Text

Initial Exam 2009-301 Final Simulator Scenarios
	ML092870802
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	10/14/2009
From:	; Division of Reactor Safety II
To:	;
References
	50-259/09/301, 50-260/09/301, 50-296/09/301
	Download: ML092870802 (273)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Browns Ferry NPP Scenario No.: 3-09 Op-Test No.: HlT 0801

- - r -......... .

SRO: SROU-1 Examiners: j:eratoffi: ATC: RO-1...

I .. .

I L-.... BOP: ....

..._'------._ RO-2 Initial Unit 3 is at 95% power following turbine valve testing. One loop of RHRSW is Conditions: tagged for repair of FCV 23-34, 3A RHR Hx SW OUTLET VLV; which is inoperable. 38 CRD pump is tagged for breaker maintenance.

Turnover: Units 1 and 2 are at 100%. On Unit 3, turbine valve testing has just been completed . Raise power to 100% with Recirc@ 10 MWe/min. Support maintenance on RHRSW valve which is expected to be repaired in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Thunderstorm warnings are in effect for Limestone County for the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

Event Event No. Malf. No. Type* Event Description R-ATC 1 ------ Raise power N-SRO C-SRO RFP 3A failure/trip AOI-3-1 response and power reduction, 2 fw13a C-ATC Restores tripped RFP per 3-01-3 N-80P I-ATC 3 rd25 RPIS failure on Control Rod 14-35 TS-SRO C-80P 3C Condenser waterbox develops a tube leak requiring isolation 4 mc01e 4 C-SRO of the waterbox TS-SRO 5 hp01 Inadvertent HPCI Initiation C-80P th233 Fuel Failure 6 th35a 8 M-ALL MSL leak with failure to auto-isolate Multiple Stuck Open SRV, HPCI/RCIC/CRD Failure

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor ANTICIPATED EAL: 1.1-5 SITE AREA

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Browns Ferry NPP Scenario No.: 3-09 (2) Op-Test No.: HLT 0801 I -

SRO: SROI-1 I Examiners:

i I

r Operators: ATe:

- --RO-3 I ~._~_ _..L...:B= -O

=-::...

P _=-: _ _ __ ~ R9_-4____ _ _---'

Facility : Browns Ferry NPP Scenario No.: 3-09 (3) Op-Test No.: HLT 0801

~------.--

SRO: , SROI-4 Exam iners:

L_______ . ~_ _ Operators: ATe:

BOP:

RO-5 RO-6 ANTICIPATED EAL: 1.1-5 SITE AREA

Scenario Narrative

Unit three is at 95% power following turbine valve testing. One loop of RHRSW is tagged for repair of FCV 23-34.

The crew will raise power with Recirc.

3A RFP will receive an inadvertent trip. The crew will reduce power per AOI-3-1 to within the capacity of the running RFPs << 5050 rpm) and return the pump to service per 3-01-3.

A control rod reed switch will fail and the crew will reposition the rod to restore tech spec compliance.

The 3C NS Condenser waterbox develops a tube leak and the Crew will respond per 3-AOI-3-1 and 3-01-27.

A HPCI inadvertent initiation is received and the crew will respond per 3-AOI-3-1.

Foreign material and conductivity in the vessel causes fuel failure. A subsequent Main Steam Line Break and Group 1 isolation signal occurs. The MSIVs fail to auto-close and must be manually closed.

When SRVs are cycled to maintain reactor pressure, PCV 1-179 will stick open resulting in decreasing RPV inventory and pressure. When an attempt to use HPCI is made a power

failure occurs, resulting in HPCI system failure. When RCIC is operated, it will trip locally and area radiation levels will preclude immediate restoration. The 3A CRD pump trips.

SLC should be aligned to the test tank.

The scenario is terminated when the RPV level is depressurized due to inability to maintain level above - 180".

ANTICIPATED EAL: 1.1-5 SITE AREA

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 1 of 66

SIMULATOR EVALUATION GUIDE TITLE: RAISE POWER WITH RECIRC, RFP FAILURE, RPIS FAILURE FOR A ROD, CONDENSER TUBE LEAK, INADVERTANT HPCI START, FUEL FAILURE, MAIN STEAM LEAK, MSRV FAILS OPEN, HPCI INVERTER FAILURE, RCIC TRIP, CRD PUMP FAILURE, CONTINGENCY C1, EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZE BEFORE LEVEL REACHES -180" REVISION: 0 DATE: Jan. 16,2009 PROGRAM: BFN Operator Training - Hot License Rep required (95% -100% w/Recirc flow @ 10MWe/min) - Provide marked up copy of 3-GOI-100-12 signed thru step 5.0[6.2] and with steps 5.0[7] thru 5.0[19] marked N/A

An RPHP may be required for re-starting tripped RFP (attached).

PREPARED: \ __________

(Operations Instructor) Date REVIEWED: \ ______

(LOR Lead Instructor or Designee) Date REVIEWED: \ _ _ __

(Operations Training Manager or Designee) Date CONCURRED: \ ______

(Operations Superintendent or Designee Required for Exam Scenarios) Date VALIDATED: \ _ _ ___

(Operations SRO) (Required for Exam Scenarios) Date LOGGED-IN: \ _ _ _ __

(Librarian) Date TASK LIST

_\-------

UPDATED Date

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 2 of 66

Revision Number Description of Changes Nuclear Training Revision/Usage Log Date Pages Affected Revised 0 Initial 01/16/09 All csf 1 Added NRC revisions 6/23/09 ALL BKC

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 3 of 66 I. Program: BFN Operator Training II. Course: Examination Guide III.

Title:

RAISE POWER WITH RECIRC, RFP FAILURE, RPIS FAILURE FOR A ROD, CONDENSER TUBE LEAK, INADVERTANT HPCI START, FUEL FAILURE, MAIN STEAM LEAK, MSRV FAILS OPEN, HPCIINVERTER FAILURE, RCIC TRIP, CRD PUMP FAILURE, CONTINGENCY C1, EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZE BEFORE LEVEL REACHES -180" IV. Length of Scenario - 1 to 1 % hours V. Training Objectives:

A. Terminal Objective:

1. Perform routine shift turnover, plant assessment and routine shift operation in accordance with BFN procedures.

2. Given uncertain or degrading conditions, the operating crew will use team skills to conduct proper diagnostics and make conservative operational decisions to remove equipment / unit from operation. (SOER 94-1 and SOER 96-01)

3. Given abnormal conditions, the operating crew will place the unit in a stabilized condition per normal, annunciator, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 4 of 66

B. Enabling Objectives:

1. The operating crew will raise power with recirc lAW GOI-100-12.

2. The operating crew will respond to a failure of RFP 3A per 3-AOI 1.

3. The operating crew will respond to a control rod reed switch failure and move the rod to a position with an operable detector per technical specifications.

4. The operating crew will respond to a Condenser tube leak per 3-AOI-3-1 and 3-01-27.

5. The operating crew will respond to an Inadvertent HPIC initiation.

6. The operating crew will recognize and respond to fuel failure in accordance with ARPs.

7. The operating crew will recognize and respond to a Main Steam line break and failure of MSIVs to auto isolate per EOI-3.

8. The operating crew will recognize and respond to a stuck open SRV in accordance with AOI-1-1 and EOI-2.

9. The operating crew will respond to RPV low water level due to HPCI, RCIC and CRD pump failure in accordance with EOI-1, RC/L C1, and C2.

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 5 of 66 VI.

References:

The procedures used in the simulator are controlled copies and are used in development and performance of simulator scenarios. Scenarios are validated prior to use, and any procedure differences will be corrected using the procedure revision level present in the simulator. Any procedure differences noted during presentation will be corrected in the same manner. As such, it is expected that the references listed in this section need only contain the reference material which is not available in the simulator.

VII. Training Materials: (If needed, otherwise disregard)

A. Calculator B. Control Rod Insertion Sheets C. Stopwatch D. Hold Order / Caution Order tags E. Annunciator window covers F. Steam tables

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 6 of 66 VIII. Console Operator Instructions A. Scenario File Summary

1. File: bat hlts-3-09 MF/RF/OR# Description

1) trg e1 MODESW Set trigger

2) trg e3 1-179 Set trigger

3) trg e4 RCIC Set trigger

4) imf rd01 a (e1 0) Trip CRD pum~ 3A

5) imffw13c (e1 OJ Trip_ RFW pump 3C

6) imffw13b (e1 0) Trip RFW pump 38

7) mmfth2310 (e1 0) 1:00 Fuel failure

8) imf ad01m 100 (e3 0) SRV 1-179 fail open

9) imf rc03 (e4 0) RCIC trip on low suction

10) imfsw03a Tag RHRSW A1 pump

11) imf sw03b Tag RHRSW A2 pump

12) ior zlohs231 a[ 1] off RHRSW A 1 green light off

13) ior ypobkrrhrswpa1 fail ccoil RHRSW A1 bkr 14} ior zlohs235a[11 off RHRSW A2 green light off

15) ior ypobkrrhrswpa2 fail ccoil RHRSW A2 bkr

16) 17) 18) 19) 20) ior zlozi2331 off ior ypovfcv2334 fail _power ior zaopi234 0 ior zdihs7117a null imf rp15a RHRSW 23-31 red light off RHRSW FCV-23-34 breaker RHRSW A pressure = 0 psig Null RCIC torus suction valve HS MSIV ch A group 1 isolation fail

21) imf rp15b MSIV ch 8 group 1 isolation fail

22) imf rd01 b Tag 38 CRD pump

23) ior zlohs852a[1] off 38 CRD pump green light off 241 ior an:xa553a27 alarm off Disable Main Steam line RAD HI HI ann

25) ior zaori9020a .02 Override RI

1. File: bat fuelfailhpci MF/RF/OR# Description

1) I imf hp07 (none 3:00) HPCI 120V Power Failure

2) I Imf th23 3 10:00 Fuel Failure

HL TS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 7 of 66 IX. Console Operators Instructions HLTS 3-09 ELAP TIME DESCRIPTIONIACTION Simulator Setup Reset to IC 242 -95% power manual

""' - nv.

=

rst 242 PW david Simulator Setup I Main batch file - see summary bat hlts-3-09 Simulator Setup Place H.O. card on 38 CRD pump, manual A 1 & A2 RHRSW pumps and FCV-23-34

,( '~' h ~ " ,- ~ ~- .

imffw13a l trips 3A RFW pump 2 minutes after power raised to i 100% or when directed by lead AND after it trips

" .. " ..... ,., ~ - .

- dmffw13a evaluator. ... I Removes trip I

ROLE PLAY: If sent to investigate 3A RFW pump trip, report Radcon performing a survey in the 3A RFW pump room accidentally tripped the pump When RFP is recovered or when , imf rd25 directed by lead evaluator. .... Loss of RPIS on rod 14-35 ROLE PLAY: If dispatched as 1M's to check individual circuit cards in panel 9-27, report card is fine, must be a reed switch failure ROLE PLAY: If contacted as Reactor Engineer, recommend notch insert control rod 14-35 one notch and see if rod indicates position 46, if so, leave at position 46. (Provide RCP and shove sheet) r ___

5 minutes after the rod is '"~ ;:'''''':'A_'''_- <~,,!:'' _''_<

imf mc01 e 4 5:00

,i repositioned or when directed by the lead evaluator .. ..

I I Condenser tube leak 3C NS ROLE PLAY: 4 minutes after requested, Chemistry reports Conductivity of "C" Hotwell is highest

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 8 of 66 If directed to close FCV-27-70 to I "** sev mcvfcv2770 0.2 20% I

! Throttle 3C NS outlet

, 1 If directed to close FCV-27-78 to 20%

r- -.... _ .. ,. - - ,.-

I

--I sev mcvfcv2778 0.2 Throttle 3C SS outlet ROLE PLAY: Report 3-FCV-27-46 (38) is/are throttled ROLE PLAY: If notified as Ops Management of impending Unit shutdown,

respond, additional personnel will be called in 3 minutes after waterbox isolated or r"

,,-_.......... .. . ,.,...

_, imf hp01 when directed by the lead evaluator, ......

I, I HPCI inadvertent initiation y ......,> * * ......'..

After the Tech Spec call is made on bat fuelfailhpci

<F"", .,.."

HPCI inoperable ... I fuel failure with HPCI 120 VAC t 1 failure AND r'" imf th35a (none 6:00) 8 6:00 I

i ---~l Steam line A steam leak in steam i tunnel I

ROLE PLAY: When asked to check on HPCI, the fuse was replaced and blew again immediately. It smells like there is a burned transformer in the inverter. A FINN team member is here and thinks they can replace the inverter in 30 -45 minutes if there is one in the warehouse (Updates on status may be provided as requested with progress toward success indicated)

After scram ROLE PLAY: If sent to investigate trip of 3A CRD pump, report breaker appears to be damaged and Elec Maint has been contacted to repair ROLE PLAY: If sent to investigate trip of 38 and 3C RFW pumps, report nothing unusual noted in either pump room

..~

When requested to open breaker mrf ad01 m out

, Opens breaker for PCV 1-179 for PCV 1-179, wait 3 minutes ... .. ,

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 9 of 66

' ' ' ," _. .. *** **** ¥ When requested to close breaker mrf ad01m in for PCV 1-179 ... Closes breaker for PCV 1-179

..~ .-- - . - .: ,.. ~ .

mrf og09 shutdown If requested to shutdown HWC ........ Removes HWC from service ROLE PLAY: If asked to check RWCU temp ATU's in Aux Inst rm, report 68-835 A-D reading 90°F to 92 of ROLE PLAY: As the RB AUO, when directed to investigate RCIC, wait 1 minute then report back that your alarming dosimeter went off and you saw a CAM in alarm when you entered the building. I am currently trying to get Radcon to put me on an RWP to get to the RCIC room NOTE: monitor FW flow. If ... - .v,,.,,,~ _ .... .WN. ' " .<

imffw18100 condensate injection is observed prior to ED ... i

~~= _v , ~ -

I Rupture the RFW header At about 450 psig prior to ED. dmf ad01m Leave open if ED is initiated earlier f Closes PCV 1-179 If requested to perform App 78, wait I1 batapp07b 25 minutes ; Align SLC to test tank Terminate the scenario when the following conditions are satisfied or upon request of instructor:

1) MSIV's closed

2) Emergency Depressurization completed

3) RPV water level restored to +2 to +51 (Lead evaluator may desire to terminate when satisfactory progress to achieve this standard is observed)

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 10 of 66 Scenario Summary:

x.

Unit three is at 95% power following turbine valve testing. One loop of RHRSW is tagged for repair of FCV 23-34.

The crew will raise power with Recirc.

3A RFP will receive an inadvertent trip. The crew will reduce power per AOI-3-1 to within the capacity of the running RFPs << 5050 rpm) and return the pump to service per 3-01-3.

A control rod reed switch will fail and the crew will reposition the rod to restore tech spec compliance.

The 3C NS Condenser waterbox develops a tube leak and the Crew will respond per 3-AOI-3-1 and 3-01-27.

A HPCI inadvertent initiation is received and the crew will respond per 3-AOI-3-1.

Foreign material and conductivity in the vessel causes fuel failure. A subsequent Main Steam Line Break and Group 1 isolation signal occurs. The MSIVs fail to auto-close and must be manually closed.

When SRVs are cycled to maintain reactor pressure, PCV 1-179 will stick open resulting in decreasing RPV inventory and pressure. When an attempt to use HPCI is made a power failure occurs, resulting in HPCI system failure. When RCIC is operated, it will trip locally and area radiation levels will preclude immediate restoration. The 3A CRD pump trips. SLC should be aligned to the test tank.

The scenario is terminated when the RPV level is depressurized due to inability to maintain level above - 180".

HL TS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 11 of 66 XI. Floor Instructor Instructions A. Assign crew positions (assign positions based on evaluation requirements for personnel.

1. SRO: Unit Supervisor

2. ATC: Board Unit Operator

3. BOP: Desk Unit Operator B. Review the shift briefing information with the operating crew. Provide US with a copy of the shift turnover sheet for the scenario.

C. Direct the shift crew to review the control boards and take note of present conditions, alarms, etc.

D. Ensure recorders are inking are recording and ICS is active and updating. Note any deficiencies during shift briefing.

E. Terminate the scenario when the following conditions are satisfied or upon request of Lead Examiner.

1. MSIV's closed

2. Emergency Depressurization completed

3. RPV level being maintained + 2 to + 51 "or recovering

HL TS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 12 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event 1: Raise Power With Recirc Position Expected Actions Time/Comments SRO Notify ODS of power increase Direct return of U3 to Full Power using Recirc Flow per 3-GOI-100-12 step 5[20] and 3-01-68 ATC Raises Power w/Recirc using 3-GOI-100-12 and 3-01-68, section 6.2

[1] IF NOT in single loop operation, THEN ADJUST Recirc Pump speeds 3A using, RAISE SLOW (MEDIUM), 3-HS-96-15A(15B)/LOWER SLOW(MEDIUM)(FAST) 3-HS-96-17A(17B)(17C),

push-buttons, to achieve balanced jet pump flows.

AND/OR ADJUST Recirc Pump speed 3B using, RAISE SLOW (MEDIUM), 3-HS-96-16A(16B)/LOWER SLOW(MEDIUM)(FAST) 3-HS-96-18A(18B)(18C),

push-buttons, to achieve balanced jet pump flows

[2] WHEN desired to control Recirc Pumps 3A and/or 3B speed with the RECIRC MASTER CONTROL, THEN ADJUST Recirc Pump speed 3A & 3B using the following push buttons as required:

RAISE SLOW, 3-HS-96-31 RAISE MEDIUM, 3-HS-96-32 LOWER SLOW, 3-HS-96-33 LOWER MEDIUM, 3-HS-96-34 LOWER FAST, 3-HS-96-35 BOP Provides peer check for Recirc adjustment Continue to monitor BOP (transfer volts, condensate flow, etc)

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 13 of 66

XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #2: RFP 3A Failure Position Expected Actions Time/Comments ATC Announces 3-9-6C- Window 1, "RFPT A Abnormal" alarm and trip of RFPT 'A'.

Announces 3-9-6C Window 23, "RFPT TRIP CIRCUIT ABNORMAL."

Announces 3-9-6C Window 29, "RFPT TRIPPED."

Announces 3-9-6C Window 32, "RFP DISCH FLOW LOW."

SRO Directs Entry into 3-AOI-3-1 Directs Reactor Power lowered as needed to maintain operating RFP's speed < 5050 rpm per 3-01-68 ATC Reduces reactor power as necessary to maintain Rx level or verifies Recirc run backs Reduces reactor power as necessary to maintain RFP speed < 5050 rpm as directed by SRO Splits Recirc Pump speeds by 60 rpm if maintained between 1200 & 1300 rpm per 01-68 BOP Refers to ARP, 3-AOI-3-1 and/or 3-01-3 and takes required actions SRO Dispatches AUO to RFP to determine cause of trip ATC Verifies unit stable, Power, Level, Pressure

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 14 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #2: RFP 3A Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments SRO Directs RFP returned to service after report of spurious trip per 3-AOI-3-1, section 4.2 or 3-01-3, section 8.1 / 5.7 BOP Returns RFP to service per 3-AOI-3-1 Subsequent actions iPreferred) OR 3-01-3, section 8.1 /5.7 3-AOI-3-1 4.2 (preferred method) NO RPHP if this section used

[11] IF RFPT has tripped and it is needed to maintain level, THEN PERFORM the following:

[11.1] OBTAIN Unit Supervisor permission to restart RFPT.

[11.2] RESET trip by using pushbutton.

[11.3] DEPRESS RFPT Speed Control Raise/Lower switch to MANUAL GOVERNOR position.

[11.4] PLACE RFPT Start/Local enable switch to START.

[11.5] VERIFY RFPT accelerates to approximately 600 rpm.

[11.6] IF Fast Recovery of RFPT is desired, THEN PERFORM the following:

[11.6.1] OBTAIN Unit Supervisor's permission to perform fast recovery of RFPT.

[11.6.2] VERIFY Reactor Water Level Control PDS in AUTO and SELECT Column 2.

[11.6.3] VERIFY Reactor Water Level Control PDS level setpoint set at desired level.

[11.6.4] PULL individual RFPT Speed Control Raise/Lower switch to FEEDWATER CONTROL position AND VERIFY amber light at switch is extinguished.

[11.6.5] PLACE individual RFPT Speed Control PDS in AUTO.

[11.7] IF Slow Recovery of RFPT in MANUAL GOVERNOR is desired, THEN RAISE RFPT speed using RFPT Speed Control Raise/Lower switch until desired flow is

obtained.

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 15 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #2: RFP 3A Failure (continued)

BOP [11.8] IF Slow Recovery of RFPT using individual RFPT Speed Control PDS is desired, THEN PERFORM the following:

[11.8.1] VERIFY Column 3 selected and MANUAL selected on individual RFPT speed Control PDS.

[11.8.2] PULL individual RFPT Speed Control Raise/Lower switch to FEEDWATER CONTROL position.

[11 .8.3] RAISE RFPT speed using Ramp Up/Ramp Down push buttons to obtain desired flow.

[14] IF unit remains on-line, THEN RETURN Reactor water level to normal operating level of 33" (normal range).

8.1 RFPT Trip Recovery (ALTERNATE OPTION)

[1] VERIFY complete actions of Alann Response RFPT TRIPPED, 3-XA-55-6C Window 29

. [2] CHECK CLOSED RFP 3A(3B)(3C) DISCH TESTABLE CHECK VLV, 3-FCV-3-94(93)(92), by one of the following:

Observe RFP discharge flow indicator

Locally listening to check valve slam i

A. IF testable check valve did NOT close, THEN CLOSE tripped RFP discharge and suction valves

[3] IF desired to place alternate RFP/RFPT in service AND another RFPT is available, THEN I PERFORM applicable action: (Otherwise N/A)

IF no RFP/RFPT in service, THEN REFER II I

TO Section 5.5 i

IF any RFP/RFPT in service, THEN REFER TO Section 5.7 A. WHEN either Section 5.5 or 5.7 is complete, THEN GO TO Step 8.1[1]

I ---.. ** -y

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 16 of 66 XII . Simulator Event Guide:

Event #2: RFP 3A Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments BOP [4] IF cause of RFPT trip is already corrected AND I tripped RFPT will be returned to service, THEN I PERFORM applicable action: (Otherwise N/A) I

IF no RFP/RFPT in service. THEN GO TO I Section 5.5 I I

IF any RFP/RFPT in service. THEN GO TO i Section 5.7 3-01-3, section 5.7 5.7 Placing the Second and Third RFP/RFPT In Service I (1) BEFORE placing a RFPT in service:

[1.1] NOTIFY Radiation Protection that an RPHP is in effect for the impending action to I place RFPT 3A(3BX3C) in service. RECORD time Radiation Protection notified in NOMS Narrative Log (BFN PER 126211]

[1.2] VERIFY appropriate data and signatures I recorded on Appendix A per Appendix A I - instructions (Tech Spec 5.?) (BFN PER 126.2..!.!L_ . _

Evaluator Note: Provide signed RPHP to SRO

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 17 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #2: RFP 3A Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments BOP [2}IF RFP/RFPT is NOT warmed, reset and rolling, Step 2 is N/A

, THEN PERFORM the following: (Otherwise NlA)

[2.1] DEPRESS RFPT 3A(38)(3C) TRIP RESET, 3-HS-124A{150A){175A). I

[2.2] DEPRESS RFPT Speed Control Raise/Lower switch to MANUAL GOVERNOR position.

[2.3] PLACE RFPT Start/Local enable switch to START.

[2.4} VERIFY RFPT accelerates to approximately I 600 rpm.

[3} VERIFY RFP 3A(38)(3C) MIN FLOW VALVE, 3-HS-3-20(13)(6), in OPEN position I

!

CHECK OPEN MIN FLOW VALVE, 3-FCV- I r 3-20(13)(6)

I [4] SLOWLY RAISE speed of RFPT using RFPT

! 3A(38 )(3C) SPEED CONT RAISE/LOWER, 3-HS-i46-SA(9A){10A), to establish flow and maintain level in vessel I [5] WHEN RFPT discharge pressure is within 250

. psig of reactor pressure, THEN VERIFY OPEN I RFP 3A(38)(3C) DISCHARGE VALVE, I 3-FCV-3-19(12){5)

I [6] SLOWLY RAISE RFPT speed using RFPT i 3A(3B)(3C) SPEED CONT RAISE/LOWER switch, 3-HS-46-8A(9A){10A), to slowly raise RFP discharge pressure and flow on the following indications (Panel 3-9-6):

RFP Discharge Pressure - RFP 3A(38)(3C),

3-PI-3-16A(9A)(2A)

RFP Discharge Flow - RFP 3A(38)(3C), 3-FI-3-20(13)(6)

. -- ~

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 18 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #2: RFP 3A Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments 1 - - - - - - + - - - - - - - -.. . . . . . .- --.- -- - -- - I - - - - -- - - - - - - j BOP I' [7] WHEN sufficient flow is established to maintain RFP 3A(38)(3C) MIN FLOW VALVE, J.FCV 20(13){6). in CLOSED position (approximately 2 x 1Oslbm/hr). THEN PLACE RFP 3A(38}(3C) MIN

FLOW VALVE, J.HS-J.20(13X6), in AUTO

[8] OBSERVE lowering in speed and discharge flows of other o~ratin~ RFPs

[9] IF transferring RFPT from MANUAL GOVERNOR to individual RFPT Speed Control PDS, THEN PERFORM the following: (Otherwise I II N/~b.1]

PULL RFPT 3A(3B)(3C) SPEED CONT RAISE/LOWER switch, 3-HS-46-8A(9A)(10A),

I I

to FEEDWATER CONTROL position I

[9.2] VERIFY amber light at switch extinguished I above RFPT 3A(3B){3C) SPEED CONT .,

RAISE/LOWER switch, 3-HS-46-8A(9A)(10A) .

[9.3] PERFORM the following on RFPT .

3A(3B){3C) SPEED CONTROL(PDS), 3-SIC-46-8(9)(10) (Panel J.9-5):

[9.3.1] SELECT Column 3

[9.3.2] VERIFY PDS in MANUAL

[10] IF transferring control of RFPT from individual RFPT Speed Control PDS to "AUTO" control using REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL PDS, J.

UC-46-5, THEN PERFORM the following:

(Otherwise NIA)

[10.1] VERIFY REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL (PDS). 3-UC-46-5 is functioning properly and ready to control second or third RFP

[1 0.2] SLOWLY RAISE RFP discharge flow and pressure by raising RFP speed

[10.3) WHEN RFP speed is approximately equal to operating RFP(s) speed, THEN PERFORM the following on RFPT 3A(3B){3C) SPEED CONTROL (PDS). J.SIC-46-8(9)(10):

[10.3.1] PLACE PDS in AUTO

[10.3.2] VERIFY Column 3 selected

' - - - - - - - - ' -l_. __ __ __ ___

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 19 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #2: RFP 3A Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments BOP

[11] WHEN RFP in automatic mode on REACTOR

. WATER LEVEL CONTROL, (PDS) 3-LlC-46-5, I THEN CLOSE the following valves:

,

RFPT 3A(3B)(3C) LP STOP VLV ABOVE I SEAT DR, 3-FCV-6-120(125)(130)

I

RFPT 3A(38)(3C) LP STOP VLV BELOW SEAT DR, 3-FCV-6-121(126)(131)

RFPT 3A(3B)(3C) HP STOP VLV ABOVE i

SEAT DR, 3-FCV-6-122(127)(132) i

RFPT 3A(3B)(3C) HP STOP VLV BELOW SEAT DR, 3-FCV-6-123(128)(133)

RFPT 3A(3B)(3C) FIRST STAGE DRAIN VLV, 3-FCV-6-124(129)(134)

RFPT A(B)(C) HP STEAM SHUTOFF ABOVE SEAT DRAIN, 3-FCV-006-0153(0155)(0157) (local control)

RFPT A(B)(C) LP STEAM SHUTOFF ABOVE SEAT DRAIN, 3-FCV-006-0154(0156)(0158) (local control)

[12] VERIFY CLOSED the following valves on first RFP started in Section 5.5:

RFPT 3A(3B)(3C) LP STOP VLV ABOVE SEAT DR, 3-FCV-6-120(125)(130)

RFPT 3A(3B)(3C) LP STOP VLV BELOW SEAT DR, 3-FCV-6-121(126)(131)

RFPT A(B)(C) LP STEAM SHUTOFF ABOVE SEAT DR, 3-FCV-006-0154(0156)(0158) (local control) I I - -- - - -- - - ----- I

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 20 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #2: RFP 3A Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments BOP 113] VERIFY both RFPT Mafn Oil Pumps running

[14] IF desired to stop Turning Gear for in service RFPT, THEN PLACE appropriate handswitch in I i STOP and RETURN to AUTO:

i I

I

RFPT 3A TURNING GEAR MOTOR,3-HS-3-101A I

RFPT 38 TURNING GEAR MOTOR, 3-HS-3-127A II

RFPT 3C TURNING GEAR MOTOR, 3-HS- I I 3-152A I [15] REFER TO Section 6.0.

CONTROL and MONITOR RFW system f I

,-. o~eration ___

Notify SRO that 3A RFP is returned to service

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 21 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event # 3: Rod Position Failure Positio Expected Actions Time/Comment n s Crew Announces alqrm 9-5A window 28, "CONTROL ROD DRIFT" ATC B. DETERMINE which rod is drifting from Full Core Display Identifies rod 14-35 has no position indication on full core and 4-rod display .. -

I B. IF rod drifting in, THEN REFER TO 3-AOI-85-5

,-~.JfJod drif!!ng out, THEN REFER TO 3-AOI-85-6 D. REFER TO Tech Spec Section 3.1.3 SRO Determines rod is not drifting but RPIS indication has failed Directs entry into 3-AOI-85-4, "Loss of RPIS" Enters LCO 3.1 .3 and notes that insertion of the rod to an operable ~osition indication (46) is allowed SR 3.1.3. 1 The position of each control rod must be determined to ensure adequate information on control rod position is available to the operator for determining control rod OPERABILITY and controlling rod patterns. Control rod position may be determined by the use of OPERABLE position indicators, by moving control rods to a position with an OPERABLE indicator, or by the use of other appropriate methods. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Frequency of this SR is based on operating experience related to expected changes in control rod position and the availability of control rod position indications in the control room .

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 22 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event # 3: Rod Position Failure (continued)

T.S.3.1.3 ._--.

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Condition A is NI A control rod. !

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One withdrawn control rod stuck.

NOTE I Rod worth minimizer (RWM) may be bypassed as allowed by LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation," if required, to allow continued operation. I I

I A.1 Verify stuck control rod separation criteria are met.

Immediately AND

~2 Disarm the associated control rod drive (CRD).

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months A.3 Perform SR 3.1.3.2 and SR 3.1.3.3 for each withdrawn OPERABLE control rod.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months from discovery of Condition A concurrent with THERMAL POWER greater than the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RWM AND A.4._Perform SR 3.1.1.1. 72

-_..._--------_ .._ hours

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 23 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event # 3: Rod Position Failure (continued)

, - - - - -..-.. -. .. . ...... -- . . ...~-- r------------,

B. Two or more withdrawn control rods stuck. Condition B is N/A B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months C. One or more control rods inoperable for reasons Condition C is Applicable other than Condition A or B. until the rod is moved to C.1 -------------NOTE------------ a position with an RWM may be bypassed as allowed by LCO operable PIS (position 46) 3.3.2.1, if required , to allow insertion of inoperable control rod and continued operation.

Fully insert inoperable control rod.

3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months AND C.2 Disarm the associated CRD.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months f - - - - - --+..__ ~-.---...-~__=_= ....-.....---. -----------.-__+__:-____::_~__=__:__-:-:-:------1 O. - - - N O T E

Condition D is N/A Not applicable when THERMAL POWER

> 10% RTP.

Two or more inoperable control rods not in compliance with banked position withdrawal

! sequence (BPWS) and not separated by two or more OPERABLE control rods.

0.1 Restore compliance with BPWS.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months l OR I 0.2 Restore control rod to OPERABLE status.

14 hours1.62037e-4 days 0.00389 hours 2.314815e-5 weeks 5.327e-6 months E. Required Action and associated Completion Condition E is N/A Time of Condition A, C, or D not met.

OR Nine or more control rods inoperable.

E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ATC Reports to SRO that Power is STABLE 3-AOI-85-4 4.1 Immediate Actions

[1] STOP all control rod movement 4.2 Subsequent Actions

[1] CHECK with Operations Superintendent and Reactor Engineer for actions to be taken in a timely manner

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 24 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #3: Rod Position Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments ATC [2] CHECK with Technical Support to help determine the extent of loss of RPIS

[3] TF control rodwas in motion when RPIS-failed and position of that control rod can NOT be determined, THEN CONSIDER that Control Rod Inoperable. REFER TO Tech. Spec. 3.1.3 N1A I [4] IF control rod movement is required with a total loss of RPIS, THEN MANUALLY SCRAM reactor N/A ~ ** _ w _ _ *** _ . _ __ ~_ . _._

[5] REFER TO EPIP-1 SRO SRO verifies the EPIP's do not apply ATC [6] VERIFY ON Breaker 612, PANEL 3-9-27 ROD POSITION INFO SYS FEED FROM UNIT PREFERRED 120VAC, at Panel 3-9-9 Cabinet 6 Evaluator Note: When Operator goes around back to check bkr 612, report that breaker is closed ATC . [7] IF half or all control rod position indications on Full Core Display are off, THEN PERFORM the following : N/A

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 25 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #3: Rod Position Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments ATC [8] IF an individual control rod position indication is off on Full Core Display or 4-Rod Display, THEN CHECK individual circuit cards in Panel 3-9-27 for proper ~eratioQ

[9] IF an individual reed "switch position inCiicator is out-of-service on Full Core Display or 4-Rod Display, THEN RECORD control rod coordinates

~"~nd PQsition I!l..l)_nit ~~tors Log _~~ __

[10] [NER/C] IF unable to restore position indication for an individual control rod or rods, THEN CHECK with Reactor Engineer and DETERMINE additional corrective action 4.4 Alternate Methods of Determining Control Rod Position _of ~_ Single Control Rod I [1] IF the "TENS" Digit for an individual reed switch-"

position indicator is out-of-service on Full Core Display and 4-Rod Display for the Control Rod ,

THEN VERIFY the following:

The Associated Control Rod was NOT being I moved when the loss of reed switch Position for the "TENS" Digit occurred I

No Drift Alarm is present for the associated Control Rod

The "ONES" Digit is at its original expected !

position

~ .. --- ~ - ...

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 26 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #3: Rod Position Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments ATC [1.1 ] IF all three of the bullets in 4.4[1] :are satisfied, THEN The associated Control Rod can be assured it is in its required/intended I positi,?n N/A

[1.2] IF any of the three bullets in 4.4[1] cannot be met, THEN Control Rods may be moved to an Operable Position Indication as a means of position verification (Refer to Tech Spec Bases SR 3.1.~.1 ) {bullets 2 & 3 cal'!not be m.e!J

[2] IF the "ONES" Digit for an individual reed switch position indicator is out-of-service on Full Core Display and 4-Rod Display for the Control Rod, THEN Control Rods may be moved to an Operable Position Indication as a means of position verification (Refer to Tech Spec Bases SR 3.1.3.1)

SRO When provided the RCP for the rod movement, direct rod 14-35 inserted to position 46 to see if RPIS indications return ATC Notches rod 14-35 to position 46 and verifies that the RPIS indications have returned Reports RPIS restored on rod 14-35 to SRO SRO Directs rod 14-35 to remain in position 46 Notifies Reactor Engineer Directs initiation of WO

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 27 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #4: Condenser Tube Leak Position Expected Actions Time/Comments Crew Reports alarm 9-6B window 6, "Condensate Demin Abnormal" 9-6B-Window 19 "CNDS PUMP DISCHARGE CNDCT HIGH" BOP A. CHECK system flow conductivity, and system DP, on Panel 3-9-6 for abnormalities.

B. DISPATCH personnel to determine problem with condensate demineralizers.

C. IF High Conductivity exists, THEN REFER TO 3-AOI-2-1.

Checks SPDS screen "COND ALA" - condenser alarms SRO After UO report of high conductivity, directs entry into 3-AOI-2-1, Reactor Coolant High Conductivity BOP 4.2 Subsequent Actions

[1] LOWER reactor power, as necessary, to maintain radiation levels in main steam lines below the "Main Steam Line Radiation High-High" (3-XA-55-3A, Window 27) setpoint. REFER TO 3-GOI-100-12A.

[2] MONITOR reactor vessel water conductivity on REACTOR WATER CLEANUP BEFORE DEMIN (CONDUCTIVITY), 3-CR-43-11A, on Panel 3-9-4.

[3] NOTIFY Chemistry to sample reactor water.

REFER TO 3-SI-4.6.8.1-4.

[4] IF condenser hotwell in leakage is suspected, THEN PERFORM the following:

[4.1] ISOLATE and DRAIN the condenser water boxes (one at a time). REFER TO 3-01-27

[4.1.1] OBSERVE reactor water conductivity and off gas flow rate. (After the leaking water box is isolated and drained, Reactor water conductivity should begin to lower within 30-45 minutes. OFF-GAS flow rate could raise.)

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 28 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #4: Condenser Tube Leak (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments SRO When Chemistry calls and reports conductivity highest in 3C condenser, directs isolating and draining 3S CCW waterboxes per 3-01-27 BOP Starts removing waterboxes per 3-01-27 section 8.17 8.17 Removing a Waterbox from Service for Leak Check

[1] IF time permits, THEN COLLECT the Amertap System balls and SHUT DOWN the Amertap System from the waterboxes to be removed. REFER TO 3-0 1-27B. N/A

[2] IF the waterbox being removed from service is 3A1(SS), THEN SHUT DOWN Debris Filter REFER TO Section 7.2 N/A ~. R __ *

[3] CLOSE the CNDR 3A 1(3A2)(3B 1)(3B2)

(3C1 )(3C2), OFFGAS SHUTOFF VALVE to the waterbox to be removed from service using 3-HS-66-A(3A)(4A)(5A)(6A)(7 A) on Panel 3-9-8

[4] CLOSE the CNDR 3A(3B)(3C) CCW OUTLET SO VALVE (on the waterbox to be removed) to approximately 20% open as follows:

[4.1] WHILE performing the following steps, MONITOR condenser vacuum closely

[4.2] PLACE handswitch CNDR 3A(B)(C)

NS(SS) CCW OUTL SHUTOFF VLV 2-HS-027-38(46,54,62,70,78)A (3-PNLA-009-0020) in CLOSE and release to close valve to =5% open

HlTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 29 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #4: Condenser Tube leak (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments f--=-~--+-~-' --.. - '. ..'.- . . - +---- ----------1 BOP [4.3) AS necessary to maintain Condenser Vacuum greater than 25 inches Hg, SLOWLY THROTTLE OPEN the remaining CNOR 3A(38)(3C) CCW OUTLET SHUTOFF VALVEs by using the following OPEN/CLOSE/STOP pushbutton on Panel 25-116

CNOR 3A NS CCW OUTl SHUTOFF VlV, 3-HS-027-00380

CNOR 3A SS CCW OUTl SHUTOFF VlV, 3-HS-027-00460

CNOR 38 NS CCW OUTl SHUTOFF Vl V, 3-HS-027-00540

CNDR 3B SS CCW OUTl SHUTOFF VlV.

3-HS-027-00620

CNOR 3C NS CCW OUTl SHUTOFF VlV, 3-HS-027 -00700

CNDR 3C SS CCW OUTl SHUTOFF VlV, 3-HS-027 -00780 Reports annunciator 3-9-20A Window 10 "CNDR C NS WATER BOX lEVEL lOW" to US.

[4.4] IF necessary, THEN REDUCE lOAD and MAINTAIN condenser vacuum greater than 25 inches Hg to get the CNDR 3A(3B)(3C) CCW OUTLET SHUTOFF VALVE NS(SS) (on the waterbox to be removed) to approximately 20 percent open (Should not be necessary)

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 30 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #4: Condenser Tube Leak (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments BOP [5] CLOSE the CNDR 3A(3B)(3C) CCW INLET SHUTOFF VALVE for the waterbox to be removed from service using the appropriate switch on Panel 3-9-20:

CNDR 3A NS CCW INLET SHUTOFF VLV, 3-HS-27-31A

CNDR 3A SS CCW INLET SHUTOFF VLV, 3-HS-27 -39A

CNDR 3B NS CCW INLET SHUTOFF VLV, 3-HS-27-47A

CNDR 3B SS CCW INLET SHUTOFF VLV, 3-HS-27 -55A

CNDR 3C NS CCW INLET SHUTOFF VLV, 3-HS-27 -63A

CNDR 3C 55 CCW INLET SHUTOFF VLV, 3-HS-27-71A Notices Conductivity lowering after CLOSING 3C NS waterbox inlet valve --

[6] IF DESIRE[fCLOSE NASH valves step I 8.3[11 .2] and drain the waterbox step 8.3[18].

(otherwise N/A) i

[7] ADJUST the position the remaining CNDR CCW OUTLET SHUTOFF VALVES to optimize i CCW System perfonnance by perfonning Section 6.1

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 31 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #5: Inadvertent HPCllnitiation Position Expected Actions Time/Comments SRO Checks Tech Specs 3.4.6 and TRM 3.4.1 and determine neither apply unless conductivity exceeded 2 IJmho/cm (then 3.4.1 would apply) 3.4.6 RCS Specific Activity LCO 3.4.6 The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be limited to DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 specific activity::; 3.2 ~Ci/gm.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with any main steam line not isolated.

TRM 3.4.1 COLUMN E(3)

CHEMISTRY APPLICABLE CONDITf0N PARAMETERS Operation of HWC Fo!lowing Noble Metal Chemical .A.pplicatlon CHLORIDE (ppm)

2.0 CONDUCTIVITY' (Ilmholcm at 25~C) 5.6-8.8 pH ATC Reports Rx Power lowering, RPV Level stable &

RFPs RPMs decreasing

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 32 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #5: Inadvertent HPCI Initiation CREW OPDP*1, Conduct of Operations A. The onshift crew is responsible for the following:

2. Closely monitor thermal power during steady state power operation with the goal of maintaining the one-hour thermal power average at or below the licensed thermal power limit. If the core thermal power average for a one-hour period is found to exceed the licensed thermal power limit, take prompt (typically no more than1 0 minutes from point of discovery) action to ensure that thermal power is less than or equal to licensed thermal power limit.

C. Unit Operators are charged to:

1. Monitor reactor parameters to ensure the unit is operating within prescribed bands and monitor prescribed parameters and instrumentation to verify plant response is as expected during reactivity manipulations.

If, after investigation, the unit is determined to be operating above its licensed core thermal power limit take prompt (typically no more than10 minutes from pOint of discovery) action to reduce power below the core thermal power limit.

BOP Reports to US that HPCI is starting with injection into RPV SRO Announces to crew entry into 3-AOI-3-1, "Loss Of Reactor Feedwater or Reactor Water Level High/Low."

SRO Directs BOP to trip HPCI and place Aux Oil pump in Pull-to-Lock per 3-AOI-3-1.

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 33 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #5: Inadvertent HPCI Initiation (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments 3-AOI-3-1 BOP [15] IF any of the following are inadvertently injecting into the Reactor, AND are not required for level control, THEN STOP injection by tripping pump, closing discharge valves, or with flow reduction, as appropriate:

A. HPCI and/or RCIC with reactor pressure>

450 psi B. HPCI, RCIC, RHR, Core Spray, or

feedwater/condensate with reactor pressure s 450 psi Trips HPCI with trip pushbutton Places HPCI Aux Oil pump in Pull-to-Lock Announces alarm 3-9-3E Window 11, " HPCI TURBINE TRIPPED" Monitors HPCI coast down ATC [24] IF unit remains on-line, THEN PERFORM the following:

o RETURN Reactor water level to normal operating level of 33"(normal range).

o REQUEST Nuclear Engineer check core limits.

Monitors RPV Level restoration back to normal.

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 34 of 66 XI I. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #5: Inadvertent HPCI Initiation (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments SRO References T.S. 3.5.1 ACTIONS Condition A is N/A

NOTE-----

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to HPCI.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A~ One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.

OR One low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) pump in both LPCI subsystems inoperable.

A.1 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.

7 days B. Required Action and associated Completion Condition B is N/A Time of Condition A not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months AND B.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

--.:- -_.... .. ..---~I____--------------l C. HPCI System inoperable. C.1 Verify by Condition C is administrative means RCIC System is OPERABLE. APPLICABLE Immediately AND C.2 Restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status.

14 days I-=---:-:-:=-=-~-...,..-- -.:-----:-:- '-"- '-"-'-"'---'-+-::---:-:-::-~--:-:-:-----l D. HPCI System inoperable. Condition D is N/A AND Condition A entered.

D.1 Restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR D.2 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months

' - - - - - -- ' - - _ __ _ _ _.. _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ ..._ _ _ _ ._ __ ----'- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _----l

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 35 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #5 : Inadvertent HPCI Initiation (continued)

Position

- Time/Comments Expected Actions SRO E. One ADS valve inoperable.

Condition E is N/A E.1 Restore ADS valve to OPERABLE status.

14 days F. One ADS valve inoperable. Condition F is N/A AND Condition A entered.

F.1 Restore ADS valve to OPERABLE status. ,

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR F.2 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months G. Two or more ADS valves Inoperable. Condition G is N/A OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C, 0, E, or F not met. ,

G.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AND G.2 Reduce reactor steam dome pressure to 0 150 psig.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months H. Two or more low pressure ECCS injection/spray Condition H is N/A subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.

OR HPCI System and one or more ADS valves inoperable.

H.1 Enter LeO 3.0.3. Immediately

HL TS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 36 of 66

XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Damage/MSL Leak / Stuck Open SRV / HPCI/RCIC/CRD Failure Position Expected Actions Time/Comments BOP Announces alarm 9-3A window 5, OG Pre Treatment Radiation High. Responds ~er ARP A. VERIFY high radiation on following:

1. OFFGAS PRETREATMENT RADIATION recorder, 3-RR-90-157 on Panel 3-9-2

2. OFFGAS RADIATION recorder, 3-RR-90-160 on Panel 3-9-2

3. OG PRETREATMENT RAD MON RTMR, 3-RM-90-157 on Panel 3-9-10

4. OFFGAS RAD MON RTMR, 3-RM-90-160 on Panel 3-9-10 B. CHECK off-gas flow normal C. CHECK following radiation recorders and associated radiation monitors:

1. MAIN STEAM LINE RADIATION, 3-RR 135 on Panel 3-9-2

2. OFFGAS POST-TREATMENT RADIATION, 3-RR-90-265 on Panel 3-9-2

3. STACK GAS/CONT RM RADIATION FROM STACK GAS, 0-RR-90-147 on Panel 1-9-2 D. NOTIFY RADCON E. REQUEST Chemistry perform radiochemical analysis to determine source

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 37 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Damage/MSL Leak I Stuck Open SRV I HPCI/RCIC/CRD Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments BOP I F. IF Offgas System Isolation Valve, 3-FCV-66-28 is manually restrained in the OPEN position and it has been determined that this is a valid alarm.

THEN UNRESTRAIN Offgas System Isolation Valve, 3-FCV-66-28 G. REFER TO 0-SI-4.8.B.1.a.1 and 1(2)(3)-SR-3.4.6.1 (A) for ODCM compliance and to determine if power level reduction is required H. IF directed by Unit Supervisor, THEN REDUCE reactor power to maintain off-gas radiation within ODCM limits I. IF ODCM limits are exceeded, THEN REFER TO EPIP-1 SRO Notifies Chem Lab to Sample Declares NOUE (1.4-U)

BOP Announces alarm 9-3A window 5, TURBINE BLDG AREA RADIATION HIGH A. DETERMINE area with high radiation level on Panel 3-9-11. (Alarm on Panel 3-9-11 will automatically reset if radiation level lowers below setpoint.)

B. IF the TSC is NOT manned, THEN USE public address system to evacuate area where high airborne f----

conditions exist.

- -,," - ,, ~-

C. IF the TSC is manned, THEN REQUEST the TSC to evacuate non-essential personnel from affected areas.

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 38 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Damage/MSL Leak I Stuck Open SRV I HPCIIRCIC/CRD Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments BOP D. NOTIFY RADCON .

E. MONITOR other parameters providing input to this annunciator frequently as these parameters will be masked from alarming while this alarm is sealed in.

r-=-. . __._. . ..

F. IF alarm is due to sensor malfunction, THEN REFER TO 0-01-55 __ __

Check instruments and reports increase in radiation RR-90-157 (OG Pretrt) RR-90-135 (MSL Rad)

Evacuates Turbine Building via plant announcement, per ARP SRO Notifies Rad Con BOP Announces alarm 9-3A window 22, RX BLDG AREA RADIATION HIGH A. DETERMINE area with high radiation level on Panel 3-9-11. (Alarm on Panel 3-9-11 will automatically reset if radiation level lowers below setpoint.)

B. IF the alarm is from the HPCI Room while Flow testing is being performed, THEN REQUEST personnel at the HPCI Quad to validate conditions.

C. NOTIFY RADCON

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 39 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Oamage/MSL Leak I Stuck Open SRV I HPCI/RCIC/CRO Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments BOP O. IF the TSC is NOT manned and a "VALID" radiological condition exists., THEN USE public address system to evacuate area where high airborne conditions exist 1-='- - ,--~-.-. - ..

E. IF the TSC is manned and a "VALID" Iradiological condHion exists, THEN REQUEST the TSC to evacuate non-essential personnel from affected areas.

F. MONITOR other parameters providing input to this annunciator frequently as these parameters will be masked from alarming while this alarm is sealed in.

G. IF a CREV initiation is received, THEN

1. VERIFY CREV A(B) Flow is ;:: 2700 CFM, and =::; 3300 CFM as indicated on 0-FI-031 -

7214(7213) within 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months of the CREV initiation. [BFPER 03-017922]

2. IF CREV A(B) Flow is NOT;:: 2700 CFM, and

=::; 3300 CFM as indicated on 0-FI-031-7214(7213) THEN PERFORM the following:

(Otherwise N/A) [BFPER 03-017922]

a. STOP the operating CREV per 0-01-31.

b. START the standby CREV per 0-01-31.

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 40 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Damage/MSL Leak I Stuck Open SRV I HPCI/RCIC/CRD Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments BOP I H. IF alarm is due to malfunction, THEN REFER L!Q_Q:-QI-55.

I. ENTER 3-EOI-3 Flowchart.

J. REFER TO 3-AOI-79-1 or 3-A01-79-2 if applicable.

Checks RB instruments to determine affected areas Evacuates Reactor Building via plant announcement, per ARP SRO Notifies Rad Con Enters 3-EOI-3 on 9-3A window 22, RX BLDG AREA RADIATION HIGH Alarm [Table 4] (may direct power reduction with recirc flow)

Priority is the SC/R leg of 3-EOI at least one area is> MAX NORMAL level [answers YES to SC/R-2]

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 41 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Damage/MSL Leak I Stuck Open SRV I HPCI/RCIC/CRD Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments BOP Recognize and announce Group 6 isolation on high radiation Reports alarm 9-3D window 24, MAIN STEAM LINE LEAK DETECTION TEMP HIGH and verifies on T11-60A A. CHECK the following temperature indications:

MN STEAM TUNNEL TEMP temperature indicator, 3-TIS-1-60A on Panel 3-9-3

Temperature Switches 3-TS-1-60B, -60C, or -60D window(s) on Panel 3-9-21

RWCU Piping in the Main Steam Tunnel temperature indicators, 3-TIS 834A(B)(C)(D), Auxiliary Instrument Room Panels 9-83(84)(85)(86) OR ICS 'HPTURB' mimic.

B. CHECK the following flow indications:

MAIN STEAM LINE FLOW A(B)(C)(D), 3-FI-46-1 (2)(3)(4) on Panel 3-9-5

RFW FLOW LINE A(B), 3-FI-3-78A(78B) on Panel 3-9-5

RFP 3A(3B)3C) flow indicators, 3-FI 20(13)(6) on Panel 3-9-6

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 42 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Damage/MSL Leak / Stuck Open SRV / HPCI/RCIC/CRD Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments BOP C. IF RCIC is NOT in service AND 3-FI-71-1A(B),

RCIC STEAM FLOW indicates flow, THEN ISOLATE RCIC and VERIFY Temperatures lowering.

D. CHECK for elevated RAD Levels on the following Instruments:

3-RM-90-20, CRD-HCU West

. ._ .w_. __

3-RM-90:~~, Suppression Pool _

! E. IF HPCI is Injecting with elevated Suppression i Pool Temperature, THEN CONSIDER securing I I

HPCI to determine if It is the source of the leak. t F. IF Rx Bldg main steam tunnel temperature is above 160°F on 3-TIS-1-60A on Panel 3-9-3, THEN PERFORM the following:

1. ENTER 3-EOI-3 Flowchart

2. VERIFY Rx Zone fans, 3-HS-64-11A at Panel 3-9-25, in fast speed

3. VERIFY Steam Vault Exhaust Booster Fan in service. REFER TO 3-01-30B G. IF turbine building main steam tunnel temperature is above 160°F on 3-TS-1-60B, -60C, or -600 on Panel 3-9-21, THEN DISPATCH personnel to 480V AC Turb Bldg Vent Bd 3A (TB, EI 617') to verify TB fans and the Mechanical Spaces Exhaust Fan running

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 43 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Damage/MSL Leak I Stuck Open SRV I HPCI/RCIC/CRD Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments SRO Directs Core Flow Runback Renters 3-EOI-3 on any SC Area Temp above MAX NORMAL per Table 3 (RB Steam Tunnel)

Priorities are now both SCIT & SC/R legs of 3-EOI-3 Determines YES to 3-EOI-3 steps SC/R-4 & SCIT-5 Enters 3-EOI-1 from both steps SC/R-6 & SCIT-7 and Directs manual scram ATC Manually scrams and verifies all rods inserted SRO After ALL rods in, per 3-EOI-1 step RC/Q-2, exits RC/Q Leg & enters 3-AOI-100-1, Reactor Scram Directs.

Directs ATC to carry out actions of 3-AOI-100-1, Reactor Scram ATC Carries out 3-AOI-1 00-1 actions Mode switch in SID Gives scram report Trips main turbine Verify Recirc pumps at minimum Crew Verifies Group 2, 3, 6 and 8 isolations

HL TS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 44 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Damage/MSL Leak I Stuck Open SRV I HPCI/RCIC/CRD Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments BOP Closes MSIVs prior to isolation Critical Task #1 Reports MSIVs not closed on MSL high temp (189°F) on panel 9-3D alarms SRO Directs MSIV closure, if not already directed BOP Closes MSIVs Critical Task #1 SRO 3-EOI-1 priorities are the RC/P & RC/L legs ( RC/Q is not, due to all rods in)

MSIVs cannot be re-opened based on step RC/P-9, therefore step RC/P-11 is utilized Directs pressure control 800 to 1000 psig using SRV's, Appendix-11A," ALTERNATE RPV PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEMS MSRVs,"

(MSIVs are closed)

Per step RC/L-4 directs level control + 2" to + 51" using RCIC, Appendix-5C, "INJECTION SYSTEM LINEUP RCIC," or HPCI, Appendix-5D, "INJECTION SYSTEM LINEUP HPCI,"

(MSIVs are closed)

Answers YES to step RC/L-5 (1 st time thru)

BOP Controls pressure as directed using SRVs, Appendix-11A, ALTERNATE RPV PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEMS MSRVs," (MSIVs are closed)

1. IF ..... Drywell Control Air is NOT available, THEN ... EXECUTE EOI Appendix 8G, "CROSSTIE CAD TO DRYWELL CONTROL AIR,"

CONCURRENTL Y with this procedure.

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 4S of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Oamage/MSL Leak I Stuck Open SRV I HPCI/RCIC/CRO Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments

~.- ~

2. IF ..... Suppression Pool level is at or below S.S ft, THEN ... CLOSE MSRVs and CONTROL RPV

~sure using other o~tions. _._.

3. OPEN MSRVs using the following sequence to control RPV pressure as directed by SRO:

a.1 3-PCV-1-179 MN STM LINE A RELIEF VALVE

b. 2 3-PCV-1-180 MN STM LINE 0 RELIEF VALVE

c. 3 3-PCV-1-4 MN STM LINE A RELIEF VALVE

d. 4 3-PCV-1-31 MN STM LINE C RELIEF VALVE

e. S 3-PCV-1-23 MN STM LINE B RELIEF VALVE

f. 6 3-PCV-1-42 MN STM LINE 0 RELIEF VALVE

g. 7 3-PCV-1-30 MN STM LINE C RELIEF VALVE

h. 8 3-PCV-1-19 MN STM LINE B RELIEF VALVE

i. 9 3-PCV-1-S MN STM LINE A RELIEF VALVE

j. 10 3-PCV-1-41 MN STM LINE 0 RELIEF VALVE

k. 11 3-PCV-1-22 MN STM LINE B RELIEF VALVE I. 12 3-PCV-1-18 MN STM LINE B RELIEF VALVE

m. 13 3-PCV-1-34 MN STM LINE C RELIEF VALVE BOP Attempts to control level as directed using HPCI ,

Appendix-SO, "INJECTION SYSTEM LINEUP HPCI ," and RCIC, Appendix-SC, "INJECTION SYSTEM LINEUP RCIC" Reports HPCI failure (120V Power Alarm)

Reports annunciator 3-9-3F Window S, HPCI PUMP DISCH FLOW LOW in alarm Reports annunciator 3-9-3F Window 7, HPCI 120 VAC POWER FAILURE, in alarm Reports RCIC TRIP and failure to reset SRO Dispatches AUO to reset RCIC Dispatches OS-US to troubleshoot / replace HPCI power supply fuses

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 46 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Damage/MSL Leak I Stuck Open SRV I HPCI/RCIC/CRD Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments BOP Reports PCV 1-179 failure to close after use SRO Directs entry into 3-AOI-1-1, "Relief Valve Stuck Open" BOP Enters 3-AOI-1-1, "Relief Valve Stuck Open," and performs immediate operator actions 4.1 Immediate Action

[1] IDENTIFY stuck open relief valve by OBSERVING the following:

SRV TAILPIPE FLOW MONITOR, 3-FMT 4, on Panel 3-9-3, OR

MSRV DISCHARGE TAILPIPE TEMPERATURE, 3-TR-1-1 on Panel 3-9-47

[2] WHILE OBSERVING the indications for the affected Relief valve on the Acoustic Monitor; CYCLE the affected relief valve control switch several times as required:

CLOSE to OPEN to CLo.~~ pOSitions

[3] IF all SRVs are CLOSED, THEN CONTINUE at Step 4.2.3. (Otherwise N/A) N/A

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 47 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Damage/MSL Leak / Stuck Open SRV / HPCI/RCIC/CRD Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments SRO Directs actions to close PCV 1-179 per 3-AOI-1-1 outside control room BOP 4.2.1 Attempt to close valve from Panel 9-3:

[1] PLACE the SRV TAILPIPE FLOW MONITOR POWER SWITCH in the OFF position

[2] PLACE the SRV TAILPIPE FLOW MONITOR POWER SWITCH in the ON position ---'-_.

[3] IF all SRVs are CLOSED, THEN CONTINUE at

~ 4.2.3. {Otherwise NJA) NJA

[4] PLACE MSRV AUTO ACTUATION LOGIC INHIBIT, 3-XS-1-202 in INHIBIT:

[5] IF relief valve closes, THEN OPEN breaker or PULL fuses as necessary using Attachment 1 (Unit 3 SRV Solenoid Power Breaker/Fuse Table)

[6] PLACE MSRV AUTO ACTUATION LOGIC INHIBIT 3-XS-1-202, in AUTO Uses table at step 7 to determine which step to proceed to (4.2.2[12])

[12] IF 3-PCV-1-179 is NOT closed, THEN PERFORM the following: (Otherwise N/A this section.)

[12.1] REMOVE the power from 3-PCV-1-179 by performing one of the following: (Otherwise N/A):

A. OPEN the following breaker: (Preferred method)

3B 250V RMOV, Compartment 8C2 OR B. In 3-LPNL-925-0658, (EI 593' 3B Electric Board Room, South Wall)

PULL the following fuses as necessary:

Fuse 3-FU1-001-0179A

Fuse 3-FU1-001-0179B

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 48 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Damage/MSL Leak I Stuck Open SRV I HPCI/RCIC/CRD Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments BOP [12.2] IF the valve does NOT close, THEN CLOSE breaker or REINSTALL fuses removed in Step 4.2.2[12.1].

[12.3] CONTINUE at Step 4.2.3 4.2.3 Other Actions and Documentation

[1] IF ANY EOI entry condition is met, THEN ENTER the appropriate EOI(s)

[2] REFER TO Technical Specifications Sections 3.5.1 and 3.4.3 for Automatic Depressurization System and relief valve operability requirements

[3] INITIATE suppression pool cooling as necessary to maintain suppression pool temperature less than 95°F (per 01-74)

[4] IF the relief valve can NOT be closed AND suppression pool temperature Can NOT be maintained less than or equal to 95°F, THEN PLACE the reactor Mode 4 in accordance with 3-GOI-100-12A

[5] DOCUMENT actions taken and INITIATE Work Order for the valve Reports 3-PCV 1-179 does not close SRO Directs RHR placed in Suppression Pool cooling per 3-01-74 Reviews Tech Specs 3.5.1 and 3.4.3 and determined no active LCO exists 3-PCV-1-179 is E. One ADS valve E1 Restore ADS valve to 14 days NOT an ADS inoperable. OPERABLE status. SRV.

TS 3.5.1 is NOT F. One ADS valve F.1 Restore ADS valve to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months applicable.

inoperable. OPERABLE status.

AND OR Condition A entered. F,2 Restore low pressure 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE I

status.

(continued)

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 49 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Damage/MSL Leak / Stuck Open SRV / HPCIIRCIC/CRD Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments SRO T.5.3.4.3 Have 13 SRVs, only need 3.4.3 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs) 12. This would be tracked, but NO actions required.

LCO 3.4.3 The safety function of 12 S/RVs shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

Enters 3-EOI-2 at 95°F suppression pool temperature (Priority is SPIT Leg)

Directs all available RHR placed in Suppression Pool Cooling per Appendix-17A, "RHR SYSTEM OPERATION SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING" BOP Places all available Suppression Pool Cooling in service per Appendix-17 A, "RHR SYSTEM

OPERATION SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING"

1. IF .............. Adequate core cooling is assured, OR Directed to cool the Suppression Pool irrespective of adequate core cooling, THEN ....... BYPASS LPCI injection valve auto open signal as necessary by PLACING 3-HS 155A(B), LPCI SYS 1(11) OUTBD INJ VLV BYPASS SEL in BYPASS.

2. PLACE RHR SYSTEM 1(11) in Suppression Pool Cooling as follows:

a. VERIFY at least one RHRSW pump supplying each EECW header.

b. VERIFY RHRSW pump supplying desired RHR Heat Exchanger(s).

c. THROTTLE the following in-service RHRSW outlet valves to obtain between 1350 and 4500 gpm RHRSW flow:

3-FCV-23-34, RHR HX 3A RHRSW OUTLETVLV

3-FCV-23-46, RHR HX 3B RHRSW OUTLETVLV

3-FCV-23-40, RHR HX 3C RHRSW OUTLETVLV 3-FCV-23-52, RHR HX 3D RHRSW OUTLETVLV

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 50 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Damage/MSL Leak I Stuck Open SRV I HPCI/RCIC/CRD Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments BOP d. IF ............. Directed by SRO, THEN ....... PLACE 3-XS-74-122(130), RHR SYS 1(11) LPCI2/3 CORE HEIGHT OVRD in MANUAL OVERRIDE.

e. IF ............. LPCIINITIATION Signal exists, THEN ....... MOMENTARILY PLACE 3-XS 121(129), RHR SYS 1(11) CTMT SPRAY/CLG VLV SELECT in SELECT.

f. IF ............. 3-FCV-74-53(67), RHR SYS 1(11) LPCI INBD INJECT VALVE, is OPEN, THEN ....... VERIFY CLOSED 3-FCV-74-52(66),

RHR SYS 1(11) LPCI OUTBD INJECT VALVE.

g. OPEN 3-FCV-74-57(71), RHR SYS 1(11) SUPPR CHBRIPOOL ISOL VLV.

h. VERIFY desired RHR pump(s) for Suppression Pool Cooling are operating.

i. THROTTLE 3-FCV-74-59(73), RHR SYS 1(11)

SUPPR POOL CLGITEST VLV, to maintain EITHER of the following as indicated on 3-FI-74-50(64), RHR SYS 1(11) FLOW:

Between 7000 and 10000 gpm for one-pump operation. OR

At or below 13000 gpm for two-pump operation.

j. VERIFY CLOSED 3-FCV-74-7(30), RHR SYSTEM 1(11) MIN FLOW VALVE.

k. MONITOR RHR Pump NPSH using Attachment 1.

I. NOTIFY Chemistry that RHRSW is aligned to in-service RHR Heat Exchangers.

m. IF ............. Additional Suppression Pool Cooling flow is necessary, THEN ....... PLACE additional RHR and RHRSW pumps in service usin~ Steps 2.b through 2.1.

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 51 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Damage/MSL Leak I Stuck Open SRV I HPCI/RCIC/CRD Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments SRO Re-evaluates 3-EOI-1 step RC/L-5 and answers NO From 3-EOI-1 step RC/L-8, Directs Appendix-7B, "Alternate RPV Injection System Lineup SLC System" ATC Performs Appendix-7B, "Alternate RPV Injection System Lineup SLC System," by injecting with SLC from the Boron tank or dispatching AUO to align SLC suction to the test tank Verifies recirc pumps trip at -45" SRO Directs preventing flooding vessel via Condensate system by closing RFP discharge valves ATC Closes RFP discharge valves, 3-FCV-3-19(12)(5)

SRO Enters C1, Directs ADS inhibited BOP Inhibits ADS Critical Task #2 Reports DG starts Dispatches AUO to monitor DIG's

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 52 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Damage/MSL Leak / Stuck Open SRV / HPCIIRCIC/CRD Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments SRO When level decreases to TAF determines/verifies that sufficient injection sources are available to not enter steam cooling and enters C2. i.e. Will Emergency Depressurize somewhere between -

162 and -180" Directs RHR be realigned from Suppression Pool Cooling to injection BOP Secures Suppression Pool Cooling and aligns RHR Critical Task #4, if 2/3 for injection core height override used in APP-17 A, "RHR System Operation in Suppression Pool Cooling Mode" SRO Directs opening 6 ADS valves before -180"

BOP SRO Opens 6 ADS valves as directed Directs BOP to inject with ECCS until level is above -122" then secure systems to not exceed to maintain + 51"; Directs restoration of Suppression Critical Task #3 Pool Cooling after RWL control is established BOP Operates and secures ECCS injection as directed /

reestablishes Suppression Pool Cooling as directed

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 53 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Damage/MSL Leak / Stuck Open SRV / HPCI/RCIC/CRD Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments SRO Per 3-EOI-1 step RC/L-4, Directs restoring level +

2" to + 51" with Core Spray, Appendix-6D, "INJECTION SUBYSTEMS LINEUP CORE SPRAY SYSTEM," / Appendix-6 E, "INJECTION SUBYSTEMS LINEUP CORE SPRAY SYSTEM II" BOP Recover level with CS Loop I, 3-EOI Appendix-6O, "INJECTION SUBYSTEMS LINEUP CORE SPRAY SYSTEM,"

1. VERIFY OPEN the following valves:

3-FCV-75-2, CORE SPRAY PUMP 3A SUPPR POOL SUCT VL V

3-FCV-75-11, CORE SPRAY PUMP 3C SUPPR POOL SUCT VL V

3-FCV-75-23, CORE SPRAY SYS IOUTBD INJECT VALVE

2. VERIFY CLOSED 3-FCV-75-22, CORE SPRAY SYS I TEST VALVE

3. VERIFY CS Pump 3A and/or 3C RUNNING

4. WHEN ... RPV pressure is below 450 psig, THEN ... THROTILE 3-FCV-75-25, CORE SPRAY SYS I INBD INJECT VALVE, as necessary to control injection at or below 4000 gpm per pump

5. MONITOR Core Spray Pump NPSH using Attachment 1

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 54 of 66 XII. Simulator Event Guide:

Event #6: Fuel Damage/MSL Leak / Stuck Open SRV / HPCI/RCIC/CRD Failure (continued)

Position Expected Actions Time/Comments BOP Restore level to + 2" to + 51" with CS Loop II, 3-EOI Appendix-6E, "Injection Subsystems Lineup-Core Spray System II"

1. VERIFY OPEN the following valves:

3-FCV-75-30, CORE SPRAY PUMP 3B SUPPR POOL SUCT VL V

3-FCV-75-39, CORE SPRAY PUMP 3D SUPPR POOL SUCT VL V

3-FCV-75-51, CORE SPRAY SYS II OUTBD INJECT VALVE

2. VERIFY CLOSED 3-FCV-75-50, CORE SPRAY SYS II TEST VALVE

3. VERIFY CS Pump 3B and/or 3D RUNNING

4. WHEN ... RPV pressure is below 450 psig, THEN ... THROTTLE 3-FCV-75-53, CORE SPRAY SYS IIINBD INJECT VALVE, as necessary to control injection at or below 4000 g~m ~er pump

5. MONITOR Core Spray Pump NPSH using Attachment 1 SRO Classifies event as Site Area Emergency (1.1-S 1) 1.1-51 I I NOTE I I Reactor water level can NOT be mallltained abo-.., -162 lnche *. (TAF)

OPERATING CONDITION' ALL

HL TS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 55 of 66 XIII. Crew Critical Tasks:

TASK SAT/UNSAT

1) Isolates MSIVs prior to '2' 3-EOI-3 Area Radiations /

Temperatures reaching Max Safe

2) Prevent Automatic Depressurization

3) Emergency Depressurizes when below TAF and before level drops to -180"

4) If SRO directs 2/3 core height override then the SRO will verify that the RHR system is fully realigned for injection when required (contingent - if directed)

NOTE: Terminate the scenario when the following conditions are satisfied or upon request of Lead Examiner.

1. MSIV's closed

2. Emergency Depressurization completed

3. RPV level being maintained + 2 to + 51 "or recovering

HLTS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 56 of 66 xv. SCENARIO REVIEW CHECKLIST SCENARIO NUMBER: HL TS-3-09

...1Q... Total Malfunctions Inserted: List (4-8)

1) RFP failure

2) RPIS failure

3) Condenser Waterbox Tube Leak

4) Inadvertent HPCI Start

5) Fuel Failure

6) MSL Leak with MSIV Auto Close Failure

7) Stuck Open SRV

8) HPCI failure

9) RCIC trip

10) CRD Pump 3A trip

~ Malfunctions that occur after EOI entry: List (1-4)

1) MSL Leak with MSIV Auto Close Failure

2) Stuck Open SRV

3) HPCI failure

4) RCIC trip

5) CRD Pump 3A trip

~ Abnormal Events: List (1-3) 1)

2) 3)

4)

RFP failure Condenser Waterbox Tube Leak Inadvertent HPCI Start Fuel Failure

5) Stuck Open SRV L Major Transients: List (1-2)

1) Fuel Failure

2) MSL Leak

--L EOl's used: List (1-3)

1) EOI-1

2) EOI-2

3) EOI-3 L EOI Contingencies used: List (0-3)

1) C1

2) C2

~ Run Time (minutes)

~ EOI Run Time (minutes): 46 % of Scenario Run Time

-+/-- Crew Critical Tasks: (2-5)

HL TS-3-09 Rev 1 Page 57 of 66 YES Technical Specifications Exercised (Yes/No) - TRM, TS 3.5.1

SHIFT TURNOVER SHEET Equipment Out of Service/LCO's:

FCV 23-34, RHR HX 3A RHRSW OUTLET VL V, repair underway, clearance has 3A RHR Hx inop for containment cooling. Out of service 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , expected back in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . 30 day LCO entered per T.S. 3.7.1 ,3.6.2.3,3.6.2.4,3.6.2.5. All Appendix R, T.S. LC~'s have been addressed. 38 CRD pump is tagged for breaker maintenance.

Operations/Maintenance for the Shift:

Raise Unit 3 to 100% power at 10MWe/min. Support maintenance on RHRSW valve. Power was reduced for turbine valve testing which has been completed. Units 1 and 2 are at 100%

=po~w~e~r _______________________________________________________________

Unusual Conditions/Problem Areas:

Thunderstorm warning in effect next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months in Limestone County

Appendix A (Page 2 of 2)

Name Of Radiation Protection Person Notified: _ _--=J=o.:::..e...:..N=e=u=tr=o.:..:.n_ _ _ _ _ __

Date: _---....:T:....::o:..:::d=a~v_ _ _ Time: _ _...:...N=o'-'-'w'---_ _

Step# 5[16] Procedure: 3-GOI-100-12 (if not this procedure) Rev: Current RPHP Required by Ol? _(V) ~(N) RPHP Required For GOI? ~(Y) _(N)

RCI-17 Controls Necessary? ~(Y) _ _(N)

Radiation Protection Supervisor Signature for Release

_ _--==,;...>lo"-"e'-'-N....,.e:..::...u:::..:;;t"'-Y'o"""'Vl'-"-_ _ _ _ Date: _---=T'-'=o;..=d=a......

v ___ Time: _ _. ;. .;N=-o..:. ;,w_ __

Comments: For returning Rx Power to 100% after RFP recovery Name Of Radiation Protection Person Notified:

Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Time: _ _ _ _ _ __

Step#_ _ _ _ Procedure: _ _ _ _ _ _ (if not this procedure) Rev: _ _ __

RPHP Required by Ol? _(V) _ _(N) RPHP Required For GOI? _ _(V) _(N)

RCI-17 Controls Necessary? _(V) _ _(N)

Radiation Protection Supervisor Signature for Release

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Time: _ _ _ _ _ __

Comments:

FORWARD copies of completed Appendix pages to Radiation Protection Supervisor.

Appendix A (Page 2 of 2)

Name Of Radiation Protection Person Notified: _ _--=J..;: .o-=-e.. .:. N.:.,: e=u=tr. ;: .o.:. .,:.n_ _ _ _ _ __

Date: _--,T:.-=o=d=a,-,-Y_ _ _ Time: _ _..:....N:..;:;o..:.,:w'---_ _

Step# 5.7[1] Procedure: __3.=;. ---=0;.,;. 1-.. =;3__ (if not this procedure) Rev: Current RPHP Required by Ol? _(V) -L(N) RPHP Required For GOI? -L(Y) _(N)

RCI-17 Controls Necessary? -L(Y) __(N)

Radiation Protection Supervisor Signature for Release

_ _---e==,;.:.Jo""'e"--"-Nl...O:e=u=t..!,.;yO~V\.-~ _ _ _ _ Date: _--,T:.-=o=d=a..z...Y___ Time: _ _. .:. . :N=o..:.,:w_ __

Comments: For returning 3A RFP to service

Name Of Radiation Protection Person Notified: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Time: _ _ _ _ _ __

Step#____ Procedure: _ _ _ _ _ _ (if not this procedure) Rev: _ _ __

RPHP Required by Ol? _(V) __(N) RPHP Required For GOI? __(V) _(N)

RCI-17 Controls Necessary? _(V) __(N)

Radiation Protection Supervisor Signature for Release

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Time: _ _ _ _ _ __

Comments:

FORWARD copies of completed Appendix pages to Radiation Protection Supervisor.

Table 3.41-1 Coolant Chemistry Limits(1)

COLUMNA COLUMNB COLUMNC (3 COLUNNO(2) COLUMN E )

APPLICABLE JlPPlICABlE CONDITION JlPPUCABLE CONDITION APPLICABLE CmlDJTtON APPliCABLE CONDJTtON CHEMISTRY CONDITION Sleamflg Rate. Reactor Not Prf$$unzed With Foelln Opera\lon of HWe Fo/,owing NoI>Ie NoI>ie Metal Chemica! Application and PARAMETERS PrOorToSIMup > 100,000 Ibillr Reaclor"'MMI, Except During SubseQuent Reactor CooJan! Cleanup Metal Chemical P..pplication And At Steaming Startup Coodilioo Rates

<: 100.000 IbJhr CHLORIDE S 0.1 ::.Q2 ::'0.5 ::: 0.1 ::.02 (ppm) cONDucrn/lTY :; :?G ~ 1.0 ::.10.0 ~ Y.l.G ::;; 2.0 (j.lmholcmat 25'C) pH 5.6-8.6 5.6--8.6 53-8.6 4.3-9.9 5.6*$.8

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Browns Ferry NPP Scenario No.: 3-12 Op-Test No.: HlT 0801 w . . . . .. . _ ** _ .

,........ "-r-'"

l 1 t SRO: ' SROU-1 Examiners: I I Operators: ATC: RO-2 I

i L __ BOP:

RO-1 Initial Unit 3 is at 100% power. The 38 Diesel Generator is tagged for annual Conditions: maintenance and the Main Generator Voltage Regulator is in MANUAL following a monthly Electrical Maintenance PM. Thunderstorm warnings in area.

Turnover: Units 1 and 2 are at 100%. On Unit 3, return the Main Generator Voltage Regulator to AUTO. Lower power to 92% with Recirc to perform 3-SR-3.1.3.3, Control Rod Exercise Test for Partially Withdrawn Control Rods. Support maintenance on 38 Diesel Generator.

Event Event No. Malf. No. Type* Event Description N-80P 1 ------ Return Generator Voltage Regulator to Auto N-SRO R-ATC 2 ------ N-SRO Lower power N-ATC 3 ------ Perform CRD Exercise per 3-SR-3.1.3.3 N-SRO I-ATC 4 nm16a APRM HillNOP trip - bypass APRM 1 TS-SRO C-80P Trip of C3 EECW - ARP response and manual start of A3 EECW 5 sw03J C-SRO pump that fails to Auto start TS-SRO C-80P 6 rc02 Secure RCIC after inadvertent start TS-SRO Make-up H2 when leak noticed, power reduction I scram I turbine 7 eg0725 C-ALL trip Loss of Off-Site Power I HPCI aux oil pump fails to operate I 8 ed01 M-ALL DIG '3C' fails to automatically tie to the shutdown board rc09100 M-ALL Unisolable RCIC steam leak 9

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor ANTICIPATED EAL: 3.1 SITE AREA

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-O-1 Facility: Browns Ferry NPP Scenario No.: 3-12 (2) Op-Test No. : HLT 0801 I

SRO:

'-'SROI-1 I Examiners: Operators: ATC: ---,,-RO-4 L ____ _ _ -'--_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---' ' - - - - - - - - ' - --

BOP: RO-3 Facility: Browns Ferry NPP Scenario No.: 3-12 (3) Op-Test No.: HLT 0801 I SRO: SROI-2 , ____,__,

Examiners:

~---,-- '----- - - - - - - - - - - '

I operatolS__ : -t. . . .BOP:

A.=~T:. C; . .:;, _ _ ___'R_O_'__-6 RO-5

___ -_--_J_'~

ANTICIPATED EAL: 3.1-S - SITE AREA

Scenario Narrative

The unit is at 100% with '38' Diesel Generator out of service for annual maintenance .

Currently in the first day of a 7 day LCO for the Diesel Generator.

The Crew will perform actions necessary to return the Generator Voltage Regulator to Automatic per 3-01-47.

The Crew will lower Reactor Power to 92% per 3-GOI-1 00-12 to perform 3-SR-3.1.3.3 Control Rod Exercise Test for Partially Withdrawn Control Rods.

APRM #1 receives a critical fault due to an input/output card failure, which requires it to be bypassed.

C3 EECW pump trips and will not restart requiring starting of the A3 EECW pump, which fails to Auto start.

RCIC receives an inadvertent auto start signal which requires the crew to secure RCIC.

A Hydrogen leak on the generator occurs which will result in decision to trip the turbine.

When the turbine is tripped, breaker failures occur and result in loss of offsite power.

HPCI aux oil pump fails to operate, but can be restored if crew requests maintenance to investigate (after RCIC is placed in service) .

When RCIC is used a steam leak occurs and RCIC fails to auto isolate and cannot be manually isolated. The RCIC steam leak will require an emergency depressurization be performed due to High area temperatures/rad levels.

Diesel Generator '3C' starts, but fails to automatically tie to the shutdown board, but may be manually tied on.

ANTICIPATED EAL: 3.1 SITE AREA

HLTS-3-12 Rev 0 Page 1 of 65

SIMULATOR EVALUATION GUIDE TITLE: APRM FAILURE, TRIP OF C3 EECW PUMP, INADVERTANT START OF RCIC, GENERATOR HYDROGEN LEAK, LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER, HPCI AUX OIL PUMP FAILURE, RCIC STEAM LINE BREAK WITHOUT ISOLATION REVISION: 0 DATE: Jan. 11,2009 PROGRAM: BFN Operator Training - Hot License An RCP is required to lower power 100% - 92% - provide at turnover Marked up copy of 3-SR-3.1.3.3, Control Rod Exercise Test for Partially Withdrawn Control Rods required (marked up thru step 7.0 - include Attachments 2 and

3 marked up)

PREPARED: \

(Operations Instructor) Date REVIEWED: \

(LOR Lead Instructor or Designee) Date REVIEWED: \

(Operations Training Manager or Designee) Date CONCURRED: \

(Operations Superintendent or Designee Required for Exam Scenarios) Date VALIDATED: \

(Operations SRO) (Required for Exam Scenarios) Date LOGGED-IN: \

(Librarian) Date

TASK LIST UPDATED

\

Date

HL TS-3-12 Rev 0 Page 2 of 65

Revision Number Description of Changes Nuclear Training Revision/Usage Log Date Pages Affected Revised 0 Initial 01/11/09 All csf

HLTS-3-12 Rev 0 Page 3 of 65 I. Program: BFN Operator Training II. Course: Examination Guide III.

Title:

APRM FAILURE, TRIP OF C3 EECW PUMP, INADVERTANT START OF RCIC, GENERATOR HYDROGEN LEAK, LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER, HPCI AUX OIL PUMP FAILURE, RCIC STEAM LINE BREAK WITHOUT ISOLATION IV. Length of Scenario - 1 to 1 % hours V. Training Objectives:

A. Terminal Objective:

1. Perform routine shift turnover, plant assessment and routine shift operation in accordance with BFN procedures.

2. Given uncertain or degrading conditions, the operating crew will use team skills to conduct proper diagnostics and make conservative operational decisions to remove equipment / unit from operation. (SOER 94-1 and SOER 96-01)

3. Given abnormal conditions, the operating crew will place the unit in a stabilized condition per normal, annunciator, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

HLTS-3-12 Rev 0 Page 4 of 65

B. Enabling Objectives:

1. The operating crew will perform actions necessary to retum the Generator Voltage Regulator to Automatic per 3-0i-47.

2. The operating crew will lower Reactor Power per 3-GOI-100-12.

3. The operating crew will perform 3-SR-3.1.3.3 Control Rod Exercise Test for Partially Withdrawn Control Rods.

4. The operating crew will recognize and respond to an APRM failure per ARPs and Ols and Technical Specifications.

5. The operating crew will recognize and respond to a trip of C3 EECW pump

6. The operating crew will recognize and respond to an inadvertent start of RCIC.

7. The operating crew will recognize and respond to a loss of generator hydrogen per ARPs.

8.

9.

The operating crew will recognize and respond to a loss of offsite power with a diesel out of service, per O-AOI-57-1A.

The operating crew will recognize and respond to a RCIC steam line break without isolation; in accordance with the EOls and AOls.

HLTS-3-12 Rev 0 Page 5 of 65 VI.

References:

The procedures used in the simulator are controlled copies and are used in development and performance of simulator scenarios. Scenarios are validated prior to use, and any procedure differences will be corrected using the procedure revision level present in the simulator. Any procedure differences noted during presentation will be corrected in the same manner. As such, it is expected that the references listed in this section need only contain the reference material which is not available in the simulator.

VII. Training Materials: (If needed, otherwise disregard)

A. Calculator B. Control Rod Insertion Sheets C. Stopwatch D. Hold Order / Caution Order tags E. Annunciator window covers F. Steam tables

HLTS-3-12 Rev 0 Page 6 of 65 VIII. Console Operator Instructions A. Scenario File Summary

1. File: bat hlts-3-12 MF/RF/OR# Description

1) imfdg06b DG '38' fails to start

2) mrf dg01 b open DG '38' logic bkr open

3) ior zdi3hs35234a[3] close Fails 8kr 234 closed

4) ior zlo3hs35234a[4] on Fails Red light on

5) ior zlo3hs35234a[3] on Fails Red light on

6) ior zlo3hs35234a[1] off Fails Green light off

7) ior zdihs?553a null Removes amber light

8) imf dg03c DIG '3C' Tie 8kr Auto failure

9) imf swO?a

2. File: bat hlts-3-12-1 Auto start failure of A3 EECW pump MF/RF/OR# Description

1) ior an:ov:xa553b[2?] alarm_off Overrides alarm

2) imf egO? 25 35:00 Generator H2 leak

3) imf rc02 RCIC auto start

HL TS-3-12 Rev 0 Page 7 of 65

3. File: bat hlts-3-12-2 MF/RF/OR# Description

1) imf rc09 (none 10:00) 100 30:00 100% steam leak in RCIC Room

2) imf rc10 RCIC failure to Auto Isolate

3) imf ed01 Loss of offsite power

4) bat hlthpaop Fails HPCI aux oil pump & green light

5) ior zdihs712a open FCV-71-2 fails as is

6) ior zdihs713a open FCV-71-3 fails as is

7) mmf eg07 .01 :10 Reduces generator H2 leak

8) ior zaoti7569a 0 Overrides indicator downscale

4. File: bat hlts-3-12-3 MF/RF/OR# Description

1) ior zaoti7569b 165 5:00 Overrides CS room temp indo To 165°F

2) ior zaori9026a 3 4:00 Overrides CS IIRCIC rm rad to max safe

3) ior zaori9027a 3 4:45 Overrides CS II rm rad to max safe

5. File: bat hlteecw MF/RF/OR# Description

1) ior zdihs6753b Allows opening EECW from 25-32

2) ior zdihs6751 b Allows opening EECW from 25-32

3) ior zdihs6750b Allows opening EECW from 25-32

4) bat hlteecw-1 Execute bat file

HL TS-3-12 Rev 0 Page 8 of 65

6. File: bat hlteecw-1 MF/RF/OR# Description

1) dor zdihs6753b Allows valves to reclose on low pressure

2) dor zdihs6751 b Allows valves to reclose on low pressure

3) dor zdihs6750b Allows valves to reclose on low pressure

4) bat hltrpsreset Execute bat file

7. File: bat hltrpsreset MF/RF/OR# Description

1) mrf rp01 reset Reset RPS A

2) mrf rp02 reset Reset RPS B

3) bat hltca Execute bat file

1) 2)

8. File:

MF/RF/OR#

mrf ia05a reset mrf ia05d reset bat hltca Description Reset A air compressor Reset D air compressor

3) mrf ia09 reset Reset G air compressor

9. File: bat hlthpaop MF/RF/OR# Description

1) imf hp05 fails HPCI aux oil pump

2) ior zlohs7347a[1] off fails HPCI aux oil pump green light

10. File: bat hlthpaop-1 MF/RF/OR# Description

1) dmf hp05

2) dor zlohs7347a[1]

Restores HPCI aux oil pump

HL TS-3-12 Rev 0 Page 90f65 IX. Console Operators Instructions HLTS 3-12 ELAP TIME DESCRIPTION/ACTION Simulator Setup 100% Power MOC reset 238 (david) manual

- Lower power slightly to get within 100% limits if necessary Simulator Setup

--I See File summary

~.

i (bat hlts-3-12)

Simulator Setup Verify Voltage Regulator in Manual manual Simulator Setup Tag 38 DIG manual After power reduction and one rod has been exercised

-] APRM 1 Critical Fault (imf nm16a)

ROLE PLAY: If Operator tries to check pnI9-14, Floor Examiner will provide what Operator should see - APRM Blue Bypass Lights are illuminated on pnl 3-9-14 voters for APRM 1 2 min After Tech Specs addressed Trip of C3 EECW pump for the APRM (imf sw03J)

ROLE PLAY: If dispatched to check C3 EECW pump breaker, report breaker tripped on overload and breaker smells burnt but no visible smoke or flames ROLE PLAY: If called to investigate failure of A3 EECW Pump to auto-start, wait 2 minutes and report that pump will have to be secured to continue troubleshooting ROLE PLAY: If dispatched to Intake to visually inspect EECW pumps, wait 3 minutes and report everything looks the same as when inspected on rounds earlier except that A3 is running instead of C3

-I 4 minutes after A3 EECW started .~,,~~. " .'~. . Inadvertent start of RCIC & Starts and TS addressed the H2 leak on generator

~

(bat hlts-3-12-1)

HL TS-3-12 Rev 0 Page 10 of 65 ROLE PLAY: If sent to Aux Inst Rm, report a burning smell in pnl 9 contacted EM to troubleshoot ROLE PLAY: After 5 minutes (as EM) report a short in panel - repair time unknown ROLE PLAY: If sent to pnI25-31, report relays 13AK2, 13AK3, 13AK4, and 13AK37 energized ROLE PLAY: If dispatched as AUO to the local panel, wait 2 minutes and report that the "Machine Gas Pressure" alarm is illuminated.

ROLE PLAY: 30 seconds AFTER Hydrogen addition is initiated, then report as the AUO that while you were in the area, you heard a noise and went to investigate. You found a leak on one of the generator manways that cannot be isolated.

Resets local panel alarm

~

If requested to reset local H2 panel 1 (mrf an01 b reset) i

\

If necessary, modify leak rate to r-"'_'<<~V="":-~ "*d -,- .:'. , Make leak smaller t

slow leakage to allow crew time to } (mmf eg07 1535:00) add Hydrogen. 1

- ~I If Crew opens both H2 makeup Make leak bigger

~,

valves to try to raise pressure (mmf eg07 50 3:00)

Immediately after turbine is tripped r-- "~

- ~ '" ,, -_. ., Reduces hydrogen leak & LOSP &

,f others/see summary I (bat hlts-3-12-2) 1 ROLE PLAY: If directed to check on status of offsite power, report that 500 kv system was lost due to failure of 234.to trip and problems with 5264 and 5268 trip circuits. Will continue to work to restore power. Not sure why 161 kv system was lost ROLE PLAY: If requested to trip 234 breaker locally, report it will not trip ROLE PLAY: If requested to energize '3B' KV SID Bd from U2, report as U2 that they cannot support due to their loading requirement.

If requested to reset EECW valves,

.y "

Resets EECW, RPS, & CA

',"~' V_*_~_V_

reset RPS, & Control Air, wait 5 -I (bat hlteecw) minutes

HLTS-3-12 Rev 0 Page 11 of 65 ROLE PLAY: If sent to investigate HPCI aux oil pump, wait 4 minutes and report control power fuses blown in 250v RMOV bd 3A compartment 4A.

.* __ __________*__AN.'h.',,,""

After maintenance requested and Fix HPCI aux oil pump

,...~.~~ ~ ,~_ ,"'""",'W~N" ~

RCIC placed in service I, (bat hlthpaop-1)

I I ROLE PLAY: (If requested, after entering above bat file) Call and report HPCI aux oil pump control power fuses replaced.

, --" I Xfer switch Emergency (mrf rc05k emer)

If requested to close 71-2 & 3 from breaker Xfer switch Emergency

,,..,,,~,

~

--I (mrf rc05s emer)

ROLE PLAY: Report Valves will not close from Bkr MCC

-, " " ., ,/_w"" ..x- _* ~ * """: ,,,

Xfer switch Normal

",'_' :_,: "_<<' N_""M~

If requested to return Xfer SW to norm r"'w" *..""'.- ....." - " 'yy" I (mrf rc05k norm)

Xfer switch Normal I

i l

I (mrf rc05s norm)

ROLE PLAY: Report xfer switches have been returned to Normal When requested by examiner Overrides 2na indicator to 165°F

--~----- I and ramps RM-90-26 and 27 to

,i max safe Rad (bat hlts-3-12-3)

Terminate the scenario when the following conditions are satisfied or upon request of instructor:

1) Emergency Depressurization has been initiated

2) Water level restored to +2" to +51" (or recovering)

HLTS-3-12 Rev 0 Page 12 of 65 Scenario Summary:

x.

The unit is at 100% with '38' Diesel Generator out of service for annual maintenance.