Text

Draft - Section C Operating Exam (Folder 2)
	ML051320192
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	03/17/2005
From:	Godley R; Constellation Energy Group
To:	Conte R; NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
	Conte R
References
	Download: ML051320192 (194)
	v • d • e

NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 1 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 49 RECIRC FLOW UNIT FAlLURElFEEDPUMP TRIP WITH PARTIAL RUNBACWTURBINE HIGH VIBRATION/FAILURE TO SCRAM PREPARE R G. Bobka DATE 2/10/05 VALIDATED R. Lange. B. Moore, M. Smith DATE 2/16/05 DATE 3!(b,/U-GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING OPERATIONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE CON F I G U RAT1 0 N CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Length: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Initial Power Level: 1 OO%, above the 100% Rod Line The scenario begins at 100% reactor power. The crew will add water to the Suppression Pool using the High Pressure Core Spray System (CSH) per normal operating procedure N2-OP-33, High Pressure Core Spray. While water is being added to the Suppression Pool, Recirc Flow Unit input to APRM/RBM fails downscale resulting in APRM high power scram signals inputted into the Power Range Monitoring System logic modules. The crew will bypass the affected instrument per normal operating procedure and annunciator response procedures.

The crew experiences a Reactor Feedwater pump trip and partial automatic Recirc Flow Control Valve (FCV) Runback. The partial runback occurs due to a trip RCS FCV hydraulic power units. The result is slowly lowering reactor water level due to failure of reactor power to be automatically reduced to within the capacity of the single remaining operating Feedwater pump.

Reactor water level will slowly approach the automatic scram low water level of 159 inches.

The crew will manually insert CRAM rods to reduce power approximately 10% to within the capacity of the single remaining operating Feedwater pump (65%). This action will return reactor water level to the normal band of 178 to 187 inches.

After the plant is stable, the total Steam flow signal to Feedwater Level Control operates erratically resulting in water level transient. The crew will take manual contol of Feedwater to stabilize level. Manual level control will be required for the remainder of the scenario.

An inadvertent opening of an ADS/SRV valve occurs. The crew will take actions required by procedures to close the valve before a manual scram is required at Suppression Pool water temperature of 1 10°F.

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

When the ADS/SRV is closed, Main Turbine vibration begins to rise. The crew will manually scram the reactor and trip the Main Turbine when procedure limits of 12 mils are exceeded, since there are no automatic turbine trips associated with turbine vibration. When the reactor is scrammed all control rods will fail to fully insert resulting in reactor power level of approximately 20%. Heat will be added to the containment while operating SRVs for pressure control. The transient is complicated by loss of the remaining operating Feedwater pump and the inability to maintain water level above MSCRWL (-39 inches). The crew will perform an RPV Blowdown to lower RPV pressure which allows the use of RHS via Shutdown Cooling line. This is the last remaining preferred injection system. If, in the SROs judgment, additional injection sources are required to restore and maintain RPV water level above MSCRWL, Alternate Injection systems can now be lined up to restore and maintain level above -39 inches. The crew will execute Alternate Control Rod Insertion procedures to fully insert the stuck control rods, such that the reactor will remain shutdown.

Major Procedures Exercised:

EOP-RPV, PC, C5, C2. SOP-6, 29,10lD, 21 and 9.

EOP-6 Attachment 14 EAL Classification:

SAE 2.2.2 Any RPS scram setpoint has been exceeded AND automatic and manual scrams fail to result in a control rod pattern which assures reactor shutdown conditions without boron AND EITHER Power >4% OR Suppression Pool temperature >llO°F Termination Criteria:

RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is restored and maintained in normal level band 160 to 200 inches and all control rods are fully inserted.

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-20 or equivalent.

B. PresetdFunction Key Assignments

1. Malfunctions:

a. RD17Z

b. RD17Z

c. RP12A

d. RP12B

e. CU08

f. RR08B

g. FW03A

h. RR31

i. RR30

j.

FW35

k. TU02 I. MCOI

m. MCOI

n. FW02A

0. FW02B

p. FWO2C

q. RP14A

r. RP14B

s. RP02 RD17 for All Banks, 17 RDI 7 for All Banks, 00 TUA 5 seconds RRCS Failure (Div I)

QUEUED RRCS Failure (Div II)

QUEUED Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation Fail, TRUE QUEUED RR Flow Unit Failure Downscale B F3 Feedwater Pump Trip PIA, TRUE F4 HPU B PMP Number 2 Failure, TRUE F4 TUA 2 seconds HPU B PMP Number 1 Failure, TRUE TUA 2 seconds; TRA 10 seconds Steam Flow Input Fails to FW Control, TRUE RELATIVES USED TO CAUSE ERRATIC OPERATION QUEUED ET0 1 F4 F5 Main Turbine Vibration High Value 9; Ramp Time 3:OO minutes Main Condenser Air lnleakage Value 15; Ramp Time 3:OO minutes Main Condenser Air lnleakage Value 100; Ramp Time 5:OO minutes Condensate Booster Pump Trip P2A, TRUE TUA 8:OO minutes for all 3 FWO2s Condensate Booster Pump Trip PZB, TRUE Condensate Booster Pump Trip P2C, TRUE RRCS ARI Failure/Defeated Div I, TRUE TUA 1 :30 minutes RRCS ARI Failure/Defeated Div II, TRUE TUA 1 :30 minutes RPS Failure to Scram Automatic, TRUE TUA 1 :30 minutes F6 F6 ET02 ET02 ET02 ET02 F8 F8 F9 NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

t. RC02

u. RH08

2. Remotes:

a. MSOGA

b. MSOGB

c. MSOGC

d. MSOGD

3. Overrides:

a. None RCIC Failure Isolation of RCIC, TRUE TUA 1 :00 minute Group 5 Isolation Failure SDC MOVs, TRUE TUA 2:OO minutes ET03 FIO Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, DEFEATED TUA 1 :30 minutes Defeat Level 1 MSIV Isolation, DEFEATED TUA 1 :30 minutes Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, DEFEATED TUA 1 :30 minutes Defeat Level I MSlV Isolation, DEFEATED TUA 1 :30 minutes F7 F7 F7 F7

4. Annunciators:

a. None C. Equipment Out of Service

1. All OPRMs are inoperable due to electronic circuitry deficiencies D. Support Documentation

1. Working copy of N2-OP-33, H.3.0 for use by crew OR plastic sleeve procedure sections to facilitate placekeeping. An already place-kept copy of F.l.O is to be made and provided with turnover sheet, since the scenario assumes this section has already been completed.

E. Miscellaneous

1. Red rod line sign posted

2. At APRM #2 Voter Module ensure Memory reset. At APRM Module, select Trip Status and Reset Memory, to ensure no pre-existing trip lights are in on both the voter module and the APRM.

3. EVENT TRIGGERS

a. ET01 Mode Switch in Shutdown with Scram Reset (Event Trigger 82)

Automatically resets RD17Z to 00 when RPS is reset during EOP-6 Att 14 NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

to allow rods to be scrammed to 00. Setup such that the Console Operator does NOT have to manually clear RDI 7 following RPS reset.

b. ET02 Mode Switch in Shutdown (Event Trigger 8) Initiates increase in MCOl magnitude to 100% AND all three Condensate Booster Pump trip FW02 malfunctions with Ramp Time of 500 minutes after Mode Switch is placed in SHUTDOWN for reactor scram.

e. ET03 RClC Turbine Speed >72% in auto (Event Trigger 49) Initiates malfunction RC02 RClC Isolation following RClC start after 1 :30 minutes.

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

II.

TITLE SRO SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION NAME TITLE NAME PART I:

shift.

To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the 0

Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

PART II:

To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Lit Control Room Annunciators 0

Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)

(SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:

0 Reactor Power = 100%

0 Loadline = >100%

0 All OPRMs are inoperable since yesterday, due to electronic circuitry deficiencies.

TS 3.3.1.I Required Action F.l and F.2 are in place for Function 2e. Engineering and I&C are actively pursuing resolution and will have issue resolved by tomorrow.

PART I I I :

Remarks/Plan ned Evolutions:

Raise Suppression Pool Water level to 200 feet using CSH pump per N2-OP-33.

Establish CSH pump flow rate of 5500 to 6000 gpm. N2-OP-33 F.l.O Standby Condition Status Checks are comdete.

PART IV:

To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:

0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)

ATC RO BOP RO NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

Scenario ID#

INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)

What Happened?

What we did?

Why? (Goals)

Other Options?

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

Ill.

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:

CT-1.O CT-2.0 CT-3.0 CT-4.0 Given the plant at power and inadvertent opening of an ADS/SRV valve, the crew will close the SRV to preclude a manual scram if Suppression Pool temperature reaches 11 OOF, per N2-SOP-34 Given a failure of the reactor to scram and RPV Blowdown required, the crew will avoid exceeding HCTL by a combination of terminating and preventing injection, injecting boron and operating Suppression Pool Cooling per N2-EOP-C5.

Given a failure of the reactor to scram and the RPV has been blown down per EOP-C2, the crew will resume injection when RPV pressure lowers below the MSCP, to restore and maintain RPV water level between the MSCWL and 202.3 inches.

Given a failure of the reactor to scram the crew will fully insert all control rods using alternate methods per N2-EOP-6 Attachment 14 B. Performance Objectives:

PO-1.o PO-2.0 PO-3.0 Given the plant with direction to raise Suppression Pool water level, the crew will lineup High pressure Core Spray and raise level to 200 feet per N2-OP-33.

Given downscale failure of a Recirc Flow Unit, the crew will bypass APRM 2 per applicable Annunciator Response Procedures and N2-OP-92.

Given the reactor plant operating at full power when a Feedwater pump trip and failure of RCS to completely runback, the crew will perform a Rapid Power Reduction, insert cram rods to lower power NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

and stabilize the plant before a low level scram occurs per N2-SOP-6, SOP-29 and SOP-I01 D PO-4.0 Given the plant operating at power and misoperation of FWLC system due to failed steam flow input signal, the crew will take manual control of FWLC and stabilize level per N2-SOP-6 PO-5.0 Given the plant operating at power with an inadvertent opening of an ADS/SRV the crew will close the valve before Suppression Pool temperature reaches 110°F to preclude a manual scram requirement, per N2-SOP-34.

PO-6.0 Given the plant operating at power with high Main Turbine Vibration, the crew will initiate a manual scram and manual turbine trip when vibration exceed 12 mils per applicable Annunciator Response Procedures and N2-SOP-21.

PO-7.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram, the crew will establish control rod insertion in accordance with EOP-6, Attachment 14.

PO-8.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power 4% or above and reactor water level 100 inches or above, the crew will terminate and prevent injection with the exception of SLS, CRD and RCIC.

PO-9.0 Given a failure of WCS to isolate when SLS is injected, the crew will manually close WCS containment isolation valves from P602.

PO-I 0.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with loss of Feedwater the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown and inject with alternate ATWS injection systems to restore and maintain RPV water level above MSCRWL per EOPs.

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 1 SuppressIan Po0 PO-I.o Fil Jtilizing CSH Pump Zrew Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.

SRO Directs Suppression Pool fill per N2-OP-33, H.3.0 Enters Tech Spec 3.5.1 (as directed from N2-OP-33) Condition B and initates Required Actions B.l Verify by administrative means RClC System is OPERABLE when RClC is required to be OPERABLE. (Completion Time is Immediately)

AND B.2 Restore HPCS System to OPERABLE status.

(Completion Time is 14 days)

BOP RO 0 Verify Subsection F.l.O, Standby Condition Status Checks is complete. (Actual performance is NOT required because completion was provided in Shiff Turnover in forma tion.)

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS After the CSH pump is started, Suppression Pool Level (SPL) will rise from initial level of 199.8 feet. It will take about 3 minutes to raise SPL to 200 feet.

NRC Scenario 1

-1 1-3 Verify SM has declared CSH System inoperable.

CAUTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE CSH PUMP TO OPERATE IN A RUNOUT FLOW CONDITION OF > 7175 GPM OR PUMP DAMAGE MAY OCCUR.

MINIMIZE AMOUNT OF TIME CSH IS OPERATING ON MINIMUM FLOW OR PUMP DAMAGE MAY OCCUR.

Start CSH*PI, HPCS PUMP 1.

Verify open CSH*MOV105, MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VLV.

Monitor CST AND Suppression Pool Levels.

Raise rate of transferring water from CST to Suppression Pool (5500 to 6000 gpm) by performing the following:

Throttle open CSH*MOVI 11, TEST RETURN TO SUPPRESSION POOL.

WHEN CSH System Flow is

> 634 gpm, verify closed CSH*MOVlOS, MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VLV.

March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0

0 0

0 EVENT 2 Recirc Flow Unit B Failed Downscale PO-2.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F3 key:

RR086, RR Flow Unit Failure Downscale B F 3 )

2/4 MDL 1-4 have received one of the two WHEN desired Suppression Pool Level is reached, close CSH*MOVI 11, TEST RETURN TO SUPPRESSION POOL.

WHEN HPCS SYSTEM FLOW is less than 634 GPM, verify open CSH*MOV105, MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VLV.

Stop CSH*Pl, HPCS PUMP 1.

Verify closed CSH*MOVI 05, MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VLV.

Notify SM that 2CSH*MOVl I 1 is closed AND operability concern per DER 2-98-0557 no longer exist.

Restore CST Level, as required, per N2-0P-4.

ATC RO Identifies and reports annunciators to SRO Implements ARP actions (Significant ARP 603202 60321 7)

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS required trips. An additional trip from any unbypassed A PRM will cause a reactor SCRAM.

Rod withdrawal block.

The following annunciators alarm:

603202 APRM TRIP SYSTEM UPSCAL E/INOPERABLE 603208 APRM TRIP SYSTEM UPSCALE 603217 FLOW REFERENCE OFF NORMAL 603218 OPRM TRIP ENABLED 603442 CONTROL ROD OUT BLOCK At P603 Rod Select Matrix Right Side APRM 2 Amber UPSC ALARM lit APRM 2 Red UPSC TRIP OR INOP lit OPRM 2 White TRIP ENABLED lit FLOW White CA MPA R lit Process Computer points alarm consistent with conditions. RDSBC12, NMPUCO8, NMPBC47, NMPBC33, NMPBC22, NMPBC17, NMP2Cl21, NMP2C108 At P608 backpanel, APRM 2 Display includes FLOW 0.0% (pre-failure value is 95.5% flow) 2/4 MDL 2 Module (and 1,3,4 modules) indicate AP RM 2 HlG#/lNOP TRIP fed LED lit rhese are 603202 actions 1 Determine by Red UPSC/INOP light on 2CEC*PNL603 which APRM Channel has alarmed.

(APRM 2 is the affected instrument) 7 IF a SCRAM has occurred, THEN enter N2-SOP-101 C, Reactor Scram. (No scram occurs) 3 IF NO SCRAM has occurred, THEN perform the following:

Check the other APRM channels to verify that NO SCRAM should have occurred.

IF a SCRAM should have occurred, THEN enter the E merge n cy 0 perat i ng Procedures. (Scram should not have occurred)

IF NO SCRAM should have occurred, THEN perform the following:

IF required, THEN lower Reactor Power per N2-OP-101 D or N2-SOP-1 0 1 D. (Not required because instrument failure is the cause)

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Other FLOW indications on APRM 1,3,4 chassis reads about 95.5%.

Role Play:

If asked report all other Voter Module indications are consistent with Voter module 2 ind icat ions.

Note ARP actions for 603202 and 60321 7 will likely be performed concurrently or 60321 7 actions may be performed before 603202 actions.

Refer to Technical Specifications for actions. (Inform SRO to pe rfo r m )

Bypass the affected APRM per N2-0P-92.

(See later Scenario steps for bypassing the APRM) 0 Reset the memory on the following per N2-OP-92, Section F.8.0:

2/4 MDL 1 2/4 MDL 2 2/4 MDL 3 2/4 MDL 4 0 Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm.

ATC RO/BOP RO These are 603217 actions Determine which channel is in alarm and whether UPSC or COMPAR amber light(s) are illuminated on 2CEC*PNL603.

COMPAR (generated by RBM)

At 2CEC*PNL608 determine NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Failed Flow Unit is bypassed by bypassing APRM 2 After A PRM 2 is bypassed all annunciators and P603 indications return to pre-transient conditions.

which flow channel is high/low by comparison of flow indications.

IF desired, THEN bypass the affected APRM per N2-OP-92.

ATC ROIBOP RO Bypass APRM 2with Bypassing Joystick per N2-0P-92 H.2.

APRM channel bypass can be performed by placing the APRM BYPASS joystick to the APRM channel to be bypassed. This action will also bypass the associated Recirculation Flow circuitry and OPRM. Only 1 APRM channel may be bypassed.

The actions in this section are performed at 2CEC*PNL603 unless otherwise noted.

CAUTION Bypass joysticks can become electrically misaligned after numerous bending motions due to "Metal Creep". Any bypass function should NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 2 SRO Actions be verified by channel BYPASS lights to ensure that only the intended channel is bypassed.

k * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Verify NO other APRM in bypass for the instrument to be bypassed.

Place the APRM BYPASS joystick to the bypass position 2.

IF APRM 2 was bypassed, THEN verify the following:

APRM 2 BYPASS light is lit on 2CEC*PNL603.

BYP is displayed in inverse video in the header for APRM 2 (2 - 4) Chassis at H13-P608.

Blue BYPASSED LED is lit for APRM 1 (2 - 4) on EACH 2/4 MDL at H13-P608.

3 Report APRM 2 bypassed to SRO SRO Directs APRM 2 bypassed Notifies Operations and Plant Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning Enters Tech Spec 3.3.1.I RPS Function 2 APRMs. No action is required since only 1 APRM NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 3 Feedwater Pump A trip with partial RCS FCV runback PO-3.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F4key:

FWO3A Feedwater Pump Trip PIA, TRUE RR31 HPU B PMP Number 2 Failure, TRUE TUA 2 seconds RR30 HPU B PMP Number 1 Failure, TRUE TUA 2 seconds; TRA I O seconds channel is inoperable.

Refer to TRM 3.3.2 Control Rod Block Instrumentation Function 4.

2 channels are required for the function, which is to initiate a rod block. With 1 channel inoperable, 3 channels are still operable. No other action is required.

Conducts post event brief SRO Directs entry into:

N2-SOP-6 Feedwater Failures N2-SOP-29 Sudden Reduction In Core Flow N2-SOP101 D Rapid Power Reduction 0 Directs Cram Rod insertion (SOP-29 and SOP-101 D action)

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS The following annunciators alarm:

851509 REACTOR FEED PUMPlA/lB/IC AUTO TRIP 851519 REAC FEED PMP lA/IB/IC MOTOR ELEC FAULT 602210 FCV A PART CLOSURE RFP TRIP 602222 FCV B PART CLOSURE RFP TRIP 602102 RECIRC FCV B HYDRAULICS INOPERABLE 602104 RECIRC FCV B BACK UP HYDR INOPERABLE 602106 RECIRC FCV B MOTION INHIBIT 603139 REACTOR WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW At P603 RPV water level slowly lowers and reaches its lowest values of about 162 inches after about 4 minutes (Low Level scram setpoint is 159.3 inches)

APRM power lowers to about 75% and Total Core Flow is reduced to about 74 Mlbm/hr. A successful runback would result in power level of about 65%,

NRC Scenario 1 3 When conditions stabilize, enters Tech Spec 3.4.1 Condition B Required Action to Declare the recirculation loop with lower flow to be not in operation. With Completion time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . With both recirculation loops operating but the flows not matched, the flows must be matched within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . If matched flows are not restored, the recirculation loop with lower flow must be declared not in operation, as required by Required Action B.1. This Required Action does not require tripping the recirculation pump in the lowest flow loop when the mismatch between total jet pump flows of the two loops is greater than the required limits. Now the one loop part of the LCO statement applies. Those action (single loop) are required to be completed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS which is within the capacity of one Feedwater pump.

FWS-LVIOB goes to 100% open At P851 Feedwater Pump B amps rise to about 530 (max) and flow rises to top scale 24,000 gpm At P602 RCS FCV A goes to minimum (correct response)

RCS FCV B goes to about 70% (incorrect response due to HPU trips)

Loop Flow A about 20 Mlbm/hr Loop Flow B about 55 Mlbm/hr (Flow Mismatch Tech Spec entry is required)

When control rods are inserted, reactor power will lower. Inserting the first 4 cram rods results in lowering power from 75% to about 63%. As power is lowered to single Feedwater pump capacity, RPV water level will rise and return to within the normal level band of 178 inches to 187 inches and Feedwater Pump B.

FWS-LVlOB throttles closed to flow return pump flow and amps to normal values.

Note Crew initiates N2-SOP-29 flowchart decision blocks by answering YESINO questions.

ATC RO Reports Feedwater Pump A trip and RPV water level low alarms Monitors reactor power, pressure and water level Enters N2-SOP-6 Places LVIOA in MAN and full closes When directed, inserts Cram Rods using Continuous Insert button for rapid Power reduction SROlBOP ROlATC RO Enter and implement the flowchart actions per N2-SOP-29 when directed from SOP-29.1 Is a Recirc pump in service?

YES NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACT1 ONSl PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Note With operation above the 100% rod line, the crew will insert CRAM rods. It is expected that the ATC RO will insert the first four cram rods to position 00 using P603 CONTINUOUS INSERT pushbutton. (EVENT 2 Reactivity Manipulation for ATC RO)

Reactor Power will lower and Rod Line will be reduced below 100% rod line With OPRMs inoperable the crew will monitor APRM and LPRMs for power oscillations and manually scram, if observed.

CONSOLE OPERATOR If directed to remove Condensate Demineralizers from service due to the power reduction, manually enter REMOTES, as required to establish the directed number of in-service demineralizers:

FWOIA-H, CONDENSATE DEMINERALIZER, OFF Is core flow to left of natural circ line? NO Core flow AND Power within Scram Region? NO Core flow AND power within Exit Region? NO Reduce rodline below 100% by inserting CRAM rods. (Also being inserted to lower power for SOP-101D actions by ATC RO)

> 3 OPRMs operable? NO Plant in Heightened Awareness Zone? NO Recover per Attachment 2. Note that actual recovery action to reset the motion inhibit cannot be performed until repairs are completed on HPUs)

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Plant should now be stabilized at about 60-65% power. The crew will make notifications and Plant Management will be consulted to establish coordination and overall direction as to how recovery will be implemented.

SRO should address RCS Flow Mismatch RCS FCV motion inhibit requires repairs of HPUs Electric Fault trip of Feedwater Pump A 0 Bypassed APRM 2 due to failed Flow Unit EVENT 4 Steam Flow Signal Failure po-4.a CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction and relatives by depressing F5 key:

FW35 Steam Flow Input Fails to FW, TRUE Steam flow signal operation becomes erratic.

Feedwater flow and RPV water level becomes unstable.

603139 RPV WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW 603307 RWM ROD BLOCK NRC Scenario 1

-21 SRO Conducts post event brief ATC RO Identifies and reports misoperation ofFWLC toSRO Enters N2-SOP-6 Places FWS-HICIOIOB (LVIOB) controller OR Master FWLC controller to MANUAL Stabilizes RPV water level between 160 to 200 inches (1 78 to 187 inches normal band)

March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 5 Inadvertent opening of ADSlSRV PSVl2l PO-5.0 This event should proceed while the crew is discussing placing FWLC to single element in response to the previous event.

CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, manually enter override:

P628 SWITCH Page 2 of 3 P628-B22C-S4A-A; P628 ADS Valve PSVl21, OPEN The following annunciators alarm:

601537 ADS VALVESISAFETY VALVES LEAKING 601548 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE OPEN 601553 ADS ACC TANK 32/33/34 PRESSURE LOW 851506 CONDENSATE TRANSFER PUMP 1N1B AUTO START SRO Directs entry into N2-SOP-6 for mi soperati on of F W LC Conducts post event brief o Notifies Operations and Plant Management o Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning SRO Directs entry into N2-SOP-34 Declares PSV121 ADS valve inoperable.

Refers to Tech Specs 3.5.1. With one ADS valve inoperable no actions is required. Currently the minimum number of REQUIRED ADS valves is still met with one valve inoperable.

Refers to Tech Spec 3.6.1.7.2 and NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 851507 CNST XFER PMP DISCH HEADER PRESSURE LOW At P601 MSS*PSVl21 red light lit and DIV I MSS*PSVl21 OPEN white postage stamp lit indicating valve is open.

At P603, MWe drop is observed as turbine control valve closes slightly.

Suppression Pool temperature rises and approaches 90 F.

EVENT 5 BOP RO Actions recognizes requirement to perform N2-OSP-ISC-M@002 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

May direct one loop of RHS placed in Suppression Pool Cooling.

o IF RHS is placed in Suppression Pool Cooling, declares RHS inoperable for LPCl mode and enters Tech Spec 3.5.1 CONDITION A REQUIRED ACTION A.l with 7 day COMPLETION TIME.

IF Suppression Pool Temperature exceeds 90°F, enters EOP-PC.

Notifies Operations and Plant Management.

Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning.

Conducts post event brief.

BOP RO Reports annunciators Enters and executes N2-SOP-34 Identify which SRV is open. (PSV121)

Place the keylock switch for PSV21 to the OFF position.

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

I NSTRUCTOR ACT1 ONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS PSV121 remains open after pulling F79 and Did the SRV close? NO (Detail 1)

Use one or more of following indications to verify SRV status:

SPDS Computer ERF Computer Points MSSZCI 1 1 ; MSSZCI 28 Reactor Power Change Generator Output Change Steam FlowlFeed Flow Mismatch Accoustic Monitor Reduce power to approximately 85%

per N2-SOP-101D. (NIA, currently below 85% power)

IF Average Suppression Pool temperature is approaching 110°F......

THEN Scram the reactor per N2-SOP-101 C and continue here.

Proceeds to back panel P628 with fuse pullers and protective safety equipment (PPE). Using Detail 2, remove the fuses for the affected SRV in the following order until the SRV closes:

1. C Solenoid fuse

2. A Solenoid fuse (CT-1.O) 0 For 2MSFPSV121 C Solenoid P628 Strip K F79 and F80 NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS F80. At P601 position indicating (red and green) lights for PSVl21 are now deenergized.

PSV 121 closes when F9A and FlOA are pulled.

Generator MWe rises and ERF Computer Points indicate SRV is closed.

EVENT 5 ATC RO Actions pulled 0 For 2MSS*PSVl21 A Solenoid P628 Strip F9A and FlOA (CT-1.O)

Did SRV close? NO for C solenoid but YES when A solenoid fuses are pulled.

Detail 1 Use one or more of following indications to verify SRV status:

SPDS Computer ERF Computer Points MSSZC111; MSSZC128 Reactor Power Change Generator Output Change Steam FlowlFeed Flow Mismatch Accoustic Monitor Exits SOP-34 and informs SRO SRV is closed.

If directed starts RHS in Suppression Pool Cooling.

ATC RO 3 Monitors parameters to assist in determining SRV position.

7 Monitors and control RPV water level in directed band in manual.

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 6 Rising Main Turbine Vibration with minor Main Condenser Air In-leakage PO-6.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F6 key:

TU02 Main Turbine Vibration High Value 9; Ramp Time 3:OO minutes MCOI Main Condenser Air lnleakage (F6)

Value 15; Ramp Time 3:OO minutes (F6)

Main Turbine vibration and Offgas Train flow rise.

After about 1:30 minutes Turbine vibration reaches 7 mils and the following annunciators alarm:

851 140 TURBINE GENERATOR VIBRATION HIGH 851306 OFFGAS SYSTEM TROUBLE May direct fur her power reduction by Cram rod insertion When vibration or vacuum limits are exceeded, directs reactor scram and turbine trip.

Notifies Operations and Plant Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning Conducts post event brief NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS After about 3 minutes Turbine vibration reaches 12 mils requiring a manual reactor scram and turbine trip. The following annunciators alarm:

851 129 TURBINE GENERATOR VIBRATION HIGH-HIGH Reports and implements annunciator 851 129 actions by monitoring for condition that require further actions:

May initiate Process Computer Group Point 14 to monitor turbine vibration on CRT display.

0 0

IF any Bearing Vibration is 10 mils for 15 minutes. Trip OR verify Main Turbine Tripped in accordance with N2-SOP-21, Turbine Trip.

IF any Bearing Vibration is 12 mils, verify Main Turbine Trip in accordance with N2-SOP-21.

Refer to N2-0P-21 Section H.l.O, Operation With High Vibration in Alarm or High Vibration Trip Disabled.

IF any Bearing Vibration is >9 mils with >3 mils/minute rate of change THEN trip OR verify Main Turbine Tripped in accordance with N2-SOP-21, Turbine Trip.

IF Bearing Vibration is projected to exceed 30 mils NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS following a Turbine Trip THEN break condenser vacuum in accordance with N2-OP-21, Subsection H.1.4.

7 WHEN any vibration limit is exceeded or when directed, enters N2-SOP-21 and implements flowchart actions Has Tubine tripped? NO Power >25%? YES SCRAM the reactor per N2-SOP-I 01 C. (ATC RO to perform action).

Manually trip Turbine using TRIP pushbuttons. (BOP RO to perform action).

Did the Turbine trip using TRIP pushbuttons? YES Verify MSV/ CV/ ClVs closed AND TBVs open to control pressure.

Verify the following:

House loads transfer Megawatts are - 0 R230, R925 open 41 M, 41 E open MDS1/233N open NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

I NSTRUCTOR ACT1 ONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 6 ATC RO actions Tthe crew is directed to manually scram and trip the turbine on either of two parameters during this event. The crew must take these actions based on high turbine vibration

(> 12mils) or lowering condenser vacuum (prior to 22.1 inch Hg, automatic turbine trip setpoint.

ATC RO Monitors reactor power, level and pressure If directed, implements N2-SOP-9 actions for lowering condenser vacuum 0 If directed, lowers power per N2-SOP-101 D to stabilize vacuum. (Since already operating at reduced power, a further power reduction is not likely to be directed).

Verify proper operation of:

SJAE per N2-OP-9 Off-gas per N2-OP-42 Circ Water per N2-OP-1OA Reactor Power >25%? YES IF Condenser vacuum is approaching 22.1 inches Hg.....

THEN....

Scram the reactor per N2-SOP-101 C Trip the turbine per N2-SOP21 NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 7 and 8 Manual Reactor Scram and ATWS PO-7.0 and 8.0 The following preset malfunction become active:

RD17Z RD17 for All Banks, 17 QUEUED RP12A RRCS Failure (Div I)

QUEUED RP12B RRCS Failure (Div II)

QUEUED Reactor is manually scrammed by placing the Mode Switch in Shutdown. RPS trips but Control rods insert only to position 17 (blanks on 4 Rod Display) due to %hydraulic lock.

Reactor power will stabilized at about 20%.

RPV water level will lower and EOP entry conditions are met. All turbine bypass valves open as pressure rises and some SRVs begin to cycle.

The following also occur (become active and start timing) when the Mode Switch is placed in Shutdown, Event Trigger ET02:

MCOI Main Condenser Air lnleakage Value 100; Ramp Time 5:OO minutes TUA 8:OO minutes for all 3 FW02A, B and C FWO2A Condensate Booster Pump Trip P2A Directs Mode Switch placed in Shutdown Repeats back scram report Enters EOP-RPV on low RPV water level (4% and level above 100 inches directs terminating and prevent injection at P603 except boron, CRD and RClC to standard level band of 50 to 80 inches with Feedwater system.

Directs terminating and preventing injection at P601.

Per override L-5, IF power is

>4% AND level > -14 inches (TAF) AND an SRV is open AND SPT >1 IOOF, directs injection terminated and prevents again UNlTlL either APRM are dnsc OR 0 RPV Level reaches TAF (about -55 inches corrected per Fig Z)

Records Fuel Zone Level NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS As the SRO directs initial EOP-CS actions and the ROs perform those actions, the following conditions should be achieved, before conditions further degrade (loss of Condensate Booster Pumps occurs eight minutes after the Mode Switch is placed in Shutdown:

Level stabilized and controlled 50 to 80 inches with F W and RCIC. Other injection sources have been "terminated and prevented" from injecting except boron, CRD and RCIC.

Pressure stabilized and controlled 800 to 1000 psis with BPVs and SRVs. SRVs only after MSlV closure.

Both loops of SLS are injecting at 86 gpm. As Suppression Pool water temperature rises, RHS is placed in Suppression Pool Cooling lineup.

NRC Scenario 1

-32

~

Directs injection using only Detail G systems to restore and maintain level above MSCRWL Directs from EOP-C5 PRESSURE Act ions RPV pressure stabilized below 1052 psig with EHC (Bypass Valves) and SRVs. Standard pressure band 800 to 1000 psig When MSlV close, standard pressure band 800 to 1000 psig with SRVs Restore pneumatics to the Drywell WAIT until Cold Shutdown boron weight is injected (SLS tank level below 1450 gallons).

Directs from EOP-C5 POWER Actions Mode switch in Shutdown March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 8 and 9 ATC RO Actions as directed.

PO-8.0 Initiate RRCS (EOP-6 Att 13)

Reduce Recirc to minimum With power >4%, trip the RCS Pumps When pressure and level are under control, directs control rod insertion per EOP-6 4 BEFORE SPT reaches 1 IOOF, directs SLS boron injection WAIT until boron injection is no longer required before terminating SLS injection.

WHEN SPT reaches 90°F enters EOP-PC Directs both loops of RHS placed in Suppression Pool Cooling ATC RO 0

0 0

0 Places Mode Switch in Shutdown Provides scram report, including APRMs are not downcale and all rods are not fully inserted Initiates RRCS by arming and depressing manual initiation pushbuttons per EOP-6 Att 13 Terminates and prevents P603 injection by placing FW control in NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 7 and 8 BOP RO Actions as directed.

CONSOLE OPERATOR IF requested to bypass MSlV low level isolations per EOP-6 Attachment 10, immediately activate remote timer by depressing F7 key THEN WAIT until the 1 :30 minute TUA timer times out and report the jumpers are installed MSOGA Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, DEFEATED, TUA 1 :30 minutes MSOGB Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, DEFEATED, TUA 1 :30 minutes MSOGC Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, DEFEATED, TUA 1 :30 minutes MSOGD Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, DEFEATED, TUA 1 :30 minutes manual and fully closing LV1 Os E When level drops below 100 inches, establishes RPV injection by reopening LVlOs to maintain level in directed band (50 to 80 inches).

BOP RO Inhibits ADS using 2 keylock switches Places HPCS pump control switch in PTL 0 If directed, bypasses MSlV low level isolations per EOP-6 0 Manually operates SRV to maintain pressure in directed band (800 to 1000 psig)

Restores pneumatics (at P851) to Drywell by using keylocks to override and reopen IAS*SOVI 66 and 184.

Restores pneumatics (at P601) to Drywell by using keylocks to override and reopen IAS*SOV164 and 165.

Terminates and prevents Div I NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 1 :00 minute after RClC starts, ET03 actives malfunction RC02 RClC FAILURE -

ISOLATION OF RCIC, TRUE EVENT 9 WCS Isolation Failure PO-9.0 ECCS injection at P601 by performing :

Arm and depress Div I ECCS manual initiation pushbutton.

Override closed CSL Injection MOV (amber light stays on).

Place CSL pump in PTL.

Override closed RHS A Injection MOV (amber light stays on).

Terminates and prevents Div II ECCS injection at P601 by perform i ng :

Arm and depress Div II ECCS manual initiation pushbutton.

Override closed RHS C Injection MOV (amber light stays on).

Place RHS C pump in PTL.

Override closed RHS B Injection MOV (amber light stays on).

When RClC isolates, reports RCIC isolation to SRO Injects SLS boron injection using keylock switches NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CU08 Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation Fail, TRUE malfunction becomes effective WCS*MOVIU2 and I I 2 isolation valves fail to close when SLS switches are placed in ON.

When P602 control switches are used, the WCS isolation MOVs will close.

EVENT 10 Trip of all Condensate Booster Pumps PO-10.0 Eight minutes after the Mode Switch is placed in Shutdown, ET02 automatically activates the following malfunctions:

FWO2A Condensate Booster Pump Trip P2A FWO2B Condensate Booster Pump Trip P2B FWO2C Condensate Booster Pump Trip P2C SLS*MOVIA and 1B open SLS*PIA and 1B start Explosive Valves fire Pump pressure and flow rise SLS tank level begins to lower Identifies failure of WCS isolation 0 Manually closes WCS isolation valves MOVI 02 and 1 12 at P602 ATC RO Reports loss of all Condensate Booster Pumps and Feedwater Pumps Reports lowering RPV water level Closes FWS-LV1 Os for tripped Feedwater Pumps Lineup systems as directed NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS All three Condensate Booster Pumps trip.

Feedwater pump suction pressure drops.

Feedwater pumps automatically trip on low suction pressure.

RPV water level falls below MSCRWL and cannot be restored until additional systems are lined up for injection. As RPV water level drops, core voiding results in lowering reactor power and pressure.

Acknowledges loss of Feedwater Directs RHS injection through Shutdown Cooling per EOP-6 0. (Requires installation of jumpers to defeat RHS Shutdown Cooling interlocks AND RPV pressure reduced below 350 psig)

Per L-10 Conditional Step, determines RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above MSCRWL with Detail G Preferred Systems AND EOP-C2 has not been entered yet...... EXITS C5 Level and Pressure legs AND ENTERS EOP-C2 to perform an RPV Blowdown Executes EOP-C2 as follows:

Determines reactor will NOT stay shutdown without boron (Step 2)

Determines SPL is above 192 feet (Step 3)

Directs terminate and prevent all RPV injection except boron, CRD and RClC (Step 4)

Directs all 7 ADS valves open NRC Scenario I March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACT1 ONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS (Step 5 )

When all 7 ADS valves are reported open, continues in C2 to WAIT blocks (Step 16 then

17) AND ENTERS (RETURN TO ) EOP-C5 at 10 RETURNS TO EOP-C5 at 10 Determines 2 or more SRVs are open (L-12)
WAITS until RPV pressure drops below value in Table J (below 165 psig with 7 SRVs open; L-13)
Directs injection using only Detail G systems slowly start injecting to restore and maintain level above MSCRWL (RHS through Shutdown Cooling per EOP-6 Attachment 30 should now be established; L-14)
Determines capability of RHS to restore and maintain level above MSCRWL (L-15)
SRO may decide that RHS alone will not restore water level above MSCRWL and NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 10 BOP RO Actions, when directed direct Alternate ATWS System Injection from Detail H systems (L-I 6 and L-I 7)
Likely to direct injection with HPCS, LPCS or RHS LPCl Returns to EOP-C5 at 9, since level was intentionally lowered prior to entering EOP-C2 Restores and maintains water level between MSCRWL and level recorded in step L-9 number 4 using Detail G and its OK to use Detail H systems BOP RO Performs RPV Injection Via Shutdown Cooling Return per EOP-6 Attachment 30 Injection via RHS B (A)
Verify closed the following valves:
RHS*MOV15B (A), OUTLET RHS*MOV8B (A), HEAT TO DRYWELL SPRAY EXCHANGER 1 B (A) INLET BYPASS VLV (WHEN possible)
RHS*MOV33B (A), OUTLET TO SUPPR POOL SPRAY RHS*FV38B (A), RETURN TO NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
I NSTRUCTOR ACT1 ONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CONSOLE OPERATOR When requested by BOP RO/ATC RO to defeat Group 5 isolation interlocks for 2RHS*MOV40A or B per EOP-6 Attachment 30, immediately activate remote timer by depressing FIO key THEN WAIT until the 2:OO minute TUA timer times out and report the jumpers are installed and leads are lifted.
RH08 Group 5 Isolation Failure SDC MOVs, TRUE (F10)
NOTE Per EOP-C5 Step L-13 and L-14, injection is NOT allowable until RPV pressure drops below 165 psig with 7 SRVs open. The crew SHALL NOT establish injection when RPV pressure drops below 350 psig. This would violate the EOP step and Critical Task.
SUPPR POOL COOLING RHS*MOV24B (A), LPCl B (A)
INJECTION VLV RHS*MOV40B (A), SDC B RHS*MOV104, RHR B TO RETURN REACTORHEADSPRAY Defeat Group 5 isolation interlocks for 2RHS*MOV40B as follows (Figure 30-2):
(2CEC*PNL622)(NOT actually performed)
Lift AND tape the lead on terminal point BB-62 Install EOP Jumper #9 on terminal points BB-41 AND BB-60 0 Verify RHS*Pl B (A), PMP 1 B (A) is running.
Verify open SWP*MOVSOB (A),
HEAT EXCHANGER 1 B SVCE WTR INLET VLV.
WAIT UNTIL reactor pressure has been reduced to less than 350 Throttle open RHS*MOV40B (A), SDC B (A) RETURN to a maximum of 7450 gpm on E12-603B (A), RHR B (A) TOTAL NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CONSOLE OPERATOR When requested by BOP RO/ATC RO to place radiation monitor SWP*RE23B (A) in service (if not already in service), manually activate remotes, then report RE23B (A) is in service:
NOTE: USE REMOTES FOR RE 23A IF APPROPRIATE:
RM02 SWP23B Rad Detector Online/Offline, ON RM03 SWP23B Process Monitor Sample Pump, ON NRC Scenario 1 FLOW meter to control RPV water level Throttle open SWP*MOV33B (A), HEAT EXCHANGER 1B SVCE WTR OUTLET VLV THROTTLE to establish approximately 7400 gpm on E12-R602B (A), SVCE WTR TO RHR B (A) HX FLOW meter Request Rad Monitor SWP*RE23B (A) placed in service EOP-6 Attachment 30 is co m plete Confirms P601 system injection to RPV is terminated and prevented Opens all 7 ADS valves by arming and depressing ADS MANUAL INITIATION pushbuttons on P601 Reports 7 ADS valves are open Reports when RPV pressure drops below Table J value of 165 psig with 7 SRVs open Injects with systems to restore March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONSI PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CONTINGENCY: IF ALL (including Fuel Zone) water level instruments are downscale, the Crew will enter EOP-C4, RPV Flooding temporarily. When RPV water level starts to rise (level can now be determined, EOP-C4 is exited (step 1 override) and EOP-CS re-entered at 6 and EOP-C2 re-entered at 25.
Alternate Control Rod Insertion Appropriate sections to be performed are 3.3 Additional Manual Scram Initiation 3.5 Manual Control Rod Insertion (Driving rods with RDS). These sections are performed concurrently.
CONSOLE OPERATOR WHEN requested to reset ARI per EOP-6 4, immediatelv activate remote timer by depressing F8 key THEN WAIT until b
and maintain RPV water level in directed band (CT-3.0)
RHS Via Shutdown Cooling HPCS 0 LPCS 0 LPCl ATC RO Using EOP-6 Attachment 14 Flowchart determines appropriate sections (3.3 and 3.5) to be performed.
Performs section 3.3 0 Reset ARI by directing fuses pulled per 3.3.1 NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS the I
30 minute TUA timer times out and report the fuses are pulled RP14A RRCS ARI FailurelDefeated Div I, TRUE TUA I :30 minutes RP14B RRCS ARI FailurelDefeated Div II, TRUE TUA 1 :30 minutes CONSOLE OPERATOR WHEN requested to defeat RPS per EOP-6 4, immediately activate remote timer by depressing F9 key THEN WAIT until the 1 :30 minute TUA timer times out and report the jumpers are installed RP02 RPS Failure to Scram Automatic, TRUE TUA 1 :30 minutes CONSOLE OPERATOR WHEN RPS is reset, verify change in status of malfunction RDI 72 RDI 72 RD17 for All Banks, 00 TUA 5 seconds ET0 1 ET01 Mode Switch in Shutdown with 0 Defeat RPS interlocks by directing/installing RPS jumpers 0 Reset RPS by momentarily placing the following switches to RESET:
(2CC*PNL603)
REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC A REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC C REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC B REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC D 0
0 0
Ensure the eight white PILOT SCRAM VALVE SOLENOIDS lights are lit.
Ensure SCRAM DISH VOLUME VENT VLVS RDS*AOVI 24/132 indicate open.
Ensure SCRAM DISH VOLUME NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 0 PE RATOR ACT1 ON S Scram Reset.
IF ET01 fails to reset RD17Z to 00......MANUALLY delete RDI 72 after RPS is reset to allow control rod inserting when additional manual scram signal is inserted.
NOTE:
After RPS is reset and while waiting for indication that the SDV is drained, ATC RO should proceed to section 3.5 to implement action to manually insert rods by driving in using RDS. It takes about 10 minutes for the SDV annunciators to clear, indicating that the SDV is drained NOTE:
At the examiners discretion, time compression may be used to shorten the time while waiting for the SDV to drain. This is accomplished by directing the CONSOLE OPERATOR to override OFF SDV annunciator 6031 09 or 603409, to simulate SDV is drained.
0 DRAIN VLVS RDS*AOV123/130 indicate open.
Using one OR more of the following, ensure the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) is drained :
Annunciator 603109, RPS A DISCH VOLUME HIGH LEVEL TRIP, clear Annunciator 603409, RPS B DISCH VOLUME HIGH LEVEL TRIP, clear Annunciator 6031 30, SDV LEVEL HIGH, clear ATC RO While waiting for SDV to drain performs section 3.5 Verify the following pumps are running (starts znd RDS pump using control switch):
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0 RDS-PlA, CRD PUMP 1A RDS-PlB, CRD PUMP 1B Place controller 2RDS-FC107, CRD FLOW CONTROL, in MANUAL CAUTION To prevent pump motor damage or tripping the supply breaker, motor current shall not exceed 40 amps for RDS-P1A or RDS-P1B.
Depress the OPEN pushbutton on 2RDS-FCl07 UNTIL the controller output meter shows 100% OR RDS pump motor current approaches 40 amps Check that RDS System flow rises on C12-R606, CRD SYSTEM FLOW.
NOTE: In the following step it is expected that RDS System Flow will drop.
Close 2RDS-PV101, DRIVE WTR PRESS CONTROL MOV, to maximize Drive Water AP.
Ensure RDS Drive Water AP rises on C12-R602, DRIVE WTR DlFF NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS When the SDV alarms clear the ATC RO will initiate another scram by tripping RPS using manual scram pushbuffons. All rods will fully insert.
PRESSURE Using an SHH 5366 key, bypass the RWM by taking the RWM Operator Console BYPASS/OPERATE/TEST switch to the BYPASS position Using Figures 14-2 AND 14-3, track the status of the control rods, as the rods are inserted.
Starting with a control rod at OR near the center, select a control rod to be driven in on the Rod Select Matrix ATC RO Return to Section 3.3 3 WHEN the SDV is drained, initiate a manual scram 0 Arm and depress manual scram pushbutton (CT-4.0)
Check for control rod motion AND control rod positions Confirm all rods fully inserted Report control rod status to SRO NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS TERM I NATION C RITE RIA RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is restored and maintained in normal level band 160 to 200 inches and all control rods are fully inserted.
EVENT 11 SRO Admin JPM 5-1 SRO Classify the event as SAE 2.2.2 Evaluator to perform SRO Admin JPM for emergency classification.
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
V.
POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA, NRC Exam L
VI.
REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events None
6. Commitments
1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST X
X X
X
1.
ReaIism/CredibiIity Event Sequencing Simulator Modeling Evaluating Crew Competencies Additional Information about these checks:
6 2
2 1
2 2
4 For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.
Total Malfunctions Malfunctions after EOP Entry Abnormal Events Major Transients EOPsUsed EOP Contingency Procedures Used Simulator Run Time EOP Run Time Crew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)
For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.
4.
Developmental Checks:
Does every event have either a Critical Task(s) or Performance Objective?
Is Criteria given for sequencing to subsequent events?
Is termination criteria clear and unambiguous?
Does termination criteria allow verification that all CT, PO standards are met?
Constellation Energy Group OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE
Title:
Task Number: 3440190303 Emergency Classification for Scenario 1 Revision: NRC 2005 Approvals:
NA EXAMINATION SECURITY Dde '
General Supervisor Date Operations Training (Designee)
Operations (Designee)
NA EXAMINATION SECURITY Configuration Control Date Perform e r :
(RO)
TrainerIEvalu ator:
Evaluation Method: PERFORM Evaluation Location: SIMULATOR FOLLOWING SCENARIO AS SRO Expected Completion Time: 15 minutes Time Critical Task: YES Alternate Path Task: NO Start Time:
Stop Time:
Completion Time:
JPM Overall Rating:
Pass Fail NOTE: A JPM overall rating of fail shall be given if any critical step is graded as fail. Any grade of unsat or individual competency area unsat requires a comment.
Comments:
Evaluator Signature:
Date:
NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-1 1
311 712005
Recommended Start Location: (Completion time based on the start location)
Simulator or other designated location.
Simulator Set-up:
N/A Directions to the Instructor/Evaluator To be performed as an administrative JPM.
Directions to Operators:
Read Before Every JPM Performance:
For the performance of this JPM, I will function as the SSS, CSO, and Auxiliary Operators. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cuesasnecessary.
Read Before Each Evaluated JPM Performance:
This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Control Room Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional / concurrent verification will not be provided; therefore it should not be requested.
Read Before Each Traininq JPM Performance:
During this Training JPM, applicable methods of verification are expected to be used. Therefore, either another individual or I will act as the additional / concurrent verifier.
Notes to Instructor / Evaluator:
1.
2.
During Evaluated JPM:
3.
During Training JPM:
Critical steps are identified as PassIFail. All steps are sequenced critical unless denoted by a d.
Self-verification shall be demonstrated.
Self-verification shall be demonstrated.
0 No other verification shall be demonstrated.
References:
1. EPIP-EPP-02, Classification of Emergency Conditions at Unit 2.
2. EPMP-EPP-0102, Unit 2 Emergency Classification Bases.
3. EPIP-EPP-18, Activation and Direction of the Emergency Plan.
4. NUREG K/A 2.4.40 Knowledge of the SROs responsibilities in emergency plan implementation (4.0).
Tools and Equipment:
1. None.
Task Standard: Scenario properly diagnosed and classified as a Site Area Emergency Initial Conditions:
1. High Turbine vibration led to a reactor SCRAM and turbine trip
2. Control rods inserted to position 17
3. RPV injection was terminated and prevented per EOP-CS to lower power
4. Ask the operator for any questions NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-1 2
311 512005
Initiating Cue:
o Site Area Emergency is declared PasslFail per EAL 2.2.2.
(Operators name), assume the role of the SM/ED and determine the emergency classification of this event.
The time elapsed between START TIME and determination MUST BE c15minutes to pass the JPM.
Evaluator Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary RECORD START TIME
2. *Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and reviewhtilize the correct section.
~
Proper communications used for Sat/Unsat repeat back (GAP-OPS-01)
Start time is logged to determine total classification time.
I o EPIP-EPP-02 obtained.
SatIUnsat, Section 2.2.2 is referenced,
3. RPS setpoint has been exceeded AND Automatic & Manual scrams have failed to assure the reactor is shudown under all conditions AND either Reactor power was >4%
Suppression Pool temperature was
>11 OF.
End of JPM TERMINATING CUE: Scenario properly diagnosed and classified as a Site Area Emergency.
RECORD STOP TIME NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-1 3
311 712005
Initial Conditions:
1. High Turbine vibration led to a reactor SCRAM and turbine trip
2. Control rods inserted to position 17
3. RPV injection was terminated and prevented per EOP-C5 to lower power
4. Ask the operator for any questions Initiating Cue:
(Operators name), assume the role of the SM/ED and determine the emergency classification of this event.
NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-1 4
311 512005
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont) 2.2.2 Site Area Emerqency A~J RPS scram setpoint has been exceeded AND Automatic and manual scrams fail to result in a control rod pattern which assures reactor shutdown under all conditions without boron.
AND Either:
Reactor power >6%
OR Torus temperature >llO°F NUMARC IC:
Failure of Reactor Protection system instrumentation to complete or initiate an automatic reactor trip once a Reactor Protection system setpoint has been exceeded and manual scram trip was not successful.
FPB LosdPotential Loss:
NIA Mode Applicability:
Power Operation Basis:
This condition indicates failure of the Reactor Protection System to shut down the reactor (automatically or manually) and maintain it shutdown under ail conditions without boron. Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than can be removed using available safety systems. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist leading to imminent or potential loss of both the fuel clad and the primary containment.
The failure of automatic initiation of a reactor scram followed by an unsuccessful manual initiating actions which can be rapidly taken at the reactor control console does not, by itself, lead to imminent loss of either fuel clad or primary containment barriers, It is the continued criticaiity under conditions requiring a rector scram along with the continued addition of heat to the containment which poses the imminent threat to primary containment or fuel clad barriers. In accordance with the EOPs, Liquid Poison System is initiated based on heat addition to containment in excess of safety system capability under failure to scram conditions.
Page 33 EPMP-EPP-0101 Rev 07
AllACHMENT 1 (Cont)
An immediate manual scram is any set of actions by the reactor operator at the reactor control console which causes control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core and brings the reactor subcritical, including manual scram pushbuttons, ARI and mode switch.
PEG Reference@):
ss2.1 Basis Reference@):
1.
N1-EOP-3, Failure to Scram
2.
"Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Level" NUMARClNESP-007 Revision 2 -
Questions and Answers, June 1993 Page 34 EPMP-EPP-0101 Rev 07
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 2 REV. 0 No. of Pages:
42 RDS PUMP SWAP/RCS SEAL LEAK/LOSS OF LINE 5 WITH EDG FAILUREWRCS LEAK WITH DEGRADED ECCS REQUIRES RPV BLOWDOWN PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 2/1/05 VAL1 DATED B. Weaver, B. Moore, P. Brennan DATE 3/7/05 DATE
~ ) J ~ / J J -
GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING OPE RATIONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE CON F I G U RAT1 0 N CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Initial Power Level: loo%, above the 100°/~ Rod Line The scenario begins at 100% reactor power. The crew will swap Control Rod Drive Pumps to return RDS-PI B to service and remove RDS-P1A from service. After the normal evolution is complete, an outer seal leak develops on Recirc Pump (RCS) A. N2-SOP-29.1 is entered RCS pumps is removed from service and isolated. The crew will also enter N2-SOP-29 due to reduced core flow and insert Cram Rods to lower rod line below 100%. The crew will stabilize the plant in single loop and the SRO will implement the required single loop Tech Spec actions.
With the plant now stable, Control Rod Drive suction filter clogging results in the trip of the operating RDS pump and several accumulator trouble alarms. The crew will enter N2-SOP-30, trip Reactor Water Cleanup due to loss of pump seal cooling, swap RDS pump suction filters and restart an RDS pump.
A loss of one offsite 11 5 KV power Line 5 will occur. The Division I and Division Ill EDGs will fail to start. Manual operator action will be required to start the Division I EDG and preclude a manual scram. The Division Ill High Pressure Core Spray EDG cannot be started. The crew will implement the actions required by N2-SOP-3 to restore Service Water System flow to the Turbine and Reactor Building non safety related headers which have isolated due to the off site power loss.
A small reactor coolant leak develops inside the Drywell. This results in rising drywell temperatures and pressure. The crew will take manual action and scram the reactor. N2-EOP-RPV, PC are entered. The event is complicated by degraded ECCS response and loss of NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
electrical power. An RPV Blowdown is required to establish injection with the only remaining Low Pressure ECCS systems RHR B and C. Suppression Chamber Spray and Drywell Spray should be established to control primary containment pressure and temperature, as the LOCA becomes more severe. Drywell and Suppression Chamber Sprays will be complicated by loss of electrical power and degraded ECCS systems. The only remaining system that can be used for sprays, will also be required for RPV injection.
Major Procedures Exercised:
EOP-RPV, PC, C-2. SOP-29.1, 29,30 and 3 EAL Classification:
ALERT 3.1.I Primary containment pressure cannot be maintained loo%
Division I Low Pressure ECCS systems are INOPERABLE (pre-planned)
Corrective Maintenance on broken motor operator for RHS*MOV30A Return to Suppression Pool. Scheduled return to service is late on the next shift.
TS 3.5.1 Required Action C.l was entered 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago. Required Action C.l Action to restore one subsystem with 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time.
TS 3.6.1.6 Drywell Spray Required Action A.l with 7 day Completion Time TS 3.6.2.3 Suppression Pool Cooling Required Action A.l with 7 day Completion Time TS 3.6.2.4 Suppression Pool Spray Required Action A.l with 7 day Completion Time Corrective Maintenance has been completed on RDS-P1B and it is to be placed in 0
service for Post Maintenance Testing. When the pump is running contact the WEC to dispatch the assembled PMT crew to the pump to obtain all required data.
PART 111:
RemarkslPlanned Evolutions:
Place RDS-PI B in service for Post Maintenance Testing.
PART IV:
To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
Scenario ID#
INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What we did?
Why? (Goals)
Other Options? I NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
Ill.
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.O Given the plant at power with RPV pressure >900 psig and two inoperable scram accumulators, the crew will restore charging water pressure >940 psig within 20 minutes of meeting conditions for entering TS 3.1.5 Condition B, by restarting an RDS pump and avoiding the requirement to immediately scram the reactor per N2-SOP-30 and Tech Spec 3.1.5.
CT Justification: Failure to restore Charging Header Pressure by restarting RDS pump results in direct adverse consequences and a challenge to plant safety by requiring a manual scram transient to be initiated. Per Tech Spec Basis 3.1.5 With two or more control rod scram accumulators inoperable and reactor steam dome pressure >900 psig, adequate pressure must be supplied to the charging water header. With inadequate charging water pressure, all of the accumulators could become inoperable, resulting in a potentially severe degradation of the scram performance.
Therefore, within 20 minutes from discovery of charging water header pressure < 940 psig concurrent with Condition B, adequate charging water header pressure must be restored. The allowed Completion Time of 20 minutes is considered a reasonable time to place a CRD pump into service to restore the charging header pressure, if required. This Completion Time also recognizes the ability of the reactor pressure alone to fully insert all control rods.
CT-2.0 Given degraded RPV injection sources, the crew will establish RPV injection using available Preferred Injection Systems listed in Table E l of EOP-RPV to RESTORE AND MAINTAIN RPV water level above MSCRWL (-39 inches Fig 2) to preclude executing EOP-C3 or Flooding the Drywell by entering SAPS, per N2-EOP-RPV.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
CT Justification: Failure to restore and maintain RPV water level above -39 inches by implementing actions per EOP-RPV will result in adverse consequences to the plant by abandoning the EOP injection strategy and implementing Drywell Flooding (from EOP-RPV Step L-16) used in the SAPs. It is expected that proper implementation of EOP-RRV will result in performing an RPV Blowdown by opening 7 ADS valves to reduce RPV pressure and manual injecting RHS Pump B and RHS Pump C (either both or any one pump) which are capable of recovering level above -39 inches and ultimately above -14 inches (TAF). Water level is expected to drop below -39 inches for several minutes while executing the steps to blowdown and establish injection. There is no specific time constraints attached to this CT. As long as the crew recovers level without entering EOP-C3, Steam Cooling or the SAPs, this would demonstrate satisfactory completion of the CT.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-I.o PO-2.0 PO-3.0 PO-4.0 Given the plant with direction to swap Control Rod Drive pumps, the crew will start RDS-PI B and secure RDS-PIA per N2-OP-30 Given the plant with an RCS pump seal leak, the crew will remove the pump from service per N2-SOP-29.1 and N2-SOP-29, then continue to operate the plant in single loop per with N2-0P-29.
Given the plant operating at power and a Control Rod Drive pump trip with accumulator trouble alarms, the crew will restart an RDS pump within 20 minutes per N2-SOP-30 Given the reactor plant operating at power when a loss of offsite line 5 with EDG failures occurs, the crew will take action to start the NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
failed EDG and stabilize service water in accordance with N2-SOP-
03. (Operator actions with PRA significance)
PO-5.0 Given a reactor plant operating at power with a LOCA in progress, the crew will manually scram the reactor plant prior to reaching 1.68 psig in the Containment.
PO-6.0 Given a loss of all high pressure injection the crew will restore and.
maintain RPV water level above TAF after performing an RPV Blowdown per N2-EOP-RPV and N2-EOP-C2. (Operator actions with PRA significance)
PO-7.0 Given a failure of Low Pressure ECCS pumps to start on high drywell pressure signal, the crew will manually start the Low Pressure ECCS pumps per EOP Bases and Operations Manual PO-8.0 Given the plant with a LOCA and conditions met for containment spray, the crew will initiate Containment Spray per N2-EOP-PC and EOP-6 Attachment 22.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 0 P ERATO R ACT IONS EVENT 1 RDS Pump Swap PO-I.o Role Play When dispatched as additional operators to support the pump swap with activities such as performing prestart verifications and monitoring, respond as required. There will be no unusual conditions or readings to be reported for this evolution.
Crew 0
Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.
SRO Directs RDS-PIB started and RDS-PIA placed in standby per N2-OP-30, F.2.0 After RDS-PlB is placed in service, contacts WEC to dispatch team to perform Post Maintenance Testing requirements.
Dispatches A 0 to perform prestart lineup IF RDS is supplying WCS pump seal cooling, THEN station personnel at locations to simultaneously monitor WCS pump seal parameters during RDS pump changeover.
Start the standby CRD pump NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0
0 0
0 0
NRC Scenario 2
-1 1 2RDS-PI B CRD PUMP 1 B by placing its control switch to START, THEN release to Normal-After-START.
Stop the CRD pump to be shutdown 2RDS-PlA, CRD PUMP 1A by taking its control switch to STOP AND releasing to Normal-After-STOP.
Directs local monitoring of operating WCS pump(s) seal cavity tem perat u res IF WCS pump seal cooling is being supplied from RDS, THEN directs verification of seal cooling flow between 1-4 gpm as indicated locally.
As required, directs adjusting RPV Level Instrumentation Backfill Reports RDS-PIB in service and RDS-PIA in standby.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 2 RCS Pump A outer seal leakage PO-2.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F3 key:
RR16A, 0.25, Ramp Time 1:00 Min (F3)
RRPIA upper seal cavity press lowers to about 220 psig Annunciator 602109 Recirc Pump 1A Outer SL Leak High alarms after about I minute.
BOP RO Identifies and reports annunciator 6021 09 to SRO Implements ARP 6021 09 actions Monitor DW Equipment Drain Tank leak rate. Refer to ITS 3.4.5 RCS Operational Leakage.
Monitor upper and lower seal cavity pressures using P602 pressure indicators.
Monitor upper and lower seal cavity temperatures using P614 recorder points 8 and 9 and Process Computer points RCSTAI 5 and RCSTAI 7.
Enter N2-SOP-29.1 and performs concurrently with ARP actions.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CONSOLE OPERATOR After the crew enters N2-SOP-29.1 and is monitoring parameters activate malfunction by depressing F4 key:
RRIGA, 0.75, Ramp Time 1:OO Min (F4)
Upper Seal pressure drops below 100 psig which requires the RCS pump to be tripped L
NRC Scenario 2 SRO/BOP RO 3 Implements SOP-29.1 Actions while monitoring Seal Action leg conditions that may require pump trip Establish periodic monitoring of pump conditions.
If applicable, monitor DERlDFR leakage for indication of degradation (TS 3.4.5).
If conditions warrant, shutdown the affected pump per N2-OP-29, G.2.0.
Refer to N2-OP-29, H.4.0, if both seal injection and cooling water are lost.
BOP RO Implements SOP-29.1 Seal Act ions IF ANY of THESE OCCUR Upper seal cavity pressure
< 100 psig Upper seal cavity pressure >
920 psig Lower seal cavity pressure >
1200 psig Outer seal leakage > 1.2 gpm March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Annunciator 6021 15, Recirc Pmp 1A seal staging flo w h ig h/lo w RCS Pump A is manually tripped and isolated by closing RCS*MOVIOA and 18A with the following alarms 602207 RECIRC PMP I A LOW SPEED AUTO TRANSFER NOTAVAILABLE 603139 REACTOR WATER LEVEL HlGH/LO W 603218 OPRM TRlP ENABLED Reactor Water Cleanup is manually realigned for single loop by lowering system flow and closing WCS*MOVlO5. When WCS flow is lowered, the in-service filter demineralizer HOLD Pumps start with the following P602 alarms 602317 RWCU FILTER DEMlN 1 TROUBLE 602318 RWCU FILTER DEMlN I TROUBLE Note Crew initiates N2-SOP-29 flowchart decision blocks by answering YES/NO questions.
Seal staging flow > 1.8 gpm DFR > 1 gpm rise
..... THEN CONTINUE AT A (when seal pressure drops below 100 psig)
Trip the affected pump AND enter N2 -SO P-29.
Recirculation pump should be tripped by opening RECIRC PMP IA(1B)
MOTOR BRKR 5A by placing control switch to STOP or PTL.
Lower WCS flow to < 450 gpm (by throttling MOV200)
Close WCS*MOV105.
Close RCS*MOVIOA Close RCS*MOV18A When time permits, perform N2-OP-29, H. (Single Loop Operations SRO/BOP RO/ATC RO Enter and implement the flowchart actions per N2-SOP-29 when directed from SOP-29.1 Is a Recirc pump in service?
YES NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Note With operation above the 100% rod line, the crew will insert CRAM rods. It is expected that the ATC RO will insert the first four cram rods to position 00 using P603 CONTINUOUS INSERT pushbutton. (EVENT 2 Reactivity Manipulation for ATC RO)
Reactor Power will lower and Rod Line will be reduced below 100% rod line NRC Scenario 2 Is core flow to left of natural circ line? NO Core flow AND Power in Scram Region? NO Core flow AND Power in Exit Region? NO Reduce rodline below 100% by inserting CRAM rods. (EVENT 2 Reactivity Manipulation for ATC RO)
> 3 OPRMs operable? YES Plant in Heightened Awareness Zone? YES Recover per Attachment 2 SOP-29 Attachment 2 actions IF one Recirc. Pump tripped AND NOT in Natural Circulation, perform the following:
Verify Recirc Flow Controller in LOOP MANUAL for BOTH loops Close Flow Control valve for the tripped pump Reduce flow rate of operating loop to less than 41,800 gpm March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 2 SRO ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2
-16 0
0 0
SRO as indicated by flow recorder at 2CEC*PNL602 Notify I&C to perform APRM Scram AND Rod Block AND rod block monitor setpoint change Reduce thermal power to less than 70% of rated IF pump speed does NOT indicate 0 rpm one minute AFTER pump trip, close 2RCS*MOVI 8A OR 2RCS*MOVI OA IF NOT able to start the tripped pump, perform N2-OP-29, Subsection H.6.0, Single Recirculation Loop Operation AND exit this attachment.
Direct trip of RCS Pump A and ensure actions of SOP-29, and OP-29, G.2.0 are taken to place in shutdown con d it ion.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
Enters N2-SOP-29.
Directs cram rods inserted.
Refer to ITS 3.4.5 for RCS leakage requirements.
Refer to ITS 3.4.1 for single loop operation. Condition C LCO requirements are currently not met until actions are complete to adjust APLHGR, MCPR, RPS APRM Scram and Rod Block settings for single loop operation. The Completion Time is 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Notify I&C to reduce APRM scram and rod block monitor trip setpoints. May be done by contacting WEC SRO.
Notifies Operations and Plant Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and wok planning.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 3 PO-3.0 Operating Control Rod Drive Pump trip CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F5 key:
RD18 RD063419 34-1 9 Rod Failure Accum Trouble, TRUE, TUA 2:OO minutes RD062227 22-27 Rod Failure Accum Trouble, TRUE, TUA 2:20 minutes CRD Suction Filter Clogged, TRUE (F5)
RDS PIA trips RDS flow and charging pressure drop to 0 The following annunciators alarm:
603318 CRD Pmp Suction Fltr Diff Press High (first alarm)
After the RDS pump trips then:
603308 CRD Pmp IA/IB Auto Trip 603309 CRD Pmp ?A Suct Press Low 60331 I CRD Charging Wtr Press Low 603315 CRD PMP I B Suet Press Low 603446 CRD Pmp Disch Hdr Press Low NRC Scenario 2
-18 ATC RO Acknowledge and report Enter N2-SOP-30 Monitor for override conditions and performs actions if required IF THESE OCCUR....
RPV pressure is >900 psig AND Two or more accumulators for withdrawn control rods are inoperable AND Charging water header pressure e940 psig for 20 minutes THEN SCRAM the reactor per N2-SOP-101 c.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS After 2:OO minutes, 60344 I Rod Drive Accumulator Trouble alarms Rod and Detector Display Amber Trouble light is lit for the affected accumulators Accumulator 34-19 after 2:OO minute delay Accumulator 22-27 after 2:20 minute delay Note While executing actions to restart an RDS pump the crew will monitor the flowchart override conditions and initiate a manual scram, if required. It is NOT expected to meet any of the required manual scram conditions.
ROLE PLAY Report as operator dispatched that both accumulator 34-19 and 22-27 pressure read 900 psig.
Annunciator 602324, RWCU PUMP CLG WTR TEMP HIGH, is expected to be received after several minutes with no operating RDS pump.
Dispatches operator to report accumulator pressure for 34-1 9 and 22-27 Implements pump recovery actions IsRDSpump operating? NO IF Annunciator 602324, RWCU PUMP CLG WTR TEMP HIGH, is received. THEN..... Remove WCS from service as follows:
Throttle WCS*MOV200 until in service filters on hold.
Trip WCS pumps.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE RDS pump restoration is expected to be completed in less than 15 minutes.
CONSOLE OPERATOR WHEN dispatched to swap RDS suction filter DELETE malfunction RD18 WAIT 3 minutes and report to control room that suction filters are swapped.
AFTER RDS pump is operating delete malfunction RD06 to clear accumulator trouble condition.
Following RDS pump restart and flow control valve operation, system flow and pressure are restored to normal. Associated alarms will clear.
0 0
0 0
0 0
IF An RDS pump can NOT be restored to service within 15 minutes OR indications of system breech exist.
THEN......Isolate RDS backfill by closing 2RDS-V20 (preferred) OR 2RDS-V2058.
Shift 2RDS-FC107 (RDS flow controller) to Manual.
Close FCV to minimum position.
Determines trip is caused by low suction pressure Dispatches operator to swap RDS suction filters per N2-OP-30, Section F.I.O.
Start a RDS pump (within 20 minutes of 2"d inoperable accumulator with Charging header pressure 940 psig.
(CT-I.O)
WHEN a RDS pump is running, perform the following:
Adjust RDS flow using 2RDS-FC107 to approximately 63 gpm.
0 Place 2RDS-FC107 in Auto.
0 IF WCS OR RPV backfill NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 3 SRO Actions was removed from service, THEN restore per SMICRS.
Verify WCS/RCS seal flows and backfill flows per N2-OP-30, Sections F.2.5 through F.2.9 WHEN charging water header pressure has been restored above 940 psig, exit this procedure (N2-S 0 P-30).
Report RDS pump is restarted 7 Directs entry into SOP-30 J Declares two accumulators inoperable with their pressure below 940 psig and enters Tech Spec 3.1.5 Condition B and implements the REQUIRED ACT1 0 NS B. Two or more control rod scram accumulators inoperable with reactor steam dome pressure >900 psig.
B.l Restore charging water header pressure to >940 psig. Completion NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACT1 0 N S EVENT 4 P O 4 0 Loss of Line 5 with EDG Failures CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F6 key:
ED02A, Loss of Off-Site 115KV Line 5, TRUE DG04A, DG 1 UV LOCA Start Failure is now in effect Multiple 86 devices and annunciators actuate on P852. Div I and Div 111 EDG fail to start on undervoltage. 4 I60 VA C Emergency Switchgear ENS*SWGIOI and IO2 deenergize. HPCS is now unavailable due to NRC Scenario 2
-22 Time is 20 minutes from discovery of Condition B concurrent with charging water header pressure <
940 psig AND B.2.1 Declare the associated control rod scram time "slow."
Completion Time is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .
OR B.2.2 Declare the associated control rod inoperable.
Completion Time is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .
BOP RO Recognize and report Loss of Line 5 and Division I and Division Ill EDGs failed to start.
Enters and executes N2-SOP-3 Determines that both Divisions (I and II) have not lost power Determines Division I EDG did not energize the bus Starts Division I EDG from P852 and reports EDG started March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SWG102 loss and is not recoverable.
SWP Non Essential MOVs close, isolating SWP flow to CCS and CCP heat exchangers.
The Div I EDG will start when manually started fro P852.
o 0
0 0
0 0
0 Verifies output breaker 101-1 closes and observes ENS*SWGI 01 is energized At P601, verifies Div I I SWP Non-Essential MOVs close After EDG energizes ENS*SWGlOI, verifies:
Div I SWP Non-Essential MOVs close One Div I SWP pump restarts WHEN SWP Pump restarts 0 Open ALL SWP Non-Essential MOVs 0 Throttle SWP Pump Discharge MOV74's to maintain pump flow below 10,000 gpm Start a 3rd Div II SWP Pump and reopen MOV74's Verify proper operation of EDG Voltage 41 60 VAC Frequency 60 Hz SWP flow > 780 gpm Restore pneumatics to Drywell At P851 open IAS*SOV166 At P601 open IAS*SOV164 Refer to Attachment 1 for subsequent actions and fault NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Role Play: If dispatched to perform switchyard to electrical power distribution panel walkdowns, wait approximately 5 minutes then report back that all indications are good and only targets found were Div I under voltage trips.
CONSOLE OPERATOR WHEN requested to start CMSlO sample pumps, manually activate remotes as requested RM03 for CMS*REIOA, ON identification ATC RO Subsequent Actions (N2-SOP-3 )
Reports GTS running on the Reactor Build ing Restores drywell cooling by restarting unit coolers on P873.
Secures CWS blowdown if required.
Restores CMS.
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 SRO Open 2CMS*SOV62B Open 2CMS*SOVGOA Open 2CMS*SOV62A Open 2CMS*SOV6OB Restart or verify in standby the Div I H2/02 Monitor in accordance with N2-OP-82 (May not be performed)
Notify Rad Protection to start 2CMS*RE1 OA AND verify the monitor is on line and working properly Notify Rad Protection to start 2CMS*RE1 OB AND verify the monitor is on line and working properly NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Line 5 loss with CSH EDG failing to start results in loss of power to HPCS. HPCS is now inoperable and with LPCS already inoperable for maintenance, Tech Spec 3.5. I Condition H is entered. This is the most restrictive L CO.
Directs entry into N2-SOP-3 Directs subsequent and fault identification actions Declares HPCS inoperable AND with LPCS already inoperable enter Tech Spec 3.5.1 Condition H Condition H not met for HPCS and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)
Systems inoperable.
REQUIRED ACTION H.l Enter LCO 3.0.3 COMPLETION TIME Immediately Enters Tech Spec LCO 3.0.3 LCO 3.0.3 When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to place the unit, as applicable, in:
a.
b.
C.
3 Enters Tech Spec 3.5.1 Condition B MODE 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months ; MODE 3 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months ; and MODE 4 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days 0.0103 hours 6.117725e-5 weeks 1.40785e-5 months .
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS TS 3.8.1 Condition D is most restrictive after LCO 3.0.0 considerations, with 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months completion time for line or EDG restoration.
Then 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for the other component.
for HPCS inoperable High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System inoperable.
REQUIRED ACTIONS B. 1 Verify by administrative means RClC System is OPERABLE when RClC is required to be OPERABLE.
Completion Time is Immediately AND B.2 Restore HPCS System to OPERABLE status.
Completion Time is 14 days Enters Tech. Spec. 3.8.1 and Condition A Condition A not met for Line 5 REQUIRED ACTION A.l directs N2-OSP-LOG WOO1 performed within I hour and every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter.
AND A.2 is not applicable under current conditions AND A.3 Restore required offsite circuit to OPERABLE status. Completion Time 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0
0 EVENT 5 RCS Coolant Leakage into the Drywell PO-5.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR Condition B not met for Div Ill EDG Condition D not met Line 5 AND Div Ill EDG One required offsite circuit inoperable.
AND One required DG inoperable.
REQUIRED ACTION D.l Restore required offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.
Completion Time 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR D.2 Restore required DG to OPERABLE status. Completion Time 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Conducts crew briefing Notifies Operations and Plant Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and wok planning.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
\\.
When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F7 key:
RR20 RR Loop Rupture - DBA LOCA Value 1.5 RCS coolant leakage into DW is initiated. IF CMS*RlOs have been returned to service following power loss, annunciator 851254 PROCESS AIRBORNE RAD MONITOR A C TI VA TED a larms.
DRMS computer indicates CMS*REIOs a la rming.
Drywell floor drain leak rate rising.
Drywell pressure begins to rise.
DWP slowly rises and 603140 DRYWELL PRESSURE HIGH/LOW alarms at about 0.78 P W A manual scram should be directed prior to the NRC Scenario 2
-28 BOP RO Reports alarm 851254 and implements actions Determine the source(s) of the alarm by reviewing the status of the DRMS monitors using the STATUS GRID function of the DRMS console. Color-coded identification is used for status of normal (green), alert alarm (yellow), high radiation (red),
suspect data (white), and equipment failure (blue). For applicable alarm response refer to Table 851254. For alert response refer to step e.
If there has been an increase in containment activity as evidenced by an alert or High Rad alarm on the gaseous or particulate channel of CMS*RElOA or B:
Notify the SM.
Notify the Rad. Prot.
Department.
Attempt to identify the cause March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS automatic high drywell pressure RPS trip setpoint of I. 68 psig EVENT 5 and 6 SRO Actions PO-5.0 and 6.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR WHEN Mode Switch is placed in Shutdown,
verify change in status of malfunction RR20 RR20 RR Loop Rupture - DBA LOCA Value 10; Ramp Time 1O:OO minutes ET0 1 ET01 Mode Switch in Shutdown.
IF ET01 fails to trigger RR20...... MANUALLY enter RR20, 1 O%, Ramp Time 1O:OO minutes of the increase, notify Chemistry to sample containment.
Verify Reactor Coolant leakage is within Tech.
Spec. limits (see Tech.
Spec. 3.4.3.2). {ITS 3.4.5)
SRO Updates crew and identifies the threshold DWP value that the reactor will be scrammed at when reached.
When DWP threshold is reached, directs manual scram Receive and repeat back scram report Enters EOP-RPV on low RPV water level at 159 inches Directs initial level restored and maintained 160 inches to 200 inches with Feedwater, CRD, RClC (L-3)
Directs RPV pressure band 800 to 1000 psig with EHC in automatic using BPV (P-5)
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Detail E l Preferred Injection Systems Condensate/Feedwater (tripped)
RClC (available) 0 HPCS (power loss) 0 LPCS (not available) 0 0
LPCl (B and C only available)
RHS through Shutdown Cooling (RHS B after depressurizing)
Detail F Injection Subsystems CondensateIFeedwater (NO)
Enters EOP-PC on high Drywell pressure when DWP reaches 1.68 Psig May direct Suppression Chamber and Drwyell spray initiation. If this is directed, the SRO will have to redirect RHS for injection, when level drops below TAF -14 inches.
When loss of high pressure feed systems occurs determines RPV water level cannot be maintained above -14 inches (TAF)
May direct SLS injected from Boron Tank Transition to EOP-RPV at Directs ADS inhibited (L-5)
Directs level restored and maintained above -14 inches (Fig Z) with Preferred Injection Systems from Detail E l (L-6)
Are 2 or more Subsystems Detail F lineup? (L-7) YES; LPCl B and LPCl c WAIT until level drops to -14 inches (Fig Z) (L-9)
Is any Subsystems Detail F lineup with a pump running? (L-IO) YES; LPCl B and LPCl C NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0
HPCS(N0) 0 LPClA(N0) 0 LPCl B (YES) 0 LPCl C(YES)
LPCS(N0)
After applying Fuel Zone Correction using Fig Z, TAF -14 inches is abut -52 inches AND MSCRWL -39 inches is about -72 inches at 800 psig.
When RPV injection is established with RHS B and C systems, RPV water level will turn and be restored above -39 inches. After level is restored, SRO should direct RHR system A NRC Scenario 2
-31 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 Is any injection source lineup with a pump running? (L-12) YES; LPCl B and LPCl C BEFORE water level drops to -39 inches (Fig Z)....... ENTER EOP-C2 RPV Blowdown while continuing here (EOP-RPV step L-
16)
Executes EOP-C2 as follows:
Determines reactor WILL stay shutdown without boron (Step 2)
Drywell Pressure? Above 1.68 psig (Step 9)
Prevent LPCS and LPCl injection not needed for core cooling.
(Step IO) Current conditions require injection, so NO system injection is to be prevented.
Determines SPL is above 192 feet (Step 1 I)
Directs all 7 ADS valves open (Step 12)
When all 7 ADS valves are reported open, continues in C2 to WAIT blocks (Step 16 then 17)
Continues EOP-RPV actions at step L-16 and directs RPV water level restored and mainatained above -39 inches (Fig Z) with March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS lined up for Containment Spray SRO Actions directed from EOP-PC Preferred Injection Systems from Detail E l RHS B and RHS C (LPCI) are to be injected (CT-2.0)
Determines RPV water level can be restored and maintained above
-14 inches (Fig Z) per Step L-4 override and returns to EOP-RPV at @
Directs RPV water level is restored and maintained 160 to 200 inches using RHS C and RHS B WHEN water level is restored above -14 inches, directs RHS B lined up for Containment Spray These actions are directed from EOP-PC Directs RHR Loop B placed in Suppression Chamber Spray but only if pump is not needed fore core cooling.
WAIT until Suppression Chamber Pressure is above 10 psig Verify DW parameters are inside Drywell Spray Initiation Limit (EOP-PC Fig K)
Directs tripping RCS Pumps (Should already be tripped)
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Defeating Drywell Spray interlocks is necessary due to Div II ECCS initiation logic failure (malfunction RH14B).
EVENT 5 and 6 ATC ROlBOP RO as directed PO-5.0 and PO-6.0 NRC Scenario 2 o Directs Drywell Unit Coolers tripped (Should already be tripped)
Directs RHS B lined up for Drywell Spray per EOP-6 Attachment 22 Defeating Drywell Spray interlocks is necessary ATC RO WHEN DWP reaches pre-determined value and when directed by the SRO, places Mode Switch in Shutdown Provides scram report to SRO Performs Scram Actions per N2-SOP-101 c Verify automatic responses:
All rods full in Rx power lowering Turbine tripped/TSVs &
TCVs shut Generator tripped and house loads transferred SDV Vents &Drain valves closed RCS pumps downshift RPV pressure on TBVs OR SRVs FWLC controlling level >
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 159.3 inches IF all Feedwater pumps have tripped THEN place all FWS-LVlO and 55 controllers in manual and verify valves are full closed IF scram cannot be reset, if directed by SRO closes RDS-V28 Charging Header lsol by dispatching operator.
Perform the following as time permits:
o Fully insert IRMs AND SRMs.
Energize 2WCS-MOVI 07 (2NHS-MCC008-2E).
If required, secure makeup to the Cooling Tower.
At 2CEC-PNL842, shutdown HWC.
IF WCS is in one pump three filter lineup..... THEN throttle close 2WCS*MOV200 (AND if required, throttle open 2WCS-MOVI I O ) to obtain approximately 225 gpm WCS flow.
Maintains RPV water level in directed band NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Reports NPS-SWG003 de-energized and resulting loss of Feedwater system BOP RO Actions performed as directed When RPV water level drops to 108.8 inches RClC starts and water Level 2 containment isolation occurs. Standby Gas Treatment systems and Control Building Special Filter Trains start.
EVENT 7 Division II Low Pressure ECCS Systems fail to start PO-7.0 After RPV Blowdown, RHS Injection MOVs must be opened from P601 to establish injection. When level begins to rise and transitions from Fuel Zone to Wide Range instruments, action should be taken to L
BOP RO When RPV level drops to 108 inches report RCIC start Inhibits ADS using 2 keylock switches When DWP reaches 1.68 psig Inform SRO of EOP entry co nd it ion Verify Div I1 ECCS systems start Report failure to start Manually start RHS C Pump (CT-2.0)
Manually start RHS B Pump (CT-2.0)
Report pumps started Opens all 7 ADS valves by arming and depressing ADS MANUAL INITIATION pushbuttons on P601 Reports 7 ADS valves are open Injects with systems to restore and maintain RPV water level in directed band (CT-2.0)
RHS Via Shutdown Cooling LPCl B (RHS), opens MOV24B NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
\\
close RHS LPCl injection MOVs to prevent overfilling the RPV (control level below 202 inches). This will also allow RHS B loop to be diverted to Containment Spray.
Containment Spray PO-8.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR WHEN requested to defeat Drywell Spray valve interlocks per EOP-6 Attachment 22, WAIT 2 minutes then activate remote by depressing F8 key. Report the jumpers are installed RH48 2RHS*MOV15B EOP Jumper, TRUE F8 RH50 2RHS*MOV25B EOP Jumper, TRUE F8 NRC Scenario 2
-36 LPCl C (RHS), opens MOV24C ZI When directed initiates Drywell Spray using RHS B per EOP-6 2 step 3.2.2 (2CEC*PNL 60 7 ).
IF Drywell spray valve interlocks are not met, defeat the RHS*MOV15B/25B interlock by performing the following:
NOTE: Dispatches another operator to install jumpers At 2CEC*PNL704A, install EOP Jumper #33 from terminal strip TCI 10, TI32 terminal 7 to terminal strip TC112, TB2 terminal 19.
(Figure 22-2) 0 At 2CEC*PNL704AI install EOP Jumper #34 from terminal strip TC108, TBI terminal 2 to terminal strip TC108, TB1 terminal 4.
(Figure 22-3)
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE: Verifying SWP*MOVSOB open may be delayed until after sprays are in service.
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 Verify open SWP*MOVSOB, HEAT EXCHANGER 1 B SVCE WTR INLET VLV Verify closed AND IF possible overridden, RHS*MOV24B, LPCl B INJECTION VLV Verify running RHS*PI B, PMP I B IF Suppression Chamber Sprays are required concurrently with Drywell Sprays, perform the following:
0 Open RHS*MOV33B, OUTLET TO SUPPR POOL SPRAY Verify approximately 450 gpm on SUPPR SPRAY HEADER FLOW (2RHS *F/64B)
Verify closed, RHS*FV38B, RETURN TO SUPPR POOL COOLING Verify open, RHS*MOV4B, PMP 1B MINIMUM FLOW VLV Open RHS*MOV25B, OUTLET TO DRYWELL SPRAY Open RHS*MOVI 5B, OUTLET NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CONSOLE OPERATOR When requested by BOP RO/ATC RO to place radiation monitor SWP*RE23B in service (if not already in service), manually activate remotes, then report RE23B is in service:
RM02 SWP23B Rad Detector Online/Offline, ON RM03 SWP23B Process Monitor Sample Pump, ON TERM I NATION CRITERIA RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is maintained above TAF. Drywell Spray is initiated.
L NRC Scenario 2
-38 TO DRYWELL SPRAY Verify closed, RHS*MOV4B, PMP 1B MINIMUM FLOW VLV Verify approximately 7450 gpm on DRYWELL SPRAY HEADER FLOW (2RHS*F/63B)
Verify open SWP*MOV90B, HEAT EXCHANGER 1 B SVCE WTR INLET VLV Throttle open SWP*MOV33B, HEAT EXCHANGER 1B SVCE WTR OUTLET VLV to establish Service Water flow to RHR Heat Exchanger 1 B of approximately 7400 gpm (12-R602B)
WHEN possible, close RHS*MOV8B, HEAT EXCHANGER 1B INLET BYPASS VLV Request Rad Monitor SWP*RE23B placed in service.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 8 SRO Admin JPM 5-2 SRO Classify the event as ALERT 3.1.I Evaluator to perform SRO Admin JPM for emergency classification.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
V.
POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. After the second caucus, convene the crew in the classroom for a facilitative critique on:
1. What the crew saw and how they responded to each event?
2. Why the crew responded the way they did or their goal?
3. What went well during the scenario (STRENGTHS)?
4. What the crew could have done better (AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT)?
B. Ensure the expectations in each performance objective are discussed.
C. PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS (Attachment 7), that were not met, should be addressed.
D. Review the Critical Tasks if applicable.
E. At the conclusion, review the strengths and areas for improvement for improvement. Review video tape if appropriate.
F. Significant comments from the post scenario discussion should be recorded to allow later retrieval and follow-up.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
VI.
REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events None B. Commitments
1. 1 OCFR55.45
2. 1 OCFR55.59 VII. LESSONS LEARNED None NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
1.
X X
EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST ReaIism/CredibiIity Event Sequencing Additional Information about these checks:
X X
2.
Simulator Modeling Evaluating Crew Competencies
3.
2 3
1 2
4.
Malfunctions after EOP Entry Abnormal Events Major Transients EOPsUsed For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.
1 For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.
EOP Contingency Procedures Used Simulator Run Time Qualitative Attributes 2
EOP Run Time Crew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)
~~
Developmental Checks:
Does every event have either a Critical Task(s) or Performance Objective?
Is Criteria given for sequencing to subsequent events?
Is termination criteria clear and unambiguous?
Does termination criteria allow verification that all CT, PO standards are met?
Constellation Energy Group OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE
Title:
Task Number: 3440190303 Approvals:
Emergency Classification for Scenario 2 Revision: NRC 2005 NA EXAMINATION SECURITY Dale 1 General Supervisor Date Operations Training (Designee)
Operations.(Designee)
NA EXAMINATION SECURITY Configuration Control Date Performer:
(RO)
TrainedEvaluator:
Evaluation Method: PERFORM Evaluation Location: SIMULATOR FOLLOWING SCENARIO AS SRO Expected Completion Time: 15 minutes Time Critical Task: YES Alternate Path Task: NO Start Time:
Stop Time:
Completion Time:
JPM Overall Rating:
Pass Fail NOTE: A JPM overall rating of fail shall be given if any critical step is graded as fail. Any grade of unsat or individual competency area unsat requires a comment.
Comments:
Evaluator Signature:
Date:
NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-2 1
3/17/2005
Recommended Start Location: (Completion time based on the start location)
Simulator or other designated location.
Simulator Set-up:
N /A Directions to the Instructor/Evaluator To be performed as an administrative JPM.
Directions to Operators:
Read Before Every JPM Performance:
For the performance of this JPM, I will function as the SSS, CSO, and Auxiliary Operators. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary.
Read Before Each Evaluated JPM Performance:
This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Control Room Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional / concurrent verification will not be provided; therefore it should not be requested.
Read Before Each Traininq JPM Performance:
During this Training JPM, applicable methods of verification are expected to be used.
Therefore, either another individual or I will act as the additional / concurrent verifier.
Notes to Instructor / Evaluator:
1.
by a ".".
2.
During Evaluated JPM:
3.
During Training JPM:
Critical steps are identified as PasdFail. All Self-verification shall be demonstrated.
0 Self-verification shall be demonstrated.
steps are sequenced critical unless denoted 0
No other verification shall be demonstrated.
References:
1. EPIP-EPP-02, Classification of Emergency Conditions at Unit 2.
2. EPMP-EPP-0102, Unit 2 Emergency Classification Bases.
3. EPIP-EPP-18, Activation and Direction of the Emergency Plan.
4. NUREG K/A 2.4.40 Knowledge of the SROs responsibilities in emergency plan implementation (4.0).
Tools and Equipment:
1. None.
Task Standard: Scenario properly diagnosed and classified as an Alert NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-2 2
311 512005
Initial Conditions:
1. A LOCA has occurred causing a SCRAM on high DW pressure
2. NZ-EOP-C2 was performed to allow low pressure injection to recover RPV water level.
3. The lowest actual RPV water level during this event was -50 inches
4. Ask the operator for any questions I Performance Steps I Standard Initiating Cue:
Grade Comments (Operators name), assume the role of the SM/ED and determine the emergency classification of this event.
a Alert is declared per EAL 3.1.1.
PasslFail The time elapsed between START TIME and determination MUST BE <Itiminutes to pass the JPM.
Evaluator Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary RECORD START TIME
2..Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and review/utilize the correct section.
3. Primary Containment pressure has exceeded 1.68 psig.
I repeat back (GAP-OPS-01 )
Start time is logged to determine total classification time.
End of JPM TERMINATING CUE: Scenario properly diagnosed and classified as a Alert.
RECORD STOP TIME NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-2 3
311 712005
Initial Conditions:
1. A LOCA has occurred causing a SCRAM on high DW pressure
2. N2-EOP-C2 was performed to allow low pressure injection to recover RPV water level.
3. The lowest actual RPV water level during this event was -50 inches
4. Ask the operator for any questions Initiating Cue:
(Operators name), assume the role of the SM/ED and determine the emergency classification of this event.
NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-2 4
311 512005
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont) 3.1 Containment Pressure 3.1.1 Alert Drywell pressure cannot be maintained c 3.5 psig due to coolant leakage NUMARC IC:
NIA FPB LosdPotential Loss:
RCS Loss Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Hot Shutdown Basis:
The primary containment pressure value is the drywell high pressure scram setpcint and is indicative of a LOCA event. The term "cannot be maintained below" is intended to be consistent with :he conditions specified in the Primary Containment Control EOP indicative of a high energy release into containment for which normal containment cooling systems are insufficient.
PEG Reference(s):
RCS2.1 Basis Reference($:
1.
N1 -ARP-F1, annunciator 1-5
2.
N1 -ARP-F4, annunciator 1-4
3.
N1-EOP-4, Primary Containment Control Page 38 EPMP-EPP-0101 Rev 07
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 3 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 39 TRANSFER MODE SWITCH TO RUNKONTROL ROD DRIFT/UNISOLABLE RCIC STEAM LEAK WITH RPV BLOWDOWN PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 2/10/05 VAL I DATED R. Lanqe, B. Moore, M. Smith DATE 2/16/05 DATE <//6,hk GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING
/
OPE RATl ONS MANAGER NA Exam Securitv DATE CON F I G U RATl ON CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months Initial Power Level:
The scenario begins at about 4.5% reactor power, during plant startup. The crew will continue the startup by withdrawing control rods to raise power above 5% with subsequent Mode Switch transfer to RUN. IRM A failure due to an inop trip occurs resulting in a trip if RPS trip system A. The crew will bypass the failed instrument and reset the resulting RPS channel trip.
4.5% with Mode Switch in STARTUP Feedwater Pump A minimum flow valve fails open with a concurrent failure of RPV Narrow Range level input to Feedwater Level Control System (FWLC). With the level transmitter failed as-is, an RPV water level transient results requiring crew to take manual control of level control valve to prevent an automatic protective trip function per N2-SOP-6. When level is stabilized the crew will then transfer to redundant Narrow Range transmitter per normal operating procedures and subsequently return FW LC to automatic control.
The startup now continues by withdrawing control rods to raise power to above 5% and the Mode Switch is transferred to RUN. The scenario can continue regardless of whether the crew actually places the Mode Switch to RUN. Control Rod 34-27 will drift out. N2-SOP-8 will be executed to fully insert and isolate the control rod. With power level below RWM setpoint the RWM must be bypassed to insert the drifting rod. Service Water Pump A trips occurs requiring a standby pump to be placed in service.
The major transient begins when a RClC Steam Leak into Reactor Building occurs. Automatic and manual attempts to isolate the RClC steam line will be unsuccessful. Entry in EOP-SC is required and the reactor will be manually scrammed. Reactor Building Ventilation System fails to isolate on high radiation level. This requires action to close Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers and manually start Standby Gas Treatment systems to terminate a potential ground level release pathway. When Reactor Building temperatures exceed 21 2°F an RPV Blowdown is required. EHC
\\
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
Pump A trips to disable the Bypass Valves as a means of rapidly reducing RPV pressure to mitigate the steam leak. ADS/SRV PSV 126 fails to open during RPV Blowdown due to Loss of N2 supply, requiring operator action to open an additional SRV to obtain the number directed by EOP-c2.
Major Procedures Exercised: EOP-RPV, SC, C-2. N2-SOP-6 and N2-SOP-8 EAL Classification:
SAE 3.4.1 Main Steam Line, RClC steam line or Reactor Water Cleanup isolation failure AND release pathway, outside normal process system flowpaths from unisolable system exists outside primary containment SAE 4.1.I Primary system is discharging into RB resulting in RB area temperatures >212"F in more than one area, N2-EOP-SC Termination Criteria:RPV Blowdowrr is complete and RPV level is maintained above TAF NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
I.
SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-10 or equivalent.
RWM Step29 Pull rods to raise power to about 4.5%. Initial IC power level is 2.5%. Start of RWM step 31 will result in the proper initial scenario power level.
Remote MS03 Cond Low Vac Bypass OFF Reset CSH HI WTR LEVEL SEAL IN Place EHC Pump B (TME-P1B) in P-T-L and hang red clearance tag on control switch.
B. Presets/Function Key Assignments
1. Malfunctions:
a. PC06, Secondary Containment Isolation Failure, TRUE QUEUED
b. RCI 1, RClC Isolation Failure, TRUE QUEUED
c. AD08C, ADS Valve N Supply Severed (MSS*PSV126), TRUE QUEUED
d. NMOSG, IRM Channel Failure INOP (A), TRUE F3
e. FW30A, Reactor NR Level Transmitter Failure As Is (4A), TRUE F4
f. FW 16A, FW Pump Recirc Valve Failure Open (FVZA), TRUE F4 TUA 3 seconds
g. RD05 3427, Control Rod Failure Drift Out, TRUE F5
h. CWOIA Service Water Pump Trip A, TRUE F6
i. RC12, RClC Steam Leak in RB 215 Elevation 25% Ramp Time 10 minutes RC12, RClC Steam Leak in RB 215 Elevation 60%
F9
k. TC15A, EHC Pump A Trip, TRUE ET02 I.
TC15B, EHC Pump B Trip, TRUE ET02 F8
j.
2. Remotes:
a. MS03 Cond Low Vac Bypass OFF QUEUED
3. Overrides:
a. MOV 121, Switch Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard), OPEN Queued
b. MOV 128, Switch Steam Supply Line Isolation (Inboard), OPEN Queued
c. MOV 128, Light Steam Supply Inboard Isolation INOP Amber, ON F7
d. MOV 128, Light Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Green, OFF F7 NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
e. MOV 128, Light Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Red, OFF F7
f. MOV 121, Light Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Green, ON ET01 ET0 1
g. MOV 121, Light Not Fully OPEN, Amber, ON
4. Annunciators:
a. AN601305 RClC System Inoperable, ON F7
b. AN601 31 9, RClC Valves Motor Overload, ON F7 C. Equipment Out of Service
a. TMB-PI B EHC Pump B in P-T-L with red clearance on control switch D. Support Documentation
a. N2-OP-IOIA, Plant Startup complete through E.3.3 E. Miscellaneous
1. EVENT TRIGGERS
a. ET01 ANN 601 157 RB GEN TEMP HIGH IN ALARM (Event Trigger 68)
When alarm actuates this results in indications of cause of the isolation failure.
b. ET02 650 psig PAM A (Event Trigger 001). Trips EHC pump resulting in loss of Turbine Bypass Valves.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
II SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION PART I:
shift.
To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)
PART II:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA)
Lit Control Room Annunciators 0
Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
(SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
0 Reactor Power = 4.5% approx RWM Step31 0
RPV Pressure 925 psig 0
Bypass Valve #1 is full open and #2 is partially open 0
Feedwater Pumr, A in service with FWS-LV55A in AUTO (HICI 37) 0 Scheduled return to service date is May 20.
PART 111:
RemarkslPlanned Evolutions:
EHC Pump B is out of service for motor repair. Red clearance issued.
0 Continue plant startup to place the reactor mode switch to RUN per N2-OP-101A.
Currently at step E.3.3 PART IV:
To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS) 0 SRO ATC RO
~
BOP RO NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
Scenario ID#
INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened?
0 the r 0 pt io n s?
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.O CT-2.0 CT-3.0 Given a condition requiring automatic isolation of Secondary Containment and a failure of Ventilation isolation, the crew will manually isolate the reactor building by closing Secondary Containment isolation dampers and start GTS, within 5 minutes of d i scove ry.
Given an unisolable RClC steam leak and secondary containment temperature approaching maximum safe values in one area, the crew will enter EOP-RPV and initiate a manual reactor scram before performing an RPV Blowdown.
Given an unisolable RClC steam leak and secondary containment temperature above maximum safe values in more than one area, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown per EOP-C2.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-I.o PO-2.0 PO-3.0 PO-4.0 Given the plant during startup and an IRM INOP trip, the crew will bypass the failed IRM and reset RPS trip systems per N2-OP-92 and N2-OP-97.
Given a failed open Feedwater pump minimum flow valve with RPV level instrument failure resulting in lowering RPV water level, the crew will manually control level to avoid a reactor scram per N2-SOP-6 and N2-0P-3.
Given the reactor plant during startup and a control rod drifting out, the crew will fully insert and disarm the control rod per N2-SOP-8.
Given a Service Water Pump trip the crew will start a standby pump to restore the plant to 4 operating pumps per N2-OP-11 NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
PO-5.0 Given a RClC steam leak and temperatures approaching 212OF, the crew will manually scram per N2-EOP-SC and EOP-RPV.
PO-6.0 Given a RClC steam leak and temperatures in two areas exceeding 212OF, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown per N2-EOP-C2.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS The crew continues the startup per N2-OP-101A E.3.3 (EVENTS 3 and 4)
EVENT 1 IRM A Failure hop Trip PO-I.o CONSOLE OPERATOR When power is above 5% or when directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F3 key:
Crew 0
Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.
SRO Directs plant startup continued ATC RO Continue to withdraw control rods UNTIL APRM downscale lights have cleared.
Verify APRMs reading greater than 5% by placing IRM/APRM recorder select switch to APRM.
In EACH Reactor Protection Division leave one IRM/APRM recorder select switch placed in the APRM position.
SRO Acknowledges report of IRM A INOP trip and RPS A half scram Directs IRM A bypassed NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE NMOSA, IRM CHANNEL FAILURE-INOP (A),
TRUE, (F3)
IRMA channel fails upscale resulting in RPS trips system A trip. On left side of P603, the 4 white RPS scram lights are off. For IRMA the RED UPSC TR OR lNOP light is on, indicating the effected channel. Rod withdrawal block.
The following annunciators alarm:
603102 RPS A NMS TRIP 6031 I O RPS A AUTO TRIP 603201 IRM TRIP SYSTEM A UPSCALE/INOPERABLE 603442 CONTROL ROD OUT BLOCK OPERATOR ACTIONS Directs RPS trip system A reset Notifies Operations and Plant Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning Enters Tech Spec 3.3.1. I RPS Function 1 IRMs. No action is required since only 1 IRM channel is inoperable. (NOTE Also see TRM 3.3.2 Control Rod Block Instrumentation Function 2)
Conducts post event brief May place startup activities on hold to resolve IRM failure ATC RO Identifies and reports annunciators to SRO Implements ARP 603102 actions.
6031 10 actions are similar.
These are 603102 actions IF a SCRAM has occurred, THEN enter N2-SOP-101 C, Reactor Scram. (Scram should NOT have occurred)
IF NO SCRAM has occurred, THEN perform the following:
Check the other IRM channels to verify that NO SCRAM should have occurred.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 -1 1 0 IF a SCRAM should have occurred, THEN enter the Emergency Operating Procedures.
(Scram should NOT have occurred)
IF NO SCRAM should have occurred, THEN perform the following:
Troubleshoot AND correct the cause of the alarm.
Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
IF desired, THEN bypass the applicable IRM per N2-OP-92.
WHEN the initiating signal is cleared OR bypassed, THEN reset the half SCRAM per N2-OP-97.
ATC RO These are 603201 actions At P603 determine by red UPSCLANOP light which IRM channel is tripped. (Determines IRM A is INOP)
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS ATC RO Bypass IRM A When IRM is bypassed the following ann uncia tors clear:
603102 RPS A NMS TRIP 603201 IRM TRIP SYSTEM A UPSCALE/INOPERABLE 603442 CONTROL ROD OUT BLOCK Verify associated range switch setting is correct.
Consult with S.S.S. and bypass faulty channel.
ATC RO These actions are taken to bypass IRM A, when directed CAUTIO N Bypass joysticks can become electrically misaligned after numerous bending motions due to "Metal Creep". Any bypass function should be verified by channel BYPASS lights to ensure that only the intended channel is bypassed.
Verify NO other IRM in bypass for the instrument to be bypassed.
Place the IRM BYPASS joystick to the bypass position.
IF IRM A was bypassed, THEN verify the IRM A BYPASS light is lit on 2CEC*PNL603 OR H13-P606 NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
ATC RO Reset of Tripped Protective System Channel (RESET HALF SCRAM)
When RPS A trip system is reset the following PILOT SCRAM VALVE SOLENOID white lights A, C, E AND G light and 6031 10 RPS A AUTO TRIP clears..
EVENT 2 Feedwater Pump A Minimum Flow Valve fails open with RPV Narrow Range A level transmitter failed as is. PO-2.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F4 key:
FWIGA, FW PUMP RECIRC VALVE FAILURE - OPEN (FVZA), TRUE NRC Scenario 3 ATC RO These actions are taken to reset the RPS trip, when directed Determine which protective channel is tripped by verifying which SCRAM solenoid lights on 2CEC*PNL603 are de-energized.
At 2CEC*PNL603, reset SCRAM signals by momentarily placing the applicable switches to RESET as follows:
For RPS A:
REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC A REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC C Verify PILOT SCRAM VALVE SOLENOID white lights A, C, E AND G are lit.
ATC RO Reports alarms Monitors RPV water level and identifies difference between RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE A indicator and B and C indicators March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE FW30A, REACTOR NR LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE -AS IS (C33-N004A), TRUE RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE A indicator is now failed at current value of about 183 inches. Feedwater Pump A minimum flow valve opens diverting feedflow from the RPV.
RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE B and RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE C indicators slowly lower. With A failed, FWLC does not compensate for the transient.
The following annunciator alarm:
851456 CNST SYSTEM TROUBLE/ NO BACKUP PMP AVAILABLE 851457 CNST BSTR PMP SYS TROUBLE/NO BACKUP PMP AVAILABLE 851546 CNST PUMP DISCH HEADER FLOW LOW NOTE:
May have to prompt SRO to use N2-OP-3 steps E.3.27 - E.3.30 to place FWLC in AUTO with HlCl37 controlling FWS-LV55A.
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
OPERATOR ACTIONS 1
Determines FWR-FV2A is ramped to 100% open Enter SOP-6 due to lowering water level Places FWS-LIK1055A (LV55A) to manual Restores water level as directed.
(1 78 to 187 inches)
Determines RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE A indicator is malfunctioning. Recommends changeover to RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE B If directed, inserts control rods to lower power Per N2-OP-3 F.8.5, change Narrow Range Level Instruments as follows:
IF B Level Instrument is required, place LEVEL A/B CONTROL switch REACTOR WTRLEVEL C33A-SI in LEVEL B position As directed, place FWLC in auto (N2-0P-3 E.3.27 - E.3.30)
Adjust adjust 2CNM-HICI 37, FEEDWATER LO FLOW NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 3PERATOR ACTIONS CONTROLLER, tape setpoint to obtain equal signals as read in the input (vertical) AND output (horizontal) signal on 2FWS-LV55A(B) controller.
Verify 2CNM-HICI 37 indicator is in the green band.
Depress Auto (A) pushbutton on 2FWS-LV55A(B) controller.
Verify that Reactor water level is being maintained at the desired set point.
3RO 7 Directs entry into SOP-6 due to malfunctioning FWLC 3 Determines RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE A instrument is inoperable LI Refers toTech Spec 3.3.2.2 for Feedwater System and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation LCO 3.3.2.2 Three channels of feedwater system and main turbine high water level trip nstrumentation shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: THERMAL POWER 125% RTP.
No action is required since power is below 25%.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE:
May have to prompt SRO to use N2-0P-3 steps E.3.27 - E.3.30 to place FWLC in AUTO with HlCl37 controlling FWS-LV55A.
Note: Events 3 and 4 were performed in parallel with malfunction related events.
EVENT 5 Control Rod 34-27 Drift PO-3.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F5 key:
RD05 3427, Control Rod Failure Drift Out, TRUE F5 Control Rod 34-27 slowly drifts outward and power slowly rises. RWM Display indicates NRC Scenario 3 May direct control rods inserted to lower power Directs FWLC system placed on RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE A instrument and FWLC returned to automatic control per N2-OP-3 Notifies Operations and Plant Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning Conducts post event brief SRO Directs entry into N2-SOP-8 0 Provides reactivity oversight 0 Refer to TS 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 34-27 is drifting out.
The following annunciators alarm 603307 RWM ROD BLOCK 603443 CONTROL ROD DRIFT Note Crew initiates N2-SOP-8 flowchart decision blocks by answering YES/NO questions.
OPERATOR ACTIONS C Refer to TS 3.1.5, Control Rod Scram Accumulator Operability.
1 Notifies Operations and Plant Management 0 Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning 0 Conducts post event brief 0 May place startup continuation on hold to resolve current equipment deficiencies.
ATC RO Reports alarms and implements Annunciator 603443 actions Determine whether alarm is valid by checking the Full Core Display AND Four Rod Display.
IF alarm is valid, enter N2-SOP-08, Unplanned Power Changes, AND execute concurrently with this ARP.
Refer to N2-OP-95A, F.3.0, Rod Drift Indication, to reset Drift alarm.
0 Enters N2-SOP-8 IF More than one control rod has scrammed OR drifted, THEN SCRAM the reactor per N2-SOP-101 C. Scram not required, only 1 rod is drifting NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE Rod will insert to full in after bypassing RWM and using INSERT pushbutton.
After releasing the insert pushbutton, the rod NRC Scenario 3 3PERATOR ACTIONS
~
Power change due to Recirc FCV motion? NO Power on APRMs rising OR expected to rise? YES Reduce Reactor power to approximately 85% per N2-SOP-I01 D. NA, Power is below 5%
Monitor Offgas AND Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors for evidence of Fuel Element Failure.
IF Cause due to Control Rod Drift.... THEN Continue at A (of SOP-8)
ATC RO These are A actions C Identify which control rod is drifting and in what direction CR IN / OUT 1 Using INSERT pushbutton, fully insert drifted control rod.
Bypass the RWM if necessary.
Uses keylock switch and bypasses RW M.
0 Can control rod be fully inserted? YES 13 Release the insert pushbutton.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE will drift out again.
CONSOLE OPERATOR When dispatched to isolate HCU 34-27, manually enter REMOTE :
RD08 34-27, HCU Isolation for Inserted Rod Wait one minute, then report HCU 34-27 isolated.
CAUTION FOR CONSOLE OPERATOR IF Instructor Station locks up with REMOTE RD08 core grid displayed THEN select rod 31-18 on the map. This should release the grid and allow continued console operation.
After isolating the HCU, and the INSERT pushbutton is released, 34-27 no longer drifts out. With rod fully inserted, A PRM power is lower. Annunciator 6032 I5 A PRM TRIP SYSTEM DOWNSCALE may alarm intermittently (at 4%).
~
OPERATOR ACTIONS Did the control rod remain fully inserted? NO Depress and hold INSERT pushbutton to maintain control rod fully inserted.
When control rod is fully inserted, close the following valves at the HCU for the drifting control rod.
2RDS*V103 2RDS*V105 Release INSERT pushbutton.
Is the control rod drifting out?
NO IF required, disarm the control rod per N2-OP-30.
Refer to TS 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability.
WHEN directed by the SM, exit this procedure.
Refer to TS 3.1 5, Control Rod Scram Accumulator Operability.
Contact Maintenance for troubleshootlrepair plan as req u ired.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE EVENT 6 Service Water Pump A Trip P O 4 0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When power directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F6 key:
CWOIA, Service Water Pump Trip (PIA),
TRUE, (W
Service Water (SWP) Pump A trips. Flows rise on the remaining operating S WP pumps.
The following annunciators alarm:
601 I 13 Service Water Pump lA/1 C/l E PUMP AUTO TRIP/FAIL TO START 601 114 Service Water Pump lA/IC/IE Motor/
Feeder Electrical Fault.
Role Play IF dispatched to perform prestart checks when starting pump per N2-0P-I 1 E.2.0, WAIT about 2 minutes and report ready to start the standby pump.
OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO Refers to Tech Spec 3.7.1 Service Water (SW) System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)
LCO 3.7.1 Division 1 and 2 SW subsystems and UHS shall be OPERABLE.
AND Four OPERABLE SW pumps shall be in operation.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 CONDITION E. One required SW pump not in operation.
REQUIRED ACTION E.l Restore required SW pump to operation.
COMPLETION TIME 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS!
PLANT RESPONSE Role Play: As the AO, wait three minutes and report that Service Water Pump PIA, 86-lockout relay is tripped.
3PERATOR ACTIONS Notifies Operations and Plant Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning Conducts post event brief BOP RO Recognizes and reports condition of the SWP*PIA tripped to the SRO.
Performs actions required by N2-ARP-01,601113 (or 601 114 actions are the same):
IF required, throttle 2SW P*MOV74A( B,C, D,E,F) to maintain running SWP Pump flow 10,000 gpm. (Pumps 3, C and D will require throttling)
Start additional Service Water Pumps, as required, at P601 as follows:
IF time permits per N2-OP-11 Section E.2.0, OR Place associated pump control switch to START Place the tripped Service Water Pump control switch in "PULL-TO-LOCK", at P601.
Notifies SRO to refer to Technical Specifications.
Dispatches A 0 to investigate the cause of PIA trip.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
I NSTRU CTO R ACT IO NSI PLANT RESPONSE EVENT 7 SRO Tech Spec 21CS*MOVI 28 Breaker Trip, Containment Isolation Valve Failed Open CONSOLE OPERATOR:
When directed by the Lead Evaluator, insert the following overrides for ICS*MOV128 breaker trip, by depressing F7 key:
MOV*128, Steam Supply Line Isolation (Inboard) Green OFF MOV*128, Steam Supply Line Isolation (Inboard) Red OFF MOV*128, Steam Supply Inboard Isolation -
INOP Amber ON AN601 305, RClC System Inoperable ON AN601 319, RClC Valve Motor Overload ON All on F7 MOV*128 Steam Supply Line Isolation (Inboard) - OPEN Queued NRC Scenario 3 OPERATOR ACTIONS Reopen any MOV74s previously throttled BOP RO Recognizes and reports RClC Inboard Isolation Valve failure.
These are 601305 actions At 2CEC*PNL6OI1 determine IF any INOP Status Lights are en erg ized.
7 IF any INOP Status Lights are energized, refer to their applicable Alarm Response Procedure.
J Determines INOP status light lit for TURB STM SPLY INBD ISOL VLV ICS*MOVI 28 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE NRC Scenario 3 3PERATOR ACTIONS These are MOV128 hop Status light actions Using the energized red OR green indicating lights, confirm power 0 available to ICS*MOV128, TURBINE STM SUPPLY INBOARD ISOL VLV.
0 IF power is NOT available, dispatch an operator to 2EHS*MCC302.
Confirm 2EHS*MCC302 Bkr. 14A, 21CS*MOVI 28 Power Supply, is ON.
SRO Acknowledges BOP RO report.
Refers to T.S. 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation failure.
From Bases B.3.6.1.3 The power operated, automatic isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits and actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO are listed with their associated stroke times in Ref. 1. (TRM)
CONDITION A One or more penetration flow paths with one PClV inoperable except due to leakage not March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE NRC Scenario 3 3PERATOR ACTIONS within limit.
REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.
COMPLETION TIME (for A.l) 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months except for main steam line.
(Determines penetration must be isolated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .)
AND REQUIRED ACTION A.2 Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.
COMPLETION TIME (for A.2) Once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary contain men t Refer to TRM If necessary TRM 3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Valves The Primary Containment Isolation Valves and, if applicable, valve groups, isolation signals, and isolation times are listed in Table T3.6.1-2.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE Role Play: When dispatched by the BOP RO, ask for panel and breaker numbers.
Wait two (2) minutes and report breaker in the tripped condition. No cause is apparent.
EVENT 8 and 9 Unisolable RClC Steam Reactor Building Ventilation Fails to isolate CON SOLE OPE RAT0 R:
After Tech Specs are reviewed by the SRO for MOV*128 failure or when directed by Lead Evaluator, insert the following malfunction by depressing F8 key:
RC12, RClC Steam Leak in Reactor Building, 25% over 10 minute ramp F8 The following annunciator alarms:
851 254 Process Airborne Rad Monitor Activated NRC Scenario 3 OPERATOR ACTIONS May enter Tech. Spec. 3.5.3 for RClC inoperable.
Notifies Operations and Plant Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning Conducts post event brief BOPRO Check DRMS CRT Display to determine RB HVR*RE32A/B alarming.
These are 851 254 Corrective Actions On High Radiation Level Verify Automatic Response has March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE L
Malfunction PC06 becomes active PC06, Secondary Containment Isolation Failure, TRUE Reactor Building Ventilation fails to isolate Event 8 SRO enters and directs EOP-SC actions.
NRC Scenario 3 DPERATOR ACTIONS occurred, as applicable.
Gaseous Rad Level High initiates the following (CT-1.0, also redirected from EOP-SC):
RX Bldg Vent Emergency
UC413A(B) starts. Suction Test DMPR*AOD34A(B) will be open after manual start.
Shuts RX Bldg Ventilation Supp Air Is01 DMPR *AODIAIB.
Shuts RX Bldg Ventilation Exh Air lsol DMPR *AODSAIB.
Shuts RX Bldg Ventilation Refuel Area Exh Air Is01 DMPR
AODI ONB.
Initiates Standby Gas Treatment Filter Train A or B Start Signal.
0 0
0 SRO Identify Area affected, and verify level reading.
Refer to Emergency Plan Procedure EPIP-EPP-21.
Evacuates Reactor Building, when directed.
Refer to N2-EOP-SC (SRO).
Enters and directs actions per EOP-SC when HVR Exhaust radiation is above an isolation setpoint (HVR*RE32A/B exceed DRMS Red setpoint)
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
IF HVR Exhaust radiation Annunciator 601 I57 Reactor Building General Areas Temperature High is received and RClC Steam Line should isolate as temperature rises above 135OF. WCS system isolates. WHEN 601 157, Reactor Building General Areas Temperature High is received, Event Trigger ET01 activates:
MOV*121, Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) - Green - ON MOV*121, Not Fully Open - Amber - ON ET0 1 MOV*121 Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) - OPEN Queued (Prevents valve from closing)
MOV*128 has no power and MOV*121 appears to be closing.
However, RClC steam line pressure stay up and temperatures in the area are still rising.
Thus, no isolation of the RClC Steam Line has occurred. Fire panel 849107 FIRE DETECTED PNL 103 SE QUAD 215 alarms as a result of steam discharging into the area.
exceeds an isolation setpoint THEN verify (Override SC-1) (CT-1.O)
HVR isolates HVR*UC413A or B starts GTSstarts HVR Unit Coolers start IF any area temperature is above the isolation setpoint THEN GO to 28 (Step SC-2)
Isolate all discharges into affected areas except systems needed for fire fighting or other EOP actions (Step SC-4)
Directs BOP RO to manually isolate RClC Steam Line.
IF primary system is discharging into the Reactor Building (YES RCIC, Conditional Step SC-
4).... THEN GO to 29 NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE Event 8 SRO enters and directs EOP-RPV a c tions.
EOP-RPV Detail E l Systems CondensatelFeedwater CRD RClC HPCS 0 LPCS 0 LPCl RHS through Shutdown Cooling EOP-RPV Detail E2 Systems RHS Service Water Crosstie Fire Systems ECCS Keep-Full SLS, test tank SLS, boron tank Condensate Transfer IPERATOR ACTIONS 1 BEFORE any area temperature reaches Maximum Safe Value (Detail S; 212°F) (Step SC-7 and SCS).... ENTER RPV Control, while continuing in EOP-SC (CT-2.0) rhese actions are directed by the SRO from EOP-RPV 7 ENTERSCRAMPROCEDURE N2-SOP-101 C, while continuing in EOP-RPV (Step 3)
I Executes LEVEL and PRESSURE legs concurrently LEVEL ACTIONS DIRECTED BY SRO Restore and maintain RPV water level between 159.3 inches and 202.3 inches using one or more Preferred Injection Systems (Detail El) Step L-3. SRO should direct control between I59 to 200 inches.
IF level cannot be restored and maintained above 159.3 inches....THEN maintain level above -14 inches (Fig Z)
OK to augment with Alternate Injection systems if needed (Detail E2) (Use of these is NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE IPERATOR ACTIONS NOT expected)
'RESSURE ACTIONS DIRECTED 3Y SRO I IF RPV Blowdown (EOP-C2) is anticipated..... THEN Rapidly depressurize the RPV using the Main Turbine Bypass Valves. OK to exceed 100"Flhr cooldown.
(Step P-1 Override). (This is an expected action because EOP-C2 will be necessary due to rising Reactor Building temperatures).
3 Is any SRV Cycling? NO (Step P-2) 7 Stabilize RPV Pressure below 1052 psig using Main Turbine Bypass Valves. (Step P-4). SRO should direct control between 800 to 1000 psis with BPVs.
0 Use Alternate Pressure Control Systems, if needed.
Restore pneumatics to drywell, if necessary.
WAIT until shutdown cooling pressure interlock clears 128 psig (Step P-7) BEFORE proceeding to Step P-8. While in Step P-7 orsooner, the SRO will likely return to EOP-SC actions and may be waiting for 2 areas to reach 212°F NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE SRO enters and directs EOP-SC actions.
Event 8 BOP RO Actions At back panel L DS Temperature Monitoring Panels P632 and P642 the first area in alarm and to reach 212 F E31-N619A and N620A 31-N619B and N620B If anticipating RPV Blowdown, all 5 BPVs are NRC Scenario 3 OPERATOR ACTIONS These actions are directed by SRO when returning to EOP-SC 0 WAIT until 2 or more areas are above Maximum Safe Value for the same parameter (Step SC-9 and IO), THEN proceed to SC-10 to enter EOP-C2.
BOP RO Recognize and reports increasing area temperatures and in the Reactor Building.
Uses EOP-6 Attachment 28 to monitor and report temperature conditions.
Confirms WCS and RHR isolation.
Reports failure of RClC to automatically isolate.
Attempts to manually isolate the RClC Steam Line by closing MOV*121 using keylock switch.
Monitors back panels for trending area temperatures and radiation levels.
Reports levels and trends to the SRO.
IF directed to rapidly depressurize the RPV using the Main Turbine Bypass Valves, opens all 5 BPVs using the BYPASS JACK INCREASE pushbutton. OK to exceed 1 OO°F/hr cooldown. (Step March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE opened. RPV pressure lowers. RPV pressure drops to about 650 psig, the following malfunction activate from ET02:
TCI 5A, EHC Pump A Trip, TRUE TC15B, EHC Pump B Trip, TRUE EHC Pump A trips and as EHC pressure lowers, the BPVs will close to to loss of fluid pressure.
Event 8 ATC RO Scram Actions 3PERATOR ACTIONS P-I Override). (This is an expected action because EOP-C2 will be necessary due to rising Reactor Building temperatures).
Reports trip of EHC pumps and loss of BPVs, if used for rapid depressurization.
ATC RO These are N2-SOP-101 C Scram Actions IF Automatic Scram is anticipated AND time permits......THEN Reduce Recirc Flow to 55 mlbm/hr per N2-SOP-101 D. (NA, at 4%
power)
IF Mode switch is NOT in REFUEL position..... THEN Place MODE Switch to SHUTDOWN position. (C T-2.0) 0 Provides Scram report to SRO IF RPS is NOT tripped......THEN Arm AND depress BOTH Manual Scram pushbuttons on either side of 2CEC*PNL603. (NA, RPS trips)
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 3PERATOR ACTIONS 0
0 0
0 0
Verify automatic responses.
All rods full in Rx power lowering Turbine tripped/TSVs & TCVs shut Generator tripped and house loads transferred SDV V&D valves closed RCS pumps downshift RPV pressure on TBVs OR SRVs FWLC controlling level > 159.3" IF All feedwater pumps have tripped...THEN Place ALL 2FWS-LVlO and LV55 controllers to "manual" and verify the valves are full closed.
IF the Reactor scram can be promptly reset (and remain reset).... THEN Reset the scram.
IF the Reactor scram CANNOT be reset....THEN Close 2RDS-VZ8 if directed by the SM/CRS.
Performs LEVEL control actions as directed by SRO from EOPs Performs PRESSURE control actions as directed by SRO from EOPs WHILE continuing, perform the following as time permits:
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
~~
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS IF Feedwater Pumps trip on high level (above 202.3 inches), an FWS Pump Restart can be performed per N2-SOP-101 C, Level Control Actions Detail 1. Since RPV pressure will drop below 500 psig during the scenario (RPV Blowdown), Condensate Booster Pump injection can be used instead of Feedpump restart.
NRC Scenario 3 Fully insert IRMs AND SRMs.
Energize 2WCS-MOVI 07 (2NHS-MCC008-2E).
If required, secure makeup to the Cooling Tower.
At 2CEC-PNL842, shutdown HWC.
IF WCS is in one pump three filter lineup....THEN Throttle close 2WCS*MOV200 (AND if required, throttle open 2WCS-MOVI I O ) to obtain approximately 225 gpm WCS flow.
These actions are used to restart a tripped Fedwater pump, if directed Is at least 1 condensate pump running? YES Verify the following:
Out of service condensate, booster and feedpumps in PTL.
2 condensate pumps running.
2 booster pumps running.
2FWR-FV2s closed.
The following controllers in manual with 0% output:
2FWS-HIC55s 2FWS-HlC1010~
0 2FWS-HIC1600 IF required, reset Level 8 March 2005
~
~~
~
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
pushbuttons.
Start feedwater pump as follows:
Event 10 Second Area Temperature reaches 21 2°F Second area temperature reaches 212 F (31-N601E and N601F). RPV Blowdown is required.
NRC Scenario 3 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 Confirm suction pressure > 500 psi.
Verify aux oil pump running.
Place pump switch to red flag.
WHEN 2FWS-FV2A/B/C - 15%
open, confirm pump start.
Confirm flow - 8000 gpm.
Inject with 2FWS-LV55NB (open 2FWS-VI 03A/B if required)
OR verify open 2FWS-MOV47 A/B/C AND inject with ZFWS-LV1 OA/B/C as required.
IF required, reset setpoint setdown per N2-OP-3, H.l.O.
For automatic control, refer to N2-OP-3, H.9.12 OR H.9.13.
Verify aux oil pump stops.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS!
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event 10 BOP RO actions Event 10 SRO enters and directs EOPC2 actions.
BOP RO Report second area temperature reaching 21 2°F.
If required restore pneumatics to drywell At P851 IAS*SOV166 and 184 At P601 IAS *SOV164 and 165 When directed, open seven (7)
ADS / SRVs by using keylock switch for EACH ADS valve at control room back panel P631 and P628. (CT-3.0)
Recognizes and reports failed ADS
/ SRV to the SRO.
Open additional non-ADS SRV from P601 control switch to achieve 7 open valves.
These actions are directed by the SRO from EOP-C2 Will the reactor stay shutdown without boron? YES all rods are fully inserted (Step 2)
Drywell Pressure? Below 1.68 psig (Step 9, then bypass step IO)
Suppression Pool Level?
Above El 192 ft (Step 11)
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 10 ADS Valve fails to open When ADS Valves are opened AD08C, ADS Valve NZ supply severed becomes active.
PSV 126 does not indicate open at P601, even though back panel indication is that the valve opened (ADS solenoid is energized).
TERM I N AT10 N C RITE RIA RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is maintained above TAF.
NOTE SRO Classification is not required because Surrogate SRO is used in this scenario.
0 0
0 Open all 7 ADS Valves (Step 12)
(CT-3.O)
OK to exceed 10O0F/hr 0 Restore pneumatics to drywell if necessary Per Ops Manual, with no RHS pumps running, opening the 7 ADS valves is performed by placing individual keylock switch for EACH ADS valve to open at control room back panel P631 and P628.
Can all 7 ADS Valves be opened?
NO (Step 13)
Open other SRVs until a total of 7 are open (Step 14)
WAIT until shutdown cooling pressure interlock clears 128 psig (Step 16) BEFORE proceeding to Step 17.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
V.
POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA. NRC Exam VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events None B. Commitments
1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST X
X X
X
1.
Real ism/Cred i bil ity Event Sequencing Simulator Modeling Evaluating Crew Competencies
2.
6 2
2
3.
Total Malfunctions Malfunctions after EOP Entry Abnormal Events
4.
1 NA Additional Information about these checks:
EOP Contingency Procedures Used Simulator Run Time For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.
For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.
I 1
I Major Transients I
2 IEOPsUsed I
NA IEOP Run Time I
2 I Crew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)
Developmental Checks:
Does every event have either a Critical Task(s) or Performance Objective?
Is Criteria given for sequencing to subsequent events?
Is termination criteria clear and unambiguous?
Does termination criteria allow verification that all CT, PO standards are met?
Constellation Energy Group OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE
Title:
Task Number: 3440190303 Emergency Classification for Scenario 3 Revision: NRC 2005 Approvals:
NA EXAMINATION SECURITY G&&ral flpervisor Dgte I General Supervisor Date Operations Training (Designee)
Operations -(Designee)
NA EXAMINATION SECURITY Configuration Control Date Performer:
(RO)
Trainer/Evaluator:
Evaluation Method: PERFORM Evaluation Location: SIMULATOR FOLLOWING SCENARIO AS SRO Expected Completion Time: 15 minutes Time Critical Task: YES Alternate Path Task: NO Start Time:
Stop Time:
Completion Time:
JPM Overall Rating:
Pass Fail NOTE: A JPM overall rating of fail shall be given if anv critical step is graded as fail. Any grade of unsat or individual competency area unsat requires a comment.
Comments:
Evaluator Signature:
Date:
NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-3 1
311 712005
Recommended Start Location: (Completion time based on the start location)
Simulator or other designated location.
Simulator Set-up:
N /A
\\.
Directions to the Instructor/Evaluator To be performed as an administrative JPM.
Directions to Operators:
Read Before Everv JPM Performance:
For the performance of this JPM, I will function as the SSS, CSO, and Auxiliary Operators. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cuesas necessary.
Read Before Each Evaluated JPM Performance:
This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Control Room Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional / concurrent verification will not be provided; therefore it should not be requested.
Read Before Each Traininq JPM Performance:
During this Training JPM, applicable methods of verification are expected to be used. Therefore, either another individual or I will act as the additional / concurrent verifier.
Notes to Instructor / Evaluator:
1.
2.
During Evaluated JPM:
3.
During Training JPM:
Critical steps are identified as Pass/Fail. All steps are sequenced critical unless denoted by a I..
Self-verification shall be demonstrated.
0 Self-verification shall be demonstrated.
No other verification shall be demonstrated.
References:
1. EPIP-EPP-02, Classification of Emergency Conditions at Unit 2.
2. EPMP-EPP-0102, Unit 2 Emergency Classification Bases.
3. EPIP-EPP-18, Activation and Direction of the Emergency Plan.
4. NUREG K/A 2.4.40 Knowledge of the SROs responsibilities in emergency plan implementation (4.0).
Tools and Equipment:
1. None.
Task Standard: Scenario properly diagnosed and classified as a Site Area Emergency Initial Conditions:
1. Reactor building temperatures rise to an isolation setpoint.
2. RCIC has failed to isolate.
3. Reactor building temperatures and radiation levels continue to rise.
4. N2-EOP-SC does not yet require RPV Blowdown.
5. Ask the operator for any questions.
NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-3 2
3/15/2005
Initiating Cue:
(Operators name), assume the role of the SM/ED and determine the emergency classification of this event.
1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue. Proper communications used for repeat back (GAP-OPS-01 )
Sat/U nsat Evaluator Acknowledge repeatback providing correction if necessary RECORD START TIME Start time is logged to determine total classification time.
2..Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and reviewhtilize the correct section.
3. RClC Steam Line isolation failure AND a release pathway outside normal system flowpaths from an unisolable system, exists outside primary containment.
I EPIP-EPP-02 obtained.
Sat/ Unsat, Section 3.4.1 is referenced.
o Site Area Emergency is declared PasslFail and determination MUST BE top of active fuel -0R-RPV Flooding is required.
Termination Criteria:
RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is maintained at the elevation of the main steam lines and containment sprays in service.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
I.
SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-20 or equivalent.
6. Presets/Function Key Assignments
1. Malfunctions:
a. DGOIC, Diesel Generator Number 3 Failure to Start, TRUE QUEUED
b. RP03, Reactor Protection System Failure To Scram, TRUE QUEUED
c. CSOIA, HPCS Inadvertent Initiation K29 (Drywell Pressure High),
TRUE F3
d. FW15, Feedwater Master Controller Failure As - Is, TRUE F4
e. FW22A6, FW Heater Tube Leak (A6), 50%, 3 min ramp F4
f. MS03, Steam Leakage Inside the Primary Containment, 5Oh,lrnin F5 ramp
g. MS03, Steam Leakage Inside the Primary Containment, 30%
h. MS04, Steam Line Rupture Inside Primary Containment, 75%
i. ED026, Loss of Off-Site 115KV Line 6, TRUE
j.
RR50, Reference Leg Flashing, TRUE, TUA=30 sec
k. CS06, Low Pressure Core Spray Pump Trip, TRUE, TUA = 15 Seconds
2. Remotes:
a. RH27, RHS*MOV15A 600 V BKR Status, OPEN
b. RH1 6, Manual Handwheel Ops - RHS*MOV15A, OPEN
3. Overrides:
a. P628 Lamp, Vacuum Bkr 21SC*RV34A Inboard Green, ON
b. P628 Lamp, Vacuum Bkr 21SC*RV34A Inboard Red, ON
c. P601 Switch, RHR A injection MOV24A, CLOSE
4. Annunciators:
a. AN601556, Drywell Vac Bkr lnbd Disc Open, ON C. Equipment Out of Service
a. 2EGS*EG3 Start switch in P-T-L with red clearance applied.
D. Support Documentation (Relative)
ET04 ET02 ET02 ET02 ET0 1 F6 F7 Queued ET03 ET02 ET03
a. N2-OSP-ISC-M@002, DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKER OPERABILITY TEST, completed up to and including step 8.2.4.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
E. Miscellaneous
1. EVENT TRIGGERS
a. ET01 #005 DRYWELL PRESSURE greater than 1.68 psig
b. ET02 #030 Drywell Pressure >5# (1 9.7 psia)
c. ET03 #092 21SC-RV34A test pushbutton depressed
d. ET04 #008 Mode Switch in Shutdown
2. At P851, open IAS*SOV167, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT OUTBOARD ISOLATION TO DRYWELL, for N2-OSP-ISC-M@002
3. At P851, open IAS*SOV185, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INBOARD ISOLATION TO DRYWELL, for N2-OSP-ISC-M@002 NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
II.
TITLE SRO SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION NAME TITLE NAME PART I:
shift.
To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)
PART It:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, 'STA)
Lit Control Room Annunciators 0
Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
(SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Reactor Power = 100%
Loadline = >lOOo/~
0 N2-OSP-ISC-M@002, DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKER OPERABILITY TEST is in moaress.
2EGS*EG3, is out of service for preplanned maintenance. Day one of three day LCO (Tech. SDec. 3.8.1 condition B.). Scheduled return to service is late next shift.
PART 111:
RemarkslPlanned Evolutions:
Continue with N2-OSP-ISC-M@002, DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKER OPERABILITY TEST and perform step 8.3 only.
PART IV:
To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
Shift Crew Composition (SMKRS)
I BOP RO I
I I
I NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
1 I Scenario ID#
INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What we did?
Why? (Goals) 0 the r 0 pt io ns?
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
I NSTRU CTOR ACT1 ONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Ill.
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.O CT-2.0 CT-3.0 CT-4.0 Given an unplanned power change that is or is likely to cause reactor power as indicated on APRMs to rise, the crew will make an initial reactor power reduction to approximately 85% as indicated on APRMs per SOP-8 and in accordance with SOP-I 01 D.
Given RPV level indication is no longer valid, the crew will execute EOP-C4 to open SRVs with a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 7 ultimately opened.
Given RPV Flooding in progress with RPV level below the main steam lines, the crew will establish injection to the RPV to restore and maintain RPV level at or above the main steam lines.
Given the situation, RPV flooded to the main steam lines and RHR Loop A not needed to run in the LPCl mode to maintain level, divert RHR A to spray the Suppression Chamber and the Drywell.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-I.o PO-2.0 PO-3.0 Given the plant experiencing an inadvertent initiation of HPCS the crew will act to place the HPCS in a safe configuration.
Given the plant operating at rated power and a loss of a high pressure heater, the crew will lower power and monitor feedwater temperature and verify limits per N2-SOP-8.
Given a reactor plant performing a power reduction from rated with a feedwater control malfunction, the operating crew will take NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS manual control of feedwater level prior to any automatic actions occurring.
PO-4.O PO-5.0 Given a reactor plant operating at power with a LOCA in progress, the crew will manually scram the reactor plant prior to reaching 1.68 psig in the Containment.
Given the situation, RPV flooded to the main steam lines and RHR Loop A not needed to run in the LPCl mode to maintain level, divert RHR A to spray the Suppression Chamber and the Drywell.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 1 PO-1.o 21SC*RV34A Exercise and Position Indication Test Crew 0
Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.
SRO Directs N2-OSP-ISC-M@002, DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKER OPERABILITY TEST continued at step 8.3.
Repeats back communication of Vacuum breaker failure.
Refers to Tech. Spec. 3.6.1.7 and performs required actions.
o Enters condition A and takes required action A.l to restore to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months o Enters condition B and takes required action B.l to close RV34A within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .
BOP RO Opens 21SC*RV34A, VACUUM BREAKER INBOARD, by depressing AND holding VACUUM BREAKER 21SC*RV34A NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS When 21SC*RV34A pushbutton is depressed the valve will indicate intermediate position (both red and green light on) and will not re close.
Annunciator 601556 DRYWELL VACUUM BRKR INBOARD DISC OPEN alarms EVENT 2 Spurious start and injection of HPCS.
L NRC Scenario 4 INBOARD TEST pushbutton.
Verifies the following:
Position indication lights for 21SC*RV34A indicate open.
[(Green Light ON, Red Light ON1 Annunciator 601 556 DRYWELL VACUUM BRKR INBOARD DISC OPEN alarms on 2CEC*PNL601.
Computer pt. ISCBC37, RV33N34A DW VAC BRKR IN is generated in the OPEN cond it ion.
Position indication lights for 21SC*RV34B indicate closed.
(Green illuminated, Red extinguished)
Reports to SRO that 21SC*RV34A failed to fully.
Releases VACUUM BREAKER 21SC*RV34A INBOARD TEST pushbutton.
Reports to SRO that 21SC*RV34A failed to reclose and remains intermediate.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PO-I.o CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing (F3) key:
~
CSOIA, HPCS Inadvertent Initiation K29 (Drywell Pressure High)
HPCS automatically starts and injects into the RPV. Reactor pressure lowers and FWS-LVIO controllers respond by closing down to maintain RPV level in normal band. The Division 111 diesel generator starts and runs unloaded in response to HPCS start signal.
The following annunciators alarm:
85231 1 EDG 2 TROUBLE 85231 7 EDG2 RUNNING 603139 REACTOR WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW NRC Scenario 4
-1 1.
SRO Repeats back start of HPCS and EGS*EG2.
Directs RO to verify Drywell pressure and reactor water level in normal band.
Acknowledges report that RPV level and Drywell pressure are normal Directs RO to place HPCS control switch in P-T-L and/or closure of CSH*MOV107.
Refers to Tech. Spec. 3.5.1 and performs required actions.
o Enters condition B and takes required action B.l to verify by administrative means that RClC is 0 P E RAB LE immediately March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CONSOLE OPERATOR If requested for HPCS trip unit indication, report all trip units are indicating normal and untripped.
FWLC system will respond and no operator actions are expected to occur other than confirming proper FWLC response.
NRC Scenario 4
-12.
and action B.2 to restore HPCS to OPERABLE status within 14 days.
Identifies 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months reportable condition requirement of 10CFR50.72.b.3.v and 50.73.a.2.v.
for unplanned inoperability.
o Notifies Operations and Plant management.
Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning.
ATC RO o Identifies and reports annunciators to SRO.
u Implements the actions of ARP 6031 39 u Confirms FWLC system is responding properly to the rise in water level.
These are 603139 actions:
IF RPV pressure 2 900 psig, enter N2-SOP-06, Feedwater Fa iI u res.
o IF RPV pressure < 900 psig, perform the following as required:
u HIGHLEVEL March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4 0
D Reduce feed rate to the RPV by the following as required:
o Closing Feedwater Level Control valves FWS-LVlOs, LV55s OR CNM-LV137.
o Raise reject flow rate by throttling open WCS*FV135.
o Reduce CRD flow by throttling closed RDS-FC107.
o Shutdown Feedwater pumps, Feedwater Booster pumps OR Condensate pumps.
Closing ZFWS-MOV21s OR ZFWS-MOV47s OR ZCNM-M OV84s.
Restore feed AND condensate to the RPV per N2-OP-3.
BOP RO o Recognizes and reports HPCS injecting.
o Verifies Drywell pressure and reactor water level are normal.
o Places HPCS control switch in P-T-L and/or closes CSH*MOV107.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE: Crew is likely to have 2EGS*EG2 remain running until additional resources can be obtained.
NRC Scenario 4 o Implements ARP 85231 7, 601 706 and 851311 and 852319.
These are 85231 1 actions:
Dispatch an operator to 2CES*IPNL413, 2EGS*EG2 GENERATOR SWITCHBOARD.
o IF a local alarm is energized, refer to the applicable Alarm Response Procedure.
These are 852317 actions:
Confirm that 2EGS*EG2 is required to be running.
IF 2EGS*EG2 is required to be running, operate the diesel generator in accordance with N2-OP-IOOB, HPCS DIESEL GENERATOR.
IF 2EGS*EG2 is NOT required to be running, shutdown the diesel generator per N2-0 P-1 OOB.
AFTER 2EGS*EG2 is shutdown, confirm the alarm clears.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS These are 852319 actions:
Using the Process Computer, determine which computer point(s) brought in the alarm.
Notify the SM to evaluate the effect on the operability of 2EGS*EG2, DIVISION 3 diesel generator AND 2ENS*SWG102, Division 3 Emergency Switchgear.
Dispatch an operator to 2ENS*SWG102 to check for de-energized amber circuit monitoring lights.
When HP CS is placed in P
-T-L the following occurs:
85231 I EDG 2 TROUBLE clears 603139 REACTOR WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW clears 601706 HPCS SYSTEM INOPERABLE 852319 EDG 2 DC CONT POWER FAILURE Pump Motor BRKR #2 system status light illuminates.
EVENT 3 High pressure feedwater heater tube leak and feedwater master controller failure.
PO-2.0 & PO-3.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunctions by depressing (F4) key:
NRC Scenario 4 These are 601706 actions:
o Refer to the applicable INOP STATUS LIGHT for response.
Refer to Technical Specifications for required action.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS FWI 5, Feedwater Master Controller Failure AS - IS FW22A6, FW Heater Tube Leak (A6), 50%,
3 min ramp NRC Scenario 4
-16.
ATC RO Reports alarms to CRS Performs ARP 6031 39 actions.
Recognizes and reports megawatts electric change, thermal power rise and rise in APRM power.
Monitors and reports RPV water level and identifies that during the downpower the Feedwater master controller is not responding.
Enters SOP-6 due to lowering reactor water level as directed by CRS.
Places 2FWS-HIC1600 (Feedwater Master Controller) in manual.
Controls water level in manual in assigned band.
These are 603139 actions:
o IF RPV pressure 2 900 psig, enter N2-SOP-06, Feedwater Failures.
IF RPV pressure < 900 psig, perform the following as required:
LOWLEVEL Raise feed rate to the RPV by March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS The following annunciators alarm:
603139 REACTOR WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW 851420 6TH PT HEATER 6A/66/6C WATER LEVEL HIGH 85 1430 6TH PT HEATER EMER DRN VLV 26A/266/26C OPEN Reactor water level high alarm due to reduced steam flow and failed feedwater controller NRC Scenario 4
-17 ANY of the following:
o Reduce reject flow by closing WCS*FVI 35.
Raise CRD injection flow to approximately 63 gpm.
Restore feed AND condensate to the RPV per N2-OP-3.
BOP RO Implements ARP actions for 851420and 851430 These are 851420 actions:
o Using computer point HDLLC07 (08,09), determine which heater level is high.
o Dispatch an operator to 2CES-IPNL204 to verify the validity of the alarm and stabilize heaters as required.
o Verify the normal and emergency drain controllers are in automatic and setpoints correct per N2-OP-
08.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
-18.
Verify HDH-LVGA (B,C), normal level control valve, is modulating.
If required, adjust 6th point heater level per N2-OP-08, Subsection F.l.O.
If required, request Tech Support/l&C assistance to determine cause.
To reset normal level control valves to automatic operation, perform Section H.13.0 of N2-OP-
08.
Return the system to normal operation per N2-0P-8.
These are 851430 actions:
Using computer points HDHZCOl,
HDHZC02, AND HDHZC03, determine which valve is alarming.
At 2CES-IPNL204, verify alarming valve is modulating.
Verify the NORMAL DRAIN AND EM E RG E NCY D RAI N Controllers for the alarming valve are in automatic AND the setpoints are per N2-OP-8, Attachment 1.
Investigate AND determine the cause of the open valve.
Take the appropriate actions to return the system to normal March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS After approximately 3 minutes annunciator 851410 6TH PT HEATER 6A/6B/6C WATER LEVEL HI-HI alarms ESS-MOV3A closes The following annunciators alarm due to auto isolation of 6'h point heater::
851418, 4TH PT HEATER 4A/46/4C WATER LEVEL 851419, 5TH PT HEATER 5A/5B/5C WATER LEVEL 851420, 6TH PT HEATER 6A/68/6C WATER LEVEL HIGH HIGH HIGH Core thermal power rises APRM power rises.
NRC Scenario 4 operation.
o Implements ARP actions for 851410.
These are 851410 actions:
Enter N2-SOP-08, UNPLANNED POWER CHANGES, AND execute concurrently with this procedure.
Using computer points HDHLC04, HDHLCOS, OR HDHLCO6, determine which heater level is HIGH-HIGH.
Dispatches operator to 2CES-IPNL204 to confirm the validity of the alarm.
Verify the automatic responses have occurred.
Verify the NORMAL DRAIN AND EMERGENCY DRAIN Controllers for the alarming heater are in automatic AND the setpoints are per N2-OP-8, Attachment 1.
IF 2FWS-E6A (B, C) high level is valid, verify 2DSR-LVX65A AND B (LVY65A AND B, LVZ65A AND B) are closed.
Verify 6TH PT HTR E6A (B, C)
NORMAL LVL DR, HDH-LV6A (LVGB, LV6C) is open.
Verify the 6TH PT HTR E6A (B, C)
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4 HIGH LVL DR, HDH-LV26A (LV26B, LV26C) is modulating.
investigate further IF necessary AND determine the cause of the high-high level.
Take the appropriate actions to return the system to normal operation.
Enters and performs the actions of N2-SOP-8 for unplanned power changes as directed by the CRS.
Lowers power to approximately 85% using recirc. flow IAW SOP-I01 D as directed by CRS.
(CT-1.O)
Monitors Main steam line and offgas radiation monitors for evidence of fuel failure.
Verifies feedwater temperatures are within limits of figure 1 of N2-SO P-8.
Verifies 2CNM-AOV101 LOW PRESS HTR STRING BYPASS VLV, is closed.
Verify that 2ESS-MOV3Al 6TH POINT HEATER A EXTRACTION STM ISOL VLV, for the affected Heater is closed March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
-21 R At 2CES-IPNL204, transfer Sixth Point Feedwater Heater A level control to 2HDH-LV26A as follows:
Lower 2 H D H-L I C26A tape setpoint UNTIL 2HDH-LV26A begins to open Place 2HDH-LIC6A in MANUAL AND close 2HDH-LV6A Exit this procedure AND enter N2-OP-8 at Subsection H.2.0 u Makes plant announcement Stating entry into N2-SOP-6 and N2-SOP-8 using GAITRONICS.
SRO i~ Acknowledges report of feedwater Master controller Failure.
ZI Directs entry into SOP-6.
ZI Assigns reactor water level band.
LI Acknowledges report of power rise.
u Directs entry into N2-SOP-08 unplanned power changes due to loss of feedwater heating.
Directs power reduced to approximately 85% IAW N2-SOP-101 D using recirc. Flow.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 4 Steam Leak inside the primary containment.
PO-4.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR After power reduction is complete, reactor water level is stable in assigned band and when directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing (F5) key:
MS03, Steam Leakage Inside the Primary Containment at 5%.
Repeats back communication that feedwater is not responding.
Directs entry into N2-SOP-06 for feedwater failures.
Notifies Operations and Plant management.
Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning.
Determines further power reduction to 80% required per N2-OP-8 using N2-OP-101 D.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONSI PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event 4 BOP RO Actions Annunciator 851254, PROCESS AIRBORNE RADN MON ACTIVATED alarms DRMS system indicates CMS-IOA-1 and CMS 1 OB-1. (Gaseous Drywell area radiation monitors)channels in red alarm.
Drywell pressure starts to slowly rise Drywell floor drain leak rate rises After approximately 2.5 minutes drywell pressure reaches 0.75 psis which causes annunciator 603140, DRYWELL PRESSURE HIGH/LOW to alarm.
After approximately 3.5 minutes DRMS system indicates CMS-1OA-2 and CMSIOB-
2. (Particulate Drywell area radiation monitors)channels in alarm which causes annunciator 851254, PROCESS AIRBORNE RADN MON ACTIVATED to reflash.
NRC Scenario 4 BOP RO o Reports annunciator 851254 to CRS.
o Reviews ARP actions.
These are 851254 actions:
o Identifies from table 851254 that corrective action b is required.
If there has been an increase in containment activity as evidenced by an alert or High Rad alarm on the gaseous or particulate channel of CMS*REl OA or B:
o Notify the SM.
o Notify the Rad. Prot.
Department.
o Attempt to identify the cause of March 2005
I INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS the increase, notify Chemistry to sample containment.
D Verify Reactor Coolant leakage is within Tech. Spec. limits (see Tech. Spec. 3.4.3.2). {ITS 3.4.5)
These are 603140 actions:
Check Drywell pressure indications to determine whether drywell pressure is high OR low.
Monitor other primary containment parameters such as:
3 Drywell Pressure in PSlA (2CMS-PI 178 or Computer Point CMSPAOS)
Drywell Temperatures o Drywell Leak Rates o Radiation Levels IF Drywell pressure change is NOT due to Barometric change, OR as directed by SM/CRS, perform the following:
IF pressure is high, perform N2-OP-61A, Subsection H.l.O.
Reports DRMS indications to CRS If directed by CRS, reduces power NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS When Mode Switch is taken to shutdown malfunction MS03, Steam Leakage Inside the Primary Containment, 30% becomes active.
PO-4.0 The Rate of Drywell Pressure rise increases NRC Scenario 4
-25.
IAW N2-SOP-101 D to 55mlbm/hr.
o Recognizes and reports drywell floor drain leak rate rising.
Determines high Drywell pressure scram is imminent.
May direct power reduction per SOP-101 D, by directing Recirc Flow reduced to 55 Mlb/hr.
Directs mode switch to shutdown.
Acknowledges RPS failure.
Acknowledges scram report.
BOP RO o If directed reduces Recirc Flow reduced to 55 Mlb/hr Places the mode switch in shutdown when directed by CRS.
Provides scram report.
0 Recognizes and reports RPS failure to trip.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event 4 SRO enters and directs EOP-CS and EOP-RPV actions.
NRC Scenario 4 0 Arms and depresses manual scram pushbuttons.
Performs actions of N2-SOP-101c.
SRO Actions 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
Acknowledges failure to scram Enters EOP-RPV Exits EOP-RPV and enters EOP-c5.
Directs ADS inhibited Directs HPCS be placed / verified in P-T-L.
Directs RRCS initiation per EOP-6 Att. 13.
Acknowledges all rods fully inserted.
Exits EOP-C5 and enters EOP-RPV.
Directs Level control with condensate and feedwater with a band between 159.3 and 202.3 inches.
Directs pressure control with EHC in automatic with a band of 800-1000 psig.
Directs actions of N2-SOP-101 C.
Acknowledges high drywell pressure trip (1.68 psig)
Enters EOP-PC on high DWP.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACT1 ONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS o May direct RHR A or 6 to suppression chamber sprays.
o May Direct start of a fifth service water pump.
o May direct restoration of pneumatics.
u May direct LPCS and LPCl injection prevented if determined not needed for core cooling.
ATC RO o Maintains reactor water level in manual.
BOP RO Inhibits ADS Verifies HPCS in P-T-L o Initiates RRCS Reports ARI successful and provides scram report.
u Verifies:
u All rods full in o Rx power lowering n Turbine tripped/TSVs & TCVs shut o Generator tripped and house loads transferred o SDV V&D valves closed RCS pumps downshift RPV pressure on TBVs OR S RVs.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS The following annunciator alarms:
851244, REACTOR BLDG AREA RADN MON A C TI VA TED Drywell pressure reaches 1.68 psig Low pressure ECCS systems receive initiation signal.
When Drywell Pressure reaches 1.68 psig malfunction CS06, Low Pressure Core Spray Pump Trip, TRUE, TUA = 15 seconds becomes active.
NRC Scenario 4
-28.
May perform the following as time permits:
Fully insert IRMs AND SRMs.
o Energize 2WCS-MOVI 07 (2 N HS-MCC008-2 E).
o If required, secure makeup to the Cooling Tower.
At 2CEC-PNL842, shutdown HWC.
IF WCS is in one pump three filter lineup....THEN Throttle close 2WCS*MOV200 (AND if required, throttle open 2WCS-MOVI I O ) to obtain approximately 225 gpm wcs flow.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event 4 SRO enters and directs EOP-PC actions when drywell pressure exceeds 1.68 psig.
Annunciator 601559, Primary Containment Temperature High Alarms Event 4 RO EOP-PC actions These actions are directed by the SRO from EOP-PC Executes DRYW ELL TEMPERATURE, SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PRESSURE, SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE and HYDROGEN legs concurrently.
Verifies Suppression Pool Water Level below 217 ft.
Directs RHRA(B) placed in suppression chamber sprays IAW EOP-6 Att 22.
Acknowledges report that CSL trip ped.
Acknowledges EOP-PC entry on primary containment high.
These are the RO EOP-PC actions:
o Suppression Chamber Spray using RHS A(B). (2CEC*PNLGO?)
NOTE: Verifying SWP*MOVSOA(B) open may be delayed until after sprays are in service.
Verify open SWP*MOVSOA(B),
HEAT EXCHANGER IA(B), SVCE WTR OUTLET INLET VLV NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Verify closed AND IF possible overridden, RHS*MOV24A(B),
LPCl A(B) INJECTION VLV Verify running RHS*PIA, PMP W B )
IF operation in Containment Spray mode AND a trip of 2RHS*PIA(B) occurs, perform emergency refill per Section 3.3 Open RHS*MOV33A(B), OUTLET TO SUPPR POOL SPRAY Verify approximately 450 gpm on SUPPR SPRAY HEADER FLOW (2RHS*F/64A(B))
Verify RHS*MOV4A(B), PMP IA(B) MINIMUM FLOW VLV position as follows:
IF RHS A(B) is in Suppression Pool Cooling/Spray, verify closed 2RHS*MOV4A(B)
OR 0 IF RHS A(B) is in Suppression Chamber Spray ONLY, verify open 2RHS*MOV4A(B)
Verify open SW P*MOVSOA(B),
HEAT EXCHANGER IA(B), SVCE WTR INLET VLV.
NOTE: Post LOCA, in order to supply greater than 2000 gpm SWP to RHR Heat Exchangers with less than 5 SWP pumps in service it may be necessary to isolate Turbine Bldg. loads IAW N2-OP-31 Section H.12.0.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Drywell pressure rises and exceeds 5 psig.
When Drywell Pressure reaches 5.0 psig, the following malfunctions become active:
MS04, Steam Line Rupture Inside Primary Con t a i n men t, 7 5 YO ED02B, Loss of Off-Site 115KV Line 6, TRUE RR50, Reference Leg Flashing, TRUE, TUA=30 sec With Loss of line 6 and division I1 EDG out of service, Division I1 LP ECCS lose power Drywell pressure rises more rapidly Reactor water level rises to level 8 due to swell NRC Scenario 4
-31.
2 Throttle open SWP*MOV33A(B),
HEAT EXCHANGER IA(B) SVCE WTR OUTLET VLV to establish Service Water flow to RHR Heat Exchanger 1 A(B) of approximately 7400 gpm. (12-R602A(B))
NOTE: 2RHS*MOV8A(B) is interlocked in the open position for I O minutes following a Division I ECCS initiation.
3 WHEN possible, close RHS*MOV8A( B), HEAT EXCHANGER IA(B) INLET BYPASS VLV.
3 Notify Radiation Protection to start Radiation Monitor 2SW P*RE23A( B)
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS and trips FWS pumps.
Reactor pressure drops rapidly within the discharge head of both CSL and RHR A, however CSL tripped on motor electrical fault and RHR A injection valve fails to open.
No injection is attained from LP ECCS.
Event 4 SRO RPV Flooding Actions 3RO Actions 11 Acknowledges the following:
u Loss of 1 15KV off-site line 6.
o Loss of division II power, loss of Division II LP ECCS.
Level 8 Feedwater pump trip o Rapidly lowering reactor p ressu re Rapidly rising containment pressure.
o Reference leg flashing indications on all level instruments.
3 Exits EOP-RPV and Enters EOP-c4.
SRO RPV Flooding Actions:
o Will the reactor stay shutdown without boron. YES Verifies Suppression Pool level above 192 ft.
o Directs opening of all 7 ADS valves Restore pneumatics to the drywell if necessary NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Detail Q1 Co nd e n sa te/Feed water O.K. to defeat the high RPV water level interlock (EOP-6 Att 20)
CRD (OP-30, Section H.3.0)
HPCS (EOP-6 Att 3)
Use the CST suction if possible. OK to defeat the high suppression pool level suction transfer (OP-33 Section H.7.0)
LPCS (EOP-6 Att 3)
LPCl (EOP-6 Att 3)
Inject through the HXs as soon as possible RHS through shutdown cooling (EOP-6 Att 30)
OK to defeat isolations Inject through the HXs as soon as possible RHS service water crosstie (EOP-6 Att 5)
Fire System (EOP-6 Att 6)
ECCS Keep Full (EOP-6 Att 7)
Condensate Transfer (EOP-6 Att 8)
SLS, test tank (EOP-6 Att 9)
SLS, boron tank (OP-36A, Section H.l) o O.K. to exceed lOOF/hr Cooldown.
o Can 7 ADS valve be opened. YES o Directs closure of:
o MSIVs o Main Steam Line Drain Isolations RClC / RHS steam Isolations 3 Using RPV Flooding Systems (Detail Ql), flood the RPV to the main steam lines.
3 Acknowledges report that RHS*MOV24A will not open.
3 May direct RO to dispatch field operator to open RHS*MOV24A manually.
1 WAIT until

RPV level can be determined OR o Main Steam Lines are flooded OR Core damage is detected 2 IF RPV has been flooded to the Main Steam Lines perform the fo I low i ng :
o Close the following valves:
u MSIVs (slow close, OP-1 Section G.2.0 u
Main Steam line drain isolations NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4 o
RClC / RHS steam isolations o Control injection into the RPV to maintain Main Steam Lines flooded with injection as low as practicable.
o WAIT until:
3 RPV level can be determined OR 3 Core damage is detected ATC RO o Reports the following to SRO:
Loss of 1 15KV off-site line 6.
FWS pumps tripped on level 8.
Rapidly lowering RPV pressure.
Rapidly rising containment pressure.
Loss of division II power and loss of division II LP ECCS.
Indications of reference leg flashing on Panel 603.
o Closes MSIVs when directed by SRO.
Verifies steam line drains shut.
Injects with condensate as directed by SRO.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS With the loss of Division II power, no Division 11 LP ECCS will be running and therefore only the 7 division I ADS solenoids will illuminate.
Console Operator If directed as auxiliary operator to manually open 2RHS*MOV24A, perform the following:
(2 options available, see below)
If RHRA injection is -
not desired perform the following:
Insert remote function RH33, RHS*MOV24A 600 Volt Breaker Status, OPEN L
BOP RO Reports indications of reference leg flashing on panel 601.
Opens 7 ADS valves, when directed, by arming and depressing all four ADS pushbuttons on panel 601.
(CT-2.O) o Verifies seven division I ADS solenoid lights illuminate.
o Verifies 7 ADS tank accumulator pressure indicate normal.
Reports to SRO that 7 ADS valves are open.
When directed, takes HPCS out of P-T-L Verifies and reports HPCS injection.
If directed, attempts injection with RHR A.
Reports failure of RHS*MOV24A to open.
o May dispatch field operator to manually open RHS*MOV24A.
(CT-3.0)
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Wait 5 minutes and report that 2RHS*MOV24A clutch will not engage and you cant get the valve open.
If RHRA injection is desired perform the following:
Insert remote function RH33, RHS*MOV24A 600 Volt Breaker Status, OPEN Insert remote function RH22, Manual Ops -
RHS*MOV24A, Final Value 1.O, 2 minute ramp.
Report that 2RHS*MOV24A is being manually L.
opened.
Console Operator When directed as auxiliary operator to defeat the HPCS high water level interlock, perform the following:
Insert remote function CS14, OPS-CSHOI PNL 625 TST. SW CSH*MOVI 07, TEST Report that the HPCS high water level trip has been defeated.
~
Reactor water level continues to rise to the NRC Scenario 4 o Defeats HPCS high RPV water level interlock per EOP-6 Att 20.
o Verifies and reports reactor water level at the main steam lines as March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS level of the main steam lines.
Level verified at main steam lines as indicated by ADS SRV Tailpipe temperatures lowering below 200°F while all Non-ADS SRV tailpipe temperatures remain approximately 220°F.
Event 4 SRO Actions for Drywell and suppression Chamber sprays PO-5.0 NRC Scenario 4 indicated by lowering ADS SRV tailpiece temperatures on Panel 614 temperature recorder B22-R614.
SRO Determines that level is being maintained at the main steam lines using HPCS.
Verifies suppression pool water level below EL. 217 ft.
Verifies suppression chamber pressure is above 10 psig.
Verifies inside the drywell spray initiation limit (Fig K).
Verifies all recirculation pumps tripped.
Verifies all drywell unit coolers tripped.
Directs RHR A be placed in Drywell and Suppression Chamber sprays IAW EOP-6 Att 22.
Acknowledges report from RO that Drywell and Suppression Chamber Sprays are in service.
March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 4 RO Actions for Drywell and Suppression Chamber spay:
EOP-6 Att 22 RO actions for Drywell spray and suppression chamber sprays:
(CT-4.0) o Drywell Spray using RHS A (2CEC*PNL 60 1 ).
NOTE: Verifying SWP*MOVSOA open may be delayed until after sprays are in service.
Verify open SWP*MOVSOA, HEAT EXCHANGER 1A SVCE WTR INLET VLV.
Verify closed AND IF possible overridden, RHS*MOV24A, LPCl A INJECTION VLV.
Verify running RHS*PIA, PMP IA.
IF RHS A Suppression Chamber Spray is required concurrently with Drywell Sprays, perform the following:
o Open RHS*MOV33A, OUTLET TO SUPPR POOL SPRAY.
o Verify approximately 450 gpm on SUPPR SPRAY HEADER FLOW (2RHS *f
/64A).
IF operating in the Containment Spray mode AND a trip of NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
-39.
2RHS*PlA occurs, perform emergency refill per Section 3.3.
Verify closed, RHS*FV38A, RETURN TO SUPPR POOL COOLING.
Verify open, RHS*MOV4A, PMP 1A MINIMUM FLOW VLV.
Open RHS*MOV25A, OUTLET TO DRYWELL SPRAY.
Open RHS*MOV15A, OUTLET TO DRYWELL SPRAY.
Verify closed, RHS*MOV4A, PMP 1A MINIMUM FLOW VLV.
Verify approximately 7450 gpm on DRYWELL SPRAY HEADER FLOW (2RHS*F/63A).
Verify open SWP*MOV9OA, HEAT EXCHANGER 1A SVCE WTR INLET VLV.
NOTE: Post LOCA, in order to supply greater than 2000 gpm SWP to RHR Heat Exchangers with less than 5 SWP pumps in service it may be necessary to isolate Turbine Bldg. loads IAW N2-OP-31 Section H. 12.0.
Throttle open SWP*MOV33A, HEAT EXCHANGER 1A SVCE March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS T E RM I N AT IO N C RI T E RIA RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is maintained at the elevation of the main steam lines and containment sprays in service.
Event 4 SRO Admin JPM 5-4 WTR OUTLET VLV to establish Service Water flow to RHR Heat Exchanger 1 A of approximately 7400 gpm (12-R602A).
NOTE: 2RHS*MOV8A is interlocked in the open position for 10 minutes following a Division I ECCS initiation.
o WHEN possible, close RHS*MOV8A, HEAT EXCHANGER 1A INLET BYPASS VLV.
o Notify Radiation Protection to start Radiation Monitor 2SWP*RE23A Reports to SRO that Drywell and Suppression Chamber Sprays are in service using RHR A.
SRO Classify the event as SAE 2.1.2 Evaluator to perform SRO Admin JPM for emergency classification.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
V.
VI.
POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA, NRC Exam REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events None B. Commitments
1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST X
X X
X
1.
Additional Information about these checks:
RealismEred i bility Event Sequencing Simulator Modeling Evaluating Crew Competencies For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.
6 2
2 1
2 1
NA NA 2
For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.
Total Malfunctions Malfunctions after EOP Entry Abnormal Events Major Transients EOPsUsed EOP Contingency Procedures Used Simulator Run Time EOP Run Time Crew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)
4.
Deve I o p me n t a I Checks :
Does every event have either a Critical Task(s) or Performance Objective?
Is Criteria given for sequencing to subsequent events?
Is termination criteria clear and unambiguous?
Does termination criteria allow verification that all CT, PO standards are met?
Constellation Energy Group OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE
Title:
Task Number: 34401 90303 Emergency Classification for Scenario 4 Revision: NRC 2005 Approvals:
h 3h7/0{
NA EXAMINATION SECURITY G'e7ieral SuDervisor
'ode General Supervisor Date Operations Training (Designee)
Operations '(Designee)
NA EXAMINATION SECURITY Configuration Control Date Perform er :
(RO)
Trainer/Evaluator:
Evaluation Method: PERFORM Evaluation Location: SIMULATOR FOLLOWING SCENARIO AS SRO Expected Completion Time: 15 minutes Time Critical Task: YES
,.Iternate Path Task: NO Start Time:
Stop Time:
Completion Time:
JPM Overall Rating:
Pass Fail NOTE: A JPM overall rating of fail shall be given if any critical step is graded as fail. Any grade of unsat or individual competency area unsat requires a comment.
Comments:
Evaluator Signature:
Date:
NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-4 1
311 6/2005
Recommended Start Location: (Completion time based on the start location)
Simulator or other designated location.
Simulator Set-up:
N/A Directions to the Instructor/Evaluator To be performed as an administrative JPM.
Directions to Operators:
Read Before Every JPM Performance:
For the performance of this JPM, I will function as the SSS, CSO, and Auxiliary Operators. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary.
Read Before Each Evaluated JPM Performance:
This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Control Room Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional / concurrent verification will not be provided; therefore it should not be requested.
Read Before Each Traininq JPM Performance:
During this Training JPM, applicable methods of verification are expected to be used.
Therefore, either another individual or I will act as the additional / concurrent verifier.
Notes to Instructor / Evaluator:
1.
Critical steps are identified as PasslFail. All steps are sequenced critical unless denoted by a e.
2.
During Evaluated JPM:
Self-verification shall be demonstrated.
3.
During Training JPM:
Self-verification shall be demonstrated.
No other verification shall be demonstrated.
References:
1. EPIP-EPP-02, Classification of Emergency Conditions at Unit 2.
2. EPMP-EPP-0102, Unit 2 Emergency Classification Bases.
3. EPIP-EPP-18, Activation and Direction of the Emergency Plan.
4. NUREG K/A 2.4.40 Knowledge of the SROs responsibilities in emergency plan implementation (4.0).
Tools and Equipment:
1. None.
Task Standard: Scenario properly diagnosed and classified as a Site Area Emergency.
NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-4 2
311 612005
i Initial Conditions:
1. MODE Switch and Manual SCRAM pushbuttons failed to trip RPS.
2. Manual initiation of RRCS caused all control rods to insert to 00.
3. LOCA occurs causing loss of RPV level instrumentation.
4. RPV has been flooded to the Main Steam Lines.
5. Ask the operator for any questions Initiating Cue:
(Operators name), assume the role of the SM/ED and determine the emergency classification of this event.
1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue.
Evaluator Acknowledge repeat back providing correction if necessary RECORD START TIME
2..Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and reviewhtilize the correct section.
3. RPV water level cannot be maintained > top of active fuel OR RPV flooding is required.
End of JPM repeat back (GAP-OPS-01)
Start time is logged to determine total class if i ca t ion ti me.
I EPIP-EPP-02 obtained., Section 2.1.2 is referenced.
SaUUnsat o Site Area Emergency is declared per EAL 2.1.2.
and determination MUST BE 15minutes to pass the JPM.
TERMINATING CUE: Scenario properly diagnosed and classified as a Site Area Emergency.
RECORD STOP TIME NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-4 3
3/16/2005
Initial Conditions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
MODE Switch and Manual SCRAM pushbuttons failed to trip RPS.
Manual initiation of RRCS caused all control rods to insert to 00.
LOCA occurs causing loss of RPV level instrumentation.
RPV has been flooded to the Main Steam Lines.
Ask the operator for any questions Initiating Cue:
(Operators name), assume the role of the SM/ED and determine the emergency classification of this event.
NRC SRO ADMlN JPM 5-4 4
311 612005
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont) 2.1.2 Site Area Emerqencv RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained > -84 in.(TAF)
OR RPV Flooding is required NUMARC IC:
Loss of reactor vessel water level has or will uncover fuel in the reactor vessel.
FPB LosdPotential Loss:
Fuel Clad Potential Loss, RCS Loss Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Hot Shutdown, Cold Shutdown, Refuel Basis:
The RPV water level used in this EAL is the top of active fuel (TAF). This value corresponds to the level which is used to indicate challenge to core cooling and loss of the fuel ciad barrier.
Uncovery of the fuel irrespective of the event that causes fuel uncovery is justification alone for declaring a Site Area Emergency. This includes events that could lead to fuel uncsvety in any plant operating mode including cold shutdown and refuel. Escalation to a General Emergency occurs through radiological effluence addressed in EAL 1.3.3 for drywell radiation and in the EALs defined for Category 5.0, Radioactivity Release.
The terminology of "cannot be restored and maintained" that is used is intended to be consisfent with the EOP terminology using the same wording. Momentary drops below the level limit would not require classification at this level.
This determination includes making an evaluation that considers both current and future system performance in relation to the current value and trend of the parameter(s). Neither implies that the parameter must actually exceed the limit before the classification is made nor that the classification must be made before the limit is reached.
This definition would require the emergency classification be made prior to water level dropping below TAF if, based on an evaluation of the current trend of RPV water level and in consideration of current and future injection system performance, that RPV water level will not likely be maintained above TAF Page 29 EPMP-EPP-0101 Rev 07
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont)
The EOPs require RPV Flooding under conditions where RPV water level cannot be determined. The operator is directed to establish RPV Flooding conditions to assure adequate core cooling while attempting to restore RPV water level indication. Because actual RPV water level is not known under these conditions, it must be assumed that RPV water level is below the TAF thus warranting declaration of a Site Area Emergency.
PEG Reference@):
SS5.1 FC2.1 RCS4.1 Bases Reference(s):
1.
N1-EOP-2, Level Control
2.
N1 -SAP-2, RPV/Containment/Radioactivity Release Control Page 30 -
EPMP-EPP-0101 Rev 07

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