ML080460623

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2008/02/08-Reply of Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut to Entergy'S and NRC Staff'S Answers to Hearing Request and Petition to Intervene with Respect to Indian Point License Renewal Proceeding
ML080460623
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/08/2008
From: Blumenthal R
State of CT, Office of the Attorney General
To:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY/RAS
References
Docket No. 50-247/286-LR, RAS 15079
Download: ML080460623 (16)


Text

DOCKETED THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA USNRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION February 12, 2008 (8:30am)

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Docket Nos. 50-247 and 50-286 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units Nos.

2 & 3, Application for Hearing Regarding Renewal of Facility Operating Licenses Nos.

DPR-26 and DPR-64 for Additional 20-year Period REPLY OF RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CONNECTICUT TO ENTERGY'S AND NRC STAFF'S ANSWERS TO HEARING REQUEST AND PETITION TO INTERVENE WITH RESPECT TO INDIAN POINT LICENSE RENEWAL PROCEEDING I. INTRODUCTION On November 30, 2007, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut

("Attorney General"), submitted a Petition to Intervene ("Petition") in response to the filing of an Application for Operating License Renewal ("Application") for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3 by Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. ("Entergy") that is currently pending before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("Commission").

The Petition included two contentions. The first contention challenges Indian Point's failure to address the potential environmental impacts of severe accidents in the Indian Point spent fuel pool, including accidents caused by equipment failure and intentional attacks, when the likelihood of such incidents and attacks has obviously greatly increased since the plant was originally licensed in 1962. A second contention addresses the potential impacts of 20 more years of operation and fuel accumulation on the viability of k L-oT-'C 5Tc

evacuation plans, and the obvious environmental impacts of the fact that those plans are not viable.

II.

SUMMARY

Entergy and the NRC Staff do not contest the Attorney General's standing to bring this case; however, they both oppose the admission of the Attorney General's contentions on the grounds that the contentions fail to present new and significant information that should be considered under the National Environmental Policy Act

("NEPA") and address matters that have already been reviewed and decided upon by the Commission.

The attempt of NRC Staff and Entergy to exclude these critical environmental issues from a full up-to-date public review process is repugnant to public policy, public safety, and the law. As discussed below, the Attorney General's contentions meet the NRC's admissibility criteria and raise important environmental issues that Entergy and the NRC are legally required to address as a condition of re-licensing. To the extent that the contentions do not meet certain "policies" of the NRC, those policies are not authorized by and are inconsistent with NEPA. Entergy's and the NRC Staff s argument that the Attorney General has failed to show the existence of new and significant information is without merit. Further, the claim that the Commission already has considered the information offered by the Attorney General regarding the greatly increased potential for a pool fire in its general environmental impact statement for license renewal ("GEIS") is not.supported by the record. Therefore, under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2), the contentions must be admitted. Should, however, the Board conclude that

the Attorney General's contentions do not meet the strict terms of 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f),

the Attorney General requests a waiver under 10 C.F.R. § 2.335(b).

III. THE CONTENTIONS ARE ADMISSIBLE.

A. The Attorney General Complied with NEPA and NRC Regulations By Raising His Concerns About the Additional Risk of Environmental Impacts From an Additional 20 Years of Spent Fuel Storage in a Contention.

Entergy and the NRC Staff argue that the Attorney General's first contention is inadmissible because environmental impacts of spent fuel storage constitute "Category 1" impacts that are beyond the scope of this proceeding by virtue of 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c) and 51.95(c). Entergy Answer at pp. 29-33; see also NRC Staff Answer at pp. 103-105.

To the contrary, under 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(iv), new and significant information regarding increased environmental risks of terrorist attack on spent fuel pools and the increased risk due to 20 years additional accumulation of spent fuel cannot be excluded from a NEPA analysis and is directly applicable to this relicensing application.

1. NRC regulations clearly permit the Attorney General to submit a contention challenging Entergy's environmental report.

NRC regulations require a petitioner to submit contentions establishing "genuine" and "material" disputes with an applicant regarding the adequacy of information related to relicensing requests. 10 C.F.R.§ 2.309(f)(2)(vi). See also Final Rule, Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceeding-Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process, 54 Fed. Reg. 33,168,33,172 (August 11, 1989) ("1989 Final Procedural Rule") ("The rule makes clear that to the extent an environmental issue is raised in the applicant's

[environmental report], an intervenor must file contentions on that document.") An intervenor may not skip this threshold pleading requirement and wait for an EIS to be

issued by the NRC Staff. Id. Here, the Attorney General raised the issue of whether Indian Point has complied with 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(iv) by taking into account "new and significant information" regarding the additional potential for adverse environmental impacts during the period of extended operation from spent fuel pool fires and terrorist attacks on spent fuel pools that has not been raised in the applicant's environmental report.

2. 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(iv) requires Entergy to discuss significant new information regarding severe pool accidents for Indian Point license renewal.

The plain language of 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(iv) requires an applicant to address "any" new information of which it is aware. The text of 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(iv) nowhere separates impacts into Category 1 and Category 2. The NRC's use of theword "any" in this regulation plainly shows that it did not intend to limit the scope of the required discussion of significant new information to information that relates only to so-called Category 1 impacts. Wrangler Laboratories,et. al.,ALAB-951, 33 NRC 505, 513-14 (1991) ("Wrangler"), quoting Long IslandLighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1). ALAB-900, 28 NRC 275,288 (1988) ("Long IslandLighting") ("As is the case with statutory construction, interpretation of any regulation must begin with the language and structure of the provision itself.")

As noted in the NRC Staff's Answer, staff interprets NRC's regulations to permit.

disparate treatment of Category 1 and Category 2 impacts in 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(iv).

Category 1 impacts are generally excluded from consideration in a relicensing proceeding because they are deemed to be addressed through ongoing regulatory oversight and therefore any consideration in a relicensing proceeding is duplicative. This approach,

however, is contrary to the plain words of the regulation and violates the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).

As noted above, 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(iv) does not refer to Categories 1 and 2 and the staff s arbitrary limitation of new and significant information to exclude information about fuel storage is an artifact of the staff's interpretation of certain previous Commission decisions and is inconsistent with NEPA and the NRC's regulatory scheme for implementing that statute. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-05-10, 61 NRC 241, 299 (2005) (finding that a proposed interpretation of a regulation was inconsistent with both its plain meaning and the "broader context" of the regulatory scheme.) As discussed in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989) ("Marsh"), NEPA is an "action-forcing" statute that requires federal agencies to continue to take a "hard look" at the effects of their proposed actions, even after they have been approved. 409 U.S. at 372-73.

"NEPA was created to ensure that agencies will base decisions on detailed information regarding significant environmental impacts and that information will be available to a wide variety of concerned public and private actors. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FederalAviation Administration, 161 F.3d 569, 575 (9th Cir. 1998)."

Mississippi River Basin Alliance v. Westphal, 230 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 2000). As the Ninth Circuit recently stated:

When we consider the purposes that NEPA was designed by Congress to serve, what was done here is inadequate.

Congress wanted each federal agency spearheading a major federal project to put on the table, for the deciding agency's and for the public's view, a sufficiently detailed statement of environmental impacts and alternatives so as to permit informed decision making. The purpose of NEPA is to require disclosure of relevant environmental considerations

that were given a "hard look" by the agency, and thereby to permit informed public comment on proposed action...

Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738, 744-45 (9th Cir. 2004).

Here, NRC Staff assert that valuable and important information regarding unique spent fuel pool and emergency risks and inadequacies is are simply to be ignored because of staff's policy of excluding such matters. It cannot be maintained that NRC has taken a "hard look" at information if the NRC systematically excuses licensees from identifying an entire category of new and significant information bearing on the environmental impacts of a proposed nuclear operation, particularly when licensees have a high level of access to that information and when the regulatory scheme places so much reliance on applicants to address environmental issues.

Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit has held: "The purpose of NEPA is to require agencies to consider environmentally significant aspects of a proposed action, and, in so doing, let the public know that the agency's decisionmaking process includes environmental concerns. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97, 76 L. Ed. 2d 437, 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983); SierraClub v. United States Dep't of Energy, 287 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 2002)." Utahns For Better Transportationv. UnitedStates Dept. of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2002).

See, Illinois Commerce Com. v. Interstate Commerce Com., 848 F.2d 1246, 1259 (D.C.

Circuit 1988). The public has a right, therefore, to see a complete and fair evaluation of impacts, particularly about spent fuel storage and terrorism, in the site specific EIS for Indian Point.

The plain language of 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(iv), its regulatory history, and the statutory framework of NEPA therefore require Entergy to address new and significant

information bearing on the potential environmental impacts from 20 years of additional operation of Indian Point - particularly those impacts related to the additional risk of pool fires and the impacts of changing demographics on already inadequate evacuation plans.

B. The Information Submitted By the Attorney General in Support of His Contention is New and Significant.

In his first contention, the Attorney General presented significant new information, not considered in any previous NRC EIS, which shows that the potential for an attack or accident to cause a severe fire in Indian Point's high-density fuel storage pool is significant and that the consequences of such a fire would be extreme.

NRC Staff and Entergy, however, state that the issues raised in the Attorney General's contention have been discussed in various NRC documents and decisions in the past, have been declared to be Category 1 exemptions from the renewal process, and that "waste" issues are therefore outside the scope of this proceeding. See, Entergy Answer at pp. 29-31; NRC Staff Answer at pp. 103-105.

It is self-evident that various intentional attacks on prominent public facilities, culminating in the attacks of September 11, 2001, alone constitute significant new information demonstrating that intentional attacks on nuclear facilities such as the Indian Point plant are reasonably foreseeable and therefore should be addressed in an EIS.

However, no EIS has ever addressed these issues nor the fact that "diagrams of American nuclear plants were discovered in Al Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan."' Further, on July 4, 2001, the New York Times reported that an Algerian man, Ahmed Ressam, convicted of attempting to carry out a terrorist attack in Los Angeles, testified that he was 1Employees at Indian Pt. Back Safety ofReactors, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2002),

trained in an Afghanistan camp run by Osama bin Laden and received training in how to blow up "the infrastructure of a country."2 Ressam described how he was among 50 to 100 men at the camp who were being trained in "urban warfare." 3 Ressam stated that

-power plants were targets as they were labeled "enemies' installations."4 No NRC EIS has considered the impact of any of this information on relicensing of Indian Point for an additional 20 years.

Further, the Attorney General is not simply seeking review of generic "waste"'

issues, but of the additional potential for adverse environmental impacts caused by 20 years more operation of a facility that has already overloaded its spent fuel pools. The consequences of a fire or attack on a spent fuel pool at Indian Point are vastly more serious that at any other nuclear power station in the country. It is simply beyond dispute that the massive population growth in the potential impact area has greatly increased the danger over the years. This concern has never been considered in the context of an EIS.

Moreover, as the Attorney General's contention shows, a mounting body of studies by the NRC's own staff and independent scientists at the National Academy of Science shows that the NRC's understanding of the science of high-density pool storage of spent fuel, on which it has relied for decades for its environmental decisions, is inadequate and incorrect. 5 As a result, .the NRC has underestimated the risks and concomitant adverse environmental consequences of high-density pool storage of spent fuel in the past. The NRC has never addressed those studies in a draft EIS circulated to 2 Lara Mansnerus and Judith Miller, TerroristDetails His Trainingin Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2001),

3 availableat www.nci.org/01/07/04-nyt-terroristafg.htm.

id.

4id.

5National Research Council of the Nat'l Academies, Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report 17, 40 (2006).

the public or to other federal and state agencies. Thus, it has never subjected its opinions of those studies to the "critical views" that ensure an agency has fully considered the environmental implications of its actions. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 346, 349 (1989).

If the Board were to dismiss the Attorney General's contention based on the NRC Staff's dismissal or downplaying of the significant body of studies challenging the NRC's previous environmental analysis of the risk of severe pool accidents, without exposing the issues to formal public review, NEPA's purpose of ensuring rigorous environmental analysis informed by public debate would be subverted. Without that critical and legally required formal review, important environmental effects may be "overlooked or underestimated only to be discovered after the resources have been committed or the die is cast." Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349, citing Weinberger v. CatholicAction of Hawaii/PeaceEducation Project,454 U.S. 139 (1981).

A recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has a direct bearing on the Attorney General's contention. In San Luis Obispo Mothersfor Peace v.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 449 F.3d 1016 (9" Cir. 2006) ("Mothers for Peace"),

the Court reversed a 2003 decision by the NRC Commissioners that had denied the intervenors a hearing on the question of whether NEPA required preparation of an environmental impact statement to evaluate the impacts of an intentional attack on a proposed independent spent fuel storage facility at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant. Pacific Gas & Electric Company (Diablo Canyon ISFSI), CLI-03-1, 57 NRC 1 (2003) ("Diablo Canyon"). The Mothers for Peace decision is relevant here because, as

noted above, intentional attacks constitute one of the potential causes of a pool accident for which the Attorney General seeks consideration in an EIS.

In Mothersfor Peace, the Court ruled that the Commission's. rationale for refusing to consider the environmental impacts of intentional malicious attacks against nuclear facilities, as set forth in Diablo Canyon and PrivateFuel Storage (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-25, 56 NRC 340 (2002) ("PFS"), fails to meet NEPA's reasonableness standard. Id., slip op. at 6096. The Court also determined that the question of whether intentional attacks on nuclear facilities are reasonably foreseeable is a question of law rather than a question of fact. Id., at 1035. Finally, the Court held that as a matter of law, "the possibility of terrorist attack is not so 'remote and highly speculative' as to be beyond NEPA's requirements." Id., at 1027, quoting PFS, 56 NRC at 349. The Court remanded the case to the NRC for further proceedings. Id., at 1035.

The Mothersfor Peace decision is a compelling precedent that requires the NRC to consider the environmental impacts of intentional attacks on the Indian Point pool in an EIS.

In sum, Indian Point is a unique site with already full fuel storage pools in one of the most built-up areas of the nation -an area including one of the largest cities in the world. Adding 20 years more spent fuel onto the site clearly increases the likelihood of an accidental or intentional fire or other release of radiation. Accordingly, the Attorney General properly seeks a thorough and complete review of the environmental risks of such a fire or release before the Commission approves license renewal for this site.

C. Impacts of Changed Demographics toEvacuation Procedures Over the 20 Years Period are a Proper Basis for a Contention.

The Attorney General's second contention relates to the impacts on Indian Point evacuation plans and procedures created by the significant changes in regional demographics. NRC Staff and Entergy argue that emergency planning matters are outside the scope of a relicensing proceeding. Entergy Answer at pp. 34-37; NRC Staff Answer at pp. 106-107. NRC Staff has asserted that: "Emergency planning is by its very nature, neither germane to age-related degradation nor unique to the period covered by the [facility's] ... license renewal application." NRC Answer, p. 106, citation omitted.

To the contrary, the issue raised by the Attorney General in this case is specifically age-related and unique to the proposed extension period.

Initially, the arguments raised by NRC Staff and Entergy against consideration of emergency planning and evacuation issues in the context of a license extension proceeding fail to meet the mandates of NEPA for the reasons outlined previously.

NEPA requires consideration of all reasonably foreseeable impacts from a proposed action in an appropriate environmental impact statement. Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738, 744-45 (9th Cir. 2004). Arbitrarily excluding critical safety and emergency preparedness issues from consideration violates both the purpose and text of NEPA.

Further, the rationale asserted by Entergy and NRC Staff to exclude emergency planning matters does not apply in this case. As noted above, staff and applicants claim that there is nothing about emergency planning that is specifically related to age-based deterioration of a facility or specifically tied to the license extension period.

At Indian Point, however, the full storage pool is already full, and 20 years additional operation will generate 20 years additional spent fuel. That additional high

level radioactive waste will be sitting in close proximity to 50 million people - far more people than were present in the area at the time of the initial licensing, in 1962, and a number which will grow significantly during the planned extension period. The risks of that situation, and the environmental consequences of those risks, have never been the subject of an environmental review process which complies with NEPA.

The Attorney. General is not seeking a generic review of evacuation procedures around the country. The Attorney General is also not seeking a review of evacuation procedures as they currently stand at Indian Point. This latter review has already been done in a report by James Witt, former director of FEMA, and his report has shown that the established procedures at Indian Point will fail if they are ever put to the test. The Attorney General properly seeks a review and assessment of the impact of known and reasonably foreseeable demographic changes upon the already inadequate evacuation plans for this specific and unique facility over the next 20 years as additional spent fuel is continually added to the inadequate storage facilities.

The Attorney General's contention has received important corroboration from the NRC itself in recent weeks. The NRC has just imposed $650,000 in fines against Indian Point forfailing to correct its emergency notificationsystem as required by federal law.

This new information buttresses the Attorney General's position that emergency response systems at Indian Point are deficient and have collateral impacts on both emergency evacuation and incident response. These specific deficiencies at Indian Point have not 6

been adequately addressed in any NRC EIS and must be addressed now.

6 Entergy seems to argue, based on Consol. Edison Co. (Indian Pt, Units 1, 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 131-33 (2001), that the Connecticut Attorney General cannot incorporate by reference the contentions of the New York Attorney General. ConsolidatedEdison involved very different factual circumstances and different regulations that no longer exist. Further, the statement cited by Entergy is dicta. Most

IV. If the Board Concludes the Contentions are Beyond the Scope of NRC Regulations, the Attorney General Requests a Waiver.

No one disputes that the State of Connecticut has a clear interest in the issue of relicensure at Indian Point because approximately one million of its citizens could be impacted by an accident or attack on Indian Point. Any decision on relicensing -- or the imposition of license conditions -- will affect the operation of Indian Point 2 and 3 in a manner that will have a lasting impact on Connecticut's citizens.

If the Board concludes that the Attorney General's two contentions are technically beyond the typical scope of this relicensing hearing, the Attorney General seeks a petition waiver pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.335. In Turkey Point,CLI-01-7, 54 NRC 3, 12, 21-23 (2001), the Commission affirmed the denial of a contention seeking consideration of fuel pool accidents, in part on the ground that spent fuel storage impacts constitute Category 1 impacts that are excused from consideration, and that the petitioner had not filed a waiver petition pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.335. The Attorney General wishes to preserve his rights, therefore, under this provision of the NRC regulations.

In order to seek a waiver under 10 C.F.R. § 2.335, a party must demonstrate that there are unique or special circumstances. Clearly, Indian Point involves the type of "special circumstances" required to obtain a regulatory waiver under 10 C.F.R. § 2.335.

The extremely high and increasing population density, inadequate evacuation protocols, overburdened fuel storage pools and high risk of terrorism all are uniquely relevant to a license extension proceeding at Indian Point.

importantly, Entergy fails to note that the regulations involved in that case were substantially revised on January 15, 2004, to add § 2.309(0(3), which explicitly permits incorporation of other parties contentions by reference without any of the limiting language suggested by ConsolidatedEdison.

As noted above, NRC has just fined Indian Point for its failure, once again, to correct its siren system in violation of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and various NRC Orders. Furthermore, On November 29, 2007, Westchester County, New York announced that it would not participate in evacuation plan drills out of concern with Entergy's commitment to emergency planning is inadequate. 7 Clearly, Indian Point's emergency planning and preparedness, matters that directly impact the citizens of the State of Connecticut, involve changed and special circumstances.

Therefore, should the Board conclude that the contentions are outside the scope of the NRC's license renewal proceedings regulations, the Attorney General respectfully requests a waiver of NRC regulations exempting emergency planning from license 8

renewal review. 10 C.F.R. 50.47(a)(1)(ii).

7 Westchester to Boycott Nuke'Plant Drills, The Journal News, November 29, 2007.

8 Should the Board conclude that the contentions are beyond the strict scope of this renewal proceeding, the Attorney General reserves the right to file a formal waiver petition and affidavit as required by regulations.

CONCLUSION Under 10 C.F.R. § 2.3 09, the State of Connecticut has interests that will be directly affected by the outcome of this proceeding. The Attorney General therefore asks that the Commission grant its petition to intervene both as of right and as a discretionary matter, and that the Attorney General be made a party to this proceeding. Participation by the Attorney General in this matter is clearly in the public interest, and should be permitted. For these reasons, the Attorney General requests that the Commission grant his intervention petition, in order to comply with the law and fully address the critical concerns raised in that petition.

Dated: February 8, 2008 Respectfully Submitted, RICHARD BLUMENTHAL ATTORNEY GENERAL 55 Elm Street P.O. Box 120 Hartford, CT 06141-0120 Tel: (860) 808-5318 Fax: (860) 808-5387

CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have caused the foregoing document to be sent by electronic mail or first class mail to all parties on the service list for this proceeding as compiled by the Commission.

February 8, 2008 Robert Snook Assistant Attorney General 55 Elm Street PO Box 120 Hartford, CT 06141-0120 Telephone: (860) 808-5020 Facsimile: (860) 808-5347 E-mail: Robert.SnookaDuo.state.ct.us