ML120720205
| ML120720205 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/21/2012 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | |
| Gerald Laska | |
| References | |
| Download: ML120720205 (88) | |
Text
ES-201 Examination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1 Facility: Seguoyah 2012-301 Date of Examination: 1/17/2012 Facili NRC Examinations Developed by:
Writte / erating Tes Written / Operating Test T Chief Task Description (Reference) Examiners Initials
-180 1. Examination administration date confirmed (C. 1 .a; C.2.a and b) 5/09/201 1
-120 2. NRC examiners and facility contact assigned (C.1.d; C.2.e) 9j15,2011
-120 3. Facility contact briefed on security and other requirements (C.2.c) 9/15/2011
-120 4. Corporate notification letter sent (C.2.d) 9/13/201 1
[-90] [5. Reference material due (C. 1 .e; C.3.c; Attachment 2)] 11/28/201 1
{-75} 6. Integrated examination outline(s) due, including Forms ES-201-2, ES-201-3, ES 301-1, ES-301-2, ES-301-5, ES-D-ls, ES-401-1/2, ES-401-3, and ES-401-4, as 11/02/2011 applicable (C.1.e and f; C.3.d)
{-70} {7. Examination outline(s) reviewed by NRC and feedback provided to facility 11/07/201 1 licensee (C.2.h; C.3.e)}
{-45} 8. Proposed examinations (including written, walk-through JPMs, and scenarios, as applicable), supporting documentation (including Forms ES-301-3, ES-301-4, 11/28/2011 ES-301-5, ES-301-6, and ES-401-6), and reference materials due (C.1.e, f, g and h; C.3.d)
-30 9. Preliminary license applications (NRC Form 398s) due (C.1.l; C.2.g; ES-202) 12/16/2011
-14 10. Final license applications due and Form ES-201-4 prepared (C.1.l; C.2.i; ES-202) 01/02/2012
-14 1 1. Examination approved by NRC supervisor for facility licensee review 01/02/2012 (C.2.h; C.3.f)
-14 12. Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C.l.j; C.2.f and h; C.3.g) 01/02/2012
-7 13. Written examinations and operating tests approved by NRC supervisor 0 1/09/2012 (C.2.i; C.3.h)
-7 14. Final applications reviewed; 1 or 2 (if>10) applications audited to confirm qualifications / eligibility; and examination approval and waiver letters sent 01/09/2012 (C.2.i;_Attachment 4;_ES-202,_C.2.e;_ES-204)
-7 15. Proctoring/written exam administration guidelines reviewed with facility licensee 01/09/2012 (C.3.k)
-7 16. Approved scenarios, job performance measures, and questions distributed to 01/09/2012 NRC examiners (C.3.i)
Target dates are generally based on facility-prepared examinations and are keyed to the examination date identified in the corporate notification letter. They are for planning purposes and may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis in coordination with the facility licensee.
[Applies only] {Does not apply} to examinations prepared by the NRC.
Wnie,J Ecw S P 9 oun.u ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility: Sequoyah 2012-301 Date of Examination:
Item . .
Task Description Initials 1.
R a.
b.
Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401.
Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with 4
i Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all K/A categories are appropriately sampled. *4I4
- c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics.
- d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected K/A statements are appropriate.
N L pj_
- 2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, and major S transients.
M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number and U mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule L without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using at A least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated from the T applicants audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.
- c. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301 -4 and described in Appendix D.
- 3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2:
(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks distributed W among the safety functions as specified on the form I (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s)
(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.
- b. Verifythatthe administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1:
(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations
- c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.
- 4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections.
E b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate.
E c. Ensure that K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5.
- d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections. IZ I L e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage.
Printed Name/Signature Date
- a. Author /
3//,1
- b. Facility Reviewer (*) ,6J/ ,4
- c. NRCChiefExaminer(#) çJ__i j
- d. NRC Supervisor
/L4L1OCLLT, VJ(DJA& It 6 oV/zo/u
/(
Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column hief examiner concurrence required.
ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Facility: Sequoyah Nucear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 01116-23/2012 Initials Item Task Description
- 1. a. Verity that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401.
fl R b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with I Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all K/A categories are appropriately sampled.
T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics. 1I1
- d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected K/A statements are appropriate. 41-45 >--
- 2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, S and major transients. jf .3..
M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number u and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule L without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using 5 A at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated T from the applicants audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.
- c. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D.
- 3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2:
(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks W distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form I (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s)
(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.
- b. Verifythatthe administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1:
(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form 4, .
(2> at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations
- c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days. I4I7
- 4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections. .&i
- b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate.
- c. Ensure that K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. T -
R A
- d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections. 14.? ,5r L e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage.
- a. Author Michael Buckner /
- b. Facility Reviewer (*) Steven Tuthill L. /
- c. NRCChiefExaminer(#) GbL4j L(i
- d. NRC Supervisor /Iktl,4
/
Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.
Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines
ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES201.3
- 1. Pre-Examination my I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 01116-2312012 as of the date of signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator I aware of booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, am the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this to facility agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised .
- 2. Post-Examination during the To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered
. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administratio n, I did not instruct, evaluate, week(s) of 0111 6-2312012
, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations NRC.
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ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
- 1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 01/16-2312012 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 01116-2312012 . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
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?3a2 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3 ES-201
- 1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 01116-2312012 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 0111 6-2312012 . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY SIGNATUR (1) DATE SIGNATURE (2) DATE NOT
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1 ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
- 1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 01116-2312012 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 01116-2312012 . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
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ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Seguoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination:01/16-23/2012 Exam Level: RO SRO Operating Test No: 2012-301 Administrative Topic (see Type Describe activity to be performed Note) Code*
Conduct of Operations R, D 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as R.A.1.a graphs, curves, tables, etc. (3.9/4.2)
Given plant data, determine Main Turbine maximum acceleration rate, holding time and loading rate.
Conduct of Operations R, M 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or R.A.1.b limitations associated with reactivity management.
(4.3/4.6)
Calculate Manual Makeup to the Volume Control Tank Equipment Control R, M 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures. (3.7/4.1)
R.A.2 Given plant data, perform a Manual RCS Leakrate Calculation.
Radiation Control R, N 2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures RA3 pertaining to licensed operator I duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.
Prepare for a pre-job brief for an AUO for emergent work in the RCA.
Emergency Procedures/Plan Not selected NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)
A.1.a Given plant data during a plant startup, the examinee will determine the following during a Main Turbine startup using Tl-28, Plant Curve Book.
- minimum time from start to full speed
- maximum acceleration rate
- holding time
- loading rate.
A.1.b Given plant data, the examinee will calculate a manual makeup to the VCT using 0-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control Appendix C.
A.2 Given plant data the examinee will perform a Manual RCS Leakrate Calculation using 0-SI-OPS-068-1 37.0 Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Surveillance. The examinee will determine the leakrate is in excess of plant Technical Specifications and that SRO notification is required.
A.3 While preparing for a pre-job brief as a CRC, the examinee will review an emergent task in the RCA the examinee and choose from a selection the correct survey map and apply from the existing radiological conditions to calculate a total projected dose of 480 mrem for the job.
A.4 Not selected
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Seguoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination:01/16-23/2012 Exam Level: RO El SRO Operating Test No: 2012-301 Administrative Topic (see Type Describe activity to be performed Note) Code*
Conduct of Operations 2.1.40 Knowledge of refueling administrative R N requirements. (2.8/3.9)
S.A. 1 .a Review Completed Refueling Checklist and Implement Technical Specification Requirements.
Conduct of Operations R, M 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management.
S.A.1.b (4.3/4.6)
Given plant data, review a Shutdown Margin Calculation, find all embedded errors and take all required action.
Equipment Control R, M 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures. (3.7 I 4.1)
Review a Manual RCS Leakrate Calculation find all S.A.2 embedded errors and take required actions.
Radiation Control R, N 2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry S.A.3 requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (3.8)
Select and provide approval for workers to exceed their Administrative Dose Limit in order to make an emergent entry into the RCA.
Emergency Procedures/Plan R M 2.4.4 1 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications. (2.9/4.6)
A.4 Given plant data, determine event classification and complete the state notification form.
NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)
A.1.a Given plant data, the examinee will review the previously completed Refueling Surveillance Log Appendices and discovers embedded errors then applies the WA administrative process to stop fuel movement.
A.1.b Given plant data, the examinee will review a previously completed Shutdown Margin verification while in MODE 3. The examinee will identify embedded errors that results in boron concentration being inadequate and enters LCO 3.1.1.1 to initiate a boration and restore Shutdown Margin.
A.2 Given plant data, the examinee will review a previously completed Manual RCS Leakrate Calculation using 0-Sl-OPS-068-1 37.0 Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Surveillance.
The examinee will identify embedded errors in the calculation determine the leakrate is in excess of plant Technical Specifications. The examinee will apply plant Technical Specifications and identify the required Limiting Condition for Operation for the existing plant conditions. Using the TVA administrative process, examinee will identify the required internal notification requirements.
A.3 During an emergent situation, the Examinee will choose from 5 different workers based on past dose history, other criterion contained within the WA administrative process. The examinee will also determine the required approval for the workers to exceed their Administrative Dose Limit.
A.4 Acting as the Site Emergency Director and given data for a plant emergency, the examinee will interpret the data to determine the correct Emergency Classification of General Emergency, the correct Protective Action Recommendation and will complete a state notification form.
P/AJ/1L ES-301 Control Roomlln-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Seguoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 01/16-23/2012 Exam Level: RO SRO-l SRO-U Operating Test No: 2012-301 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-l); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System I JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function
- a. EPE 007 EA1.05 (4.0/4.1) Reinstate source range detectors following S, A, D, L I a reactor trip.
- b. 004 A4.06 (3.6/3.1) Establish Excess Letdown S, M 2
- c. EPE 011 EA1 .11 (4.2/4.2) Transfer to Hot Leg Recirc 5, D, A, EN 3
- d. 005 A4.01 (3.6/3.4) Swap RHR Pumps (B Train to A Train) with Level 5, D, L 4P in the Pressurizer
- e. 028 A4.03 (3.1/3.3) Place lB H2 Analyzer in Service S, M 5
- f. 064 A4.01 (4.0/4.3) Perform DIG Load Test on lA-A D/G S, A, M 6
- g. APE 061 AA1 .01 (3.6/3.6) Respond to a Main Control Room High 5, M 7 Radiation Alarm.
- h. APE 026 AA1.05 (3.1/3.1) Respond to a Leak in the Component S, N, A 8 Cooling Water System.
In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-l); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
I. APE 028 AA1 .07 (3.3/3.3) Locally Control Charging Flow Using 2-FCV- D, E, R 2 62-93
- j. EPE 038 EA1.16 (4.4/4.3) Manually Control A SIG PORV Locally M, E, A, L 3
- k. 033 A2.03 (3.1/3.5) Refill The Spent Fuel Pit During A Spent Fuel Pit D, E, L, R 8 Low Level Event.
All RO and SRO-l control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
Type Codes Criteria for RO I SRO-l I SRO-U (A)Iternate path 4-6 I 4-6 I 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irectfrombank 91814 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 I 1 I 1 (EN)gineered safety feature - I - I 1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power I Shutdown 1 I 1 I I (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1 (A) 2I 2I 1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 I 3 I 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA 1I1I1 (S)imulator
- a. The examinee will reinstate source range detectors following a reactor trip using ES-O.1 Reactor Trip Response. The examinee will determine one channel of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instruments is indicating in excess of the Source Range auto initiation setpoint and transfer to the alternate path to manually reinstate source range detectors. Once the Source Range instruments have been placed in service, the examinee will restore the High Flux at Shutdown alarms.
- b. The examinee will place Excess letdown in service at a rate with pressurizer level steady or lowering.
- c. During a plant event, the examinee will realign RHR to cold leg injection and BOTH trains of safety injection to hot leg recirculation flow path using ES-i .4, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation. During the transfer FCV-63-172 fails to open. The examinee will transition to the alternate path and realign RHR trains to cold legs.
- d. During Mode 5 conditions, the examinee will shift RHR Pumps from B Train to A Train with Level in the Pressurizer using O-SO-74-i Residual Heat Removal System.
- e. The examinee will place the 1 B H2 Analyzer in Service for a post maintenance test using O-SO-43-4 Hydrogen Analyzer.
- f. The examinee will Perform DIG Load Test on iA-A D/G using surveillance i-SI-OPS-082-007.A, Electrical Power System Diesel Generator iA-A. Once the Diesel is loaded a high crankcase pressure condition will develop, which requires the examinee to transition to the alternate path to shutdown the Diesel.
- g. The examinee will respond to a Main Control Room high radiation condition using O-SO-30-2 Section 8.1. The examinee will manually place one train of Emergency Control Room Ventilation in service and isolate the normal Control Room Ventilation
- h. The examinee will respond to a leak in the Component Cooling Water System using AOP-M.03. The examinee will manually open the Surge Tank Make-up valve and transition to the alternate path to stop the running CCS pump and manually close the CCS isolation valves to isolate the leak.
- i. The examinee will place 2-FCV-62-93 Pressurizer level Control valve in local manual and control charging and seal flow within normal values using 2-SO-62-1, CVCS.
- j. During a plant event, the examinee will take local manual control of #1 S/G PORV using EA-1 -2 Local Control of S/G PORVS. The examinee will transition to the alternate path to once the examinee discovers there is no control air available to the #1 S/G PORV. Once local manual control is established, the examinee will demonstrate the ability to control steam generator pressure
- k. During a Spent Fuel Pit low level event, the examinee will refill the spent fuel pit using EA-78-1, Refilling the Spent Fuel Pit.
F1tJL ES-301 Control Roomlln-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: SeQuoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination:_QiL1 6-23/2012 Exam Level: RO El SRO-l 121 SRO-U El Operating Test No: 2012-301 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-l); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function
- a. EPE 007 EA1.05 (4.0/4.1) Reinstate source range detectors following S, A, D, L 1 a reactor trip.
- b. Not examined
- c. EPE 011 EA1 .11 (4.2/4.2) Transfer to Hot Leg Recirc 5, D, A, EN 3
- d. 005 A4.01 (3.6/3.4) Swap RHR Pumps (B Train to A Train) with Level 5, D, L 4P in the Pressurizer
- e. 028 A4.03 (3.1/3.3) Place 1 B H2 Analyzer in Service 5, M 5
- f. 064 A4.01 (4.0/4.3) Perform DIG Load Test on lA-A D/G 5, A, M 6
- g. APE 061 AA1 .01 (3.6/3.6) Respond to a Main Control Room High 5, M 7 Radiation Alarm.
- h. APE 026 AA1.05 (3.1/3.1) Respond to a Leak in the Component 5, N, A 8 Cooling Water System.
In-Plant Systems (3 for AC); (3 for SRO-l); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i. APE 028 AA1 .07 (3.3/3.3) Locally Control Charging Flow Using 2-FCV- D, E, R 2 62-93
- j. EPE 038 EA1.16 (4.4/4.3) Manually Control A S/G PORV Locally M, E, A, L 3
- k. 033 A2.03 (3.1/3.5) Refill The Spent Fuel Pit During A Spent Fuel Pit D, E, L, R 8 Low Level Event.
All AC and SAC-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
Type Codes Criteria for RO / SAC-I / SAC-U (A)lternate path 4-6 I 4-6 I 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/ 8I 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 I 1 / 1 (EN)gineered safety feature - I - I 1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power I Shutdown 1 I i I i (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1 (A) 2I 2/ 1 (P)revious 2 exams 3I 3 / 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA (S)imulator
- a. The examinee will reinstate source range detectors following a reactor trip using ES-O.i Reactor Trip Response. The examinee will determine one channel of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instruments is indicating in excess of the Source Range auto initiation setpoint and transfer to the alternate path to manually reinstate source range detectors. Once the Source Range instruments have been placed in service, the examinee will restore the High Flux at Shutdown alarms.
- b. Not examined.
- c. During a plant event, the examinee will realign RHR to cold leg injection and BOTH trains of safety injection to hot leg recirculation flow path using ES-i .4, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation. During the transfer FCV-63-172 fails to open. The examinee will transition to the alternate path and realign RHR trains to cold legs.
- d. During Mode 5 conditions, the examinee will shift RHR Pumps from B Train to A Train with Level in the Pressurizer using O-SO-74-i Residual Heat Removal System.
- e. The examinee will place the 1 B H2 Analyzer in Service for a post maintenance test using O-SO-43-4 Hydrogen Analyzer.
- f. The examinee will Perform DIG Load Test on iA-A D/G using surveillance i-Sl-OPS-082-007.A, Electrical Power System Diesel Generator iA-A. Once the Diesel is loaded a high crankcase pressure condition will develop, which requires the examinee to transition to the alternate path to shutdown the Diesel.
- g. The examinee will respond to a Main Control Room high radiation condition using O-SO-30-2 Section 8.1. The examinee will manually place one train of Emergency Control Room Ventilation in service and isolate the normal Control Room Ventilation
- h. The examinee will respond to a leak in the Component Cooling Water System using AOP-M.03. The examinee will manually open the Surge Tank Make-up valve and transition to the alternate path to stop the running CCS pump and manually close the CCS isolation valves to isolate the leak.
- i. The examinee will place 2-FCV-62-93 Pressurizer level Control valve in local manual and control charging and seal flow within normal values using 2-SO-62-i, CVCS.
- j. During a plant event, the examinee will take local manual control of #1 S/G PORV using EA-i -2 Local Control of S/G PORVS. The examinee will transition to the alternate path to once the examinee discovers there is no control air available to the #1 S/G PORV. Once local manual control is established, the examinee will demonstrate the ability to control steam generator pressure
- k. During a Spent Fuel Pit low level event, the examinee will refill the spent fuel pit using EA-78-1, Refilling the Spent Fuel Pit.
ES-301 control RoomflmPl&ntSvstenisOutllne FornES4O1 -2 Facility: Seguoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 01/16-23/2012 Exam Level: RO El SRO-I El SRO-U E.l Operating Test No: 2012-301 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-l);
(2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function
- a. Not examined.
- b. Not examined
- c. EPE 011 EA1.11 (4.2/4.2) Transfer to Hot Leg Recirc S, M, A, EN 3
- d. Not examined
- e. Not examined
- f. 064 A4.01 (4.0/4.3) Perform DIG Load Test on lA-A DIG S, A, M 6
- g. APE 061 AA1.01 (3.6/3.6) Respond to a Main Contro l Room High S, N Radiation Alarm. 7
- h. Not examined In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-l);
(3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i. APE 028 AA1.07 (3.3/3.3) Locally Control Chargi ng Flow Using 2-FCV- D, E, R 62-93 2
- j. Not examined
- k. 033 A2.03 (3.1/3.5) Refill The Spent Fuel Pit During A Spent Fuel Pit D, E, L, R 8 Low Level Event.
All RO and SRO-l control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plan t systems and functions may overlap those tested in the contro l
room.
Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-l / SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room 4-6 / 4-6 I 2-3 (D)irectfrombank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant <9/8/4 (EN)gineered safety feature 1 / 1 / 1 (L)ow-Power I Shutdown - / - I 1 (control room system)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1 (A) 1 I 1 I 1 (P)revious 2 exams 2/ 2/ 1 (R)CA 3 I 3 / 2 (randomly selected)
(S)imulator
- a. Not examined
- b. Not examined
- c. During a plant event, the examinee will realign RHR to cold leg injection and BOTH trains of safety injection to hot leg recirculation flow path using ES-i
.4, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation. During the transfer FCV-63-172 fails to open. The examinee will transition to the alternate path and realign RHR trains to cold legs.
- d. Not examined
- e. Not examined
- f. The examinee will Perform D/G Load Test on IA-A DIG using surveillance i-Sl-OPS-082-007.A, Electrical Power System Diesel Generator lA-A. Once the Diesel is loaded a high crankcase pressure condition will develop, which requires the exam inee to transition to the alternate path to shutdown the Diesel.
- g. The examinee will respond to a Main Control Roo m high radiation condition using O-SO-30-2 Section 8.1. The examinee will manually place one train of Eme rgency Control Room Ventilation in service and isolate the normal Control Room Ventilation
- h. Not examined
- i. The examinee will place 2-FCV-62-93 Pressuriz er level Control valve in local manual and control charging and seal flow within normal values using 2-S0 1, CVCS.
- j. Not examined
- k. During a Spent Fuel Pit low level event, the examinee will refill the spent fuel pit using EA-78-1, Refilling the Spent Fuel Pit.
ES-301 Operating Test Quality Checklist Form ES-301-3 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Station I & 2 Date of Examination: 01116-23/2012 Operating Test Number: 201 2-301 Initials
- 1. General Criteria a b*
- a. The operating test conforms with the previously approved outline; changes are consistent with sampling requirements (e.g., 10 CFR 55.45, operational importance, safety function distribution). t) -T
- b. There is no day-to-day repetition between this and other operating tests to be administered during this examination. t (N -T
- c. The operating test shall not duplicate items from the applicants audit test(s). (see Section D.1 .a.) S-r
- d. Overlap with the written examination and between different parts of the operating test is within acceptable limits.
4
- e. It appears that the operating test will differentiate between competent and less-than-competent applicants at the designated license level. fl,
=
- 2. Walk-Through Criteria -- --
- a. Each JPM includes the following, as applicable:
- initial conditions
- initiating cues
- references and tools, including associated procedures
- reasonable and validated time limits (average time allowed for completion) and specific A . s.,
designation if deemed to be time-critical by the facility licensee
- operationally important specific performance criteria that include:
detailed expected actions with exact criteria and nomenclature system response and other examiner cues statements describing important observations to be made by the applicant criteria for successful completion of the task identification of critical steps and their associated performance standards restrictions on the sequence of steps, if applicable
- b. Ensure that any changes from the previously approved systems and administrative walk-through outlines (Forms ES-301-1 and 2) have not caused the test to deviate from any of the acceptance criteria (e.g., item distribution, bank use, repetition from the last 2 NRC examinations) specified on those forms and Form ES-201-2.
- 3. Simulator Criteria -- --
The associated simulator operating tests (scenario sets) have been reviewed in accordance with Form ES-301-4 and a copy is attached.
Printed Name / Signature Date
- a. Author Michael Buckner /2 7/ou
- b. Facility Reviewer(*) Steven Tuthill
- c. NRC Chief Examiner(#) arS. 0. ZOIL..
- d. NRCSupervisor /4-LL(
NOTE:
- The facility signature is not applicable for NRC-developed tests.
- Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.
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- 1 Cl)
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-I 0
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-I 0
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ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5
[ Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 1 & 2 Date of Exam: 01/16/2012 Operating Test No.: 2012-301 A E Scenarios 1 2 3 TM L N CREW CREW CREW N I T T POSITION POSITION POSITION __A c M A T S A B S A B S A B L R T 0 R T u
N V 0 R T 0 M(*
0 C P 0 C P 0 T
C P
P --------
R IU E
RO RX 5 1 1 1 0 NOR 5 Ia la 3 1 1 1 SRO-l X I/C 1,2, 1,3, 2,5 9 4 4 2 SRO-U 2a,3 4 D MAJ 6,7 6 7,8 5 2 2 1 TS 2,3,4 3 0 2 2 RX 5 1110 RO NOR 51a 2111 SRO-l I/C 1,2a, 2,7 2,3,4, 10 4 4 2 X 3,9 5 SRO-U MAJ 6,7 6 7,8 5 2 2 1 TS 4,6 2 0 2 2 NOR O-l X I/C 2,8 1,2,3, 3,4,7 9 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6,7 6 7,8 5 2 2 1 TS 1,3,4 3 0 2 2 Instructions:
- 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-i basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5
[aciiity: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 1 & 2 Date of Exam: 01/16/2012 Operating Test No.: 201 2-301 A E Scenarios 1 2 4 TM L N CREW CREW CREW N I T POSITION POSITION POSITION c M A T S A B S A B S A B L u N Y R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 M(*)
0 C P 0 C P 0 C P T
R lU E
NOR 55 3111 o-X I/C 1,2, 1,3, 1,6,8, 11 4 4 2 SRO-U 2a,3 9 El MAJ 6,7 6 7 4 2 2 1 TS 2,3,4 3022 RX 5 1110 RO NOR 55 2111 SROi I/C 1,2a, 2,7 1,2,3 9 4 4 2 X 3,9 SRO-U MAJ 6,7 6 7 4 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 o-i X
NOR I/C 2,8 1,2,3, 2,3,6
-H---
9 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6,7 6 7 4 2 2 1 TS 1,3,4 3 0 2 2 Instructions:
- 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-i basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist FcrrniS4Oi5 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 1 & 2 Date of Exam: 01/16/2012 Operating Test No.: 2012-301 A E Scenarios p v P E I T M L I N CREW CREW N I T T POSITION POSITION I c A M
A T S A B S A B L R T 0 R T u
IN M(*
0 C P 0 C P T P -
R IU E
NOR 5521 o-i I/C 1,2,3 1,2, 7 2 SRO-U 2a,3 X MAJ 7 6,7 3 TS 3,4 2,3,4 5 2 RO RX 5 1 1 X NOR 5 1 1 SRO-I I/C 2,3,6 2,8,9 6 4 SRO-U MAJ 7 6,7 3 2 D TS 00 RO RX 5 1 1 SROI NOR 511 I/C 1,6, 1,2a, 8 4 SRO-U 8,9 3,9 MAJ 7 6,7 3 2 TS 0 0 Instructions:
- 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or contmlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-i basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 1 & 2 Date of Exam: 01 /1 6/2012 Operating Test No.: 201 2-301 A E Scenarios P V P E 5 T M L N I CREW CREW N I T POSITION POSITION c M A T S A B S A B L RI s.., R T 0 R T 0 u
IM M*
0 C P 0 C P T
R IU E
NOR 56 21 SRO-l I/C 12,3 1,2,3, 7 2 SRO-U x MAJ 7 79 3 TS 3,4 1,4 4 2 RX 5 ii RO X NOR 6 1 1 SRO-l I/C 2,3,6 2,5, 6 4 D
SRO-U 8
MAJ 7 7,9 3 2
TS 00 RO RX 6 1 1 SROI NOR 5 11 I/C 1,6, 1,3 6 4 SRO-U 8,9 MAJ 77 32 TS 00 Instructions:
- 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1 -for-i basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 01/1712012 Operating Test No.: 2012-301 APPLICANTS RO X RO El RO X RO El SRO-I El SRO-I X SRO-I El SRO-I x SRO-U El SRO-U El SRO-U El SRO-U El Corn petencies 0 0 SCENARK SCENARK 1234 1234 5 5 Interpret/Diagnose 1,2, 1,2, 2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2, 1,2, 2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 36 34 45 467 34 34 45 467 478 478 Events and Conditions 7,8, 6,7 6,7, 8,9 67, 6,7 6,7, 8,9 9 9 9 8 8,9 8 Comply With and 1,2, 1,2, 1.2, 1,2,3, 1.2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 3,5. 3 4, 3,4, 4,5,6 3 4, 3,4, 3,4. 4 5,6 4,5 6, 4 5,6 Use Procedures (1) 6,7, 5,6, 5,6, 7,8,9 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 7,8,9 7,8,9 7,8,9 8,9 7 7,8 7,8, 7 7,8 9
Operate Control 1,2, 1,2, 1.2, 1,2,3, 1,2. 1,2, 1,2. 1.2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 3,5, 34, 3,4 4,5 6 3,5, 3,4 34, 4 5,6 456 45 6 Boards (2) 6,7, 5,6, 5,6, 7,8,9 6,7, 5,6, 5,6, 7,8,9 7,8,9 7,8,9 8,9 7 7,8 8,9 7 7,8 Communicate 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2,3, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 3,5, 3 4, 34 4,5 6 3 4, 34 34 4 5,6 4 5 6, 4 5,6 and Interact 6,7, 5,6, 5,6, 7,8,9 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 7,8,9 7,8,9 7,8,9 8,9 7 7,8 7,8, 7 7,8 9
Demonstrate 1,2, 1,2, 1,2, 1,2,3, 1,2.3, 34, 34 34 45,6 456 Supervisory Ability (3) 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 7,8,9 7,8,9 7,8, 7 7,8 9
Comply With and 2,3, 1,3, 4,6 3,4 1.4 Use Tech. Specs. (3)
Notes:
(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.
(2) Optional for an SRO-U.
(3) Only applicable to SROs.
Instructions:
Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate evety applicable competency for every applicant.
F UI A ES-401, Rev. 9E PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Sequoyah 2012-301 January 2012 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K KKK KKAAAAG A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4
- Total 1 2 4 3 3 3 3 18 3 3 6 Emergency &
Abnormal Plant 2 1 2 2 N/A 1 2 N/A 1 9 2 2 4 Evolutions Tier Totals 3 6 5 4 5 4 27 5 5 10 1 23223333223 28 2 3 5 2.
Plant 2 11011111111 10 1 2 3 Systems TierTotals 44332444424 38 3 5 8
- 3. GenericKnowledgeandAbilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 3 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 Note:1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
- 2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
- 3. Systemslevolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to ES-401, Attachment 2, for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
- 4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- e. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (lR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
7* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system.
- 8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2. Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
ES-401, Rev. 9 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #
j.
g -
007EA1 .10 Ability to operate and monitor the 000007 (BW/E02&E1 0; CEIEO2) Reactor Trip X following as they apply to a reactor trip: steam
- Stabilization Recovery I 1 generator pressure 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 008AK2.03 Knowledge of the interrelations X 2.7/2.4 between the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident and the following: controllers and positioners Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident! 008G2.2.4 Ability to explain the variations in 000008 3 X control board layouts, systems, instrumentation 36/36 (SRO) and procedural actions between units at a facility.
000009 Small Break LOCA / 009EK2.03 Knowledge of the interrelations 3 X between the small break LOCA and the 30/33 following: steam generators Large Break LOCA / 011EK2.02 Knowledge of the interrelations 000011 3 X between the and the following Large Break 2.6/2.7 LOCA: Pumps Large Break LOCA / OIIEA2.01 Ability to determine or interpretthe 000011 3 (SRO) X 4.2/4.7 following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA:
Actions to be taken based on RCS Temperature and pressure- saturated and superheated 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions! 4 015AK2.08 Knowledge of the interrelations X between the Reactor Coolant Pump 26/2.6 Malfunctions (Loss of RC flow) and the following: CCWS 000022 Loss Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 022AA1 .03 Ability to operate and I or monitor the of X following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor 3.2/3.2 Coolant Makeup: Pressurizer level trend 000025 Loss of RHR System /4 025AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpret the X following as they apply to the Loss of Residual 2.7/2.9 heat Removal system: proper amperage of running LPI/decay heat removal/RHR pumps.
000025 RHR 025AA2.04 Ability to determine and interpret the Loss of System / 4 (SRO) X 3.3/3.6 following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Location and isolability of leaks 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water /8 000027 Pressurizer 027AG2.1.30 Ability to locate and operate Pressure Control System X components, including local controls 44/40 Malfunction / 3 000029 A1WS! 1 029EG2.2.37 Ability to determine operability X and/or availability of safety related equipment 3.6/4.6 000038 Steam Gen. Tube 038EA1 .07 Ability to operate or monitor the Rupture /3 X 2 5/2.6 following as they apply to a SGTR PT tank temperature, pressure, and setpoints
ES-401, Rev. 9 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergencand Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group I (RO / SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #
2J OO7EA1 .10 Ability to operate and monitor the 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CEIEO2) Reactor Trip X following as they apply to a reactor trip: steam
- Stabilization - Recovery / 1 generator pressure 008AK2.03 Knowledge of the interrelations 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident I 3 X 2.7/2.4 between the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident and the following: controllers and positioners 008G2.2.4 Ability to explain the variations in 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 X control board layouts, systems, instrumentation (SRO) and procedural actions between units at a facility.
- z. 4-, L 009EK2.03 Knowledge of the interrelations 000009 Small Break LOCA /3 X between the small break LOCA and the 3.0/3.3 following: steam generators OIIEK2.02 Knowledge of the interrelations 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 X between the and the following Large Break 2.6/2.7 LOCA: Pumps OIIEA2.OI Ability to determine or interpret the 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 (SRO) X 4.2/4.7 following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA:
Actions to be taken based on RCS Temperature and pressure- saturated and superheated 015AK2.08 Knowledge of the interrelations 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions /4 X 2.6/2.6 between the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC flow) and the following: CCWS 022AA1.03 Abilitytooperateandlormonitorthe 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X 3.2/3.2 following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Pressurizer level trend 025AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpret the 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 X 2.7/2.9 following as they apply to the Loss of Residual heat Removal system: proper amperage of running LPI/decay heat removal/RHR pumps.
025AA2.04 Ability to determine and interpret the 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 (SRO) X 3.3/3.6 following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Location and isolability of leaks 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water /8 027AG2.1.30 Ability to locate and operate 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System X 4.4/4.0 components, including local controls Malfunction / 3 029EG2.2.37 Ability to determine operability 000029 ATWS I 1 X 3.6/4.6 and/or availability of safety related equipment 038EA1 .07 Ability to operate or monitor the 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X 2.5/2.6 following as they apply to a SGTR PT tank temperature, pressure, and setpoints
WEI2EK3.2 Knowledge of the reasons for the 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12) Steam X 33/39 following responses as they apply to the Line Rupture Excessive Heat Transfer /
(Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators) Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures associated with(Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators) 054AA2.03 Ability to determine and interpret the 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Feedwater /4 X 41/42 following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater: Conditions and reasons for AFW pump startup 055EK1.02 Knowledge of the operational 000055 Station Blackout / 6 X 41/44 implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Station Blackout: Natural circulation cooling 056AG2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific basis for 000056 Loss of Off-site Power! 6 (SRO) X 3.3/4.0 EOPs 056AG2.4.34 Knowledge of RO tasks performed 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 X 4.2/4.1 outside the main control room during an emergency and the resultant operational effects 057AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons forthe 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus /6 X 4.1/4.4 following responses as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC instrument bus: Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital AC electrical instrument bus 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 062AA2.03 Ability to determine and interpret the 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 X 2.6/2 9 following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: The valve lineups necessary to restart the SWS while bypassing the portion of the system causing the abnormal condition 065AK3.08 Knowledge of the reasons for the 000065 Loss of Instrument Air /8 X following responses as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: actions contained in EOP for loss of instrument air 065AA2.08 Ability to determine and interpret the 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 (SRO) X 2.9/3.3 following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: failure modes of air-operated equipment 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 WEO4G2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment /3 (SRO) X strategies 3.7/4.7 BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer -
LossofSecondaryHeatSink/4 W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of X WEO5EKI .3 Knowledge of the operational 3.9/4.1 Secondary Heat Sink / 4 implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink):
annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)
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ES-401, Rev. 9 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)
E/APE #1 Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR 1 2312 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal I 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod I 1 X 003AK3.07 Knowledge of the reasons for 3.8/3.9 the following responses as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod Tech-Spec limits for Tave 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod I 1 3.3/4.1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 x 024AA2.04 Ability to determine and 3.4/4.2 interpret the following as they apply to the Emergency Boration: Availability of BWST 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 (SRO) x O28AG24.1 I Knowledge of abnormal 4.0/4.2 condition procedures 000032 Loss of Source Range NI I 7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 036AK2.O1 Knowledge of the 2.9/3.5 interrelations between the fuel Handling Incidents and the following: Fuel handling equipment.
000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 059AK3.02 Knowledge of the reasons for 3.2/3.5 the following responses as they apply to the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release:
Implementation of E-Plan 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 (SRO) X 068AA2.04 Ability to determine and 3.7/4.0 interpret the following as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation: S/G pressure
000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 X 069AA1.O1 Ability to operate and br 3.5/3.7 monitor the following as they apply t the Loss of Containment Integrity: Isolation valves, dampers and electropneumatic devices.
000074 /E06&E07) mad. Core Cooling / 4 X 074EA2.03 Ability to determine or 3.8/4.1 interpret the following as they apply to a Inadequate Core cooling: Availability of turbine bypass valves for cooldown 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 (SRO) X 076AG2.2.40 Ability to apply Tech Specs for 3.4/4.7 a system W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 X WEO1 EG2.1 .7 SI Termination: Ability to 4.4/4.7 evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretations W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 X WEI3EK2.2 Knowledge of the 3.0/3.2 interrelations between the (Steam generator Overpressure) and the following: Facilitys heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these to the operation of the facility.
W/E1 5 Containment Flooding / 5 W/E1 6 High Containment Radiation /9 X WE1 6EK1 .3 Knowledge of the operational 3.0/3.3 implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (High Containment Radiation) Annunciators and conditions, indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (High Containment Radiation)
BW/A01 Plant Runback /
BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding I 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. /4
BW/E09; CE/Al 3; W/E09&E1O Natural Circ. / 4 (SRO) X WE1OEA22 Ability to determine and 3.4/3.9 interpret the following as they apply t the (Natural Circulation with steam void in vessel with/without RVLIS) Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments.
BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/All; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals: i 2 2 1 2 1 Group Point Total: 9 LA Category Point Totals: (SRO) = = = 2 2{ Group Point Total: 4
ES-401,Rev.9 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2
Pnt Systems -]ler2/Grouol(RO I SRO)
System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G KIA Topic(s) IR #
1 234561234 003A1 .05 Ability to predict and br 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCPS controls including: RCS Flow 003A4.05 Ability to manually operate 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X 3.1/3.0 and or monitor in the control room: RCP seal leakage detection instrumentation 004K6.31 Knowledge of the of the effect 004 Chemical and Volume Control X 3.1/3.5 of a loss or malfunction on the following CVCS components: Seal injection system and limits on flow range 005K1.11 Knowledge of the physical 005 Residual Heat Removal X connections and br cause-effect 3.5/3.6 relationships between the RHRS and the following systems: RWST 005K5.O1 Knowledge of the operational 005 Residual Heat Removal X 2.6/2.
implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RHRS: Nil ductility transition temperature (brittle fracture) 005G2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in 005 Residual Heat Removal (SRO) X Technical Specifications for limiting 3.2/4. 2 conditions for operations and safety limits.
006K1.11 Knowledge of the physical 006 Emergency Core Cooling X connections and/or cause-effect 2.8/3.2 relationships between the ECCS and the following systems: CCWS 006K6.O3Knowledgeoftheeffectofa 006 Emergency Core Cooling X loss or malfunction on the following will have on the ECCS: Safety Injection Pumps 007G2.1.30 Ability to locate and operate 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank X components including local controls. 4.4/4.0 008A2.O1 Ability to (a) predict the 008 Component Cooling Water (SRO) X impacts of the following malfunctions or 3336 operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of CCW pump
010K5.01 Knowledge of the operational 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X 3.5/4.0 implications of the following concepts as they apply to the PZR PCS: Determination of condition of fluid in PZR, using steam tables.
010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X 01 0G2.1 .7 Ability to evaluate plant (SRO) performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretations 012K2.01 Knowledge of the bus power 012 Reactor Protection X supplies to the following: RP5 channels, components, and interconnections.
01 2K6.02 Knowledge of the effect of a 012 Reactor Protection X 2.9/3.1 loss or malfunction of the following will have on the RPS: Redundant channels.
013 Engineered Safety Features X 013K2.01 Knowledge of the bus power 3.6/3.8 Actuation supplies to the following:
ESFAS/Safeguards equipment control 013 Engineered Safety Features X 013K5.02 Knowledge of the operational 2.9/3.3 Actuation implications of the following concepts as they apply to the ESFAS: Safety system logic and reliability 022 Containment Cooling X 022K2.02 Knowledge of the bus power 2.5/2.4 supplies to the following: Chillers 025 Ice Condenser 026A1 .06 Ability to predict and br 026 Containment Spray X 2.7/3.0 monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CSS Controls including: Containment spray pump cooling 026A2.09 Ability to (a) predict the 026 Containment Spray (SRO) X 2.5/2.9 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Radiation hazard potential of BWST 039A3.02 Ability to monitor automatic 039 Main and Reheat Steam X 3.1/3.5 operation of the MRSS including:
isolation of the MRSS
039K4.05 Knowledge of MRSS design 039 Main and Reheat Steam X features and/or interlocks which provide for the following: Automatic Isolation of steam lines.
059A3.04 Ability to monitor automatic 059 Main Feedwater X operation of the MFW including: 2.5 /2 6 Turbine driven feed pump.
061A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater X 3.2 /3 6 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations Loss of air to steam supply valves 062G2.4.1 1 Knowledge of abnormal 062 AC Electrical Distribution X conditions procedures. 4.0 /4 2 062 AC Electrical Distribution X 062K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a 3.3/3.4 loss or malfunction of the ac distribution system will have on the following Major system loads 062G22.25 Knowledge of the basis in 062 AC Electrical Distribution (SRO) X Technical Specifications for limiting 3.2/4.2 conditions for operations and safety limits.
063K3.02 Knowledge of the effect that a 063 DC Electrical Distribution X loss or malfunction of the DC electrical system will have on the following:
components using DC control power 064G2.4.8 Knowledge of how abnormal 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X 3.8 .5 operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs 064A1 .05 Ability to predict and br 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X monitor changes in parameters (to 2.5/2.5 prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ED/G system controls including: ED/G room temperature 073A4.01 Ability t manually operate and 073 Process Radiation Monitoring X br monitor in the control room: Effluent release 076K4.03 Knowledge of SWS design 076 Service Water X feature(s) and /or interlocks which 2.9/3.4 provide for the following: Automatic opening features associated with SWS isolation valves to CCW heat exchangers 078 Instrument Air
. I 03A2M3 Ability to (a) predict the 103 Containment X impacts of the following malfunctions or 3538 operations on the Containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations; Phase A and B isolation
. I 03A2.05 Ability to (a) predict the 103 Containment X impacts of the following malfunctions or 2.9/3.9 operations on the Containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations Emergency containment entry K/A Category Point Totals: 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 Group Point Total: 28 K/A Category Point Totals: (SRO) 2 3 Group Point Total:
ES-401, Rev. 9 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant_Systems_-_Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)
System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #
1234561234 001 Control Rod Drive 002 K6.06 Knowledge of the effect or a 002 Reactor Coolant X loss or malfunction on the following 2.5/2.8 RCS components: sensors and detectors 011 Pressurizer Level Control 014 Rod Position Indication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation X 015K2.01 Knowledge of the bus power 3.5/3.7 supplies to the following: NIS channels, components and interconnections 016K5.01 Knowledge of the operational 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation X implications of the following concepts 2.7/2.8 as they apply to the NNIS: separation of control and protection circuits 017 In-core Temperature Monitor 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and X 028G2.2.40 Ability to apply technical 3.4/4.7 Purge Control (SRO) specifications for a system 029 Containment Purge 033A1 .02 Ability to predict andlor 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling X monitor changes in parameters (to 2.8/3.3 prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the spent fuel pool cooling systems controls, including: Radiation monitoring systems
. 034A4.01 Ability to manually operate 034 Fuel Handling Equipment X and or monitor in the control room:
Radiation levels 035 Steam Generator X 035A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic 4.0/3.9 operation of the SIG including: SGWLC 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal X 055G2.1.19 Ability to use plant computer 3.9/3.8 (SRO) to evaluate system or component status 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste
071 Waste Gas Disposal X 071 G2.2.40 Ability to apply Technical 3.4/3.7 specifications for a system.
072K4.01 Knowledge of ARM system 072 Area Radiation Monitoring X 3.3/3.6 design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
Containment ventilation isolation 075 Circulating Water 079K1 .01 Knowledge of the physical 079 Station Air X 3.0/3.1 connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the SAS and the following systems: lAS 079A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the 079 Station Air (SRO) X 4.6/4.6 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: connection with lAS 086A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the 086 Fire Protection X impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Fire Protection System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
Failure to actuate the FPS when required, resulting in fire damage K/A Category Point Totals: 11 1 0 1 1 1 iii 1 1 1 Group Point Total: 10 K/A Category Point Totals: (SRO) I 2 Group Point Total: 3
ES-401 Record of Rejected KIAs Form ES-401-4 Tier I Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A RO T2G1 039 K4.05 System was oversampled during outline development (Replaced with 008 K4.0l JR 3.1/3.3, which was not sampled on the original outline)
T2G 1 005 K5 .01 System was oversampled during outline development (Replaced with 025 K5.01 JR which was not sampled on the original outline)
T2G1 062 G2.4.1 1 System was oversampled during outline development (Replaced with 078 G2.4.l 1 JR 4.0/4.2, which was not sampled on the original outline)
T2G2 072 K4.01 There are no design features or interlocks between the area radiation monitors in containment and containment ventilation isolation.
(Randomly selected and replaced with 072 K4.02)
T2 G2 033 Al .02 This K/A was rejected and replaced due to oversampling of radiation monitor response associated with spent fuel pooi and refueling operations.
(Randomly selected and replaced with 033 Al .01)
T2 G2 061 A2.02 This KJA was rejected because this does not apply to SQN due to the system design (steam supply valves are motor operated vs air operated)
(Randomly selected and replaced with 061 A2.07)
Ti G2 059 AK3.02 This K/A was rejected because it is not RO required knowledge at SQN.
(Randomly selected and replaced with 059 AK3 .03)
T2/Gi 006 Kl .11 This K/A was rejected due to oversampling of knowledge of interaction of CCS (CCW) with ECCS components.
(Randomly selected and replaced with 006 Ki .05)
SRO Ti Gi 008 EG2.2.4 Due to plant design there are no know differences between units associated with Pressurizer Vapor Space Accidents, both units use the same procedures, and all controls and indications are located in the same locations on either unit.
(Randomly selected and replaced with 008 EG2.4. 18)
T2/G1 026 A2.09 This KIA was rejected because an operationally valid question at the SRO level could not be written.
(Randomly selected and replaced with 026 A2.07)
Ti/Gi 01 1 EA2.0l This K/A was rejected due to inability to write an operationally valid question at the SRO level.
(Randomly selected and replaced with 011 EA2.i4)
ES-401 Written Examination Quality Checklist Form ES-401-6 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 1 & 2 Date of Exam: 02/01/2012 Exam Level: RO X SRO X Initial Item Description a b* c#
- 1. Questions and answers are technically accurate and applicable to the facility.
- 2. a. NRC K)As are referenced for all questions.
- b. Facility learning objectives are referenced as available.
- 4. The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions were repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exams, consult the NRR OL program office).
- 5. Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate:
the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or the examinations were developed independently; or , _
the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or other (explain)
- 6. Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent Bank Modified New from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest IM(
new or modified); enter the actual RO / SRO-only 41 / 12 8/5 26 / 8 rvi question distribution(s) at right.
- 7. Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO Memory C/A exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected KJAs support the higher cognitive levels; enter 33 / 8 42 / 17 Y S-c the_actual_RO_/_SRO_question_distribution(s)_at_right.
- 8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers or aid in the elimination of distractors.
- 9. Question content conforms with specific KJA statements in the previously approved examination outline and is appropriate for the tier to which they are assigned; Jj deviations are justified.
- 10. Question psychometric quality and format meet the guidelines in ES Appendix B.
- 11. The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple choice items; the total is correct and agrees with the value on the cover sheet.
Printed Name I Signatur Date
- a. Author Michael Buckner / / -
- b. Facility Reviewer (*) Steven Tuthill I /25/ZCLL
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) G.w6 U.
- d. NRC Regional Supervisor Pc #. y26/IP_
Note:
- The facility reviewers initials/signature are not applicable for NRC-developed examinations.
- Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.
ES-401, Rev. 9 Seguoyah 2012-301 RO Written Examination Review Worksheet FINAL Form ES-401 -9 1 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/El Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S Instructions
[Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]
- 1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
- 2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2
- 4 range are acceptable).
- 3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:
- The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).
- The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).
- The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.
- The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable.
- One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).
- 4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:
- The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content).
- The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).
- The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).
- The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.
- 5. Check Questions that are samrled for conformance with the approved K/A and those that are designated SRO-only (K/A and license level mismatches are unacceptable).
- 6. Based on the reviewers judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?
- 7. At a minimum, explain any U ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- a= SRO uiFJ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S RO portion of the exam was determined to meet the quality quidelines contained in NUREG-1021
1 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. IPadial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/El Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S H 2 X X X E OO7EA1.1 Question appears to match the K/A.
responses for first part should be approximately 1005 psig or approximately 1020 psig. Using statements like greater than 1005 could always be considered correct.
What is the purpose of the TD AFW being out of service? (I suppose it is so the TD will not have an effect on S/G Pressure) If that is the case its Ok. If not it gives the applicant another item to read.
NEW For Whatever reason this questions was changed from the practice question submitted and a Bank question was submitted in its place.
OO7EA1 .1 Replacement question appears to match the K/A.
With the steam dumps in the steam pressure mode, having the B reactor trip breaker failing to open has no effect on the question. It is stated twice in the question that P10-1-33 is in AUTO. One of these should be removed.
The early submittal question was new, and more discriminating.
With the steam dumps in the steam dump pressure mode, I do not think 552°F is plausible, unless that is approximately the pressure that the PlC would be set for while at 2% power. What pressure would the steam dumps be controlling at 2% power? The setpoint would not be 1047 psig.
BANK 2010 Sequoyah 2010 NRC exam.
Changed distractors b and D to 1026 and 550 degrees. SAT 01/04/2012
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/El Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 2 H 2 X E 008AK2.03 Question appears to match the K/A. I arr not sure if someone in the control room can determine a leak equivalent to 1/2 inches in diameters.
Is this operationally valid? Why dont you just state that RCS pressure is lowering?
This question is marked as NEW, but it also states that the question is on the WB 2011 initial exam.
That makes it a bank question.
BANK Changed stem to initial. Will look at plant information to ensure D is still correct.
01/04/2012 Changed valve in second column to Charging flow controller. Answer is now C. SAT 01/10/2012
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SAC U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 3 H 2 X U 009EK2.03 Question appears to match the K/A.
Some cueing in stem. Distractors C and D are not plausible. Change the question to:
- A reactor trip and safety injection occurred, concurrent with a loss of offsite power.
- RCS pressure is 1500 psig and slowly lowering
- The crew has transitioned to E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
- Add a containment condition that is ADV or not ADV Which one of the following describes the level band Steam Generator levels are required to be maintained between and why?
A. 10-50%; to ensure an adequate S/G inventory to maintain a heat sink.
B. 25-50%; to ensure an adequate S/G inventory to maintain a heat sink.
C. 10-50%; to provide a static head of water to prevent primary to secondary leakage.
D. 25-50%; to provide a static head of water to prevent primary to secondary leakage.
NEW Changed question as requested. SAT.
01/04/2012 H 2 S 011 EK2.02 Question appears to match the K/A.
4 Appears to be SAT.
BANK SAT 01/04/2012
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H)
Focus Dist.
I (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO Only U/E/
S Explanation Link junits ward K/A 5 F 2 X E 015 AK2.08 Question appears to match the K/A.
Replace the second bullet with the annunciator(s) that indicate a loss of all CCS flow to the RCPs has occurred.
BANK 2008 Sequoyah 2008 NRC exam Made changes as requested. SAT 01/04/2012 022AA1 .03 Question appears to match the KJA.
H 2 X X E 6 Teaching (cueing) in stem Excess letdown flow at maximum capacity of heat exchanger: 25 gpm (this needs to be removed); is there a meter on the MCB that indicates the flow rate? If so, then just state Indicator XXX is reading or indicating 25 gpm.
If you lowered the total charging flow(is there a total charging flow meter?) in the 10:00 time frame you could modify this question and have pressurizer level slowly decreasing and the question would be modified. Recommend making this change.
BANK Watts Bar Removed excess letdown, add indicator noun names. SAT 01/04/2012 Made changes as requested. SAT 01/10/2011 7 H 2 X E 025AA2.01 Question appears to match the K/A.
What are the normal values for amps on the RHR pumps during reduced inventory? Distractor B does not appear to be plausible. Refueling malfunctions deals with an RCS cavity leak, or fuel issues.
Nothing to do with RHR. Stem needs to state: Which one of the following identifies the procedure that is required to be entered to mitigate the event?
BANK Sequoyah Changed distractor B. SAT 01/04/2012
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 8 H 2 X U 027AG2L30 Question appears to match the K/A.
Good attempt at a tough K/A. However we are testing three items, the alarm pressure, what action is required, and where it is controlled. If the applicant knows action to mitigate the conditions (i.e.
turn off heaters, the location is moot, then the question does not match the K/A. This question had no changes made to it or any new explanation from the test submittal. Distractor analysis does not match the distractors. With no changes the question is Unsat because we need to test the location, not the actions.
NEW Made changes as requested SAT 01/04/2012
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD r (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues Focus T/F I Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back-Link units ward Q=
K/A SRO Only U/El S
Explanation 9 H X S 029EG2.2.37 Question does not really match the K/A as written.
The reference provided is ECA 0.0 Loss of all AC.
ECA 0.0 contains a step that has the operator verify the turbine tripped by verifying all turbine stop valves CLOSED (SSPS status lights on M-6.)
However, FR-S.1 does not contain this step. It states verify all turbine stop valves closed and does not include the SSPS status lights statement. If you cannot verify the valves closed, the RNO states to close the MSIVs.
Stem should state which one of the following would be an indication of turbine stop valves being closed lAW FR-S.1?
Power should be greater than 50% to make A more plausible. (It is not listed as an approved indication anywhere that I searched.
BANK Sequoyah After much discussion determined question to be SAT. 01/04/2012 F 1 X U 038EA1 .07 Question appears to match the K/A. Not 10 very discriminating. The stem asks for the required actions, lAW what? Distractors A, and C are not plausible while in the ERGs unless they are covered in some other ERG. Suggest trying a two by two question, or consider asking for a K/A change. This question is also a memory level question as written.
NEW Changed question as requested SAT. 01/04/2012
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues Focus T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back-Dist.
0= I SRO Only U/El S
Explanation Link units ward K/A H 2 U WE12EK3.2 Question does not appear to match the K/A. The correct answer does not have a reason, it 11 has a step to take if something changes but does no ask why an action is being taken as required by the K/A. Distractor D is not plausible. You include the reasons for most actions in the stem when you state:
the crew has taken all actions to minimize the plant cooldown. This question requires a major re-write.
NEW Will come back and look at question 01/04/20121 Will get another examiner opinion. 01/10/2012 2 Examiner agreed. Licensee changed question, SAT 01/10/2012 12 H 2 X X U 054AA2.03 Question kind of matches the K/A. With the way the stem is worded it would appear that S/G levels were low prior to the trip. Would they not continue to lower to the point that both MDAFW pumps and the TDAFW pump would be operating?
It would appear that SIG 2 would be at 10% almost immediately.
You have S/G levels listed, and then state immediately following the reactor trip (teaching in stem). Should the Reactor Trip be further up in the stem?
I would argue that there may not be a correct answer as written. Need to revise stem to solicit only 1 correct answer.
Also stated in the distractor analysis are comments that are based on RCS temperatures (550 and 552°F) but there is not a temperature mentioned in the stem, or a statement made that informs the applicant that all other items operated as designed.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD r I (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Linki units ward K/A Only S One part of the questions states it is a new question, and another part states that it is a bank question with some modification.
NEW or BANK or Modified?
Made several changes to stems and choices.
SAT 01/04/2012 13 F 2 X X X E 055EK1 .02 Question appears to match the K/A.
ECA 0.0 Loss of All AC Power directs the operator tc reduce RCS Pressure to less than 160 psig not the band you have stated in the question. Step 22.d does give some RCS Tcold numbers that are not to be exceeded 31 0°F on unit 1 and 275°F on unit 2.
What are these numbers for? Could they make D a correct response.
No unit is given in the stem so I do not know which one is appropriate.
I do not believe that C is plausible.
BANK 2008 Sequoyah NRC Exam Made changes to stem and choices SAT 01/04/2012
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F I Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/El S
Explanation Focus f Dist. Link units ward K/A Only F 2 X E 056AG2.4.34 Question appears to match the K/A.
14 Part two asks which 125 VDC loads are no longer...
I believe the DC seal oil pump is 25Ovdc therefore it will not be plausible as worded. I do understand that is will be secured on the load shed and when but the way the question is worded just knowing it is a 250v component rules is out. Change (2) to read which dc loads are no longer available after EA-250-1 is complete. Then question will be SAT.
NEW Made changes based on NRC request. Will ensure that the correct answer is correct.
01/04/2012 Changed stem both (1) and (2) to ensure only one correct answer. SAT 01/0/2012 15 H 2 X E 057AK3.01 Question appears to match the K/A.
What are indications that an electrical board has failed? These indications should be used. This question was on the 2009 Sequoyah NRC Exam.
Ask the question with a different board failed, or if the same bus on the other unit failed.
or Change the stem to read all channel status lights on 1-M-5 and 1-M-6 are out with the exception of the protection set III trouble light. Then ask the question for boards 1-br 1-Ill and the question will be modified, unless this is also already a question in your bank. I based this on your distractor analysis. If this is not correct develop something that is correct.
BANK 2009 Sequoyah NRC Exam. Made changes as requested. SAT 01/04/2012
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/El Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 16 H 2 X E 062AA2.03 Kind of matches the K/A.
Need to reword stem a little so that the applicants understand you want to know which ERCW header is supply the appropriate heat exchangers.
Maybe something like Which one of the following describes the ERCW header supply to the CCS heat exchangers after AOP-MO.1 is complete. (Reference is okay as long as it does not aide in answering any other questions.
BANK Made changes as suggested. SAT 01/04/2012 17 F 2 S 065AK3.08 Question kind of matches the K/A.
appears to be sat. Forms states question is both NEW and BANK. Need to decide which one it is.
Again I need to see all bank questions.
BANK SAT 01/04/2012 18 H 2 X U WEO5EK1 .3 Question appears to match the K/A.
The stem should read WOOTF describes how SGs are to be fed when auxiliary feed is restored. Then with the CETC rising they should be feed at the maximum rate. The other distractors should be between 50 and 100 gpm. You can use all S/G and One S/G for each and the correct reasons.
As written distractors A and B are not plausible.
BANK Discussed question and made changes to all distractors. SAT 01/04/2012
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIE Cred. IPartial Job- Minutia I #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link junits ward KJA Only S 19 H 2 X E 003AK3.07 Question appears to match the K/A.
Distractor C is not plausible. Suggest using a 2 X 2 with action to take (immediately trip the reactor and why or recovery control rod within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to prevent exceeding limits etc.
NEW Made changes to question as requested.
SAT 01/04/2012 20 F 2 X U 024AA1 .10 Question does not appear to match the K/A. The K/A requires the applicant to determine if the RWST is available. (Correct level, boron ppm, temp etc.)
The complete top of the stem adds nothing to the question, and could be removed. WOOTF...
NEW Made some changes, will continue to work 01/04/201 2. Changed all distractors, essentially wrote a new question SAT. 01/10/2012 21 H 2 X E 036AK2.01 Question appears to match the K/A.
Change the first bullet to state: An irradiated assembly is in the manipulator crane and is being transferred from an incore location to the upender.
Add lAW AOP-M.04 to the WOOTF statement.
BANK Made changes as requested SAT 01/04/2012
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 22 H 1 X X X E 059AK3.02 Question appears to match the K/A.
Appears to be some cueing in the stem.
Chemistry reports that sample results for the Turbine Building sump indicates an ECL for 1-131 concentration at 2.5 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid This states the limi for an unmonitored release, why would I select a response that stated the radiation monitor failed to isolate, the release was unmonitored? If the yard drainage (cattail pond) is normal why would I send contaminated water to the normal drain site? This question has two distractors that are not plausible, and a cue to send the applicant to the first two distractors.
Above is the response I sent when this question was submitted as a pre-submittal question. No changes were made. The comments are still valid. Question is still unsat.
NEW Replaced K/A with AK3.03 Continue to work to match K/A. Wrote new question SAT 01/10/2012
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/Fl) (1-5) Stem Cues 7/F I Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO U/E/
S Explanation Focus Dist. Link junits ward K/A Only 23 H 2 X U 069AA1 .01 Question does not meet the K/A. There is nothing in the question pertaining to Isolation valves, damper, and electro-pneumatic devices.
Need to develop a question that includes at least one of these items to match the K/A.
BANK 2008 Sequoyah NRC exam.
Replaced question, still need to work on distractor B. Continue to work 01/04/2012 Added: contact chemistry to secure zinc injection. Need to validate. SAT 01/10/2012.
24 H 2 X X U 074EAZ03 Question does not really match the K/A.
This could occur on any cooldown. What does the C.1 procedure direct the operators to do if the dumps are not available? The question should be written with conditions in the stem that allow the operator to make the call, are the steam dumps available, if so cool down using the dumps, if not cooldown using the atmospherics from the control room or local. What trips the reactor on a SBLOCA?
As written distractors C and D are not plausible.
Discussed with second examiner.
NEW Replaced Question SAT. 01/04/2012 25 H 2 X E WEO1 EG2.1 .7 Question appears to match the K/A.
As written distractor B is not plausible. Need to state all S/G levels are less 10% narrow range and slowly lowering then SAT.
NEW Made changes as suggested SATO1/04/201 2
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 26 H 2 S WE13EK2.2 Question appears to meet K/A. SAT BANK 2007 Sequoyah NRC exam.
SAT 01/04/2012 27 F 2 X E WE16EK1.3 Question kind of matches KJA. Would like to find another distractor for D. (this one is not plausible)
BANK Changed distractor D. SAT 01/04/2012 28 H 2 S 003A1 .05 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT NEW 29 H 2 S 003A4.05 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT 2008 Sequoyah Audit Exam 30 H 2 X E 004K6.31 Question kind of matches the K/A in a backwards way. The K/A is actually soliciting what will happen to CVCS components with a seal injection system malfunction and limits on flow range. Expected question to have a failure, seal failure, valve failure, etc and then explain the effect this will have on the charging system.
As written distractors B and D are not plausible, no action with Seal injection flow less than 6.0 gpm?
There are too many places in the procedures that state: verify seal injection is between 6.0 10 gpm.
If you are going to use this question the second part of these distractors need to be changed.
NEW Made changes to all distractors SAT 01/04/2012
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. IPaial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 31 H 2 S 005K1.1l Question appears to match the K/A. SAT.
NEW 32 H 2 X S 006K1 .11 Question appears to match the K/A. This question is very similar to question #87 on the SRO exam. (Essentially the same question without the SRO part.)
Need to replace at least one of these. (This is essentially double jeopardy) I realize the answers are somewhat different, but essentially the question is the same because the reasons are the same.
Question 87 also helps answer question 32.
(NEW) Question 87 is a modified BANK Changed K/A to 006K1 .05 Replacement Question SAT. 01/04/2012 33 H 1 X U 006K6.03 Question kind of matches the K/A. Stem should state if one of the running SI pumps tripped.
Distractors A and D have reasons in the distractors (teaching in the distractors), the question asks for plant response, not why, this could be considered cueing. Distractor D plant response is not plausible.
How could RCS temperature and pressure decrease with a reduction in ECCS flow?
BANK from an HB Robinson NRC exam Continue to work. 01/04/2012 Changed pressure in stem to 1600 psig. This will make distractor D correct.
Modified. SAT 01/10/2012
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/El Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 34 H 2 X E 007G2.1.30 Question appears to match the K/A.
Good attempt at a tough K/A. Distractor C needs to be changed as written it is not plausible. Change to:
Manually by the AUO when PRT level reaches 50%
or something similar.
NEW Made changes as requested.
SAT01/04/201 2 35 H 2 X U 008K4.01 Question appears to match the K/A.
Distractor A is not plausible. Why would All (Unit2 included) load shed on a unit 1 loss of offsite power?
Does C-S CCS pump ever get an auto start signal, are there any special conditions that are required to satisfy this? It would seem using normal nuclear plant conventions that even if C-S CCS pump was being supplied by Unit 1 power, with the 1 B-B CCS pump in standby Auto only the 1 B-B CCS would get the auto start. Therefore, I do not believe that distractor B is plausible as written.
BANK Modify to unit 2 with D as correct answer.
Modified as requested. Changed distractor B to 2A and 2B only auto start. SAT 01/1 0/201 2.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/El Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 36 H 2 X E 010K5.O1 Question kind of matches the K/A. Stem does not elicit the response you are asking for. RCS Tave is not required. It should state: With RCS wide range pressure indicating 150 psig, WOOTF identifies the temperature of the pressurizer liquid when a bubble starts to form.
Distractor A is not plausible. Replace distractor A with a distractor that is based on the applicant using 150 psig and converting to PSIA correctly and determining the bubble will start to form at approximately 364 °F.
NEW Made changes as requested. SAT 01/05/2012
- 2. 3, Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. IPaial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 37 H 1 U 012K2.01 Question appears to match the K/A. The distractors also teach that this is the power supply to the shunt trip coils. What is the associated reactor trip breaker? Are all trip breakers affected? As written this is not very discriminating.
Change to:
Which ONE of the following describes the effect on the Reactor Trip Breakers?
A. MCB Indication is lost for RTA and BYA; breakers will not open on a Reactor Trip signal.
B. MCB Indication is lost for RTB and BYB; breakers will not open on a Reactor Trip signal.
C. MCB Indication is lost for RTA and BYA, breakers will open on a Reactor Trip signal D. MCB Indication is lost for RTB and BYB; breakers will open on a reactor trip signal.
Or something very similar.
BANK Made changes as requested. Now Modified. SAT 01105/2012 38 H 2 S 012K6.02 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT.
BANK 2010 Audit Exam.
Made change adding an alarm. SAT 01/05/2012 39 H 2 S 013K2.01 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT Some information in the stem is not required.
BANK 2008 Sequoyah NRC Exam.
Made some changes to the stem. SAT 01/05/2012
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/El Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 40 H 2 X E 013K5.02 Question appears to match the K/A. Add to third bullet, and remains closed. Need to add a time to the stem something like after 10 seconds after the switch is placed back in Auto.
BANK 2009 Sequoyah Retake Examination Made changes as requested. SAT 01/05/2012 41 F 2 S 022K2.02 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT BANK SAT 01/05/2012 42 F 2 S 025K5.01 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT NEW Made changes to stem based on validation to make question clearer. SAT 01/05/2012 43 F 2 X E 026A1.06 Question appears to match the K/A. Will the C-CCS pump continue to run in this event? If so, then any of the B components are not plausible. As it appears from the distractor analysis it does not matter what train is affected for the CCP, SI, and RHR pumps, then why do we pick different trains?
Need to discuss.
BANK Made Changes as requested. SAT 01/05/2012 44 H 2 5 039A3.02 Question appears to match K/A. SAT NEW Changed stem to correct. SAT 01/05/2012 45 H 2 X E 059A3.04 Question appears to match K/A. Are these controls usually in automatic? If so, distractor D is not plausible, if control is in manual then C is not plausible. To make D plausible you need to state control will transfer to manual and speed will
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LCD r I (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Linki units ward K/A Only S remain the same.
NEW Changed distractor D. SAT 01/05/2012 46 H 2 X X X U 061A2.07 Question appears to match the KJA, but the way the question is written I could cover up the top and still ask and answer the question without an reference to the top portion, meaning that it really does not match the K/A. (the concept does)
What Pressure transmitters are the inputs for this logic? Could we develop a question off of this?
Another issue is that C and D are subsets of A and E we need to fix the subset issue.
Lastly the stem states: assuming the TD AFW pump starts, the operators control SG level by... and one response manually control is appropriate, but the other monitoring, is not actually controller (one is an action the other is not)
NEW Changed stem and all distractors. SAT 01/05/2012 47 H 2 X E 062K301 Question appears to match the K/A. The applicant need only know that 2D control heater does not automatically come on to answer this question correctly. Change distractor C to 2A-A, an 2C only. Add only all other distractors.
BANK Made changes as requested.
SATO1/05/201 2
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 48 F 2 X E 063K3.02 Question appears to match the K/A.
Cueing in the stem Unit 2 was at 85% you are informing the applicant that it is not longer at 85%,
that would rule out A. Just state power is at 85%.
Remove the reasons, the KA does not ask for reasons. Change the distractors to read:
A. All MSIVs will close B. Reactor power will increase C. Reactor will trip on high pressurizer level D. Control Air compressors C and D will unload BANK SAT 01/05/2012 49 H 2 S 064G2.4.8 Question appears to match the K/A.
Question is marked as modified; however after looking at the 2009 NRC exam question as given, it appears to be a bank question. Items in the stem are changed, however the answers are the same (identical) with the exception of the AOP. Will discuss if the bank number is exceeded.
BANK 2009 Sequoyah NRC exam If there are no Bank Number issues then question is SAT 01/05/2012 50 F 2 X E 064A1 .05 Question appears to match the K/A.
Distractor A is not plausible. If this exhaust has no automatic operation, why would anyone pick it?
Distractor B mentions each of the intake dampers going closed, do these dampers operate automatically and how do they function. This temperature is an upper limit, and would require more dampers to be open, so why would an applicant select this distractor?
NEW Changed B to 70°F (70.3 was kind of a trick)
1 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/El Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S changed A to manually secure the EB Room Fan.
SAT 01/05/2012 51 F 2 S 073A4.01 Question appears to match K/A. SAT BANK 52 F 2 S 076K4.03 Question appears to match K/A. SAT BANK 2007 Sequoyah NRC exam.
53 F 2 X E 078G2.4.1 1 Question appears to match the K/A. Do not believe that distractors C and D (first part are plausible). Will discuss BANK Changed C and 0 to the SO SAT 01/05/2012 54 H 2 X E 103A2.03 Question appears to match the K/A.
Teaching in stem (as required by T/S). Just say the bistable is in trip.
BANK 2008 Sequoyah Audit Exam made changes to the stem and distractors to eliminate conflict with question 49. SAT 01/05/2012 55 H 2 E 103A2.05 Question appears to match the K/A. Do not believe H2 is plausible (you would have to have a large RCS leak). Low 02 may be better. Also do not believe Containment Air return fans are plausible. Does the procedure allow operators to use self contained breathing apparatus in containment? If not these may be better distractors.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/El Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S Will discuss NEW Made some changes as requested. SAT 01/05/2012 56 H 2 X E 002K606 Question appears to match the K/A. This question is very similar to a 2009 Sequoyah NRC examination (question 25). There are some differences in the stem and distractors but
. essentially the answer is the same.
As written you are teaching/cueing in the distractors, specifically A where you state until pressure decreases to 20 psig below the minimum lift setpoint. If this is true, then you should be testing one distractor that states PORV 334 will open and immediately close when RCS pressure drops to less than the minimum LTOP setpoint. Does PORV-340 ever get an open signal from LTOP and is it different from 334? If so we should test this.
Modified BANK Sequoyah 2009 NRC exam. Bank question reworded SAT 01/05/2012 57 F 1 S 015K201 Question appears to match the K/A. Not very discriminating. SAT BANK 2009 Sequoyah Retake NRC examination.
01/05/2012 58 F 2 5 016K5.01 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT BANK 01/05/2012 59 F 2 S 033A1 .01 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT BANK 01/05/2012
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/El Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 60 F 2 X E 034A4.01 Question appears to match the KJA.
Distractor B is not plausible with an alarm setting of 100R/hr. The first indication mark on these detectors are usually 1 R/hr. Need to develop a new distractor.
NEW Made changes as requested. SAT 01/05/2012 61 F 2 X E 035A3.01 Question appears to match the K/A. Need to reword A. As written it is very different than the other distractors. It starts with automatic and all of the others start with S/G level. Change to SG level control will not be affected.
NEW Made changes as requested SAT 01/05/2012 Added control rods in manual.
62 F 1 E 071G2.2.40 Question appears to match the K/A.
lAW which units T/S. You included unit 1 T/S in you reference. Not very discriminating, what happens when you exceed the limit? Try a 2X2 with distractors B and C and then state the correct action (without delay suspend all additions of waste gases to the affected waste gas holdup tank and reduce the concentration of X to less than 2% or 4%.
Question would then be modified. Is without delay the same as immediate? If so:
WOOTF describes the Unit 1 TS limit for waste gas decay tanks and the action required if exceeded?
A. If H2 exceeds 4%, 02 must be less than 2 %,
suspend all additions of waste gases to the affected waste gas holdup tank and reduce the concentration of H2 to less than 4%.
B. If 02 exceeds 4%, H2 must be less than 2 %,
suspend all additions of waste gases to the affected_waste_gas_holdup_tank_and_reduce_the
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S concentration of 02 to less than 4%.
Etc. or something similar.
BANK Continue to work to resolve issue.
01/05/2012 Rewrote question SAT. 01/10/2012.
63 F 2 S 072K4.02 Question appears to match K/A. SAT BANK 2008 Sequoyah Audit 01/05/2012 64 F 2 S 079K1 .01 Question appears to match K/A. SAT BANK 01/05/2012 65 H 2 E 086A2.04 Question appears to match K/A. Not sure the correct answer is selected. None of the bulleted indications indicate a fire header pressure of less than 115 psig which is value AOP-N.O1 uses.
Unless I missed something, it would seem that B is the correct answer as written.
NEW Added a pressure to the stem. SAT 01/05/2012 66 F 2 S G2.1.17 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT BANK 67 H 2 S G2.1.32 Question appears to match the K/A.
BANK Sequoyah 2009 NRC exam.
Changed first bullet in stem. SAT 01/05/2012
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 68 H 2 E G.1.41 Question appears to match the K/A. Which Unit/which units TS? Recommend picking a unit, then have stem read: WOOTF would require core alterations to be suspended lAW TS. This could easily be modified to have one of the other conditions be the reason why core alterations should be suspended BANK 2009 Sequoyah Retake examination Made changes, shortened the stem. SAT 01/05/2012 69 F 2 S G2.2.12 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT NEW SAT 01/05/2012 70 F 2 X S G2.2.38 Question appears to match the K/A.
Change the second part of the stem to read requires reactor power to be reduced to a maximum of within.. .Otherwise SAT NEW SAT 01 /05/2012 71 F 2 X E G2.3.5 Question appears to match the K/A. Do not believe that C and D are plausible. Need to find another distractor for the first part of the distractors.
BANK Changed the first part on all distractors.
SAT 01/05/2012 72 F 3 X E G2.3.13 Question appears to match the K/A. This appears to be SRO only knowledge. The actions are taken from the ODCM. If you require your ROs to know this it may be okay.
This question is listed as new, but it is actually a bank question (and there are many versions).
Site expected the ROs to know this. SAT 01/05/2012
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD r
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/El Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 73 H 2 S G2.4.4 Question appears to match K/A. SAT BANK (not really too keen on distractor C)
SAT 01/05/2012 74 H 2 X E G2.4.32 Question appears to match the KJA.
Distractors A and B do not appear to be plausible.
Try a 2X2 using C and D and a major action required by them, one of them to be incorrect for C.
BANK 2008 Sequoyah Audit exam Made changes as requested. SAT 01/05/2012 75 F 2 X S G2A.34 Question appears to match the K/A. SAT May want to reword the stem a little, consider adding initial prior to location.
BANK Made changes as requested. SAT 01/05/2012 26 Sats, 13 Unsats, and 36 Enhancements
- 1) Please provide a copy of all bank questions (the answers should not be the same letter that is in the original bank question, for example if A is the correct answer in the bank the distractors should be moved around so the answer is not A.
- 2) Need to know the method of how the bank questions were selected.
- 3) Several questions had two distractors that were not considered plausible, but because they were two part questions and only one part was considered not plausible, an E was assigned.
ES-401, Rev. 9 Seguoyah 201 2-301 SRO Written Examination Review Worksheet FINAL Form ES-401-9 1 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/El Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S Instructions
[Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]
- 1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
- 2. Enter the level of difficulty (LCD) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2
- 4 range are acceptable).
- 3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:
- The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).
- The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).
- The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.
- The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable.
- One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).
- 4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:
- The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content).
- The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).
- The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).
- The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.
- 5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved K/A and those that are designated SRO-only (K/A and license level mismatches are unacceptable).
S. Based on the reviewers judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?
- 7. At a minimum, explain any U ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).
SRO-only portion of the exam was determined to meet the quality guidelines contained in NUREG 1021.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LCD 1 (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- jMinutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 76 H 2 X E 008G2.4.18 Question appears to match the K/A.
Question appears to contain SRO required knowledge. Not sure if B and D (second part) are plausible. RCPs are designed to pump two phase liquid, and in fact pump air and water during RCS fill and vent. Need to discuss distractors B and D.
Which PORV block valve failed to close?
Could not find the question on the 2008 NRC exam.
Would like to see a copy of the original bank question.
BANK Sequoyah 2008 NRC EXAM Made changes to the stem including adding CETCs and RVLIS level to enhance distractor plausibility. Also made changes to stem statement place H2 analyzer in service. SAT 0110412012 77 2 X X X U 011 EA2.01 Question does not appear to match the K/A. (There does not appear to be a large break LOCA in progress) If we are performing actions to lower RCS pressure to allow ECCS flow, then a LBLOCA is not in progress. ( two other examiners agreed with not meeting K/A)
This question is a question on FRP-C.1. There are many other temperatures and pressures that require action while in a LBLOCA. While these actions are listed in FR-Cl, if a large break LOCA was in progress this step would only prevent the SIG from being a heat source.
Question also contains teaching in the stem, you state FR-C.l has been entered and give RVLIS and CETC to support this. This could answer other questions on the exam.
Recommend changing question to deal with RCS
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD I (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A j Only S temperature/pressures located in E-1.
Replaced question, replacement question not SAT, gave three K/A replacements. Still have work to do.
0110412012 BANK Watts Bar 2009 Selected new KIA.
OIIEA2.14 Wrote new question made several changes to the new question. Will review when final is sent. 0111012012. Replacement question SAT 01I012012.
78 2 H X S 025AA2.04 Question appears to match the K/A, but not at the SRO level. (Received confirmation from another chief examiner). First part of question is RO knowledge. The K/A does not mention classifying lAW EPIPs.
Depending on how your technical specifications are worded, the leakage into the RHR pump room could be considered identified leakage if there is a room sump, and the leakage can be quantified. (at several other Westinghouse nuclear stations, this would be considered identified leakage) and this would make distractor C correct.
Need to find a way to make this SRO only, and ensure there is only one correct answer.
BANK Cook 2008 NRC exam Discussed in Office licensee provided additional information to enforce correct answer. SAT 01I04I201 2.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 79 H 2 X U 056AG2.4.18 Question appears to match the K/A, but is not SRO only. (This version of the question came out prior to the current SRO only guidance).
Knowing the entry conditions to ECA-O.O is RO knowledge.
Knowing the priorities for Critical Safety Functions is also RO knowledge.
Therefore this question can be answered using RO knowledge.
BANK 2007 Summer NRC Exam Replaced Question. SAT 0110412012
1 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia I #/ Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link 1t5 ward K/A Only S 80 H 2 X E 065AA2.08 Question appears to meet the K/A.
Appears to have an SRO aspect to it.
Does the Train A containment isolation valve automatically close on lowering air pressure? If so this is okay, if not the first two distractors are not plausible. The first two plausibility statements do not make sense as written.
Change stem to read:
Unit I is in Mode 5...
Based on the above conditions which one of the following identifies the ABGTS status and required tech spec entry if any.
- a. ABGTS Train A remains OPERABLE until the Train A containment isolation valve automatically closes; TS 3.0.3 entry is not required.
- b. ABGTS Train A remains OPERABLE until the Train A containment isolation valve automatically closes; TS 3.0.3 entry is required.
- c. Both trains of ABGTS are INOPERABLE; TS 3.0.3 entry is not required.
- d. Both trains of ABGTS are INOPERABLE; TS 3.0.3 entry is required.
C is the correct answer, and the question is Modified.
BANK 2008 Sequoyah NRC exam Made changes to mode 5. SAT 0110412012
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 81 H 2 X WEO4G2.4.6 Question appears to match the K/A.
E Appears to be SRO only. Will discuss references, I believe a reference is needed, but I dont think it should be limited to just two applicable pages. Will discuss. The stem states When ECA1 .2 is complete... and the first question reads: upon completion. You state in the stem it is complete, change the statement to say the crew is required to transition to (1).
Otherwise SAT.
BANK Discussed references, direct look-up. Changed stem to have applicant determine Subcooling, which in turn will have applicant determine classification. SAT. 0110412012
1 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 82 H 2 X X E 028AG2.4.11 Question appears to match the K/A. Question appears to test at the SRO level.
Modify first part of stem to state In accordance with AOP-l.1 1 actions to hard trip Modify the second part of the stem to state in accordance with technical specifications.
Distractors B and D are not plausible as written with 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> required to trip bistables Need to find another time for placing bistables in trip.(for another component).
OR Another option is to add times to the stem and ask for the maximum time place the bistables in trip.
Modified Bank (need to see original bank question to verify Changed B and D distractors to eight hours SAT 0110412012
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 83 H 2 X E 068AG2.4.7 Question appears to meet the K/A.
Question appears to be SRO only.
Which RCS Tech Spec limit has or has not been violated. (temp/RCS flow operable loops etc.) need to add the TS you are referring to.
30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> from 0515 is 1 115. (are you allowing the 1 hr to start actions? One could believe that when 3.0.3 was declared, actions had already been taken.
BANK 2009 Sequoyah NRC Exam. Discussed.
Question is SAT 0110412012 H 2 X E 076AG2.2.40 Question appears to match the K/A.
84 Appears to be SRO only.
Teaching in stem: Why is it stated that the crew begins reducing RCS Tavg in accordance with a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> tech spec action statement?
Just state a cooldown is in progress.
BANK 2009 Sequoyah NRC Exam. Changed stem as requested. SAT 01/04I2012
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S WEIOEA2.2 Question kind of matches the K/A.
85 H 1 X Does not appear to be SRO knowledge.
With the decision already made (given in the stem) a faster cooldown is required (the entry requirements for ES0.3) determination in this case is RO knowledge. Cooldown rates are also typically RO knowledge.
As written question is not very discriminating.
Furthermore, the first two distractors are not plausible in that if the cooldown rate needs to be increased the crew must transition and the only choice is ES-0.3. Distractor D is still not plausible, the only time exceeding 100°F is allowed is in E-3.
Will get a second opinion from another examiner. Had two other examiners review and the agreed.
BANK Replaced question. SAT 01104/2012 86 H 2 X E 005G2.2.25 Question appears to match K/A.
Appears to be SRO only. Question is somewhat confusing the way it is written. Are these plant conditions operationally valid? Would procedures allow SIG levels to get this low? Consider rewriting to make question clearer.
NEW May have more than one correct answer continue to work. 01/04I2012 Changed question back to original question. SAT 01I10I2012
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S H 2 X X E 008A2.01 Question appears to match the K/A.
87 Question appears to have an SRO only aspect.
Lots of teaching in the stem (first and second bullets.) Need to remove the teaching.
Need to have the procedure name along with the first 1-SO-70-1.
Very similar to RO Question 32.
Modified BANK Need to see original bank question.
Changed the KA on the RO question. Made changes as requested. SAT. 0110412012 88 H 2 X U 010G2.1.7 Question does not appear to match the K/A. Question does appear to have an SRO aspect to it.
What are we testing in relation to the PT failure? If I took the top part of the question and covered it up and left the RCS temperature trend and the rest of the question it could still be answered the same. I believe what you are attempting to test is that the PT is an input to a PORV and it is no longer operable, but that is not what the question is asking. And if that is what you were going to ask, you tell them in (2) of the stem the PORV is inoperable.
Try asking what PORV does the PT provide input for and then ask the TS portion.
NEW Rewrote question based on comments. SAT 01I04I2012
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only S 026A2.09 Question appears to match the K/A. Does 89 H 2 X not appear to be SRO only Reviewed 0-SO-72-1 and located the note that describes the operator not having to remain in the pipe chase due to ALARA concerns. (Most ALAARA items are covered in GET.)
Technical specification entry requirements are typically RO knowledge (when to enter a T/S. The TISs were not included in the reference material you sent with the questions. Will have another examiner look at question prior to making final determination.
Stem could be worded a little different, it is difficult to follow.
The note in the procedure states the operator may exit the pipe chase only if recirc will continue for an extended period of time.
NEW Based on licensee feedback, selected new KIA.
New Question SAT 1212212011.
90 H 2 X E 062G2.2.25 Question appears to match the K/A.
Appears to test some SRO knowledge. The diesel requirements are above the line on TS 3.8.1.2 and are therefore RO knowledge. Distractors B and C are not plausible. The unit is already shutdown, why would anyone pick ensure safe shutdown of the facility?
NEW Made changes as suggested. SAT 01I04/2012
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S F 2 E 028G2.2.40 Question appears to match the K/A.
91 Does not appear to be SRO only. Reviewed lesson material and lesson material states the nominal temperature of the igniters is 1700, °F. 1700°F is also listed in precautions and limitations, therefore I do not feel this is SRO knowledge. I also do not feel that 1400°F is plausible.
NEW Made changes (1760 and 1700). SAT 0110412012 92 H 2 X E 055G2.1.19 Question appears to match the K/A.
Appears to be SRO only.
Stem, last bullet, state chemistry has provided the following data in the turnover package. (This is from AOP-R.01).
I realize the procedure states that 1 -RM-90-1 19 is the preferred monitor, but the data calculated by chemistry can only be for one monitor. Is 1 19 the only monitor that can use this data? If so the word preferred should be removed. (Note 2).
Check Watts Bar Questions to verify.
BANK Made changes as requested. SAT 01104I2012
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S 93 F 2 X S 079A2.O1 Question appears to match K/A. Question does not appear to be SRO only. Both parts of the question can be determined by systems knowledge.
Valves that isolate (or should isolate) is systems knowledge, and what trains are affected are also systems knowledge.
BANK Need to see original bank question.
After much discussion and review of TS bases, the question was determined to be SAT 0110412012 94 F 2 S G2.2.14 Question appears to match the K/A.
Appears to be SRO only.
Need to add lAW OPDP-4 This appears to be a Bank WB question. Will need to see original question to determine if it is modified. (Modified) 0110412012 95 F 2 X S G2.18 Question appears to match the K/A. Questior appears to be SRO knowledge. Distractors A and C are not plausible. Why with margin at 12 minutes would anyone pick: Approval granted to open the penetration without restriction? This does not pass the common sense test. This question is listed as higher cognitive but appears to be recall of two memory items.
BANK Discussed question left question as is.
SAT 01I04I2012 96 H 2 S G2.2.42 Question appears to meet K/A. Appears to be SRO only. (This is the second time that you have tested LCO 3.O.4.b, this could be considered double jeopardy will discuss.
- 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LCD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only S NEW Discussed this question actually testing the implementation of 304.b SAT 0110412012 97 H 2 X E G2.3.4 Question appears to match the K/A. Questior appears to have an SRO only aspect. As written distractors C and D second parts are not plausible.
These items are also taught in Radiation Worker Training.
BANK Need to work on distractors C and D. 01I04I2012 replaced distractors C and D. SAT 0111 01201 2.
98 F 2 X E G2.3.7 Question appears to match the K/A. Questior appears to have an SRO only aspect. First bullet can be removed. It has no impact on the quesfion.
NEW Changed 62 to 58. SAT 0110412012 99 H 2 X S G2.4.35 Question appears to match the K/A at the RO level. Do not believe the K/A is matched at the SRO level. I understand that the classification is SRO knowledge, but it is not based on local auxiliary actions or there resultant effect. Will discuss with another examiner.
BANK After discussion determined question to be SAT 12I2212011
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO U/E/ Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only S 100 F 2 E G2.4.38 Question kind of matches the K/A. Question does contain SRO only knowledge. What does CECC stand for? Until I know what this position is and what his duties are I cannot classify the question as Sat or E or U BANK 2009 Sequoyah Retake exam. Need to find another individual to delegate duties to besides the V.P. 0110412012 Changed VP to EP Manager. SAT 01104/2012 6 Sats, 5 Unsats, and 14 Enhancements 15 Banks, 7 New, 2 Modified (need to see originals)
Generic comments
- 1) Why are many of the questions in two part format, this is not required. If your applicants are used to taking a test in this manner, it is okay. But not required.
- 2) Please provide a copy of all bank questions (the answers should not be the same letter that is in the original bank question, for example if A is the correct answer in the bank the distractors should be moved around so the answer is not A.
ES-403, Rev. 9 Written Examination Grading Form ES-403-1 Quality Checklist Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: 02/01/2012 Exam Level: RO/SRO Initials Item Description a b c
- 1. Clean answer sheets copied before grading N/A M.
- 2. Answer key changes and question deletions justified and N/A documented
- 3. Applicants scores checked for addition errors N/A (reviewers_spot_check_>_25%_of_examinations)
- 4. Grading for all borderline cases (80 +/-2% overall and 70 or 80, N/A as applicable, +/-4% on the SRO-only) reviewed in detail D
- 5. All other failing examinations checked to ensure that grades N/A are justified 1
- 6. Performance on missed questions checked for training N/A deficiencies and wording problems; evaluate validity of questions_missed_by_half_or more of_the_applicants Printed Name/Signature Date 4i .1 a Grader J, 1
- b. Facility Reviewer(*)
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (*) aa-Qq-,/
- d. NRC Supervisor (*) &2/zWrz-(*) The facility reviewers signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC; two independent NRC reviews are required.