ML12052A032

OL - Updated OI List

ML12052A032
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	02/04/2011
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
References
Download: ML12052A032 (132)

Text

WBN2Public Resource From: Darbali, Samir Sent: Friday, February 04, 2011 12:37 PM To: Poole, Justin Cc: Garg, Hukam

Subject:

Updated OI List Attachments: 20110204 Open Item List Master NRC Update 02-04-11.docx

Justin, Attached is the updated OI list to be sent out to TVA.

Thanks, Samir 1

Hearing Identifier: Watts_Bar_2_Operating_LA_Public Email Number: 658 Mail Envelope Properties (0046140293E11F408991442DB4FE25CA3A824B18F0)

Subject:

Updated OI List Sent Date: 2/4/2011 12:37:24 PM Received Date: 2/4/2011 12:37:26 PM From: Darbali, Samir Created By: Samir.Darbali@nrc.gov Recipients:

"Garg, Hukam" <>

Tracking Status: None "Poole, Justin" <Justin.Poole@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None Post Office: HQCLSTR01.nrc.gov Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 89 2/4/2011 12:37:26 PM 20110204 Open Item List Master NRC Update 02-04-11.docx 462392 Options Priority: Standard Return Notification: No Reply Requested: No Sensitivity: Normal Expiration Date:

Recipients Received:

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N 001 All All The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant FSAR red-line for Unit 2 (Agency 12/15/2009 Presentation Slides Y Closed Closed EICB RAI 3/12/2010 NNC 11/19/09: The FSAR contains EICB (All) wide Documents Access and Management System Accession ML093230343, Item mostly description of the function that Number ML080770366) lists changes to the Unit 1 FSAR and This item was partially addressed during the December 15, Date: 3/15/2010 No. 1 the various TVA systems must perform.

depicts how Chapter 7 of the Unit 2 FSAR will appear at fuel load. 2009 meeting. Therefore this question was asked to Have additional changes been made to Chapter 7 of the Unit 2 RAI response received. determine how the systems have been FSAR beyond those indicated in ML080770366? Which of the TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Item No. 1 changed.

changes identified correspond to digital instrumentation and on Page 1 of 15): TVA responded to this request for controls (I&C) components and systems that have not been additional Information. NNC 4/15/10: The response addresses previously reviewed and approved by the NRC? many systems and should be read by all EICB reviewers.

002 All All Are there I&C components and systems that have changed to a 12/15/2009 Presentation Slides Y Closed Closed EICB RAI 3/12/2010 NNC 11/19/09: The FSAR contains EICB (All) new or different digital technology without the change being ML093230343, Item mostly description of the function that reflected in the FSAR markup? Are there any not-redlined I&C This item was partially addressed during the December 15, Date: 3/15/2010 No. 2 the various TVA systems must perform.

components and systems that have been changed or replaced by 2009 meeting. Therefore this question was asked to digital base technology since Unit 1 was approved? TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Item No. 2 RAI response received. determine how the systems have been on Page 2 of 15): TVA responded to this request for changed.

additional Information.

NNC 4/15/10: The response addresses many systems and should be read by all EICB reviewers.

003 All All Because a digital I&C platform can be configured and programmed 12/15/2009 Presentation Slides Y Closed Closed EICB RAI 3/12/2010 NNC 11/19/09: The FSAR contains EICB (All) for different applications, the review process can be divided ML093230343, Item mostly description of the function that between a review of the platform and a review of the application. This item was partially addressed during the December 15, Date: 3/15/2010 No. 3 the various TVA systems must perform.

For planning and scheduling reasons, it is important to know 2009 meeting. Therefore this question was asked to beforehand which platform has been used in each digital TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Item No. 3 RAI response received. determine how the systems have been component and system. What is the base platform of each on Page 2 of 15): TVA responded to this request for changed.

unreviewed digital I&C component and system (e.g., Common Q)? additional Information.

NNC 4/15/10: The response addresses many systems and should be read by all EICB reviewers.

004 All All Please identify the information that will be submitted for each Responder: Webb 1/13/10 Public Meeting Y Closed Closed EICB RAI January 13, 2010 NNC 11/19/09: LIC-110 Rev. 1 Section EICB (All) unreviewed digital I&C system and component and the associated ML093230343, Item 6.2.2 states: "Design features and docketing schedule. TVA identified a schedule for docketing some Post Accident Date: 3/15/2010 Responsibility: TVA to docket a D3 No. 4 March 12, 2010 administrative programs that are unique Monitoring System (PAMS) documentation, and the new NRC (All) and TVA (Hilmes) analysis for the to Unit 2 should then be reviewed in setpoint methodology. No other documentation was Common Q PAMS. June 30, 2010 accordance with current staff discussed. TVA to address the question of positions.TVA will supply a how a Foxboro IA common NNC 8/19/10: TVA August 11, 2010 description of the changes implemented Add: By letter dated June 30, 2010, TVA docketed WNA-LI- mode or complete failure segmentation analysis at Unit 1 but have not been reviewed for 00058-WBT-P &-NP, "PAMS Licensing Technical Report." impacts the plant accident has been received - TVA Letter dated Unit 2 by the NRC technical staff...TVA WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P Section 4.11 addressed CCF and analysis as described in Chapter NRC to review. 10/5/10 will also provide the applicable portion BTP 7-19. 15 of the FSAR. (Demonstrate of the FSAR and the proposed TSs...In segments are independent and addition, the staff should review items TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Item No. 4 how a common mode or that are identical for WBN Units 1 and 2 on Page 3 of 15): TVA responded to this request for complete failure is prevented by that have not previously been reviewed additional Information power supply design and and approved by the NRC staff. These segmentation.) items are changes in the design and Foxboro I/A Segmentation Analysis Calculation licensing basis for WBN Unit 1 that TVA DCSSEGMENT, Rev. 0 submitted on TVA letter dated NNC 8/19/10: The justification has implemented without NRC prior August 11, 2010. for not performing and D3 approval under the 10 CFR 50.59 analysis contained in the CQ process."

PAMS Licensing Technical NNC 4/15/10: The response addresses Data Storm Testing Report is not acceptable. TVA many systems and should be read by all to docket a D3 analysis for the EICB reviewers.

(a) Foxboro I/A Segmentation Analysis, Calculation CQ PAMS. This will be DCSSEGMENT, Rev. 0 submitted on TVA letter to the responded to in Item 64.

NRC dated August 11, 2010 (Reference).

NNC 8/25/10: The

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N (b) Attachment 36 to letter dated 10/5/10 contains Foxboro segmentation analysis has been proprietary drawings 08F802403-SC-2001 sheets 1 read. Please explain why it is through 6. An affidavit for withholding and non- believed that failure will not proprietary versions of the drawings will be submitted propagate over the peer-to-peer no later than January 31, 2011. network.

(c) Credible Mesh Network Failure Modes Looking for an architectural description of the network Attachment 42 to letter dated 10/5/10 contains the interconnections similar to the mesh network failure analysis. ICS overview, identification of credible failure modes caused (d) Refer to the response to item (c) above. by the mesh network and what component(s) prevent mesh network failures from disabling the entire system. What prevents a segment failure from propagating across the mesh network and affecting other segments.

005 7.1.3.1 By letter date February 28, 2008 (Agencywide Documents Access Responder: Craig/Webb Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg) and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML093431118, Item 2/5/10 ML080770366) TVA provided a "red-lined" version of the FSAR for TVA Letter Dated February 5, 2010: TVA provided the Unit 2 Date: 3/15/2010 FSAR AMD 100 No. 5 WBN Unit 2. The purpose of this FSAR "red-line" version was to setpoint methodology (WCAP-177044-P Revision 0 - dated Responsibility: NRC (Garg) and TVA Letter depict how the Unit 2 FSAR will appear at fuel load. This letter December). TVA (Hilmes and Crouch) dated3/12/10 identified significant FSAR changes and provided a X-REF number for each. TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Item No. 5 RAI response received. This on Page 5 of 15): TVA responded to this request for item is closed as this is covered Change 7.3-1 refers to the following two Summary Reports: additional Information under item 154 later on.

TVA Letter, P. L. Pace to NRC, dated February.9, 1998, "Watts This item is addressed as follows: This item requires further Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 - 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2), Changes, discussion between TVA and Tests and Experiments Summary Report 1. FSAR Amendment 100 which was submitted on TVA letter the staff concerning the setpoint to the NRC dated August __, 2010 incorporates as-found methodology employed for TVA Letter, P. L. Pace to NRC, dated September 30, 2005, "Watts and as-left setpoint tolerance discussion into section WBN2.

Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 - 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests 7.1.2.1.9, adds EEB-TI-28, Setpoint Methodology to the and Experiments Summary Report" section 7.1 references and adds a reference to 7.1.2.1.9 to See Item 8.

section 7.2.1.1.10.

Please submit the 50.59 Evaluations for each of these Summary Reports and identify which parts are relevant to the Unit 2 Setpoint TSTF-493, Rev. 4 Option A has been incorporated into the Methodology. Unit 2 Tech Spec submittal dated February 2, 2010.

006 Amendment 95 of the FSAR, Chapter 7.3, shows that change 7.3- By letter dated February 5, 2010: TVA provided the Unit 2 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated NNC: WCAP-12096 Rev. 7 EICB (Garg) 1 consists of updating a reference from revision 5 to revision 7 and setpoint methodology (WCAP-177044-P Revision 0 - dated ML093431118, Item 2/5/10 (ML073460281) is in ADAMS.

making it applicable to Unit 1 only, while adding a new reference, December 2009). This item is reviewed in FSAR No. 6 applicable only to Unit 2. amendment 100 review. TVA to reference TI-28 TVA Letter dated NNC: WCAP-12096 Rev. 8 is the TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Item No. 6 for as found and as left 3/12/10 current revision for Unit 1.

Reagan, J. R., "Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection on Page 7 of 15): TVA responded to this request for Date: 2/16/2010 value. Also provide the Systems, Watts Bar Units 1 and 2, Eagle 21 Version," WCAP- additional Information. reference to FSAR TVA Letter dated TVA to docket Rev. 8 and identify that 12096 Rev. 7, (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2). Unit 1 Only The Westinghouse Setpoint Section 7.1 for the 7/30/10 Rev. 8 is the current revision for Unit 1.

a. TVA to docket Rev. 8 and identify that Rev. 8 is the methodology document (WCAP- setpoint methodology. TVA to identify any NRC approval of WCAP Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection current revision for Unit 1. TVA to identify any NRC approval 17044-P Revision 0) identifies Rev. 8.

System, Watts Bar Unit 2, Eagle 21 Version, WCAP-17044-P. Unit of Rev. 8. that the intermediate and source This is addressed in 2 Only. range calculations were FSAR Amendment 100. TVA to describe how TVA calculations In accordance with item 2, below, there is no change to the performed by TVA (2-NMD-092- for Unit 2 are different than Unit 1. If Please provide both setpoint methodology documents identified methodology, therefore revision 8 is not included in this 0131). Please provide the they are the same, TVA to docket such above. response. intermediate and source range statement under oath and Affirmation.

calculations performed by TVA Westinghouse letter WAT-D-10502 (Attachment 1) describes (2-NMD-092-0131).

the two changes to WCAP-12096 Revision. 8. The first

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N change addresses the containment sump level transmitter The Westinghouse Setpoint replacement. This change was submitted under 50.59 methodology document (WCAP-summary report (ML073460444, Page 77). The second 17044-P Revision 0) identifies change is to delete the power range negative flux rate trip. that the undervoltage and This item was submitted as a Technical Specification change underfrequency calculations (ML073201052). The Technical Specification change was were performed by TVA (2 subsequently approved. 068-0031). Please provide the undervoltage and The current revision of Unit 1 WCAP-12096 is Revision 9. underfrequency calculations Revision 9 was issued to make the changes required by the performed by TVA (2-27-068-Steam Generator Replacement Project. Unit 2 is using the 0031).

original steam generators, therefore the changes in Revision 9 are not applicable to Unit 2. Work with Item 7 for WCAP-12906 issues.

b. TVA to describe how TVA calculations for Unit 2 are different than Unit 1. If they are the same, TVA to docket such statement under oath and Affirmation.

TVA response letter dated March 12, 2010, Enclosure 1, Item Number. 7 addressed this request; however, the March 12 letter was not submitted under oath and affirmation. This letter fulfills the oath and affirmation requirements for the previous response.

007 7.1.3.1 The setpoint methodology has been reviewed and approved by the TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Item No. 7 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated TVA to provide Rev. 8 of the Unit 1 EICB (Garg)

NRC staff in Section 7.1.3.1 of NUREG-0847 (ML072060490), on Page 7 of 15): TVA responded to this request for This item is reviewed in FSAR ML093431118, Item 3/12/10 document (which is the current one) if NUREG-0847 Supplement No.4 (ML072060524), and NUREG- additional Information. 100 review. No. 7 there is a change in methodology and 0847 Supplement No. 15 (ML072060488). Same as Item 6 above TVA Letter dated identify how the Unit 2 document differs

a. TVA will submit WCAP-12096, Rev. 8 if there is a change Date: 1/13/2010 7/30/10 from it.

Please describe all changes from the methodology that has been to the methodology. This is addressed in reviewed and approved by the staff. RAI response received. NRC to FSAR Amendment 100.

No change in methodology, therefore WCAP-12906, review response.

Revision 8 is not submitted.

TVA will submit WCAP-12096,

b. TVA will supply the 50.59 letter for Rev. 8 Rev. 8 if there is a change to the methodology.

Westinghouse letter WAT-D-10502 (Attachment 1) describes the two changes to WCAP-12096 Revision. 8. The first TVA will supply the 50.59 letter change addresses the containment sump level transmitter for Rev. 8 replacement. This change was submitted under 50.59 summary report (ML073460444, Page 77). The second TVA to locate transmittal letter change is to delete the power range negative flux rate trip. that submitted Rev. 7.

This item was submitted and approved as a Technical Specification change (ML073201052). TVA to determine the last revision of WCAP-12096 where

c. TVA to locate transmittal letter that submitted Rev. 7. there was a change in methodology.

Refer to response to Item 1. TVA responded to this request for additional Information in letter dated March 12, 2010, Work with Item 6 for WCAP-Enclosure 1, Item Number 6. 12906 issues.

d. TVA to determine the last revision of WCAP-12096 where there was a change in methodology.

Previous revisions to WCAP-12096 have been due to hardware changes. The calculation methodology has not changed since revision 0.

008 7.3 CB There are several staff positions that provide guidance on setpoint TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Item No. 8 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated (G

ar methodology (e.g., Reg Guide 1.105, BTP 7-12, RIS-2006-17 and on Page 7 of 15): TVA responded to this request for ML093431118, Item 3/12/10

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N TSTF-493 Rev. 4). Please identify how the Unit 2 setpoint additional Information FSAR AMD 100. No. 8 methodology addresses staff guidance. Closed as it will be This item is addressed as follows: covered under item 154

1. FSAR Amendment 100 which was submitted on TVA letter to the NRC dated August __, 2010 incorporates as-found and as-left setpoint tolerance discussion into section 7.1.2.1.9, adds EEB-TI-28, Setpoint Methodology to the section 7.1 references and adds a reference to 7.1.2.1.9 to section 7.2.1.1.10.

2. TSTF-493, Rev. 4 Option A has been incorporated into the Unit 2 Tech Spec submittal dated February 2, 2010.

009 7.3.2 5.6, Change 7.3-2, identified in Watts Bar Nuclear Plant FSAR red-line TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Item No. 9 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI 3/12/10, EICB (Darbali) 6.3.5 for Unit 2 (ADAMS Accession Number ML080770366), refers to on Page 8 of 15): TVA responded to this request for ML093431118, Item ML101680598, the following Summary Report: TVA Letter, P. L. Pace to NRC, additional Information Date: 3/15/2010 No. 9 Item 9 dated September 20, 2002, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 Responsibility: NRC (Darbali)

- 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests and Experiments Summary Report" 50.59 evaluation was submitted in the RAI response.

Please provide the 50.59 Evaluation summarized in this Summary Report.

010 7.3 7.3 The original SER on Watts Bar (NUREG-0847) documents that the TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Item No. 10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI 3/12/10, EICB (Darbali) scope of the review of FSAR Section 7.3, Engineered Safety on Page 8 of 15): TVA responded to this request for ML093431118, Item ML101680598, Features Actuations System, included: included single-line, additional Information. Replaced by OI 314 No. 10 Item 10 function logic and schematic diagrams, and descriptive information for the ESFAS and those auxiliary supporting systems that are TVA Letter (ML073550386) dated FEB 26 1992: docketed essential to the operation of either the ESFAS or the ESF systems. WCAP-12374 Rev. 1 (ML080500664).

The review included the applicant's design criteria and design bases for the ESFAS and the instrumentation and controls of auxiliary supporting systems. The review also included the applicant's analyses of the manner in which the design of the ESFAS and the auxiliary supporting systems conform to the design criteria."

Please provide the information referred to in the quotation and include a description of all changes since this information was reviewed and approved by the NRC staff.

If some parts of this information is included in the FSAR (e.g.,

Design Criteria) this information can be explicitly referenced in the response to this question.

011 7.3.2 5.6, NUREG-0847 Supplement No. 2 Section 7.3.2 includes an TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Item No. 11 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI ML101680598, EICB (Darbali) 6.3.5 evaluation of a change in containment sump level measurement. on Page 13 of 15): TVA responded to this request for ML093431118, Item Item 9 Provide information to demonstrate that Unit 2 implements the additional Information Date: 3/15/2010 No. 11 containment sump level indication as described and evaluated in Responsibility: NRC (Darbali)

NUREG-0847 Supplement No. 2, Section 7.3.2, for Unit 1.

Requested information was submitted in the RAI response.

012 7.4 7.4 The original SER on Watts Bar (NUREG-0847) documents that the TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Item No. 12 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Darbali) scope of the review of FSAR Section 7.4, "Systems Required for on Page 13 of 15): TVA responded to this request for ML093431118, Item 3/12/10 Safe Shutdown," included single-line and schematic diagrams: additional Information Date: 3/15/2010 No. 6 "The scope of the review of the systems required for safe TVA Letter dated shutdown included the single-line and schematic diagrams and the A revised response was included in the 7/30 letter that TVA provided the following: 7/30/10 descriptive information for these systems and for the auxiliary provides the requested information.

systems essential for their operation." 1. Description of what is ML101680598, different from Unit 1 Item 9

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Please provide the single-line and schematic diagrams for the systems required for safe shutdown that are applicable to Unit 2, 2. Road map between functions and include a description of all changes since these diagrams were listed in 7.4 and the FSAR reviewed and approved by the NRC staff. section that describes the equipment that performs the function. Item Closed.

013 7.1.3.1 Chapter 7 and Chapter 16 of Amendment 95 to the FSAR do not TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Item No. 13 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated TS have been docketed.

EICB (Garg) include any setpoint values. Please describe how and when on Page 14 of 15): TVA responded to this request for ML093431118, Item 3/12/10 setpoint values (e.g., TS allowable values) will be provided for Unit additional Information Date: 3/15/2010 This item is closed for No. 13

2. chapter 7. NRC will RAI response received. review T.S. under Please describe the information that will be provided to justify the Westinghouse is completing the different chapter.

acceptability of these values. setpoint calculations which will be completed by May 11, 2011.

NRC to review response.

014 All All Provide the justification for any hardware and software changes Date: 4/27/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated EICB (All) that have been made since the previous U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Responder: TVA Summary 4/27/10 Commission (NRC) staff review for Eagle 21 and other platforms NNC: I do not recall saying that ML093560019, Item By letter dated April 27, 2010: TVA responded to this request the NRC is not interested in No. 1 for information (Enclosure, Item No. 1) stated: "In discussion changes in other platforms.

with the staff, TVA's understanding is that the focus of this Please provide a description of question is the Eagle 21 system. Please refer to Reference changes to other platforms (e.g.,

2 [TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010], Question 10, and TVA SSPS).

letter to NRC dated August 25, 2008, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) - Unit 2 - Westinghouse Eagle 21 Process For Eagle 21, this response Protection System, Response to NRC I&C Branch request points to Open Item No. 10.

for additional information' (Reference 3 [TVA letter dated August 25, 2008]) for the discussion of changes to the Eagle Response understood.

21 system." Additional material will be requested separately to A listing of changes to other platforms was provided in TVA understand the systems letter dated April 27, 2010, Enclosure 1, items 21 and 23. described.

015 Verify that the refurbishment of the power range nuclear Date: 4/27/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg) instrumentation drawers resulted in only like-for-like replacements. Responder: TVA Summary 4/27/10 Date: 4/27/10 ML093560019, Item By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request Responsibility: NRC (Garg) No. 2 for information (Enclosure, Item No. 2).

Response acceptable. Close 016 Identify the precedents in license amendment requests (LARs), if Date: 4/27/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte) any, for source range monitors or intermediate range monitors. Responder: TVA Summary 4/27/10 Date: 4/27/10 ML093560019, Item By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request Responsibility: NRC (Garg) No. 3 for information (Enclosure, Item No. 3).

Acceptable. Close 017 7.3.1 7.3.1, Identify precedents in LARs, if any, for the solid state protection Date: 4/27/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated 5.5.5, EICB system. Also, identify any hardware deviation from the precedent. Summary 4/27/10 5.6 (Darbali) By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request ML093560019, Item for information (Enclosure, Item No. 4). No. 4 ML101230248, Item 4 018 Identify any changes made to any instrumentation and control Date: 4/27/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

(I&C) system based on prior knowledge of failures. Responder: TVA Summary 4/27/10 Date: 4/27/10 ML093560019, Item By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request Responsibility: NRC (Garg) No. 5 for information (Enclosure, Item No. 5).

Acceptable. Close

(

019 G Verify that the containment purge isolation radiation monitor is the Date: 4/27/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N same as used in Watts Bar Unit 1, or identify any hardware Summary 4/27/10 changes. By latter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request Date: 4/27/10 NRC Review ML093560019, Item for information (Enclosure 1, Item No. 6) for the ratemeter. No. 6 TVA Letter dated A newer model, RD-52, of the RD-32 detector assembly 6/18/10 used in Unit 1. The detector assembly replacement is due to obsolescence and improved reliability.

Clarify electronics are analog and the same as unit 1 and the only difference is the detector assembly.

020 Provide environmental qualification information pursuant to Section Date: 4/27/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated NNC 4/30/10: SRP Section 7.0 states:

EICB (Garg) 50.49 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) for Responder: TVA Summary 4/27/10 "The organization responsible for the safety-related actuation transmitters. Date: 4/27/10 ML093560019, Item review of environmental qualification By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request Responsibility: NRC (EEEB) No. 7 reviews the environmental qualification for information (Enclosure, Item No. 7). of I&C equipment. The scope of this Garg to coordinate with Weibi to review includes the design criteria and ensure EEEB takes qualification testing methods and responsibility for this one. procedures for I&C equipment."

021 7.3 For the Foxboro Spec 200 platform, identify any changes in Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated The resolution of this item will be EICB (Garg) hardware from the precedent systems. Provide the design report The resolution of this item will Summary 6/18/10 covered by OI#288..

and the equipment qualification information. No vendor system description is available for the Foxboro be covered by OI#288 ML093560019, Item Spec 200 system. The hardware description and No. 8 qualification documents are provided on a component level Date: 5/24/10 basis. A TVA generated system description is provided to assist the reviewer. The hardware differences from the unit The understanding reached in 1 systems are provided in the loop and card comparison the meeting on April 14, 2010, documents. As agreed with the reviewer, the component was that TVA should identify level documents are not required to be submitted at this any changes, or state under time, but may be required later based on the review of oath and affirmation that there attached documents. The following TVA generated were no changes. If there were documents are provided (Attachment 1): no changes, then the NRC would confirm by inspection.

1. Analog loop comparison A revised response was

2. Analog card comparison requested at the 5/24/10 public meeting.

3. Analog system description Add a brief discussion of the Foxboro Spec 200 to the FSAR let Hukam know on Thursday which section we will add the discussion to.

022 7.3.2 5.6, Verify the auxiliary feedwater control refurbishment results in a Date: 4/27/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated EICB (Darbali) 6.3.5 like-for-like replacement, and identify any changes from the Summary 4/27/10 identified precedents. By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request Date: 4/27/10 to open item 285 ML093560019, Item for information (Enclosure, Item No. 9). No. 9 TVA Letter dated TVA should confirm if 10/5/10 The control function of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Flow Woodward Governor is the only for Steam Generator Level is the same as Unit 1. The change.

controllers and signal modifiers/conditioners are Foxboro SPEC 200 discrete analog modules as Unit 1 control loops. See Item 285 for follow up The only different Unit 1 uses a 10-50ma signal and Unit 2 is question.

using a 4-20ma. The SPEC 200 control modules operate with a 0-10mv system for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Response is included in letter dated 10/5/10.

The differences between the Units that have a control function for the AFW system is the differential pressure control upstream of the motor driven AFW pumps 2A-A and

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N 2B-B. Unit 1 still has the analog Bailey/GEMac controllers and signal conditioners. Whereas Unit 2 has converted the controllers and signal conditioners to Foxboro SPEC 200 discrete analog components. Both loops still maintain a Fisher modifier for valve control.

The four (4) control loops are described below:

2-P-3-122A This loop controls the differential pressure of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A-A by varying valve 2-PCV-3-122.

Differential Pressure Indicating Controller 2-PdIC-3-122A (on panel 2-M-4) can be used either in manual mode or in automatic mode. This loop controls this valve from the Main Control Room when transfer switch 2-XS-3-122 (on panel 2-L-11A) is in the normal position.

2-P-3-122C This loop controls the differential pressure of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A-A by varying valve 2-PCV-3-122.

Differential Pressure Indicating Controller 2-PdIC-3-122C (on panel 2-L-10) can be used either in manual mode or in automatic mode. This loop controls this valve from the Auxiliary Control Room when transfer switch 2-XS-3-122 (on panel 2-L-11A) is in the auxiliary position.

2-P-3-132A This loop controls the differential pressure of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B-B by varying valve 2-PCV-3-132.

Differential Pressure Indicating Controller 2-PdIC-3-132A (on panel 2-M-4) can be used either in manual mode or in automatic mode. This loop controls this valve from the Main Control Room when transfer switch 2-XS-3-132 (on panel 2-L-11B) is in the normal position.

2-P-3-132C This loop controls the differential pressure of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B-B by varying valve 2-PCV-3-132.

Differential Pressure Indicating Controller 2-PdIC-3-132C (on panel 2-L-10) can be used either in manual mode or in automatic mode. This loop controls this valve from the Auxiliary Control Room when transfer switch 2-XS-3-132 (on panel 2-L-11B) is in the auxiliary position.

Unit 2 controllers are Foxboro model N-250HM-M2NH-F; Signal Converters, current-voltage IN are model N-2AI-I2V, and voltage-current OUT are N-2AO-VAI; Control Card is model N-2AX+A4.

All components are supplied in accordance with requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix B and ASME NQA-1 as defined in Invensys Systems, Inc. Corporate Quality Assurance Program Requirements, QMS, Revision S, dated October 26, 2007.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N All components were manufactured with the same materials and processes as those qualified for Nuclear Class 1E Service per IEEE-323-1974 and IEEE-344-1975.

023 Provide environmental qualification (10 CFR 50.49) information for Date: 4/27/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated NNC 4/30/10: SRP Section 7.0 states:

EICB (Garg) safety-related control transmitters and complete the deviation Responder: TVA Summary 4/27/10 "The organization responsible for the section of the table. Date: 12/22/09 ML093560019, Item review of environmental qualification By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request Responsibility: NRC (EEEB) No. 10 reviews the environmental qualification for information (Enclosure, Item No. 10). of I&C equipment. The scope of this Garg to coordinate with Weibi to review includes the design criteria and ensure EEEB takes qualification testing methods and responsibility for this one. procedures for I&C equipment."

024 Provide a schedule by the January 13, 2010, meeting for providing During the January 13, 2010 meeting, TVA presented a Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting N/A - Request for NNC 4/30/10: Carte to address EICB (Carte) information in accordance with I&C Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) 6. schedule for completing various documents for the PAMS Summary schedule response with respect to PAMS and system. This schedule did not support TVA's desired The explanations provided by to Open Item No. 43 ML093560019, Item information Darbali to address response with schedule. TVA was so informed and said they would work TVA (that certain information is No. 11 respect to RM1000.

on improving the schedule. TVA said that the setpoint not required) are unacceptable.

methodology would be provided shortly. No other systems TVA has agreed to submit the of documentation was discussed. NNC 8/18/10: The TVA requested information on the docket.

agreement in the Comments By letter dated February 5, 2010 (see enclosure 1), TVA column conflicts with the TVA provided a list of documents and associated availability for responses to other open items PAMS. where TVA states that information is available for audit.

By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request for information (Enclosure, Item No. 11).

By letter Dated June 18, 2010 (see Attachment 3) TVA provided a table, "Watts Bar 2 - Common Q PAMS ISG-6 Compliance Matrix."

025 7.5.2 7.5.1 For the containment radiation high radiation monitor, verify that the Date: 4/27/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting ML101230248, EICB information provided by TVA is consistent with the information Summary Item 12 (Singh) provided with the previously-approved license amendment request By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request (See OI 300 for additional ML093560019, Item 4/27/2010 for the Duane Arnold plant or provide Phase 3 information. for information (Enclosure, Item No. 12). questions.) No. 12 026 Provide environmental qualification (10 CFR 50.49) information for Date: 4/27/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated NNC 4/30/10: SRP Section 7.0 states:

EICB (Garg) safety-related monitoring transmitters. Responder: TVA Summary 4/27/10 "The organization responsible for the Date: 12/22/09 ML093560019, Item review of environmental qualification By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request Responsibility: NRC (EEEB) No. 13 reviews the environmental qualification for information (Enclosure, Item No. 13). of I&C equipment. The scope of this Garg to coordinate with Weibi to review includes the design criteria and ensure EEEB takes qualification testing methods and responsibility for this one. procedures for I&C equipment."

027 7.7.1.4 For Foxboro I/A provide information regarding safety/non-safety- Date: 4/27/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte) related interaction, common cause failures, and communication Responder: TVA Summary 4/27/10 with safety related equipment in accordance with ISG 4. ML093560019, Item By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request No. 14 for information (Enclosure, Item No. 14): "There is no digital communications or interactions between Foxboro Intelligent Automation (IA) and any Safety-related system."

028 For the turbine control AEH system, verify that the refurbishment Responder: Mark Scansen Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg) results in a like-for-like replacement. Date: 4/27/10 Summary 10/5/10 Response is included in letter Provide 50.59 ML093560019, Item By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request dated 10/5/10. No. 15 for information (Enclosure, Item No. 15).

Provide 50.59 evaluation.

The requested 50.59 is included in Attachment 1. Response acceptable.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N 029 For the rod control system, verify that the refurbishment results in a Date: 4/27/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte) like-for-like replacement. Responder: TVA Summary 4/27/10 ML093560019, Item By letter dated April 27, 2010 (ML101230248) TVA No. 16 responded to this request for information (Enclosure, Item No. 16 & Attachment 5): TVA stated on a card by card basis that the refurbished cards have the same form fit and function.

030 Regarding the refurbishment of I&C equipment, identify any Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg) component digital upgrades and, if so, provide the supporting Summary 10/5/10 design information. Date: 4/27/10 Response is included in letter ML093560019, Item dated 10/5/10. No. 17 By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request Date: 4/27/10 for information (Enclosure, Item No. 17).

Does not state if there are no There are no other I&C upgrades which contain an other upgrade which contain imbedded digital processor. imbedded digital processor.

Revised response acceptable.

031 For the rod position indication system (CERPI), provide information Date: 4/27/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated CERPI is non-safety related.

EICB in accordance with ISG 4. Need to consider cyber-security issues. Responder: TVA Summary 4/27/10 Note: The issue of interlock with rod (Carte) ML093560019, Item withdrawal system is addressed in open By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request No. 18 item 301. (Singh Sept22, 2010) for information (Enclosure, Item No. 18).

032 For the process computer, need to consider cyber security issues Date: 4/27/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated EICB will no longer consider cyber EICB and emergency response data system needs. Responder: TVA Summary 4/27/10 issues.

(Carte) ML093560019, Item By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request No. 19 for information (Enclosure, Item No. 19).

033 For the loose parts monitoring system, provide information Date: 4/27/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated The loose parts monitoring system is EICB (Carte) regarding interactions with safety related equipment. Responder: TVA Summary 4/27/10 not connected to any other system.

ML093560019, Item By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request No. 20 for information (Enclosure, Item No. 20): Loose parts is not connected to any other system.

034 2/4/2010 Responder: TVA Y Closed Closed N/A TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

Awaiting NRC evaluation of 4/27/10 In the December 15, 2009 public meeting, TVA listed the By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to this request response.

significant changes made since the Watts Bar Unit 1 Licensing for information (Enclosure, Item No. 21).

(see below). For each of the following significant changes:

Remove all references to Elbow Tap Methodology from Unit

1) Is the change unique to Unit 2, or will it be the same as whats 2 Licensing Bases.

currently installed in Unit 1?

2) If its the same as Unit 1, was this change made under a license amendment or under a 50.59?

3) When do you plan to submit the detailed information regarding the changes?

034.1 Chapter 7.1 - Introduction Y Closed Closed N/A N/A EICB (Garg/Si Reactor Coolant System Flow Rate Measurement ngh) Design Basis Analysis Parameters Loose Parts Monitoring

(

034.2 G Chapter 7.2 - Reactor Trip System Y Closed Closed N/A N/A

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Deletion of Neutron Flux Negative Rate Trip Design Basis Analysis Parameters Alternate Method for Use of Condenser Steam Dump Reactor Coolant System Flow Rate Measurement Foxboro I/A 034.3 7.3 7.3 Chapter 7.3 - ESFAS Y Closed Closed N/A N/A EICB Design Basis Analysis Parameters (Darbali) Alternate Method for Use of Condenser Steam Dump to item 153 034.4 7.5.1.1 7.5.2 Chapter 7.5 - Instrumentation Systems Important to Safety Y Closed Closed N/A N/A Closed EICB (Marcus)

Plant Process Computer Replacement Containment Sump Level Transmitter Replacement to Item 192 RAI not required.

Safety Injection Systems Cold Leg Accumulator Level Measurement System For plant process computer see Items Common Q/PAMs This is closed by Norbert. 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 199, 203, 204, 206, 216, and 224.

034.5 7.5.1.1 7.5.2 Chapter 7.6 - All Other Systems Required for Safety Y Closed Closed N/A N/A Closed EICB 7.6.1 7.6.7 Plant Process Computer Replacement Loose Parts Monitoring System to Item 192 RAI not required.

(Marcus/Singh) For plant process computer see Items 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 199, 203, 204, 206, 216, and 224.

034.6 Chapter 7.7 Control Systems Y Closed Closed N/A N/A EICB (Singh/Darbali)

Alternate Means for Monitoring Control or Shutdown Rod Position to item 301 for alternate Eliminate Pressurizer Backup Heaters on High Level rod position indication.

Signal AMSAC Replacement Foxboro I/A WINCISE /Power Distribution Monitoring System (Beacon) 035 2/18/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed RAI No. 1 TVA Letter dated LIC-110 Section 6.2.2 states: Design EICB (Singh)

ML102980005 3/12/10 features and administrative programs Please provide a system description of the Digital Metal Impact TVA Letter dated March 12, 2010 Enclosure 1, item 4 Response is included in letter Att.2 to 10/5/2010 TVA 10/26/2010 that are unique to Unit 2 should be Monitoring System that contains sufficient detail to support a responded to this request for information. dated 10/5/10. letter provided the TVA Letter dated reviewed in accordance with the current review of this system using current staff positions. information. 10/5/10 staff positions. Unit 2 FSAR Section Attachment contains the non-proprietary system description Description provide is not of 7.6.7, Loose Part Monitoring (LPMS) which was developed from proprietary Westinghouse Watts sufficient detail to allow a system Description, describes a system Bar Unit 2 DIMMS-DX Operations and Maintenance Manual, regulatory determination. TVA design that is unique to Unit 2.

1TS3176 Rev.0 (Reference ). Westinghouse approved this to send the proprietary non-proprietary version for public release via letter WBT-D- information for NRC review. At 2281 dated August 17, 2010 (Reference ) the 9-2 meeting G. Singh stated the system description provided was acceptable and the proprietary information was not required at this time.

036 7.5.2 7.5.1 February 18, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed NRC Meeting NNC: Unit 2 FSAR Section 7.5.1, Post EICB (Carte)

Responder: Clark Summary Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, Please provide a system description of the Post Accident ML093560019, Item describes a system design that is Monitoring System that contains sufficient detail to support a In previous letters TVA has provided the Common Q No. 11 unique to Unit 2. LIC-110, "Watts Bar review of this system using current staff positions. documents that address this item: Unit 2 License Application Review,"

states: "Design features and administrative programs that are unique to Unit 2 should then be reviewed in

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N accordance with the current staff positions."

037 7.5.1.1 7.5.2 2/18/2010 Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed N/A TVA Letter dated FSAR Amendment 100 provides EICB (Marcus) 09/16/10 10/5/10 information Is the plant computer a safety-related display system? As identified in TVA letter dated March 12, 2010, Enclosure Response is included in letter 1, item 2, the plant computer system is non-safety related. dated 10/5/10. FSAR Section 7.5, Instrumentation System Important to Safety, consists of FSAR section 7.5 describes both safety and non-safety August 19, 2010 - TVA to submit two major subsections: 7.5.1, Post related devices and systems. FSAR section 7.1.1.2 is markup of FSAR Amendment Accident Monitoring Instrumentation revised in FSAR Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on 100. (PAM), and 7.5.2, Plant Computer TVA letter to the NRC dated September 1, 2010. System.

FSAR Amendment 100 states Plant computer system is non- Regulatory Guide 1.70, Standard safety related. format and content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 3 dated November 1978 states (see Section 7.1.1): List all instrumentation, control, and supporting systems that are safety-related including alarms, communication, and display instrumentation. FSAR Section 7.1.1.2, Safety-Related Display Instrumentation, describes, in the first paragraph, the PAM system, and the second paragraph states: All other safety-related instrumentation is discussed in Section 7.5. Therefore, to be consistent with the preceding paragraph, the FSAR states that the plant computer system is safety related.

Contrary to the FSAR the slides presented at the December 15, 2010 meeting indicate that the plant process computer is not safety-related.

Therefore the docketed material is inconsistent and needs to be clarified.

RAI not required 038 7.5.1.1 7.5.2 2/18/2010 Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated The slides presented at the December EICB (Marcus)

ML102861885 10/5/10 15, 2010 meeting (ML093520967)

Please provide a description of the interfaces between: (1) the FSAR sections 7.1.1.2 and 7.5.2 are revised to address this Response is included in letter NRC issue formal RAI. Item No. 19 indicate that the plant process computer Safety Parameter Display System and (2) the Technical Support comment in FSAR Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on dated 10/5/10. has been replaced.

Center and Nuclear Data Links with the plant control and safety TVA letter to the NRC dated September 1, 2010.

systems. This Description should contain sufficient detail to August 19, 2010 - TVA to submit EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL support a review of these interfaces using current staff positions. markup of FSAR Amendment 100.

NRC confirmed FSAR Amendment 100 provides details on interfaces.

039 January 13, 2010 Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI FSAR amendment The equation for the calculation of the EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 98 estimated average hot leg temperature Please describe the change to the calculation of the estimated Refer to revised equations in FSAR amendment 98. Date: 1/13/2010 OI#37 on page 7.2-13 of Revision WBNP-96 of average hot leg temperature (see FSAR Section 7.2.1.1.4, page Responsibility: TVA the Unit 2 FSAR is different than the 7.2-14 Version WBNP-96) in sufficient detail to support a review of calculation of the average hot leg this system using current staff positions. NRC staff will review temperature shown at the top of page

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N 7.2-14 of version WBNP-1 of the UNIT 1 FSAR.

040 January 13, 2010 Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI EICB RAI FSAR amendment The equation for the calculation of the EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 98 power fraction on page 7.2-14 of Please describe the change to the calculation of the power fraction Refer to revised equations in FSAR amendment 98. Date: 1/13/2010 OI#38 Revision WBNP-96 of the Unit 2 FSAR (see FSAR Section 7.2.1.1.4, page 7.2-13 Version WBNP-96) in Responsibility: TVA is different than the calculation of the sufficient detail to support a review of this system using current power fraction shown at the top of page staff positions. NRC staff will review 7.2-14 of version WBNP-1 of the UNIT 1 FSAR.

041 7.5.2 7.5.1 2/19/2010 Responder: WEC N Open Open-TVA/WEC NRC Meeting TVA Letter dated See also Open Item Nos. 226 & 270.

EICB (Carte)

Summary NRC 6/18/10 Please provide the following Westinghouse documents: Items (1) and (2) were docketed by TVA letter dated April 8, Final Response included in NNC 1/27/11: Issues Meeting Summary (1) WNA-DS-01617-WBT Rev. 1, "PAMS System Requirements 2010. letter dated 12/3/10 with the STP were ML093560019, Item TVA Letter dated Specification" discussed in the weekly No. 11 10/5/10 (2) WNA-DS-01667-WBT Rev. 0, "PAMS System Design Item (3) will be addressed by Revision 2 of the Licensing Partial Response is included in public meetings.

Specification" Technical Report. Due 12/3/10 letter dated 10/5/10. Westinghouse to:

(3) WNA-CD-00018-GEN Rev. 3, "CGD for QNX version 4.5g" The SysRS and SRS (1) perfrom STP self Please provide the following Westinghouse documents or pointers Item (4) will be addressed by Westinghouse developing a incorporate requirements from assessment., and to where the material was reviewed and approved in the CQ TR or WBN2 Specific Test Plan to compensate for the fact that the many other documents by (2) Augment Test SPM: NRC disapproved WNA-PT-00058-GEN during the original reference. Summary report to (4) WNA-PT-00058-GEN Rev. 0, "Testing Process for Common Q Common Q review. Due 12/7/10 provide missing test Safety systems" NNC 8/25/10: (3) An earlier plan information (5) WNA-TP-00357-GEN Rev. 4, "Element Software Test Item (5) Procedures that are listed in the SPM compliance version of this report was Procedure" table in the Licensing Technical Report revision 1 supersede docketed for the Common Q NNC 2/3/11: At next that test procedure WNA-TP-00357-GEN.Due 10/22/10 topical report; therefore, there audit compare &

should be no problem to docket discuss:

For Item 3, Attachment 19 contains the Westinghouse this version. (4) Per (1) WNA-PT-00058-document Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) ML091560352, the testing GEN Rev. 0 Licensing Technical Report, WNA-LI-00058-WBT, Revision process document does not (2) WNA-PT-00138-2, dated December 2010. Attachment 20 contains the address the test plan WBT Rev. 0 Westinghouse Application for Withholding for the Post- requirements of the SPM. (3) AP1000 STP Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Please provide a test plan that Report, WNA-LI-00058-WBT, Revision 2, dated December implements the requirements of 2010. the SPM.

For Item 4, Attachment 9 contains the Westinghouse document Nuclear Automation Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects, Post Accident Monitoring System Test Plan, WNA-PT-00138-WBT, Revision 0, dated November 2010. Attachment 10 contains the Westinghouse Application for Withholding for the WNA-PT-00138-WBT, Revision 0 Nuclear Automation Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects, Post Accident Monitoring System Test Plan, WNA-PT-00138-WBT, Revision 0, dated November 17, 2010.

042 All All February 25, 2010: Telecom Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated The drawing provided did not have the EICB (All)

Responder: Clark ML102910002 6/18/10 identification numbers as in the FSAR.

On December 16, 2009: EICB stated to DORL: "I am having Date: 2/25/2010 Item No. 1 trouble reading the drawings in the binder that was given to me. Is Attachment 2 provides a drawing cross reference list for Responsibility: TVA it possible to produce a set of full size drawing that are in the FSAR Chapter 7 and electronic copies of the fully legible FSAR?" current drawings previously submitted in full size hard TVA provided readable copies. drawings.

On February 23, 2010: EICB received a set of enlarged Chapter 7 FSAR pages (drawings) that are still unreadable.

Please provide readable drawings N

(

043 7.5.2 7.5.1 2/19/2010 Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 Open Open-TVA/WEC EICB RAI TVA Letter dated NNC 8/25/10: A CQ PAMS ISG6 C

a

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N ML102910002 2/5/10 compliance matrix was docketed on: (1)

The PAMS ISG6 compliance matrix supplied as Enclosure 1 to The PAMS ISG6 compliance matrix supplied as Enclosure 1 Revised response included in NNC 2/2/11: Issues Item No. 2 February, 5 12010, (2) March 12, 2010, TVA letter dated February 5, 2010 is a first draft of the information to TVA letter dated February 5, 2010 is a first draft of the letter dated 12/22/10. with Common Q TR & TVA Letter dated & (3) June 18, 2010. The staff has needed. The shortcomings of the first three lines in the matrix are: information needed. SPM compliance were 5/12/10 expressed issued with all of these Response is included in letter discussed in the weekly compliance evaluations. The staff is still Line 1: Section 11 of the Common Q topical report did include a By letter dated April 8, 2010 TVA provided the PAMS dated 10/5/10. public meetings. TVA Letter dated waiting for a good compliance commercial grade dedication program, but this program was not Licensing Technical Report provided additional information. Westinghouse to 6/18/10 evaluation.

approved in the associated SE. Westinghouse stated that this was Revised compliance matrix is perform Common Q TR the program and it could now be reviewed. The NRC stated that Attachment 3 contains the revised Common Q PAMS ISG-6 unacceptable. & SPM compliance self TVA Letter dated NNC 11/23/10: WNA-LI-00058-WT-P TVA should identified what they believe was previously reviewed Compliance Matrix, dated June 11, 2010, that addresses assessment; his will be 10/5/10 Rev. 1 Section 7 does not include the and approved. these items (Reference 13). NNC 8/12/10: It is not quite discussed in detail on RSED documents, and it should. Table enough to provide all of the the next audit. 6-1 Item No. 15 should also include the Line 2: TVA stated the D3 analysis was not applicable to PAMS, By letter Dated June 18, 2010 (see Attachment 3) TVA documents requested. There RSED RTMs.

but provided no justification. The NRC asked for justification since provided a table, "Watts Bar 2 - Common Q PAMS ISG-6 are two possible routes to SRP Chapter 7.5 identified SRM to SECV-93-087 Item II.Q as Compliance Matrix." review that the NRC can being SRP acceptance criteria for PAMS. undertake: (1) follow ISG6, and It is TVAs understanding that this comment is focused on (2) follow the CQ SPM. The Line 3: TVA identified that the Design report for computer integrity the fact that there are documents that NRC has requested TVA response that was was completed as part of the common Q topical report. The NRC that are currently listed as being available for audit at the originally pursued was to follow noted that this report is applicable for a system in a plant, and the Westinghouse offices. For those Common Q PAMS ISG6, but some of the CQ topical report did no specifically address this PAMS system at documents that are TVA deliverable documents from compliance items for ISG6 were Watts Bar Unit 2. Westinghouse, TVA has agreed to provide those to NRC. addressed by referencing the Westinghouse documents that are not deliverable to TVA will SPM. The NRC approved the NRC then concluded that TVA should go through and provide a be available for audit as stated above. Requirements CQ TR and associated SPM; it more complete and thorough compliance matrix. Traceability Matrix issues will be tracked under NRC RAI may be more appropriate to Matrix Items 142 (Software Requirements Specification) and review the WBN2 PAMS 145 (System Design Specification). Commercial Item application to for adherence to Dedication issues will be tracked under NRC RAI Matrix the SPM that to ISG6. In either Item 138. This item is considered closed. path chosen, the applicant should provide documents and a TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request: justification for the acceptability of any deviation from the path WNA-LI-00058-WT-P, Revision 2, Post-Accident Monitoring chosen. For example, it System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report submitted in appears that the TVA Letter to NRC dated December 3, 2010, (Reference 1) Westinghouse's CDIs are contains the following changes to address the NRC commercial grade dedication requests: plans, but Westinghouse maintains that they are (1) While RSEDs are not specifically mentioned, Section 7 commercial grade dedication has been revised to be applicable to both hardware and reports; this apparent deviation software which includes the RSEDs. should be justified or explained.

(2) Table 6-1 item 15 reference added for WNA-VR-00280-WBT (RESD) 044 7.5.2 7.5.1 February 25, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte)

Responder: Clark ML102910002 6/18/10 The PAMS system described in Section 7.5 of the FSAR is Item No. 3 implemented in various manners. TVA should identify: By letter Dated June 18, 2010 (see Enclosure 1 Item 6) TVA (1) Those variables that are implemented identical to what was provided information requested.

reviewed and approved for Unit 1.

(2) Those variable that are implemented identical to Unit 1, but that have been changed (e.g., under 50.59) and not reviewed by the NRC.

(3) Those variables that are implemented in a manner that is unique to Unit 2 (e.g., using Common Q).

TVA should supply supporting information appropriate to the manner of implementation.

045 CB February 25, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated (C

art Responder: Clark ML102910002 7/30/10

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N For each system implemented using a digital technology, please Item No. 4 (ML102160349 -

identify any communications between divisions, or between safety- There are no communications between divisions. The See Enclosure 1 related equipment and non-safety-related equipment. Please response includes the description of communications and Item No. 4.)

describe the implementation of the associated communications isolation between the Common Q PAMS, Eagle 21 and RM-isolation. 1000 radiation monitors and non safety systems.

046 February 25, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed N/A - Request for N/A EICB (Carte)

Responder: Clark help finding The Watts Bar Unit 1 Ser (Section 7.2.1, page 7-3) identifies that information the RTS includes a trip from the "general warning alarm". Please FSAR amendment 98, Section 7.2.2.2, page 7.2-29 second identify where this trip is described in the current FSAR, or what paragraph states:

SSER approved its removal.

"Auxiliary contacts of the bypass breakers are connected into the SSPS General Warning Alarm System of their respective trains such that if either train is placed in test while the bypass breaker of the other train is closed, both reactor trip breakers and both bypass breakers will automatically trip."

047 7.5.2 7.5.1 4/8/2010 Responder: WEC/Hilmes Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte)

ML102910002 7/30/10 The PAMS System Requirements Specification (SysRS) The licensing basis for WBN Unit 2 is Regulatory Guide 1.97 NNC 8/9/10: There are two Item No. 5 (ML102160349 -

references RG 1.97 Rev. 3 where the FSAR References Rev. 2. Revision 2. The Common Q PAMS system was designed to aspects of this issue. The first See Enclosure 1 Please explain. Regulatory Guide 1.97 Revision 3, which is why the basis for aspect has been addressed by Item No. 5) the System Requirements Specification references revision the response dated 7/30/10.

3. In order to resolve this discrepancy an engineering The second aspect is: How TVA Letter dated evaluation of the Common Q PAMS was performed. could Westinghouse Design, 10/21/10 and TVA approve a design to Enclosure 1 Item Attachment 2 contains an engineering evaluation of the the wrong requirement? No. 1 Common Q PAMS design against the requirements of Reg.

Guide 1.97 Rev. 2. The evaluation concluded that the The revised response was Common Q PAMS meets all requirements of Reg Guide 1.97 provided in TVA Letter to the Rev. 2. This evaluation will be added to design criteria WB- NRC Dated 10/21/10.

DC-30-7, Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation by October 1, 2010.

TVA Revised Response:

The difference in revisions of Reg. Guide 1.97 was not identified during the contract review process. Therefore Westinghouse designed the system to the Common Q standard design which is revision 3. When the design work was assigned to a new engineer, the difference in revisions was not identified as an issue. When the issue was identified by the NRC, it was entered into the TVA Corrective Action Process as WBPER233598 (Attachment 3) 048 7.5.2 7.5.1 April 8, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte)

Responder: WEC ML102910002 6/18/10 Reference 16 of the PAMS System Requirements Specification Item No. 6 (SysRS) is the Unit 1 precautions Limitations and Setpoints To ensure technical fidelity with the Unit 1 ICCM-86 system, document. When and how will the transition to the unit 2 the Unit 1 PLS was used as an input to the Common Q document be made? PAMS System Requirements Specification. This was done to ensure the Unit 2 PAMS had at a minimum the same capabilities and accuracy as the unit 1 system.

The Unit 2 Common Q PAMS PLS section was developed based on the actual Common Q PAMS system design as reflected in the System Requirements Specification. As

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N such, the Common Q PAMS PLS section is an output of the Common Q PAMS System Requirements Specification.

Therefore, no transition from the Unit 1 to the Unit 2 PLS is required.

The Unit 2 PLS is scheduled to be issued December 13, 2010.

049 7.5.2 7.5.1 4/8/2010 Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte)

ML102910002 6/18/10 Please provide 00000-ICE-30156 Rev. 6. The PAMS SysRS Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2024 (Reference 7), this Item No. 7 incorporates sections of this document by reference. document is available for audit at the Westinghouse TVA Letter dated Rockville office. 10/5/10 This document was submitted on September 2, 2010.

050 7.5.2 7.5.1 4/8/2010 Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 N Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated NNC 11/18/10: SysRS Rev. 2 contains EICB (Carte)

ML102910002 6/18/10 several Reference 8, however, How should the "shall" statements outside of the bracketed These sections are descriptive text and not requirements. Revised response included in Due12/22/10 Item No. 8 Reference 8 has been deleted.

requirements in Common Q requirements documents be The next revision of the Watts Bar Unit 2 PAMS System letter dated 12/22/10. Discuss at 11/22 phone TVA Letter dated interpreted? Requirements Specification will remove shall from the call. 10/29/10 wording in those sections. A date for completing the next Enclosure 1 Item revision of the System Requirements Specification will be TVA response is inconsistent This will be corrected in No. 1 provided no later than August 31, 2010. (e.g., WNA-DS-01667-WBT the Revision 3 Rev. 1 page 1-1, Section 1.3.1 document due to TVA The System Requirements Specification will be revised by implies that "SysRS Section 12/10/10 September 30, 2010 and submitted within two of receipt from ###" has requirements. See Westinghouse. also SDS4.4.2.1-1 on page 4- NNC 2/3/11: The 32). docketed material (to TVA Revised Response date) still has a few Is there a requirement on the unitended shalls in it Shall statements within the scope of the System shall referenced above?? which can be Requirements Specification (SysRS) and System Design addressed as an open Specification (SysDS) were reviewed by Westinghouse. The Response is provided in letter item in the SE.

statements were either relocated to the numbered dated 10/29/10.

requirements section or the wording was changed to identify that it was not a requirement. This item is resolved by TVA Revised Response in TVA submittal of revision 2 of the SysRS and the SysDS Letter dated 10/29/10 Enclosure (attachments 7 and 8 of TVA Letter to NRC dated 10/25/10). 1 Item No. 1 is Acceptable TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request: NNC 11/18/10: Revised Response is not a statement of This item is corrected in the revision 3 requirements fact. SysRS Rev. 2 (i.e., WNA-documents. DS-01617-WBT Rev. 2) contains many shalls that are Attachment 1 contains the proprietary version of WNA-DS- not within numbered 01617-WBT-P, Revision 3, Post Accident Monitoring requirements sections, for System- System Requirements Specification, dated example:

November 2010. Attachment 2 contains the non-proprietary (1) Page 2-1, Section 2.3.1 -

version WNA-DS-01617-WBT-NP, Revision 3, Post See guidance statement Accident Monitoring System - System Requirements (2) Page 2-10, top of page 1 -

Specification, dated December 2010. Attachment 3 See guidance statement contains the Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure, WNA-DS-01617-WBT-P, Revision 3, Nuclear Automation Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects, Post Accident Monitoring System - System Requirements Specification (Proprietary),

dated December 6, 2010.

Attachment 4 contains the proprietary version of WNA-DS-

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N 01667-WBT-P, Revision 3, Post Accident Monitoring System - System Design Specification, dated November 2010. Attachment 5 contains the non-proprietary version WNA-DS-01667-WBT-NP, Revision 3, Post Accident Monitoring System - System Design Specification, dated December 2010. Attachment 6 contains the Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure, WNA-DS-01667-WBT-P, Revision 3, Nuclear Automation Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Post Accident Monitoring System - System Design Specification (Proprietary), dated December 6, 2010.

Attachment 7 contains the proprietary version of WNA-SD-00239-WBT-P, Revision 3, Software Requirements Specification for the Post Accident Monitoring System, dated November 2010. Attachment 8 contains the non-proprietary version WWNA-SD-00239-WBT-NP, Revision 3, Software Requirements Specification for the Post Accident Monitoring System, dated December 2010. Attachment 9 contains the Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure, WNA-SD-00239-WBT-P, Revision 3, Nuclear Automation Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects, Software Requirements Specification for the Post Accident Monitoring System (Proprietary), dated December 8, 2010.

051 April 15, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed N/A N/A Review addressed by another Open EICB (Garg)

Responder: Craig/Webb Item, NRC staff has issued RIS 2006-17, to provide guidance to the Date: 4/15/2010 This item is closed as it industry regarding the instrument setpoint methodology which This item is addressed as follows: Responsibility: TVA will be reviewed under complies with 10CFR50.36 requirements. The staff has requested item 154. FSAR AMD all the licensees for the existing license to demonstrate how they 1. FSAR Amendment 100 which was submitted on TVA letter This item is to be worked with 100 meet the guidance provided in this RIS. The staff consider WBN 2 to the NRC dated August __, 2010 incorporates as-found item 108.

as a license amendment for all the setpoints in the TS. Provide the and as-left setpoint tolerance discussion into section information on how WBN 2's setpoint methodology meets the 7.1.2.1.9, adds EEB-TI-28, Setpoint Methodology to the guidance of RIS 2006 -17. You may also consider the guidance section 7.1 references and adds a reference to 7.1.2.1.9 to provided in TSTF - 493, rev.4 as a basis for meeting the RIS 2006 section 7.2.1.1.10.

-17 guidance.

2. TSTF-493, Rev. 4 Option A has been incorporated into the Unit 2 Tech Spec submittal dated February 2, 2010.

3. Refer to TVA to NRC letter dated August 25, 2008.

052 7.5.2 7.5.1 April 19, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed RAI No. 12 EICB (Singh)

Responder: Slifer ML102980005 Please identify the systems that will use the RM-1000 radiation Date: 4/19/2010 10/26/2010 monitors. As identified in TVA letter dated March 12, 2010, Enclosure Responsibility: NRC 1, item 3 the RM-1000 radiation monitors are used for the Containment High Range Post Accident Monitors.

053 7.5.2 7.5.1 April 19, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed RAI No. 13 EICB (Singh)

Responder: Slifer ML102980005 Please identify all FSAR sections that apply to the RM-1000. Date: 4/19/2010 10/26/2010 The containment high range post accident radiation monitors Responsibility: NRC are discussed in FSAR amendment 98 sections 7.5 and 12.3.

054 7.5.2 7.5.1 CB 4/19/2010 Responder: Slifer/Clark Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed RAI No. 14 TVA Letter dated (Si ng -Response acceptable ML102980005 6/18/10

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Please describe all the different environments in which the RM- The only safety-related application for the RM-1000 is the Revised response is included in 10/26/2010 1000 will be required to operate. Please group these Containment High Range radiation monitors. The letter dated 10/29/10.(TVA to TVA Letter dated environments into two categories (a) Harsh environment, per 10 Containment High Range radiation monitors will be installed confirm) Design Criteria is WB- Due 10/14/10 10/29/10 CFR 50.49, and (b) Mild Environment. in the Main Control Room, a mild environment. The DC-40-54 is attached to this Enclosure 1 Item detectors will be installed remotely in the containment. letter. Identify source of No. 2 reference 3.

For WBN Unit 2, a mild environment is defined as:

TVA to identify when A defined room or building zone where (1) the temperature, and by what letter pressure, or relative humidity resulting from the direct effects number WB-DC-40-54 of a design basis event (DBE) (e.g., temperature rise due to was submitted to NRC.

steam release) are no more severe than those which would If not previously occur during an abnormal plant operational condition, (2) the submitted then please temperature will not exceed 130°F due to the indirect effects submit this document.

of a DBE (e.g., increased heat loads from electrical equipment), (3) the event radiation dose is less than or equal to 1 x 104 rads, and (4) the total event plus the 40 year TID (total integrated dose) is less than or equal to 5 x 104 rads.

(Reference 3).

What is Reference 3?

TVA Revised Response:

Reference 3 is TVA Design Criteria WB-DC-40-54, Environmental Qualification To 10CFR50.49, which provides the definition of mild and harsh environments. Attachment 13 to TVA letter dated October 29, 2010 contains WB-DC-40-54, Revision 4.

055 7.5.2 7.5.1 4/19/2010 Responder: Slifer/Clark Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed RAI No. 15 TVA Letter dated EICB (Singh)

-Response acceptable ML102980005 6/18/10 The "Qualification Test Report Supplement, RM-1000 Upgrades," The detectors for these loops will be located in a harsh Revised response is included in 10/26/2010 Document No. 04508905-1SP Rev. A states that the qualification environment (inside containment). The RM-1000 will be letter dated 10/29/10. (TVA to Due 10/14/10 10/14/10 was done in accordance with IEEE 323-1974 and -1983. Please located in the main control room, which is a mild confirm) Design Criteria is WB-describe and justify all differences in this qualification methodology environment. The RM-1000 and associated I/F converters DC-40-54 is attached to this Identify source of TVA Letter dated and that endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.209. Specifically have been tested to the requirements present in IEEE Std. letter. reference 3. 10/29/10 address EMI and RFI 323-1983 and -1974, as well as the System Requirements Enclosure 1 Item including EPRI TR 102323 (Sept. 94) in the design basis. No. 3 Electro-Magnetic-Interference and Radio Frequency Interference (EMI-RFI) testing was performed (the results of the testing are included in the Equipment Qualification Test Report submitted under TVA letter dated March 12, 2010, Reference 4). Since RG 1.209 was not issued until 2007, General Atomics test reports do not reference it.

For WBN Unit 2, a harsh environment is defined as:

A defined room or building zone where either (1) the temperature, pressure, and relative humidity resulting from the direct effects of a DBE (e.g., temperature rise due to steam release) are more severe than those which would occur during an abnormal plant operational condition, (2) the temperature will exceed 130°F due to the indirect effects of DBE (e.g., increased heat loads from electrical equipment),

(3) the event radiation dose is greater than 1 x 104 rads, or (4) the total event plus the 40-year TID is greater than 5 x 104 rads. (Reference 3)

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N What is Reference 3?

TVA Revised Response:

Reference 3 is TVA Design Criteria WB-DC-40-54, Environmental Qualification To 10CFR50.49, which provides the definition of mild and harsh environments. Attachment 13 to TVA letter dated October 29, 2010 contains WB-DC-40-54, Revision 4.

056 April 19, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed RAI No. 16 TVA Letter dated Sorrento Radiation Monitoring EICB (Singh)

Responder: Slifer ML102980005 6/18/10 The "RM-1000 Version 1.2 Software Verification and Validation Date: 4/19/2010 10/26/2010 Report," Document No. 04508006 Rev. A, is an incremental report. The initial draft Software Verification and Validation (V&V) Responsibility: NRC That is to say it addresses the verification an validation for report document, version 1.0, was never issued.

changes that resulted in Version 1.2; therefore, the NRC has not TVA provided the requested received a software verification and validation report for all other Attachment 4 contains the latest complete proprietary Software V&V Report.

aspects of the software. Please provide the last complete version 1.1 Software V&V report (04508005). The non-verification and validation report, and all incremental reports after proprietary version and withholding affidavit will be submitted the complete report. by July 14, 2010. Submittal of the non-proprietary version and withholding affidavit is tracked by Responses to Licensee Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval item 119.

The latest proprietary version is 1.2, (an incremental report that addresses the differences from the version 1.1 report) was submitted by TVA Letter dated March 12, 2010 (Reference 4). Submittal of the non-proprietary version and withholding affidavit is tracked by Responses to Licensee Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval item 101, due June 30, 2010.

057 7.5.2 7.5.1 4/19/2010 Responder: TVA I&C Staff Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed RAI No. 17 TVA Letter dated EICB (Singh)

ML102980005 6/18/10 Please describe the ability to change the software of the RM-1000 Firmware/software changes are done by connecting a laptop Response is included in letter Closed by 10/5/2010 10/26/2010 at site, including all required equipment and administrative controls to a port on the front of the RM-1000 and placing the dated 10/5/10. TVA letter (Item 11 of TVA Letter dated (e.g., temporary digital connections). Operate/Calibrate switch in the Calibrate position. The first letter). 10/5/10 physical barrier to access is the location of the RM-1000 in the main control room which has limited access. The RM- Requested information provided.

1000 Operate/Calibrate switch is located behind the hinged NRC to review. Further front panel. The front panel must be opened (held closed by Information Requested: Please two thumbscrews) to access the switch. This provides a confirm that the laptop is secure physical barrier to inadvertent switch operation. The system and access to this laptop is malfunction alarm is visible locally and will annunciate on the commensurate with the access control board when the switch is in the Calibrate position. to the equipment for which it will be used. Is the laptop dedicated Administrative control of software/firmware updates is in for calibration of radiation accordance with TVA Standard Specification SS-E18.15.01, monitors? If the laptop is used Software Requirements for Real-Time Data Acquisition and for more than one application Control Computer Systems, and TVA procedures SPP-9.3, then please describe the Plant Modifications and Engineering Change Control, and equipment for which the laptop SPP-2.6, Computer Software Control. Approved changes to may be used. In addition please software/firmware are implemented utilizing the TVA work explain how software security is order process. assured and that only the software intended for the (1) A laptop is not used to calibrate the monitor. All TVA in- specific application is used. Is house activities (calibration, alarm setpoint adjustment, etc.) the connection to the radiation are performed using the touchpad on the monitor. An monitors made via a special external computer (laptop etc.) is only used to perform cable/connectors? Please software or firmware updates. TVA does not perform confirm that the RS-232

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N software or firmware updates using in-house resources communication port of the therefore no TVA computer is ever connected to the monitor. radiation monitors will only be If software or firmware updates are required, they are used for calibration purposes.

approved via the TVA design change process previously Also please confirm that the described and implemented by a vendor representative radiation monitor will not be in under the TVA work order and Quality Assurance processes. operation during the calibration (2) A laptop is not used to calibrate the monitor. mode. In addition please (3) See the response to Item 1. confirm that password protection (4) See the response to Item 1. is provided for logging on to the (5) No. The connection between the computer and the RM- laptop prior to start of 1000 is made via a standard RS-232 cable. calibration.

(6) The RS-232 connection on the RM-1000 is used to upload new software versions and is not for calibration.

(7) A physical control switch is located behind the front panel on the front edge of the Output Board to change between Operate and Calibration modes on the RM-1000. Placing the switch in the Calibrate position makes the monitor inoperable.

(8) See the response to Item 1.

058 7.5.0 7.5 April 19, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed RAI No. 18 TVA Letter dated EICB (Singh)

Responder: Slifer ML102980005 6/18/10 Please describe all digital communications used in the installed Date: 4/19/2010 10/26/2010 configuration. There are no digital communications between the RM-1000 Responsibility: NRC ML101940236, and any other plant system or component. Encl 1, Item 13 Requested information provided.

NRC to review.

059 7.5.2 7.5.1 April 19, 2010 Date: Y Closed Closed RAI No. 19 TVA Letter dated EICB (Singh)

Responder: Slifer ML102980005 6/18/10 Previously TVA provided the "RM-1000 Digital Radiation Processor Date: 4/19/2010 10/26/2010 Technical Manual," Document No. 04508100-1TM Revision C (a) The technical manual is applicable to versions 1.1 and Responsibility: NRC dated October 2003. The "RM-1000 Version 1.2 Software 1.2 of the software.

Verification and Validation Report," Document No. 04508006 Rev. Requested information provided.

A is dated April 2008. (a) What software version does the (b) Version 1.2 was implemented April 1, 2008 NRC to review.

technical manual address? (b) When was Version 1.2 implemented?

060 7.5.2 7.5.1 April 19, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed N/A N/A Addressed by Open Item No. 47 EICB Responder: Clark (Carte) The PAMS System Requirements Specification (SysRS) references RG 1.97 Rev. 3 where the FSAR References Rev. 2. Duplicate of Item 47 Please explain.

061 7.5.2 7.5.1 April 19, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed N/A N/A Addressed by Open Item No. 48 EICB (Carte)

Responder: Clark Reference 16 of the PAMS System Requirements Specification (SysRS) is the Unit 1 precautions Limitations and Setpoints Duplicate of Item 48.

document. When and how will the transition to the unit 2 document be made.

062 7.5.2 7.5.1 April 19, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed N/A N/A Addressed by Open Item No. 49 EICB Responder: Clark (Carte) Please provide 00000-ICE-30156 Rev. 6. The PAMS SysRS incorporates sections of this document by reference. Duplicate of Item 49 063 7.5.2 7.5.1 April 19, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed N/A N/A Addressed by Open Item No. 50 EICB Responder: Clark (Carte) How should the "shall" statements outside of the bracketed requirements be interpreted? Duplicate of Item 50 Y

(

064 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the target submittal Responder: Webb Date: 4/8/2010 Closed Closed N/A - No question TVA Letter dated C

a

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N date for the D3 Analysis was April 2, 2010. was asked. Item 10/5/10 The WBN2 Common Q PAMS provides redundant signal was opened to track processing and indication of two RG-1.97 Type A variables: commitment made Core-Exit Temperature (CET) and Subcooled Margin. In the by applicant.

event of a common-cause failure of the Common Q PAMS, instrumentation diverse from Common Q is available for these two variables. Wide Range (WR) Hot Leg Temperature indication is specified as a diverse variable for CET in the Post-Accident Monitoring Design Criteria, WB-DC-30-7 (Attachment ). WR Hot Leg Temperature indication from all four hot legs is available on control board indicators and plant computer displays.

Temperature and pressure saturation margin calculations are also performed in the plant computer independently of Common Q utilizing different hardware and software.

Isolated outputs from the Eagle 21 protection system are provided to the plant computer for four WR Hot Leg Temperature channels and four WR RCS Pressure channels. The temperature channels and two of the pressure channels are the same as those used in the Common Q saturation margin calculations.

The plant computer temperature saturation margin is calculated as the difference in the maximum temperature input and the saturation temperature of the minimum pressure input. The temperature saturation margin is displayed as point ID U0987.

The plant computer pressure saturation margin is calculated as the difference in the minimum pressure input and the saturation pressure of the maximum temperature input. The pressure saturation margin is displayed as point ID U0984.

Reactor Vessel Level Indication (RVLIS) is defined as a Type B1 variable. Redundant indication for this variable is provided by the core exit thermocouples/Thot and reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure. So long as the RCS pressure is greater than the saturation pressure for the temperature indicated by the core exit thermocouples/Thot, there is reasonable assurance that a steam void has not formed in the core and the vessel is full. This is indicated by the subcooled margin monitor/plant computer previously discussed.

065 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the target submittal Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed N/A - No question TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte) date for the FMEA was August 31, 2010. was asked. Item 10/5/10 Attachment 37 to letter dated 10/5/10 contains the was opened to track proprietary version of the Common Q PAMS FMEA and the commitment made affidavit for withholding. A non-proprietary version will be by applicant.

provided at a later date.

066 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the target submittal Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed N/A - No question TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte) date for the "Watts Bar 2 PAMS Software Design Description (two was asked. Item 6/18/10 documents, one for flat panel display and one for AC160)" was Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-1961 (Reference 8), these was opened to track March 31, 2010. items are available for audit at the Westinghouse Rockville comm8ittment TVA Letter dated office. made by applicant. 8/20/10

• WNA-SD-00250-WBT Rev. 0 (AC160) was submitted on TVA Letter dated TVA letter to the NRC dated August 20, 2010 (Reference 7). 9/2/10

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N

• WNA-SD-00248-WBT, Rev. 0 (FPDS) was submitted on TVA letter to the NRC dated SEPT 2, 2010 (Reference 8). TVA Letter dated 10/5/10 067 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the target submittal Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 N Open Open-TVA/WEC N/A - No question TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte) date for the "Commercial Grade Dedication Instructions for AI687, was asked. Item 6/18/10 AI688, Upgraded PC node box and flat panels." was September The following status is from the revised WB2 Common Q Response included in letter NNC 2/2/11: Section 7 was opened to track 28, 2010. PAMS ISG-6 Compliance Matrix submitted in response to dated 12/22/10. of the WBN2 PAMS comm8ittment Item 43: LTR should be updated made by applicant.

This item is addressed in Rev. 2 to include:

a. AI687, AI688 - Scheduled for September 28, 2010 of the Licensing Technical (1) non-proprietary Report description of

b. Upgraded PC node box and flat panel displays - Per commercial grade Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2024 (Reference 7), these items dedication, and are available for audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office. (2) Software example

c. Power supplies - Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2035 Commercial grade (Reference 12), these items are available for audit at the dedication will also be Westinghouse Rockville office. addressed at the next audit.

To be addressed during 9/20-9/21 audit TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request:

WNA-LI-00058-WT-P, Revision 2, Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report submitted in TVA Letter to NRC dated December 3, 2010, (Reference 1) contains the following change to address the NRC request:

Section 7, Commercial Grade Dedication Process, has been revised to describe the general commercial grade dedication process for both hardware and software and uses a description of the AI687 dedication process as an example of how the process is applied.

068 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the target submittal Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 N Open Open-NRC Review N/A - No question TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte) date for the "Summary Report on acceptance of AI687, AI688, was asked. Item 6/18/10 Upgraded PC node box, flat panels, and power supplies." was The following status is from the revised WB2 Common Q Response included in letter NNC 2/2/11: was opened to track September 28, 2010. PAMS ISG-6 Compliance Matrix submitted in response to dated 12/22/10. Commercial grade comm8ittment Item 43: dedication will be made by applicant.

addressed at the next

a. AI687, AI688 - Scheduled for September 28, 2010 This item is addressed in Rev. 2 audit. Summary of the Licensing Technical reports for AI687 &

b. Upgraded PC node box - Per Westinghouse letter WBT- Report AI688 were docketed D-2024 (Reference 7), this item is available for audit at the one month late.

Westinghouse Rockville office.

c. Flat panel displays - Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2024 (Reference 7), this item is available for audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office.

d. Power supplies - Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2035 (Reference 12), these items are available for audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office.

To be addressed during 9/20-9/21 audit TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request:

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N For the commercial grade dedication process, please see the response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) item 3 in this letter, NRC Matrix Item 067.

The component level EQ/Seismic summary reports for the hardware listed above are available for NRC review/audit as described below:

(1) AI687 and AI688, the following documents were submitted in TVA Letter to NRC dated October 26, 2010, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 -

Instrumentation and Controls Staff Information Requests, (Reference 5):

a. EQ-EV-62-WBT, Revision 0, Common Q PAMS Comparison of Tested Conditions for the AI687 and AI688 Common Q Modules and Supporting Components to the Watts Bar Unit 2 (WBT)

Requirements, dated September 10, 2010

b. EQLR-171, Revision 0, Environmental and Seismic Test Report, Analog Input (AI)687 &

AI688 Modules for use in Common Q PAMS, dated September 10, 2010

c. CN-EQT-10-44, Revision 0, Dynamic Similarity Analysis for the Watts Bar Unit 2 Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS), dated September 28, 2010 (2) Upgraded PC Node Box - As stated in Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2024, dated June 9, 2010 NRC Access to Common Q Documents at the Westinghouse Rockville Office, (Reference 6), the following documents are available for NRC audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office:

a. CDI-3722, Revision 7, Next Generation PC Node Box Commercial Dedication Instruction

b. LTR-EQ-10-50 PC Node Box/Flat Panel Display System Components Qualification Summary (3) Flat Panel Displays - As stated in Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2024, dated June 9, 2010 NRC Access to Common Q Documents at the Westinghouse Rockville Office, (Reference 6), the following documents are available for NRC audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office:

a. CDI-3803, Revision 8, Next Generation Flat Panel Display (FPD) Commercial Dedication Instruction

b. LTR-EQ-10-50 PC Node Box/Flat Panel Display System Components Qualification Summary (4) Power supplies - As stated in Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2035 dated June 11, 2010 NRC Access to Common Q Documents at the Westinghouse Rockville Office (Reference 7), the following documents are available for NRC audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office:

a. CDI- 4057, Revision 4, Commercial Dedication Instruction

b. EQ-TP-1 05-GEN, Revision 0, Electromagnetic Compatibility Test Plan and Procedure for Quint

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Power Supplies and Safety System Line Filter

c. Breakers, EQ-TP-114-GEN, Revision 0, Seismic Qualification Test Procedure For Common Q Power Supplies, Quint Power Supplies, Line Filter Assemblies, and South Texas Units 3 & 4 Circuit

d. EQ-TP-117-GEN, Revision 0, Environmental Qualification Test Procedure For Common Q Powe Supplies, Quint Power Supplies, and Line Filter Assemblies 069 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the target submittal Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 N Open Open-TVA/WEC N/A - No question N/A EICB (Carte) date for the "Watts Bar 2 PAMS Specific FAT Report" was October was asked. Item 2010. Awaiting for document to be Due 2/18/11 was opened to track docketed by TVA. comm8ittment NNC 2/3/11: The made by applicant.

current due dated above is 4 months later than planned.

070 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the target submittal Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 N Closed Closed N/A - No question TVA Letter dated NNC 11/23/10: The dues date in this EICB (Carte) date for the "Concept and Definition Phase V&V Report" was was asked. Item 6/18/10 open item does not agree with the due March 31, 2010. Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-1961, this document is Final Response included in Due 12/17/10 was opened to track dated in Open Item No. 71.

available for audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office. letter dated 12/3/10 comm8ittment TVA Letter dated NNC 2/3/11: SVVR made by applicant. 8/20/10 WNA-VR- 00283-WBT, Rev 0 was submitted on TVA letter Partial Response is included in (WNA-VR-00283-WBT) to the NRC dated August 20, 2010. letter dated 10/5/10. Rev. 0 (dated March TVA Letter dated 2010) was docketed by 10/5/10 The submitted V&V did not address the Requirements Regulations require that the TVA letter dated Traceability Matrix and did not summarize anomalies. At the NRC review be based on 8/20/10, but was not September 15th public meeting, Westinghouse agreed to docketed material. Awaiting for complete. SVVR Rev.

include the Concept and Definitions Phase Requirements document to be docketed by 1 (dated November Traceability Matrix (RTM) in the next IV&V report along with TVA. 2010) was docketed by partial Design Phase updates to the RTM. TVA letter dated NNC 8/25/10: Requirements 12/3/2010, this is a TVA Revised Response: Phase SVVR provided by TVA delay of more than 8 TVA submitted WNA-VR- 00283-WBT, Rev 0 to NRC in letter dated 8/20/10. months.

letter dated August 20, 2010 (Reference 6). NNC 11/23/10: The The next Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) requirements Phase SVVR report will include the Design provided by TVA on 8/20/10, is Phase Requirements Traceability Matrix. The Design Phase not complete. This report IV&V Report will be submitted should address the RTM, which to NRC by February 11, 2011. it did not. TVA/WEC agreed to address the concept phase RTM Attachment 14contains the Westinghouse document in the next revision.

Nuclear Automation Watts Bar Unit 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects, IV&V Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System, WNA-VR-00283-WBT, Revision 1, dated November 2010. Attachment 15 contains the Westinghouse Application for Withholding for the WNA-VR-00283-WBT, Revision 1, Nuclear Automation Watts Bar Unit 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects, IV&V Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System, dated November 8, 2010.

NOTE: Due to document sequencing, this IV&V Phase Summary Report references a previous version of the contract compliance matrix. Refer to the Licensing Technical Report Revision 2 (Attachment

19) for the current contract compliance matrix.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N 071 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the target submittal Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 N Closed Closed N/A - No question N/A NNC 11/23/10: The dues date in this EICB (Carte) date for Revision 2 of the I V&V Report" covering the Design and was asked. Item open item does not agree with the due Implementation phases was July 30, 2010. Attachment 16 contains the Westinghouse document IV&V Response included in letter NNC 1/27/11: Issues was opened to track dated in Open Item No. 70.

Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System, dated 12/3/10 with the SVVR were commitment made WNA-VR-00283-WBT, Revision 2, dated November 2010. discussed in the weekly by applicant.

Attachment 17 contains the Westinghouse Application for Awaiting for document to be public meetings.

withholding for the IV&V Summary Report for the Post docketed by TVA. Westinghouse to Accident Monitoring System, WNA-VR-00283-WBT, perfrom SVVR self Revision 2, dated November 2010. assessment.

NOTE: Due to document sequencing, this IV&V Phase NNC 2/3/11: SVVR Summary Report references a previous version of Rev. 2 was docketed by the contract compliance matrix. Refer to the TVA latter dated Licensing Technical Report Revision 2 (Attachment 12/3/10; this is 4

19) for the current contract compliance matrix. months later than planned.

072 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the target submittal Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed N/A - No question N/A EICB (Carte) date for the "Implementation Phase V&V Report" was September to item 71. Per WEC, was asked. Item 30, 2010. Awaiting for document to be the design and was opened to track docketed by TVA. implementation phase commitment made IV&V reports are by applicant.

combined.

073 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the target submittal Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 N Closed Closed N/A - No question N/A EICB (Carte) date for Revision 3 of the IV&V Report covering the Integration was asked. Item phase was October 29, 2010. WNA-VR-00283-WBT, Revision 3, IV&V Summary Report Response included in letter NNC 1/27/11: Issues was opened to track for the Post Accident Monitoring System, covers the dated 12/22/10 with the SVVR were commitment made Integration phase. Attachment 10 contains the proprietary discussed in the weekly by applicant.

version of IV&V Summary Report for the Post Accident Awaiting for document to be public meetings.

Monitoring System, WNA-VR-00283-WBT-P, Revision 3, docketed by TVA. Westinghouse to dated December 2010. Attachment 11 contains the non- perfrom SVVR self proprietary version IV&V Summary Report for the Post assessment.

Accident Monitoring System, WNA-VR-00283-WBT-NP, Revision 3, dated December 2010. Attachment 12 contains NNC 2/3/11: SVVR the Application For Withholding Proprietary Information From Rev. 3 was docketed by Public Disclosure WNA-VR-00283-WBT, Revision 3, TVA latter dated Nuclear Automation Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion 12/22/10; this is 2 Program I&C Projects, IV &V Summary Report for the Post months later than Accident Monitoring System (Proprietary), dated December planned.

10, 2010.

074 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the target submittal Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 N Open Open-TVA/WEC N/A - No question N/A EICB (Carte) date for the Post FAT IV&V Phase Summary Report was was asked. Item November 30, 2010. TVA to provide due date. Due 2/21/11 was opened to track commitment made NNC 2/3/11: The by applicant.

current due date above is 3 months later than planned.

075 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the target submittal Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 N Closed Closed N/A - No question N/A EICB (Carte) date for the "Watts Bar 2 PAMS Specific FAT Procedure" was was asked. Item September 30, 2010. Attachment 12 contains the Westinghouse document Response included in letter NNC 2/3/11: FATP was opened to track Nuclear Automation Watts Bar Unit 2 NSSS Completion dated 12/3/10 docketed as commitment made Program I&C Projects, Post Accident Monitoring System Attachment 12 to TVA by applicant.

Channel Integration Test/Factory Acceptance Test, WNA- Awaiting for document to be letter dated December TP-02988-WBT, Revision 0, dated November 2010. docketed by TVA. 3, 2010; this is a delay Attachment 13 contains the Westinghouse Application for of more than 2 Withholding for WNA-TP-02988-WBT, Revision 0,Nuclear months.

Automation Watts Bar Unit 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Projects, Post Accident Monitoring System Channel Integration Test/Factory Acceptance Test, dated November 2010.

076 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the target submittal Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed N/A - No question N/A EICB date for the "Watts Bar 2 PAMS Specific Processor Module was asked. Item (Carte) Software Test" was August 31, 2010. Verify schedule dates for the next submittal of this matrix Awaiting for document to be to OI 71 and 41(4) was opened to track against update WEC schedule. docketed by TVA. commitment made by applicant.

077 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the target submittal Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed N/A - No question TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte) date for seven other documents was "TDB". Please provide a was asked. Item 6/18/10 schedule for the docketing of the remaining documents. The availability dates for these documents are included in Open was opened to track the revised WBN2 Common Q ISG-6 Compliance Matrix commitment made 10/22/10 submitted in response to item 43. As stated in the March 12, Regulations require that the by applicant.

2010 letter (Reference 4), the dates in the matrix are the NRC review be based on dates the documents will be available to TVA to prepare for docketed material. Awaiting for submittal or being Available for Audit. They do not reflect document to be docketed by the dates the documents will be submitted to the NRC. TVA.

Expected submittal date is two weeks after TVA receives the document.

Note: There is a typo in the matrix in line item 33. The power supply entry date says TBD. Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2035 (Reference 12) this item is complete and the documents are available for audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office.

The Licensing Technical Report now includes a SPM compliance matrix. Submit a revised response.

078 4/26/2010 Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/5/10 FSAR Section 7.1.2.1.8 adds a reference 6 to the FSAR. (Q1) The cross reference information is corrected in FSAR Response provided in letter to OI323 OI# 18 However, Reference 6 is for instrument setpoint and has nothing to Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on TVA letter to the dated 10/5/10 do with the diversity discussion on the FSAR Section. We believe NRC dated August __, 2010 (Reference 2). FSAR AMD 100 SSER the TVA wants to add reference 7 which is the diversity document, 13 for unit 1 references WCAP 13869, "Reactor Protection System Diversity in (Q2) WCAP-13869 revision 1 was previously reviewed under Awaiting TVA response. rev. 1 of WCAP 13869.

Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors." Please confirm this WBN Unit 1 SER SSER 13 (Reference 8). Unit 2 references Rev. 2 is used for Unit and add commitment to revise FSAR to correct the reference. revision 2. A review to identify the differences and justify 2. Identify all the (Q1) Also, confirm whether this WCAP has been reviewed by their acceptability will be performed by September 30, 2010 differences between NRC, if yes, provide reference and if not, then submit the WCAP to and submitted to the NRC no later than November 15, 2010. Rev.1 and Rev.2 and NRC. (Q2) Also provide the justification for this reference to justify their WBN2. (Q3) (Q3) Westinghouse confirmed the applicability of this WCAP acceptability.

to Watts Bar Unit 2 in letter WBT-D-1321, Final Response to WBT-TVA-0713 Unit 2 WCAP Reviews, dated December 2, 2009 (Reference 10).

079 4/26/2010 Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated Reviewed under Item 154 EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/5/10 FSAR Section 7.1.2.1.9, Trip Setpoints, adds reference to 3, 4, and (Q1) WBN Unit 2 is licensed based on WBN Unit 1. The Response provided in letter This item is closed as it OI#19

5. However, reference 3 was deleted by FSAR amendment 81. WBN Unit 1 licensing basis is ISA-DS-67.04-1982. dated 10/5/10 will be reviewed under Reference 4 has been changed to ISA-DS-67.04-1982. Justify Therefore this methodology is used for the same SSDs for item 154. FSAR AMD applicability of this standard for WBN 2.(Q1) Why the latest ISA WBN Unit 2. This maintains consistency in the licensing 100 standard endorsed by NRC has not been used? (Q2) Also bases for both units.

reference 5 is a topical report for Eagle 21, system. Please confirm that this topical report also discusses the setpoint for Eagle (Q2) Please refer to the response to Q1.

21 system and whether it meets the recent guidance for the setpoint issued by the staff. (Q3) Also, W setpoint methodology do (Q3) FSAR Reference 4 is the Eagle 21 Topical Report.

not provide discussion on the AS Found Tolerance and As left FSAR Reference 5, WCAP-17044, Westinghouse Setpoint value determination and how these values are used for the Methodology for Protection Systems Watts Bar Unit 2

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N instrument operability, therefore, add the discussion of these topics submitted under TVA letter to the NRC dated February 12, in the FSAR. (Q4) and add reference to other documents if it is 2010 (Reference 11) discusses the setpoint methodology discussed in some other document. (Q5) Provide this document to used for Eagle 21 loops.

the staff for review and approval. (Q6)

(Q4) (Q4) FSAR Amendment 100 which was submitted on TVA letter to the NRC dated September 1, 2010 (Reference

2) incorporates as-found and as-left setpoint tolerance discussion into section 7.1.2.1.9, adds EEB-TI-28, Setpoint Methodology to the section 7.1 references and adds a reference to 7.1.2.1.9 to section 7.2.1.1.10.

(Q5) Please refer to the response to Q4.

(Q6) EEB-TI-28, Setpoint Methodology was submitted in TVA letter to the NRC dated May 13, 2010 (Reference 12).

080 4/26/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed RAI No. 2 TVA Letter dated EICB ML102980005 7/30/10 (Singh) FSAR Table 7.1-1, Note 12 has been added to the table but it's A revised note was included in the 7/30 letter along with NRC review complete. 10/26/2010 ML102160349, justification has not been provided to the staff for review and justification for the note. Item 6 approval.

081 7.5.2 7.5.1 5/6/2010 Responder: Merten/WEC N Open Open-TVA/WEC EICB RAI TVA Letter dated NNC 1/5/11: See Also Open Item No.

EICB (Carte)

ML102910002 6/18/10 86 and 202.

The PAMS Licensing Technical Report (WNA-LI-00058-WBT Rev. The codes and standards documents listed in Section 7 of ML101600092 Item No.1: There Due 12/22/10 Item No. 9 0, Dated April 2010), in Section 7, lists codes and standards the Common Q PAMS Licensing Technical Report are the are three sets of regulatory applicable to the Common Q PAMS. This list contains references documents that the Common Q platform was licensed to criteria that relate to a Common TVA to provide to old revisions of several regulatory documents, for example: when the NRC approved the original topical report and Q application (e.g. WBN2 requested information.

(1) RG 1.29 - September 1978 vs. March 2007 issued the approved SER. The WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS):

(2) RG 1.53 - June 1973 vs. November 2003 PAMS is designed in accordance with the approved (a) Common Q platform NNC 2/3/11: The (a) IEEE 379-1994 vs. -2000 Common Q topical report and approved SER and the codes components - Common Q TR above due date has (3) RG 1.75 - September 1975 vs. February 2005 and standards on which the SER was based. Since the (b) Application Development been missed by at (a) IEEE 384-1992 vs. -1992 current versions referenced are not applicable to WBN Unit Processes - Common Q SPM least 2 months.

(4) RG 1.100 - June 1988 vs. September 2009 2, there is no basis for a comparison review. (c) Application Specific - current Please provide new (a) IEEE 344-1987 vs. -2004 regulatory criteria due date.

(5) RG 1.152 - January 1996 vs. January 2006 Bechtel to develop a matrix and work with Westinghouse to The Common Q Topical Report (a) IEEE 7-4.33.2-1993 vs. -2003 provide justification. and associated appendices (6) RG 1.168 - September 1997 vs. February 2004 primarily addressed (a) and (b).

(a) IEEE 1012-1986 vs. -1998 The Common Q SER states:

(b) IEEE 1028-1988 vs. -1997 (7) IEEE 279-1991 vs. 603-1991 Appendix 1, Post Accident (8) IEEE 323-1983 vs. -1974 (RG 1.89 Rev. 1 June 1984 Monitoring Systems, provides endorses 323-1974) the functional requirements and However, LIC-110, "Watts Bar Unit 2 License Application Review," conceptual design approach for states: "Design features and administrative programs that are upgrading an existing PAMS unique to Unit 2 should then be reviewed in accordance with the based on Common Q current staff positions." Please identify all differences between the components (page 58, Section versions referenced and the current staff positions. Please provide 4.4.1.1, Description)On the a justification for the acceptability PAMS with respect to these basis of the above review, the differences. staff concludes that Appendix 1 does not contain sufficient information to establish the generic acceptability of the proposed PAMS design (page 56, Section 4.4.1.3, PAMS Evaluation)

The NRC did not approve the proposed PAMS design.

Section 6, References, and

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Section 7, Codes and Standards Applicable to the Common Q PAMS, of the PAMS Licensing Technical Report contain items that are not the current regulatory criteria.

Please provide an explanation of how the WBN2 PAMS conforms with the application specific regulatory criteria applicable to the WBN2 PAMS design. For example IEEE Std.

603-1991 Clause 5.6.3, Independence Between Safety Systems and Other Systems, and Clause 6.3, Interaction Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems, contain application specific requirements that must be addressed by a PAMS system.

Awaiting TVA Response.

082 7.5.2 7.5.1 5/6/2010 Responder: WEC Date: 6/18/10 N Open Open-NRC Review EICB RAI TVA Letter dated NNC 11/18/10: See also Open Item No.

EICB (Carte)

ML102910002 7/30/10 41, Item No. 3.

The PAMS Licensing Technical Report (WNA-LI-00058-WBT Rev. These components can be found in the Summary Revised response included in NNC 2/2/11: Item No. 10 0, Dated April 2010), in Section 2.3, lists hardware/software Qualification Report Of Hardware Testing For Common Q letter dated 12/22/10 Qualification of changes to the Common Q PAMS previously reviewed by the Applications, 00000-ICE-37764, Rev 3 and changes will be NRC. However the Common Q ISG-6 Compliance Matrix does not TWICE Qualification Status Report, WNAQR-00011-SSP Regulations require that the addressed at the next contain activities that address qualification of all changes Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2024, (Reference __) dated NRC review be based on audit. The description specifically: June 9, 2010, these documents are available for audit at the docketed material. Awaiting for of the commercial Westinghouse Rockville Office. document to be docketed by grade dedication 2.c - CI527 AF100 Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) TVA. process in the CQ interface card TVA provided information by letter dated July 30, 2010 PAMS LTR Rev. 2

3. - Common Q TC514 AF100 Fiber Optic Modems (Evolutionary (ML102160349) - See Enclosure 1 Item No. 7. NNC 8/9/10: per telephone should be updated to Product Maintenance/Improvements) conversation on 8/5/10, it is not include a non-4.a - PM646A Processor Module Revision 1 of the Licensing Technical Report provides clear how Westinghouse proprietary description 4.b - CI631 AF100 Communication Interface Module additional detail on the platform specific to WBN2 and Commercial Grade Dedication and to include a 4.e - DO620 Digital Output Card references to the evaluation documentation. Plans and Reports for Digital software example.

I&C. Westinghouse agree to Please provide sufficient detail regarding the changes for the NRC TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request: present to the NRC in a public to independently evaluate the acceptability of the changes. meeting on August 17, 2010, Please see the response to Request for Additional and explanation of how their Information (RAI) item 3 in letter dated 12/22/10, NRC Matrix system addresses regulatory Item 067. criteria for both commercial grade dedication and equipment qualification.

NNC 8/25/10: In the August 17, 2010 public meeting Westinghouse stated that the CDI were the plans. The NRC requested that the plans and associated reports be docketed.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N NNC 11/18/10: During the September 20-21, 2010 audit, TVA agreed to put a description of the commercial grade dedication program and implementation in Rev. 2 of the CQ PAMS LTR.

083 7.5.2 7.5.1 May 6, 2010 Date: 6/18/10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte)

Responder: WEC ML102910002 7/30/10 Please identify all FPGAs in the new or changed PAMS hardware. Date: 5/6/2010 Item No. 11 The FPGAs used in the Common Q PAMS AC160 module Responsibility: TVA are listed in Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2166, (Attachment 5), which provides both the proprietary and non-proprietary information. Attachment 6 (provided by Reference 11) contains the affidavit for withholding for WBT-D-2166-P-Attachment (contained in Attachment 5)..

Additionally, Westinghouse states in, Westinghouse Letter WBT-D-2170, (Reference 10) that their review of Flat Panel displays and PC Node Boxes concluded that they do not contain any FPGAs.

084 7.5.2 7.5.1 May 6, 2010 Date: 6/18/10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte)

Responder: Clark ML102910002 6/18/10 Please provide: TVA Design Criteria WB-DC-30-7 Rev. 22, Post Date: 5/6/2010 Item No. 12 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. Attachment 5 contains Design Criteria WB-DC-30-7 Rev. 22, Responsibility: TVA Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation.

Document received 085 7.5.2 7.5.1 5/6/2010 Responder: WEC N Closed Closed EICB RAI EICB (Carte)

ML102910002 Please provide a detailed description of the PAMS MTP data link Is the WEC ISG4 evaluation inadequate? Revised response included in MTP is postulated, & Item No. 13 to the plant computer. This description should identify all letter dated 12/22/10 tested, to fail, but not equipment (model & version) and describe the functions that each Operation of the MTP as a barrier device. MTP Fails as a propagate failures.

piece of equipment performs. This description should be of barrier device. Describe what prevents a MTP failure from A response will be provided by sufficient detail for the NRC to independently evaluate the propagating to the AC160? 10/31/10 statements made in WNA-LI-00058-WBT Rev. 0, Section 5.3.

Node loss on the bus? Bus loss? NNC 8/11/10: Design information should be available Revise the ISG4 section of the Licensing Technical Report now. By letter dated July 30, (Rev. 2) to provide a more detailed description of the MTP as 2010 (ML102160349) TVA a barrier device. stated that the MTP was connected to a Red Hat Linux TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request: Server (see Enclosure 1, Item No. 14 part b.). It is presumed WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Revision 2, Post-Accident that this server is not safety-Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report related. IEEE 603-1991 Clause submitted in TVA letter to NRC dated December 3, 2010 5.6.3(1) states, "Isolation (Reference 1), contains the following changes to address the devices used to affect a safety NRC requests: system boundary shall be classified as part of the safety Section 2.2, System Description page 2-3 provides a system."

description of the MTP Fiber-Optic (FO) data link to the plant computer. Section 2.2.1.4, Hardware has been expanded Please describe how the MTP to include a table detailing all hardware changes that have serves as the isolation device.

occurred since the initial submittal. Section 2.2.2, Software has been expanded to include a table detailing all software changes that have occurred since the initial submittal.

N

(

086 7.5.2 7.5.1 5/6/2010 Responder: WEC Date: 5/24/10 Open Open-TVA/WEC EICB RAI TVA Letter dated NNC 1/6/11: See Also Open Item No.81 C

a

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N ML102910002 6/18/10 & 202 The PAMS Licensing Technical Report (WNA-LI-00058-WBT Rev. The regulatory documents listed in the Common Q PAMS TVA to address with item OI Due 12/22/10 Item No. 14 0, Dated April 2010), in Section 6, lists references applicable to the Licensing Technical Report are the documents that the 81.

Common Q PAMS. This list contains references to old revisions of Common Q platform was licensed to when the NRC NNC 2/3/11: The several regulatory documents, for example: approved the original topical report and issued the approved above due date has (1) DI&C-ISG04 - Rev. 0 (ML072540138) vs. Rev. 1 SER. The WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is designed in been missed by at (ML083310185) accordance with the approved Common Q topical report and least 2 months.

However, LIC-110, "Watts Bar Unit 2 License Application Review," approved SER and the regulatory documents on which the Please provide new states: "Design features and administrative programs that are SER was based. Since the current versions referenced are due date.

unique to Unit 2 should then be reviewed in accordance with the not applicable to WBN Unit 2, there is no basis for a current staff positions." Please identify all differences between the comparison review.

versions referenced and the current staff positions. Please provide a justification for the acceptability PAMS with respect to these Rev 0 of the Licensing Technical Report references Rev. 1 of differences. ISG4 087 7.5.2 7.5.1 May 6, 2010 Date: 5/24/10 Y Closed Closed RAI No. 20 TVA Letter dated EICB Responder: Slifer ML102980005 6/18/10 (Singh) Regarding the Sorrento RM-1000 Digital Radiation Processor: Date: 5/6/2010 10/26/2010 Please identify the model and version to be installed. Please The rate meter is model RM-1000. The software is version Responsibility: TVA include explicit identification of software version. 1.2 088 7.5.2 7.5.1 May 6, 2010 Date: 5/24/10 Y Closed Closed RAI No. 21 TVA Letter dated EICB Responder: Slifer ML102980005 6/18/10 (Singh) Regarding the Sorrento RM-1000 Digital Radiation Processor: Date: 5/6/2010 10/26/2010 Please provide prior software V&V reports. The latest report only See response to item 56 Responsibility: TVA addresses Version 1.2.

089 5/6/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated NNC: Docketed response states that EICB (Carte)

ML102910002 3/12/10 the applicable FSAR Sections are:

What FSAR functions are implemented using Foxboro Intelligent The list of FSAR functions is listed in TVA letter dated March Item No. 15 5.6 -

Automation (IA)? 12, 2010, Enclosure 1, item 12 7.2.2.3.2 - Garg 7.2.2.3.3 - Garg FSAR Section 7.7.11 will add a discussion of the DCS. 7.2.2.3.4 - Garg 7.2.2.3.5 - Garg See item 4 for questions on failure modes and mesh 7.2.3 - Garg network. 7.6.8 -

7.7.1.6 -

7.7.1.7 -

7.7.1.8 -

9.3.4.2.1.C -

10.4.7.2 -

090 5/6/2010 Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte)

ML102910002 3/12/10 What FSAR Systems are implemented using Foxboro Intelligent The list of FSAR functions is listed in TVA letter dated March Item No. 16 Automation (IA)? 12, 2010, Enclosure 1, item 12 FSAR Section 7.7.11 will add a discussion of the DCS.

See item 4 for questions on failure modes and mesh network.

091 7.4 7.4 May 20, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI No.1 TVA Letter dated EICB (Darbali)

Responder: Clark ML102910017, 6/18/10 TVA to submit excerpts of EDCRs 52421, 52987, 52321, 52351 Two EDCRs have been Item is Closed and 10/19/10 and 52601 1. Attachment 6 contains the EDCR 52421 excerpt submitted. TVA has agreed to replaced by items 103, submit the remaining EDCRs. 104 and 118.

2. Attachment 7 contains the EDCR 52987 excerpt

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N

3. EDCR 52321 is scheduled to be issued Oct 13, 2010.

Submittal of EDCR 52321 excerpts is tracked by Responses to Licensee Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval item 103 due October 31,2010.

4. EDCR 52351 is scheduled to be issued November 30, 2010. Submittal of EDCR 52351 excerpts is tracked by Responses to Licensee Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval item 104 due December 15, 2010.

5. Attachment 8 contains the EDCR 52601 (RVLIS) excerpt.

The RVLIS EDCR has been split into two EDCRs. The second EDCR is 55385. Submittal of EDCR 55385 excerpts is tracked by Responses to Licensee Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval item 118 due November 15, 2010.

092 5/20/2010 Responder: Hilmes Y Open Open-TVA/Oversight Continuous review as items are added DORL (Poole) TVA to review Licensee Open Item list and determine which items This item will close when we are no longer using this Due: SER Issue are proprietary. document as a communications tool.

093 May 20, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed N/A N/A Will be reviewed under item 154 EICB (Garg)

Responder: Knuettel TVA to submit a letter committing to include setpoint methodology discussion in the FSAR no later than amendment 100. Letter Sent 5/25/10 094 5/20/2010 Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed N/A N/A Information was found in FSAR EICB (Garg)

TVA to locate and provide information on the TMI action item to This item is described in FSAR amendment 98, Section NRC staff will review.

add an anticipated reactor trip on turbine trip to the design bases in 7.2.1.1.2 item 6 page 7.2.9, and Table 7.2-1 item 14, page the FSAR 7.2-39.

095 7.8.1, XX May 20, 2010 Date: Y Closed Closed EICB RAI No. 2 TVA Letter dated EICB (Darbali)

7.8.4 Responder

ML102910017, 7/30/10 TVA to review SER supplements 5 and 14 item 7.8.1 and 10/19/10 supplement 4 item 7.8.4 and confirm if they are identical to Unit 1. Q1: Monitoring of the reactor coolant system relief valve If not provide differences. position is the same as Unit 1.

Q2: The reactor trip on turbine trip is the same as Unit 1.

096 7.7.5 XX 5/20/2010 Responder: Y Closed Closed EICB RAI No.3 TVA Letter dated EICB (Darbali)

ML102910017, 7/30/10 TVA to provide information on implementation of IEN 79-22 and IEN 79-22 is not specifically listed or discussed in the WBN Response provided. NRC staff OI 283 10/19/10 how it is addressed in the FSAR Unit 1 UFSAR or Unit 2 FSAR. IEN 79-22 is one of the to review response.

precursors to 10CFR50.49 environmental qualification. The initial SQN and WBN Unit 1 response was developed prior to See Follow up question 283.

TVA implementing 10CFR50.49. As such, the discussion of safety-related actuations is no longer valid. In implementing 10CFR50.49, TVA upgraded susceptible safety-related devices located in harsh environments to fully qualified devices. For WBN Unit 2, only fully qualified safety-related devices are installed in areas susceptible to a high energy line break. The non-safety-related device/systems within the scope of IEN 79-22 are:

1. Steam generator power operated relief valve control system

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N

2. Pressurizer power operated relief valve control system

3. Main feedwater control system

4. Automatic rod control system.

Failure of these systems/devices due to a high energy line break is fully addressed in Chapter 15, Accident Analysis of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR.

097 7.4.2 7.4 May 20, 2010 Date: Y Closed Closed EICB RAI No.4 TVA Letter dated EICB (Darbali)

Responder: ML102910017, 7/30/10 TVA to review SER Supplement 7 item 7.4.25 deviation on Aux Response is satisfactory. 10/19/10 Control Room display of RCS cold leg temperature for applicability The deviation to not have RCS cold leg temperature to Unit 2. displayed in the Auxiliary Control Room was approved as part of the WBN Unit 1 initial license. WBN Unit 2 complies with the WBN Unit 1 Licensing bases and this deviation is applicable to Unit 2.

098 7.4.2 7.4 May 25, 2010 Date: Y Closed Closed EICB RAI No.5 TVA Letter dated EICB Responder: ML102910017, 7/30/10 (Darbali) Unit 1 SER Supplement 7, RCS Cold Leg Temperature 10/19/10 instrumentation. How does Unit 2 address this change? Refer to the response to Item 13 11 above.

099 April 12, 2010 Date: Y Closed Closed Closed to Item 129 DORL (Bailey)

Responder: WEC TVA will provide non-proprietary versions of the following Common Q attached proprietary documents and the affidavits for the proprietary documents by June 30, 2010.

1. System Design Specification WNA-DS-01667-WBT, Rev. 1

2. System Requirements Specification WNA-DS-01617-WBT, Rev.

1

3. Watts Bar 2 - Common Q PAMS ISG-6 Compliance Matrix dated March 4, 2010

4. Watts Bar Unit 2 (WBN2) Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report LTR-RCPL-10-XX

5. Software Requirements Specification WNA-SD-00239-WBT, Rev. 1 100 5/20/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A - No question N/A EICB (Carte) was asked. Item The following Common Q proprietary documents listed in the The documents, and affidavits for withholding for the listed was opened to track response and the affidavits for the proprietary documents will be documents were submitted to the NRC on TVA letter to the commitment made provided by April 9, 2010. NRC dated April 8, 2010. by applicant.

1. System Design Specification WNA-DS-01667-WBT, Rev. 1

2. System Requirements Specification WNA-DS-01617-WBT, Rev.

1

3. Watts Bar 2 - Common Q PAMS ISG-6 Compliance Matrix dated March 4, 2010

4. Watts Bar Unit 2 (WBN2) Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report LTR-RCPL-10-XX

5. Software Requirements Specification WNA-SD-00239-WBT, Rev. 1 101 4/12/2010 Responder: Slifer Y Open Open-NRC Review N/A TVA is working with the vendor to meet DORL (Poole) the 6/30 date, however there is the The non-proprietary versions of the following RM-1000, The documents, and affidavits for withholding for the listed Documents provided in letter Due 10/14/10 potential this will slip to 7/14.

Containment High Range Post Accident Radiation Monitor documents were submitted to the NRC on TVA letter to the dated 07/15/10 documents will be provided by June 30, 2010. NRC dated July 15, 2010. Confirm receipt.

1. V&V Report 04508006A

2. System Description 04508100-1TM

3. Qualification Reports 04508905-QR, 04508905-1 SP, 04508905-2SP, 04508905-3SP

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N

4. Functional Testing Report 04507007-1TR 102 May 24, 2010 Date: 5/24/10 Y Closed Closed N/A TVA Letter dated Request for schedule not information.

EICB (Carte)

Responder: WEC 6/18/10 Provide a schedule for resolution of items 80, 82 and 83 Item 80 - no later than July 23, 2010 Item 82 - no later than July 23, 2010 Item 83 - no later than July 23, 2010 103 7.4 7.4 5/27/2010 Responder: Ayala Date: 5/27/10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI No.1 TVA Letter dated Submittal date is based on current EICB (Darbali)

ML102910017, 10/29/10 EDCR scheduled issue date.

TVA to submit excerpts of EDCR 52321 Attachment 1 contains excerpts from draft EDCR 52321 (i.e., Response is included in letter Due 10/31/10. Waiting 10/19/10 Enclosure 1 Item draft Scope and Intent, Unit Difference and Technical dated 10/29/10. for docketed version to No. 4 Evaluation). The final excerpts will be submitted within two close item.

weeks after issuance of the EDCR.

104 7.4 7.4 5/27/2010 Responder: Merten Date: 5/27/10 Y Closed Closed EICB RAI No.1 TVA Letter dated Submittal date is based on current EICB (Darbali)

ML102910017, 10/29/10 EDCR scheduled issue date.

TVA to submit excerpts of EDCR 52351 Attachment 2 contains excerpts from draft EDCR 52351 (i.e., Response is included in letter Due 10/31/10. Waiting 10/19/10 Enclosure 1 Item draft Scope and Intent, Unit Difference and Technical dated 10/29/10 for docketed version to No. 5 Evaluation). The final excerpts will be submitted within two close item.

weeks after issuance of the EDCR.

105 April 29, 2010 Date: Y Closed Closed N/A N/A Will be reviewed under item 154.

EICB (Garg)

Responder: Langley Provide As-Found/As-Left methodology procedure Date: 5/27/10 Submitted copy of TI-28 May 14/2010. Responsibility: NRC Replaced with new open item 176.

106 May 6, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed RAI No. 9 TVA Letter dated EICB (Singh)

Responder: Davies ML102980005 6/18/10 Confirm that the Unit 1 and Unit 2 CERPI systems utilize the same Date: 10/26/2010 processor (AC110 or AC160). Westinghouse Unit 2 Drawing 6D31420, Watts Bar 2- CERPI Responsibility:

AC160 Chassis Configuration, Rev. 2, shows the processors are model AC160, which are the same that are utilized for Unit 1, as shown on Westinghouse drawing 2D82995 Rev. 0, Watts Bar CERPI AC 160 Chassis Configuration.

107 May 6, 2010 Date: 5/28/10 Y Closed Closed RAI No. 22 TVA Letter dated EICB (Singh)

Responder: Clark ML102980005 6/18/10 Describe any control functions associated with the RM-1000 Requested information provided. See ML101940236, 10/26/2010 radiation monitors. The RM-1000 radiation monitors do not provide any control NRC to review. Encl 1, Item 29.

functions.

108 May 6, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Y Closed Closed N/A N/A Will be reviewed under OI#154 EICB (Garg)

Responder: Webb/Hilmes We are requested to docket the fact that the appropriate sections This item is to be worked with This item is closed as it of chapter 7 of the FSAR will be updated to include references to: This item is addressed as follows: item 51. will be reviewed under item 154. FSAR AMD

a. TI-28 to address as-found/as-left issues 109. FSAR Amendment 100 which was submitted on 100

b. RISC 2006-17 TVA letter to the NRC dated August __, 2010 incorporates as-found and as-left setpoint tolerance discussion into section 7.1.2.1.9, adds EEB-TI-28, Setpoint Methodology to the section 7.1 references and adds a reference to 7.1.2.1.9 to section 7.2.1.1.10.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N

2. TSTF-493, Rev. 4 Option A has been incorporated into the Unit 2 Tech Spec submittal dated February 2, 2010.

109.b 5/6/2010 Responder: N/A Y Closed Closed N/A N/A Duplicate of another open Item.

EICB (Carte) The reviewer was unable to identify the sections of the FSAR that TVA Provided response J. Wiebe accepted this action. NRC Action correspond to the standard review plan sections7.9.

109.a 7.8 XX 5/6/2010 Responder: N/A Y Closed Closed N/A N/A EICB (Darbali) The reviewer was unable to identify the sections of the FSAR that TVA Provided response J. Wiebe accepted this action.

correspond to the standard review plan sections 7.8.

110 May 6, 2010 Date: Y Closed Closed N/A N/A Information was found.

EICB (Garg)

Responder: Clark The reviewer was unable to locate the Eagle 21 WCAPs 12374 and 12375 for review within the NRC records. We agreed to These items were docketed under ML073550386 provide the ADAMS numbers for the submittal.

111 May 6, 2010 Date: 5/28/10 Y Closed Closed N/A TVA Letter dated Request to help find, not a request for EICB (Carte)

Responder: Clark 6/18/10 information.

The reviewer was unable to locate information (SER) on the plant computer or annunciator systems and asked us to provide the The annunciator system is not described in the WBN Unit 1 location within the FSAR where these systems are described. UFSAR. As such it is not included in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR.

With the exception of the ERFDS functions in section 7.5, the plant computer is not described in the WBN Unit 1 UFSAR. As such it is not included in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR.

112 June 1, 2010 Date: Y Closed Closed N/A N/A Information was received EICB (Garg)

Responder: Clark What are the differences between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Eagle 21 Systems? This information is included in TVA letter dated March 12, 2010, Enclosure 1, Item 10.

113 6/1/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 6/18/10 Are the new model Eagle 21 power supplies installed in Unit 1? Yes. Attachment 9 provides a work order excerpt and unit Attachment 9 does not show Item #34 difference form. the vendor and model no. of the Revised attachment provided on 7/30 letter. Power Supply.

114 7.2 7.2 6/1/2010 Responder: WEC Y Close Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 6/18/10 Provide the resolution of the Eagle 21 Rack 5 lockup on update The following non-proprietary response was developed from TVA to provide justification that Due 10/31/10 Item#35 issue. proprietary Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2027 (Reference there are no more surprises. TVA Letter dated 11), which provided the resolution of this issue. The write-up shows that 10/29/10 Westinghouse approved this non-proprietary response via e- there was differences Enclosure 1 Item mail from A. Drake to M. Clark on June 15, 2010. Revised response is included in between Unit 1 and 2 No. 6 letter dated 10/29/10 but was not identified to As documented in WBT-D-1917, Eagle-21 Rack 5 LCP NRC in earlier Diagnostic Failures, (Reference 14), during the factory response. Are there acceptance testing for the Unit 2 Eagle-21 System, any more surprises like Westinghouse noted an occasional diagnostic failure while this?

performing the parameter update function on Rack 5.

Subsequently, TVA provided to Westinghouse for testing and examination, a Loop Control Processor (LCP) board removed by TVA from Unit 1 Rack 5 for life cycle-based preventive maintenance. TVA personnel familiar with Unit 1 had indicated they had not experienced problems when performing parameter updates on Unit 1 Rack 5.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Based on Westinghouse examination and testing, a difference in hardware was identified between the Unit 1 LCP shipped to Westinghouse, the new Unit 2 Rack 5 LCP, and an older LCP (older than the Unit 1 LCP) from the Westinghouse Eagle 21 test bed. Installed on the Unit 1 LCP was a different version of an 80287 math coprocessor chip (80287 XL).

This version of the 80287 had an improved specification for calculation speed. Use of this chip on both the Unit 2 LCP and the test bed LCP allowed proper performance of the LCP when making parameter updates using the Unit 1/Unit 2 Rack 5 software. Also, use of the slower 80287 on any of the three LCP boards caused failure in parameter update with the Unit 1/Unit 2 Rack 5 software.

Through investigation of historical records, Westinghouse found that the 80287 XL chip had been evaluated and used by its former Process Control Division (now Emerson) for this application, but the current Westinghouse documentation had not been updated. This part has now been evaluated, and the Westinghouse documentation and drawing have been revised to allow use of the 80287 XL coprocessor. The 80287 XL coprocessor has been installed on the Unit 2 Rack 5 LCP, and the appropriate factory acceptance testing has been successfully conducted using this updated board.

Additionally, the LCP boards in the balance of the Unit 2 racks have been updated with the 80287 XL coprocessor.

TVA Revised Response:

The Eagle 21 system is installed and the Site Acceptance Test has been completed. To the best of TVAs knowledge there are no unknown issues with the system.

115 2/25/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte)

ML102910002 6/18/10 Provide a list of digital 1E systems that have a digital Response states that Eagle21 and the CQ PMAS MTP have Response provided in letter Item No. 17 communications path to non safety related systems and if it has: communications links to non-safety-related systems.. dated 10/5/10 TVA Letter dated

a. Been reviewed before for unit 1 10/5/10

b. Or installed in unit 1 under 50.59, or The original design allowed printing from both the Operator

c. Is unique to unit 2 Module (OM) and Maintenance and Test Panel (MTP) via The CQ PAMS SysRS (WNA-the plant computer. This required both to be connected to DS-01617-WBT Rev. 1 Figure the plant computer. Westinghouse did not perceive this as 2..1-1) shows that the OM has a an issue, because the standard Common Q PAMS design TCP interface to non-safety.

includes both the flat panel displays and individual control Please provide a list of ALL panel indicators. The Westinghouse Common Q team did digital communications paths to not realize that WBN does not use the individual control non-safety-related systems.

panel indicators. As a result, the original design documents provided by Westinghouse included the connection from the NNC 8/12/10: The staff pointed OM to the plant computer. out this inconsistency to TVA.

The staff could consider PAMS The TVA team did not realize that the Westinghouse design Licensing Technical Report to relied on the OM and MTP to be qualified isolation devices be a correction if TVA that protected the AC160 functions and individual control specifically identified the panel indicators from interference from the plant computer. inconsistency to the staff, or It was not until a meeting was held with TVA, Westinghouse identified where the error in the and Bechtel to discuss the design of the OM that the issues SysRS, SRS, & SDS had came to light. That was when Westinghouse understood already been identified. This

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N that the OM was the PAMS display and WBN did not use appears to be a feature in the individual control panel indicators and TVA/Bechtel CQ TR appendix that was understood that the OM was being credited as the qualified carried forward to WBN2 PAMS isolation device. It became apparent at the meeting to both inappropriately TVA/Bechtel and Westinghouse that the original design was not acceptable. The team then agreed to delete the OM connection to the plant computer.

116 6/3/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated Letter sent to Westinghouse requesting EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/5/10 the basis information and The Eagle 21 boards originally had a conformal coating. However, The response to this RAI was submitted in TVA letter to the Response provided in letter How is the tin whisker Item # 20 documentation for submittal to the NRC.

the new boards do not. Provide the basis for deletion of the NRC dated June 21, 2010. dated 10/5/10 issue is addressed. I conformal coating. think conformal coating As previously stated the technical reason for the coating was credited to protect was to ensure performance at high humidity, with the major against tin whisker concern being the effects of humidity on low level analog issue.

circuitry. Westinghouse letter (WBT-D-2036, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2, Basis for Removal of Conformal Coating Requirement on Eagle 21 Boards (Reference 7) does not credit the conformal coating as addressing the tin whisker issue.

As addressed in Resolution of Generic Safety Issues: Issue 200: Tin Whiskers (NUREG-0933, Main Report with Supplements 1-33),

CONCLUSION The low number of reported events associated with this issue, the lack of any increasing trend, the lack of any apparent decrease in reliability of systems or components due to tin whiskers, the existence of applicable regulatory requirements and programs (i.e., 10 CFR Part 21, the maintenance rule requirements, and the Reactor Oversight Program), and the issuance of Information Notice 2005-251878 to alert licensees collectively indicated that tin whiskers did not meet the requirements of NRC Management Directive 6.4. "Generic Issues Program," for further pursuit. Based on the considerations discussed above, RES recommended that the issue be returned to the originator to be evaluated for other possible options. As a result, the issue was DROPPED from further pursuit.1879 Based on the preceding NRC position no further discussion of the tin whisker issue is required.

117 7.1 7.1 6/3/2010 Responder: Hilmes Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/29/10 Does TVA use a single sided or double sided methodology for as- Reactor Protection System (RPS) (comprised of Reactor Trip Revised response is included in Pending FSAR Item#21 Enclosure 1 Item found and as-left instrument setpoint values. (RIS2006-7) (RPS) and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System letter dated 10/29/10 Amendment 102 No. 7 (ESFAS)) setpoint values are monitored by periodic submittal performance of surveillance tests in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. TVA uses double- Due 12/17/10 sided as-found and as-left tolerances for Reactor Trip and ESFAS trip setpoint surveillance tests as described in FSAR TVA needs to address amendment 100. that trip setpoint and allowable value TVA Revised Response: uncertainties are not reduced by the

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N For TSTF-493 parameters WBN Unit 2 uses only double reduction factor for the sided correction factors. Attachment 3 contains the revised single sided reduction FSAR section 7.1.2.1.9 that will be included in FSAR factor. TVA response Amendment 102 that reflects this change. not acceptable. TVA need to clarify if single sided methodology has been used in calculating trip setpoint and allowable value and if it is used then provide justifications.

118 7.4 7.4 6/8/2010 Responder: Merten Y Closed Closed EICB RAI No.1 TVA Letter dated Submittal date is based on current EICB (Darbali)

ML102910017, 10/29/10 EDCR scheduled issue date. Note:

TVA to submit excerpts from EDCR 55385 Attachment 4 contains excerpts from draft EDCR 55385 (i.e., Due 10/31/10. Waiting 10/19/10 Enclosure 1 Item The RVLIS EDCR has been split into draft Scope and Intent, Unit Difference and Technical Response is included in letter for docketed version to No. 8 two EDCRs. The first EDCR is 52601 Evaluation). The final excerpts will be submitted within two dated 10/29/10 close item. (Open Item 91) The second EDCR is weeks after issuance of the EDCR. 55385.

119 June 10, 2010 Date: Y Closed Closed RAI No. 23 TVA Letter dated EICB (Singh)

Responder: ML102980005 7/30/10 Submit the non-proprietary version of Sorrento/GA software V&V 10/26/2010 report version 1.1 04508005 and withholding affidavit Provided 7/15/2010 Date: 07/29/10 Responsibility: NRC TVA provided the non-proprietary version of V&V report version 1.1 04508005 and the withholding affidavit via TVA letter dated July 15, 2010.

120 5/6/2010 Responder: Hilmes/Merten/Costley Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte)

ML102910002 7/30/10 In reviewing the Maintenance Test Panel (MTP) link to the plant TVA responded by letter dated July 30, 2010 NNC 8/9/10: By letter dated July Item No. 18 computer, the reviewer noted that the MTP software is not purely (ML102160349) - See Enclosure 1 Item No. 14: Detailed 30, 2010 (ML102160349) - See one directional in that it does allow low level handshaking to discussion is provided including technical information on the Enclosure 1 Item No. 14 support the communications protocol. M. Merten/S. Hilmes data diode.

a. The reviewer stated that this was a potential concern and See Item 85. TVA not crediting the data diode.

requested additional information on how the MTP was protected a. TVA stated no new from feedback from the plant computer. information was found in Westinghouse documentation and that this information would be addressed in the V&V reports, and that the final hardware drawing will be provided. Neither of these two documents will contain the information requested. Please provide a detailed description of the MTP hardware connections and the software that perform the communications.

b. The reviewer stated that in the Oconee review, it was found that

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N the non-safety related data diode was easier to credit than a b. The information provided software barrier. It was suggested we look at changing our indicates that the MTP is position to credit the data diode provided it provided a physical connected directly to a non-barrier to feedback. Need OWL Information SAH safety-related Red Hat Linux Server which is then connected to the data diode devices.

Please describe the secure development and operational environment of these Red Hat

c. During this discussion, the reviewer asked if we had information Linux Servers.

from Westinghouse that demonstrated the ability of Common Q PAMs to withstand a data storm. A verbal response was that this c. The answer is not complete.

was required by contract as part of the Factory Acceptance Test A chattering node is one of the and would not be available until the FAT was completed. Need to failure modes of an Ethernet docket the verbal response and provide a date the information will link. The MTP is connected to a be available. Believe we stated this in the Tech Report. SAH Linux server over an Ethernet link. What prevents this link from locking up the MTP by a data storm?

121 5/6/2010 Responder: Webb/Webber Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte)

ML102980066 Item 7/30/10 If not previously provided, provide the requested information in The information in the letter provides references to previous No. 1 items a, b and c for changes to all platforms between Unit 1 and 2. submittals and a cross reference for the Foxboro I/A system.

(Specific request for information on Foxboro IA). D. Webb/H.

Webber

a. Describe the hardware differences between unit 1 and unit 2

b. Identify which systems have been transferred to the Foxboro Spec 200 system that utilize a different platform in Unit 1.

c. Identify the functions (ensure all control functions are addressed) that have been transferred to the Foxboro Spec 200 system that utilize a different platform in Unit 1.

122 June 14, 2010 Date: Y Closed Closed N/A - Request for N/A EICB Responder: WEC schedule not (Carte) Provide a date for completing the next revision of the Common Q technical PAMS System Requirements Specification. This is a duplicate of NRC RAI Matrix Item 50 and is information.

considered closed.

123 7.7.3 7.4.1, 6/14/2010 Responder: Y Closed Closed ML101720589, TVA Letter dated EICB (Darbali) 9.3.4.2. RAIs 21 and 22, 7/30/10 4 Safety Evaluation(SE) Section 7.7.3 Volume Control Tank Level 1. The devices in the Volume Control Tank Level Control Follow up question is to request 6/25/10 and EICB Control System System have been replaced. The Volume Control Tank a logic diagram in OI 284. RAI No.8 Level Indication and Control functions have been relocated ML102910017,

1. Confirm whether or not any Instrumentation & Control (I&C) to the Foxboro IA system. The transmitters and indicators 10/19/10 systems or equipment have been changed in the Volume Control have been replaced with 4-20mA technology and the Tank Level Control System. transmitters have been changed to Rosemount.

2. In the original Safety Evaluation(SE), NUREG-0847 2. Upscale failure of LT-62-129A: Flow is diverted to the (ML072060490), Section 7.7.3, the staff addressed a concern that holdup tank but makeup continues to maintain level and was raised by Westinghouse regarding an adverse control and alarms alert the operator.

protection system interaction. (a single random failure in the VCT level control system could cause the letdown flow to be Upscale failure of LT-62-130A: Unlike Unit 1, the makeup diverted to the liquid holdup tank). Based on your responses to the control system uses inputs from both LT-62-130A and LT staffs questions related to this concern, the staff considered the 129A. This results in a more robust design that eliminates a issue resolved. Confirm that your responses are applicable to Unit single point of failure for LT-62-130A. If transmitter LT 2. 130A fails >20mA, the system disregards the input and uses

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N the LT-62-129A signal for control. If transmitter LT-62-130A is high but <20 mA, the deviation between the two causes an alarm, and the diverter valve loop and makeup control both use the last good value of the average. Once the level goes high or low, alarms on LT-62-129A alert the operator to take action to mitigate.

124 7.7.5 XX 6/14/2010 Responder: Y Closed Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Darbali)

No. 23, 6/25/10 and 7/30/10 SE Section 7.7.5 IE Information Notice 79-22 Duplicate of item 96 EICB RAI No. 9 ML102910017,

1. In the original SE, Section 7.7.5, the staff determined that 10/19/10 Information Notice 79-22 was resolved based on your statement that the control and logic functions of the Watts Bar plant were identical to the Sequoyah plant, thus making the Sequoyah evaluation applicable to Watts Bar. Confirm that your statements regarding the control and logic functions are applicable to Unit 2s control and logic functions or describe any changes and why they are acceptable.

125 7.7.8 7.7.1.12 6/14/2010 Responder: Y Closed Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Darbali)

No.s 24 and 25, 7/30/10 SE Section 7.7.8 AMSAC 1. The AMSAC system was not previously installed in Unit 2. 6/25/10 and EICB EDCR 52408 installs the system. Attachment 3 contains RAI Nos.10 and 11

1. Confirm whether or not any I&C systems or equipment have excerpts from the EDCR that describe the Unit 2 system and ML102910017, been changed in the AMSAC? Describe the changes, if any. how it differs from the Unit 1 system. 10/19/10

2. NUREG-0847, Supplement 14 (ML072060486), documents the 2. EDCR 52408 incorporates the AMSAC system into the staffs review of FSAR Amendment 81 that found that the AMSAC Unit 2 drawings.

automatic initiation signal [to start the turbine-driven and motor-driven AFW pumps] was not added to the logic diagram for the AFW system shown in FSAR Figure 7.3-3, Sheet 2. The issue was resolved in Amendment 88. Confirm that this signal has been incorporated in the Unit 2 drawings.

126 7.8 7.8 June 14, 2010 Date: Y Closed Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Darbali)

Responder: No. 26, 6/25/10 and 7/30/10 SE Section 7.8 NUREG-0737 Items EICB RAI No.12 No I&C components or systems are affected by this change. ML102910017,

1. In the SER Cross Reference To FSAR table (06-25-09), section 10/19/10 7.8.5 Confirm Existence of Anticipatory Reactor Trip Upon Turbine Trip (II.K.3.12) has the following scope of change:

Common Station Service Transformers (CSST) A and B, eight (8) vital inverters vs. four, fifth DG will be removed from FSAR, Double breaker, double breaker scheme of the new Watts Bar 500kV switchyard.

Is any I&C system or component affected in the scope of this change?

127 7.2 7.2 6/16/2010 Responder: WEC/Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 6/18/10 Provide the status of the Eagle 21 Rack 2 RTD accuracy issue. The following non-proprietary response was developed from Item36 proprietary Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2034 (Reference 15), which provided the details of this issue. Westinghouse approved this non-proprietary response via e-mail from A.

Drake to M. Clark on June 16, 2010.

During the Watts Bar Unit 2 Eagle 21 Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) of Rack 2 it was discovered that the narrow range

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) temperature inputs were consistently reading about 0.2 °F higher than expected.

Investigation revealed that these inputs are configured in the Loop Calculation Processor software as a shared RTD. This is incorrect. Rack 2 RTD's are not shared. Racks 6, 10 and 13 RTD's are. Configuration as a shared RTD input alters the equation used for the temperature calculation. Watts Bar Unit 1 uses identical software to Unit 2.

Further investigation by Westinghouse showed this configuration error causes the Narrow Range Temperatures for only Division I to read 0.2 to 0.27 °F higher over the Narrow Range span of 510-650 °F. The 0.2 °F shift affects Thot and Tcold equally and thus will not affect the indication of Delta T. Tavg will indicate high by 0.2 °F which will decrease the Over temperature and Overpower set points; which is in the conservative direction.

128 7.2 7.2 6/18/2010 Responder: WEC Drake /TVA Craig Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated Track through SE open item EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/29/10 Submit the report on the final resolution of the Eagle 21 Rack 2 The Unit 1/Unit 2 Eagle 21 configuration has a sufficient Response is included in letter Due 10/31/10 Item46 Enclosure 1 Item RTD input issue number of spare Narrow Range and Wide Range RTD inputs dated 10/29/10 No. 9 available on the installed ERI-01 and ERI-02 boards to wire these spare inputs to the active channels. The spare input Has it been tested to show that will provide the parallel resistance to resolve the problem. the revised config. Provide the The Wide Range (WR) RTD inputs provide the same input needed accuracy.

impedance as the Narrow Range (NR) RTD inputs. Jumpers will be installed at the Eagle 21 termination frame to provide a parallel connection from each existing NR RTD input to an existing spare input, thus simulating the hardware connection for shared RTDs. Therefore, as configured, the Rack 2 Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) would provide the correct temperature calculation for the NR RTDs.

129 6/12/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A TVA Letter dated DORL (Poole) 10/5/10 TVA will provide non-proprietary versions of the following Common The documents, and affidavits for withholding for the listed Response provided in letter Confirmation by Q attached proprietary documents and the affidavits for the documents were submitted to the NRC on TVA letter to the dated 10/5/10 10/14/108 proprietary documents by June 30, 2010. NRC dated July 14, 2010.

1. System Design Specification WNA-DS-01667-WBT, Rev. 1

2. System Requirements Specification WNA-DS-01617-WBT, Rev.

1

3. Software Requirements Specification WNA-SD-00239-WBT, Rev. 1 130 6/28/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed N/A TVA Letter dated DORL 10/5/10 (Poole) TVA committed to revise in Amendment 100: table 4.3-1 to add ID FSAR Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on TVA letter Response provided in letter Confirmation by and OD nomenclature to thimble guide tube dimensions . to the NRC dated September 1, 2010 added the ID and OD dated 10/5/10 10/14/10 nomenclature.

131 6/28/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed N/A TVA Letter dated DORL 10/5/10 (Poole) TVA committed to revise in Amendment 100: FSAR 3.10 FSAR Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on TVA letter Response provided in letter Confirmation by references to eliminate (LATER) for document numbers. to the NRC dated September 1, 2010 updated the reference dated 10/5/10 10/14/10 document number information.

132 6/28/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed N/A TVA Letter dated DORL (Pool 10/5/10 e)

TVA committed to revise in Amendment 100: FSAR 3.10 to correct FSAR Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on TVA letter Response provided in letter Confirmation by

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N differences between the list on page 3.10-4 and the numbering to the NRC dated September 1, 2010 corrected the dated 10/5/10 10/14/10 referenced by the text below the list. numbering in the text.

133 6/28/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed TVA Letter dated DORL 10/5/10 (Poole) TVA committed to revise in Amendment 100: FSAR 3.10 to FSAR Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on TVA letter Response provided in letter Confirmation by remove references to IEEE 344-1987. to the NRC dated September 1, 2010 removed the reference dated 10/5/10 10/14/10 to IEEE 344-1987.

134 6/28/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed TVA Letter dated DORL 10/5/10 (Poole) TVA committed to revise in Amendment 100: FSAR Table 1.3-3 to FSAR Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on TVA letter Response provided in letter Confirmation by reflect modifications to WBN2 . to the NRC dated September 1 2010 updated the table to dated 10/5/10 10/14/10 reflect the WBN2 modifications.

135 7.3.1 7.3.1 6/30/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed RAI not necessary TVA Letter dated EICB (Darbali) because this item 10/5/10, item 27 TVA committed to add in Amendment 100 a reference to 7.3.1.1.1 FSAR Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on TVA letter Response provided in letter was originated by in 6.2.5.2.b. to the NRC dated Sept 1, 2010 added the reference. dated 10/5/10 TVA Amendment 100 received.

136 7.3.2, 7.4, 5.6, 6/30/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed RAI not necessary TVA Letter dated EICB (Darbali) 7.4 6.3.5 because this item 10/5/10, item 28 TVA committed to replace in Amendment 100 the terms "service FSAR Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on TVA letter Response provided in letter was originated by water" and "emergency raw cooling water" where they are used to the NRC dated Sept 1, 2010 updated the "service water" dated 10/5/10 TVA incorrectly with "Essential Raw Cooling Water" in sections 7.4, and "emergency raw cooling water" nomenclature as 6.2.1, Table 3.7-25, Table 9.3-3, Table 15.4-14, 1.9.2.7, 7.3.2.2.5 required to read essential raw cooling water.

and 11.2.4. Amendment 100 received.

137 Several WBN2 PAMS documents contain a table titled, Document Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed ML101650255, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte)

Traceability & Compliance. No. 1 10/5/10 (a) The table is to show the document hierarchy (i.e., what Response provided in letter (a) Please explain the purpose of this table. documents are predecessors to the document in relationship dated 10/5/10 to the design life cycle).

(b) Please describe how this table is different than a reference list.

(b) This table is showing a hierarchical relationship between Carte accepted this response (c) What does it mean for a document to be listed in this table? documents. These documents are also in the reference list 9/1 along with other documents that have no hierarchical relationship with the document.

(c) This question is similar to (a). It is to identify the documents that are predecessors to this document in relationship to the design life cycle.

138 By letter dated February 3, 2010, Westinghouse informed TVA that Responder: WEC N Open Open-NRC Review ML101650255, Item EICB (Carte) certain PAMS documentation has been completed. No. 2 This item is used to track all Commercial Grade Revised response included in NNC 2/2/11:

(a) The draft ISG6 states that a commercial grade dedication plan Dedication issues. letter dated 12/22/10 Commercial grade should be provided with an application for a Tier 2 review. dedication will be

a. WNA-LI-00058-WT-P, Revision 2, Post-Accident TVA agreed to include a addressed at the next By letter dated February 5, 2010, TVA stated that the commercial Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report description of the generic audit.

grade dedication plan was included in the Common Q Topical submitted in TVA Letter to NRC dated December 3, Westinghouse hardware Report Section 11, Commercial Grade Dedication Program. 2010, (Reference 1) contains the following changes to commercial grade dedication Section 11 includes a description of the Common Q Commercial address the NRC request: process in the PAMS licensing Grade Dedication Program, and states: A detailed review plan is technical report. (see developed for each Common Q hardware or software component Section 7, Commercial Grade Dedication Process has ML102920031 Item No 1) that requires commercial grade dedication. been revised to describe the general commercial grade dedication process for both hardware and software and TVA agreed to include (in the Please provide the commercial grade dedication plans for each uses a description of the AI687 dedication process as PAMS licensing technical report)

Common Q hardware or software component that has not been an example of how the process is applied. an evaluation of WBN2 critical previously reviewed and approved by the NRC. characteristics for commercial

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N As listed in Table 6-3. Westinghouse Watts Bar 2 Westinghouse hardware (b) The draft ISG6 states that a commercial grade dedication Common Q PAMS Documents at Westinghouse components against the generic report should be provided within 12 months of requested approval Rockville Office, the following commercial grade critical characteristics. (see for a Tier 2 review. dedication documents are available for NRC audit at the ML102920031 Item No 2)

Westinghouse Rockville office: (list included in letter)

(i) Please provide 00000-ICE-37722 Rev. 0, Commercial Grade TVA agreed to include a Dedication Report for the QNX Operating System for Common Q b. It is TVAs understanding that the submittal of the description of the generic Applications. documents listed in (b.i) and (b.ii) is no longer required. Westinghouse software Rather, it was agreed, that the inclusion of a description commercial grade dedication (ii) Please provide WNA-CD-00018-GEN Rev. 3, Commercial of the commercial grade dedication process in revision process in the PAMS licensing Dedication Report for QNX 4.25G for Common Q Applications. 2 of the Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) technical report. (see Licensing Technical Report, WNA-LI-00058-WT-P, ML102920031 Item No 3) would be sufficient to address this request.

TVA agreed to include (in the PAMS licensing technical report) an evaluation of WBN2 critical characteristics for commercial software components against the generic critical characteristics. (see ML102920031 Item No 4) 139 The WBN2 PAMS System Requirements Specification (WBN2 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed ML101650255, Item TVA Letter dated WBN2 PAMS System Requirements EICB (Carte)

PAMS SysRS) contains a table (see page iii) titled, Document No. 3 10/5/10 Specification Traceability & Compliance, which states that the WBN2 PAMS The table is to show the document hierarchy (i.e., what Response provided in letter SysRS was created to support no documents. Please explain. documents are predecessors to the document in relationship dated 10/5/10 TVA docketed WNA-DS-01617-WBT to the design life cycle). The table purpose is to provide Rev. 1, RRAS Watts Bar 2 NSSS references to internal Westinghouse documents and is not Completion Program I&C Projects Post intended to reference TVA documents. Accident Monitoring System- System Requirements Specification, dated December 2009.

140 The first requirement in the WBN2 PAMS SysRS (i.e., R2.2-1) Responder: Clark N Closed Closed ML101650255, Item TVA Letter dated WBN2 PAMS System Requirements EICB (Carte) states: The PAMS shall be capable of operation during normal No. 4 10/29/10 Specification and abnormal environments and plant operating modes. The WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 100 Section 7.5.1.8, Post Revised response included in NNC 2/3/11: This item Enclosure 1 Item rational for this requirement is that it is necessary to meet Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) specifies the Reg. letter dated 12/22/10 is addressed by: No. 10 TVA docketed WNA-DS-01617-WBT Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97. Guide 1.97 variables implemented in the Common Q based (1) WNA-LI-00058- Rev. 1, RRAS Watts Bar 2 NSSS WBN Unit 2 PAMS NNC 11/3/10: The origin of the WBT-P Rev. 2 Section Completion Program I&C Projects Post What document specifies which RG 1.97 variables are requirements in the SysRS are 11 Accident Monitoring System- System implemented in the Common Q based WBN2 PAMS? TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request: not clearly document. Rev. 1 of Requirements Specification, dated (2) Attachment 1 to the Common Q PAMS Licensing December 2009.

WNA-LI-00058-WT-P, Revision 2, Post-Accident Monitoring Technical Report contains an TVA letter dated Octobr System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report was submitted open item that will be addressed 21, 2010.

in TVA Letter to NRC, dated December 3, 2010 (Reference in Rev. 2; this open item is to 1). Revision 2 contains the following change to address this include TVAs enhanced request: contract compliance matrix. It is expected that this matrix will Section 11, TVA Contract Compliance Matrix has been address this open item.

added. Specifically the items of concern are addressed by Requirements 7 through 19 (pages 11-1 and 11-2).

141 Deleted by DORL Date: Y Closed Closed ML101650255, Item WBN2 PAMS System Requirements EICB (Carte)

Responder: No. 5 Specification TVA docketed WNA-DS-01617-WBT Rev. 1, RRAS Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Post Accident Monitoring System- System Requirements Specification, dated December 2009.

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N 142 The applicable regulatory guidance for reviewing the WBN2 PAMS Responder: WEC N Open Open-TVA/WEC ML101650255, Item WBN2 PAMS System Requirements EICB (Carte)

SysRS would be IEEE 830 as endorsed by Regulatory Guide No. 6 Specification 1.172 and BTP 7-14 Section B.3.3.1, Requirements Activities - This item is used to track all traceability issues with the Response included in letter NNC 2/2/11: Updated Software Requirements Specifications. IEEE 830-1994 Section Software Requirements Specification (SRS). dated 12/22/10 Specifications and TVA docketed WNA-DS-01617-WBT 4.3.8, Traceable, states: A [requirements specification] is RTMs to be provided by Rev. 1, RRAS Watts Bar 2 NSSS traceable of the origin of each of its requirements is clear TVA/Westinghouse agreed to TVA Completion Program I&C Projects Post include the V&V evaluation of Accident Monitoring System- System

1. How did TVA ensure the traceability of each requirement in TVA Response to 1: their reusable software element Tracability to be Requirements Specification, dated the WBN2 PAMS SysRS. Traceability of requirements for the WBN Unit 2 Common Q development process in the addressed during the December 2009.

PAMS is ensured by: V&V design phase summary next audit.

report. This evaluation would

a. Preparation of the TVA Contract Compliance Matrix include an evaluation against contained in WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Revision 2, Post-the development process Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing requirements. This evaluation Technical Report submitted in TVA Letter to NRC would also include an evaluation dated December 3, 2010 (Reference 1).

of how the WBN2 specific

b. Engineering review/comment/status of each revision requirements were addressed of:

by the reusable software

i. WNA-DS-01617-WBT, Post Accident elements. (see ML102920031 Monitoring System - System Requirements Item No 5)

Specification ii. WNA-DS-01667-WBT, Post Accident Monitoring System - System Design Specification (hardware) iii. WNA-SD-00239-WBT, Software Requirements Specification for the Post Accident Monitoring System (software)

TVA Response to 2:

2. Explain the source(s) of the requirements present in the Post As documented in the RTM, some software requirements Accident Monitoring Systems Software Requirements are taken from generic documents. The decision to include Specification. To clarify, many documents have generic software requirements was to reduce the overall requirements that are incorporated by reference into the scope for Common Q features that are unchanged across SRS, but what served to direct the author to include those projects. Westinghouse reviewed the generic PAMS various documents in the SRS or, if the requirement is based requirements and included those requirements that were on the System Requirements Specification, what directed the applicable to WBN Unit 2 PAMS.

author to include the requirement there?

Source: E-mail from Westinghouse (Matthew A.

Shakun) to Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: December 22 letter review, dated December 17, 2010 (Reference 13)

3. Clarify whether the unnumbered paragraphs in the Post TVA Response to 3:

Accident Monitoring Systems Software Requirements Unnumbered paragraphs in the Post Accident Monitoring Specification, such as in the section headings, or are all such Systems Software Requirements Specification, such as in sections simply considered to be informative?

the section headings, are informative and are not to be interpreted as requirements. All requirements are explicitly Does the same apply to documents referenced by the SRS?

numbered.

Such as WCAP-16096-NP-A, Rev. 1A, Software Program Manual for Common Q Systems, which is incorporated by It depends on the document type. The statement would be reference in requirement R2.3-2 in the SRS.

true for requirements documents (such as the SysRS or SDS) if they were incorporated by reference. However, for R2.3-2 [The PAMS software shall comply with the the specific item cited, WCAP-16096-NP-A, Rev. 1A, it does requirements and guidelines defined in WCAP-16096-NP-A, not contain numbered requirements. The requirements Software Program Manual for Common Q Systems contained in this document are contained within the text of (reference 5).]

the various sections.

If any requirements are expressed in such unnumbered Source: E-mail from Westinghouse (Matthew A. Shakun) to paragraph form instead of individually identified requirements, Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: December 22 letter review, please list them, describe why they satisfy the fundamental dated December 17, 2010 (Reference 13) requirement of unambiguity, and describe how they were

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N verified.

4. Are there any sources of requirements in parallel with the Post Accident Monitoring Systems Software Requirements TVA Response to 4:

Specification? Meaning does the SRS contain, explicitly or The Westinghouse SRS, WNA-SD-00239-WBT, Revision 3 by reference, all the requirements that were used in the contains references to other Westinghouse software design phase for the application specific software, or do requirements documents. Specifically, software design phase activities use requirements found in any other source or document? If so, what are these 00000-ICE-3238, Revision 5, Software Requirements sources or documents? Specification Post Accident Monitoring System 00000-ICE-3239, Revision 13, Software Requirements Specification for the Common Q Generic Flat Panel Display Software Source: E-mail from Westinghouse (Matthew A. Shakun) to Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: December 22 letter review, dated December 17, 2010 (Reference 13)

5. References 12, 27, 29, and 31-44 in the Post Accident Monitoring Systems Software Requirements Specification TVA Response to 5:

are various types of Reusable Software Element. Requirements for the reusable software elements (RSEDs) are evaluated in WNA-VR-00283-WBT-P, Revision 3, IV&V These references are used in the body of the SRS, for Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System, example: dated December 2010 (Attachment 10).

R5.3.14-2 [The Addressable Constants CRC error signal RSED traceability is contained in WNA-VR-00280-WBT, shall be TRUE when any CAL CRC's respective ERROR Revision 2, Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C terminal = TRUE (WNA-DS-00315-GEN, "Reusable Software Projects Requirements Traceability Matrix for the Reactor Element Document CRC for Calibration Data" [Reference Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) Custom PC 12]).] Elements. This document can be made available for audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office.

They are also included via tables such as found in requirement R7.1.2-1

[The Watts Bar 2 PAMS shall use the application-specific type circuits and custom PC elements listed in Table 7.1-1.]

Do the referenced reusable software element documents include requirements not explicitly stated in the SRS? If so what is their origin?

At the September 15 public meeting in Rockville, the following actions were agreed to. These items address the traceability concerns with the Software Requirements Specification.

1. Westinghouse will perform a review of the Requirements Traceability Matrix(RTM), using the issues identified at the 9/15 public meeting as a guide (documented below) and update the RTM as required.

TVA Response:

See response to letter Item 13 (NRC Matrix Item 145).

2. The next issue of the IV&V report will include the Requirements phase review of the RTM and a partial review for the Design phase.

TVA Response:

See response to letter Item 13 (NRC Matrix Item 145).

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N

3. Westinghouse will add a comments column in the Requirements Traceability Matrix (RTM) to address items not in the SRS or SysRS.

TVA Response:

A comments column has been added to WNA-VR-00279-WBT, Revision 3, Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Requirements Traceability Matrix for the Post Accident Monitoring System.

Source: E-mail from Westinghouse (Matthew A.

Shakun) to Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: December 22 letter review, dated December 17, 2010 (Reference 13)

4. IEEE 830 says you shouldnt have planning information in the SRS. Westinghouse has agreed to remove this information.

TVA Response:

Westinghouse has confirmed that process requirements have been removed from the SRS.

Source: E-mail from Westinghouse (Andrew P. Drake) to Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: Common Q RAI concerns, dated December 8, 2010 (Reference 17)

5. IEEE 830 says you shouldnt have process requirements in the SRS. Westinghouse has agreed to remove these requirements.

TVA Response:

Westinghouse confirmed that process requirements have been removed from the SRS.

Source: E-mail from Westinghouse (Andrew P. Drake) to Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: Common Q RAI concerns, dated December 8, 2010 (Reference 17)

6. Westinghouse will perform and document an evaluation of the SRS to ensure compliance with Reg.

Guide 1.172 and justify any deviations.

TVA Response:

WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Revision 2, Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report submitted in TVA Letter to NRC dated December 3, 2010, (Reference 1):

Section 9, Compliance Evaluation Of The Watts Bar 2 PAMS Software Requirements Specification To IEEE Standard 830-1998 And Regulatory Guide 1.172 has been added.

7. 25 issues identified by V&V where some requirements have not been included in the System Design Specification (SDS) (14) and SRS (11) at the revisions reviewed by V&V. Have these been addressed?

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N TVA Response:

The twenty-five (25) issues are captured in Exception Reports (ERs): V&V-769 and V&V-770. These ERs have all been addressed and the ERs have been closed satisfactorily by Westinghouse IV&V.

Source: E-mail from Westinghouse (Matthew A.

Shakun) to Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: December 22 letter review, dated December 17, 2010 (Reference 13)

8. Some hardware requirements are contained in the SRS instead of the System Design Specification (SDS). These will be removed from the SRS and incorporated into the next revision of the SDS.

TVA Response:

The hardware requirements in the Software Requirements Specification have been deleted and moved to System Design Specification.

Source: E-mail from Westinghouse (Matthew A.

Shakun) to Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: December 22 letter review, dated December 16, 2010 (Reference 15)

9. RTM item R4.2-2 protection class software set to 0.

Needs to be fixed internally. Write CAPs to revise the application restrictions document on AC160.

TVA Response:

Westinghouse CAPs IR# 10-259-M034 has been issued. This item will be addressed in revision 4 of the RTM.

Source: E-mail from Westinghouse (Matthew A.

Shakun) to Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: December 22 letter review, dated December 17, 2010 (Reference 13)

10. Westinghouse to improve the traceability of the tests that are performed with the function enable (FE) switch in the ENABLE position.

TVA Response:

The tests that are performed with the FE keyswitch in the ENABLE position are defined in the SRS Sections:

6.2 Manually Initiated Testing, 7.2.23 Annunciator Test Display, 7.2.25 Saturation Margin Test Display, and 7.2.26 Analog Output Test Display.

11. Westinghouse to revise documents to be consistent with referring to the FE switch in the ENABLE position.

TVA Response:

Westinghouse has elected to standardize on the terms FE keyswitch and ENABLE. A review of recent documents for compliance with this comment and commitment was performed with the following results:

a. Revision 3 of the SysRS, and SDS have been

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N revised to use the terms FE keyswitch. Revision 3 of the SDS is consistent in use of the term ENABLE.

b. SysRS Revision 3 is not consistent in use of the term ENABLE as noted below:

i. R2.5.2.1-2 uses the term ENABLED instead of ENABLE ii. R2.5.2.1.3-3, R2.6.3.3-1, R2.6.3.3-2, R2.6.3.3-3, and R2.6.3.3-7, use the term Enable instead of ENABLE

c. Revision 3 of the SRS is not consistent in use of the terms FE keyswitch and ENABLE as noted below:

i. Tables 7.2-1 Train A PAMS Data Transmitted to the Plant Computer and 7.2-2 Train B PAMS Data Transmitted to the Plant Computer items 101 and 102 in the SRS refer to the FE switch.

All other items in the SRS refer to the FE keyswitch.

ii. Section 2.1, page 2-4, uses the term Enable instead of ENABLE iii. Requirements R7.2.14-6 and R7.2.16-7 use the term active instead of ENABLE iv. Requirements R7.2.23-2, R7.2.25-2, R7.2.26-2, R7.2.31-4, 7.2.56 FPDS Availability, and R7.2.57-4 use the term enabled instead of ENABLE

d. WNA-AR-00180-WBT-P, Revision 0, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for the Post Accident Monitoring System, dated October 2010, submitted in TVA letter to NRC dated (Reference

12) is not consistent in use of the term FE keyswitch as noted below:

i. Section 2.2 System Description and Table 3-1 WB2 PAMS FMEA refer to the FE switch.

ii. Table 3-1 describes the switch as the Functional Enable (FE) switch and the FE key-switch

e. Revision 2 of the Licensing Technical Report is not consistent in use of the term FE keyswitch as noted below:

i. Sections 2.2, 5.3 use the term (FE) keylock switch on pages 2-3 (2 places), page 5-3, page 5-6 (4 places)

The identified discrepancies in the use of the terms FE keyswitch and ENABLE in the SysRS, SRS, FMEA and Licensing Technical Report, will be corrected in the next revision of the documents.

12. The flow of information is from the SysRS to the SDS (hardware) and SRS (software). Describe how the documents are used. Describe in 1.1 of the SysRS.

Need a good write up of how the process works.

TVA Response:

See response to letter item 13 (NRC Matrix Item 145).

13. Westinghouse and TVA will develop a revised

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N schedule for document submittals and provide it to the NRC no later than 9/30/10 TVA Response:

The revised document submittal schedule was included as item 3 NRC Request (Matrix Item Number 142, TVA Commitments Nos. 10 and 17) in TVA letter to NRC dated October 26, 2010 (Reference 5).

14. TVA will update the Procurement Requisition Resolution Matrix and submit it to show how the Common Q PAMS design meets the contract requirements.

TVA Response:

The Procurement Requisition Resolution Matrix has been updated and is included in WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Revision 2, Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS)

Licensing Technical Report submitted in TVA Letter to NRC dated December 3, 2010, (Reference 1), as Section 11, TVA Contract Compliance Matrix.

15. Westinghouse to add the Software Design Descriptions to the RTM TVA Response:

The Software Design Description documents were added to the RTM in WNA-VR-00279-WBT, Rev 2.

Source: E-mail from Westinghouse (Matthew A.

Shakun) to Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: December 22 letter review, dated December 17, 2010 (Reference 13)

16. Westinghouse to clarify how requirements or documents are incorporated by reference into the Common Q PAMS requirements.

TVA Response:

When a Common Q PAMS requirements document references a section of another document, all requirements in that section are applicable.

Source: E-mail from Westinghouse (Matthew A.

Shakun) to Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: December 22 letter review, dated December 17, 2010 (Reference 13)

17. Westinghouse to review the use of shall outside of numbered paragraphs in requirements documents to ensure that all requirements are captured and clearly identified.

TVA Response:

See response in letter dated December 22, 2010, item 2 (NRC Matrix Item 050).

18. Westinghouse to resolve the following questions concerning Software Design Descriptions (SDDs)

a. Is the SDD a standalone document or will it

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N incorporate the generic SDD by reference?

b. What are the SDDs?

c. PAMS is a delta document so how do we capture all the generic requirements for traceability.

TVA Response:

a. There are three SDDs prepared specifically for the Watts Bar 2 PAMS project. These are listed below in Item b. These documents and superior requirements documents refer to other generic SDDs also listed in Item b.

b. The SDDs developed for this project are:

i. WNA-SD-00248-WBT, Revision 1, Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Software Design Description for the Post Accident Monitoring System Flat Panel Display ii. WNA-SD-00250-WBT, Revision 1, Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Software Design Description for the Post Accident Monitoring System AC160 Software iii. WNA-SD-00277-WBT, Revision 2, Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Software Design Description for the Post Accident Monitoring System Flat Panel Display System Screen Design Details iv. Other generic SDDs referenced by the PAMS project are:

(a) 00000-ICE-20157, Revision 18, Software Design Description for the Common Q Generic Flat-Panel Software (b) 00000-ICE-30152, Revision 5, Software Design Description Post Accident Monitoring System AC160 (c) 00000-ICE-30140, Revision 4, Software Design Description for the Common Q Core Protection Calculator System Database and Utility Functions

c. Refer to WNA-VR-00279-WBT, Revision 3.

Source: E-mail from Westinghouse (Matthew A.

Shakun) to Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: December 22 letter review, dated December 17, 2010 (Reference 13)

19. For Reusable Software Elements, Westinghouse to describe as qualified libraries by following the SPM and qualified using the Software Elements Test procedure under Appendix B program. Provide a summary of RSEDs generic WCAP. Westinghouse to determine if the WCAP was docketed under the AP1000. RSED concept is not in the SPM. WCAP-15927 AP-1000

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N does not discuss RCEDs. WCAP process was acceptable. RSEDs are listed in the SDD References.

TVA Response:

Section 3.2.4.1 of WCAP-15927 describes the RSED design process for custom PC elements and type circuits. The Glossary of Terms in the SPM defines custom PC elements and type circuits as modules.

Therefore, the relationship between WCAP-15927 describing the RSED process as circuits, is defined in the SPM requirements for software module development.

WCAP-15927 is on the AP1000 docket.

Source: E-mail from Westinghouse (Matthew A.

Shakun) to Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: December 22 letter review, dated December 17, 2010 (Reference 13) 143 The WBN2 PAMS Software Requirements Specification (WBN2 Responder: WEC N Open Open-TVA/WEC ML101650255, Item WBN2 PAMS System Requirements EICB (Carte)

PAMS SRS - ML101050202) contains a table (see page iii) titled, No. 7 Specification Document Traceability & Compliance, which states that the Addressed in the 9/15 public meeting and 9/20 - 9/21 audit. Response included in letter Due 12/22/10 WBN2 PAMS SRS was created to support the three documents A detailed explanation will be provided. dated 12/22/10 TVA docketed WNA-DS-01617-WBT identified (one of which is the WBN2 PAMS SysRS). Section 1.1, To be addressed by Rev. 1, RRAS Watts Bar 2 NSSS Overview, of the WBN2 PAMS SRS states: This document TVA Response: Revision of the RTM, Completion Program I&C Projects Post describes requirements for the major software components SRS, SysRS, and Accident Monitoring System- System (a) and (b) The requested information is provided in the SysDS. Requirements Specification, dated (a) Please list and describe each of the major software following documents: December 2009.

components. Please include a description of any NRC review for i. WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Revision 2, Post- NNC 2/2/11: Updated each of these components. Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Specifications and Technical Report, Table 6-1, Document RTMs to be provided by (b) Please list and describe each of the other software Requirements which lists the software TVA components. Please include a description of any NRC review for documentation requirements for the Common Q each of these components. PAMS and Section 11 TVA Contract NNC 2/3/11: The Compliance Matrix submitted in TVA Letter to above due date has (c) What other documents contain the requirements for the other NRC, dated December 3, 2010 (Reference 1). been missed by at software components? ii. WNA-DS-01617-WBT-P, Revision 3, Post least 2 months.

Accident Monitoring System- System Please provide new The WBN2 PAMS System Design Specification (WBN2 PAMS Requirements Specification, dated December due date.

SDS) contains a table (see page iii) titled, Document Traceability 2010 (Attachment 1)

& Compliance, which states that the WBN2 PAMS SysRS was iii. WNA-SD-00239-WBT-P, Revision 3, Software created to support the WBN2 PAMS SysRS. Section 1.1, Requirements Specification for the Post Accident Purpose, of the WBN2 PAMS SDS states: The purpose of this Monitoring System, dated December 2010 document is to define the hardware design requirements (Attachment 7) iv. WNA-VR-00279-WBT, Revision 3, Watts Bar 2 (c) Do the WBN2 PAMS SRS and SDS, together, implement all of NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects the requirements in the WBN2 PAMS SysRS? Requirements Traceability Matrix for the Post Accident Monitoring System (available for NRC (e) Please briefly describe all of the documents that implement audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office) the WBN2 PAMS SysRS. To the best of TVAs knowledge, no prior NRC review of the software components has been performed.

(c) WNA-VR-00280-WBT, Revision 2, Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Requirements Traceability Matrix for the Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) Custom PC Elements (available for NRC audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office)

(d) No. Please see Item (e) below.

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N (e) The documents that describe the requirements that implement the WBN Unit 2 SysRS are:

i. WNA-VR-00279-WBT, Revision 3, Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Requirements Traceability Matrix for the Post Accident Monitoring System (available for NRC audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office) ii. WNA-VR-00280-WBT, Revision 2, Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Requirements Traceability Matrix for the Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) Custom PC Elements (available for NRC audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office)

Source: E-mail from Westinghouse (Matthew A. Shakun) to Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: December 22 letter review, dated December 17, 2010 (Reference 13) 144 The WBN2 PAMS Software Requirements Specification (WBN2 Responder: WEC N Open Open-TVA/WEC ML101650255, Item TVA Letter dated WBN2 PAMS Software Requirements EICB (Carte)

PAMS SRS) contains a table (see page iii) titled, Document No. 8 10/5/10 Specification Traceability & Compliance, which states that the WBN2 PAMS (a) The purpose of NABU-DP-00014-GEN document is to Revised response included in Due TBD - TVA to SRS was created to support the three documents identified (two of define the process for system level design, software design letter dated 12/22/10 provide a date By letter dated April 8, 2010 these documents have been provided on the docket). and implementation, and hardware design and (ML10101050203), TVA docketed implementation for Common Q safety system development. Response provided in letter Responses to items a WNA-SD-00239-WBT, Revision 1, (a) Please describe the third document (i.e., NABU-DP-00014- This document supplements the Common Q SPM, WCAP- dated 10/5/10 and e provided. "RRAS Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion GEN Revision 2, Design Process for Common Q Safety 16096-NP-A. The scope of NABU-DP-00014-GEN includes Program I&C Projects, Software Systems). the design and implementation processes for the application NRC Review and WEC to NNC 11/18/10: Requirements Specification for the Post development. For a fuller description of the design process complete response. (1) Items b-d closed to Accident Monitoring System, dated (b) Please describe the flow of information between these three described in NABU-DP-00014-GEN please refer to the other Open Item nos. February 2010 (ML101050202).

documents. Design Process for AP1000 Common Q Safety Systems, b-d to be addressed at public (2) The point of these WCAP-15927 on the AP1000 docket. Since this is a meeting and audit. Will require questions was to (c) Does the PAMS SRS implement the requirements in these Westinghouse process document that is not specifically information to be docketed. understand how the three documents? referenced in the SRS, it will be removed in the next revision origin of the of the document. requirements in the (d) Please describe if and how these three documents are used in requirements the development of the PAMS Software Design Description. (b) - Closed to items 142 and 145 specifications were documented. TVA (e) Do the WBN2 V&V activities include verification that the (c) - Closed 142 stated that the origin of requirements of these three documents have been incorporated the requirements would into the WBN2 PAMS SRS. (d) - Closed to Item 142 be demonstrated in Rev. 2 of the CQ PAMS (e) WBN2 PAMS Software Requirements Specification LTR.

(WNA-SD-00239-WBT, Rev. 1) refers to Document Traceability & Compliance table on page iii. This table has NNC 2/3/11: CQ three entries; Design Process for Common Q Safety PAMS LTR Rev. 2 Systems (NABU-DP-00014-GEN, Rev. 2), RRAS Watts Bar Section 11 & 12 do not 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Post Accident adequately Monitoring System - System Requirements Specification demonstrate the origin (WNA-DS-01617-WBT, Rev. 1), and RRAS Watts Bar 2 of requirements in NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Post Accident SysRS. TVA to Monitoring System - System Design Specification (WNA- describe how to DS-01667-WBT, Rev. 1). address concern.

IV&V performed a Requirements Traceability Assessment during which it reviewed Software Requirements Specification (WBN2 PAMS SRS, WNA-SD-00239-WBT, Rev. 1) against System Requirements Specification (WNA-DS-01617-WBT, Rev. 1) and System Design Specification (WNA-DS-01667-WBT, Rev. 1). Requirements within

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Software Requirements Specification that are referring to NABU-DP-00014-GEN, Rev 2, Design Process for Common Q Safety Systems, have also been reviewed for traceability and compliance. During IV&V's RTA effort the anomaly reports V&V-769 and V&V- 770 have been initiated and reported in the IV&V Phase Summary Report for the System Definition Phase, WNA-VR-00283-WBT, Rev. 0.

IV&V has verified that the requirements in SRS are derived from the specified documents listed in the Document Traceability and Compliance Table of WBN2 PAMS SRS.

TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request:

(1) Item (a) in the original list, NABU-DP-00014-GEN Revision 2, Design Process for Common Q Safety Systems, is available for NRC audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office.

(2) WNA-LI-00058-WT-P, Revision 2, Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report submitted in TVA Letter to NRC dated December 3, 2010, (Reference 1) contains the following change to address the NRC request:

Section 11, TVA Contract Compliance Matrix showing the origin of the requirements was added.

145 The WBN2 PAMS System Design Specification (WBN2 PAMS Responder: WEC N Open Open-TVA/WEC ML101650255, Item WBN2 PAMS System Design EICB (Carte)

SDS) contains a table (see page iii) titled, Document Traceability No. 9 Specification

& Compliance, which states that the WBN2 PAMS SDS was (1) The review and update of the RTM is complete. The Response included in letter Due TBD - TVA to created to support the WBN2 PAMS SysRS. revised RTM can be made available for NRC audit at dated 12/22/10 provide a date TVA docketed WNA-DS-01667-WBT the Westinghouse office in Rockville. Rev. 1, RRAS Watts Bar 2 NSSS (a) Does the WBN2 PAMS SDS implement all of the hardware During the September 20-21, To be addressed by Completion Program I&C Projects Post requirements in the WBN2 PAMS SysRS? (2) Please see letter Item 10 (NRC Matrix Item 142, sub 2010 audit at Westinghouse, it Revision of the RTM, Accident Monitoring System- System item 13). was acknowledged that SRS, SysRS, and Design Specification, dated December (b) Please briefly describe all of the documents that implement the TVA/Westinghouse had SysDS. 2009.

hardware requirements of the WBN2 PAMS SysRS. (3) Please see letter Item 10 (NRC Matrix Item 142, sub previously (in September 15, item 12). 2010 public meeting) stated:

This item is used to track all traceability issues with the System Design Specification (SDS). (4) Section 11 TVA Contract Compliance Matrix was TVA would provide the RSED added to WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Revision 2, Post- RTM. (see ML102920031 Item At the September 15 public meeting in Rockville, the following Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing No 6) actions were agreed to. These items partially address the Technical Report submitted in TVA Letter to NRC traceability concerns with the System Design Specification. dated December 3, 2010, (Reference 1). TVA would revise and resubmit This item will be updated with the results of the September 20 the PAMS RTM to address all and 21 Commercial Grade Dedication and SDS RTM audit. (5) WNA-VR-00283-WBT, Revision 1, IV&V Summary types of issues identified in the Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System, public meeting. (see

1. Westinghouse will perform completed a review of the submitted in TVA to NRC letter dated December 3, ML102920031 Item No 7)

Requirements Traceability Matrix(RT), using the issues 2010 (Reference 1) includes the Requirements and identified at the 9/15 public meeting as a guide (documented Design phase reviews. TVA would revise and resubmit below) and update the RTM as required. the Software Verification and (6) Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2268 NRC Access to Validation phase summary

2. Some hardware requirements are contained in the SRS Common Q Documents at the Westinghouse Rockville report for the requirements instead of the System Design Specification (SDS). These will Office dated August 16, 2010 (Reference 9) System phase to document the be removed from the SRS and incorporated into the next Requirements Specification for the Common Q Generic completion of the requirements revision of the SDS. Flat Panel Display, 00000-ICE-30155, Revision 9 is phase review. (see available for audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office. ML102920031 Item No 8)

3. 25 issues identified by V&V where some requirements have

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N not been included in the SDS (14) and SRS (11) at the The generic AC160 specifications are contained in the revisions reviewed by V&V. Have these been addressed? documents listed below. The documents are available Yes. The next revisions of the SDS and SRS address these for NRC audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office in issues. accordance with the letter number referenced. List is contained in letter.

4. TVA will update the Procurement Requisition Resolution Matrix and submit it to show how the Common Q PAMS (7) A schedule was developed and is reviewed weekly by design meets the contract requirements. Westinghouse and TVA project management.

5. The next issue of the IV&V report will include the (8) The revised document submittal schedule was Requirements phase review of the RTM and a partial review included as item 3 NRC Request (Matrix Item Number for the Design phase. 142, TVA Commitments Nos. 10 and 17) in TVA letter to NRC dated October 26, 2010.

6. Westinghouse to provide the generic AC160 and flat panel specifications. (9) The flow of documentation information was provided to the NRC inspector during the Common Q PAMS audit.

7. Westinghouse and TVA to develop a schedule of licensing document submittals that can be met by the project team. Source: E-mail from Westinghouse (Andrew P. Drake) to Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: RAI on SysRS, dated

8. The flow of information is from the SysRS to the SDS December 8, 2010 (hardware) and SRS (software). Describe how the documents are used. Describe in 1.1 of the SysRS. Need a good write up of how the process works.

146 6/17/2010 Responder: Y Closed Closed ML101650255, Item PAMS System Requirements EICB (Carte)

No. 10 Specifications Deleted by DORL WBN2 PAMS documents reference generic PAMS documents, for example:

WBN2 PAMS SysRS

References:

00000-ICE-30156 Rev. 6, System Requirements Specification for the Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System, and 00000-ICE-30155, Rev. 9, System Requirements Specification for the Common Q Generic Flat Panel Display 147 6/17/2010 Responder: Y Closed Closed ML101650255, Item PAMS System Requirements EICB (Carte)

No. 11 Specifications Deleted by DORL WBN2 PAMS documents reference generic PAMS documents, for example:

WBN2 PAMS SysRS

References:

00000-ICE-30156 Rev. 6, System Requirements Specification for the Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System, and 00000-ICE-30155, Rev. 9, System Requirements Specification for the Common Q Generic Flat Panel Display 148 6/17/2010 Responder: Y Closed Closed ML101650255, Item PAMS System Requirements EICB (Carte)

No. 12 Specifications Deleted by DORL WBN2 PAMS documents reference generic PAMS documents, for example:

WBN2 PAMS SysRS

References:

00000-ICE-30156 Rev. 6, System Requirements Specification for the

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System, and 00000-ICE-30155, Rev. 9, System Requirements Specification for the Common Q Generic Flat Panel Display 149 7.2 7.2 FSAR Section 7.1.1.2(2), Overtemperature delta T and Responder: Tindell Y Close Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

Overpressure delta T equations have been simplified and many No. 1 10/5/10 values are removed from the FSAR. Provide the justification for In FSAR amendment 96 the equations were revised to agree Response provided in letter TVA to provide date this change. with the Unit 1 UFSAR which is the basis document for the dated 10/5/10 when information will TVA Letter dated Unit 2 FSAR. This resulted in the equations being simplified be docketed. TVA 10/29/10 and the removal of the values for the constants. The need to identify when Enclosure 1 Item equations were revised to match those used in the Technical In FSAR amendment 96, the Unit 1 UFSAR was No. 11 Specifications. The values for the constants are contained in values of the constants have revised with this the Technical Specifications and were removed as been moved to TS or plant information.

redundant. procedures. Need to document the basis for this change.

Additional changes were made in FSAR amendments 98 and 99 to correct typographical errors found during FSAR Response is acceptable.

review.

TVA Revised Response:

This change was incorporated in the Unit 1 FSAR in Amendment 0 as part of FSAR change package 1473.

150 7.2 7.2 Many of the changes were based on the Westinghouse document Responder: Clark Y Close Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB N3-99-4003. Provide this document for staffs review so the staff Response provided in letter No. 2 10/5/10 (Garg) can determine the basis for these changes. System description N3-99-4003, Reactor Protection System dated 10/5/10 is contained in Attachment 3.

151 7.2 7.2 Provide the EDCR 52378 and 54504 which discusses the basis for Responder: Clark Y Close Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg) many changes to this FSAR section. No 3 10/5/10 EDCR 54504 has been voided and replaced with EDCR Response provided in letter 52378 which is contained in Attachment 4 and EDCR 52671 dated 10/5/10 is contained in Attachment 5.

152 7.2 7.2 Deleted portion of FSAR section 7.2.3.3.4 and moved to FSAR Responder: Merten/Clark Y Close Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg) section 7.2.1.1.5. However, the FSAR section 7.2.1.1.5 does not No. 4 10/5/10 include the discussion of ambient temperature and also on the The text was revised to match the Unit 1 UFSAR. The Unit 1 Due 10/22/10 calibration of the sealed reference leg system. No justification was text was modified in Amendment 1 by FSAR Change TVA Letter dated provided for deleting this discussion. Please explain the bases for Package 1553 S00 which is contained in Attachment 30. TVA to confirm if this 10/29/10 deletion of this information. The basis for the change in the change package is: description is the same Enclosure 1 Item as for Unit 1. If it is No. 12 16 The update to Section 7.2.1.1.5 is taken from text in same as Unit 1 then Section 7.2.2.3.4 with clarifications and editorial changes. why this was shown as The relocated discussion of the pressurizer water level change in redline instrumentation Is more appropriately included in this section version of FSAR than Section 7.2.2.3.4, which deals with control and Amendment 96.

protection system interaction. The changes to 7.2.1.1.5 are based on a general description of the Westinghouse TVA to provide date pressurizer level design, channel independence, and actual when information will installation attributes found on TVA physical drawings. Also, be docketed. When the hydrogen gas entrainment issue documented in NRC Unit 1 UFSAR was Information Bulletin No. 92-54, Level Instrumentation revised.

Inaccuracies Caused by Rapid Depressurization, is retained and clarified. Similar clarification is made to Reactor Protection System Description N3-9g.4003 Section 3.1.1.2(d). The original text in 7.2.2.3.4 provides some information that is too detailed and is not pertinent to the subject of discussion. It also includes a statement that the

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N error effect on the level measurement during a blowdown accident would be about one inch. The basis for this value is not known; however, the worst case reference leg loss of fill error due to a rapid RCS depressurization event Is no more than 12 inches elevation head. This value is based on the relative elevation difference between the condensing chamber and the reference leg sensor bellows. The Westinghouse Owners Group response to this issue is found in RIMS # L44930216800. The channel error value discrepancy is documented in WBPER980417. The remaining text in 7.2.2.3.4 is revised to clarify the control and protection system interaction discussion.

TVA Revised Response:

This change was incorporated in the Unit 1 UFSAR in Amendment 1.

153 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.1.1.7 added the reference to FSAR section Responder: Craig/Webb Y Close Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg) 10.4.4.3 for exception to P-12. However, FSAR section 10.4.4.3 No. 5 10/21/10 states bypass condition is not displayed and it is not automatically EDC E50952-A added an alternate method of RCS Response provided in letter Due 10/22/10 Enclosure 1 Item removed when conditions for bypass are no longer met. Provide cooldown using additional steam dump valves after entering dated 10/21/10 No. 2 the basis for this. Mode 4, by disabling the P-12 Interlock. Operators use TVA will send 50.59.

additional condenser dump valves to aid in maintaining a cooldown rate closer to the administrative limit established TVA to provide date by operating procedure. when information will be docketed. TVA did Refer to Unit 1 UFSAR Amendment 3 Change Package not address why 1676 S00 (Attachment 6) for the safety evaluation and basis bypass condition is not for this change. displayed.

The 50.59 for the change is included in the Change Package.

The process is controlled by the procedures used to shutdown the plant. The procedure initiates the bypass by lifting a wire at a relay and then ensures that it is restored prior to starting the plant. GO-6 Unit Shutdown From Hot Standby To Cold Shutdown, Appendix F prescribes the steps required to bypass and restore the P-12 interlock. GO-6 Appendix F, step 3.0[6] says PLACE Caution Order on 1-HS-1-103A, 1-HS-1-103B, AND 1-PIC-1-33 indicating that P-12 interlock is disabled. This provides indication to the operators that the P-12 interlock is bypassed. GO-6 Appendix F, step 4.0[1] says WHEN steam dumps no longer affect plant cooldown OR plant heatup is desired, THEN ENSURE MIG re-enables P-12 Interlock USING Section 6.0 of this Appendix, LANDING LEADS TO RE-ENABLE P-12 INTERLOCK. GO-6 Appendix F, step 4.0[2] states REMOVE Caution Order on 1-HS-1-103A, 1-HS-1-103B, AND 1-PIC-1-33 indicating that P-12 interlock is disabled.

154 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.1.1.10, setpoints: NRC staff has issued RIS Responder: Craig/Webb Y Closed Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL EICB (Garg) 2006-17 to provide guidance to the industry regarding the No. 6 and EICB RAI 10/5/10 instrument setpoint methodology which complies with 10 CFR (Q1) Refer to the response to letter item 13, RAI Matrix Item Response is not acceptable. A Due 12/17/10 ML102861885 Item 50.36 requirements. Provide the information on how the WBN2 51. revised response will be No. 8 TVA Letter dated setpoint methodology meets the guidance of RIS 2006-17 and submitted in the letter dated Pending FSAR 10/29/10 include this discussion in this section. Also, by letter dated May (Q2) EEB-TI-28's single sided methodology conforms with 10/29/10. Amendment 102 Enclosure 1 Item 13, 2010, TVA provided Rev. 7 of EEB-TI-28 to the staff. The staff WBN's design basis commitment to ensure that 95% of the submittal. No. 13 noted that section 4.3.3.6 of EEB-TI-28 discusses the correction analyzed population is covered by the calculated tolerance

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N for setpoints with a single side of interest. It should be noted that limits as defined in NRC Reg Guide 1.105, Revision 2, 1986 FSAR AMD 100. Since the staff has not approved this aspect of setpoint methodology for that was in affect during WBN Unit 1 licensing. The single all the setpoint and Unit 1. The staff finds this reduction in uncertainties is not justified sided methodology is not used for any TSTF-493 setpoints allowable value for Unit unless it can be demonstrated that the 95/95 criteria is met. that use TI-28 methodology. 2 is calculated and Therefore, either remove this reduction factor for single sided added to TS, TVA uncertainties or justify how you meet the 95/95 criteria given in RG TVA Revised Response: needs to address the 1.105. latest criteria and that In order to respond to other NRC comments on the setpoint include 95/95 criteria.

methodology discussion in FSAR Amendment 100, TVA Why the last sentence reviewed the previous response to this RAI. This resulted in has been modified by a complete rewrite of the responses to this question as adding TI-28. It was shown below. As a result, the response does not specifically NRCs understanding address the NRC Follow-up Request. However, the overall that all setpoints have responses to all of the NRC RAIs on setpoint methodology to meet TI-28 addresses this item.

(Q1) WBN 2 implementation of TSTF-493, Rev. 4, Option A includes addition of a discussion of the WBN setpoint methodology in FSAR section 7.1.2.1.9.

(Q2) Electrical Engineering Branch (EEB) Technical Instruction (TI) 28, Setpoint Calculations, single-sided methodology conforms to WBN's design basis commitment to ensure that 95% of the analyzed population is covered by the calculated tolerance limits as defined in NRC Reg Guide 1.105, Revision 2, 1986, which was in effect during WBN Unit 1 licensing. Single-sided multipliers are not used for any TSTF-493 setpoints.

There are some areas where a 95% confidence level could not be achieved. Some examples would be harsh environment instrumentation where only 2 or 3 devices were tested in the 10CFR50.49 program. In these situations, the Confidence is referred to as high..

155 7.2 7.2 Summary of FSAR change document section 7.2 states that Date: Y Closed Closed ML101720589, Item EICB (Garg) sections 7.2.1.1.9 and 7.2.2.2(4) are changed to show that these Responder: Stockton No. 7 activities will occur in future. However, no changes were made to TVA to provide date the FSAR sections. Please explain. The change package summary were the changes when information will recommended by Engineering. TVA Licensing is responsible be docketed for the actual submittal and elected not to incorporate these recommendations. The activities are complete and the text in Amendment 99 of the FSAR is correct.

156 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.1.1 states that dashed lines in Figure 15.1- Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated Response on hold pending EICB (Garg) 1designed to prevent exceeding 121% of power.The No. 8 10/5/10 Westinghouse review.

value of 121% is changed from 118%. The justification for this Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2340, TENNESSEE Revised response included in Due 12/22/10 change states that this was done to bring the text of this section in VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT letter dated 12/22/10.

agreement with section 4.3.2.2.5, 4.4.2.2.6 and table 4.1-1. UNIT 2 FSAR Markups Units I and 2 118% vs. 121 % and Amendment 101 However, Table 4.1-1 and section 4.3.2.2.5 still show this value as Correction to RAI Response SNPB 4.3.2-7, (Reference 17) Response is included in letter Submitted 10/29/10.

118%. Justify the change. the 118% value should be 121%. Depending on the use in dated 10/5/10 the FSAR either 118% or 121% are the correct values. As a TVA needs to justify result of the question, Westinghouse reviewed all locations why some places 121%

where either 118% or 121% are used and the context of use is used and other and provided a FSAR markup to reflect the correct value at places 118% is used .

the specific location. These changes will be incorporated in What does 121% or a future FSAR amendment. 118% means.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request:

The following response was provided by Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2690 Follow Up -NRC Request on 118% and 121 %

FSAR Power Levels, dated December 6, 2010 (Reference 2). This corrects the information provided in TVA letter to NRC letter dated October 5, 2010 (Reference 21)

A review of the markups provided by Westinghouse (Reference 4) and the current Unit 2 FSAR shows that in the context of the Power Range High Neutron Flux, High Setting, the value of 118% is correct. In the context of the peak core power during certain transients to confirm the fuel melt criterion, the value of 121% is correct. A detailed discussion of peak core power during transients is contained in FSAR Chapter 4.3.2.2.5, Limiting Power Distributions.

157 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.1.1, fifth paragraph was deleted except for the Responder: Tindell Y Close Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg) last sentence. The last sentence states that, The P-8 interlock No. 9 10/5/10 acts essentially as a high nuclear power reactor trip when The condition is defined in the preceding discussion as Response provided in letter operating in this condition. This sentence is confusing because operating with a reactor coolant pump out of service and dated 10/5/10 the condition is not defined. Please clarify this discrepancy. core power less than 25%.

Response Acceptable 158 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.1.1, paragraph six was changed to state that Responder: Tindell Y Closed Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg) the design meets the requirements of Criterion 23 of the 1971 No. 10 10/5/10 GDC instead of the Criterion 21 of the GDC. The Criterion 21 is FSAR Amendment 99 reflects the change to Criterion 23. Response provided in letter about protection system reliability and testability, while Criterion 23 dated 10/5/10 is about protection system failure modes. Since this paragraph deals with the evaluation of design with respect to common-mode failure, the staff believes that Criterion 23 is the right reference for this paragraph. Please clarify.

159 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.1.2 discusses reactor coolant flow Responder: Craig Y Close Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg) measurement by elbow taps. However, it further states that for No. 11 10/5/10 Unit 2, precision calorimetric flow measurement methodology will For the purposes of measuring reactor coolant flow for Response provided in letter Due 10/31 be used. If elbow taps are not used for Unit 2, then why does this Reactor Protection functions, elbow taps are used for both dated 10/5/10 section discuss this methodology? It is the staffs understanding Unit 1 and 2. The discussion and equation are valid for that TVA plans to use elbow taps methodology in the future for Unit establishing the nominal full power flow which is used to Response Acceptable

2. Please revise this section to describe the current plant establish the Reactor Protection System low flow trip design/methodology. setpoint. However the method used to verify reactor coolant flow, as required by the Technical Specifications, is not the same. Unit 1 uses a simplified methodology based on elbow tap P measurements correlated with precision calorimetric data over several cycles of operation as described in Reference 17, WCAP-16067, Rev 0, RCS Flow Measurement Using Elbow Tap Methodology at Watts Bar Unit 1. The plan is for Unit 2 to transition to this method after sufficient data is obtained. Pending this transaction, 7.2.2.1.2 will be revised as follows:

From:

Nominal full power flow is established at the geginning of each fuel cycle by either elbow tap methodology or, performance of the RCS calorimetric flow measurement, (For Unit 1 elbow tap methodology is implemented for RCS flow measurement (Reference [17]) and Unit 2 may implement elbow tap methodology at a future date) the results of which

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N are used to normalize the RCS flow indicators. This provides a reference point for the low flow reactor trip setpoint, and also provides a relatively simple method for periodic verification of the thermal design flow assumed in the safety analysis, as required by the Technical Specifications.

Accuracy and repeatability of the flow measurement instrumentation are considered in establishment of the low flow setpoint and the minimum required flow and are adequate for these functions. This is for Unit 1 only. For Unit 2, the precision calorimetric flow measurement methodology will be used.

To:

Nominal full power flow is established at the beginning of each fuel cycle by either elbow tap methodology or, performance of the RCS calorimetric flow measurement.

Unit 1 utilizes elbow tap methodology Reference [17]. Unit 2 utilizes the RCS calorimetric flow measurement. The results are used to normalize the RCS flow indicators and provide a reference point for the low flow reactor trip setpoint.

160 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.2(7) deleted text which has references 12 and Responder: Tindell Y Close Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

14. These references are not included in the revised text. Provide No. 12 10/5/10 the basis for the deletion of these references. Also, the revised The text was revised to match the Unit 1 UFSAR. The Unit 1 Response provided in letter 10/21 text states that typically this requirement is satisfied by utilizing 2/4 text was modified in Amendment 1 by FSAR Change dated 10/5/10 logic for the trip function or by providing a diverse trip. Provide any Package 1553 S00 which is contained in Attachment 30.

exception to this and their basis for acceptability. The basis for the change in the change package is:

23. (page 7.2-24): Portions of the discussion of control and protection system interaction are revised to clarify the requirement. The discussion of how the SG low-low water level protective function and the control system Median Signal Selector satisfy this requirement is deleted since it Is redundant to the information provided In Section 7.2.2.3.5.

Reactor Protection System Description N3-99-4003 is also revised to move and clarify the discussion of the requirements for control and protection system Interaction from Section 3.1.1.2 to Section 2.2.11, where the Issue is also discussed.

161 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.3 states that changes to the control function Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg) description in this section are expected to be required after vendor No. 13 10/5/10 design of the Unit 2 Foxboro IA design is complete. Provide the FSAR Amendment 99 reflects the changes associated with Response provided in letter schedule for the completion of the design and when this the Foxboro I/A system design. dated 10/5/10 information will be available to the staff for review and approval.

162 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.2(14) states that bypass of a protection Responder: Tindell Y Closed Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg) channel during testing is indicated by an alarm in the control room. No. 14 10/5/10 Explain how this meets RG 1.47. The Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication System Response provided in letter (BISI) compliance with Reg. Guide 1.47 is described in detail dated 10/5/10 in FSAR Section 7.5.2.2.

163 7.2 7.2 CB Deleted by DORL Date: Y Closed Closed ML101720589, Item (G

ar Responder: No. 15 164 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.2(20) has been revised to include the plant Responder: Perkins Y Closed Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated Item No. 8 sent to DORL EICB 7.5.1.1 computer as a means to provide information read out for all signals No. 16 and EICB 10/5/10 which can cause a reactor trip. Justify the use of the plant The primary purpose of the plant computer is to present Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal RAI ML102861885 (GarglMarcus) computer for this function. Include the discussion on the effect of plant process and equipment status information to the dated 10/5/10 RAI to TVA Item No. 8 plant computer failure on the system functions. control room operators to assist them in the normal operations of the unit, and inform them of any abnormal

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N conditions. The plant computer obtains real-time plant TVA letter dated 10/5/10 parameter information via Data Acquisition Response 44 provided Systems(DAS)(multiplexers, etc.) by scanning preassigned information.

analog, pulse, and contact sensors located throughout the plant. The computer is not defined as being primary safety-related and it is not required to meet the single failure criterion or be qualified to IEEE criteria for Class 1E equipment.

The plant computer system acquires, processes, and displays all data to support the assessment capabilities of the Main Control Room (MCR). To help ensure that reactor trip and other information presented to the Operations staff is reliable:

• The data undergoes several validation steps before being presented to the operators. When redundant sensors are used, the data received by the computer can be processed by software to determine if the quality of one or more points is questionable.

• Any software associated with the computer and the DAS must meet the quality requirements of plant procedure SPP-2.6, Computer Software Control which is based on requirements in NUREG/CR-4640, the Watts Bar Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan, and SS-E18.15.01 - Software Requirements for Real-Time Data Acquisition and Control Computer Systems, which complies with IEEE Std. 279-1971 Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. The computer software is controlled by a Software Quality Assurance Plan.

• One of the requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A states that Appropriate controls shall be provided to maintain variables monitored and systems within prescribed operating ranges. Periodic maintenance and calibration will be performed on the computer and DAS. In addition, calibration procedures for instrumentation which is used for input to the computer include verification of the computer input signal at the DAS and as displayed on the display stations.

• The software and associated hardware undergoes a detailed Factory Acceptance Test prior to installation in the plant. After installation in the plant, a Site Acceptance Test (SAT) will be conducted. The SAT will include several tests:

computer accuracy, analog input accuracy, calculated value accuracy, computer performance, system response times, all input/output (from termination strip to display stations/printers), all data ports, and computer power supplies.

• In order to minimize the possibility of bad sensor inputs to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and/or inaccurate SPDS display of sensor inputs, routine instrument loop calibration of sensors that provide input to the SPDS will include verification that the SPDS-displayed values are correct. WBN's instrument surveillance instructions will incorporate these verifications.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Effect of plant computer failure on system functions The WBN Unit 2 is designed on the basis that it can still operate when the plant computer is inoperable. The computer is not required for safe shutdown of the plant during external design basis events such as tornadoes, floods, rain, and transportation accidents. Operators are trained to respond to accidents both with and without the computer information available. The control room instrumentation provides the operators with the information necessary for safe reactor operations under normal, transient, and accident conditions.

The DAS is mechanically and electrically isolated from the safety systems to avoid degradation of the systems should the computer and/or DAS fail.

The computer is not expected to perform any nuclear safety-related function, therefore, the computer need not be designed to meet nuclear safety-related Class 1E, single-failure criteria. The computer is not designed to safety system criteria and therefore is not to be used to perform functions essential to the health and safety of the public.

165 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.3.2, last paragraph of this section has been Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg) deleted. The basis for this deletion is that discussion regarding the No. 17 10/5/10 compliance with IEEE-279, 1971 and GDC 24 is covered in section The reference to Section 7.2.2.2 for the general discussion Response provided in letter 7.2.2.2. However, there is no reference to this section in 7.2.2.3.2 for control and protection interactions is provided in Section dated 10/5/10 to direct the reader to 7.2.2.2. Please revise 7.2.2.2 accordingly. 7.2.2.3. The reference in Section 7.2.2.3 is applicable to all Sub-Section paragraphs, including 7.2.2.3.2. An additional reference in this section is not necessary and would be redundant to the Section 7.2.2.3 reference.

166 7.2 7.2 Changes to FSAR section 7.2.2.2(20) are justified based on the Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB statement that the integrated computer system is implemented No. 18 10/5/10 (Garg) through EDCR 52322. Provide a copy of EDCR 52322 for staff EDCR 52322 is contained in Attachment . Response provided in letter review. dated 10/5/10 167 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.4, provide an analysis or reference to chapter Responder: Clark Y Close Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg) 15 analysis which demonstrate that failure of rod stop during a rod No. 19 10/5/10 withdrawal event will not affect the safety limit. Continuous rod withdrawal events are analyzed in FSAR Response provided in letter sections 15.2.1 and 15.2.2. While the rod stops a dated 10/5/10 mentioned, they are not credited in the analysis.

168 7.2 7.2 FSAR table 7.2-4, item 9 deleted loss of offsite power to station Responder: Clark Y Close Closed ML101720589, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg) auxiliaries (station blackout) based on the fact that station blackout Response provided in letter No. 20 10/5/10 is not listed in AAPC events. Explain what are AAPC events and This change is in accordance with the Unit 1 UFSAR. The dated 10/5/10 how it justifies deleting this accident from the list. change was made by FSAR Change Package 1553 S00 (Attachment 30). The justification for the change is:

38 (Table 7.2-4): This table lists the reactor trips and the various accident analyses for which each trip could provide protection. The intent of the table is to demonstrate the diversity of and comprehensive protection provided by the reactor trip system against various postulated events and to correlate the trip functions with the analyses in which they may be utilized, either as a primary or secondary protective function. Chapter 15, along with the Accident Analysis Parameters Checklist, WB-OC-40-70, provides the accident analysis discussion and identifies the protection system functions which provide accident mitigation. The additions and deletions to the table are made for consistency with the

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N safety analyses of record as reflected in the design and licensing basis and do not represent analysis changes or protection system changes. Therefore. they are considered to be non-significant as discussed at the beginning of this section. Neutron Monitoring System Description N3-85-4003 Table 2 is also revised for consistency with WB-DC-40-70.

169 6/18/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB (Garg)

Describe the design changes which were made to Unit 1 by This is a duplicate of items 2, 10, 11 and 44 10CFR50.59 process and which significantly affect the instrumentation and controls systems discussed in FSAR Chapter 7.

170 6/17/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB (Garg)

TVA needs to document that Arnold Magnetics power supplies This is a duplicate of item 113.

have been used and environmentally qualified at Unit 1 and therefore meet the licensing basis for Unit 2. If these power supplies are not used and qualified in Unit 1, then TVA will have to discuss the qualification of these power supplies based on the guidance provided in RG 1.209 (Open Item # 2 of Eagle 21 audit.)

171 7.2 7.2 6/17/2010 Responder: Craig Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated Closed to SE Open Item EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/21/10 An external unidirectional communications interface was installed The external Eagle 21 unidirectional communications Response provided in letter itemI#49 Enclosure 1 Item between the Eagle 21 test subsystem and the plant process interface will be tested prior to WBN Unit 2 fuel load dated 10/21/10 No. 3 computer. TVA should confirm that testing has demonstrated that two way communication is impossible with the described configuration. (Open Item # 3 of Eagle 21 audit) 172 6/17/2010 Responder: Craig Y Closed Closed EICB RAI EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 During a FAT diagnostic test, the Loop Calculation Processor This is a duplicate of the rack 5 update issue item 114. Item#50 (LCP) failed while performing a parameter update. TVA should identify the cause and fix for the problem encountered. (Open Item

1. 1 of Eagle 21 audit) 173 7.1 7.1 6/17/2010 Responder: Craig/Webb/Powers Y Closed Closed EICB RAI EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 EEB-TI-28 discusses the correction for setpoints with a single side Please see the revised response to letter item 3 (I&C Matrix to OI 154 Item#51 of interest. The staff finds this correction factor is not justified. Item 154) question (Q1).

TVA should justify this correction factor and demonstrate that, with TVA to provide date this correction, factor 95/95 criteria identified in RG 1.105 is met. when information will be docketed 174 6/28/2010 Responder: Hilmes/Craig Y Closed Closed EICB RAI EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 Placeholder: The staff has identified questions regarding Duplicate of 171 Item#52 unidirectional communications interface. The staff will keep this item open until TVA confirms testing has demonstrated that two way communication is impossible with the described configurations.

175 June 28, 2010 Responder: Y Closed Closed EICB RAI EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 Placeholder: The staff has identified questions regarding diversity. WCAP-13869 rev.2. is submitted in response to item In FSAR amendment 98, This item is covered Item#53 The staff will keep this item open until TVA provides the related reference 6 added a new under item 78.

WCAP to the staff for its review and approval. WCAP-13869 rev.2. Has this WCAP been reviewed by the TVA to provide date staff. If not then provide the when information will copy of WCAP for staff review. be docketed.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N 176 7.1 7.1 6/28/2010 Responder: Craig/Webb Y Closed Closed EICB RAI EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 Placeholder: The staff has identified questions regarding Setpoint methodology questions are addressed in the to OI 154 Item#54 instrument setpoints. The staff will keep the instrument setpoint revised response to letter item 3 (I&C Matrix Item 154).

methodology issue open until TVA provides additional information TVA to provide date regarding RIS 2006-17 and single sided correction factor for when information will uncertainty determination. be docketed 177 7.5.2.1 7.5.1 7/15/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed N/A TVA Letter dated RAI not required EICB (Marcus) 10/5/10 FSAR Amendment 99 Section 7.5.1.2 states: "Type A Variables The type A variables are the same in Unit 1 and Unit 2. See Response provided in letter 09/16/10 Those variables that provide primary information to the MCR calculation WBNOSG4047 Rev. 4 (Attachment ) dated 10/5/10 operators to allow them to take preplanned manually controlled actions for which no automatic action is provided and that are required for safety systems to accomplish their safety functions for August 19, 2010 - TVA to submit Chapter 15 design basis events. Primary information is information calculation.

that is essential for the direct accomplishment of specified safety functions." Review of Unit 2 FSAR confirms Unit 1 and Unit 2 Type A Clarify whether Unit 2 has the same Type A variables as Unit 1. variables are the same.

Not necessary to docket WBNOSG4047.

178 7.5.2.1 7.5.1 7/15/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed N/A TVA Letter dated RAI not required EICB (Marcus) 10/5/10 Please provide WBN-OSG4-047, "PAM Type A Variable See response to item 177 above. Response provided in letter 09/16/10 Determination." dated 10/5/10 August 19, 2010 - TVA to submit calculation.

Review of Unit 2 FSAR confirms Unit 1 and Unit 2 Type A variables are the same.

Not necessary to docket WBOSG4047.

179 An emphasis is placed on traceability in System Requirements Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A - Closed to NA EICB (Carte)

Specifications in the SRP, in the unmodified IEEE std 830-1993, Item No. 142 and even more so given the modifications to the standard listed in Steve Clark to look at how to combine traceability items.

Regulatory Guide 1.172, which breaks with typical NRC use of the word should regarding backwards traceability to say Each Was addressed to during the 9/15 meeting and 9/20 - 9/21 identifiable requirement in an SRS must be traceable backwards to audit.

the system requirements and the design bases or regulatory requirements that is satisfies Closed to Item 142.

Discuss how TVA has ensured that there is traceability (and particularly backward traceability) for each requirement. If requirements are not traceable, please explain how the SRS complies with the regulations that underlie the SRP.

180 CB The SRP, BTP 7-14, Section B.3.3.1 states that Regulatory Guide Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A - Closed to NA (C

art 1.172 endorses, with a few noted exceptions, IEEE Std 830-1993. Item No. 142

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N IEEE Recommended Practices for Software Requirements Steve Clark to look at how to combine traceability items. TVA to provide date Specifications. when information will Will be addressed to during the 9/15 meeting and 9/20 - 9/21 be docketed Clarify whether the WBU2 Post Accident Monitoring Systems audit.

Software Requirements Specification adheres to IEEE std 830-1993 as modified by Regulatory Guide 1.172? Closed to Item 142.

If yes, please provide an evaluation that includes an identification and description of all differences proposed from the modified standard. Please describe how the alternatives provide an acceptable method of complying with those regulations that underlie the corresponding SRP acceptance criteria.

If no then please provide an evaluation that includes an identification and description of all differences proposed from the acceptance criteria given in SRP , BTP 7-14, Section B.3.3.1.

Please describe how the alternatives provide an acceptable method of complying with those regulations that underlie the corresponding SRP acceptance criteria.

181 An emphasis is placed on traceability in System Requirements Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A - Closed to NA EICB (Carte)

Specifications in the SRP, in the unmodified IEEE std 830-1993, Item No. 142 and even more so given the modifications to the standard listed in Steve Clark to look at how to combine traceability items.

Regulatory Guide 1.172, which breaks with typical NRC use of the word should to say Each identifiable requirement in an SRS Will be addressed to during the 9/15 meeting and 9/20 - 9/21 must be traceable backwards to the system requirements and the audit.

design bases or regulatory requirements that is satisfies Closed to Item 142.

Explain the source(s) of the requirements present in the Post Accident Monitoring Systems Software Requirements Specification. To clarify, many documents have requirements that are incorporated by reference into the SRS, but what served to direct the author to include those various documents in the SRS or, if the requirement is based on the System Requirements Specification, what directed the author to include the requirement there?

182 Characteristics that the SRP states that a Software Requirements Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A - Closed to NA EICB (Carte)

Specifications should have include unambiguity, verifiability, and Item No. 142 style, part of the latter is that Each requirement should be uniquely Steve Clark to look at how to combine traceability items.

and completely defined in a single location in the SRS.

Will be addressed to during the 9/15 meeting and 9/20 - 9/21 Clarify whether the unnumbered paragraphs in the Post Accident audit.

Monitoring Systems Software Requirements Specification, such as in the section headings, or are all such sections simply considered Closed to Item 142.

to be informative?

Does the same apply to documents referenced by the SRS? Such as WCAP-16096-NP-A, Rev. 1A, Software Program Manual for Common Q Systems, which is incorporated by reference in requirement R2.3-2 in the SRS.

R2.3-2 [The PAMS software shall comply with the requirements and guidelines defined in WCAP-16096-NP-A, Software Program Manual for Common Q Systems.]

If any requirements are expressed in such unnumbered paragraph form instead of individually identified requirements, please list them, describe why they satisfy the fundamental requirement of unambiguity, and describe how they were verified.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N 183 7/15/2010 Responder: WEC Y Open Open-TVA/WEC EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte)

ML102980066 Item 10/21/10 An emphasis is placed on traceability in System Requirements The generic Software Requirements Specification applies Revised response included in Due TBD - TVA to No. 9 Enclosure 1 Item Specifications in the SRP, in the unmodified IEEE std 830-1993, except as modified by the WBN Unit 2 System Requirements letter dated 12/22/10. provide a date No. 4 and even more so given the modifications to the standard listed in Specification.

Regulatory Guide 1.172, which breaks with typical NRC use of the NNC 11/18/10: The word should to say Each identifiable requirement in an SRS TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request: Response provided in letter point behind this open must be traceable backwards to the system requirements and the dated 10/21/10 item was that TVA must design bases or regulatory requirements that is satisfies Please see the response to RAI item 12 in letter dated demonstrate that the 12/222/10, NRC Matrix Item 144. origin of each On page 1-2 of the Post Accident Monitoring Systems Software requirement in the Requirements Specification in the background section, is the WEC requirements sentence Those sections of the above references that require specification is known modification from the generic PAMS are defined in the document and documented. TVA referring purely to the changes from WNA-DS-01617-WBT Post stated that this Accident Monitoring System-System Requirements Specification information would be in or is it saying that there are additional changes beyond those and CQ PAMS LTR Rev. 2.

that the SRS defines them?

NNC 2/3/11: CQ PMS If there are additional changes, what is their origin? LTR Rev. 2 Sections 11

& 12 do not prove this information. TVA to proive a plan to address requested information.

184 7/15/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A - Closed to N/A EICB (Carte)

Item No. 142 The NRC considers that a System Requirements Specification is Steve Clark to look at how to combine traceability items.

the complete set of requirements used for the design of the software, whether it is contained within one document or many. In Will be addressed to during the 9/15 meeting and 9/20 - 9/21 order to evaluate an SRS against the guidance in the SRP the staff audit.

needs access to all the requirements.

Closed to Item 142.

Are there any sources of requirements in parallel with the Post Accident Monitoring Systems Software Requirements Specification? Meaning does the SRS contain, explicitly or by reference, all the requirements that were used in the design phase for the application specific software, or do software design phase activities use requirements found in any other source or document? If so, what are these sources or documents?

185 7/15/2010 Responder: WEC N Open Open-NRC Review EICB RAI EICB (Carte)

ML102980066 Item An emphasis is placed on the traceability of requirements in Steve Clark to look at how to combine traceability items. Response included in letter Due (1) 12/3/10 No. 17 Software Requirements Specifications in the SRP, in the dated 12/22/10. (2) 12/22/10 unmodified IEEE std 830-1993, and even more so given the Was addressed to during the 9/15 meeting and 9/20 - 9/21 modifications to the standard listed in Regulatory Guide 1.172, audit. NNC 11/18/10: (1)The which breaks with typical NRC use of the word should to say point behind this open Each identifiable requirement in an SRS must be traceable TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request: item was that TVA must backwards to the system requirements and the design bases or (1) See NRC Matrix Item 144 demonstrate that the regulatory requirements that is satisfies Also the NRC considers (2) There is no RTM for development of the individual origin of each that the SRS is the complete set of requirements used for the reusable software elements. As listed in item 15 of requirement in the

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N design of the software, whether it is contained within one Table 6-1 Document Requirements of WNA-LI-00058- WEC requirements document or many. In order to evaluate an SRS against the WT-P, Revision 2, Post-Accident Monitoring System specification is known guidance in the SRP the staff needs access to all the (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report submitted in TVA and documented. TVA requirements. Letter to NRC, dated December 3, 2010, a RTM for stated that this implementation of the RSEDs (WNA-VR-00280-WBT) information would be in References 12, 27, 29, and 31-44 in the Post Accident Monitoring for the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS has been CQ PAMS LTR Rev. 2.

Systems Software Requirements Specification are various types developed. This document is available for NRC audit at (2) TVA also said it of Reusable Software Element. the Westinghouse Rockville office. would provide a RTM for the RSED These references are used in the body of the SRS, for example:

NNC 2/3/11: To be R5.3.14-2 [The Addressable Constants CRC error signal shall be addressed during next TRUE when any CAL CRC's respective ERROR terminal = TRUE audit.

(WNA-DS-00315-GEN, "Reusable Software Element Document CRC for Calibration Data" [Reference 12]).]

They are also included via tables such as found in requirement R7.1.2-1

[The Watts Bar 2 PAMS shall use the application-specific type circuits and custom PC elements listed in Table 7.1-1.]

Do the referenced reusable software element documents include requirements not explicitly stated in the SRS? If so what is their origin?

186 7.7.8 7.7.1.12 7/15/2010 Responder: Perkins/Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI No.6 TVA Letter dated EICB (Darbali)

ML102910017, 10/5/10 Along with Amendment 96, TVA submitted a list of Bechtel No. The previous wording reflected operation of the Response included in letter 10/19/10 changes for each section. Change number 45 addresses a computer based AMSAC system. The change reflects the dated 10/29/10 TVA Letter dated change to section 7.7.1.12, AMSAC, however, the Justification operation of the relay logic based system that replaced the 10/29/10 column states This change is not included. EDCR 52408 installs original computer based system in Unit 1. Unit 2 is installing Enclosure 1 Item the AMSAC in Unit 2. It does not have a trouble alarms. The a similar relay logic based system, so the change to the Unit Response is satisfactory. No. 14 existing words better reflect the operation of the system. 1 wording is applicable to Unit 2.

Follow-up NRC Request:

Even thought this change was not included in Amendment 96, will EDCR 52408 Summary it be included in a future amendment? TVA to state that no further A Purchase Order was issued to Nutherm International to FSAR changes are planned.

Also, please submit a summary of EDCR 52408. provide a Unit 2 cabinet with the same functions as the current Unit 1 AMSAC. EDCR 52408 will install the cabinet and route/install cabling to provide the necessary inputs/outputs for/from the AMSAC cabinet.

In the Main Control Room, three cables will be installed for the AMSAC handswitch on 2-M-3 and AMSAC NOT ARMED and AMSAC ACTUATED annunciator windows.

In the Turbine Building, two pressure transmitters will be installed in two local panels to sense turbine pressure.

Cables will be routed to the transmitters to provide the signal and power. Four cables will be routed to a local panel to provide steam generator level signals.

In the Control Building, three cables will be routed to separation relays which will provide the start signal for the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, and initiate a Turbine Trip.

Additionally, a cable will be routed to Unit 2 ICS for AMSAC NOT ARMED and AMSAC ACTUATED log points.

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N This EDCR is intended to configure Unit 2 AMSAC like Unit 1 when possible.

TVA Revised Response:

No further changes to the FSAR associated with AMSAC are planned.

187 By letter dated June 18, 2010, TVA docketed responses to NRC Responder: Merten N Closed Closed ML101970033, Item TVA Letter dated Are these connections already EICB (Carte) requests for information. No. 1 & 2 10/5/10 docketed?

1) Please refer to the revised response to letter dated Revised response included in

1) Enclosure 1, Item No. 33 of the TVA letter dated June 18, 2010, 10/5/10 Item 18 (RAI Matrix item 115). letter dated 12/22/10.

did not identify any connection from the PAMS Operator Modules (OMs) to the plant computer and printers; however, Figure 2.1-1 of Partial Response provided in the PAMS System Requirements Specification (WNA-DS-01617- letter dated 10/5/10 WBT Rev. 1 - ML101680578) shows a TCP connection from the OMs to the plant computer and printer. Please explain. NNC 8/25/10: Why did TVA not catch this on the review of the

2) Please clarify whether any digital safety-related systems or 2) This is a duplicate of closed RAI Matrix Item 45. PAMS SysRS or SRS? Does components have a digital communications path to non-safety- TVA check that the CQ PAMS related systems or with safety related systems in another division. system meets the requirements If so, NRC staff will need these paths identified on the docket. in its purchase specifications?

TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request:

A review of the following documents determined that the connection between the OM and the plant computer has been changed to a connection to a printer:

1. WNA-DS-01617-WBT-P, Revision 3, Post Accident Monitoring System - System Requirements Specification, dated November 2010

2. WNA-DS-01667-WBT-P, Revision 3, Post Accident Monitoring System - System Design Specification, dated November 2010

3. WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Revision 2, Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report, dated November 2010, submitted in TVA to NRC letter December 3, 2010 Review of the newly released Common Q PAMS documents listed below confirmed they correctly show a connection from the OM to a printer and not the plant computer. None of the other newly released documents contain a figure of the Common Q PAMS system showing the connection from the OM. The exception is WCAP-17351 which was created to allow a non-proprietary version of a generic Common Q document to be submitted on the docket and was not intended to reflect the WBN Unit 2 configuration.

Note: The OM printer connection is only used for maintenance. A printer is not normally connected to the OM. To use the OM printer connection, the FE keyswitch must installed and be in the ENABLE position.

(1) WNA-TP-02988-WBT, Revision 0, Post Accident Monitoring System Channel Integration Test/Factory Acceptance Test, dated November 2010, submitted in TVA to NRC letter December 3, 2010 (Reference 1)

(2) WNA-AR-00180-WBT-P, Revision 0, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for the Post Accident

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Monitoring System, dated October 2010, submitted in TVA to NRC letter November 5, 2010 (Reference 12) 188 By letter dated June 30, 2010, TVA docketed, Tennessee Valley Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed ML101970033, Item TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte)

Authority (TVA) Watts Bar Unit 2 (WBN2) - Post-Accident No. 3 & 4 10/5/10 Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report, 1) The original design was to allow printing from both the Response provided in letter to Open Item 187 (Document Number WNA-LI-00058-WBT- P, Revision 0, June Operator Module (OM) and Maintenance and Test Panel dated 10/5/10 2010) (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2). (MTP) via the plant computer. This required both to be connected to the plant computer. Westinghouse did not NNC 08/25/10: See Open Item

1) Figure 2.2-1 of the PAMS Licensing Topical Report does not perceive this as an issue, because the standard Common Q No. 187.

show any connection between the Operators Modules and the PAMS design includes both the flat panel displays and plant computer or printer; however, Figure 2.1-1 of the PAMS individual control panel indicators. The Westinghouse System Requirements Specification (WNA-DS-01617-WBT Rev. 1 Common Q team did not realize that WBN does not use the

- ML101680578) shows a TCP connection from the OMs to the individual control panel indicators. As a result, the original plant computer and printer. Please explain. design documents provided by Westinghouse included the connection from the OM to the plant computer.

2) Section 5.3, Response to individual criteria in DI&C-ISG-04, of the PAMS Licensing Topical Report does not address the TCP The TVA team did not realize that the Westinghouse design connection between the OM and non-safety components depicted relied on the OM and MTP to be qualified isolation devices in Figure 2.1-1 of the PAMS System Requirements Specification that protected the AC160 functions and individual control (WNA-DS-01617-WBT Rev. 1 - ML101680578). Please explain. panel indicators from interference from the plant computer.

It was not until a meeting was held to discuss the design of the OM that the issues came to light. That was when Westinghouse understood that the OM was the PAMS display and WBN did not use individual control panel indicators and TVA understood that the OM was being credited as the qualified isolation device. It became apparent at the meeting to both TVA and Westinghouse that the original design was not acceptable. The team then agreed to delete the OM connection to the plant computer.

2) This is a duplicate of closed RAI Matrix Item 45.

189 7.6.7 7/20/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed RAI No. 3 TVA Letter dated EICB (Singh)

ML102980005 10/5/10 FSAR Section 7.6.7States: Conformance with Regulatory Guide This is a typographical error. The correct reference is Table Response provided in letter By FSAR Amendment 10/26/2010 1.133, Revision 1 is discussed in Table 7.1-7. FSAR Chapter 7 7.1-1. The reference will be corrected in FSAR Amendment dated 10/5/10 100, page 7.6-4.

does not contain any such numbered table. Please explain. 100.

NNC 8/25/10: Acceptable response.

190 7.9 FSAR Table 7.1-1 states: Regulatory Guide 1.133, May 1981 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed RAI No. 4 TVA Letter dated Closed to OI-331.

EICB (Singh)

Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light- ML102980005 10/5/10 Water Cooled Reactors, Revision 1 (See Note 12)Note 12 1) TSR 3.3.6.3 specifies 18 months as the calibration Response provided in letter to Open Item 331. 10/26/2010 Conforms except as noted belowPositi[o]ns C.3.a.(3) and C.5.c. frequency. dated 10/5/10 recommend a channel calibration be performed at least once pe[r] TVA letter of 10/5/2010, 18 months. In lieu of this recommendation, the DMIMS will be 2) Per the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Bases Item 55 provided the calibrated at the frequency stated in subsection TSR 3.3.6.3 of TR 3.3.6 (Attachment 9) the surveillance requirements and response.

3.3.6 (Loose-Part Detection System). frequency are provided in Regulatory Guide 1.133, "Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light- FSAR conformance

1) Clarify what frequency is specified in TSR 3.3.6.3. Water-Cooled Reactors." claims open items addressed in OI No.

2) Please explain why the stated calibration frequency is adequate 3) TRM section 3.3.6 and its bases are contained in 331 .

for meeting regulatory requirements. Attachment 9 to the 10/5/10 response letter.

3) Please provide sufficient documentation for the NRC to independently evaluate the conformance claims stated in the FSAR.

191 7.9 CB NUREG-0800 Chapter 7, Section 7.9, "Data Communication Responder: Jimmie Perkins Y Closed Closed ML10197016, Item TVA Letter dated (C

art Systems" contains review criteria for data communication systems. Nos. 1-3 10/5/10

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N The WBN2 FSAR did not include any description of data WBN Unit 2 is in compliance with the regulatory Response provided in letter communications systems. requirements for data communications systems as described dated 10/5/10

1) Please identify all data communications systems. in Attachment 34 (Data Communications Systems

2) Please describe each data communications system identified Description and Regulatory Compliance Analysis). NNC 8/25/10: Information above. received, and read.

3) Please provide a regulatory evaluation of each data communications system against the applicable regulatory criteria.

192 7.5.1.1 7.5.2 The NRC Staff is using SRP (NUREG-0800) Chapter 7 Section Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed Item No. 1 sent to TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML1028618855 sent to EICB (Marcus) 7.5, Instrumentation Systems Important to Safety, to review the DORL 7/20/2010 10/5/10 DORL.

WBU2 FSAR Section 7.5, Instrumentation Systems Important to 1. At WBN Unit 1 and 2, there is a single computer system Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal ML102010034.

Safety. The following requests are for information that the SRP named the Integrated Computer System or ICS. That dated 10/5/10 RAI to TVA. EICB RAI directs the reviewers to evaluate. system is sometimes described as the Plant Computer ML102861885 Item System, the Process Computer, the Technical Support August 19, 2010 - NRC to No. 1 The role of the EICB Technical reviewer is to determine if there is Center Data System (TSCDS) or the Emergency Response review TVA response.

reasonable assurance that the equipment will perform the required Facility Data System (ERFDS). At one time, the TSCDS functions. The WBU2 FSAR, Section 7.5.2, Plant Computer and ERFDS were separate computers on Unit 1 but their TVA letter dated10/5/10 System, does not contain any description of the equipment that functions were all incorporated into the ICS when it was Response 57 provided performs the functions described in the section. Enclosure 1 Item installed. information.

3 of letter dated March 12, 2010, TVA stated that the platform of the Process Computer was, Hewlett Packard RX2660 and Dell 2. The Watts Nuclear Plant ICS is a non-safety related Poweredge R200 servers with RTP Corp 8707 I/O. In addition system, is designed as a single, large-scale nuclear plant TVA provided (a) two pages of marketing literature by DELL on the computer system which integrates balance of plant (BOP)

Poweredge R200 Server, (b) the HP Integrity rx2660 Server monitoring with extensive nuclear steam supply system Unser Service Guide, and (c) the Integrated Computer System (NSSS) application software into a comprehensive computer Network Configuration Connection Diagram (2-45W2697-1-1 dated based tool for plant operations. The system is comprised of 8/27/09). This provided information is not sufficient for evaluating the following major components:

whether the equipment will, with reasonable assurance, perform

• Remote multiplexers in the Computer Room, Auxiliary the functions described in the FSAR. Instrument Room and 480V Board rooms.

• Redundant Central Processing Units (CPUs)

1) Is the Plant Computer System another name for the Process

• Data Storage Devices Computer?

• Man-Machine Interfaces (MMI) - Satellite Display Stations (SDS) terminals in the Main Control Room (MCR), Technical

2) Please provide an architectural description of the Plant Support Center (TSC) and Computer Room.

Computer System.

• Networking equipment including switches, firewalls and terminal servers

3) Please describe the relationship between the Plant Computer

• Printers System and the Integrated Computer System.

• Data Links to other plant computer devices (serial and network)- These systems or devices include but are not limited to:

o System Foxboro I/A Systems (unit 2 only) o Areva Beacon core monitoring systems o Multi-pen recorders o Landis & Gyr switchyard monitoring system o Computer Enhanced Rod Position Indication (CERPI) o Eagle 21 o Ronan Annunciator o Leading Edge Flow Meter (LEFM) o Bentley-Nevada vibration monitoring system o Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor (ICCM) (unit 1 only) o Common Q (unit 2 only) o WINCISE (unit 2) o Plant Engineering Data System (PEDS)

In support of normal plant operations, each units ICS:

• Scans and converts analog and digital plant process inputs to engineering units for displaying, alarming and reporting.

• Receives analog and digital inputs as pre-processed values

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N from other digital systems for displaying, alarming, archiving, and reporting.

• Performs data validity checking.

• Performs calculations to obtain parameters such as difference, flows, and rates.

• Displays alarms when data point value exceeds predefined set points.

• Displays alarms received from the digital Annunciator system.

• Generates periodic station logs and pre-selected special logs.

• Performs BOP and NSSS related calculations.

• Provides graphical and digital trending displays of plant data.

• Provides graphical P&ID type displays of plant data.

In support of emergency plant operations each units ICS:

• Provides plant emergency support with the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) functions based upon the Westinghouse Owners Group CSF status trees and historical data collection, storage, and retrieval functions required to support NUREG-0737 and NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 category 1 variables (except for containment isolation).

• Provides SPDS and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) data to the Emergency Offsite Facilities via PEDS.

• Provides BISI functions (not including operating and trip bypasses of RPS and ESFAS).

• Provides continuous monitoring of RHR system performance when RHR is in use.

ICS is not required to be safety-related and is not required to meet IEEE single-failure criteria for Class 1E equipment.

3. The Plant Computer System and the Integrated Computer System are the same system.

193 7.5.1.1 7.5.2 The WBU2 FSAR, Section 7.5.2, Plant Computer System, Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed Item No. 2 sent to TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML1028618855 sent to EICB (Marcus) contains three subsections, DORL 7/20/2010 10/5/10 DORL.

7.5.2.1, Safety Parameter Display System There is a single set of hardware that incorporates the Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal ML102010034 7.5.2.2, Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication System functionality of Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), dated 10/5/10 RAI to TVA. EICB RAI (BISI) Bypass and Inoperable Status Indication System (BISI) and ML102861885 Item 7.5.2.3, Technical Support Center and Nuclear Data Links the Technical Support Center (TSC). TVA letter dated 10/5/10 No. 2 Responses 58 and 67 provided Are there three separate sets of hardware that implement these Also refer to the response to item 59 (RAI Matrix Item 193). information.

functions, or are these three functions that are implemented on a single set of hardware? The function of the Nuclear Data Links or Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) is actually provided by the TVA Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) which acts as the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) for all of TVAs nuclear units. Plant data will be sent on a periodic basis from the ICS to the CECC via the Plant Engineering Data System (PEDS). That data is then available to be sent from the CECC to the NRC.

194 7.5.1.1 7.5.2.1 The WBU2 FSAR Section 7.5.2.1, Safety Parameter Display Responder: Costley/Norman Y Closed Closed Item No. 3 sent to TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML1028618855 sent to

.1 EICB System, contains a description of the Safety Parameter Display DORL 7/20/2010 10/5/10 DORL.

(Marcus) System. The principal purpose and function of the SPDS is to aid Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal ML102010034 control room personnel during abnormal and emergency dated 10/5/10 RAI to TVA. EICB RAI SRP Section 7.5, Subsection II, Acceptance Criteria states: conditions in determining the safety status of the plant and in ML102861885 Item

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Requirements applicable to the review of SPDS10 CFR assessing if abnormal conditions require corrective action by TVA letter dated 10/5/10 No. 3 50.55a(a)(1), Quality Standards. the operators to avoid a degraded core. It also operates Response 59 provided during normal operations, continuously displaying information.

Please provide a description of how SPDS meets this regulatory information from which the plant safety status can be readily requirement. and reliably accessed.

To ensure quality, the design, testing, and inspection of the SPDS is controlled by qualified personnel and by using TVA procedure SPP-2.6, Computer Software Control. The procedure details controls and processes required for the development, modification, and configuration management of computer software used to support the design, operation, modification, and maintenance of TVAs nuclear power plants consistent with the Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan.

This ensures that the design and operation of the SPDS complies with the 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1) quality standards requirements. The controls and processes outlined in the procedure provide assurance that the SPDS will perform its intended function correctly.

The plant Integrated Computer System(ICS) provides the SPDS for WBN. Any changes to the SPDS software must be documented and controlled using a Software Service Request(per SPP-2.6) and must be implemented under the engineering design change process(Design Change Notice, DCN). Controls in SPP-2.6 guide the development and testing of the SPDS changes.

Other controls put in place by this procedure to further maintain quality standards are:

• Changes to SPDS software from remote locations is prohibited.

• The application custodian implements controls to prevent unauthorized changes to the software.

• Changes are made in a non-production environment and validation testing takes place before the change is installed on the ICS.

• Once validation testing begins, the source code is placed under configuration control.

• When the modifications are installed on the ICS, an operability test is performed to demonstrate that the software is installed correctly and is functioning correctly in its operating environment.

• All documentation related to the SPDS software changes are QA records.

• The software source code is kept in a physically secure, environmentally controlled space to prevent inadvertent changes.

• Cyber security considerations are also considered in the storage environment.

The data goes through several validation steps before being presented to the operators. When redundant sensors are used, the data received by the computer can be processed by software to determine if the quality of one or more points is questionable.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N 195 7.5.1.1 7.5.2.2 Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication (BISI) Responder: Costley/Norman Y Closed Closed Item No. 4 sent to TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML1028618855 sent to EICB (Marcus)

.2 DORL 7/20/2010 10/5/10 DORL.

The WBU2 FSAR Section 7.5.2.2, Bypassed and Inoperable The BISI system is a computer based system that provides Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal ML102010034 Status Indication System (BISI), contains a description of the automatic indication and annunciation of the abnormal status dated 10/5/10 RAI to TVA. EICB RAI Bypassed Inoperable Status Indication System (BISI). of each ESFAS actuated component of each redundant ML102861885 Item portion of a system that performs a safety-related function. TVA letter dated 10/5/10 No. 4 SRP Section 7.5, Subsection II, Acceptance Criteria states: Response 60 provided Requirements applicable to bypassed and inoperable status To ensure quality, the design, testing, and inspection of the information.

indication 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1), Quality Standards. BISI system is controlled by qualified personnel and by using TVA procedure SPP-2.6, Computer Software Control. The Please provide a description of how BISI meets this regulatory procedure details controls and processes required for the requirement. development, modification, and configuration management of computer software used to support the design, operation, modification, and maintenance of TVAs nuclear power plants consistent with the Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan.

This ensures that the design and operation of the BISI System complies with the 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1) quality standards requirements. The controls and processes outlined in the procedure provide assurance that the BISI system will perform its intended function correctly.

The plant Integrated Computer System(ICS) provides the BISI system for WBN. Any changes to the BISI software must be documented and controlled using a Software Service Request(per SPP-2.6) and must be implemented under the engineering design change process(Design Change Notice, DCN). Controls in SPP-2.6 guide the development and testing of the BISI changes.

Other controls put in place by this procedure to further maintain quality standards are:

• Changes to BISI software from remote locations is prohibited.

• The application custodian implements controls to prevent unauthorized changes to the software.

• Changes are made in a non-production environment and validation testing takes place before the change is installed on the ICS.

• Once validation testing begins, the source code is placed under configuration control.

• When the modifications are installed on the ICS, an operability test is performed to demonstrate that the software is installed correctly and is functioning correctly in its operating environment.

• All documentation related to the BISI software changes are QA records.

• The software source code is kept in a physically secure, environmentally controlled space to prevent inadvertent changes.

• Cyber security considerations are also considered in the storage environment.

196 7.5.1.1 7.5.2.2 Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication (BISI) Responder: Costley/Norman Y Closed Closed Item No. 5 sent to TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML1028618855 sent to

.2 EICB DORL 7/20/2010 10/5/10 DORL.

(Marcus) The NRC staff is performing its review in accordance with LIC-110, Section C of the Regulatory Guide lists the following six Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal ML102010034 Rev. 1, Watts Bar Unit 2 License Application Review. LIC-110 regulatory positions for guidance to satisfy the NRC dated 10/5/10 RAI to TVA EICB RAI directs the staff to review systems unique to Unit 2 in accordance requirements with respect to the bypassed and inoperable ML102861885 Item

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N with current staff guidance. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.47 Revision status indication(BISI) for nuclear power plant safety TVA letter dated 10/5/10 No. 5 1, Bypassed and Inoperable Status indication for Nuclear Power systems: Response 61 provided Plant Safety Systems, is the current regulatory guidance for BISI. information.

Please provide a regulatory evaluation of BISI against the current 1. Administrative procedures should be supplemented by an RG. indication system that automatically indicates, for each affected safety system or subsystem, the bypass or deliberately induced inoperability of a safety function and the systems actuated or controlled by the safety function.

Provisions should also be made to allow the operations staff to confirm that a bypassed safety function has been properly returned to service.

Response: The BISI system provides indication(displays and annunciation) that a functional path for each train of a safety system or support system has been rendered in a state which could cause inoperability. The BISI system monitors and provides system level alarms for these plant safety-related systems:

• Main and Aux Feedwater

• Safety Injection

• Residual Heat Removal

• Containment Spray

• Emergency Gas Treatment

• Essential Raw Cooling Water

• Chemical and Volume Control

• Ventilating

• Component Cooling

• Control Air( including Aux Control Air)

• Standby Diesel Generator The system level displays/indicating lights indicate the status of each systems train functional path as well as the status of any support system that might put the system in an inoperable or bypassed condition.

The BISI system software runs on the Integrated Computer System(ICS) and it provides the capability to monitor in real time the parameters required to provide a BISI system as described in the Reg Guide.

The system level display or indicating lights indicate NORMAL status when a previously bypassed system returns to normal operational status. The Operations staff will determine the impact of each alarm on the process flow path indication during plant modes of operation. The final decision of system operability is left up to the Operations staff to determine per Technical Specifications.

2. The indicating system for BISI should also be activated automatically by the bypassing or the deliberately induced inoperability of any auxiliary or supporting system that effectively bypasses or renders inoperable a safety function and the systems actuated or controlled by the safety function.

Response: The Integrated Computer System(ICS) obtains real-time plant parameter information system by continuously scanning pre-assigned analog, pulse, and contact sensors

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N located throughout the plant to provide status information to the BISI system and automatically displays that information on the BISI terminals in the Main Control Room. Alarms are also initiated to gain the Operations staffs attention.

3. Annunciating functions for system failure and automatic actions based on the self-test or self-diagnostic capabilities of digital computer-based I&C safety systems should be consistent with Positions 1 and 2.

Response: The data goes through several validation steps before being presented to the operators. When redundant sensors are used, the data received by the computer can be processed by software to determine if the quality of one or more points is questionable.

4. The bypass and inoperable status indication system should include a capability for ensuring its operable status during normal plant operation to the extent that the indicating and annunciating functions can be verified.

Response: The BISI system is designed to operate during all normal plant modes of operations including startup, shutdown, standby, refueling, and power operation. The ICS is designed to provide a very high degree of reliability and the accuracy of the displayed data is not significantly less than the accuracy of comparable data displayed in the Main Control Room.

5. Bypass and inoperable status indicators should be arranged such that the operator can determine whether continued reactor operation is permissible. The control room of all affected units should receive an indication of the bypass of shared system safety functions.

Response: A system level display via the BISI display or indicating lights is provided to the operators to indicate the status of the systems being monitored as well as any support systems. If an alarm condition exists, additional detailed information is provided to the operations staff so as to allow determination of the abnormal condition. The information provided will identify to the Operations staff the exact nature of the initiating condition for the abnormal alarm. Each BISI system point will allow the user to access a detailed system screen.

These indicators and alarms will provide critical information to help the operations staff determine whether continued reactor operation is/is not permissible. As stated previously, the final decision of system operability/inoperability is left to the Operations staff to determine per Technical Specifications.

6. Bypass and inoperable status indicators should be designed and installed in a manner that precludes the possibility of adverse effects on plant safety systems. The indication system should not be used to perform functions that are essential to safety, unless it is designed in conformance with criteria established for safety systems.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Response: The BISI system is not designed to safety system criteria and therefore is not to be used to perform functions essential to the health and safety of the public, nor are operator actions based solely on BISI indications.

Appropriate electrical and physical isolation from safety-related equipment to the non-safety system is provided to meet the requirements identified in the FSAR. The ICS is independent of existing sensors and equipment in safety-related systems. Independence is achieved through qualified safety-related Class 1E isolators. The ICS is also isolated to preclude electrical or electronic interference with existing safety systems.

Inputs and outputs are isolated from the plant inputs such that normal faults on the plant side of the loops will have no adverse impact on the ICS other than loss of the one circuit with the fault. The inputs/outputs meet the isolation requirements of Watts Bar Design Criteria WB-DC-30-4, Separation/Isolation, which defines the design requirements for electrical separation/isolation of the distribution equipment and wiring for Class 1E electrical systems and components in the plant.

197 X Open Item 197 was never issued. Y Closed Closed 198 7.5.1.1 7.5.2.2 SRP Section 7.5, Subsection III, Review Procedures states: Responder: Costley/Norman Y Closed Closed Item No. 6 sent to TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML1028618855 sent to EICB (Marcus)

.2 Recommended review emphasis for BISI DORL 7/20/2010 10/5/10 DORL.

F. Scope of BISI indications - As a minimum, BISI should be F. The scope of the WBN BISI indications are based on Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal ML102010034 provided for the following systems: engineering calculation WBPEVAR8807025 Rev. 7 dated 10/5/10 RAI to TVA EICB RAI

- Reactor trip system (RTS) and engineered safety features (Attachment 10). This calculation has not been updated for ML102861885 Item actuation system (ESFAS) - See SRP Appendix 7.1-B subsection Unit 2. The calculation does include Common and Unit 2 TVA letter dated 10/5/10 No. 6 4.13, Indication of Bypasses, and SRP Appendix 7.1-C equipment required to support Unit 1 operation. Response 62 and Attachments subsection 5.8.3, Indication of Bypasses. G. Compliance to Regulatory Guide 1.47 is described in 10 and 35 provided information.

- Interlocks for isolation of low-pressure systems from the reactor design criteria document WB-DC-30-29 Rev. 8, Integrated coolant system - See SRP BTP 7-1. Computer System (submitted under TVA letter dated August

- ECCS accumulator isolation valves - See SRP BTP 7-2. 11, 2010 (Reference 1)) which is a design input to

- Controls for changeover of residual heat removal from injection to calculation WBPEVAR8807025 Rev. 7.

recirculation mode - See SRP BTP 7-6. H. Design criteria document WB-DC-30-29 Rev. 8, G. Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.47, Bypassed and Integrated Computer System submitted under TVA letter Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety dated August 11, 2010 (Reference 1)) section 3.4.1, BISI Systems. Design and Operation states: The BISI shall not be H. Independence - See SRP Appendix 7.1-B subsection 4.7, designed to safety related system criteria and therefore is Control and Protection System Interaction, and SRP Appendix not to be used to perform functions essential to the health 7.1-C subsections 5.6, Independence, and 6.3, Interaction and safety of the public. Class 1E isolation is required, Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems. however, to maintain the independence of safety related The indication system should be designed and installed in a equipment and systems.

manner that precludes the possibility of adverse effects on plant I. Development of the Bypassed and Inoperable Status safety systems. Failure or bypass of a protective function should Indication (BISI) application of the Integrated Computer not be a credible consequence of failures occurring in the System (ICS) is performed in accordance with NPG SPP 2.6, indication equipment, and the bypass indication should not reduce Computer Software Control, Rev. 12 (Attachment 35). The the required independence between redundant safety systems. development process starts with classifying the application I. Use of digital systems - See SRP Appendix 7.0-A and Appendix depending on how the output of the software will be used.

7.1-D. BISI software is currently classified as category C in accordance with . Appendix B which defines Category C Please provide a description of how BISI meets each item above, as:

or provide appropriate justification for not doing so.

Application Software Categories Category Description

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N C Software and data which are an integral part of a quality-related but not safety-related plant system or component and are essential to the performance of that function.

Software, portions of software, and data essential to the implementation of quality-related programs listed in Section 5.1.B of the Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan, including software used to implement regulatory physical security requirements.

Software and data which implements NQAP requirements but not specifically identified as an augmented quality-related program as defined in Section 5.1.B of the NQAP.

Software, not associated with a specific plant system, which stores, maintains, controls, distributes or manages data which can be used without further verification in activities which affect safety- or quality- related plant structures, systems, and components.

Software, portions of software, and data which are an integral part of a non safety-related, non-quality related plant system or component whose failure would significantly impact plant operations.

Software used in the design of non quality-related, non safety-related plant structures, systems, and components Based on category C classification, SPP 2.6, Annex C defines the documentation that is required for the software..

For BISI, a Software Requirements Specification (SRS) based on the engineering calculation will be generated along with a Software Design Description. A Software Verification and Validation Report (SVVR) consisting of a Validation Test and results and an Operability Test and results will be prepared. User documentation for BISI will be incorporated into the overall ICS user documents.

Future changes to BISI will be driven foremost by changes to the engineering calculation that defines the overall functionality of the system. Any changes to the engineering calculation will cause a Software Services Request (SSR) to be generated. Depending on the scope of the change, the various documents (SRS, SDD, SVVR and user documentation) will be updated or re-issued.

199 7.5.1.1 7.5.2.3 The WBU2 FSAR Section 7.5.2.3, Technical Support Center and Responder: Costley/Norman Y Closed Closed Item No. 7 sent to TVA Letter dated Related SE Section 7.5.5.3 EICB RAI EICB (Marcus)

.3 Nuclear Data Links, contains a description of the Technical DORL 7/20/2010 10/5/10 ML1028618855 sent to DORL.

Support Center and Nuclear Data Links. The Technical Support Center is intended to be an accident Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal ML102010034 mitigation support center and provides Satellite Display dated 10/5/10 RAI to TVA EICB RAI SRP Section 7.5, Subsection II, Acceptance Criteria states: Stations (SDS) capable of displaying information on plant ML102861885 Item Requirements applicable to the review ofERF information systems for Unit 1, Unit 2 or the Simulator. Stations in the TVA letter dated 10/5/10 No. 7 systems, and ERDS information systems 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1), TSC receive data from the plant Integrated Computer Response 63 provided Quality Standards. System (ICS) over the ICS network. Separate PCs receive information.

data from the simulator computer over the WBN site network Please provide a description of how the nuclear data links meets to support drills and training exercises. Those PCs can also this regulatory requirement. access the Plant Engineering Data System (PEDS) as a

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N backup to ICS. The TSC also has a separate computer that connects to the CECC to allow additional access to meteorological station.

The ICS data is also transmitted from the PEDS server through the PEDS Firewall over the WBN Site Network to the CECC computers (Chattanooga). The CECC computers transmit the data over the TVA Corporate Network, through the TVA Firewall (provided by NRC), through the NRC Firewall to the NRC. Transmission of this data from the ICS and Meteorological Station over data link (High Speed Communications Link) to the CECC and NRC meet the requirements of NUREG-0696, Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities and NUREG-1394, Emergency Response Data System Implementation.

200 7.2 7/21/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte) 7.3 The statement in SER Section 7.5.1 is supported by the ML102980066 Item 10/5/10 7.5 Amendment 99 of the Watts Bar Unit 2 FSAR Section 7.5, following: No. 2 7.7 Instrumentation Systems Important to Safety, does not include

• I&C Systems for Normal Operation FSAR Section Amendment 101 any description of instrumentation for normal operation; therefore,

• Eagle 21 7.2 Submitted Section 7.5 of the FSAR does not support statements made in the

• Neutron Monitoring 7.2 10/29/10.

SER Section 7.5; compare SER (ML072060490) Section 7.5.1 and

• Foxboro Spec 200 7.3 (List of other sections in FSAR Amendment 99 Section 7.5. Please identify where, in the attachment 34) docketed material, information exists to support the statements in

• Foxboro I/A 7.7.11 (new section will be added by the SER Section 7.5.1. amendment 101) (other sections have been previously provided)

• Plant Computer 7.5.2

• Rod Control 7.7.1.2

• CERPI 7.7.1.2

• Control Rod Drive 7.7.1.1

• Incore Neutron Monitoring 7.7.1.9

• Lose Part Detection/Monitoring 7.6.7

• Vibration Monitoring RCP 5.5.1.2

• Control Boards 7.1.1.10

• RVLIS 7.5, 5.6 201 7.7.1.1 7.7.11 7/21/2010 Responder: Webb Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte)

.1 ML102980066 Item 10/5/10 Amendment 99, FSAR Section 7.7.1.1.1, "Reactor Control Input These functions are within the scope of the Foxboro I/A No. 3 Signals (Unit 2 Only)," contains a description of functions system. Section 7.7.11 will be added to the FSAR in Amendment 101 performed uniquely for Unit 2. Please describe the equipment that amendment 101 to provide a discussion of the DCS. Submitted performs this function (in sufficient detail to support a regulatory 10/29/10.

evaluation), and evaluate this equipment against the appropriate regulatory criteria.

202 7.5.2 7/22/2010 Responder: WEC N Open Open-TVA/WEC EICB RAI TVA Letter dated NNC 1/5/11: See Also Open Item No.

EICB (Carte)

Response included in letter ML102980066 Item 10/5/10 81 and 86.

The letter (ML0003740165) which transmitted the Safety Revision 1 of the Licensing Technical Report will provide dated 12/22/10 to provide information No. 4 Evaluation for the Common Q topical report to Westinghouse more detailed information on the changes to the platform. requested.

stated: "Should our criteria or regulations change so that our Partial Response provided in conclusions as to the acceptability of the report are invalidated, CE Rev. 2 of the Licensing Technical Report will include the letter dated 10/5/10 Due TBD Nuclear Power and/or the applicant referencing the topical report applicability of guidance.

will be expected to revise and resubmit their respective NNC 1/5/11: Summary provided documentation, or submit justification for continued applicability of TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request: in Licensing Technical Report the topical report without revision of the respective WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Revision 2, Post-Accident R2 has been reviewed and documentation." Question No 81 identified many criteria changes; Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report found to be unacceptable.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N please revise the respective documentation or submit justification (LTR) submitted in TVA Letter to NRC dated December 3, for continued applicability of the topical report. 2010, contains the following change to address the NRC LTR Section 9 evaluates the request: compliance of the SRS to IEEE 830-1998. There are two issues Section 9, Compliance Evaluation of the Watts Bar 2 PAMS with this evaluiation:

Software Requirements Specification to IEEE Standard 830- (1) IEEE 830-1998 is not the 1998 and Regulatory Guide 1.172 to show the origin of the current SRP acceptance criteria.

requirements has been added. IEEE 830-1998 has not been formally endorsed by a The descriptions and commitments in the Topical Report regulatory guide.

(TR) still apply. The LTR provides compliance evidence to (2) Westinghouse committed to the new ISG-04 criteria. The statement in the SE means that evaluate the SRS against 830 the TR can be evaluated against later NRC criteria when it when the NRC identified several appears. inconsistencies.

Source: E-mail from Westinghouse (Matthew A. Shakun) to Yes ISG-4 is one new criteria, Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: December 22 letter review, and an evaluation against it has dated December 17, 2010 been provided.

In addition, LTR Rev. 2 Section 13 states: The applicable NRC regulatory guides, IEEE and EPRI industry standards fo the common Q PAMS are shown below. Compliance to these codes and standards are stated in Section 4 of Reference 1.

Reference 1 is the common Q topical report.

203 7.5.1.1 7.5.2 7/26/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL EICB (Marcus)

ML102861885 Item 10/5/10 By letter dated April 27, 2010 (ML101230248), TVA stated The plant computer system is one set of hardware. The Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal No. 9 (Enclosure Item No.19): "The WBN Unit 2 Integrated Computer Safety Parameter Display System, Bypassed and dated 10/5/10 RAI to TVA System(ICS) modification merges the ERFDS and plant computer Inoperable Status Indication System (BISI), Technical into a single computer network." Support Center and Nuclear Data Links are all functions of TVA letter dated 10/5/10 the Plant Computer System. Historically the Westinghouse Response 67 provided FSAR Section 7.5.2, "Plant Computer System," has three P2500 Plant Process Computer and Emergency Response information.

subsections: Facilities Data System (ERFDS) were individual systems but 7.5.2.1, "Safety Parameter Display System" were merged together with the implementation of DCN 7.5.2.2, "Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication System 39911-A, implemented for WBN Unit 1 in December 1998, to (BISI)" become the Plant Integrated Computer System (ICS). A 7.5.2.3, "Technical Support Center and Nuclear Data Links" similar system is being installed for WBN Unit 2 based on the This arrangement implies that the each of these function are part same software with more modern hardware.

of the plant computer, and not a separate sets of equipment.

Please describe the equipment for each function and identify any The ICS is composed of a number of pieces of hardware, all equipment common to more than one function. utilized as a system, to provide the functions listed in the FSAR sections 7.5.2.1, 7.5.2.2 and 7.5.2.3. This hardware includes but is not limited to Hewlett Packard (HP) servers (CPU), DELL servers (CPU), Fiber Optic Panels, Fiber Optic Converters, Switches, Firewalls, Network Taps, Multiplexors (RTP), LCD displays and fiber optic and copper Ethernet cables. As all the applicable hardware make up the system it is all common to more than one function and there is no separate set of equipment for any of the functions referenced in FSAR Section 7.5.2.1 and 7.5.2.2.

The Nuclear Data Link and EOF functions described in 7.5.2.3 are provided by the CECC in Chattanooga. In order

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N for the CECC to have access to ICS data, both the PEDS and the data diode isolating the PEDS from the ICS must be operational.

Meteorological data from the Environmental Data Station (EDS) is gathered by the Unit 1 ICS. That data is sent over to the unit 2 ICS via the inter-unit firewall.

204 7.5.1.1 7.5.2 7/26/2010 Responder: Costley/Norman Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL EICB (Marcus)

NRC to issue formal ML102861885 Item 10/5/10 By letter dated March 12, 2010 (ML101680577) TVA provided 1. Three data diodes. Response provided in letter RAI to TVA No. 10 drawing No. 2-45W2697-1-1, "Integrated Computer System 2. Two provide an interface between train A and B of dated 10/5/10 Network Configuration Connection Diagram," that depicts three Common Q.

"Data Diodes. Please provide a detailed description of the a. These are identical systems consisting of the following: 10/5/10 TVA letter Response 68 equipment, software, and configurations of each "Data Diode". i. Dual DELL R200 computers provided information.

ii. Red Hat Enterprise Linux software that is locked down by CTI Response is acceptable.

iii. 55 Mbs Owl cards iv. Fiber optic Ethernet interface to trained Maintenance test panel

b. Software is configured to allow only specific traffic from the MTP to pass through to the ICS

c. The secure side of the data diode will initiate the connection to the MTP, so there will be a bidirectional connection between the secure side of the data diode and the MTP. There will be no bidirectional data flow from the ICS to the MTP since the diode will block all incoming traffic from the ICS.

3. The third data diode is placed between the two ICS systems and the two PEDS computer systems.

a. Hardware is identical to that used by TVA in other plants

i. Dual HP DL360GS computers ii. Red Hat Enterprise Linux software that is locked down by CTI iii. 155 Mbs OWL cards iv. RJ45 Ethernet to PEDS network

b. Diode is configured to allow certain types of data to flow from the ICS network to the PEDS network. This includes but is not limited to the following:

i. Once per second current values and qualities for all points ii. History data archived by the ICS iii. Data files

c. The data diode does not allow any data to be transferred between the PEDS network and the ICS network.

205 7/26/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated Question B related to prior NRC EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/5/10 approval of this system or 50.59 Regarding the Foxboro Spec 200 system installed at Unit 2: As discussed at the August 3 and 4 meeting in Knoxville Response provided in letter TVA to respond or Item#22 information. This question will be between TVA and the NRC, the Foxboro Spec 200 is not a dated 10/5/10 provide proposed date addressed in the August plant visit.

a- Is it similar to Unit 1? If not, identify the differences and system. The Foxboro Spec 200 analog hardware is used to of response.

evaluation of the acceptability of these differences. replace the existing obsolete hardware with the same 10/14 functions. There are no interconnections between the b- deleted analog loops unless such interconnections existed prior to the replacement. This is strictly an analog to analog upgrade c- For each system which is discussed in the FSAR and utilizes the due to equipment obsolescence. The Foxboro hardware is Spec 200 system, please provide the instrument logic diagram, installed in existing cabinets which require modifications to loop/block diagram with reference to where the system is accept the Foxboro hardware racks.

discussed in the FSAR.

a- A listing of the replacements and differences was

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N previously provided as Attachment 1 to TVA letter to the NRC dated June 18, 2010. Within Unit 1, only portions of the AFW controls were replaced. In Unit 2 all safety-related analog loops were replaced. The Foxboro Spec 200 is a fully qualified industry standard for replacement of obsolete analog instrument and control loop hardware.

b- deleted c- c- The Foxboro Spec 200 hardware has not been installed. Therefore the revised drawings have not been issued. Based on this, EDCR excerpts for the logic diagrams and loop/logic drawings were provided as attachments to TVA letter to the NRC dated July 30, 2010.

The cross reference between the functions upgraded as part of the Foxboro Spec 200 change is contained in Attachment 33.

206 7.5.1.1 7.5.2 7/27/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL EICB (Marcus)

ML102861885 Item 10/5/10 The NRC Requested a description of the plant computer and TVA (1) The Plant Computer is not just a computer but is a Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal No. 11 provided: system and is designated the Integrated Computer System dated 10/5/10 RAI to TVA (1) Dell marketing literature for Dell Poweredge R200 Server, or ICS. The ICS is composed of multiple computer CPUs, which can be found on the internet LCD displays, RTP Multiplexer Assemblies, network fiber WB-DC-30-29 Rev. 8 is (http://www.dell.com/downloads/global/products/pedge/en/pe_R20 optic panels, fiber optic converters, Ethernet switches and Enclosure 1 of TVA letter dated 0_spec_sheet_new.pdf), and network taps previously described in items 71, 81 and 82 August 11, 2010 (ML102240382 (2) HP Integrity rx2660 Server User Service guide (edition 6), above. For a detailed discussion of the ICS functions refer letter and ML102240383 which has not yet been found on the internet, but many other to design criteria document WB-DC-30-29 Rev. 8, Integrated Enclosure 1).

editions have been found. Computer System submitted under TVA letter dated August This information is not adequate for answering the question. (Note: 11, 2010. 10/5/10 TVA letter Response 70 TVA also provided a network configuration connection diagram, provided information.

which is necessary but not sufficient.) (2) As previously discussed in item 82, there is no unique set of hardware for any specific function. Response is acceptable Please provide a description of the plant computer:

(1) Please include sufficient detail so that an evaluation can be made against the SRP acceptance criteria in SRP Section 7.7.

(2) Please identify the equipment (hardware and software) that performs each function described in the FSAR.

207 July 27, 2010 Date: Y Closed Closed EICB (Carte Responder:

)

Deleted by DORL 208 7.5.2.1 7.5.1 7/27/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL EICB (Marcus)

ML102861885 Item 10/5/10 By letter dated June 18, 2010 (ML101940236), TVA responded to The notes provided with the table include the change to the Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal No. 12 See Item 302 which requests more an NRC request for additional information. Enclosure 1 Item No. 6 variable under 10 CFR 50.59. For ease of review, the other dated 10/5/10 RAI to TVA detailed information on this topic of this letter identified, for each PAM variable whether the variable note references have been deleted for these variables and was: (1) implemented identically to Unit 1 and reviewed by the only the note dealing with the Unit 1 change has been 10/5/10 TVA letter Response 71 NRC, (2) implemented identically to Unit 1 but modified under 10 retained in the Notes column of the table excerpt. The provided information.

CFR 50.59 after it was reviewed by the NRC, and (3) implemented applicable notes are highlighted in the notes list.

in a manner that is unique to Unit 2. There were sixteen variables .

modified under 10 CFR 50.59; please describe the changes that were performed under 50.59.

209 7.5.2.1 7.5.1 7/27/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL EICB ML102861885 Item 10/5/10 (Marcus) By letter dated June 18, 2010 (ML101940236), TVA responded to The first eight variables in question are primary chemistry Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal No. 13 an NRC request for additional information. Enclosure 1 Item No. 6 parameter. The parameters are the same for both units, but dated 10/5/10 RAI to TVA

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N of this letter identified, for each PAM variable whether the variable in Unit 1, the sample is obtained via the post accident was: (1) implemented identically to Unit 1 and reviewed by the sampling system, while in Unit 2 the sample is obtained !0 /5/10 TVA letter Response 72 NRC, (2) implemented identically to Unit 1 but modified under 10 using a grab sample via the normal sample system. provided information.

CFR 50.59 after it was reviewed by the NRC, and (3) implemented in a manner that is unique to Unit 2. There were nine variables The last variable was somewhat difficult to characterize. The that were identified as both Unique to Unit 2 and identical to what method of detection and the hardware manufacturer is the was reviewed and approved on Unit 1. Please explain. same in both units. However, due to obsolescence some of the parts are different than what is installed in Unit 1. The differences are described in Note 21 of the original response.

210 7.5.2.1 7.5.1 7/27/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL EICB (Marcus)

ML102861885 Item 10/5/10 By letter dated June 18, 2010 (ML101940236), TVA responded to The design basis for Unit 2 is to match Unit 1 as closely as 10/5/10 TVA letter Response 73 NRC to issue formal No. 14 See Item 302 which requests more an NRC request for additional information. Enclosure 1 Item No. 6 possible. This includes incorporating changes made to Unit provided information. RAI to TVA detailed information on this topic of this letter identified, for each PAM variable whether the variable 1 after licensing under 10 CFR 50.59. The changes in was: (1) implemented identically to Unit 1 and reviewed by the question fall into this category and are described in the Response provided in letter NRC, (2) implemented identically to Unit 1 but modified under 10 Notes for each variable in the original submittal. dated 10/5/10 CFR 50.59 after it was reviewed by the NRC, and (3) implemented in a manner that is unique to Unit 2. There were seven variables that were identified as both identical to Unit 1 and changed under 10 CFR 50.59. Please explain.

211 7.5.1.1 7/27/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated Relates to SE Sections:

EICB (Carte) 7.5.2 ML102980066 Item 10/5/10 7.5.5, Plant Computer 7.6.1 FSA Table 7.1-1 shows: "The extent to which the The WBN 2 FSAR Section 7.5 defines the following systems No. 5 7.6.10, Loose Part Monitoring 7.7.1 recommendations of the applicable NRC regulatory guides and as important to safety Amendment 101 7.7.1, Control System Description 7.7.2 IEEE standards are followed for the Class 1E instrumentation and Submitted 7.7.2, Safety System Status Monitoring 7.7.4 control systems is shown below. The symbol (F) indicates full 1. Post Accident Monitoring including: 10/29/10. System 7.9 compliance. Those which are not fully implemented are discussed a. Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System (Safety- 7.7.4, PZR & SG Overfill in the referenced sections of the FSAR and in the footnotes as Related) 7.9, Data Communications indicated." i. Reactor Vessel Level ii. Core Exit Thermocouples Please describe how systems that are important to safety, but not iii. Subcooling Margin Monitor 1E, comply with 10 CFR 50.55a(a)1: "Structures, systems, and b. Eagle 21 indications (Safety-Related) components must be designed, fabricated, erected, constructed, c. Foxboro Spec 200 indications (Safety-Related) tested, and inspected to quality standards commensurate with the d. Neutron Monitoring (Source and Intermediate Range) importance of the safety function to be performed." (Safety-Related)

e. Radiation Monitors (Safety-Related)

f. Unit 1 and Common shared indications (Safety-Related)

g. Foxboro I/A indications (Non-Safety-Related)

h. Radiation Monitors (Non-Safety-Related)

i. CERPI (Non-Safety-Related)

j. Integrated Computer System (Non-Safety-Related)

k. Unit 1 and Common shared indications (Non-Safety-Related)

Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Design Criteria, WB-DC-30-7, Rev. 22, Appendix A provides the minimum quality requirements for each Category (1, 2 or 3) of variable.

By definition, no Category 1 variable can be non-safety-related. Therefore, non-safety-related variables and the source equipment are limited to category 2 or 3. Since some variables are designated as having more than 1 category, the requirements of the highest category apply. Additional design criteria information for specific systems is contained in:

g. Foxboro I/A - Site-Specific Engineering Specification WBN Unit 2 NSSS and BOP Controls Upgrade Specification Rev. 1 (Attachment 23)

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N

h. CERPI - Rod Control System Description, N3-85-4003, Rev. 12 Section 2.2, Design Requirements

i. Radiation Monitors - Design Criteria Document WB-DC-40-24, Radiation Monitoring - (Unit 1 / Unit 2), Rev. 21

j. Integrated Computer System - Design Criteria Document WB-DC-30-29 Plant Integrated Computer System (ICS),

Rev. 8 (Submitted under TVA to NRC letter dated August __,

2010)

2. Plant Computer (Integrated Computer System) - See Item j above.

The WBN 2 FSAR Section 7.6, defines the following non-safety-related systems as other systems required for safety

1. Foxboro I/A - While not specifically described, functions performed by the system are described in this section. The qualify requirements are described above.

2. Lose Part Monitoring System - Design Criteria Document WB-DC-30-31, Loose Parts Monitoring System, Rev. 4, provides the quality requirements for this system. A description of the distributed control system will be added as FSAR section 7.7.1.11 in FSAR Amendment 101.

Installation is performed in accordance with the quality requirements of either the Bechtel or TVA work order processes based on the quality classification of the equipment being installed. Vendor testing is performed in accordance with procurement specification requirements which are based on the type and quality classification of the equipment. Preoperational testing is performed in accordance with Chapter 14 of the FSAR.

212 7.5.2 7/27/2010 Responder: WEC N Open Open-NRC Review EICB RAI EICB (Carte)

ML102980066 Item By letter dated June 18, 2010 (ML101940236) TVA stated Application specific requirements for testing. This cannot be Response included in letter Due 12/22/10 No. 10 (Enclosure 1, Attachment 3, Item No. 3) that the PAMS system addressed in a topical report. Evaluation of how the dated 12/22/10.

design specification and software requirements specification hardware meets the regulatory requirements. To be addressed by contain information to address the "Design Report on Computer WBN2 specific test plan Integrity, Test and Calibration..." The staff has reviewed these WEC to provide the information and determine where the documents, and it is not clear how this is the case. information will be located.

(1) Please describe how the information provided demonstrates compliance with IEEE 603-1991 Clauses 5.5, 5.7, 5.10, & 6.5. IEEE-603 1991:

(2) Please describe how the information provided demonstrates 5.5 System Integrity. The safety systems shall be conformance with IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 Clauses 5.5 & 57. designed to accomplish their safety functions under the full range of applicable conditions enumerated in the design basis.

TVA Response: The applicable conditions and Common Q PAMS system compliance are contained in WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Rev. 2, Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report submitted in TVA Letter to NRC dated December 3, 2010, Section 11, Contract Compliance Matrix items:

• 87 and 88 Seismic

• 89, 90, 91, 92 and 185 EMI/RFI

• 300, 301 and 302 Environmental

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N 5.7 Capability for Test and Calibration. Capability for testing and calibration of safety system equipment shall be provided while retaining the capability of the safety systems to accomplish their safety functions.

The capability for testing and calibration of safety system equipment shall be provided during power operation and shall duplicate, as closely as practicable, performance of the safety function. Testing of Class 1E systems shall be in accordance with the requirements of IEEE Std 338-1987. Exceptions to testing and calibration during power operation are allowed where this capability cannot be provided without adversely affecting the safety or operability of the generating station. In this case:

(1) appropriate justification shall be provided (for example, demonstration that no practical design exists),

(2) acceptable reliability of equipment operation shall be otherwise demonstrated, and (3) the capability shall be provided while the generating station is shut down.

TVA Response: The requirements for test and calibration and Common Q PAMS system compliance, are contained in WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Rev. 2, Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report Section 11, TVA Contract Compliance Matrix items:

• 202 self test

• 350 Maintenance Bypass

• 351 Loop Tuning Parameters,

• 400 and 401 3.7.2 Testing, Calibration, and Verification

• 402, 403 and 404, 3.7.3 Channel Bypass or Removal from Operation 5.10 Repair. The safety systems shall be designed to facilitate timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of malfunctioning equipment.

TVA Response: The requirements for repair and Common Q PAMS system compliance are contained in WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Rev. 2, Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report Section 11, TVA Contract Compliance Matrix items:

• 179 Mean time to repair

• 202 self test

• 398 3.7 Maintenance

• 399 3.7.1 Troubleshooting 6.5 Capability for Testing and Calibration 6.5.1 Means shall be provided for checking, with a high degree of confidence, the operational availability of each sense and command feature input sensor required for a safety function during reactor operation.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N This may be accomplished in various ways; for example:

(1) by perturbing the monitored variable, (2) within the constraints of 6.6, by introducing and varying, as appropriate, a substitute input to the sensor of the same nature as the measured variable, or (3) by cross-checking between channels that bear a known relationship to each other and that have readouts available.

6.5.2 One of the following means shall be provided for assuring the operational availability of each sense and command feature required during the post-accident period:

(1) Checking the operational availability of sensors by use of the methods described in 6.5.1.

(2) Specifying equipment that is stable and retains its calibration during the post-accident time period.

TVA Response: The requirements for sense and command feature testing and Common Q PAMS system compliance are contained in WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Revision 2, Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report Section 11 TVA Contract Compliance Matrix items:

• 10, display of sensor diagnostic information

• 202 self test

• 205 self diagnostics and watchdog timer

• 264 through 271, system self checks

• 311 system status displays,

• 341 alarms,

• 344 on-line diagnostics IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 5.5 System integrity In addition to the system integrity criteria provided by IEEE Std 603-1998, the following are necessary to achieve system integrity in digital equipment for use in safety systems:

Design for computer integrity Design for test and calibration Fault detection and self-diagnostics 5.5.1 Design for computer integrity The computer shall be designed to perform its safety function when subjected to conditions, external or internal, that have significant potential for defeating the safety function. For example, input and output processing failures, precision or round off problems, improper recovery actions, electrical input voltage and frequency fluctuations, and maximum credible number of coincident signal changes.

If the system requirements identify a safety system preferred failure mode, failures of the computer shall not preclude the safety system from being placed in that mode. Performance of computer system restart

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N operations shall not result in the safety system being inhibited from performing its function.

TVA Response: Common Q PAMS system reliability and failure modes are described in:

• WNA-AR-00180-WBT, Revision 0, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) for the Post Accident Monitoring System

• WNA-AR-00189-WBT, Revision 0 Post Accident Monitoring System Reliability Analysis The requirements for mean time between failure and Common Q PAMS system compliance are contained in WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Revision 2, Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report, Section 11 TVA Contract Compliance Matrix item 178.

5.5.2 Design for test and calibration Test and calibration functions shall not adversely affect the ability of the computer to perform its safety function. Appropriate bypass of one redundant channel is not considered an adverse effect in this context. It shall be verified that the test and calibration functions do not affect computer functions that are not included in a calibration change (e.g., setpoint change).

V&V, configuration management, and QA shall be required for test and calibration functions on separate computers (e.g., test and calibration computer) that provide the sole verification of test and calibration data.

V&V, configuration management, and QA shall be required when the test and calibration function is inherent to the computer that is part of the safety system.

V&V, configuration management, and QA are not required when the test and calibration function is resident on a separate computer and does not provide the sole verification of test and calibration data for the computer that is part of the safety system.

TVA Response: The requirements for test and calibration and Common Q PAMS system compliance are contained in WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Revision 2, Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report Section 11 TVA Contract Compliance Matrix items:

• 202 self test

• 350 Maintenance Bypass

• 351 Loop Tuning Parameters,

• 400 and 401 3.7.2 Testing, Calibration, and Verification

• 402, 403 and 404, 3.7.3 Channel Bypass or Removal from Operation 5.5.3 Fault detection and self-diagnostics

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Computer systems can experience partial failures that can degrade the capabilities of the computer system, but may not be immediately detectable by the system.

Self-diagnostics are one means that can be used to assist in detecting these failures. Fault detection and self-diagnostics requirements are addressed in this sub-clause.

The reliability requirements of the safety system shall be used to establish the need for self-diagnostics. Self diagnostics are not required for systems in which failures can be detected by alternate means in a timely manner. If self-diagnostics are incorporated into the system requirements, these functions shall be subject to the same V&V processes as the safety system functions.

If reliability requirements warrant self-diagnostics, then computer programs shall incorporate functions to detect and report computer system faults and failures in a timely manner. Conversely, self-diagnostic functions shall not adversely affect the ability of the computer system to perform its safety function, or cause spurious actuations of the safety function. A typical set of self-diagnostic functions includes the following:

Memory functionality and integrity tests (e.g.,

PROM checksum and RAM tests)

Computer system instruction set (e.g., calculation tests)

Computer peripheral hardware tests (e.g.,

watchdog timers and keyboards)

Computer architecture support hardware (e.g.,

address lines and shared memory interfaces)

Communication link diagnostics (e.g., CRC checks)

Infrequent communication link failures that do not result in a system failure or a lack of system functionality do not require reporting.

When self-diagnostics are applied, the following self-diagnostic features shall be incorporated into the system design:

a) Self-diagnostics during computer system startup b) Periodic self-diagnostics while the computer system is operating c) Self-diagnostic test failure reporting TVA Response: The requirements for fault detection and self diagnostics and Common Q PAMS system compliance are contained in WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Rev. 2, Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS)

Licensing Technical Report Section 11 TVA Contract Compliance Matrix items:

• 107 error free download

• 202 self test

• 205 self diagnostics and watchdog timer

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N

• 263 primary and backup communication

• 264 through 271, continuous on-line self checks

• 311 system status displays,

• 341 alarms,

• 344 on-line diagnostics 5.7 Capability for test and calibration No requirements beyond IEEE Std 603-1998 are necessary.

TVA Response: No response required.

Concurrence: E-mail from Westinghouse (Andrew P. Drake) to Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: RAI 212 Response - Errors in the Contract Compliance Matrix, dated December 17, 2010 213 7.5.2 7/27/2010 Responder: WEC N Open Open-TVA/WEC EICB RAI EICB (Carte)

ML102980066 Item By letter dated June 18, 2010 (ML101940236) TVA stated Conformance with IEEE 603 is documented in the revised Response is included in letter Due TBD - TVA to No. 18 (Enclosure 1, Attachment 3, Item No. 3) that the PAMS system Common Q PAMS Licensing Technical Report and the dated 10/25/10 provide a date design specification and software requirements specification Common Q PAMS System Design Specification.

contain information to address the "Theory of Operation NNC to review and revise this NNC 2/3/11: The Description." The staff has reviewed these documents, and it is Attachment 1 contains the proprietary version of question after LTR R2 is identified not clear how this is the case. The docketed material does not Westinghouse document Tennessee Valley Authority received. documentation does appear to contain the design basis information that is required to (TVA), Watts Bar Unit 2 (WBN2), Post-Accident Monitoring not include the design evaluate compliance with the Clause of IEEE 603. System (PAMS), Licensing Technical Report, Revision 1, bases. Please provide (1) Please provide the design basis (as described in IEEE 604 WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Dated October 2010 schedule for providing Clause 4) of the Common Q PAMS. the requested (2) Please provide a regulatory evaluation of how the PAMs Attachment 8 contains the proprietary version of information.

complies with the applicable regulatory requirements for the theory Westinghouse document Nuclear Automation Watts Bar 2 of operation. NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Post Accident For example: Regarding IEEE 603 Clause 5.8.4 (1) What are the Monitoring System - System Design Specification, WNA-manually controlled protective actions? (2) How do the documents DS-01667-WBT, Rev. 2 dated September 2010.

identified demonstrate compliance with this clause?

214 7/27/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte)

ML102980066 Item 10/5/10 By letter dated June 18, 2010 (ML101940236) TVA stated According to "The Software Program Manual for Common Q No. 11 (Enclosure 1, Attachment 3, Item No. 10) that the approved Systems," WCAP-16096-NP-1A, the Software Safety Plan Common Q Topical Report contains information to address the only applies to Protection class software and PAMS is "Safety Analysis." The Common Q SPM however states that a classified as Important-to-safety. Exhibit 4-1 of the SPM Preliminary Hazards Analysis Report and the V&V reports shows that PAMS is classified as Important-to-Safety document the software hazards analysis. Please Provide these documents.

215 7/29/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed DORL (Poole)

By letter dated June 18, 2010, TVA provided a table showing the Close this item documents that had been completed and were available for staff review. In a conference call on July 27, 2010, TVA agreed to submit the requested documents on the docket. Please provide the schedule for submitting the documents.

216 7.5.1.1 7.5.2 7/29/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL EICB (Marcus)

ML102861885 Item 10/5/10 By letter dated March 12, 2010 (ML101680577), TVA stated that it 1) EDCR 52322 is contained in Attachment 7. Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal No. 15 would provide five documents to describe the Process computer: 5) The design change referred to is the addition of a data dated 10/5/10 RAI to TVA.

(1) EDCR 52322 Rev. A excerpts, (2) HP RX2660 Users Guide diode. This has not been incorporated into the drawing.

AB419-9002C-ed6, (3) Dell Poweredge R200 Server sheet Please see the response to letter item 88 (RAI Matrix Item 10/5/10 TVA letter Response 76 November 2007, (4) RTP Corp 8707 I/O Brochure RTP 8707-02, 224). and Attachment 7 provided

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N 2004, and (5) Integrated Computer System Drawing. information.

217 7/6/2010 Responder: Clark Y Close Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 7/30/10 Provide copies excerpts of the EDCRs and DCNs that provide the Attachment 7 contains excerpts of the following change Item#55 block and logic diagrams for the Foxboro Spec 200 documents:

implementation.

DCN 52376 Note: These changes are scheduled to be implemented after Unit 2 Fuel Load DCN 52641 NOTE: DCN 52376 and 52641 impact loops already in service for Unit 1 and as such are implemented under 10CFR50.59.

EDCR 52343 EDCR 52427 218 7/6/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 7/30/10 Provide copies excerpts of the EDCRs and DCNs that provide the The excerpt of work order WO 08-813412-000 provided with Attachment 8 contains the Item#56 block and logic diagrams for the Foxboro Spec 200 the June 18 letter did not contain the information showing required correct work order implementation. that the new type (Arnold) power supplies had been installed excerpt.

in the Unit 1 Eagle 21 system. Please provide the necessary pages of the work order to verify the installation of Arnold power supplies in the Unit 1 Eagle 21 System.

219 8/4/2010 Responder: TVA Licensing Y Closed Closed EICB RAI EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 Transmit copy of February 8, 2008 FSAR Red-Line for Unit 2 letter A copy was hand carried by Mr. W. Crouch and delivered to Check what sent by Terry Item#57 with attachments [CD]. Stewart Bailey at the August 17 meeting at NRC missing attachments.

headquarters.

TVA Revised Response:

Attachment 6 contains the redline FSAR with attachments.

220 8/4/2010 Responder: Ayala Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/5/10 For Safety Related SSPS, submit letter justifying delta between U1 The Westinghouse ARLA latch attachment is obsolete. In Response provided in letter TVA to respond or Item#23

[utilizing ARs] & U2 [utilizing ARs and MDRs]. [Requires TS order to provide a latching relay for Unit 2 Solid State dated 10/5/10 provide proposed date change ???] Protection System (SSPS), a MDR latching relay must be of response.

used. MDR relays are currently in use and shown to be Are there any open issues?

reliable as SSPS Slave Relays in other Westinghouse Docket plant specific responses plants. to the individual.

The Technical Specification (TS) Bases was updated in Amendment B to indicate acceptability of testing MDR ESFAS Slave relays on an 18-month interval based on the assessment done in WCAP-13878-P-A, Revision 2, Reliability Assessment of Potter & Brumfield MDR Series Relays.

An initial Unit 2 ESFAS SSPS Slave Relay Service Life and Contact Load study similar to that done in Unit 1 has been completed to show that Unit 2 satisfies the conditions of WCAP-13877-P-A, Revision 2, Reliability Assessment of Westinghouse Type AR Relays used as SSPS Slave Relays, and WCAP-13878, Revision 2, Reliability Assessment of Potter & Brumfield MDR Series Relays. The Contact Load study also identifies locations in which MDR

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N relays are not acceptable for use.

221 7.7.1.2 7.7.1.3 8/4/2010 Responder: Trelease Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL EICB (Marcus)

ML102861885 Item 10/5/10 Submit EDCR Technical Evaluation for the source and The EDCR 52421 Source and Intermediate Range, Scope Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal No. 16 intermediate range updated electronics for Unit 2 and Intent, Unit Difference and Technical Evaluations are dated 10/5/10 RAI to TVA.

contained in Attachment 31 to 10/5 letter.

10/5/10 TVA letter Response 78 and Attachment 31 provided information.

222 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Y Close Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB ML102910008 10/5/10 (Garg)

Submit updated list for Foxboro Spec 200 [replacement of Bailey The updated listing of Foxboro Spec 200 loop functions is Response provided in letter Item#24 and Robert-Shaw electronics contained in Attachment 33. dated 10/5/10 223 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 Submit EDCR Technical Evaluation for Foxboro I/A replacing Duplicate of item 233. Item#58 obsolete non-safety related Foxboro H-Line analog electronics with a digital CDS. [selected single point failures being addressed in design]

224 7.5.1.1 7.5.2 8/4/2010 Responder: Norman (TVA CEG) Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL EICB (Marcus)

ML102861885 Item 10/5/10 Mike Norman [TVA Computer Eng. Group] will check status of The Data diode to isolate the WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2 ICS Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal No. 17 DCN/50.59 for Integrated Computer System upgrade that will computers from the WBN PEDS computers will be installed dated 10/5/10 RAI to TVA.

install the data diode between the WBN PEDS and the Unit 1 and in PIC 56278 as part of DCN 54971. This DCN is scheduled Unit 2 ICS. for implementation in Spring 2011. This date was included in 10/5/10 TVA letter Response 80 the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedules provided information.

submitted to the NRC on July 23.

225 8/4/2010 Responder: Scansen Y Close Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/5/10 Provide EDCR Technical Evaluation Justify/explain updated The requested information is contained in the Scope and Response provided in letter Item#25 hardware [functionally equivalent to Unit 1] for the RCP and Intent, Unit Difference and Technical Evaluations for EDCRs dated 10/5/10 Turbine Generator vibration monitoring equipment. 52420 (Attachment 11) and 53559 (Attachment 12) 226 8/4/2010 Responder: TVA Licensing Y Closed Closed N/A - Information TVA Letter dated See also Open Item Nos. 41 & 270.

EICB (Carte) requested under 8/11/10 Submit the Foxboro I/A segmentation analysis and ICS Design These documents were submitted under TVA letter dated NNC 8/25/10: Segmentation another open item.

Criteria documents on an expedited separate letter. Provide a August 11, 2010. analysis has been received and date when the Segmentation analysis will be revised based on read. Please describe why a discussions at the meeting. failure or error will not propagate over the -peer-to-peer network, and cause more than one segment to fail.

227 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Y Close Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/5/10 Provide copies of 50.59s for the following Unit 1 changes A. CERPI, initial installation DCN 51072 and 2009 Response provided in letter Item#26 upgrade DCN 52957 (Attachment Upgrade of RCP, TG dated 10/5/10

a. CERPI (initial installation and 2009 upgrade) and FW pumps vibration monitoring to Bentley-Nevada

b. Vibration monitoring (RCP, TG and FW pumps to Bentley- 3300, DCN 39242, DCN 39506, DCN 39548, and DCN Nevada 3300) 50750 (Attachment )

c. Containment Sump Level Transmitter replacement B. Containment Sump Level Transmitter replacement,

d. Turbine Servo Control Valve Card replacement DCN 39608 (Attachment )

e. Pressurizer Heater deletion of Backup Heaters on for PZR High C. Turbine Servo Control Valve Card replacement, DCN Level 38993 (Attachment )

f. AMSAC D. Pressurizer Heater deletion of Backup Heaters on for

g. Significant ESFAS changes PZR High Level, DCN 51102 (Attachment )

E. AMSAC DCN 50475 (Attachment )

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N F. Significant ESFAS changes

i. Relocate containment isolation valve function and relocate the 6.9KV Shutdown Boards Emergency Feeder Breaker Trip function from K626 and K602, respectively, to minimize disruption on plant operation. DCN 38238 (Attachment )

ii. Revise OTT and OPT turbine runback setpoints, DCN 38842 (Attachment )

iii. Install Integrated Computer System (ICS)

Stages 4 and 5, DCN 50301 (Attachment )

228 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB ML102980066 Item 10/5/10 (Carte) Submit rod control system description N3-85-4003 The Rod Control System Description N3-85-4003 is Response provided in letter No. 6 contained in Attachment 21. dated 10/5/10 229 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB ML102980066 Item 10/5/10 (Carte) Submit Annunciator system description/design criteria Condition Status/Alarm Design Criteria Document WB-DC- Response provided in letter No. 7 30-21 is contained in Attachment 22. dated 10/5/10 230 8/4/2010 Responder: Webb Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB ML102980066 Item 10/5/10 (Carte) Submit Foxboro I/A Procurement Specification excerpts that The requested Foxboro I/A Procurement Specification is Response provided in letter No. 8 provide system description information contained in Attachment 23. dated 10/5/10 231 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/5/10 Update FSAR Amendment 100 Section 7.1.1.2 markup based on FSAR section 7.1.1.2 is revised in FSAR Amendment 100 Response provided in letter FSAR AMD 100 Item#27 discussion with Hukam Garg. submitted to the NRC on TVA letter to the NRC dated dated 10/5/10 September 1, 2010 includes the requested clarifications.

232 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed RAI No. 5 TVA Letter dated EICB (Singh)

ML102980005 10/5/10 Submit EDCR Technical Evaluation for LPMS EDCR The EDCR 52418 Lose Part Monitoring Scope and Intent, TVA provided 10/26/2010 Unit Difference and Technical Evaluations are contained in information in Att. 24 of Attachment 24 to 10/5 letter. 10/5 letter.

233 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB ML102980066 Item 10/5/10 (Carte) Submit EDCR Technical Evaluation for Foxboro I/A EDCR Foxboro I/A EDCRs 52378 and 52671 Scope and Intent, Unit Response provided in letter No. 12 Difference and Technical Evaluations are contained in dated 10/5/10 Attachment 25 to the 10/5 letter.

234 8/4/2010 Responder: Y Closed Closed N/A - Duplicate N/A EICB Item (Carte) Bechtel to perform D3 analysis for Common Q PAMS which will be Duplicate of Item 64 incorporated into Westinghouse Licensing Technical Report.

235 8/4/2010 Responder: TVA Licensing Y Closed Closed N/A N/A EICB (Garg)

TVA to ensure Stewart Bailey is on cc: for all Chapter 7 RAI Stewart Bailey has been added to the standard response response letters. letter template used for Chapter 7 responses.

236 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Y Close Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB ML102910008 10/5/10 (Garg)

Submit EDCR Technical Evaluation for Foxboro Spec 200 EDCRs Foxboro Spec 200 EDCRs 52343, 52427 and 52641, Scope Response provided in letter Item#28 and Intent, Unit Difference and Technical Evaluations are dated 10/5/10

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N contained in Attachment 26 to 10/5 letter.

237 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB ML102980066 Item 10/5/10 (Carte) Submit EDCR Technical Evaluation for Annunciator EDCR The Annunciator EDCR 52315 Scope and Intent, Unit Response provided in letter No. 13 Difference and Technical Evaluations are contained in dated 10/5/10 Attachment 27 to 10/5 letter.

238 8/4/2010 Responder: Webb/Hilmes Y Closed Closed N/A - Duplicate N/A EICB Item (Carte) Discuss with TVA adding a description of the Foxboro I/A system Duplicate of item 201 to chapter 7 of the FSAR.

239 8/4/2010 Responder: Hilmes Y Closed Closed N/A - Meeting N/A EICB request (Carte) Plan a meeting with TVA the NRC and Westinghouse to review meeting held 8/17/10 Common Q PAMS documentation.

240 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Y Close Closed Ml102910008 TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

Item#29 10/5/10 Submit EDCR Technical Evaluation for Vibration Monitoring The Scope and Intent, Unit Difference and Technical Response provided in letter EDCR(s) Evaluations for EDCRs 53559 and 52420 are contained in dated 10/5/10 Attachment 28 of 10/5 letter.

241 8/4/2010 Responder: Davies Y Closed Closed RAI No. 10 TVA Letter dated EICB (Singh)

ML102980005 10/5/10 Review CERPI WCAPs for system description information to be CERPI was designed after Westinghouse stopped using Response provided in letter TVA provided 10/26/2010 submitted to the NRC. WCAPs. The document that provides the most detailed dated 10/5/10 information in Att. 29 of information is the CERPI System Requirements Specification 10/5 letter.

WN-DS-00001-WBT Rev. 2. The proprietary version of this document and the affidavit for withholding are contained in Attachment 29.

242 8/4/2010 Responder: Hilmes Y Close Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/5/10 TVA to make firm decision on date of transfer (before or after initial The Unit 2 loops in service for Unit that are scheduled to be Response provided in letter Item#30 startup) of Unit 2 loops in service for Unit 1 to new Foxboro Spec transferred to the Foxboro Spec 200 hardware will be dated 10/5/10 200 hardware transferred prior to Unit 2 fuel load.

243 8/3/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A - Closed to N/A EICB (Carte)

Item No. 142 Section 8.2.1 of the Common Q SPM (ML050350234) states that WEC to address at the 9/15 meeting the System Requirements Specification (SysRS) includes the system design basis. Section 1.2, "System Scope," of the WBN2 Closed to Item 142 PAM SysRS (ML101680578) includes a description of the PAMS design bases that does not meet the requirements of IEEE 603-199 Clause 4. Please provide a description of the PAMs design bases that conforms to the requirements of IEEE 603-1991 Clause 4.

244 8/3/2010 Responder: WEC N Open Open-TVA/WEC EICB RAI Response is LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B Section 4, EICB (Carte)

ML102980066 Item provided in letter "Safety Evaluation" states: "the Section 8.2.2 of the Common Q SPM (ML050350234) states that The process related requirements have been removed from Revised response is included in NNC 2/2/11: Issues No. 14 dated 10/25/10. information relied upon in the SE must the Software Requirements Specification (SRS) shall be developed revision 2 of the Software Requirements Specification (SRS). letter dated 12/22/10 with Common Q TR & be docketed correspondence."

using IEEE 830 and RE 1.172. Clause 4.8, "Embedding project SPM compliance were requirements in the SRS," of the IEEE 830 states that an SRS Attachment 3 of letter dated 10/25/10 contains the Response is provided in letter discussed in the weekly LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The safety should address the software product, not the process of producing proprietary version of Westinghouse document Nuclear dated 10/25/10. public meetings. analysis that supports the change the software. In addition Section 4.3.2.1 of the SPM states "Any Automation, Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program, I&C Westinghouse to requested should include technical alternatives to the SPM processes or additional project specific Projects, Software Requirements Specification for the Post NNC 11/18/10: SysRS Rev. 2 perform Common Q TR information in sufficient detail to enable

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N information for the ...SCMP...shall be specified in the PQP. Accident Monitoring System, WNA-SD-00239-WBT, also contains process & SPM compliance self the NRC staff to make an independent Revision 2, Dated September 2010. requirements that are more assessment; his will be assessment regarding the acceptability Contrary to these two statements in the SPM, the WBN2 PAMS appropriately incorporated into discussed in detail on of the proposal in terms of regulatory SRS (ML101050202) contains many process related requirements, TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request: process documentation. the next audit. requirements and the protection of for example all seventeen requirements in Section 2.3.2, As shown is the listed documents, process related public health and safety."

"Configuration Control," address process requirements for requirements have been deleted from the SRS and SysRS in configuration control. Revision 3:

Please explain how the above meets the intent of the approved Attachment 1 contains proprietary version of WNA-DS-SPM. 01617-WBT-P, Revision 3, Post Accident Monitoring System-System Requirements Specification, dated December 2010.

Attachment 7 contains the proprietary version of WNA-SD-00239-WBT-P, Revision 3, Software Requirements Specification for the Post Accident Monitoring System, dated December 2010.

Source: E-mail from Westinghouse (Andrew P. Drake) to Bechtel (Mark S. Clark), RE: Common Q RAI concerns, dated December 8, 2010 (Reference 17) 245 8/3/2010 Responder: WEC N Open Open-TVA/WEC EICB RAI LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B Section 4, EICB (Carte)

ML102980066 Item "Safety Evaluation" states: "the Section 5.8 of the Common Q SPM (ML050350234) identifies the Relates to the commitment to provide the test plan and the Response included in letter NNC 2/2/11: Issues No. 119 information relied upon in the SE must required test documentation for systems developed using the SPM compliance matrix dated 12/3/10 with the Common Q TR be docketed correspondence."

Common Q SPM. Please provide sufficient information for the & SPM were discussed NRC staff to independently assess whether the test plan for WBN2 Attachment 9 contains the Westinghouse document Post in the weekly public LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The safety PAMS, is as described in the SPM (e.g., Section 5.8.1). Accident Monitoring System Test Plan, WNA-PT-00138- meetings. analysis that supports the change WBT, Revision 0, dated November 2010. Attachment 10 Westinghouse to requested should include technical contains the Westinghouse Application for Withholding for perform Common Q TR information in sufficient detail to enable the Post Accident Monitoring System Test Plan, WNA-PT- & SPM compliance self the NRC staff to make an independent 00138-WBT, Revision 0, dated November 2010. assessment assessment regarding the acceptability of the proposal in terms of regulatory requirements and the protection of public health and safety."

246 8/3/2010 Responder: WEC N Open Open-TVA/WEC EICB RAI Response is LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B Section 4, EICB (Carte)

ML102980066 Item provided in letter "Safety Evaluation" states: "the Section 4.3.2.1, "Initiation Phase" of the Common Q SPM As agreed ISG6 does not apply to the Common Q PAMS Response is provided in letter NNC 2/2/11: Issues No. 15 dated 10/25/10 information relied upon in the SE must (ML050350234) requires that a Project Quality Plan (PQP) be platform. The information required to address this question dated 10/25/10 with the Common Q TR be docketed correspondence."

developed. Many other section of the SPM identify that this PQP concerning the PQP and SPM has been added to & SPM were discussed should contain information required by ISG6. Please provide the compliance matrix in revision 1 of the Licensing Technical NNC 11/18/10: PQP has not in the weekly public LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The safety PQP. If "PQP" is not the name of the documentation produced, Report. been provided and CQ PAMS meetings. analysis that supports the change please describe the documentation produced and provide the LTR Rev. 1 does not contain Westinghouse to requested should include technical information that the SPM states should be in the PQP. Attachment 1 of letter dated 10/25/10 contains the comparable information. perform Common Q TR information in sufficient detail to enable proprietary version of Westinghouse document Tennessee & SPM compliance self the NRC staff to make an independent Valley Authority (TVA), Watts Bar Unit 2 (WBN2), Post- assessment assessment regarding the acceptability Accident Monitoring System (PAMS), Licensing Technical of the proposal in terms of regulatory Report, Revision 1, WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Dated October requirements and the protection of 2010 public health and safety."

247 8/8/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed EICB RAI Response is LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B Section 4, EICB (Carte)

ML102980066 Item provided in letter "Safety Evaluation" states: "the As part of the Common Q topical report development effort, The implementation documents required by the SPM are No. 16 dated 10/25/10 information relied upon in the SE must Westinghouse developed the Software Program Manual for identified in the compliance matrix in revision 1 of the be docketed correspondence."

Common Q Systems (ML050350234) to address software planning Licensing Technical Report.

documentation. The NRC reviewed the SPM and concluded: the LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The safety SPM specifies plans that will provide a quality software life cycle Attachment 1 of letter dated 10/25/10 contains the analysis that supports the change process, and that these plans commit to documentation of life proprietary version of Westinghouse document Tennessee requested should include technical

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N cycle activities that will permit the staff or others to evaluate the Valley Authority (TVA), Watts Bar Unit 2 (WBN2), Post- information in sufficient detail to enable quality of the design features upon which the safety determination Accident Monitoring System (PAMS), Licensing Technical the NRC staff to make an independent will be based. The staff will review the Implementation of the life Report, Revision 1, WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Dated October assessment regarding the acceptability cycle process and the software life cycle process design outputs 2010 of the proposal in terms of regulatory for specific applications on a plant-specific basis. Please identify requirements and the protection of the implementation documentation produced as a result of public health and safety."

following the SPM, and state what information will be docketed.

248 8/8/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed Response is LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B Section 4, EICB (Carte) provided in letter "Safety Evaluation" states: "the As part of the Common Q topical report development effort, The documents are identified in the compliance matrix in dated 10/25/10 information relied upon in the SE must Westinghouse developed the Software Program Manual for revision 1 of the Licensing Technical Report be docketed correspondence."

Common Q Systems (ML050350234) to address software planning documentation. The NRC reviewed the SPM and concluded: the Attachment 1 of the letter dated 10/25/10 contains the LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The safety SPM specifies plans that will provide a quality software life cycle proprietary version of Westinghouse document Tennessee analysis that supports the change process, and that these plans commit to documentation of life Valley Authority (TVA), Watts Bar Unit 2 (WBN2), Post- requested should include technical cycle activities that will permit the staff or others to evaluate the Accident Monitoring System (PAMS), Licensing Technical information in sufficient detail to enable quality of the design features upon which the safety determination Report, Revision 1, WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Dated October the NRC staff to make an independent will be based. The staff will review the Implementation of the life 2010 assessment regarding the acceptability cycle process and the software life cycle process design outputs of the proposal in terms of regulatory for specific applications on a plant-specific basis. Please identify requirements and the protection of the design outputs produced as a result of following the SPM, and public health and safety."

state when what information will be docketed.

249 8/8/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B Section 4, EICB (Carte)

"Safety Evaluation" states: "the The SVVP in the SPM describes the V&V implementation tasks Close to previous items to provide the V&V Reports. information relied upon in the SE must that are to be carried out. The acceptance criterion for software be docketed correspondence."

V&V implementation is that the tasks in the SVVP have been carried out in their entirety. Documentation should exist that LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The safety shows that the V&V tasks have been successfully accomplished analysis that supports the change for each life cycle activity group. Please provide information that requested should include technical shows that the V&V tasks have been successfully accomplished information in sufficient detail to enable for each life cycle activity group. the NRC staff to make an independent assessment regarding the acceptability of the proposal in terms of regulatory requirements and the protection of public health and safety."

250 8/8/2010 Responder: WEC N Open Open-NRC Review LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B Section 4, EICB (Carte)

"Safety Evaluation" states: "the The SPM describes the software and documents that will be Westinghouse develops Software Release Reports/Records Revised response included in Due 12/22/10 information relied upon in the SE must created and placed under configuration control. The SCMP (e.g., and a Configuration Management Release Report. Describe letter dated 12/22/10 be docketed correspondence."

SPM Section 6, Software Configuration Management Plan) the documents and when they will be produced. Summarize 10/25/10 is a partial describes the implementation tasks that are to be carried out. The guidance on how to produce these records, focus on project Response included in letter response. Still waiting LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The safety acceptance criterion for software CM implementation is that the specific requirements in SPM etc. dated 10/25/10. on Software Test Plan analysis that supports the change tasks in the SCMP have been carried out in their entirety. and all other testing requested should include technical Documentation should exist that shows that the configuration TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request: documentation. information in sufficient detail to enable management tasks for that activity group have been successfully the NRC staff to make an independent accomplished. Please provide information that shows that the CM The following documentation shows that the configuration NNC 2/2/11: To be assessment regarding the acceptability tasks have been successfully accomplished for each life cycle management tasks for that activity group have been addressed during the of the proposal in terms of regulatory activity group. successfully accomplished. next audit. requirements and the protection of public health and safety."

1. WNA-LI-00058-WT-P, Revision 2, Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report submitted in TVA Letter to NRC dated December 3, 2010, (Reference 1) contains the following changes to address the NRC requests:

a. Section 2.2.1 Hardware/Software Change Process

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N has been added to describe the process of how changes are evaluated.

b. Section 2.2.2, Software has been expanded to include a table detailing evolutionary software changes that have occurred since the initial submittal and the change evaluation of the life cycle.

2. WNA-PT-00138-WBT, Revision 0, Nuclear Automation Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects, Post Accident Monitoring System Test Plan, (Proprietary), dated November 2010 submitted in TVA Letter to NRC, dated December 3, 2010 (Reference 1).

251 8/8/2010 Responder: WEC N Open Open-TVA/WEC LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B Section 4, EICB (Carte)

"Safety Evaluation" states: "the The SPM describes the software testing and documents that will The software testing performed and documents created are Revised response included in NNC 2/2/11: Issues information relied upon in the SE must be created. The SPM also describes the testing tasks that are to addressed by the SPM Compliance matrix contained in letter dated 12/22/10 with the Common Q TR be docketed correspondence."

be carried out. The acceptance criterion for software test Revision 1 of the Licensing Technical Report. & SPM were discussed implementation is that the tasks in the SPM have been carried out Partial response is provided in in the weekly public LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The safety in their entirety. Please provide information that shows that Attachment 1 of the letter dated 10/25/10 contains the letter dated 10/25/10 meetings. analysis that supports the change testing been successfully accomplished. Proprietary version of Westinghouses document titled: Westinghouse to requested should include technical Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Watts Bar Unit 2 perform Common Q TR information in sufficient detail to enable (WBN2), Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS), & SPM compliance self the NRC staff to make an independent Licensing Technical Report, Revision 1, WNA-LI-00058- assessment assessment regarding the acceptability WBT-P, Dated October 2010 of the proposal in terms of regulatory requirements and the protection of TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request: public health and safety."

Please see the response to RAI item 21 in letter dated 12/22/10, NRC Matrix Item 250.

252 8/8/2010 Responder: WEC N Open Open-TVA/WEC LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B Section 4, EICB (Carte)

"Safety Evaluation" states: "the The SPM contain requirements for software requirements Explain response to AP1000 audit report. Response included in letter NNC 2/2/11: Updated information relied upon in the SE must traceability analysis and associated documentation (see Section RTM docketed NRC awaiting V&V evaluation of RTM. dated 12/22/10 RTMs and be docketed correspondence."

5.4.5.3, Requirements Traceability Analysis). Please provide specifications to be information that demonstrates that requirements traceability The following responses are based on WBN Unit 2 Common Read ML091560352 provided. LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The safety analysis has been successfully accomplished. Q PAMS traceability: analysis that supports the change Requirements requested should include technical Software requirements traceability analysis is described in traceability to be information in sufficient detail to enable the following documents: addressed during he the NRC staff to make an independent next audit. assessment regarding the acceptability

1. WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Revision 2, Post-Accident of the proposal in terms of regulatory Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical requirements and the protection of Report submitted in TVA Letter to NRC dated public health and safety."

December 3, 2010, (Reference 1) Section 11, TVA Contract Compliance Matrix

2. WNA-VR-00279-WBT, Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Requirements Traceability Matrix for the Post Accident Monitoring System (available for NRC audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office)

3. WNA-VR-00280-WBT, Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Requirements Traceability Matrix for the Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) Custom PC Elements (available for NRC

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office) This document addresses the RSEDs used in the WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS.

The V&V evaluation of the RTM is documented in section 2.2.2 of the following documents:

1. The Independent Verification & Validation (IV&V) report covering the Concept and Definition phases (Nuclear Automation Watts Bar Unit 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects, IV&V Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System, (Proprietary), WNA-VR-00283-WBT, Revision 1, dated November 2010), submitted in TVA Letter to NRC dated December 3, 2010 (Reference 1).

2. The Independent Verification &Validation (IV&V) report covering the Design and Implementation phases (Nuclear Automation Watts Bar Unit 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects, IV&V Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System, (Proprietary), WNA-VR-00283-WBT, Revision 2, dated November 2010), submitted in TVA Letter to NRC dated December 3, 2010 (Reference 1).

3. The integration phase is covered in Attachment 10, the proprietary version of IV&V Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System, WNA-VR-00283-WBT-P, Revision 3, dated December 2010.

Attachment 11 contains the non-proprietary version of IV&V Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System, WNA-VR-00283-WBT-NP, Revision 3, dated December 2010. Attachment 12 contains the Application For Withholding Proprietary Information From Public Disclosure WNA-VR-00283-WBT-P, Revision 3, IV &V Summary Report for the Post Accident Monitoring System (Proprietary), dated December 2010.

253 8/8/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed TVA Letter dated Related to Open Item no. 83.

EICB (Carte) 10/5/10 TVA provided information by letter dated July 30, 2010 All AC160 modules used for the Common Q PAMS have Response provided in letter TVA to respond or LIC-110 Rev. 1 Section 6.2.2 states:

(ML102160349) - See Enclosure 1 Item No. 8 - that some AC160 been previously approved. The original response listed all dated 10/5/10 provide proposed date "Design features and administrative module contain FPGAs. For those modules that have not been FPGAs when the request was only for components that had of response. programs that are unique to Unit 2 previously approved, please provide information to address not been previously approved. should then be reviewed in accordance regulatory criteria for FPGAs. with current staff positions" LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B Section 4, "Safety Evaluation" states: "the information relied upon in the SE must be docketed correspondence."

254 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A - Request to TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte) make documents 10/21/10 Please make the following available in Westinghouse's Rockville Documents are available for review in the Westinghouse Response provided in letter available for audit. Enclosure 1 Item office. Rockville office per WEC letter WBT-D-2268, NRC Access to dated 10/21/10 No. 5 Common Q Documents at the Westinghouse Rockville WNA-PD-00056-WBT, Rev 1 Watts Bar Unit 2 NSSS Completion Office, dated 8/16/10 (Reference 2).

I&C Projects As the indicated source of customer specific requirements for

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N deliverables, as indicated in the project plan, this document may serve as one end of a thread audit, and may contain information relevant to evaluating the completeness of later requirements.

956080, Rev 1. Cabinet mounted electronics - Inadequate core cool monitor (ICCM-86)

Believe this to be the source of the requirements or at least algorithms and justifications for RIVLIS.

NABU-DP-00014-GEN, rev 2 Design Process for Common Q Safety Systems. As it defines the scope of other documents we are reviewing, it may clarify what documents are expected to contain what information.

255 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A - Request to TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte) make documents 10/21/10 Please make the following available in Westinghouse's Rockville Documents are available for review in the Westinghouse Response provided in letter available for audit. Enclosure 1 Item office. Rockville office per WEC letter WBT-D-2268, NRC Access to dated 10/21/10 No. 6 The Reusable Software Elements Documents. These contain Common Q Documents at the Westinghouse Rockville requirements for the software. Office, dated 8/16/10 (Reference 2).

WNA-DS-01564-GEN, Rev 1. ; WNA-DS-00315-GEN, Rev. 2 ;

WNA-DS-01715-GEN, Rev 2 ; WNA-DS-01838-GEN, Rev. 3 ;

WNA-DS-01839-GEN, Rev. 3 ; WNA-DS-01840-GEN, Rev 2. ;

WNA-DS-01841, Rev 2. ; WNA-DS-01842-GEN Rev 2.; WNA-DS-01845-GEN Rev. 1. ; WNA-DS-01846-GEN Rev. 2 ; WNA-DS-01847-GEN Rev. 0 ; WNA-DS-01848 Rev. 1. ; WNA-DS-01849-GEN Rev. 2. ; WNA-DS-01994-GEN Rev. 0 ; WNA-DS-00306-GEN Rev. 5 ; WNA-DS-02065-GEN Rev. 2 ; WNA-DS-01505-GEN Rev. 0 Further documentation for application-specific type circuits and custom PC elements are indicated by the SRS to be in 00000-ICE-3238, Rev 5 ; 00000-ICE-30140, rev 4 and 00000-ICE-30152, Rev. 5 256 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A - Request to TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte) make documents 10/21/10 Please make the following available in Westinghouse's Rockville Documents are available for review in the Westinghouse Response provided in letter available for audit. Enclosure 1 Item office. Rockville office per WEC letter WBT-D-2268, NRC Access to dated 10/21/10 No. 7 Common Q Documents at the Westinghouse Rockville The following are documents that contain requirements used in the Office, dated 8/16/10 (Reference 2).

SRS which we incorporated by reference within that document.

Coding Standards and Guidelines for Common Q Systems, 00000-ICE-3889, Rev. 10, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

Application Restrictions for Generic Common Q Qualification, WNA-DS-01070-GEN, Rev. 3, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

System Requirements Specification for the Common Q Generic Flat Panel Display 00000-ICE-30155, Rev. 9, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

Software Requirements Specification for the Common Q Generic Flat Panel Display Software, 00000-ICE-3239, Rev. 12, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

Common Q Software Configuration Management Guidelines, NABU-DP-00015-GEN, Rev. 2, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC,

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Standard General Requirements for Cyber security, WNA-DS-01150-GEN, Rev. 0, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, 257 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A - Request to N/A EICB (Carte) make documents Please make the following available in Westinghouse's Rockville WEC Reviewing to ensure all documents are available in available for audit.

office. Rockville office.

The following are documents that contain requirements used in the SRS which we incorporated by reference within that document.

AC160 CPU Loading Restrictions, AN03007Sp, ABB Memo, ABB Process Automation Corporation, WBT-D-2268, 8/16/2010 Software Design Description for the Common Q Generic Flat-Panel Display Software, 00000-ICE-30157, Rev. 16, WEC still needs to make/confirm this document is available.

Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

System Requirements Specification for the Common Q Post WBT-D-2024, 6/9/2010 Accident Monitoring System, 0000-ICE-30156, Rev. 06, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

Software Requirements Specification for the Common Q Post WBT-D-2024, 6/9/2010 Accident Monitoring System 00000-ICE-3238, Rev. 5, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

Commercial Dedication Report for QNX 4.25G for Common Q WBT-D-2268, 8/16/2010 Applications, WNA-CD-00018-GEN, Rev. 3, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, Generic Common Q Software Installation Procedure, WNA-IP- WBT-D-2268, 8/16/2010 00152-GEN, Rev. 7, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

258 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A - Request to N/A EICB (Carte) make documents Please make the following available in Westinghouse's Rockville WEC Reviewing to ensure all documents are available in available for audit.

office. Rockville office.

The IV&V Phase Summary Report, (WNA-VR-00283-WBT Rev .

0 ) indicated that the IV&V team had created some information that may facilitate the approval process. However the form the information may have taken was not indicated or referenced in the Phase Summary Report. Information requested for the Rockville office includes:

-The excel spreadsheet described in section 2.2.2 that verifies all low level requirements have a basis in a higher one, and that all higher level requirements decompose into a lower level.

-A review of the WBU2 SysRS, SDS, and SRS for clarity, completeness, correctness and compatibility

-Comparison of the WBU2 SysRS, SDS, and SRS to source level documents

-An evaluation, per section 2.2.3, of the baseline report

-a second party peer review for the source level documents 259 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A - Request to TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte) make documents 10/21/10 Please make the following available in Westinghouse's Rockville Documents are available for review in the Westinghouse Response provided in letter available for audit. Enclosure 1 Item office. Rockville office per WEC letter WBT-D-2268, NRC Access to dated 10/21/10 No. 8 Common Q Documents at the Westinghouse Rockville As they may demonstrate that a number of issues raised by, or Office, dated 8/16/10 (Reference 2).

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N that will be raised by, the NRC staff are already being resolved by the vendor, we would like to have access to V&V-769 and V&V-770 in the Exception Reports (ER) database for common Q systems.

260 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A - Request to N/A EICB (Carte) make documents Please make the following available in Westinghouse's Rockville WEC Reviewing to ensure all documents are available in available for audit.

office. Rockville office.

The Source level documents for the requirements WBT-D-2268, 8/16/2010 WBT-TVA-0070 Safety Related Digital Logic Cards Circuitry and Related Instrument Racks Restrictions WBT-D-0088 Transmittal Westinghouse comments on TVA WBT-D-2268, 8/16/2010 specification EDSR 52451 Contract Number 65717 Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar WBT-D-2268, 8/16/2010 Nuclear Plant Unit 2 NSSS Completion Project WEST-WBT-2008-25 TVA Contract Word Authorization Hilmes to determine if this document can be provided.

261 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A - Closed to TVA Letter dated LIC-110 Rev. 1 Section 6.2.2 states:

EICB (Carte)

Item No. 142 8/20/10 "Design features and administrative Please provide the Requirements Traceability Matrix for generic WEC to make available in Rockville ASAP. May require later programs that are unique to Unit 2 PAMS and/or any other RTMs applicable to WBN2 PAMS. Some submittal per 9/15 meeting. TVA Letter dated should then be reviewed in accordance requirements in the Software Requirements Specification are 9/2/10 with current staff positions" simply not present in the Watts Bar 2 PAMS specific RTM (WNA- Closed to Item 142 VR-00279-WBT). LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B Section 4, "Safety Evaluation" states: "the information relied upon in the SE must be docketed correspondence."

262 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A - Request to N/A EICB (Carte) make documents In order to facilitate visits to the Rockville office, please make the WEC Reviewing to ensure all documents are available in available for audit.

following documents available at the Rockville office. Rockville office.

Watts Bar 2 PAMS licensing technical report 00000-ICE-37722 Rev. 0 (ML003733136) WBT-D-1526, 01/28/10; WBT-D-2268, 8/16/10 Common Q Software Programming manual (ML050350234)

Common Q topical report. (ML031830959) 263 8/11/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed ML101650255, Item EICB (Carte)

Based on an examination of document available at the No. 2 Westinghouse Rockville offices (i.e., NA 7.4, WEC 7.2, WEC 7.3, Addressed in 9/20 - 9/21 audit.

CDI-3803, & CDI-3722) a CDI appears to identify the verification activities for each critical characteristic. These activities appear to Combine with item 138 after audit.

be documented on the associated dedication data sheets; therefore, it appears that the Westinghouse Commercial Grade Dedication Plan is called a CDI and the completed CDI data sheets are the commercial grade dedication Report. If so, please provide the CDI for each new (not previously approved) component and the associated completed dedication data sheets.

264 8/11/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed ML101650255, Item EICB No. 2 (Carte) Please provide a copy of the commercial grade survey(s) After the 9/20 - 9/21 audit.

applicable to each new (not previously approved) Common Q

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N component. Combine with item 138 after audit.

265 8/11/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed ML101650255, Item EICB No. 2 (Carte) Please provide: After the 9/20 - 9/21 audit.

WNA-CD-00018-GEN Rev. 3 00000-ICE-35444 Rev. 1 Combine with item 138 after audit.

266 8/11/2010 Responder: Webb/Webber Y Closed Closed TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte) 10/21/10 Please provide a high level description of the Foxboro IA FSAR section 7.7.1.11 will be added in Amendment 101. In Enclosure 1 Item equipment used at WBN2. This description should be more discussions with the NRC reviewer on October 4, 2010 it No. 9 detailed than a brochure on the product line (or available on the was agreed that the new FSAR section along with previously web), and less detailed than a technical manual on each field submitted documents should be sufficient to address this replaceable unit. It is expected that such literature already exists. request. The NRC reviewer will notify TVA if additional documentation is required.

267 8/11/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed EICB (Carte)

By letter dated June 18, 2010 (ML101940236) TVA stated that the This is addressed in the Licensing Technical Report, software safety plan (SSP) was not applicable to PAMS Revision 1, WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P.

applications (see Watts Bar 2 - Common Q PAMS ISG-6 Compliance matrix Item No. 10); however, reference No. 30 of the Attachment 1 of the letter dated 10/25/10 SRS (ML101050202) is: 00000-ICE-37727, Rev. 0, "Post Accident contains the Proprietary version of Westinghouses Monitoring System Software Preliminary Hazard Analysis for the document titled: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Watts Common Q PAMS Project." A Preliminary Hazard Analysis is Bar Unit 2 (WBN2), Post-Accident Monitoring System required by the SSP. Please explain. (PAMS), Licensing Technical Report, Revision 1, WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P, Dated October 2010 268 8/19/2010 Responder: WEC N Closed Closed EICB (Carte)

By letter dated March 12, 2010 (ML101680577), TVA stated that 11/18/10 Warren Odess-Gillett took action to discuss with Response included in letter the application specific hardware and software architecture Design Engineering to generate a non-prop figure dated 12/3/10 descriptions are addressed in the WBN2 PAMS System Design Specification (ML101680579, ML102040481, & ML102040482) Attachment 18 contains the non-proprietary version of the and Software Requirements Specification (ML101050202, Westinghouse document Watts Bar 2 Common Q PAMS ML102040486, & ML1022040487). Block Diagram.

Neither of these documents contain a non-proprietary figure of the architecture that can be used in the SE. Please provide a non-proprietary figure of the architecture.

269 8/20/2010 Responder: NRC Y Closed Closed N/A N/A DORL (Poole)

DORL to send the Eagle-21 Audit Report to TVA. Audit Report sent to TVA. Letter dated 11/2/2010 (ML102240630) 270 8/23/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed See also Open Item Nod. 41 & 245.

EICB (Carte)

By letter dated June 18, 2009 (ML091560352) the NRC informed Close to items 41 and 245 Westinghouse that WNA-PT-00058-GEN (see pdf page 7 of 25) did not adequately address the test plan criteria of the Software Program Manual (ML050350234); however, by letter dated June 18, 2010 (ML101940236) TVA/Westinghouse stated that WNA-PT-00058-GEN addressed the test plan criteria of the SPM (pdf page 59 of 194, Item No. 12). Please explain.

271 8/23/2010 Responder: WEC Y Closed Closed N/A - Closed to NA EICB (Carte Item No. 142

)

By letter dated August 20, 2010 TVA docketed a Requirements 9/15 meeting and 9/20 audit

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Traceability Matrix for the Common Q PAMS (Requirements Phase).This document does not identify the source of each Closed to Item 142 requirement. The Common Q PAMS System Requirements Specification (SysRS -ML101680578, ML102040483, &

ML102040484) does not explicitly identify the origin of each requirement. The SRP acceptance criteria for requirements specifications is that the origin of the requirements is know.

Please explain how to trace each requirement in the SysRS to its origin.

272 7.5.2.1 7.5.1 8/26/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL EICB (Marcus)

ML102861885 Item 10/21/10 In WBN2 FSAR Table 7.5-2, "Regulatory Guide 1.97 Variable List The variable number will be changed to 19 in FSAR Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal No. 19 Enclosure 1 Item (Deviation and Justification for Deviations)," (WBNP-96) for Amendment 101 as shown below: dated 10/21/10 RAI to TVA. No. 10 Variable 19, "Containment Hydrogen Concentration," Deviation 2 (page 19 of 41), the variable number is listed as 15. The variable Table 7.5-2 TVA formal response number should be listed as 19. due 10/31/10 DEVIATION 2 VARIABLE (1519)

Containment Hydrogen Concentration 273 7.5.2.1 7.5.1 8/26/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL EICB (Marcus)

ML102861885 Item 10/5/10 In WBN2 FSAR Table 7.5-2, "Regulatory Guide 1.97 Variable List Post accident samples will be obtained from the normal Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal No. 18 (Deviation and Justification for Deviations)," (WBNP-96) for sample system. dated 10/5/10 RAI to TVA Variable 97g, "Reactor Coolant Sample Activity," Deviation 5 (page 21 of 41), the last two sentences of the Justification read, "TVA 10/5/10 TVA letter Response 95 meets the intent of RG 1.97 recommended range by monitoring provided information.

this variable using the gross activity analysis of primary coolant samples taken in the post accident sampling facility. Samples are obtained from the post accident sampling system in Unit 1 only."

Please describe how the samples are obtained for Unit 2.

274.a 7.5.2.1 7.5.1 8/26/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL EICB (Marcus)

ML102861885 Item 10/21/10 In WBN2 FSAR Table 7.5-2, "Regulatory Guide 1.97 Variable List The SC in the last sentence will be changed to SG in FSAR Response provided in letter NRC to issue formal No. 21 Enclosure 1 Item (Deviation and Justification for Deviations)," (WBNP-96) for Amendment 101 as shown below: dated 10/21/10 RAI to TVA. No. 11 Variable 82, "Steam Generator Level Wide Range," Deviation 10 (page 24 of 41), in the last sentence, of the Justification, SC should SG wide range level indication is utilized as a diverse TVA formal response be SG. variable to auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow for gross due 10/31/10 indication of flow to the SGs. The WBN AFW monitors are Types A1 and D2. WBN's position is that since SC SG wide range level is only used as a backup to redundant AFW flow monitors, it does not require redundancy 274.b 8/26/2010 Responder: Stockton Y Closed Closed RAI No. 6 TVA Letter dated EICB (Singh)

ML102980005 10/21/10 Loose Parts Monitoring System: TR 3.3 refers to section 4.4.6 of The reference will be changed to FSAR section 7.6.7 Loose Response provided in letter Due __________ 10/26/2010 Enclosure 1 Item the FSAR for description of the loose parts monitoring system. Part Monitoring System (LPMS) System Description in next dated 10/21/10 No. 12 However, this section of the FSAR is not available. TVA to check revision of the Technical Requirements Manual as shown Pending TRM the reference and respond. below: TRM Change Package amendment submittal.

submitted to TVA Licensing.

1. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 7.6.7, Lose Part Monitoring Response acceptable.

System. TVA to complete stated action.

275 EICB 8/27/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed Not Required N/A (Sing h) Answer exists in Loose Parts Monitoring System: RG 1.133, sections C.1.a and TRM

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N C.1.c address sensor locations and channel separation respectively. TR 3.3, FSAR section 7.6.7 and the DMIMMS-DX System Description do not clearly explain the location or address channel separation per the guidance of RG 1.133. Please update the documents as needed.

276 7.6 7.6 8/27/2010 Responder: Webb Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/21/10 In order for the staff to review the effects of multi control systems Revised response provided in Due 11/24/10 Item#60 Enclosure 1 Item failure, provide the summary of the analyses documenting the The NRC reviewer confirmed this question applies to non- letter dated 12/22/10 No. 13 effect on the plant based on the following events: (1) loss of power safety systems. TVA to provide to all control systems powered by a single power supply; (2) Response provided in letter justification for non-failure of each instrument sensor which provides signal to two or The Distributed Control System (DCS) implemented using dated 10/21/10 safety system other more control systems; (3) Break of any sensor impulse line which Foxboro I/A hardware, replaces most of the non-safety than DCS.

is used for sensors providing signals to two or more control related control systems for WBN Unit 2. The other non- Revised response provided in systems; and (4) failure of digital system based on the common safety-related control systems within the scope of this letter dated 11/24/10 The statement that cause software failure affecting two or more control systems. For question are: failure of sense line each of these events, confirm that the consequences of these Response Acceptable. 11/17/10 where more than one events will not be outside chapter 15 analyses or beyond the a. Rod Control - Failures of this system are addressed in transmitter is connected capability of operators or safety systems. FSAR Chapter 15. would be bounded by

b. Main Turbine Electro-Hydraulic Control System TVA changed the response in the failure of a single the latest writeup. The scope of transmitter does not The following provides the requested summaries for the four the question applies to all non make sense.

events listed: safety related control systems and is not limited to just three TVA needs to make a (1) The (DCS) segmentation analysis submitted on TVA system listed by the TVA. TVA statement that all non-letter to NRC dated August 11, 2010, Enclosure 2 could use to envelope other safety control systems (Reference 7) demonstrates that the loss of any single control systems by Unit 1 have been evaluated power source does not result in a loss of any DCS analysis if they applies to Unit 2 against these criteria function. The other systems within the scope of this systems also. and have determined question are configured in the same manner as Unit 1, that their failure does with redundant power sources such that the failure of a not have consequences single power source does not cause a loss of function. which will put the plant outside chapter 15 (2) Signals shared by more than one control function analyses.

within the DCS are addressed in the DCS segmentation analysis submitted on TVA letter to NRC dated August 11, 2010, Enclosure 2 (Reference 7) which demonstrates that the loss of a single signal does not cause a failure of any critical control function.

The impact of a loss of signal to the other systems within the scope of this question is bounded by the loss of that signal to the individual system and has the same effect as for Unit 1.

(3) Where feasible, the Unit 2 design includes separate sense lines for redundant transmitters, thereby eliminating multiple single point failures which are present in Unit 1. A review of the transmitter sense line database was performed to identify multiple sensors on a single sense line that had control functions (transmitters and switches). Attachment 9 provides the results of the review and an analysis of the functions impacted by a sense line failure.

There are no transmitters on shared sense lines, such that a sense line failure would impact any combination of the DCS, Rod Control or Main Turbine Electro-Hydraulic Control Systems.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N (4) Limiting DCS failures were addressed in the segmentation analysis, supplemented by Fault Handling in the I/A Series System, Revision 1, submitted on TVA letter to NRC dated October 5, 2010, Attachment 42 (Reference 1). The other systems within the scope of this question are analog and therefore this question is not applicable.

All non-safety control systems have been evaluated against these criteria and TVA has determined that their failure does not have consequences which will put the plant outside chapter 15 analyses.

TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request:

All non-safety related control systems were reviewed in the context of this question. The review found that failures of non-safety related control systems based on the scenarios in this RAI, do not have consequences which will put the plant outside the Chapter 15 analyses.

277 7.6 7.6.3 8/27/2010 Responder: Clark Y Close Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/29/10 NUREG 0847, "Safety evaluation report Related to the operation of Removal of the Upper Head Injection System was reviewed Response is included in letter Item#61 Enclosure 1 Item Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2." has section 7.6.3 which as part of the WBN Unit 1 original and was reviewed by the dated 10/29/10 No. 15 discusses the, "Upper Head Injection Manual Control" system but staff in SER Supplement 6:

has been removed from the FSAR. Please provide the information regarding when this system was removed, and the justification for 1.7 Summary of Outstanding Issues - PAGE 1-3 the removal of the system and if the NRC staff has previously "Supplement 7" reviewed and accepted the removal of the system provide the reference to the staff's SE. (22) Removal of upper head injection system Opened (SSER 7) 6.3.1 (TAC 77195)

When the removal of UHI System was evaluated by the NRC, this should be applied to both sections 6.3.1 and 7.6.3, since the UHI Control System has no function once the UHI System has been removed.

278 7.6 7.6.6 8/27/2010 Responder: Trelease Y Close Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/21/10 For FSAR Section 7.6.6, provide the justification for adding valves UFSAR section 7.6.6 does not identify control valves FCV- Response provided in letter TVA to Docket in 10/20 Item#62 Enclosure 1 Item FCV 63-8 and FCV 63-11, which require that power to be removed 63-8 and -11 as part of a list of valves that are required to dated 10/21/10 letter No. 14 and will be administratively controlled prior to use of RHR system have their motive power removed during specific operating for plant cooldown. Provide the P & ID and block diagram showing modes. The Unit 1 General operating instructions GO-1 and the operation of these valves. GO-6 (which will be used as a guideline for unit 2) provide administrative instructions to remove power and restore power to these valves in mode 3. Also, U1 Emergency operating procedures (e.g ES-1.3) do not address the restoration of power to the valves as part of post LOCA Mitigation activities.

Attachment 8 contains the control and logic diagrams, along with the applicable design changes to verify that the control schemes are similar to unit 1.

279 7.6 7.6.6 8/27/2010 Responder: Mather Y Close Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB ML102910008 10/21/10 (Garg)

For FSAR Section 7.6.6, provide the justification for the exception The FSAR change to include the valves as exceptions to the Response provided in letter TVA to docket in 10/20 Item#63 Enclosure 1 Item to install protective covers which operator has to remove before he use of protective covers was made to match Unit 1 UFSAR dated 10/21/10 letter No. 15

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N can have access to control switch to operate two additional valves change Pkg. No. 1547 Safety Assessment Item 8. The FCV62-98 and FCV62-99. change package identified FCV-62-98 and 99 as exceptions to the use of protective covers. This change was based on WBPER980417 which removed the power from the valves and had them locked open. TVA will incorporate the same changes in Unit 2 as Unit 1. The Unit 1 changes are described in References 3 and 4.

280 7.6 7.6.6 8/27/2010 Responder: Trelease Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/21/10 For FSAR Section 7.6.6, provide the justification for the Historical DCN 38661 removes the requirement that power Response is acceptable. Item#64 Enclosure 1 Item acceptability of removing FCV 63-5 from the list of valves which be removed from FCV-63-5 during normal operations, and TVA to issue by 10/20 No. 16 has operating instructions specifying the removal of power during notes that the valve does not have a shunt breaker to allow Response provided in letter specific modes of plant operation. MCR position indication with power removed. The Unit 2 dated 10/21/10 system description has been updated to reflect the Unit 1 change to the system description, and the update of section 7.6.6 to remove the requirement of FCV-63-5 from the list of valves which has operating instructions specifying the removal of power during normal operations. This is supported by the failure modes and effects analysis for the safety injection system calculation EMP-SNM-043029 (which has been revised to be applicable to Unit 2), as well as the Unit 2 FSAR Table 6.3-8 both which state that spurious closure of FCV-63-5 is not credible. Spurious closure of FCV-63-5 is not credible because the MCR hand switch is provided with a protective cover to prevent operator error. In addition, the hand switch is wired with contacts on both sides of the motor contactor to prevent a single failure within the switch gear from spuriously closing the valve. These features eliminate the need to remove power from FCV-63-5.

Attachment 10 contains the documentation associated with this response.

281 7.6 7.6.8 8/27/2010 Responder: Webb Y Open Open-TVA EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/29/10 For FSAR Section 7.6.8 in amendment 96, redline version has Attachment 5 contains the WBN Unit 2 FSAR markup for Response provided in letter Due 11/24/10 Item#65 Enclosure 1 Item completely rewritten this section of the FSAR, however, the staff is Section 7.6.8, Interlocks for RCS Pressure Control During dated 10/29/10 No. 16 not able to determine any changes made to the section. Explain Low Temperature Operation, showing what was changed Provide the basis for what changes have been made to this FSAR Section. between Amendments 95 and 96. the changes. Look at FSAR Amendment 101 did not Foxboro I/A impact.

TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request: reflect the changes in 7.6.8 associated with implementation The interlock for the RCS Pressure Control for Unit 2 is of the DCS. Provide the basis implemented differently than Unit 1 implementation. There for acceptance to use Foxboro are no differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 interlocks, I?A DCS inplace of analog operation of interlocks and operator interface for operation of instrumentation and relays.

the RCS Pressure Control. Primary sensing elements and final control elements are identical and operations of these devices are identical. For Unit 2, once signals are processed by the Eagle 21 system, interlock implementation is by software modules in the Foxboro I/A Distributed Control System (DCS). Hardware outputs, generated in the DCS, operate the PORVs. The Unit 2 DCS is implemented via EDCRs 52378 and 54504. Section 7.6.8 in Amendment 101 of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR reflects the Unit 2 changes associated with implementation of the DCS.

TVA Response to Second Follow-up NRC Request:

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N The highlighted text from FSAR Amendment 101 Section 7.6.8 reflects the installation of the Foxboro DCS.

7.6.8 Text from FSAR Amendment 101 The wide range temperature signals, as inputs to the Protection Sets I and II, continuously monitor RCS temperature conditions. In Protection Set I, the existing RCS wide range temperature channels on RCS loops 1 and 2 provide inputs to the Eagle 21 digital process protection system. Eagle 21 provides isolated analog signals to the digital process control system. An auctioneer function selects the lowest temperature signal which is then used to calculate an acceptable reference pressure limit (PORV setpoint) considering the plants allowable pressure and temperature Protection Set III. The calculated reference pressure is compared to the actual RCS pressure monitored by the wide range pressure channel. The auctioneered temperature signal will annunciate a main control room (MCR) alarm whenever the measured temperature approaches, within a predetermined amount, the reference temperature for arming the system. Similarly, whenever the measured pressure approaches within a predetermined amount of the programmed setpoint, another MCR alarm will be generated.

When the measured RCS pressure is equal to or above the programmed setpoint (nominal values), a PORV open signal is initiated and a MCR alarm is actuated. A manually armed permissive allows this actuation signal to control the Train A PORV (PCV-68-340A). The manually armed permissive also serves to block a spurious PORV opening due to potential instrument failure whenever the RCS temperature is above the arming reference temperature.

The monitored generating station variables that generate the actuation signal for the Train B PORV (PCV-68-334) are processed in a similar manner. The RCS loops 3 and 4 wide range temperature signals and the RCS pressure signal are provided from Protection Set II. Therefore, the generating station variables used for the Train B PORV are derived from a protection set that is independent of the sets from which generating station variables used for the Train A PORV are derived. The wide range temperature auctioneer function and the programmed pressure setpoint calculation for the Train B PORV are performed in a different group of the digital process control system than those for the Train A PORV. Each of these control groups has a fault tolerant, redundant processor pair and redundant power supplies with different power sources.

282 7.6 7.6.9 8/27/2010 Responder: Trelease Y Close Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

Response is acceptable ML102910008 10/21/10 For FSAR Section 7.6.9 which discusses the switch over from The re-write for section 7.6.9 was to provide a more concise TVA to issue by 10/20 Item#66 Enclosure 1 Item injection to recirculation, and is a ESF system, the compliance with description of the instrumentation and controls. The section Response provided in letter No. 17 IEEE 279 has been removed from the FSAR. Justify this deletion. was too wordy, and several topics were duplicated in section dated 10/21/10 7.3. Wording is now more closely aligned to system description.

Compliance with IEEE 279 is not intended to be removed, merely the reference to the standard in that particular

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N section. A statement is added that The automatic switchover of the RHR pumps from the injection to the recirculation Mode is part of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) discussed in chapter 7.3.

Chapter 7.3 includes a reference to IEEE Standard 279-1979. The reference in 7.6.9 was therefore considered unnecessary, and therefore removed.

Attachment 9 contains FSAR excerpts required to support this response.

283 7.7.5 XX 8/27/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB RAI No.13 TVA Letter dated This item is a follow-up question to item EICB (Darbali)

ML102910017, 10/29/10 96.

Follow-up to item 96 1. Steam generator power operated relief valve control Response is included in letter Due 10/31/10 10/19/10 Enclosure 1 Item system dated 10/29/10 No. 17 On Open Item 96, regarding the implementation of IEN 79-22, part of TVAs response was: The potential scenario for this event is addressed in 15.2.13, Accidental Depressurization of the Main The non-safety-related device/systems within the scope of IEN 79- Steam System.

22 are:

1. Steam generator power operated relief valve control system 2. Pressurizer power operated relief valve control system

2. Pressurizer power operated relief valve control system

3. Main feedwater control system The potential scenario for this event is depressurization

4. Automatic rod control system. of the reactor coolant system due to a relief valve failing open. This is addressed in 15.2.12, Accidental Failure of these systems/devices due to a high energy line break is Depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System and fully addressed in Chapter 15, Accident Analysis of the WBN Unit 15.3.1, Loss Of Reactor Coolant From Small Ruptured 2 FSAR. Pipes Or From Cracks In Large Pipes Which Actuate The Emergency Core Cooling System.

Please identify the sections of FSAR Chapter 15 that address the failures of these systems. 3. Main feedwater control system The potential scenarios for this event are:

a. A loss of feedwater due a feedwater isolation valve failing closed. This is addressed in 15.2.8, Loss of Normal Feedwater.

b. A feedwater regulating valve failing open. This is addressed in 15.2.10, Excessive heat removal due to feedwater system malfunctions.

4. Automatic rod control system The potential scenarios are uncontrolled rod withdrawal events that are addressed in 15.2.1, Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal From A Subcritical Condition, 15.2.2, Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Control Assembly Bank Withdrawal At Power, and 15.2.3, Rod Cluster Control Assembly Misalignment.

284 7.7.3 7.4.1 8/27/2010 Responder: Webber Y Closed Closed EICB RAI No.14 TVA Letter dated This item is a follow-up question to item EICB (Darbali)

ML102910017, 10/21/10 123 Follow-up to item 123 Attachment 2 to the 10/20 letter contains the electrical logic 10/19/10 Enclosure 1 Item diagrams and required Drawing Change Authorizations No. 18, Please provide a readable electrical logic diagram of the Volume (DRAs). Attachment 7 Control Tank Level Control System.

285 7.3.3 7.3 CB (D 8/27/2010 Responder: McNeil Y Closed Closed EICB RAI No.15 TVA Letter dated This item is a follow-up question to item ar bal ML102910017, 10/29/10 22

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Follow-up to item 22 The Foxboro SPEC 200 components are physically arranged Response is included in letter 10/19/10 Enclosure 1 Item in the racks to meet the requirements of IEEE-279 and Watts dated 10/29/10 No. 18 Do the control loops meet the requirements of IEEE-279? If not Bar Design Criteria WB-DC-30-4, Separation/Isolation.

are they isolated from the circuit which meets the requirements of 279. Foxboro (Invensys) uses two IE analog modules to isolate IE to Non-IE signals. These are Contact Output Isolator (Model Number 2A0-L2C-R Relay Output) and Voltage-to-Current Converter (Model Number 2A0-VAI), both of which have the Input and Output signals isolated.

286 7.7.3 9.3.4.2. 8/27/2010 Responder: Webber Y Closed Closed EICB RAI No.16 TVA Letter dated EICB (Darbali) 4 ML102910017, 10/21/10 Item No.

SE 7.7.3, Volume Control Tank Level Control System Low alarm is correct - the setpoint is above the low-low Response is satisfactory. 10/19/10 19 interlock that opens the isolation valve, mentioned earlier in In FSAR section 9.3.4.2.4 a change was made to the last the paragraph. Response provided in letter paragraph of the Volume Control Tank description (page 9.3-31 of Editorial change to correct a typo. dated 10/21/10 the Amendment 97 redline), where the "low-low level alarm" was changed to "low level alarm".

Please explain if this deletion was an editorial change to correct a typo.

287 7.3 7.3-1 8/27/2010 Responder: Elton Y Closed Closed ML102390538, Item Response EICB (Darbali)

No. 1, 9/10/10 and received in 11 In Amendment 95 of FSAR section 7.3.2.3 Further Unit 2 FSAR Section 7.3 addresses Engineered Safety EICB RAI No.17 10 TVA letter, item Considerations, the list of signals that would start the auxiliary Features (ESF) Actuation System. AMSAC is non-safety, ML102910017, 7.3-1 feedwater motor driven and turbine driven pumps was moved to and thus non-ESF. Therefore, it was correct to not include 10/19/10 table 7.3-1 item 3, Auxiliary Feedwater. However, item (6) AMSAC when the initiating signals were relocated from Unit AMSAC was not included in table 7.3-1. 2 FSAR Section 7.3.2.3 to Table 7.3-1.

Please explain this omission or state your commitment to correct this in a future amendment.

288 7.3 9/2/2010 Responder: McNeil Y Closed Closed EICB RAI EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 (1) Can we add a section to chapter 7 giving a brief overview of the (1) and (2) The following new section and reference will be Due 11/24/10 Item#67 Foxboro Spec 200 in Section 7.3? added to the WBN Unit 2 FSAR as part of Amendment 102: TVA committed to adding a description of the Foxboro TVA should include the Additional Clarification provided by the NRC 7.3.1.1.3 Analog Instrumentation Spec 200 hardware at the list of all the functions 10/12 NRC Public Meeting. where Spec 200 is (2) TVA should include the list of all the functions where Spec 200 The miscellaneous safety-related analog process control used and discuss is used and discuss differences between unit 1 and unit 2. (3) This and indication loops are made up of discrete analog differences between discussion should also include loops which are currently used for modules that have been tested and qualified for use in unit 1 and unit2. This Unit 1 operation (4) If Spec 200 components have also been safety related systems. The various components have discussion should also qualified to RG 1.209, it should be stated and if not why not. been qualified to IEEE Standard 323-1983 (R-1996) IEEE include loop which are Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear currently used for Unit 1 Power Generating Stations, IEEE Standard 344-1987 (R- operation If Spec 200 1993) IEEE Standard Recommended Practices for components have also Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear been qualified to RG Power Generating Stations, and IEEE Standard 384-1984 1.209, it should be (R-1992) IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of stated and if not why Class IE Equipment and Circuits. The modules are not.

arranged in instrument loops to provide the safety functions listed below:

• Turbine driven AFW Pump Flow Control

• Motor driven AFW pump differential pressure indication and recirculation valve control

• Steam generator AFW flow and level indication and control

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N

• Containment Pressure indication

• Upper and Lower Compartment Containment Ambient Temperature indication

• RHR Heat Exchanger CCS Supply Header Flow

• Sample Heat Exchanger Header CCS Differential Flow

• ERCW Strainer Differential Pressure, Backwash and Flush Control

• CCS Heat Exchanger B Inlet Pressure

• CCS Surge Tank Level Control

• CCS Heat Exchanger B Outlet Temperature

• Reactor Vessel Head Vent Throttle Manual Loading Station (Unit 2 Only)

• EGTS Annulus Differential Pressure Control The components are physically arranged in the racks to meet the requirements of IEEE-279 and Watts Bar Design Criteria WB-DC-30-4, Separation/Isolation. (Unit 2 Only) Two IE analog modules are used to isolate IE to Non-IE signals. These are the Contact Output Isolator and Voltage-to-Current Converter, both of which have the Input and Output signals isolated.

EMI testing and acceptance by TVA of the Foxboro Spec 200 hardware is documented in Reference [8].

References:

(8) Invensys Process Systems Document No. 800063-1830, Electromagnetic Compatibility Test Reports, dated August 21, 2008, Rev. 0.

(2) As agreed to by TVA and the NRC reviewer, the level of detail necessary to describe the differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 is down to the specific hardware manufacturer.

This level of detail was agreed to not be appropriate in Chapter 7 which discusses the functions and design requirements for the plant control systems. The hardware manufacturer level of detail is addressed in Chapter 3.10 which describes the qualification of the specific hardware for safety related functions.

(3) While not specifically identified as such, loops in service for Unit 1 (Essential Raw Cooling Water etc.) are described in the FSAR chapters describing the systems the loops serve.

(4) Reg. Guide 1.209, Guidelines for Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants, is not applicable to the analog Foxboro Spec 200 hardware.

289 9/2/2010 Responder: Faulkner Y Closed Closed RAI No. 24 TVA Letter dated EICB (Singh)

- Response acceptable. ML102980005 10/21/10 There are 4 Containment High Range Radiation Monitors Response provided in letter 10/26/2010 Enclosure 1 Item Provide an ISG 2 diversity analysis for the containment high range (HRRMs) for WBN2, a pair in upper containment and a pair dated 10/21/10 Please refer to No. 20 accident monitors RM-1000. in lower containment. Each pair completely meets the highlighted sections of requirements for safety related equipment including response that address

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N separation, independence, electrical isolation, seismic NRC comments 1) and qualification, quality requirements, etc. Each monitor 2).

channel is a standalone instrument loop with traditional individual panel readout. They are not a part of a Highly Staff has the following Integrated Control Room (HICR) and there is no diversity comments on the question relating to the HRRMs and any HICR infrastructure. proposed TVA Therefore, the response to this RAI will address the response per the functional uses of the HRRMs and the alternate and diverse 10/21/submittal:

instrumentation that could be used for those functions should a common mode software issue render both trains of 1) Response HRRMs non-functional. addresses upscale failure. Please The Containment HRRMs have no automatic actuation explain how function. They only provide indication as required by RG downscale failure of 1.97R2. They are used at WBN for 2 functions. They are all HRRM channels used by the operators in Emergency Operating Instructions is detected and (EOI) as one of the indications of abnormal containment appropriate actions conditions indicative of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) taken.

after a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection and they are used in Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP) to assist 2) Please confirm that with event classification for events which involve fuel the location for cladding degradation. obtaining the RCS sample is In the EOI procedures, there are several diverse indications accessible after an of containment conditions that are used to detect a LOCA accident.

and they are Containment Pressure, Containment Temperature, and Containment Sump Level. All of these Otherwise, the instrument channels are diverse to the HRRMs in that they response is acceptable.

do not share a software platform or any integrated information or control system features. The HRRMs Due 10/31/10 functional through individual, self contained, microprocessor based instrument loops. Containment Pressure and Sump Level indications are provided through Eagle 21 equipment which is completely diverse from the HRRMs. Containment Temperature is provided through Foxboro Spec 200 instrument channels which are completely diverse from the HRRMs. All of these readouts are through traditional panel meters and are not part of any HICR infrastructure.

In the EPIPs, the HRRMs are used to indicate loss of fuel clad barrier and the potential loss of a containment barrier.

Potential fuel clad damage can also be determined from samples taken from the Reactor Coolant System and from Incore Thermocouple readings. RCS sampling does not rely on plant instrumentation systems and the Incore Thermocouple System uses a Common Q software platform which is diverse from the HRRMs. 2) The accessibility required to obtain post accident samples of RCS has been demonstrated to be a viable post accident action at WBN.

Should all 4 channels of HRRMs fail upscale, Annunciator Response Instructions would be followed and they call for evacuation of containment, sampling of RCS, checking other non-accident Radiation Monitors, notification of Radiological Control personnel to investigate, potential transition to Abnormal Operating procedures for management of potential radioactive material release, and evaluation under the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures for event classification. All of these actions are conservative actions.

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N

1) Should all 4 channels of the HRRMs fail downscale, the operators would turn to diverse indications as noted above before taking any further action.

Therefore, there are diverse methods and equipment sets that can be used for any functions provided by the HRRMs should both channels become nonfunctional.

290 7.7 9/7/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed N/A N/A This item is a duplicate of item 291.

EICB (Carte)

The equation at the bottom of Amendment 99 page 7.7-3 is wrong. This item is a duplicate of item 291.

There are two ways that this equation is inconsistent with the text above it.

291 7.7 9/7/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed TVA Letter dated EICB (Carte) 10/21/10 The equation at the bottom of Amendment 100 page 7.7-3 is The errors in the terms within the equation for total rod Enclosure 1 Item wrong. There are two ways that this equation is inconsistent with speed error [TE] will be corrected in FSAR Amendment 101 No. 21 the text above it. as shown below:

1 1 1 1 1 1

292 7.2.5 7.2 9/7/2010 Responder: Craig Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg)

ML102910008 10/21/10 FSAR Section 7.2, Steam Generator Reference Leg: By letter The SG level transmitter reference legs are not insulated on Response provided in letter Due 10/31/10 Item#68 Enclosure 1 Item dated July 27, 1994, TVA had withdrawn its commitment on Unit 1 Unit 1 and will not be insulated on Unit 2. The analysis dated 10/21/10 No. 22 to insulate SG reference leg. TVA had provided an analysis to provided for Unit 1 is also applicable to Unit 2. FSAR justify this action which was accepted by the staff. Confirm Section 7.2.1.1.2 (5) indicates that the Low-Low steam whether SG reference leg in Unit 2 are insulated and if not then generator water level trip protects the reactor from loss of confirm that the analysis which was submitted for Unit 1 is also heat sink in the event of a loss of feedwater to one or more applicable to Unit 2. steam generators or a major feedwater line rupture outside containment. For a feedwater line rupture inside containment the TVA analysis credits the high containment pressure Safety Injection signal. FSAR Section 15.4.2.2 has been revised accordingly.

Reference:

1. Watts Bar Unit 1 SER NUREG-0847, Supplement 14.

2. Westinghouse WCAP 13462, Revision 2 293 7.7.4 7.2.2.3. 9/8/2010 Responder: Craig Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL EICB (Marcus) 5 ML102861885 Item 10/29/10 FSAR Amendment 100, Section 7.2.2.3.5 discusses Steam Steam Generator Overfill Response is acceptable NRC to issue formal No. 22 Enclosure 1 Item Generator Water Level and protection against low water level. FSAR Section 7.2 discusses reactor trip functions. Section RAI to TVA. No. 19 However, this section does not discuss protection against Steam 7.2.2.3.5 describes the Low-Low steam generator level Response is included in letter Generator overfill. Additionally, FSAR Section 7.2.2.3.4 discusses reactor trip. The steam generator High-High level interlock dated 10/29/10 TVA to provide formal Pressurizer Water Level and provides minimal information (P-14) protects against steam generator overfill by initiating response to RAI concerning Pressurizer overfill. Please provide a discussion of feedwater isolation and a turbine trip. Reactor trip occurs protection against Pressurizer and Steam Generator overfill. indirectly as a result of the turbine trip if power is above 50%,

the P-9 interlock. This function is identified as ESFAS interlock P-14 in FSAR Section 7.3, Table 7.3-3. The High-

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N High level interlock is also discussed in FSAR Section 10.4.7.3. Section 15.2.10 analyzes the feedwater malfunction event which causes one or more feedwater control valves to fail to the fully open position.

Pressurizer Overfill The High pressurizer water level reactor trip protects against pressurizer overfill. This trip is described in FSAR Section 7.2.1.1.2 (3). Section 7.2.2.3.4 discusses specific control and protection interactions related to pressurizer level control. The high water level trip setpoint provides sufficient margin such that the undesirable condition of discharging liquid coolant through the safety valves is avoided.

Pressurizer level is modeled in various Chapter 15 events to ensure that critical protection functions will function as required.

294 7.3 7.3.1.1. 9/9/2010 Responder: Elton Y Closed Closed ML102390538, Item Response EICB (Darbali) 1 No. 2, 9/10/10 received in 11 In Amendment 95 of FSAR section 7.3.1.1.1 Function Initiation, The information provided in Unit 2 FSAR Section 7.3.1.1 is 10 TVA letter, item item (13) was arranged into paragraph form from what used to be not meant to describe the specific function of each item in 7.3-2 a listing of items (a), (b) and (c). detail; the descriptions provided are a summary listing. The omitted information provided information beyond the level of The second bullet under item (c) was omitted in the new detail provided for the other items in this section.

paragraph.

The level of detail contained in item (13) of Unit 2 FSAR Initiates Phase B containment isolation of the following: Section 7.3.1.1 is consistent with that contained in item 13.

• Closure of the main steam isolation valves (MSIV) to limit of Unit 1 UFSAR Section 7.3.1.1.

reactor coolant system cooldown for breaks downstream of the MSIVs.

Please explain this omission or state your commitment to correct this in a future amendment.

295 7.3 7.3.1.1. 9/9/2010 Responder: Elton Y Closed Closed ML102390538, Item Response EICB (Darbali) 2 No. 3, 9/10/10 received in 11 In Amendment 95 of FSAR section 7.3.1.1.2 Process Protection The level of detail is sufficient for this section without the two 10 TVA letter, item Circuitry, item (3), references to sections 7.6 and 7.7 were removed references to other Sections. 7.3-3 removed.

The level of detail contained in item (3) of Unit 2 FSAR Please explain the reason for removal. Section 7.3.1.1.2 is consistent with that contained in item 3.

of Unit 1 UFSAR Section 7.3.1.1.2.

296 7.3 7.3.1.2. 9/9/2010 Responder: Elton Y Closed Closed ML102390538, Item Response EICB (Darbali) 1 No. 4, 9/10/10 received in 11 In Amendment 95 of FSAR section 7.3.1.2.1 Generating Station The information provided in Unit 2 FSAR Section 7.3.1.2.1 is 10 TVA letter, item Conditions, the new paragraph was arranged from what used to not meant to provide detailed information describing what 7.3-4 be a listing of items (1.b), (1.c), and (2.b), leaving out items (1.a) each condition includes. Deletion of the breaks described in and (2.a). Even if the paragraph contains the word include, the Items (1.a) and (2.a) is justified because they are breaks in items (1.a) and (2.a) should be listed. encompassed by the operating conditions primary system breaks and secondary system breaks, respectively.

Please explain this omission or state your commitment to correct this in a future amendment. The level of detail contained in Unit 2 FSAR Section 7.3.1.2.1 is consistent with that contained in Unit 1 UFSAR Section 7.3.1.2.1.

297 7.3 7.3.1.2. 9/9/2010 Responder: Elton Y Closed Closed ML102390538, Item Response 2 EICB No. 5, 9/10/10 received in 11 (Darbali) In Amendment 95 of FSAR section 7.3.1.2.2 Generating Station Unit 2 FSAR Section 7.3 addresses Engineered Safety 10 TVA letter, item Variables, the following sentence was erased: Features (ESF) Actuation System. Post accident monitoring 7.3-5 is not an ESF; thus, a reference to it is not required in

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Post accident monitoring requirements and variables are given in 7.3.1.2.2.

Tables 7.5-1 and 7.5-2.

Please explain the reason for removal.

298 7.3 XX 9/9/2010 Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed ML102390538, Item Response EICB (Darbali)

No. 6, 9/10/10 received in 11 IE Bulletin 80-06 calls for review of engineered safety features with A review of the schematic diagrams for the WBN Unit 2 10 TVA letter, item the objective of ensuring that no device will change position solely valves listed in SER 3 found the following: 7.3-6 because of the reset action.

(1) For feedwater isolation valves (FCV-3-33, FCV-3-47, In Supplement 3 of NUREG-0847, section 7.3.5, the staff approved FCV-3-87, and FCV-3-100), feedwater check valve the design modifications proposed by the applicant that would bypass valves (FCV-3-185, FCV-3-186, FCV-3-187, allow certain devices to remain unchanged upon an ESF reset. and FCV-3-188), and upper tap main feedwater The staff also found acceptable the applicants justification for isolation valves (FCV 3-236, FCV-3-239, FCV-3-242, some safety-related equipment that does not remain in its and FCV-3-245), the Unit 2 equivalent reset switch emergency mode after an ESF reset. and a relay have been added for each steam generator loop. When the engineered safety feature Please confirm whether or not the equipment that was determined (ESF) signal is reset, the individual valve will not in NUREG-0847 and its supplements to remain unchanged upon change state until both the loop and the ESF train an ESF reset will still remain unchanged in Unit 2. reset switches have been reset.

(2) For steam generator blowdown isolation valves (FCV-43-54D, FCV-43-56D, FCV-43-59D, FCV 63D, FCV-43-55, FCV-43-58, FCV-43-61, and FCV-43-64), the ESF signal is sealed in by means of a seal in relay. The individual valve will not change state until a hand switch in the sample room is used to reopen the individual valve.

(3) For residual heat removal heat exchanger outlet flow control valves (FCV-74-16 and FCV-74-28), the ESF signal is sealed in by the limit switch. The Unit 2 equivalent reset switch has been added at the control room control board. When the ESF signal is reset, the individual valve will not change state until the individual reset switch has been reset.

299 Provide Common Q Software Requirements Specification Post Attachment 41 of the 10/5 letter contains the Common Q Y Closed Closed TVA Letter dated EICB Accident Monitoring System 00000-ICE-3238 Rev. 5 Software Requirements Specification Post Accident 10/5/10 (Carte) Monitoring System 00000-ICE-3238 Rev. 5 and the affidavit Response provided in letter for withholding. dated 10/5/10 300 Need Radiation Monitoring System Description/Design Criteria Responder: Temples/Mather Y Closed Closed RAI No. 25 TVA Letter ML102980005 11/24/10, item 4, Are detectors different from Unit 1. Describe any differences. (1) The Radiation Monitoring Design Criteria Document, Response is included in letter Due 11/24/10 10/26/2010 and TVA letter WB-DC-40-24, Revision 21 is contained in Attachment dated 10/29/10 10/29/10 Are there any commercially dedicated parts in the RM-1000? If so, 6 to letter dated October 31, 2010. TVA to address the Enclosure 1 Item how are they dedicated? Revised response Included in following comments: No. 20 (2) Attachment 7 contains the General Atomics detector letter dated 11/24/10 EICB (Singh)

Please confirm that digital communication ports available in RM- differences report. The containment high range (1) Is it Att. 5 or Att.

1000 are not used. radiation monitors are loops 271-274. 6?

(2) Pl. confirm that (3) For safety-related applications, General Atomics HRRMs are loops Electronic Systems, Inc. supplies the RM-1000 module 271-274.

assembly as a Basic Component. This assembly does (3) TVA to clarify that contain component parts that are Safety-Related GA has a Commercial Grade Items (SRCGI). Because these commercial SRCGI components are assembled into the delivered dedication Basic Component, they are dedicated to the assembly program in place

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N by virtue of the acceptance test of the full RM-1000 and that GA is an assembly. Safety-related commercial grade items are approved dedicated in accordance with General Atomics 10CFR50, App. B approved 10 CFR 50 Appendix B program. supplier.

App B does not (4) The digital communications ports on the safety-related address RM-1000 radiation monitors are not used. commercial grade dedication .

TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request:

Revised response General Atomics Electronics Systems, Inc. is an approved is acceptable.

10 CFR 50 Appendix B supplier. They have a commercial Please submit grade dedication program. response.

(4) Response acceptable.

301 1.TVA is requested to address the consequences of software Responder: WEC/Davies/Clark Y Closed Closed RAI No. 11 TVA Letter dated Note 1:

common cause failure including all potential resulting failures (i.e. ML102980005 10/29/10 (Encl 1, total loss of CERPI, system fail as-is). TVA Partial Response: Revised response included in Due 12/22/10 10/26/2010 Item 21) and letter Effects of common cause software letter dated 12/22/10. dated 12-22-10 failure are addressed in DI&C-ISG-02

2. In addition, address how the actions stipulated in the plant For all accidents analyzed in WBN Unit 2 FSAR, Chapter 15, 1) Please address (Encl 1, item 25) (ML091590268) Section 4 on pages 8 Technical Specifications will be taken when the CERPI system no credit is taken for the rod position indication system. For Revised response included in how fail-as-is is and 9. This document is publically indications are lost. Information notice IN 2010-10 (ML100080281) all continuous rod withdrawal accidents analyzed in WBN letter dated 11/24/10. detected i.e. available. Some excerpts are as addresses the need to consider software failures and the actions Unit 2 FSAR, Chapter 15, no credit is taken for any rod alarms, rod follows:

required to assure that the plant will stay within its licensing basis. stop/block. Partial response in 10/29 letter. position deviation alarms, etc. For example, a failure to trip might

3. Provide FMEA in support of your response. (1) Technical Specification 3.1.8, Rod Position Indication, 2) Response not be as limiting as a partial does not have an action for total loss of indication; acceptable. actuation of an emergency core

4. FSAR Table 7.7-1, Plant Control System Interlocks lists interlock therefore, a total loss of CERPI puts the plant into LCO 3) Response cooling system, with digital indications of a successful actuation.

C-11 to block automatic rod withdrawal when 1/1 Control Bank D 3.0.3 which states: acceptable. In cases such as this, it may take an rod position is above setpoint. This interlock capability would be 4) a. Response operator longer to evaluate and lost in case of total loss of CERPI. How is the rod block assured When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS acceptable. correct the safety system failure than for this event? are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if b. Pl. address it would if there was a total failure to directed by the associated ACTIONS the unit shall be failure mode on send any actuation signal. For this

5. How is automatic rod withdrawal affected in case of total loss of placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which fail-as-is. reason, the evaluation of failure EICB (Singh) signals from the CERPI to the ICS? Is this interlock fail safe? the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 5) Response modes as a result of software CCF 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place the unit, as applicable, in: acceptable. should include the possibility of 6.FSAR chapter 15, Section 2.3.2.1states that the resolution of the 6) Response partial actuation and failure to actuate with false indications, as well rod position indicator channel is 5% of span (7.2 inches). The MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />; acceptable.

as a total failure to actuate.

CERPI system accuracy specified in the CERPI System MODE 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />; and requirements Specification, WNDS-DS-00001_WBT, Rev. 2 is 12 MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />. TVA to address The primary concern is that an steps or 5.19%. The specified system accuracy seems to be common cause failure undetected failure within the digital greater than the accuracy assumed in the FSAR Chapter 15. as stated under system could prevent proper system Please clarify this anomaly. Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the response item 2. operation. A failure or fault that is individual Specifications. Where corrective measures detected can be addressed; are completed that permit operation in accordance with Please explain how however, failures that are non-the LCO or ACTIONS, completion of the actions various alarms will detectable may prevent a system actuation when required.

required by LCO 3.0.3 is not required. continue to annunciate Consequently, non-detectable faults on software lockup? are of concern.

(2) CERPI common mode software failure Need better explanation to Description of the CERPI systems installed at Watts understand the Bar (Unit 1 & 2): rationale behind the response.

Each Programmable Logic Controller (PLC),

Maintenance Test Panel (MTP), and Operators Module Further response (OM) is isolated within its own Train, A or B. Rod required to address position information is provided to the OMs in the main CCF:

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N control room via redundant data links. Each train (PLC, MTP, and OM) is electrically isolated from the other Total failure of train. software and lock-up alone would normally Communications within a CERPI train (PLC, MTP, and be detected. Staff is OM) are continuously monitored. If communication is also concerned by interrupted, this condition is annunciated to the operator undetected failure in the control room. The MTP and OM display screens within the digital have rotating cursors in the upper right-hand corner of system that could the display to indicate that the system is operating. prevent proper system operation. A failure or History of CERPI: fault that is detected can be addressed; The basic PLC software associated with the CERPI however, failures that system has been in use for over ten years. The first are non-detectable plant to utilize the CERPI PLC software was Beaver may prevent a system Valley. In 2003, the CERPI software was deployed with actuation when interfaces to the Common Q MTP and OM interfaces required or may result within the systems for Surry Units 1 & 2, and Watts Bar in a partial actuation.

Unit 1. In 2009, the Watts Bar Unit 1 CERPI system Please address the was modified to allow for two independent trains of consequences of an CERPI. The Watts Bar Unit 2 CERPI system is based undetected failures on on the Unit 1 design. Only the detectors and the system operation and detector interface boards are not redundant within the alarms and interlocks Watts Bar CERPI systems. including control bank D interlock. (See note CERPI Software Failure Analysis 1 in the Comments column of this open With regard to the CERPI system software: item for reference)

• The software used on PLC-A is identical to that used on PLC-B.

• The software used on MTP-A is identical to that used on MTP-B

• The software used on OM-A is identical to that used on OM-B.

A common cause failure affecting the software of one CERPI train would affect the other train as well.

Common cause problems associated with the CERPI software were mitigated by the Westinghouse software development process, factory acceptance testing, and site acceptance testing. There is no "fail as-is" scenario. Any failure of a hardware/software component (resulting in processor lock-up) would be immediately annunciated (Main Control Room alarm).

A loss of communication to the MTP, or OM would be annunciated, and the data values on the flat panel display would be displayed in magenta (indicating failure). A hardware/software failure in the PLC (resulting in processor lock-up) would result in an annunciator because of the watchdog alarm circuit associated with the PLC processor module.

A total loss of CERPI indication (e.g., loss of both AC power sources to the rod position cabinets) is possible, but this condition would be immediately annunciated. A complete loss of CERPI indication would lead to

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N entering Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3. A more likely scenario would be loss of a single train of CERPI due to a hardware failure; in which case, there are no technical specification conditions to enter because a single train is capable of providing all rod indications needed for control.

(3) There is no FMEA for the CERPI system.

(4) Control Bank D Automatic Rod Withdrawal Limit would be assured by Operations and control circuitry by the following 2 methods:

a. A simultaneous failure of all indications of the Rod Position Indication System places the plant in LCO 3.0.3, since it would prevent compliance with actions in LCO 3.1.8.

b. CERPI cabinet relays A-KX-18 and B-KX-18 are the PLC controlled components of Rod Withdrawal Limit. The relays are active low requiring power to activate the contacts in the control circuit. Total loss of CERPI will open the contacts and block Automatic Rod Withdrawal.

Additionally, Annunciator window 64F will annunciate to show C-11 BANK D AUTO WITHDRAWAL BLOCKED.

(5) The CERPI Maintenance and Test Panels are used to set the Rod Withdrawal Limit with output signal to ICS as a parallel path. As stated above, the relays are the controlling functions and loss of signal to ICS will not affect the capability of the control circuit to disable the Automatic Rod Withdrawal function. The C-11 interlock is fail safe with regards to loss of power.

(6) The cycle-specific analyses for the static rod misalignment assume full misalignment of an individual rod from the bank position indicator(s). Such a misalignment exceeds that which is possible during plant operations when accounting for the most adverse combination of the rod deviation alarm and uncertainty of the rod position indicator (both 12 steps). For consistency of parameter (and units) with the deviation alarm and position indicator uncertainty, the WBN Unit 2 FSAR Chapter 15, Section 2.3.1 will be revised in Amendment 102 to read:

The resolution of the rod position indicator channel is +/-

12 steps. Deviation of any RCCA from its group by twice this distance (24 steps) will not cause power distributions worse than the design limits. The deviation alarm alerts the operator to rod deviation with respect to group demand position in excess of 12 steps. If the rod deviation alarm is not operable, the operator is required to take action as required by the Technical Specifications.

This change is consistent with FSAR section 4.3.2.2.5,

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Limiting Power Distributions Page 4.3-13, which states the maximum deviation assumed is 12 steps.

TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request:

1. The following response is based on the information contained in Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2722 Response To Question On CERPI RAI #301, dated December 6, 2010 (Reference Error!

Reference source not found.).

TVA believes the follow-up question is related to the statement found in the response to question 2 of NRC Matrix Item 301, submitted on TVA Letter to NRC Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 -

Instrumentation and Controls Staff Information Requests, dated November 24, 2010, (Reference Error! Reference source not found.)

Any failure of a hardware/software component (resulting in processor lock-up) would be immediately annunciated (Main Control Room alarm)

The CERPI system will not annunciate various system alarms if the software is in a lockup condition.

However, the system will annunciate an alarm based on the PLC watchdog relay dropping out because the software has locked up the processor. So, even if the PLC locks up, an alarm is generated to alert the operators in the Main Control Room (MCR).

The CERPI system alarms (that connect to the plant annunciator system) are wired to specific alarm relays within the CERPI system. With the exception of the watchdog alarm relay, the alarm relay coils are actuated by the PLC Digital Output Module. The plant annunciator wiring connects to either the Normally Open (NO) or the Normally Closed (NC) contacts of the associated alarm relay. The watchdog relay is configured such that when a timeout condition occurs (the PLC locks up), the watchdog relay de-energizes, and a CERPI System Trouble alarm is annunciated in the MCR.

2. As previously stated;

a. For all accidents analyzed in WBN Unit 2 FSAR, Chapter 15, no credit is taken for the rod position indication system. For all continuous rod withdrawal accidents analyzed in WBN Unit 2 FSAR, Chapter 15, no credit is taken for any rod stop/block. Based on this, an undetected failure of the CERPI would not have any impact on the WBN Unit 2 accident analysis.

b. Concerning the impact on Bank D, CERPI cabinet relays A-KX-18 and B-KX-18 are the PLC controlled components of Rod Withdrawal Limit.

The relays are active low requiring power to

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N activate the contacts in the control circuit. Total loss of CERPI will open the contacts and block Automatic Rod Withdrawal. Additionally, Annunciator window 64F will annunciate to show C-11 BANK D AUTO WITHDRAWAL BLOCKED.

Therefore, this would not result in an undetected failure. In the event of an undetected failure that kept relays A-KX-18 and B-KX-18 energized, the worst case scenario would be a continuous rod withdrawal event. This event is already addressed in the Chapter 15 accident continuous rod withdrawal accident analysis which takes no credit for rod stops/blocks.

302 7.5.2.1 7.5.1 09/17/2010 Responder: Tindell Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL ML102861885 Item 10/29/10 Item 208 requested a description of the changes that were Attachment 8 contains the requested 50.59 evaluations and Response is acceptable NRC to issue formal No. 23 Enclosure 1 Item See Item 332 performed under 10 CFR 50.59 for 16 Unit 1 PAM variables that the variable table cross referencing the variable to the RAI to TVA No. 22 were identified in Enclosure 1 Item No.6 of the letter dated June appropriate DCN. There are two changes to the original Response is included in letter EICB (Marcus) 18, 2010 (ML101940236). Please identify the specific 10 CFR table. Variable 9, RCS Pressurizer Level and 10, RCS dated 10/29/10 TVA to provide formal 50.59 documentation that applies to each of these 16 variables. Pressure Wide Range have been changed from 50.59 Y to response to RAI N. The original response showed these variables as changed under 10 CFR 50.59. The response was based on the plan to replace all paper recorders in Unit 1. The assumption was that these recorders would be replaced prior to Unit 2 startup. While this may still occur, the recorders have not been replaced at this time.

303 7.5.2.1 7.5.1 09/17/2010 Responder: Tindell Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL ML102861885 Item 10/29/10 Enclosure 1 Item 6 of the letter dated June 18, 2010 included a Attachment 9 contains the cross reference between the Unit Response is acceptable NRC to issue formal No. 24 Enclosure 1 Item See Item 333 column to indicate the Unit 2 variable source for each PAM 2 and Unit 1 variable sources for the unique WBN Unit 2 RAI to TVA No. 23 variable and also if the variable was unique to Unit 2. For each variables within the scope of the Foxboro Spec 200, Corrected response is included EICB (Marcus) variable that was indicated as unique to Unit 2 and the Unit 2 Common Q PAMS and Foxboro I/A changes. in letter dated 10/29/10 TVA to provide formal variable source is (1) Foxboro Spec 200, (2) Common Q PAMS, or response to RAI (3) Foxboro IA, identify the Unit 1 variable source. NOTE: An error was identified during preparation of this response. Variable 37 CCS Surge Tank Level was incorrectly identified as being within the scope of the Foxboro I/A system in TVA to NRC letter dated June 18, 2010. Variable 37 will be provided by the Foxboro Spec 200 system for Unit 2.

304 7.5.2.1 7.5.1 09/17/2010 Responder: Tindell Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL ML102861885 Item 10/29/10 EICB (Marcus)

Enclosure 1 Item 6 of the letter dated June 18, 2010 indicated that The source for the Unit 1 variables is the Eagle 21 System. Response is included in letter NRC to issue formal No. 25 Enclosure 1 Item the Unit 2 variable source for 14 PAM variables is Eagle 21. dated 10/29/10 RAI to TVA No. 24 Please confirm that for each of these 14 variables the Unit 1 variable source is also the Eagle 21. Response is acceptable TVA to provide formal response to RAI 305 7.5.2.1 7.5.1 09/17/2010 Responder: Tindell Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB RAI ML102861885 sent to DORL ML102861885 Item 10/29/10 EICB (Marcus)

Enclosure 1 Item 6 of the letter dated June 18, 2010 indicated that The source for the Unit 1 variables is the Integrated Response is included in letter NRC to issue formal No. 26 Enclosure 1 Item the Unit 2 variable source for 2 PAM variables is the Integrated Computer System. dated 10/29/10 RAI to TVA No. 25 Computer System. Please confirm that for these 2 variables the Unit 1 variable source was the Unit 1 plant computer system. Response is acceptable TVA to provide formal response to RAI 306 7.1 7.1 FSAR amendment 100, page 7.1-12 provides the definition of Responder: Hilmes Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated EICB (Garg Allowable value which is not consistent with TSTF-493 as ML102910008 10/29/10

)

allowable value is the value beyond which instrument channel is The FSAR Allowable Value definition will be revised to be Response is included in letter Due 12/17/10 Item#69 Enclosure 1 Item

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N declared inoperable. consistent with the TSTF-493 in FSAR Amendment 102. dated 10/29/10 No. 26 Attachment 3 contains the revised FSAR section 7.1.2.1.9 Pending FSAR that will be included in FSAR Amendment 102 that reflects Amendment 102 this change. submittal 307 7.1 7.1 (1) FSAR amendment 100, Section 7.1, page 7.1-12, definition of Responder: Hilmes Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated Acceptable as found tolerance is not in accordance with TSTF-493 ML102910008 10/29/10 as AAF is the limit beyond which the instrument channel is (1) The Acceptable As Found (AAF) definition will be Response is included in letter Due 12/17/10 Item#70 Enclosure 1 Item degraded but may be operable and its operability must be revised to be consistent with TSTF-493 in FSAR dated 10/29/10 No. 27 evaluated. (2) Also it states that AAF is based on measurable Amendment 102. Attachment 3 contains the revised Pending FSAR instrument channel uncertainties, such as drift, expected during the FSAR section 7.1.2.1.9 that will be included in FSAR Amendment 102 surveillance interval. These wording should be revised to agree Amendment 102 that reflects this change. submittal with the wording given in RIS2006-17 as these wordings are very vague. (3) Also it states that RPS functions use double sided (2) Additional detail on the AAF methodology was provided tolerance limits for the AAF. Since AAF is a band it will always be in sections 7.1.2.1.9.1, Westinghouse Setpoint double sided and therefore, this clarification does not mean Methodology, and 7.1.2.1.9.2, TVA Setpoint anything and it clouds the issue. Methodology. These sections will be revised to clarify EICB (Garg) the AAF calculations in FSAR Amendment 102.

Attachment 3 contains the revised FSAR section 7.1.2.1.9 that will be included in FSAR Amendment 102 that reflects this change.

(3) The statement about double sided limits addresses a TSTF requirement that the AAF tolerance consider errors in both the conservative and non-conservative directions and ensures that an as-found value which exceeds these limits, even in the conservative direction (away from the safety limit), will be evaluated. Attachment 3 contains the revised FSAR section 7.1.2.1.9 that will be included in FSAR Amendment 102 that reflects this change.

308 7.1 7.1 (1) FSAR Amendment 100, Section 7.1, page 7.1-13, definition of Responder: Hilmes Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated Acceptable as left tolerance is not in accordance with TSTF-493 as ML102910008 10/29/10 it states that this may take calibration history into consideration. (1) The statement about using calibration history to Response is included in letter Item#71 Enclosure 1 Item EICB (Garg)

This is very vague and ambiguous. (2) Also it states that RPS determine the Acceptable As Left (AAL) will be deleted dated 10/29/10 Due 12/17/10 No. 28 functions use double sided tolerance limits. Since ALF is a band it in FSAR Amendment 102. Attachment 3 contains the Pending FSAR will always be double sided and therefore, this clarification does revised FSAR section 7.1.2.1.9 that will be included in Amendment 102 not mean anything and clouds the issue. FSAR Amendment 102 that reflects this change. submittal (2) See response to letter item 27 (NRC Matrix Item 307).

309 7.1 7.1.2.1. (1) FSAR amendment 100, Page 7.1-14, Westinghouse setpoint Responder: Hilmes Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated 9.1 methodology, states that AAF is the algebraic sum of the .. This ML102910008 10/29/10 is not acceptable. As algebraic sum is non conservative compared (1) The AAF calculation for Westinghouse setpoint Response is included in letter Due 12/17/10 Item#72 Enclosure 1 Item to the SRSS method and will mask the operability of the instrument methodology calculations in TI-28 for TSTF-493 will be dated 10/29/10 No. 29 channel and therefore, it is not acceptable to the staff. (2) It also revised to use the Square Root Sum of the Squares Pending FSAR EICB (Garg) make the statement that ALT may take calibration history into (SRSS) method. Amendment 102 consideration which is vague and ambiguous. submittal (2) AAF definition will be revised to be consistent with TSTF-493 as discussed with the NRC Staff, in FSAR Amendment 102. Attachment 3 contains the revised FSAR Amendment 102 Change Markup that reflects this change.

310 7.1 7.1.2.1. (1) FSAR amendment 100, Page 7.1-14, TVA setpoint Responder: Hilmes Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated 9.2 methodology, states that for AAF .and other measurable ML102910008 10/29/10 EICB (Garg) uncertainties as appropriate (i.e., those present during TVA Response: Response is included in letter Due 12/17/10 Item#73 Enclosure 1 Item calibration.) should be changed to present during normal dated 10/29/10 No. 30 operation (2) Also on page 7.1-15, states that ALT may take (1) The AAF definition will be revised in FSAR Amendment Pending FSAR calibration history into consideration which is vague and 102 to read: Amendment 102

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N ambiguous. submittal A tolerance band on either side of the NTSP which defines the limits of acceptable instrument performance, beyond which the channel may be considered degraded and must be evaluated for operability prior to returning it to service. Channels which exceed the AAF will be entered into the Corrective Action Program for further evaluation and trending. The Acceptable As Found tolerance is the SRSS combination of drift, maintenance and test equipment (M&TE) accuracy and readability, and calibration/reference accuracy. Other uncertainties may be included in the AAF if applicable.

This revision eliminates the concern regarding uncertainties. Attachment 3 contained in the October 29, 2010 letter provided the revised FSAR Section 7.1.2.1.9 that will be included in FSAR Amendment 102 that reflects this change.

(2) The AAL definition will be revised in FSAR Amendment 102 to read:

A tolerance band on either side of the NTSP within which an instrument or instrument loop is left after calibration or setpoint verification. The Acceptable As Left tolerance is equal to or less than the SRSS combination of reference accuracy, M&TE accuracy and M&TE readability. Other uncertainties may be included in the AAL if applicable.

This revision eliminates the concern regarding calibration history. Attachment 3 contained in the October 29, 2010 letter provided the revised FSAR Section 7.1.2.1.9 that will be included in FSAR Amendment 102 that reflects this change.

311 7.1 7.1 Both Westinghouse and TVA setpoint methodology do not have Responder: Hilmes Y Closed Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated any discussion on single sided calculation. Please confirm that ML102910008 10/29/10 EICB (Garg) single sided calculation has not been used for all setpoints with A statement that single-sided corrections are not used for Response is included in letter Due 12/17/10 Item#74 Enclosure 1 Item TSTF-493 and provide a statement to that effect in the FSAR. TSTF-493 setpoints will be included in FSAR Amendment dated 10/29/10 No. 31 102. Attachment 3 contains the revised FSAR section Pending FSAR 7.1.2.1.9 that will be included in FSAR Amendment 102 that Amendment 102 reflects this change. submittal 312 7.0 By letter dated September 10,2010, TVA provided the summary Responder: Stockton Y Close Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated evaluation of 50.59 reports which were related to FSAR Chapter ML102910008 10/21/10 EICB (Garg) 7.0. However, these evaluation only covers Amendments 0 thru 8. Amendment 8 is the current version of Unit 1 UFSAR. Response provided in letter Due 10/31/10 Item#75 Enclosure 1 Item Provide all other evaluation which have been done since these dated 10/21/10 No. 23 amendments and which forms the basis for FSAR Chapter 7.0 systems.

313 7.7.8 7.7.1.12 EDCR 52408 (installation of AMSAC in Unit 2) states that Design Responder: Ayala Y Closed Closed EICB RAI No.18 TVA Letter dated Criteria WB-DC-40-57 needs to be modified to reflect AMSAC in ML102910017, 10/29/10 EICB (Darbali)

Unit 2. (1) The review of WB-DC-40-57 for Unit 2 applicability has Response is included in letter 10/19/10 Enclosure 1 Item been completed and included in Revision 4 of the dated 10/29/10 No. 32

1. Has WB-DC-40-57 been completed for Unit 2? If so, please document. Attachment 10 contains TVA design submit. criteria WB-DC-40-57, Revision 4, Anticipated Transients Without Scram Mitigation System Actuation

2. If WB-DC-40-57 has not been completed for Unit 2, please Circuitry (AMSAC).

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N give an estimated date of completion and submittal.

(2) The revision for Unit 2 is complete with open items as

3. Please submit WB-DC-40-57 for Unit 1 and identify any identified in item (3) below.

changes to the Unit 2 version.

Attachment 10 contains TVA design criteria WB-DC-40-57, Revision 4, Anticipated Transients Without Scram Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) which is applicable to both WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2. There are 17 open Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Startup Integration Task Equipment List (WITEL) punch list items associated with Revision 4 that require resolution. A list of the punch list items is contained in Attachment 10.

314 7.3 7.3 The following 50.59 changes were listed in the March 12 RAI Responder: Stockton Y Closed Closed EICB RAI No. 19 TVA Letter dated Related to OI 10 response letter (item 10) but were not included in the September 9 ML102910017, 10/21/10 submittal of 50.59 safety evaluations. Please submit the 50.59 Attachment 8 contains the requested safety evaluations. Response provided in TVA letter 10/19/10 Enclosure 1 Item safety evaluations for the following changes: dated 10/21/10. No. 24 EICB (Darbali)

• DCN 38842 (Revise OTT and OPT turbine runback setpoints)

• DCN 50991 (Install Test Points)

• DCN 51124 (Eliminate spurious ICS alarms associated with the SSPS 315 7.5.3 7.5.3 IE Bulletin 79-27 required that emergency operating procedures to Responder: S. Smith (TVA Operations) Y Close Closed EICB RAI TVA Letter dated be used by control room operators to attain safe shutdown upon ML102910008 10/21/10 loss of any Class IE or non Class IE bus are adequate. WBN1 has While the WBN Unit 2 Emergency Operating Procedures Response provided in letter Due 10/31/10 Item#76 Enclosure 1 Item EICB (Garg) performed the review and documented their conclusion. Confirm (EOPs) have not been written, they will be written the same dated 10/21/10 No. 25 that WBN2 emergency procedures are adequate to achieve safe as the Unit 1 EOPs. WBN Unit 1 personnel will perform shutdown in the event of loss of any Class IE or non-Class IE bus. validations to ensure that WBN Unit 2 EOPs will perform the required actions. The WBN Unit 2 EOPs will be written and validated prior to Unit 2 fuel load.

316 7.5.2.3 7.5 TVA has provided various documents in support of RM-1000 high Responder: Temples/Mather Y Closed Closed RAI No. 26 range monitors for WBN2. ML102980005 Please clarify the following: The Sequoyah RM-1000 v1.1 Software Verification Report Response provided in letter Response acceptable 10/26/2010 RM-1000 v1.1 Software Verification Report 04508006 (Sequoyah) 04508006 and RM-1000 v1.2 Software Verification Report dated 10/21/10 per TVA letter of EICB (Singh)

RM-1000 v1.2 Software Verification Report 04508006 (Sequoyah) 04508006 are applicable to WBN Unit 2. 10/21/10, Enclosure 1, RM-1000 System Verification Test Results (Sequoyah) Item 26.

The RM-1000 System Verification Test Results report is not These documents were prepared for the Sequoyah plant. IS the applicable to WBN Unit 2. This document was for the non-version provided applicable to WBN2? Please confirm and explain safety related software and was superseded by the if these documents are applicable to WBN 2 as provided or with 04508006 v1.1 and v1.2 reports for the safety-related differences? software.

317 7.5.2.3 7.5 TVA has provided a proprietary and a non-proprietary version of Responder: Temples Y Closed Closed RAI No. 27 TVA Letter dated Technical Manual for RM-1000 Digital Radiation Processor under ML102980005 10/29/10 ML101680582 and ML101680587). i. These documents are applicable to WBN Unit 2. Response is included in letter Proposed response is 10/26/2010 Enclosure 1 Item ii. This was an error in document preparation that dated 10/29/10 acceptable. No. 33 (i) Are these documents applicable to WBN2 as provided occurred when attachments were assembled for a EICB (Singh)

(October 2003 version). previous letter. Due 10/31/10 (ii) Why is DCN38993-A attached at the back of the iii. The Technical Manual is not intended to include proprietary version? It is for WBN1 Turbine Governor equipment requirements. Requirements would be Control Valve. found in the applicable TVA Specifications for the (iii) This document does not state the requirements for RM- contract. (iii) Staff is looking for high 1000 units. Please provide a document that states the level requirements for RM-requirements for the RM-1000 radiation monitors for Attachment 11 contains the Material Requisition 1000 monitors. Pl. provide WBN2. Specification Revisions 1 and 4 which contain the requested appropriate documents.

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N information.

318 7.5.2.3 7.5 TVA has provided the following documents for RM-1000 Responder: Temples N Open Open-TVA/Bechtel RAI No. 28 TVA Letter dated equipment qualification: ML102980005 10/29/10, Encl 1 Revised response is included in Due 12/22/10 10/26/2010 Item 34, and TVA (i) Qualification Test Report for RM-1000 Processor Module letter dated 12/22/10. letter 11/24/10, and Current-To-Frequency Converter 04508905-QR (i) Applicable to WBN Unit 2. 04508905-1QR is Response update Att. 2.

(January 2001) applicable only in regards to the RM-1000, with the Note check 04508905-1QR or required. It is clear that (ii) Qualification Test Report Supplement, RM-1000 Upgrades exception of re-qualification of certain RM-1000 QR. Staff version is QR only. 04508903-2SP and -

04508905-1SP (June 2006) equipment differences covered in the -1SP report. 3SP are not applicable.

(iii) Qualification Test Report Supplement, RM-1000 Upgrades The Current-to-Frequency (I-F) converter module Response is included in letter The response for 04508905-2SP (June 2008) qualifications in the base report and the -1SP report dated 10/29/10 applicability of (iv) Qualification Test Report Supplement, RM-1000 Upgrades are not applicable to the RM-1000s, and will be used 04508905-QR and -

04508905-3SP (May 2008) later as references in the WBN Unit 2 specific 1SP to RM-1000 and IF qualification reports. converter is not clear.

Please clarify whether all of these are fully applicable to WBN2 or are they applicable with exceptions? If with exceptions, then (ii) Applicable to WBN Unit 2. Check page numbers of please clarify what those are. Appendix F (iii) Not applicable to WBN Unit 2 (missing/duplicate Supplement 3 was issued one month prior to supplement 2. (iv) Not applicable to WBN Unit 2 pages).

Please explain the reason for the same. Check applicability of The 04508905-3SP report was prepared for another TVA Appendix C to RM1000 plant, as a monitor system-level report, where the system instead of RM2300?

included equipment mostly based on the base report See items 336 and 337.

equipment items. These two -2SP and -3SP supplement reports were essentially worked concurrently, but the -2SP All equipment document review/release process resulted in the release qualification reports time difference. including supplements 2SP and 3SP have EICB (Singh)

TVA Response to Follow-up NRC Request: been reviewed as vendor drawings for NOTE: The response for the current to frequency (I to F) WBN-2. Please explain converter in item 1 below is a reversal of the the reason for response previously provided in TVA to NRC letter applicability of one dated October 29, 2010 (Reference 22). General report and not the Atomics Electronic Systems Inc. (GA-ESI) notified other.

TVA of this change on December 8, 2010 (Reference 20). Further all TVA/Bechtel reviews seems to be (1) The applicability of the qualification reports from GA- dispositioned as Code ESI e-mail dated December 10, 2010 (Reference 19) is 4, Review not required.

as follows: Work may proceed.

The applicable reports

a. 04508905-QR Qualification Test Report for RM- should have been 1000 Processor Module and Current-to- reviewed prior to Frequency Converter is applicable to the WBN dispositioning them.

Unit 2 RM-1000 and I to F converter modules. Please explain the apparent lack of review

b. 04508905-1SP Supplement to Qualification Test of WBN-2 applicable Report for RM-1000 Processor Module and documents. Was Current-to-Frequency Converter is applicable to appropriate review the WBN Unit 2 RM-1000 module. guidance used?

c. 04508905-1SP is not applicable to the WBN Unit Further update required 2 I to F converter module.

d. 04508905-2SP Qualification Test Report Provide model Supplement, I-F Converter Upgrades is number/part number for applicable to the WBN Unit 2 I to F converter the RM-1000 and I/F converter used for

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N module. WBN-2. This information is needed GA-ESI provided two other reports required to support to verify that the model qualification of the containment high range radiation or part number used is monitors. The report descriptions are from GA-ESI e- the equipment that has mail on December 8, 2010 (Reference 20). The been qualified for WBN-reports are: 2.

e. GA-ESI report 04038903-QSR, Qualification Provide qualification Summary Report for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit reports 04038903-QSR 2 Replacement Radiation Monitors: The report is and 04038903-7SP by the principle report and the starting point for all the dues date of the radiation monitors provided as part of the 1/22/11.

replacement contract. The report describes each monitor; referenced to the technical manual for Submit a copy of any the physical and functional description and lists other relevant reviewed the major components of the monitor system. versions of the Report section 3 identifies the TVA Watts Bar Unit qualification reports.

2 Environmental, Seismic, Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC), and software requirements Submit copies of the for each monitor. In section 4 a brief description reviewed reports for of GA-ESI generic qualification programs for all 04508905-QR, radiation monitoring equipment in each of the four 04508905-1SP, above areas is provided. The qualification basis 04508905-2SP.

for each monitor is provided in a separate supplement to the principle report and is identified Clarification of in section 5. applicability of existing reports is acceptable.

f. GA-ESI report 04038903-7SP, Qualification Basis for 04034101-001 (2-RE-90-271, -272, -

273, & -274) [TVA Note: These are the containment post accident high range radiation monitors.]: GA-ESI report 04038903-7SP is divided into subsections to address the Environmental, Seismic, EMC, and Software qualification basis for the High Range Area Monitors. Within each subsection, the HRAM is compared to a tested or analyzed article to demonstrate similarity and/or evaluate differences, the tests that were performed, and evaluation to demonstrate qualification. In most cases, the qualification basis references other documents. In addition to qualification, a section is provided that lists the life of those replaceable components that have life expectancy less than 40 years.

(2) This is addressed by response to RAI Question 336 in TVA to NRC letter dated November 24, 2010 (Reference 8)

(3) This is addressed by response to RAI Question 337 in TVA to NRC letter dated November 24, 2010 (Reference 8)

(4) The 04508905-3SP Qualification Test Report Supplement, RM-1000 Upgrades is not applicable to WBN Unit 2 (Reference 19).

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Please see Item 1, above, for applicability of the other reports.

(5) TVA provided the proprietary versions of the reports by letter dated March 12, 2010 (Reference 10). By letter dated July 15, 2010 (Reference 23), TVA provided the non-proprietary version of the reports and included a copy of the proprietary report which had been erroneously marked as having not been reviewed.

04508905-QR report has been reviewed by TVA. The review of the remaining reports is ongoing.

(6) See item 5.

319 7.5.2.3 7.5 TVA provided System Verification Test Results 04507007-1TR Responder: Temples Y Closed Closed RAI No. 29 TVA Letter dated (July 1999) for Sequoyah to support test verification. However, the -Response Acceptable ML102980005 10/29/10 document states (page v) that it is not applicable for high range See TVA letter to the NRC dated October 21, 2010, item 26 Response is included in letter 10/26/2010 Enclosure 1 Item monitors with an action noted for fixing a problem with the high (RAI Matrix Item 316) for non-applicability of 04507007-1TR. dated 10/29/10 No. 35 EICB (Singh) range RM-1000 monitors on page vi. TVA to respond to the The recorded anomaly was later resolved through the Due 10/31/10 following clarifications: verification of software version 1.2, reported in RM-1000 v1.2 Software Verification Report 04508006. Response acceptable.

Has the anomaly noted on page vi been resolved for the high TVA to issue letter and range monitors? The high range verification documents are the Sequoyah confirm stated (future)

RM-1000 v1.1 Software Verification Report 04508006 and dates Provide the high range verification document for WBN2. RM-1000 v1.2 Software Verification Report 04508006.

320 Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2340, TENNESSEE VALLEY Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed N/A N/A Duplicate of item 156 AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 FSAR Markups Units 1 and 2 118% vs 121 % and Correction to RAI This item is not required It was entered as a tracking Response SNPB 4.3.2-7, (Reference 17) the 118% value should commitment from the 10/5 letter to issue FSAR Amendment EICB (Garg) be 121%. Depending on the use in the FSAR either 118% or 121% 101 which includes the described change. Amendment 101 is the correct value. As a result of the question, Westinghouse will be issued no later than 10/29.

reviewed all locations where either 118% or 121% are used and the context of use and provided a FSAR markup to reflect the correct value at the specific location. These changes will be incorporated in FSAR Amendment 101 321 For the purposes of measuring reactor coolant flow for Reactor Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed N/A N/A Duplicate of OI# 157 Protection functions, elbow taps are used for both Unit 1 and 2.

The discussion and equation are valid for establishing the nominal This item is not required It was entered as a tracking full power flow which is used to establish the Reactor Protection commitment from the 10/5 letter to issue FSAR Amendment System low flow trip setpoint. However the method used to verify 101 which includes the described change. Amendment 101 reactor coolant flow, as required by the Technical Specifications, will be issued no later than 10/29.

is not the same. Unit 1 uses a simplified methodology based on elbow tap P measurements correlated with precision calorimetric data over several cycles of operation as described in FSAR Reference 17, WCAP-16067, Rev 0, RCS Flow Measurement EICB (Garg)

Using Elbow Tap Methodology at Watts Bar Unit 1. The plan is for Unit 2 to transition to this method after sufficient data is obtained.

Pending this transition, 7.2.2.1.2 will be revised to read as follows:

Nominal full power flow is established at the beginning of each fuel cycle by either elbow tap methodology or, performance of the RCS calorimetric flow measurement. Unit 1 utilizes elbow tap methodology Reference [17]. Unit 2 utilizes the RCS calorimetric flow measurement. The results are used to normalize the RCS flow indicators and provide a reference point for the low flow reactor trip setpoint.

This change will be incorporated in FSAR Amendment 101

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N 322 7.7.1.11 Section 7.7.1.11 will be added to FSAR Amendment 101 to provide Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed EICB (Carte) a discussion of the Distributed Control System This item is not required It was entered as a tracking commitment from the 10/5 letter to issue FSAR Amendment 101 which includes the described change. Amendment 101 will be issued no later than 10/29.

323 WCAP-13869 revision 1 was previously reviewed under WBN Unit Responder: Hilmes/Unit 1 Y Open Open-TVA/Unit 1 TVA Letter dated 1 SER SSER 13 (Reference 8). Unit 2 references revision 2. An Licensing 10/29/10 analysis of the differences and their acceptability will be submitted Attachment 12 contains the WCAP 13869 Revision 1 to Response is included in letter Enclosure 1 Item to the NRC by November 15, 2010 Revision 2 Change Analysis. dated 10/29/10 Due: 12/22/10 No. 36 EICB(Garg)

The staff is confused with the Steve Hilmes took response since both units have action to resolve with reference leg not insulated Rev Unit 1.

2 should apply to Unit 1 also and there should be no difference between Unit 1 and 2 324 Per the NRC reviewer, the BISI calculation is not required to be Y Closed Closed EICB (Marc submitted.

us) 325 The Unit 2 loops in service for Unit 1 that are scheduled to be Responder: TVA Startup Olson Y Closed Closed Closed to open item ?

transferred to the Foxboro Spec 200 hardware will be transferred prior to Unit 2 fuel load EICB(Garg) 326 TVA uses double-sided methodology for as-found and as-left Responder: Webb Y Closed Closed TVA Letter dated Reactor Trip and ESFAS instrument setpoint values. The FSAR 10/29/10 EICB(Garg) will be revised in a future amendment to reflect this methodology Attachment 3 contains the revised FSAR section 7.1.2.1.9 Response is included in letter Due 12/17/10 Enclosure 1 Item that will be included in FSAR Amendment 102 that reflects dated 10/29/10 No. 37 this change. Pending FSAR Amendment 102 submittal 327 Attachment 36 contains Foxboro proprietary drawings 08F802403- Responder: Webber Y Open Open-NRC Review SC-2001 sheets 1 through 6. An affidavit for withholding and non-DORL (Poole) proprietary versions of the drawings will be submitted by January In accordance with correspondence from Foxboro, there is Response Included in letter Due 11/24/10 31, 2011. no proprietary information contained in the 08F802403-SC- dated 11/24/10 2001 drawings. Based on this, no affidavit for withholding is required. Attachment 1 contains versions of the drawings with the proprietary information block removed.

328 7.5.2.3 7.5 Provide the model number for the four containment high range Responder: Temples Y Closed Closed RAI No. 30 TVA Letter dated area monitors, RM-1000 and identify how the software V&V and -Response Acceptable ML102980005 10/29/10 qualification documents apply to them. If there is no specific model The Containment High Range Radiation Monitors are model Response is included in letter 10/26/2010 Enclosure 1 Item EICB (Singh) number then how is it ensured that the correct radiation monitor is RM-1000. The monitors are uniquely identified by serial dated 10/29/10 No. 38 received at the site and subsequently installed? numbers which are assigned when the equipment is assembled. The applicability of V&V reports and quality documentation for the RM-1000 model is in accordance with manufacturers approved 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Quality Program and the requirements of the purchase order.

329 7.6.1 7.6.7 CB Section 7.6.7 of the FSAR (Amendment 100) states that, The Responder: Clark Y Closed Closed RAI No. 1 TVA Letter dated (Si ng DMIMS-DX' audio and visual alarm capability will remain ML102980005 10/29/10

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N functional after an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE). All of the The title of FSAR Section 3.10 is Seismic Design of Response is included in letter 10/26/2010 Enclosure 1 Item DMIMS-DX' components are qualified for structural integrity Category I Instrumentation and Electrical Equipment. Since dated 10/29/10 Due 12/17/10 No. 39 and FSAR during a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and will not the Loose Part Monitoring System is not a Category 1 Amendment 102.

mechanically impact any safety-related equipment. system, it is not included in the scope of 3.10. FSAR Section Pending FSAR 7.6.7, Loose Parts Monitoring System (LPMS) System Amendment 102 TVA to clarify the seismic qualification of the loose parts monitoring Description, identifies basic system seismic design criteria submittal.

system and include the appropriate information in Table 3.10 (or which are consistent with the requirements of TVA Design another suitable section) of the FSAR. Criteria, WB-DC-30-31, Loose Parts Monitoring System. As TVA to confirm that the identified in FSAR Table 7.1-1, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant NRC equipment has been Regulatory Guide Conformance, the system conforms to seismically qualified as Reg. Guide 1.133 as modified by Note 12. Reg. Guide 1.133 required and that TVA identifies the seismic requirements and Note 12 does not reviewed and found the contain any exception to the Regulatory Guide seismic report acceptable.

requirements.

TVA response does not The Westinghouse LPMS seismic report, EQ-QR-33-WBT, list the seismic test Revision 0, Seismic Evaluation of the Digital Metal Impact document and its Monitoring System (DMIMS-DXTM) for Watts Bar Unit 2, will acceptance by TVA.

be added as Reference 7 to FSAR section 7.6 in amendment FSAR should reference 102. the test document as the source document for tracking conformance.

330 7.3 7.3 Related to Item 298 Responder: Hilmes/Faulkner Y Closed Closed EICB RAI No.20 Item 7, TVA letter ML102910017, dated November IE Bulletin 80-06 calls for review of engineered safety features with The original response to IE Bulletin 80-06 for both WBN Unit 10/19/10 24, 2010 the objective of ensuring that no device will change position solely 1 and 2 was provided on TVA letter to NRC dated March 11, because of the reset action. 1982 (ML073530129) (Reference 4). Subsequent design changes have impacted the original response such that In Supplement 3 of NUREG-0847, section 7.3.5, the staff approved some equipment that originally changed state no longer does the design modifications proposed by the applicant that would so and some equipment has been deleted. There are no allow certain devices to remain unchanged upon an ESF reset. additions to the list originally provided in TVA letter to NRC The staff also found acceptable the applicants justification dated March 11, 1982 (ML073530129) (Reference 4). The for some safety-related equipment that does not remain in its following is the current list of equipment that does not remain emergency mode after an ESF reset. in its emergency mode after an ESF reset:

Please list for Unit 1 and Unit 2 the safety-related equipment 1. Unit 1 and 2 Equipment (prefix 1- (Unit 1) or 2- (Unit 2) that does not remain in its emergency mode after an ESF reset. a. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Speed Control EICB (Darbali)

Valve, FCV-1-52

b. Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Level Control Valves as listed below:

i. LCV-3-172 - SG3 - Level Control Valve ii. LCV-3-173 - SG2 - Level Control Valve iii. LCV-3-174 - SG1 - Level Control Valve iv. LCV-3-175 - SG4 - Level Control Valve

v. LIC-3-172 - SG3 - Level Indicating Controller vi. LIC-3-173 - SG2 - Level Indicating Controller vii. LIC-3-174 - SG1 - Level Indicating Controller viii. LIC-3-175 - SG4 - Level Indicating Controller ix. LCV-3-148 - SG3 - Level Valve

x. LCV-3-156 - SG2 - Level Valve

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N xi. LCV-3-164 - SG1 - Level Valve xii. LCV-3-171 - SG4 - Level Valve xiii. LCV-3-148A - SG3 - Level Bypass Control Valve xiv. LCV-3-156A - SG2 - Level Bypass Control Valve xv. LCV-3-164A - SG1 - Level Bypass Control Valve xvi. LCV-3-171A - SG4 - Level Bypass Control Valve xvii. LIC-3-148 - SG3 - Controller xviii. LIC-3-156 - SG2 - Controller xix. LIC-3-164 - SG1 - Controller xx. LIC-3-171 - SG4 - Controller

c. Lower and Upper Compartment Cooler Fans and Control Rod Drive Mechanism Cooler Fan

d. Penetration Room Cooler Fans Elevations 737, 692 and 713

e. Pipe Chase Cooler Fans

2. Common Equipment

a. Shutdown Board Room A Pressurizing Fans

b. Control Building Ventilation Dampers as listed below:

i. 0-FCO-31-9 - Spreading Room Supply Fan Damper ii. 0-FCO-31 Spreading Room Supply Fan Damper iii. 0-FCO-31 Toilet a Locker Room Exhaust Fan Exhaust Damper iv. 0-FCO-31 Toilet a Locker Room Exhaust Fan Exhaust Damper

v. 0-FCO-31-3 - Main Control Room Isolation Damper vi. 0-FCO-31-4 - Main Control Room Isolation Damper vii. 0-FCO-31 Spreading Room Fresh Air Supply Damper viii. 0-FCO-31 Spreading Room Fresh Air Supply Damper

c. Cask Loading Exhaust Dampers as listed

i. 0-FCO-30-122 - Cask Loading Area Exhaust Damper ii. 0-FCO-30-123 -Cask Loading Area Exhaust Damper

d. Auxiliary Building General Supply Exhaust Fans Elevation 737

e. CCW and AFT Pump Space Cooler Fans

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N

f. Spent Fuel Pit Pumps Space Coolers

g. EGTS Room Coolers

h. Turbine Driven AFW and Boric Acid Space Coolers 331 7.6.1 7.6.7 As a follow up of OI 190, Staff has reviewed the proprietary version Responder: WEC/Harless/Clark Y Closed Closed RAI No. 8 TVA Letter dated Follow-up of OI-190.

of the DMIMS-DX system description to verify the conformance ML102980005 10/29/10 claims in the FSAR. Staff has noted the following insufficiencies TVA Partial Response: Response included in letter TVA letter 12/22/10, 10/26/2010 Enclosure 1 Item and discrepancies between the FSAR and the proprietary version dated 12/22/10 Encl 1, Item 27. No. 40 of the system description for loose parts monitoring system 1) The source of the information is the DMIMS-DXTM provided by TVA. Operations and Maintenance Manual, TS3176, Revision Due 12/22/10 0, dated August 2010. Attachment 14 contains the

1) FSAR, Amendment 100, page 7.6-5 states, During baseline revised system description, Westinghouse DIMMS- Pending FSAR testing, the reactor vessel and steam generator are impacted DXTM Loose Part Detection System Description, Amendment 102 three feet from each sensor with a force of 0.5 ft-lb. Loose Revision 1. The Westinghouse DIMMS-DXTM Loose submittal parts detection is accomplished at a frequency of 1 kHz to 20 Part Detection System Description, Revision 1 will be kHz, where background signals from the RCS are acceptable. added as Reference 9 to section 7.6 in FSAR TVA to reference the Spurious alarming from control rod stepping is prevented by a Amendment 102. DMIMS-DXTM module that detects CRDM motion commands and Operations Manual in automatically inhibits alarms during control rod stepping. 2) The source of the information is the DMIMS-DXTM the FSAR as the source seismic qualification report, Westinghouse report EQ- document The online sensitivity of the DMIMS-DX' is such that the QR-33-WBT, Revision 0, Seismic Evaluation of the system will detect a loose part that weighs from 0.25 to 30 Ib Digital Metal Impact Monitoring System (DMIMS-DXTM) TVA to reference the and impacts with a kinetic energy of 0.5 ft-lb on the inside for Watts Bar Unit 2. Attachment 14 contains the source document for surface of the RCS pressure boundary within 3 ft of a sensor. revised system description, Westinghouse DIMMS- item# 4 per the DXTM Loose Part Detection System Description, response.

The source of this information is not cited nor is it described in Revision 1.

the system description. TVA to provide the source of the information and update the system description as needed. 3) The entries for the following items in FSAR Section 7.6.7 will be modified in Amendment 102 as shown in

2) Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.133, rev.1, regulatory position C.1.g Attachment 3 for draft revision to WBN Unit 2 FSAR states that, Operability for Seismic and Environmental Section 7.6.7, Loose Part Monitoring System (LPMS)

Conditions. Components of the loose-part detection system System Description.

within containment should be designed and installed to perform their function following all seismic events that do not Sensors (In Containment) require plant shutdown, i.e., up to and including the Operating Softline Cable (In Containment)

Basis Earthquake (OBE). Recording equipment need not Preamplifier (In Containment) function without maintenance following the specified seismic event provided the audio or visual alarm capability remains Attachment 3 contains the FSAR Amendment 102 functional. The system should also be shown to be adequate Change Markups that reflect these changes.

by analysis, test, or combined analysis and test for the normal operating radiation, vibration, temperature, and humidity 4) The source of the information is Westinghouse Letter environment. WBT-D-2580, Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Response to NRC RAIs on LPMS FSAR, Amendment 100, page 7.6-5 states, The DMIMS- (Reference 5). Attachment 14 contains Westinghouse DX' audio and visual alarm capability will remain functional DIMMS-DXTM Loose Part Detection System after an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE). All of the Description, Revision 1.

DMIMS-DX' components are qualified for structural integrity during a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and will not In responding to Item 4, conflicting information was mechanically impact any safety-related equipment. found between the Westinghouse-prepared FSAR Paragraphs 4.c and 4.d of the system description are not section and various Westinghouse technical consistent with the seismic qualifications described in the documents. To fully respond to this item, a change to FSAR. TVA to provide the source of the information the FSAR is required to change the minimum flat sensor EICB (Singh) contained in the FSAR and update the system description as frequency response from 5 Hz to 10 Hz. Attachment 3 needed. contains the FSAR Amendment 102 Change Markups that reflect the revised frequency response of the

3) The system description clearly describes the In-containment sensor.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N equipment and DIMMS-DX Cabinet equipment. The FSAR should be updated to reflect the equipment locations for Westinghouse document 1TS3182, Revision 0, Watts clarification purposes. Bar Unit 2 DMIMS-DXTM System Validation Data Package, dated July 2010 has been added as reference

4) The information regarding frequency ranges of the sensors is 8 to FSAR Section 7.6 in amendment 102. Per included on page 7.6-6 of Amendment 100 of the FSAR but Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2580, this document will be the system description does not contain this information. revised to reflect the 10Hz minimum frequency and Please provide the source of this information and update the provide the basis for the frequency response values in system description to reflect the appropriate information. the FSAR.

5) Please provide information as to how the in-containment 5) In-containment component qualification for vibration as components are qualified for vibration as addressed in addressed in regulatory position C.1.g of RG 1.133, will regulatory position C.1.g of RG 1.133. be addressed in a future RAI response letter.

TVA Partial Response:

Items 1) through 4) were addressed in the partial response provided in TVA to NRC letter dated October 29, 2010. Item 5 is addressed as follows:

TVA has reviewed the information provided by Westinghouse describing how the Loose Part Monitoring System (LPMS) sensor is qualified for normal operating conditions provided in Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2782, dated December 17, 2010 (Reference 11) as addressed in regulatory position C.1.g of Reg. Guide 1.133 and found it acceptable. Vibration qualification is not applicable to the softline cable. Due to the installation location (junction boxes mounted to the shield or fan room walls) and previous seismic qualification, vibration qualification of the charge converter/preamplifier is not required. This completes the response to this item.

332 7.5.2.1 7.5.1 10/26/2010 Y Closed Closed ML103000105 Item TBD EICB RAI ML103000105 sent to DORL EICB (Marcus)

No. 1 Related to 302 TVA included DCN 52389 in the 10/29/10 letter. Response is acceptable NRC to issue formal RAI to TVA In response to Open Item 302 TVA provided a diskette that This item was corrected prior to transmittal of the response Response is included in TVA included a draft of Attachment 8 to the proposed 10/29/2010 letter. to OI 302 in the 10/29/10 TVA letter. letter dated 10/29/10 TVA to provide formal Attachment 8 included 14 of the 15, 50.59 documents listed in the, response to RAI RG 1.97 50.59 Listing. DCN 52389 was not included on the diskette. Identify the document and date that officially transmitted or will transmit, DCN 52389 to the NRC. If DCN 52389 has not been previously transmitted to NRC please transmit the document to the NRC.

333 7.5.2.1 7.5.1 10/27/2010 Y Closed Closed ML103000105 Item TBD EICB RAI ML103000105 sent to DORL EICB (Marcus)

No. 2 Related to 44 and 303 TVA included the correct information in the 10/29/10 letter. Response is acceptable NRC to use formal RAI to TVA In response to Open Item 303, TVA provided a diskette that This item was corrected prior to transmittal of the response Response is included in TVA included a draft of Attachment 9 to the proposed October 29, 2010 to OI 303 in the 10/29/10 TVA letter. letter dated 10/29/10 TVA to provide formal letter. In Attachment 9, the Unit 2 variable source for RG 1.97 response to RAI variable 37, CCS Sample Tank Level, was listed as Foxboro Spec 200. However, in response to Open Item 44, in Enclosure 1 to TVA letter dated June 18, 2010 (ML101940236), the Unit 2 variable source for RG 1.97 variable 37 was listed as Foxboro I/A.

Determine which is correct and formally issue a correction.

Y

(

334 7 7 FSAR Figure 7A-3 Mechanical Flow and Control Diagram Responder: Stockton Open Open-TVA/Licensing RAI not required. N/A RAI not required because the figure is D

a r

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) rad60D27.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval

Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N Symbols doesnt show the symbols for the first column of valves. not part of any SE section.

Please correct this in a future FSAR amendment. Figure will be corrected in FSAR Amendment 103.

Update:

Please fix symbols for Gate Valve, Globe Valve and Float operated valve.

335 7.6.1 7.6.7 LPMS: Reference to OI-331, sub item 2. Responder: WEC Y Open Open-TVA/WEC Provide analysis, test, or combined analysis and test for normal TVA has reviewed the information provided by Partial Response included in Submit qual report by operating radiation, temperature, and humidity environment per Westinghouse describing how the Loose Part Monitoring letter dated 12/22/10 3/11/11 as stated in EICB (Singh) regulatory position C.1.g of RG 1.133. As an alternate TVA may System (LPMS) sensor is qualified for normal operating TVA letter of 12/22/10, confirm that the required equipment has been qualified for the conditions provided in Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2782, Encl 1, Item 28.

environments stated in RG 1.133, position C.1.g and that TVA has dated December 17, 2010 (Reference 11) as addressed in reviewed the test report and found it acceptable. regulatory position C.1.g of Reg. Guide 1.133 and found it Due 12/22/10 acceptable. The qualification information on the softline cable and charge converter/preamplifier is being assembled and will be submitted by March 11, 2011.

336 7.5.2.3 7.5 Re: RM-1000 Report 04508905-QR Responder: GA Y Closed Closed Please check the page numbering in Appendix F, Closed General Atomics was not able to determine where the Response Included in letter Response acceptable.

Nonconforming Material Reports. Pages 1 and 6 are missing and duplicate page 2 originated. The master document does not dated 11/24/10 Please submit page 2 is included multiple times. Also identify which page number contain any duplicate pages. Due a clerical error during response.

EICB (Singh) is the last page number. document development, the master document starts at page 2 and ends at page 9, for a total of 8 pages. In May of this year, the NRC discovered that the master document was missing page 6. The master document was revised and re-submitted. Attachment 2 contains the missing page 6.

The Nonconforming Material (NCM) reports found on Appendix F are complete.

337 7.5.2.3 7.5 Re: RM-1000 Report 04508905-QR Responder: GA Y Closed Closed Appendix C is titled as Seismic Test Fixture for RM2300, See The test fixture listed on Appendix C is applicable to the RM- Response Included in letter Response acceptable.

Drawing 04619028. Please verify whether or not it applies to RM- 1000, as indicated in the second and third paragraph of dated 11/24/10 Please submit EICB (Singh) 1000? If applicable, then please identify how it is applicable. section 4.3.1, of the 04508905-QR report. The RM-1000s response.

and the I/F converters are mounted on a standard 19 inch NIM-Bin, and this test rack is configured to simulate the field installation of a standard 19 inch rack.

This seismic test fixture was originally built for the seismic testing of the RM2300s which are also mounted on a standard 19 in NIM-Bin.

338 7.5.2.3 7.5 In page 3-15 and appendix B of Qualification Test Report Responder: Civil EQB N Open Open-TVA/Bechtel 04508905-QR, licensee described the selection of seismic required response spectra (RRS) and indicated Figure 3-2 (page Get date from Bob Brown Due: 12/22/10 3-17), Figure 3-3 (page 3-18) are the RRSs used. The RRS curves used for actual testing are lower than the RRS curves that EICB (Singh) are shown on Figures 3-2 and 3-3. The RRS curves used for testing are shown in Figure 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 4-8, 4-11, 4-12, 4-13, and 4-14 (pages 4-25, 4-26, 4-28, 4-29, 4-37, 4-38, 4-40, 4-41).

Please clarify and justify why the RRS curves used in actual tests are lower than the RRS curves determined in Figures 3-2 and 3-3.

In addition please justify that the RRS used for testing envelopes the RRS required for WBN-2 application specific seismic conditions.

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SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N 339 7.5.2.3 7.5 In the Qualification Test Report 04508905-QR, the licensee Responder: Bob Brown N Open Open-TVA/Bechtel provided only eight Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) Test EICB Response Spectra (TRS) as mentioned in the previous open item Due: 12/22/10 (Singh) (OI-338). Please provide all SSE and Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) TRS plots for NRC review.

340 7.5.2.3 7.5 Provide test result curves for all EMI/RFI tests listed in Table 3.2.3 Responder: GA Y Open Open-TVA/Bechtel (page 3-8) of the Qualification Test Report 04508905-QR. In addition, please provide the standards or the guidance documents The following responses are based on e-mail: GA-ESI to Response included in letter Provide the qual reports used as the source for ENV 50140, ENV 55011 Class A, and EN Bechtel, dated December 8, 2010 (Reference 20), dated 12/22/10. by 1/28/11 per TVA 55022 Class B. letter of 12/22/10.

(1) The EMI/RFI tests described in Table 3-2 are based on GA-ESI report 04509050 and are summarized in GA- Due:12/22/10 ESI report 04508905-QR. The independent laboratory report, with curves, is part of GA-ESI report 04509050.

Subsequent to issuing GA-ESI report 04508905-QR additional EMC testing was performed in accordance with TVA specific requirements. The results of the subsequent EMC testing are reported in GA-ESI report 04038800. GA-ESI report 04038800 includes the test curves and the report is used as the basis for EMC qualification of the Upper and Lower Inside Containment Post Accident Radiation Monitors (2-RE-EICB (Singh)90-271 through -274). The results of the testing and the acceptability of the RM-1000 monitors for use at WBN Unit 2 are addressed in GA-ESI report 04038903-7SP. This report will be submitted no later than January 28, 2010.

(2) ENV 50140, EN 55011, and EN 55022 are British Standard Institution (BSI) publications concerning equipment electromagnetic and radio frequency performance. The standard titles are shown below:

a. ENV 50140 - Electromagnetic Compatibility -

Basic Immunity Standard - Radiated Radio-Frequency Electromagnetic Field - Immunity Test

b. EN 55011 - Industrial, scientific and medical equipment - Radio-frequency disturbance characteristics - Limits and methods of measurement

c. EN 55022 - Information technology equipment -

Radio disturbance characteristics - Limits and methods of measurement 341 7.5.2.3 7.5 FSAR Tables 3.10 list seismically qualified equipment. However, A review of WBN Unit 2 FSAR amendment 102 chapters Y Open Open-TVA/Bechtel these tables do not list the containment high range radiation 3.10, 11 and 12 was performed. The reviewer was unable to monitors. Please add them to the appropriate FSAR table(s) or locate seismic qualification information for the radiation Will be closed on justify why they should not be included in the FSAR 3.10 series of monitoring system in those chapters. A review of chapter update of FSAR 3.10 EICB (Singh) tables. 3.11 confirmed that radiation monitoring is included in the series tables.

environmentally qualified systems.

It appears that seismic qualification of the radiation monitoring equipment was unintentionally omitted from FSAR chapter 3.10. FSAR chapter 3.10 will be updated to include the qualified radiation monitoring equipment in a future FSAR amendment.

342 7.5.2.3 7.5 Please confirm that RM-1000 monitors and the associated The RM-1000 containment high range radiation monitors are Y Closed Closed EICB (Sing h) equipment is supplied power from redundant battery backed class powered from 2-RM-90-271 & 2-RM-90-273 - Vital Power 1E power sources. Board 2-III Breaker 45 Train A and 2-RM-90-272 & 2-RM See TVA letter

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N 274 - Vital Power Board 2-IV Breaker 47 Train B. The vital 12/22/10, encl 1, item power boards are battery backed. 31.

343 7.5.2.3 7.5 Seismic RRS in the 04508905-QR report Figures 3-2 and 3-3 (1) The cause of the difference between the RRS and TRS Y Closed Closed show Required Response Spectra (RRS) to be greater than 20 was a test equipment failure at the test facility. When gs. The Test Response Spectra (TRS) in Figures 4-11 and 4-12 the test equipment failed, the facility was unable to use See TVA letter appears to be limited to about 15 g maximum. Please explain this the table capable of 20gs. Rather than delay testing 12/22/10, encl 1, item EICB (Singh) apparent lack of consistency between the RRS and the TRS. Will for six months, the facility proposed and GA-ESI 32.

this document be revised to take care of this inconsistency? agreed to use a smaller table with a lower capability.

The justification was that the resulting TRS would still envelope the majority of US nuclear plants RRS.

(2) To TVAs knowledge GA-ESI does not plan to revise this report. This is a baseline report that is used as a basis for producing individual plant specific reports.

344 7.6.6  ? Unit 1 SE discussed in Section 7.6.5, Valve Power Lockout. The requested information is contained in FSAR Amendment N Open Open-TVA/Bechtel There is no section in FSAR which provides discussion on this 102 as follows:

subject. SE section discusses compliance with PSB-18. Provide a ICSB-18 provides guidance on discussion which can be used by the staff to determine similar 7.6.2.1 Description application of the single failure conclusion as Unit 1 and if the design is similar to Unit 1 then make criterion to manually controlled a statement to that effect. Also provide the list of the valves where 5th paragraph: The motor-operated bypass valves are electrically operated valves..

power lockout during normal reactor operation is utilized for valves located in bypass lines paralleling the normal RHR suction According to this BTP, whose inadvertent operation could affect plant safety. isolation valves FCV 74-1 and FCV 74-2 which are in series electrically operated valves in the flowpath. Valves FCV 74-8 and FCV 74-9 are normally includes MOV, SOV and those closed and remain closed with power locked out unless one valves operated indirectly by an of the two main isolation valves (FCV 74-1 or FCV 74-2) electrical device, e.g.an air Eicg(Garg) cannot be opened and the plant must be cooled down. operatd valves whose air supply is controlled by an electrical And: solenoid valves. FSAR Section 7.6.6 addresses only MOVs. If 7.6.6 Spurious Actuation Protection for Motor Operated TVA has done an analysis to Valves demonstrate compliance with the guidance of this BTP for Unit To the best of TVAs knowledge, the information contained in 1 and this analysis does not the FSAR is complete and accurate as of February, 2, 2011. change for Unit 2 for other valves than TVA shouls make a statement to that effect. If there are changes to the analysis then justify those changes based on this BTP.

345 7.5.2.3 7.5 Provide the normal temperatures and expected periods of high/low RM-1000 in a NIM Bin was Tested at 39°F for 72 Hrs and N Open Open-TVA/Bechtel temperature excursions to assess aging requirements. TVA to Tested at 131°F for 72 Hrs per Section 4.2.6 of 04508905-further clarify if 86ºF for 40 years was used as the qualification QR. This is stated in document 04038903-7SP, Section 2.1.

EICB (Singh) requirement for aging tests. This has been stated in some of the The ambient temperature used for aging was 86°F(30°C).

subsections under section 4.2 of the 04508905-QR report but the The NIM Bin has perforated holes in top and bottom covers rationale for using 86ºF (includes an internal temperature rise of and has an average internal temperate rise of approximately 18ºF) for 40 years has not been justified in the 04508905-QR 18 °F due to natural air convection. So the average internal report or the supplement reports. TVA to provide the rationale for temperature used for aging was 104°F (40°C).

this acceptance criteria for WBN-2.

Response is incomplete. Awaiting further input from GA.

346 7.5.2.3 7.5 TVA has previously stated in response to open item 319 that RM- Document 04507007-1TR is only the RM-1000 System N Open Open-TVA/Bechtel 1000 System Verification Test Results report, 04507007-1TR is not Verification Test Results. Additional test results are EICB (Singh) applicable to WBN-2. However, TVA has not provided a WBN-2 summarized in the following documents: 04508905-QR, The proposed response specific test results report. Please identify and provide the 04508905-1SP, and 04508905-2SP. appears to be appropriate test results reports to complete the review. conflicting with the Response is incomplete. Awaiting further input from GA. proposed response for OI-351 regarding not submitting the

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N 04508905-QR report.

TVA to re-assess proposed response for both OIs.

347 7.5.2.3 7.5 Qualification report 04508905-1SP does not address EMI/RFI Qualification report 04038903-7SP, Qualification Basis for N Open Open-TVA/Bechtel EICB (Singh) qualification for the new RM-1000 modules. TVA to provide the 04034101-001 (2-RE-90-271, -272, -273, & -274), addresses updated qualification or explain the basis for not addressing the the EMI/RFI qualifications for the entire loop including the EMI/RFI qualification. RM-1000 & I/F converter. This report references 04038800, RM-1000 EMC Test Report, TVA, and the results are summarized in 04038903-7SP.

348 7.5.2.3 7.5 Qualification report 04508905-2SP does not address EMI/RFI Qualification report 04038903-7SP, Qualification Basis for N Open Open-TVA/Bechtel EICB (Singh) qualification for the new I/F converters. TVA to provide the 04034101-001 (2-RE-90-271, -272, -273, & -274), addresses updated qualification or explain the basis for not addressing the the EMI/RFI qualifications for the entire loop including the EMI/RFI qualification. RM-1000 & I/F converter. This report references 04038800, RM-1000 EMC Test Report, TVA, and the results are summarized in 04038903-7SP.

349 7.5.2.3 7.5 Radiation testing was not considered in any of the test reports as In response to a question about Common Q PAMS N Open Open-TVA/Bechtel all the equipment has been assumed to be located in nuclear equipment qualification, TVA re-evaluated the Control and power plant areas with mild environments and radiation dosages Aux Instrument Room TID and concluded it to be less than TVA to provide the less than 1 x 103 rads for total integrated dose (TID). However, 1x103 RAD. assessment document the radiation monitors and the I/F converters are located in the or a suumaryt of the main control room which is defined as mild environment. For document with the WBN-2 mild environment is defined as room or building zone reference to the EICB (Singh) where (1) the temperature, pressure, or relative humidity resulting appropriate from the direct effects of a design basis event (DBE) (e.g., document/documents.

temperature rise due to steam release) are no more severe than those which would occur during an abnormal plant operational condition, (2) the temperature will not exceed 130ºF due to indirect effects of a DBE, (3) the event radiation dose is less than or equal to 1 x 104 rads, and (4) the total event plus the 40 year TID (total integrated dose) is less than or equal to 5 x 104 rads (reference WB-DC-40-54). TVA to address lack of radiation qualification for WBN-2.

350 7.5.2.3 7.5 The seismic required response spectra (RRS) is shown in Figures RM-1000 in a NIM Bin was Seismically Tested and the N Open Open-TVA/Bechtel 3-1 of 04508905-1SP and Figure 3-1 of 0458905-2SP report. The actual test response spectra fully envelopes the RRS of actual test response spectra are shown in Figures 4-5 and 4-6 of CEB-SS-5.10 Rev. 3, Figure 3-1 as shown in Figures 3-4 EICB (Singh) 04508905-QR report. The actual test response spectra does not and 3-5 of 04038903-7SP.

seem to fully envelope the RRS. However, this statement is based on visual reading of unidentified numbers. TVA to provide clarification to the values at the inflection point of all lines on the Response is incomplete. Awaiting further input from GA.

RRS and the actual test response spectra. The seismic qualification issue is open till further clarification is received from TVA.

351 7.5.2.3 7.5 The replacement schedule for the components that have a After further review, it was determined that 04508905-QR is N Open Open-TVA/Bechtel qualified life of less than 40 years is noted in Table 6-1 of the a historical document and should not have been submitted supplemental qualification report 04508905-1SP. It is not clear if as part of the WBN Unit 2 licensing documents. Reports 04508905-1SP the components identified for replacement in this report are the and -2SP both refer to EICB (Singh) only components or if the components which are in addition to the The replacement schedules stated in 04508905-1SP and 04508905-QR as the components previously identified in qualification report 04508905- 04508905-2SP should be used. 04508905-2SP states in parent document in QR. Section 6: None of the Current-to-Frequency converter section 4.1. Also see modules qualified by this supplement contain parts that have staff comment on OI-Are there any age sensitive components for the I/F converter used significant age related failure mechanisms. 346.

for WBN-2? (Note: Report 04508905-2SP does not state any age sensitive components that require replacement during the qualified life).

352 7.5.2.3 7.5 Please calrify how many RM-1000 radaition monitors are being The total number of RM-1000 units procured under MR Y Open Open-TVA/Bechtel

(

S i

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Response

SE FSAR NRC No. Issue TVA Response(s) Acceptable Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date RAI Resp. Date Comments Sec. Sec. POC Y/N procured for WBN-2, is the quantity 2 or four. MR 25402-011- 25402-011-MRA-HARA-00002 is four. The MR on line item MRA-HARA-00002, R4 under Item 1.6 indicates that the quantity is 1.6 is stating the purchase of 2 sets of 2 RM-1000s & I/F Will close on receipt of

2. If so, is WBN-2 using dual channel indication on each RM-1000 Converters making a total of 4 for each type of component. formal response.

unit. TVA to clarify.

Each monitor utilizes a single channel display for the 2-RM-90-271 - 274 monitors.