service.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the H2 Analyzers are typically placed in service at approximately the same time as the NF AHUs are secured.

Therefore, it is plausible for the applicant to conclude that the reason the NF AHUs are secured is to ensure proper operation of the H2 Analyzers.

The second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of the reason for directing local operator actions related to operation of the Containment Cooling system and the operational implications of those operations.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

This information needed to answer the first part of the question is only found in the background document for E-1. The information needed for the second part of the question is detailed procedure step knowledge based of a given set of conditions.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

There are no immediate operator actions in E-1.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

Neither part of this question is based on procedure entry conditions.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

The first part of the question is based on knowledge of the E-1 Background Document. The second part of the question is not based on overall sequence of events because whether the NF AHUs are stopped before or after the H2 Igniters are placed in service is not a fixed sequence. It is condition dependent.

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content and procedure background document. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 257 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 87 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source 87 D SRO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

E-1 (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)

E-0 Background Document LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

NONE SYS022 2.4.35 - Containment Cooling System (CCS)

SYS022 GENERIC Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 258 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 88 SYS059 A2.01 - Main Feedwater (MFW) System 88 B Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Feedwater actuation of AFW system ................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit was manually tripped from 100% RTP due to a loss of both CF pumps

At Step 7 of E-0 (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION) the OATC reports that the Feedwater Isolation status lights on 1SI-4 are NOT LIT

Narrow Range (NR) levels in ALL S/Gs are 78% and INCREASING Based on the conditions above, a YELLOW PATH on Heat Sink will occur if NR level in the intact S/Gs exceeds a MAXIMUM of (1) .

In accordance with the Background Document for FR-H.3 (RESPONSE TO STEAM GENERATOR HIGH LEVEL), the reason for preventing S/G levels from going above the NR level span is to (2) ..

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 83%

2. prevent an NC system overcooling event B. 1. 83%

2. ensure each S/G remains effective for secondary heat removal C. 1. 92%

2. prevent an NC system overcooling event D. 1. 92%

2. ensure each S/G remains effective for secondary heat removal Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 259 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 88 88 B General Discussion The entry condition for FR-H.3 (Response to S/G High Level) is any S/G NR level greater than 83%.

In accordance with the Background Document for FR-H.3, the reason for preventing S/G levels from exceeding the NR level span is to ensure that each S/G remains effective for secondary heat removal. This criteria is also shown in the WOG Background Document for FR-H.3.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because NC system overcooling is a concern in an event where there is excessive steam flow or excessive steam demand. It is plausible for the applicant to confuse those events with an overfeeding event and conclude that overcooling is the primary concern.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

The first part is plausible because 92% S/G NR level is specified in FR-H.3 as the level above which an evaluation of the overfilled S/G should be performed and the effected S/G should not be steamed until the overfill evaluation is complete.

The second part is plausible because NC system overcooling is a concern in an event where there is excessive steam flow or excessive steam demand. It is plausible for the applicant to confuse those events with an overfeeding event and conclude that overcooling is the primary concern.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

The first part is plausible because 92% S/G NR level is specified in FR-H.3 as the level above which an evaluation of the overfilled S/G should be performed and the effected S/G should not be steamed until the overfill evaluation is complete.

The second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because it requires the applicant to predict the impact of high S/G levels on implementation of FR-H.3 and demonstrate the ability to mitiagate the consequences of the overfeeding condition by having knowledge of the basis for performing the actions of FR-H.3.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

Part 1 is related to YELLOW PATH FRP entry conditions. Part 2 is knowledge of EOP rules of usage.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

There are no immediate actions associated with FR-H.3.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

The first part of this question is RO level knowledge. The second part is knowledge of the FR-H.3 background document and is therefore SRO knowledge.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is not knowledge of the purpose of the procedure. It is not knowledge of the overall sequence of events. And, it is not knowledge of the overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

5) This is knowledge from the FR-H.3 Background Document regarding the basis for maintaining specific conditions in the S/G (i.e. preventing level from exceeding the NR level span).

Therefore, this is an SRO-level question.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 260 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 88 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source 88 B SRO Memory BANK 2013 MNS NRC SRO Q79 (Bank 5290)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees)

OMP 4-3 (Use of Abnormal and Emergency Procedures) Section 7.15 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-EP-FRH Objective 2 SYS059 A2.01 - Main Feedwater (MFW) System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Feedwater actuation of AFW system ................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 261 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 89 SYS064 A2.02 - Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System 89 C Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Load, VARS, pressure on air compressor, speed droop, frequency, voltage, fuel oil level, temperatures .......................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

Unit is at 100% RTP

OAC Alarm M1A1590 (1A1 VG HEADER PRESS LO-LO) in alarm

Annunciator 1AD-11 / A6 (DG A PANEL TROUBLE) in alarm An AO dispatched to the 1A DG Room reports the following:

Annunciator 1AD-19 / C5 (STARTING AIR PRESS LOW) is in alarm

No other annunciators are lit at the local panel

VG Starting Air Tank 1A1 is 208 PSIG and going down slowly

VG Starting Air Tank 1A2 is 220 PSIG and stable

VG compressor 1A1 cannot be started

1A1 VG Starting Air Tank has been isolated Based on the conditions above, the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator is (1) .

Per Tech Spec 3.8.3 (DIESEL FUEL OIL AND STARTING AIR) Bases, for the Starting Air system to be considered OPERABLE it must be capable of a MINIMUM of (2) .start attempts without recharging the air start receivers.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

1. OPERABLE A.

2. three

1. INOPERABLE B.

2. three

1. OPERABLE C.

2. five

1. INOPERABLE D.

2. five Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 262 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 89 89 C General Discussion Per Tech Spec 3.8.3 basis, Each DG has an air start system with adequate capacity for five successive start attempts on the DG without recharging the air start receiver(s). Per Condition D Basis, DG starting air system normal alignment allows air from both receivers to enter both left and right starting air headers. Therefore, with one receiver isolated, both left and right starting air headers will be supplied from the remaining receiver. With the degraded receiver isolated and the remaining receiver @ 210 psig, the capacity for 5 starts exists. Therefore, the DG is still operable. If starting air pressure to the receiver tank cannot be restored within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , the DG would then be declared inoperable.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible if the applicant fails to realize that one starting air receiver tank will supply both left and right starting air headers and think that starting air capacity has been reduced.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

First part is plausible because other conditions associated with starting air would render the D/G inoperable right away (e.g. both receiver tanks pressures < 210 psig). Additionally if starting air pressure couldnt be restored within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , the DG would be declared inoperable for this condition.

Second part is plausible if the applicant concludes that starting air capacity has been reduced with the loss of one of the receiver tanks.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

First part is plausible because other conditions associated with starting air would render the D/G inoperable right away (e.g. both receiver tanks pressures < 210 psig). Additionally if starting air pressure couldnt be restored within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , the DG would be declared inoperable for this condition.

Second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because the question requires the applicant to predict the impact of a loss of part of the VG system (Diesel Starting Air) on the diesel and use procedures (Tech Specs) to mitigate the consequences of the loss of air.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires multiple mental steps. The applicant must first analyze the information to determine that the low starting air pressure is an entry condition for Tech Specs. The applicant must then recall from memory that one Starting Air Receiver tank is all that is needed for the DG to meet its intended function (one tank can still provide 5 start attempts, therefore the DG is still considered operable).

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the "Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions (Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010)" under the Screening Criteria for question linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(2) (Tech Specs):

1) It can NOT be answered solely by knowing < 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs.

2) It can NOT be answered solely by knowing the LCO/TRM information listed "above-the-line".

3) It can NOT be answered by knowing the Tech Spec Safety Limits or their bases

4) It requires the applicant to have detailed knowledge of Tech Spec 3.8.3 Basis document.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension BANK 2013 MNS Audit Exam Q80 (Bank 5764)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

TS 3.8.3 (DG Fuel Oil and Starting Air)

TS 3.8.3 Basis Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 263 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 89 89 C LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-DG-DGA Objective 56 SYS064 A2.02 - Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Load, VARS, pressure on air compressor, speed droop, frequency, voltage, fuel oil level, temperatures .......................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 264 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 90 SYS073 A2.01 - Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System 90 C Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to cor- rect, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Erratic or failed power supply ......................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

NC system temperature is 192°F

Unit cooldown is in progress

ND Train "A" is in service

A Containment purge is in progress in preparation for a Containment entry

The BOP operator reports that power has been lost to 1EMF-39 (CONTAINMENT GAS)

Which ONE (1) of the following indicates the required action per OP/1/A/6450/015 (CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM)?

A. Continue the containment purge while verifying the flow rate is below the GWR requirement on the required surveillance interval.

B. Continue the containment purge and verify 1EMF-38 (CONTAINMENT PARTICULATE) and 1EMF-40 (CONTAINMENT IODINE) are OPERABLE.

C. Stop the Containment Purge. Shutdown VP per Enclosure 4.3 (VP SYSTEM SHUTDOWN). When 1EMF-39 is restored to OPERABLE, a new sample and new GWR paperwork are required.

D. Stop the Containment Purge. Shutdown VP per Enclosure 4.3 (VP SYSTEM SHUTDOWN). Have RP generate new GWR paperwork crediting 1EMF-40, restart the release.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 265 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 90 90 C General Discussion According to OP/1/A/6450/015 Limits and Precautions, in Modes 5 and 6 1EMF-39(L) shall be operable during VP releases.

According to SLC 16.11.7, the radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 16.11.7-1 shall be OPERABLE with Alarm/Trip Setpoints set to ensure that the limits of SLC 16.11.6 are not exceeded.

According to Table 16.11.7-1, Instrument 4, EMF-39L shall be operable in Modes 1-6 except when the VP isolation valve is closed and locked.

If, as is the case under the stated conditions, EMF-39 is inoperable then Conditions A, F and I are applicable.

According to Condition F, if the Noble gas activity monitor providing automatic termination of release is inoperable, then the PURGING or VENTING of radioactive effluents via this pathway must be suspended immediately.

According to OP/1/A/6450/015, IF VP will NOT be restarted OR is being secured due to 1EMF 38/39/40 package being INOPERABLE, shutdown per Enclosure 4.3 (VP System Shutdown). Enclosure 4.3 will close out the existing GWR paperwork.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since releases are often permitted to continue (or begin) by allowing alternatives to operability of the primary radiation monitor, and according to CNT-VP, the purge exhaust air is monitored by EMF-38, 39 and 40 during a release.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since releases are often permitted to continue (or begin) by allowing alternatives to operability of the primary radiation monitor See A).

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Plausible since the first part is correct that VP is required to be shutdown and it is plausible to begin a release allowing alternatives to operability of the primary radiation monitor See A).

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must demonstrate the ability to predict the impacts of EMF-39 becoming inoperable during operation(

due to a failed power supply) on the Containment Purge System and based on those predictions, use procedures (i.e. SLC/OP) to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those operations.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(2) (Tech Specs):

1) This question can NOT be answered by knowing less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs.

In this question the applicant could only discern that a less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Spec applied if they had Table 16.11.7-1 memorized to the point of knowing which conditions of SLC 16.11.7 applied to 1EMF-39. However, even if they had the table memorized, requirements to resume the purge are beyond the knowledge of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Tech Specs.

2) This question can NOT be answered by knowing information listed "above-the-line".The information required to answer this question are not contained in the information "above-the-line" in SLC 16.11.7.

3) This question can NOT be answered by knowing the TS Safety Limits or their bases.

The question does not involve TS Safety Limits.

4) This question requires the applicant to possess knowledge related to the application of SLC 16,11, 7 which is beyond the knowledge required of an RO. Therefore, it is SRO level knowledge.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory BANK 2011 MNS SRO Audit Examination AUDIT Q82 (Bank 3210)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 266 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 90 Development References Student References Provided 90 C

REFERENCES:

OP/1/A/6450/015, Encl 4.6, Step 3.9 SLC 16.11.7 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-WE-EMF Objective 10 SYS073 A2.01 - Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to cor- rect, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Erratic or failed power supply ......................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 267 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 91 SYS001 A2.01 - Control Rod Drive System 91 D Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunction or operations on the CRDS- and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations : (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13)

Loss of CCW or fan cooling Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit is in MODE 4 following a Refueling Outage

OP/1/A/6100/SU-13 (HEATUP TO 350°F) is in effect

Two CRD Vent (VR) fans are currently in service Subsequently:

One VR fans trips In accordance with OP/1/A/6100/SU-15 (MODE 3 CHECKLIST), the crew must start (1) of the remaining available VR fans to enter MODE 3.

In accordance with the design basis, the VR system is designed to maintain temperature exiting the CRDM shroud equal to or less than a MAXIMUM of (2) .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. one

2. 100°F B. 1. one

2. 150°F C. 1. both

2. 100°F D. 1. both

2. 150°F Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 268 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 91 91 D General Discussion In accordance with OP/1/A/6100/SU-15 (MODE 3 Checklist), three CRD Vent fans must be in opertion prior to making the mode change from MODE 4 to MODE 3.

In accordance with the VR System design basis, the VR system will maintain the air temperature exiting the CRDM shroud area equal to or less than 150°F.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant does not recall the number of VR fans required to be in service in MODE 3 and above. Also, in accordance with the PT for testing the CRDMs, only two VR fans must be in service.

Part two is plausible because 100°F is the upper Containment Hi-Hi temperature alarm setpoint on the OAC.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible if the applicant does not recall the number of VR fans required to be in service in MODE 3 and above. Also, in accordance with the PT for testing the CRDMs, only two VR fans must be in service.

Part two is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct.

Part two is plausible because 100°F is the upper Containment Hi-Hi temperature alarm setpoint on the OAC.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant must have knowledge of the requirements of the MODE 3 checklist to "control" the consequencs of the loss of one VR fan.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

The first part of the question does not involve systems knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

There are no immediate actions associated with Operating Procedures.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

The first part of the question is related to detailed procedure knowledge in an Operating Procedure.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is detailed procedure step step knowledge and not sequence of events, purpose, or mitigating strategy within the procedure.

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory NEW Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 269 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 91 Development References Student References Provided 91 D

REFERENCES:

OP/1/A/6100/SU-13 (Heatup to 350°F)

OP/1/A/6100/SU-15 (Mode 3 Checklist)

OP/1/A/6450/001 (Containment Vent. Sys)

OP-MC-CNT-VUL LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

NONE SYS001 A2.01 - Control Rod Drive System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunction or operations on the CRDS- and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations : (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13)

Loss of CCW or fan cooling 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Need to ask Chief Examiner for new K/A.

New K/A provided 10/15/14 HCF.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 270 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 92 SYS072 A2.02 - Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System 92 D Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ARM system- and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 43.3 / 45.13)

Detector failure .................................................

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The unit has experienced a Safety Injection

All S/G pressures are 1000 PSIG and STABLE

The crew has implemented E-3 (STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE) due to 1EMF-24 (STEAM LINE 1A MONITOR) Trip 2 light being LIT

The BOP informs the OSM that 1RAD-3 / F5 (CABINET TROUBLE) is LIT

The OSM believes the EMF detector may have failed

1. In accordance with E-3, what method will the crew use to determine the validity of the EMF indication?

2. Once the indication is determined to be false, which ONE (1) of the following indicates the FIRST procedure to which the crew will transition upon exiting E-3?

PROCEDURE LEGEND:

E-1 (LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT)

ES-0.0 (RE-DIAGNOSIS)

A. 1. Verify Trip 2 alarm on adjacent steam line EMF (1EMF-27 (STEAM LINE 1D MONITOR)) is DARK

2. E-1 B. 1. Verify Trip 2 alarm on adjacent steam line EMF (1EMF-27 (STEAM LINE 1D MONITOR)) is DARK

2. ES-0.0 C. 1. Request that RP frisk cation columns

2. E-1 D. 1. Request that RP frisk cation columns

2. ES-0.0 Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 271 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 92 92 D General Discussion In accordance with E-3, the crew will confirm that the EMF alarm is not valid based on surveys of the S/G Cation Columns.

Upon verifying that the EMF alarm is not valid, the first procedure transition will be to ES-0.0.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because with a valid SGTL,, indications would also increasing on the adjacent steam line.

The second part is plausible for several reasons. First, since a Safety Injection has occurred, a loss of NC system inventory is in progress and E-1 (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant) would seem the logical procedure to mitigate the accident. Also, based on the conditions given, the crew will end up in E-1 at some point.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because with a valid SGTL,, indications would also increasing on the adjacent steam line.

The second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible for several reasons. First, since a Safety Injection has occurred, a loss of NC system inventory is in progress and E-1 (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant) would seem the logical procedure to mitigate the accident. Also, based on the conditions given, the crew will end up in E-1 at some point.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The KA is matched because an area EMF detector failure has occurred and the applicant must identify the procedure actions used to determine the validity of the EMF alarm and the subsequent procedure transition when the alarm is determined to be invalid.

Basis for Hi Cog This is an analysis level question since the candidate must analyze the impact of the power input to the detector circuitry failing high to determine the effect on the alarm setpoint.

Basis for SRO only This is an SRO Only question linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5). This question can NOT be answered using system knowledge alone. It can NOT be answered by knowing immediate actions or procedure entry conditions. To correctly answer this question the candidate must assess plant conditions and then decide which procedure (if any) should be implemented.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory BANK CNS Bank Question 598 Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

ES-0.0 (Re-Diagnosis) bckgd doc LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

NONE Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 272 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 92 SYS072 A2.02 - Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System 92 D Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ARM system- and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 43.3 / 45.13)

Detector failure .................................................

401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Send this question to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review.

Question sent to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review on 01 15. HCF Chief Examiners Early Submittal comments:

K/A SYS072 A2.02 Question was submitted for preliminary review.

Per the SLC 16.7.6 table, these monitors are not required until 40% power.

Based on reading the lesson plan, the setpoints are manually set by RP (5 gpd above 40% and 20gpd below 40%). I do not believe this is technically correct. I think it is the algorithm that changes when the power indication fails, not the setpoint. Need to discuss.

The distractor analysis does not match the number choices.

Facility Response:

The facility agrees with Chief Examiner's comments. After re-evaluating this question, the facility did not believe that the existing question could be salvaged without extensive reach. The facility also believed that the existing question could not be re-written into a valid question that applicants could reasonably answer based on existing reference material. Consequently, the facility elected to use a completely different question in place of the early submittal question.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 273 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 93 SYS086 2.4.30 - Fire Protection System (FPS) 93 D SYS086 GENERIC Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is at 100% RTP

AOs are performing the SSF D/G Operability Test in accordance with PT/0/A/4200/002 (STANDBY SHUTDOWN FACILITY OPERABILITY TEST)

The following sequence of events occurs:

0200 - A fuel oil leak occurs on the SSF D/G 0203 - A fire breaks out on the SSF D/G 0205 - The SSF D/G is secured 0220 - The fire brigade extinguished the fire 0222 - It is determined that damage to the SSF D/G has occurred because the SSF Sprinkler system failed to actuate Based on the conditions above, the Emergency Classification for this event would be an (1) .

In addition to the state of North Carolina, event notification will be made to a total of (2) . County Warning Points.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. Unusual Event

2. five B. 1. Alert

2. five C. 1. Unusual Event

2. six D. 1. Alert

2. six Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 274 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 93 93 D General Discussion Unusual event is fire extinguished after 15 min or greater. Alert is visible damage to certain equipment (of which the SSF is one) regardless of length of fire.

In accordance with the Event Notification Form, there are six NC Counties Warning Points which must be contacted.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See conditions above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the conditions for declaring an Unusual Event are met (i.e. a fire in the SSF lasting more than 15 minutes).

The second part is plausible because most licensed operators and applicants tend to forget at least one of the warning points.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See conditions above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because most licensed operators and applicants tend to forget at least one of the warning points.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See conditions above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the conditions for declaring an Unusual Event are met (i.e. a fire in the SSF lasting more than 15 minutes).

The second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because it requires the applicant to classify a fire related event which requires notfication to external organizations and recall the number of Warning Points which must be contacted.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step.

First, the applicant must diagnose the conditions given to determine the appropriate procedure to be implemented.

Next, the applicant must apply the requirements of RP-000 to the conditions given to determine the appropriate Emergency Action Level classification.

Basis for SRO only This question is SRO-Only because it requires the applicant to classify a fire event in accordance with RP-000 (Classification of Emergency) which is an SRO-only function. Acting as the Emergency Communicator for an event is a function that is also only performed by SROs at MNS.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension BANK 2008 CNS SRO NRC Examination NRC Q93 (Bank 599)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

RP-000 (Classification of Emergency)

RP-000 Classification of Emergency RP-029 Notifications to Offsite Agencies from the Control Room LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-EP-EAL Objective 6 SYS086 2.4.30 - Fire Protection System (FPS)

SYS086 GENERIC Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 275 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 93 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status 93 D Send this question to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 Review.

This question does not specifically address a notification that is required as a result of a problem with or operation of the Fire Protection System.

The question actually pertains to notifications as the result of an actual fire. Believe this is the closest we're going to be able to come to matching this K/A with a discrimminating, operationally valid question.

Question sent to Chief Examiner for pre-401-9 review on 01 15. HCF Chief Examiners Early Submittal comments:

K/A SYS 086 G2.4.30 Unable to fully evaluate this question. The distractor analysis, source of the question and the references to be provided were not included with the question.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 276 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 94 GEN2.1 2.1.13 - GENERIC - Conduct of Operations 94 B Conduct of Operations Knowledge of facility requirements for controlling vital/controlled access. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.9 / 45.10)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is at 100% RTP

Engineering has requested access to the Containment Annulus area for an inspection In accordance with MSD-585 (REACTOR BUILDING PERSONNEL ACCESS AND MATERIAL CONTROL),

1) the MINIMUM level of approval for the Annulus entry is the .

2) the use of the "buddy system" .required for entry into the Annulus.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. WCC SRO

2. is NOT B. 1. WCC SRO

2. is C. 1. Shift Manager

2. is NOT D. 1. Shift Manager

2. is Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 277 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 94 94 B General Discussion Per MSD-585, Attachment 4.3 (Procedure for Containment Entry Modes 1-4), permission to enter Containment must be obtained from the WCC SRO prior to entry.

Per MSD-585, the buddy system is required in MODES 1-4 for BOTH containment and annulus entries.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is correct.

The second part is plausible because Annulus entries are not common at any time and an Annulus entry is not as significant event as a containment entry in MODES 1-4. Therefore, is plausible that the applicant could conclude that the buddy system is NOT required for an Annulus entry.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is plausible because the Shift Manager has overall responsibility for the operation of the plant in all modes.

The second part is plausible because Annulus entries are not common at any time and an Annulus entry is not as significant event as a containment entry in MODES 1-4. Therefore, is plausible that the applicant could conclude that the buddy system is NOT required for an Annulus entry.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The first part is Shift Manager has overall responsibility for the operation of the plant in all modes.

The second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of MSD-585 which provides direction for Containment access during all modes of operation.

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

Neither part of this question involves systems level knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

There are no immediate actions associated with MSD-585.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

This question is not related to knowledge of EPs or APs,

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is detailed knowledge of procedure steps.

5) The question requires detailed knowledge of procedure content. Therefore, it is SRO knowledge.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory NEW Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 278 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 94 Development References Student References Provided 94 B

REFERENCES:

MSD-585 (Reactor Building Personnel Access and Material Control)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

NONE GEN2.1 2.1.13 - GENERIC - Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations Knowledge of facility requirements for controlling vital/controlled access. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.9 / 45.10) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 279 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 95 GEN2.1 2.1.42 - GENERIC - Conduct of Operations 95 A Conduct of Operations Knowledge of new and sepnt fuel movement procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.7 / 45.13)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is in MODE 6 for a Refueling Outage In accordance with AD-NS-ALL-1001 (CONDUCT OF REFUELING),

1) bypassing fuel handling interlocks can only be approved by the (1) .

2) the Refueling SRO (2) required to be present inside Containment for control rod latching.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Refueling SRO

2. is B. 1. Refueling SRO

2. is NOT C. 1. Shift Manager

2. is D. 1. Shift Manager

2. is NOT Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 280 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 95 95 A General Discussion In accordance with AD-NS-ALL-1001:

1) The Refueling SRO has responsibility for approving the use of fuel handling interlock bypasses.

2) The Refueling SRO must be on the refueling floor or operating deck of Containment to directly supervise fuel movements or evolutions deemed to be core alteration activities.

Control rod latching has been determined to be a core alteration activity.

Answer A Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausibe because it is a commonly misunderstood that the Refueling SRO is required to be in containment for BOTH fuel movement and core alterations .

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because the highest level of authority on shift during fuel movement or core alterations is the Shift Manager. It is also the responsibility of the Shift Manager during fuel movement to remain cognizant of all activities related to fuel movement and to keep all Ros and SROs on shift informed of those activities.

Second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because the highest level of authority on shift during fuel movement or core alterations is the Shift Manager. It is also the responsibility of the Shift Manager during fuel movement to remain cognizant of all activities related to fuel movement and to keep all Ros and SROs on shift informed of those activities.

Second part is plausibe because it is a commonly misunderstood that the Refueling SRO is required to be in containment for BOTH fuel movement and core alterations .

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of fuel movement procedures (i.e. AD-NS-ALL-1001 Conduct of Refueling).

Basis for Hi Cog Basis for SRO only This question is SRO level knowledge because it is associated with procedures and limitations involved in initial core loading as described in the "Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Question".

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Memory NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

AD-NS-ALL-1001 (Conduct of Refueling)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-FH-FC Objectives 2 and 5 GEN2.1 2.1.42 - GENERIC - Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 281 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 95 Knowledge of new and sepnt fuel movement procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.7 / 45.13) 95 A 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 282 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 96 GEN2.2 2.2.12 - GENERIC - Equipment Control 96 B Equipment Control Knowledge of surveillance procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

The unit is in MODE 6 with core RELOAD in progress

NC system boron concentration is 2705 PPM

Boric Acid Tank level is 10%

The following surveillances are being performed:

o PT/2/A/4600/100 (SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS) o PT/2/A/4600/003 C (WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE ITEMS CHECKLIST)

The surveillance for NC system boron concentration performed during PT/2/A/4600/100 (SR 3.9.1.1) ensures that keff during MODE 6 remains less than a MAXIMUM of (1) .

Based on the conditions above the MINIMUM required Boric Acid Tank level (2) met.

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. 0.95

2. is B. 1. 0.95

2. is NOT C. 1. 0.98

2. is D. 1. 0.98

2. is NOT Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 283 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 96 96 B General Discussion In accordance with TS 3.9.1 (Boron Concentration), in MODE 6 boron concentration shall be maintained within the limits specified in the COLR (Core Operating Limits Report). In accordance with the Basis Document for TS 3.9.1 the basis for maintaining boron concentration within limits is to ensure that Keff remains less than 0.95 to ensure that a recriticality does not occur while in MODE 6 (i.e. during fuel movement).

In accordance with SLC 16.9.14, Borated Water Sources (Shutdown) for the BAT to be considered OPERABLE it must meet the minimum volume requirements specified in the COLR. There are two conditions that would require different BAT levels. If the unit was in MODE 6 at the end of a cycle after 455 EFPD and the core had not yet been off loaded, Figure 6 of the COLR would be used to determine the minimum volume and the required minimum level would be 8.7%. However, for the conditions given, since core reload is in progress (i.e. the full cycle core is no longer loaded), the requirements of COLR 2.15 would apply (i.e. 13.6%).

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is correct Part 2 is plausible because this would be the correct answer if the core had not yet been off loaded.

Answer B Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible because < .99 is the maximum Keff for Cold Shutdown.

Part 2 is plausible because this would be the correct answer if the core had not yet been off loaded.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

Part 1 is plausible because < .99 is the maximum Keff for Cold Shutdown.

Part 2 is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA This question requires the applicant to have knowledge of the basis for NC system boron concentration surveillance requirements during refueling. If the limits of this surveillance requirement are not met, it could result in an inadvertent criticality which would constitute a Fuel Handling Incident.

Basis for Hi Cog This question is higher cognitive level because it requires more than one mental step. The first part of the question requires the applicant to recall from memory the basis for NC system boron surveillance requirement during refueling. The second part requires the applicant to analyze plant conditions and determine which BAT level limit from the COLR applies to the given conditions.

Basis for SRO only This question is SRO-only knowledge linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(2) (Tech Specs) as described in the "Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Question" Rev 1 (dated 03/11/2010):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months TS/TRM action statements. It requires knowledge of TS basis.

2) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the LCO/TRM information listed "above-the-line". Again, TS basis knowledge.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the TS Safety Limits. TS 3.9.1 (Boron Concentration) Basis.

4) The question requires the applicant to have detailed knowledge of the TS basis to analyze TS requirements (i.e. basis for the NC system boron concentration surveillance). As such this constitutes SRO-level knowledge.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 284 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 96 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source 96 B SRO Comprehension BANK 2011 MNS NRC Exam Q91 (Bank 4439)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Unit 2 COLR - Borated Water Sources TS 3.9.1 (Boron Concentration) Basis Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) - 2.15 and Figure 6 SLC-16.9.14 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-PS-N Objective 24 GEN2.2 2.2.12 - GENERIC - Equipment Control Equipment Control Knowledge of surveillance procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 285 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 97 GEN2.2 2.2.44 - GENERIC - Equipment Control 97 D Equipment Control Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

A SGTR has occurred

E-3 (STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE) is in progress

After terminating Safety Injection, the following indications are observed:

o NC system pressure is DECREASING o Pressurizer level is 12% and DECREASING o Containment temperature, pressure, and radiation levels are INCREASING PROCEDURE LEGEND:

ES-0.0 (RE-DIAGNOSIS)

E-0 (REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION)

E-1 (LOSS OR REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT)

ECA-3.1 (SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED)

Based on the conditions above, the CRS will direct the crew to:

A. initiate Safety Injection and go to E-0.

B. initiate Safety Injection and go to ES-0.0.

C. manually start ECCS pumps as necessary and transition to E-1.

D. manually start ECCS pumps as necessary and transition to ECA-3.1.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 286 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 97 97 D General Discussion In accordance with the foldout criteria of E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture), if Pressurizer Level cannot be maintained greater than 11% and restart of ECCS pumps occurs after step 21 (SI termination) the crew is directed to start ECCS pumps as necessary and transition to ECA-3.1 (SGTR With Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired).

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because under most circumstances if SI initiation is required after enter E-0, the crew would be directed to initiate SI and go back to the beginning of E-0.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible because initiating Safety Injection would restart the ECCS pumps which is the correct action and ES-0.0 is plausible because the circumstances given present a complex situation which may not be fully understood by the operators.

Answer C Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible since manually starting ECCS pumps as necessary is correct and transition to E-1 is plausible since it addresses a loss of reactor coolant.

Answer D Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because the applicant is presented with indications of a complex situation and must determine what operator actions must be taken to mitigate the consequences of the event.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level because it requires more than one mental step.

First the applicant must diagnose the indications given to determine the condition of the plant.

Second, the applicant must recall from memory the requirements of E-3. Finally, the applicant must associate the diagnosis with the recalled information to determine the correct actions.

Basis for SRO only This question meets the following criteria for an SRO only question as described in the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions Rev 1 dated 03/11/2010 for screening questions linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5) (Assessment and selection of procedures):

1) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing systems knowledge.

This question is in no way related to systems knowledge.

2) The question can NOT be answered by knowing immediate operator actions.

While there are immediate actions associated with E-0, this question cannot be answered based on knowledge of procedure immediate action steps.

3) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing entry conditions for AOP or direct entry conditions for EOPs.

This question is not associated with procedure entry conditions. It is associated with detailed procedure step knowledge associated with procedure transition.

4) The question can NOT be answered solely by knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

This is detailed knowledge of procedure steps associated with transition to another procedure.

5) The question requires the applicant to perform a diagnosis of plant condtions and determine the appropriate procedure transition based on detailed procedure step knowledge. Therefore, it is SRO level knowledge.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 287 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 97 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source 97 D SRO Comprehension BANK 2013 Watts Bar Nuclear ILT Exam Bank Q271 Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-EP-E3 Objective 6 GEN2.2 2.2.44 - GENERIC - Equipment Control Equipment Control Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 288 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 98 GEN2.3 2.3.6 - GENERIC - Radiation Control 98 C Radiation Control Ability to approve release permits. (CFR: 41.13 / 43.4 / 45.10)

Given the following plant conditions:

A release of Waste Monitor Tank (WMT) A has been planned

A radioactive liquid release permit has been prepared with the following data:

RC PUMP DATA ==========================================

RC pumps running................................................................... 3.00 RC pumps assigned to RELEASE........................................... 3.00 Total RC pumps required (all concurrent releases)................. 4.00

RECOMMENDED RELEASE RATE ============================

Allowable release rate (gpm)................................................. 1.61E+01 Recommended release rate (gpm)........................................ 1.20E+02

SETPOINT DATA =========================================

EMF49L in Service ................ Yes Monitor Background (cpm)...... 4.49E+03 Cs-137 Equivalence (uCi/ML)... 7.23E-06 Expected CPM.................. 4.50E+03 Trip 1 setpoint (cpm)............... 8.97E+03 Trip 2 setpoint (cpm)............... 1.42E+04 Which ONE (1) of the following indicates the actions related to the approval of this release permit?

A. The release may NOT be approved due to inadequate number of RC pumps.

Recommended Release Rate information is correct.

B. The release may NOT be approved due to incorrect Recommended Release Rate. RC Pump Data information is adequate.

C. The release may NOT be approved due to inadequate number of RC Pumps AND incorrect Recommended Release Rate.

D. The release MAY be approved as presented.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 289 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 98 98 C General Discussion The Liquid Waste Release (LWR) permit is designed to prevent an UNCONTROLLED release of radioactive materials to the environment in liquid effluents. The two pieces of this control are: 1. ensuring adequate dilution of the liquid and 0EMF40(L) Trip setpoints. The amount of dilution needed is based on the activity of the tank to be released. The dilution includes a limit on the release rate and the number of RC pumps that need to be running. Minimum dilution flow is assured by an interlock terminating waste liquid releases if the number of RC Pumps running falls below the number of pumps required for dilution.

Since more than one liquid waste release can occur at one time, the LWR states the number of pumps needed for this release and also the total number for all concurrent releases. The SRO must verify the required number of RC pumps are running for all concurrent releases. If less than the required number of RC pumps is running, the LWR cannot be approved.

Per OP-MC-WE-RLR lesson, section 2.1, a limiting release rate is calculated and shown as "Allowable Release Rate" on the LWR. This is based on the activity present in the tank. Also printed on the LWR is the Recommended Release Rate. The Recommended Release Rate is either the Allowable Release Rate or the system maximum, whichever is lower. The system maximum for the WMT pump is 120 gpm. In this case, if the WMT is released at 120 gpm, it is possible the limits of SLC 16.11.1 (Liquid Effluents - Concentration) would be exceeded.

When reviewing the LWR, the SRO is not expected to know the exact Trip setpoint values of the EMF, just that the "Expected CPM" of the EMF and the EMF "Trip I" Setpoint are less than the "Trip II" Setpoint.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The "allowable release rate" is determined by the amount of activity present in the tank. The "recommended release rate" is the release rate limit imposed by the procedure (i.e. LWR). The operator will set the release rate at the value of the recommended release rate. This answer is plausible if the applicant confuses the terms and think that "allowable" is the procedural limit instead of the "recommended".

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

This answer is plausible if the candidate fails to realize that another release is occurring and/or believes the only concern is RC pumps associated with this release.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

The "allowable release rate" is determined by the amount of activity present in the tank. The "recommended release rate" is the release rate limit imposed by the procedure (i.e. LWR). The operator will set the release rate at the value of the recommended release rate. This answer is plausible if the applicant confuses the terms and think that "allowable" is the procedural limit instead of the "recommended".

PLAUSIBLE if the candidate fails to realize another release is occurring and/or believes the only concern is RC pumps associated with this release.

Basis for meeting the KA This KA deals with Accidental Liquid Radioactive-Waste Release. An Accidental Release could be an uncontrolled or unmonitored release, or one that is not adquately diluted. There are three items the SRO must verify before approving a release: Adequate number of RC pumps for dilution, Recommended Release Rate is less than or equal to the Allowable release rate, and EMF Trip 2 setpoint. A release rate that is too high, or an inadequate number of RC pumps running could result in inadquate dilution of the release. Therefore this KA is matched.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires more than one mental step. The SRO must recall from memory the purpose of each section of the LWR, then determine if it meets the requirements.

Basis for SRO only This is SRO level because at MNS it is the responsibility of the SRO to authorize the release based on given conditions.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 290 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 98 Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source 98 C SRO Comprehension BANK 2012 MNS NRC Exam Q91 (Bank 5776)

Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

Lesson Plan OP-MC-MT-RC Section 2.1 Lesson Plan OP-MC-WE-RLR Section 2.1 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

OP-MC-WE-RLR Objective 3 GEN2.3 2.3.6 - GENERIC - Radiation Control Radiation Control Ability to approve release permits. (CFR: 41.13 / 43.4 / 45.10) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 291 of 297

Question 99 deleted (pages 292-294) and intentionally left blank FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 100 GEN2.4 2.4.50 - GENERIC - Emergency Procedures / Plan 100 C Emergency Procedures / Plan Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3)

Given the following initial plant conditions:

Both units are at 100% RTP Subsequently, the following are observed:

The operating crew feels a tremor in the Control Room

1AD-13 / E7 (O.B.E EXCEEDED) comes into alarm

2EMF-3 (CONTAINMENT REFUELING BRIDGE) is in Trip 2

1EMF-17 (UNIT 1 SPENT FUEL REFUELING BRIDGE) is in Trip 1 indicating 200 mr/hr Based on the conditions above:

1) the crew required to swap both trains of RN on BOTH units to the SNSWP.

2) in accordance with RP-000 (EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION), the classification for this event is a/an .

Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. is

2. Notification of Unusual Event B. 1. is NOT

2. Notification of Unusual Event C. 1. is

2. Alert D. 1. is NOT

2. Alert Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 295 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 100 100 C General Discussion In accordance with the annunciator response procedure for 1AD-13 / E7, the crew is directed to implement RP-007 (Earthquake) and RP-000 (Emergency Classification) if the alarm is valid.

In accordance with RP-007 (Earthquake), the crew is required to swap both trains of RN on BOTH units to the SNSWP.

The classification for this event is an Alert based on the valid OBE Exceeded annunciator.

Answer A Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is correct.

Second part is plausible if the applicant considers the EMF indications only as a Notification of Unusual Event would be correct based on EMF indications alone. Additionally, if the applicant considers the tremor felt in the Control Room and neglects the OBE annunciator alarm, they would also determine the event to be a NOUE.

Answer B Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because the applicant could conclude that the RN swap is only required on Unit 1 since the seismic alarm is a Unit 1 alarm.

Second part is plausible if the applicant considers the EMF indications only as a Notification of Unusual Event would be correct based on EMF indications alone. Additionally, if the applicant considers the tremor felt in the Control Room and neglects the OBE annunciator alarm, they would also determine the event to be a NOUE.

Answer C Discussion CORRECT: See explanation above.

Answer D Discussion INCORRECT: See explanation above.

PLAUSIBLE:

First part is plausible because the applicant could conclude that the RN swap is only required on Unit 1 since the seismic alarm is a Unit 1 alarm.

Second part is correct.

Basis for meeting the KA The K/A is matched because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of alarms in the alarm response manual, automatic responses associated with those alarms, and to demonstrate the ability to classify an event based on increased radiation levels (above alarm setpoints) and a seismic event.

Basis for Hi Cog This is a higher cognitive level question because it requires the applicant to evaluate multiple indications, compare those indications to the requirements in RP-000, and based on that evaluation determine an Emergency Classification.

Basis for SRO only This is an SRO Only question because it requires the applicant to use RP-000 (Emergency Classification) to determine the Emergency Action Level. At MNS, this is an SRO only function.

Job Level Cognitive Level QuestionType Question Source SRO Comprehension NEW Development References Student References Provided

REFERENCES:

RP-000, Classification of Emergency RP-000 (Emergency Classification)

RP-007 (Earthquake)

Annunciator Response for 1AD-13 LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

MC-OP-EP-EAL Objective Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 296 of 297

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ILT-31 MNS SRO NRC Examination QUESTION 100 GEN2.4 2.4.50 - GENERIC - Emergency Procedures / Plan 100 C Emergency Procedures / Plan Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3) 401-9 Comments: Remarks/Status Tuesday, March 10, 2015 Page 297 of 297

ML15203A965

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