Text

Draft - Section C Operating Exam (Folder 2)
	ML051320192
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	03/17/2005
From:	Godley R; Constellation Energy Group
To:	Conte R; NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
	Conte R
References
	Download: ML051320192 (194)
	v • d • e

NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 1 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 49 RECIRC FLOW UNIT FAlLURElFEEDPUMP TRIP WITH PARTIAL RUNBACWTURBINE HIGH VIBRATION/FAILURE TO SCRAM PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 2/10/05 VALIDATED GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING OPERATIONS MANAGER

-- R. Lange. B. Moore, M. Smith NA Exam Security DATE 2/16/05 DATE DATE 3!(b,/U-CONFIG URAT10N CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Length: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Initial Power Level: 1OO%, above the 100% Rod Line The scenario begins at 100% reactor power. The crew will add water to the Suppression Pool using the High Pressure Core Spray System (CSH) per normal operating procedure N2-OP-33, High Pressure Core Spray. While water is being added to the Suppression Pool, Recirc Flow Unit input to APRM/RBM fails downscale resulting in APRM high power scram signals inputted into the Power Range Monitoring System logic modules. The crew will bypass the affected instrument per normal operating procedure and annunciator response procedures.

The crew experiences a Reactor Feedwater pump trip and partial automatic Recirc Flow Control Valve (FCV) Runback. The partial runback occurs due to a trip RCS FCV hydraulic power units. The result is slowly lowering reactor water level due to failure of reactor power to be automatically reduced to within the capacity of the single remaining operating Feedwater pump.

Reactor water level will slowly approach the automatic scram low water level of 159 inches.

The crew will manually insert CRAM rods to reduce power approximately 10% to within the capacity of the single remaining operating Feedwater pump (65%). This action will return reactor water level to the normal band of 178 to 187 inches.

After the plant is stable, the total Steam flow signal to Feedwater Level Control operates erratically resulting in water level transient. The crew will take manual contol of Feedwater to stabilize level. Manual level control will be required for the remainder of the scenario.

An inadvertent opening of an ADS/SRV valve occurs. The crew will take actions required by procedures to close the valve before a manual scram is required at Suppression Pool water temperature of 1 10°F.

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

When the ADS/SRV is closed, Main Turbine vibration begins to rise. The crew will manually scram the reactor and trip the Main Turbine when procedure limits of 12 mils are exceeded, since there are no automatic turbine trips associated with turbine vibration. When the reactor is scrammed all control rods will fail to fully insert resulting in reactor power level of approximately 20%. Heat will be added to the containment while operating SRVs for pressure control. The transient is complicated by loss of the remaining operating Feedwater pump and the inability to maintain water level above MSCRWL (-39 inches). The crew will perform an RPV Blowdown to lower RPV pressure which allows the use of RHS via Shutdown Cooling line. This is the last remaining preferred injection system. If, in the SROs judgment, additional injection sources are required to restore and maintain RPV water level above MSCRWL, Alternate Injection systems can now be lined up to restore and maintain level above -39 inches. The crew will execute Alternate Control Rod Insertion procedures to fully insert the stuck control rods, such that the reactor will remain shutdown.

Major Procedures Exercised: EOP-RPV, PC, C5,C2. SOP-6, 29,10lD, 21 and 9.

EOP-6 Attachment 14 EAL Classification: SAE 2.2.2 Any RPS scram setpoint has been exceeded AND automatic and manual scrams fail to result in a control rod pattern which assures reactor shutdown conditions without boron AND EITHER Power >4% OR Suppression Pool temperature >llO°F Termination Criteria: RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is restored and maintained in normal level band 160 to 200 inches and all control rods are fully inserted.

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-20 or equivalent.

B. PresetdFunction Key Assignments

1. Malfunctions:

a. RD17Z RD17 for All Banks, 17 QUEUED

b. RD17Z RDI 7 for All Banks, 00 TUA 5 seconds ET01

c. RP12A RRCS Failure (Div I) QUEUED

d. RP12B RRCS Failure (Div II) QUEUED

e. CU08 Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation Fail, TRUE QUEUED

f. RR08B RR Flow Unit Failure Downscale B F3

g. FW03A Feedwater Pump Trip PIA, TRUE F4

h. RR31 HPU B PMP Number 2 Failure, TRUE F4 TUA 2 seconds

i. RR30 HPU B PMP Number 1 Failure, TRUE F4 TUA 2 seconds; TRA 10 seconds

j. FW35 Steam Flow Input Fails to FW Control, TRUE F5 RELATIVES USED TO CAUSE ERRATIC OPERATION

k. TU02 Main Turbine Vibration High F6 Value 9; Ramp Time 3:OO minutes I. MCOI Main Condenser Air lnleakage F6 Value 15; Ramp Time 3:OO minutes

m. MCOI Main Condenser Air lnleakage ET02 Value 100; Ramp Time 5:OO minutes

n. FW02A Condensate Booster Pump Trip P2A, TRUE ET02 TUA 8:OO minutes for all 3 FWO2s

0. FW02B Condensate Booster Pump Trip PZB, TRUE ET02

p. FWO2C Condensate Booster Pump Trip P2C, TRUE ET02

q. RP14A RRCS ARI Failure/Defeated Div I, TRUE F8 TUA 1:30 minutes

r. RP14B RRCS ARI Failure/Defeated Div II, TRUE F8 TUA 1:30 minutes

s. RP02 RPS Failure to Scram Automatic, TRUE F9 TUA 1:30 minutes NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

t. RC02 RCIC Failure Isolation of RCIC, TRUE ET03 TUA 1:00 minute

u. RH08 Group 5 Isolation Failure SDC MOVs, TRUE FIO TUA 2:OO minutes

2. Remotes:

a. MSOGA Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, DEFEATED F7 TUA 1:30 minutes

b. MSOGB Defeat Level 1 MSIV Isolation, DEFEATED F7 TUA 1:30 minutes

c. MSOGC Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, DEFEATED F7 TUA 1:30 minutes

d. MSOGD Defeat Level IMSlV Isolation, DEFEATED F7 TUA 1:30 minutes

3. Overrides:

a. None

4. Annunciators:

a. None C. Equipment Out of Service

1. All OPRMs are inoperable due to electronic circuitry deficiencies D. Support Documentation

1. Working copy of N2-OP-33, H.3.0 for use by crew OR plastic sleeve procedure sections to facilitate placekeeping. An already place-kept copy of F.l .O is to be made and provided with turnover sheet, since the scenario assumes this section has already been completed.

E. Miscellaneous

1. Red rod line sign posted

2. At APRM #2 Voter Module ensure Memory reset. At APRM Module, select Trip Status and Reset Memory, to ensure no pre-existing trip lights are in on both the voter module and the APRM.

3. EVENT TRIGGERS

a. ET01 Mode Switch in Shutdown with Scram Reset (Event Trigger 82)

Automatically resets RD17Z to 00 when RPS is reset during EOP-6 Att 14 NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

to allow rods to be scrammed to 00. Setup such that the Console Operator does NOT have to manually clear RDI 7 following RPS reset.

b. ET02 Mode Switch in Shutdown (Event Trigger 8) Initiates increase in MCOl magnitude to 100% AND all three Condensate Booster Pump trip FW02 malfunctions with Ramp Time of 5 0 0 minutes after Mode Switch is placed in SHUTDOWN for reactor scram.

e. ET03 RClC Turbine Speed >72% in auto (Event Trigger 49) Initiates malfunction RC02 RClC Isolation following RClC start after 1:30 minutes.

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Lit Control Room Annunciators 0 Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)

(SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)

Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:

0 Reactor Power = 100% 0 Loadline = >100%

0 All OPRMs are inoperable since yesterday, due to electronic circuitry deficiencies.

TS 3.3.1. I Required Action F.l and F.2 are in place for Function 2e. Engineering and I&C are actively pursuing resolution and will have issue resolved by tomorrow.

PART III : Remarks/Planned Evolutions:

Raise Suppression Pool Water level to 200 feet using CSH pump per N2-OP-33.

Establish CSH pump flow rate of 5500 to 6000 gpm. N2-OP-33 F.l.O Standby Condition Status Checks are comdete.

PART IV: To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:

0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)

TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SRO ATC RO BOP RO NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

Scenario ID#

INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)

What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other Options?

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

Ill. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:

CT-1 .O Given the plant at power and inadvertent opening of an ADS/SRV valve, the crew will close the SRV to preclude a manual scram if Suppression Pool temperature reaches 11OOF, per N2-SOP-34 CT-2.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram and RPV Blowdown required, the crew will avoid exceeding HCTL by a combination of terminating and preventing injection, injecting boron and operating Suppression Pool Cooling per N2-EOP-C5.

CT-3.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram and the RPV has been blown down per EOP-C2, the crew will resume injection when RPV pressure lowers below the MSCP, to restore and maintain RPV water level between the MSCWL and 202.3 inches.

CT-4.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram the crew will fully insert all control rods using alternate methods per N2-EOP-6 Attachment 14 B. Performance Objectives:

PO-1.o Given the plant with direction to raise Suppression Pool water level, the crew will lineup High pressure Core Spray and raise level to 200 feet per N2-OP-33.

PO-2.0 Given downscale failure of a Recirc Flow Unit, the crew will bypass APRM 2 per applicable Annunciator Response Procedures and N2-OP-92.

PO-3.0 Given the reactor plant operating at full power when a Feedwater pump trip and failure of RCS to completely runback, the crew will perform a Rapid Power Reduction, insert cram rods to lower power NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

and stabilize the plant before a low level scram occurs per N2-SOP-6, SOP-29 and SOP-I01 D PO-4.0 Given the plant operating at power and misoperation of FWLC system due to failed steam flow input signal, the crew will take manual control of FWLC and stabilize level per N2-SOP-6 PO-5.0 Given the plant operating at power with an inadvertent opening of an ADS/SRV the crew will close the valve before Suppression Pool temperature reaches 110°F to preclude a manual scram requirement, per N2-SOP-34.

PO-6.0 Given the plant operating at power with high Main Turbine Vibration, the crew will initiate a manual scram and manual turbine trip when vibration exceed 12 mils per applicable Annunciator Response Procedures and N2-SOP-21.

PO-7.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram, the crew will establish control rod insertion in accordance with EOP-6, Attachment 14.

PO-8.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power 4% or above and reactor water level 100 inches or above, the crew will terminate and prevent injection with the exception of SLS, CRD and RCIC.

PO-9.0 Given a failure of WCS to isolate when SLS is injected, the crew will manually close WCS containment isolation valves from P602.

PO-I 0.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with loss of Feedwater the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown and inject with alternate ATWS injection systems to restore and maintain RPV water level above MSCRWL per EOPs.

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Zrew Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.

EVENT 1 SRO SuppressIan Po0 Fil Jtilizing CSH Pump Directs Suppression Pool fill per PO-I .o N2-OP-33, H.3.0 Enters Tech Spec 3.5.1 (as directed from N2-OP-33) Condition B and initates Required Actions B . l Verify by administrative means RClC System is OPERABLE when RClC is required to be OPERABLE. (Completion Time is Immediately)

AND B.2 Restore HPCS System to OPERABLE status.

(Completion Time is 14 days)

BOP RO 0 Verify Subsection F . l .O, Standby Condition Status Checks is complete. (Actual performance is NOT required because completion was provided in Shiff Turnover information .)

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 3 Verify SM has declared CSH System inoperable.

CAUTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE CSH PUMP TO OPERATE IN A RUNOUT FLOW CONDITION OF > 7175 GPM OR PUMP DAMAGE MAY OCCUR.

MINIMIZE AMOUNT OF TIME CSH IS OPERATING ON MINIMUM FLOW OR PUMP DAMAGE MAY OCCUR.

Start CSH*PI, HPCS PUMP 1.

After the CSH pump is started, Suppression Verify open CSH*MOV105, Pool Level (SPL) will rise from initial level of MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VLV.

199.8 feet. It will take about 3 minutes to raise Monitor CST AND Suppression SPL to 200 feet. Pool Levels.

Raise rate of transferring water from CST to Suppression Pool (5500 to 6000 gpm) by performing the following:

Throttle open CSH*MOVI 11, TEST RETURN TO SUPPRESSION POOL.

WHEN CSH System Flow is

> 634 gpm, verify closed CSH*MOVlOS, MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VLV.

NRC Scenario 1 -1 1- March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0 WHEN desired Suppression Pool Level is reached, close CSH*MOVI 11, TEST RETURN TO SUPPRESSION POOL.

0 WHEN HPCS SYSTEM FLOW is less than 634 GPM, verify open CSH*MOV105, MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VLV.

0 Stop CSH*Pl, HPCS PUMP 1.

0 Verify closed CSH*MOVI 05, MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VLV.

0 Notify SM that 2CSH*MOVl I 1 is closed AND operability concern per DER 2-98-0557 no longer exist.

0 Restore CST Level, as required, per N2-0P-4.

EVENT 2 Recirc Flow Unit B Failed Downscale PO-2.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F3 key:

ATC RO RR086,RR Flow Unit Failure Downscale B Identifies and reports annunciators F3) to SRO Implements ARP actions 2/4 MDL 1-4 have received one of the two (Significant ARP 603202 60321 7)

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS required trips. An additional trip from any rhese are 603202 actions unbypassed A PRM will cause a reactor 1 Determine by Red UPSC/INOP SCRAM. light on 2CEC*PNL603 which APRM Channel has alarmed.

Rod withdrawal block. (APRM 2 is the affected instrument)

The following annunciators alarm: 7 IF a SCRAM has occurred, THEN 603202 APRM TRIP SYSTEM enter N2-SOP-101C, Reactor UPSCALE/INOPERABLE Scram. (No scram occurs) 603208 APRM TRIP SYSTEM UPSCALE 3 IF NO SCRAM has occurred, 603217 FLOW REFERENCE OFF NORMAL 603218 OPRM TRIP ENABLED THEN perform the following:

603442 CONTROL ROD OUT BLOCK Check the other APRM channels to verify that NO At P603 Rod Select Matrix Right Side SCRAM should have APRM 2 Amber UPSC ALARM lit occurred.

APRM 2 Red UPSC TRIP OR INOP lit IF a SCRAM should have OPRM 2 White TRIP ENABLED lit occurred, THEN enter the FLOW White CAMPA R lit Emergency 0perating Process Computer points alarm consistent with Procedures. (Scram conditions. RDSBC12, NMPUCO8, should not have occurred)

NMPBC47,NMPBC33, NMPBC22, NMPBC17, IF NO SCRAM should NMP2Cl21, NMP2C108 have occurred, THEN perform the following:

IF required, THEN lower At P608 backpanel, APRM 2 Display includes Reactor Power per N2-FLOW 0.0% (pre-failure value is 95.5% flow) OP-101 D or N2-SOP-2/4 MDL 2 Module (and 1,3,4 modules) 10 1D. (Not required indicate AP RM 2 HlG#/lNOP TRIP fed LED lit because instrument failure is the cause)

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Refer to Technical Specifications for actions. (Inform SRO to Other FLOW indications on APRM 1,3,4 perform )

chassis reads about 95.5%. Bypass the affected APRM per N2-0P-92.

Role Play: (See later Scenario If asked report all other Voter Module steps for bypassing the indications are consistent with Voter module 2 APRM) indications. 0 Reset the memory on the following per N2-OP-92, Section F.8.0:

2/4 MDL 1 2/4 MDL 2 2/4 MDL 3 2/4 MDL 4 0 Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm.

Note ATC RO/BOP RO ARP actions for 603202 and 603217 will likely These are 603217 actions be performed concurrently or 603217 actions Determine which channel is in may be performed before 603202 actions. alarm and whether UPSC or COMPAR amber light(s) are illuminated on 2CEC*PNL603.

COMPAR (generated by RBM)

At 2CEC*PNL608 determine NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS which flow channel is high/low by comparison of flow indications.

IF desired, THEN bypass the affected APRM per N2-OP-92.

ATC ROIBOP RO Failed Flow Unit is bypassed by bypassing Bypass APRM 2with Bypassing APRM 2 Joystick per N2-0P-92 H.2.

After A PRM 2 is bypassed all annunciators APRM channel bypass can be and P603 indications return to pre-transient performed by placing the APRM conditions. BYPASS joystick to the APRM channel to be bypassed. This action will also bypass the associated Recirculation Flow circuitry and OPRM. Only 1 APRM channel may be bypassed.

The actions in this section are performed at 2CEC*PNL603 unless otherwise noted.

CAUTION Bypass joysticks can become electrically misaligned after numerous bending motions due to "Metal Creep". Any bypass function should NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS be verified by channel BYPASS lights to ensure that only the intended channel is bypassed.

k * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Verify NO other APRM in bypass for the instrument to be bypassed.

Place the APRM BYPASS joystick to the bypass position 2.

IF APRM 2 was bypassed, THEN verify the following:

APRM 2 BYPASS light is lit on 2CEC*PNL603.

BYP is displayed in inverse video in the header for APRM 2 (2 - 4) Chassis at H13-P608.

Blue BYPASSED LED is lit for APRM 1 (2 - 4) on EACH 2/4 MDL at H13-P608.

3 Report APRM 2 bypassed to SRO EVENT 2 SRO Actions SRO Directs APRM 2 bypassed Notifies Operations and Plant Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning Enters Tech Spec 3.3.1 .IRPS Function 2 APRMs. No action is required since only 1 APRM NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS channel is inoperable.

Refer to TRM 3.3.2 Control Rod Block Instrumentation Function 4.

2 channels are required for the function, which is to initiate a rod block. With 1 channel inoperable, 3 channels are still operable. No other action is required.

Conducts post event brief EVENT 3 Feedwater Pump A trip with partial RCS FCV runback PO-3.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate SRO malfunction by depressing F4key: Directs entry into:

N2-SOP-6 Feedwater Failures FWO3A Feedwater Pump Trip PIA, TRUE N2-SOP-29 Sudden Reduction RR31 HPU B PMP Number 2 Failure, TRUE In Core Flow TUA 2 seconds N2-SOP101D Rapid Power RR30 HPU B PMP Number 1 Failure, TRUE Reduction TUA 2 seconds; TRA I O seconds 0 Directs Cram Rod insertion (SOP-29 and SOP-101 D action)

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS The following annunciators alarm: 3 When conditions stabilize, enters 851509 REACTOR FEED PUMPlA/lB/IC AUTO TRIP Tech Spec 3.4.1 Condition B 851519 REAC FEED PMP l A / I B / I C MOTOR ELEC Required Action to Declare the FAULT 602210 FCV A PART CLOSURE RFP TRIP recirculation loop with lower flow to 602222 FCV B PART CLOSURE RFP TRIP be not in operation. With 602102 RECIRC FCV B HYDRAULICS INOPERABLE Completion time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . With 602104 RECIRC FCV B BACK UP HYDR INOPERABLE both recirculation loops operating 602106 RECIRC FCV B MOTION INHIBIT but the flows not matched, the 603139 REACTOR WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW At P603 flows must be matched within 2 RPV water level slowly lowers and reaches its hours. If matched flows are not lowest values of about 162 inches after about 4 restored, the recirculation loop with minutes (Low Level scram setpoint is 159.3 inches) lower flow must be declared not in operation, as required by Required Action B.1. This Required Action does not require tripping the recirculation pump in the lowest flow loop when the mismatch between total jet pump flows of the two loops is greater than the required limits. Now the one loop part of the LCO statement applies. Those action (single loop) are required to be completed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

APRM power lowers to about 75% and Total Core Flow is reduced to about 74 Mlbm/hr. A successful runback would result in power level of about 65%,

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS which is within the capacity of one Feedwater pump.

FWS-LVIOB goes to 100% open At P851 ATC RO Feedwater Pump B amps rise to about 530 (max) Reports Feedwater Pump A trip and flow rises to top scale 24,000 gpm and RPV water level low alarms At P602 Monitors reactor power, pressure RCS FCV A goes to minimum (correct response) and water level RCS FCV B goes to about 70% (incorrect Enters N2-SOP-6 response due to HPU trips) Places LVIOA in MAN and full Loop Flow A about 20 Mlbm/hr closes Loop Flow B about 55 Mlbm/hr (Flow Mismatch Tech Spec entry is required)

When directed, inserts Cram Rods using Continuous Insert button for rapid Power reduction When control rods are inserted, reactor power will lower. Inserting the first 4 cram rods results in lowering power from 75% to about 63%. As power is lowered to single Feedwater pump capacity, RPV water level will rise and return to within the normal level band of 178 inches to 187 inches and Feedwater Pump B .

FWS-LVlOB throttles closed to flow return pump flow and amps to normal values.

SROlBOP ROlATC RO Note Enter and implement the flowchart Crew initiates N2-SOP-29 flowchart decision actions per N2-SOP-29 when blocks by answering YESINO questions. directed from SOP-29.1 Is a Recirc pump in service?

YES NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACT1ONSl PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Is core flow to left of natural circ line? NO Core flow AND Power within Scram Region? NO Note Core flow AND power within With operation above the 100% rod line, the Exit Region? NO crew will insert CRAM rods. It is expected that Reduce rodline below 100% by the ATC RO will insert the first four cram rods inserting CRAM rods. (Also to position 00 using P603 CONTINUOUS being inserted to lower INSERT pushbutton. (EVENT 2 Reactivity power for SOP-101D actions Manipulation for ATC RO) by ATC RO)

> 3 OPRMs operable? NO Reactor Power will lower and Rod Line will be Plant in Heightened Awareness reduced below 100% rod line Zone? NO Recover per Attachment 2. Note that actual recovery action to With OPRMs inoperable the crew will monitor reset the motion inhibit cannot be APRM and LPRMs for power oscillations and performed until repairs are manually scram, if observed. completed on HPUs)

CONSOLE OPERATOR If directed to remove Condensate Demineralizers from service due to the power reduction, manually enter REMOTES, as required to establish the directed number of in-service demineralizers:

FWOIA-H, CONDENSATE DEMINERALIZER, OFF NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Plant should now be stabilized at about 60- SRO 65% power. The crew will make notifications Conducts post event brief and Plant Management will be consulted to establish coordination and overall direction as to how recovery will be implemented.

SRO should address RCS Flow Mismatch RCS FCV motion inhibit requires repairs of HPUs Electric Fault trip of Feedwater Pump A 0 Bypassed APRM 2 due to failed Flow Unit EVENT 4 Steam Flow Signal Failure po-4.a CONSOLE OPERATOR ATC RO When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate Identifies and reports misoperation malfunction and relatives by depressing F5 ofFWLC toSRO key: Enters N2-SOP-6 Places FWS-HICIOIOB (LVIOB)

FW35 Steam Flow Input Fails to FW, TRUE controller OR Master FWLC Steam flow signal operation becomes erratic. controller to MANUAL Feedwater flow and RPV water level becomes Stabilizes RPV water level unstable. between 160 to 200 inches (178 to 603139 RPV WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW 187 inches normal band) 603307 RWM ROD BLOCK NRC Scenario 1 -21 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO Directs entry into N2-SOP-6 for misoperation of FW LC Conducts post event brief o Notifies Operations and Plant Management o Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning EVENT 5 Inadvertent opening of ADSlSRV PSVl2l PO-5.0 This event should proceed while the crew is discussing placing FWLC to single element in response to the previous event.

CONSOLE OPERATOR SRO When directed by Lead Evaluator, manually Directs entry into N2-SOP-34 enter override: Declares PSV121 ADS valve P628 SWITCH Page 2 of 3 P628-B22C-S4A- inoperable.

A; P628 ADS Valve PSVl21, OPEN Refers to Tech Specs 3.5.1. With one ADS valve inoperable no The following annunciators alarm: actions is required. Currently the 601537 ADS VALVESISAFETY VALVES LEAKING minimum number of REQUIRED 601548 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE OPEN ADS valves is still met with one 601553 ADS ACC TANK 32/33/34 PRESSURE LOW valve inoperable.

851506 CONDENSATE TRANSFER PUMP 1N1B Refers to Tech Spec 3.6.1.7.2 and AUTO START NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 851507 CNST XFER PMP DISCH HEADER recognizes requirement to perform PRESSURE LOW N2-OSP-ISC-M@002 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

May direct one loop of RHS placed At P601 MSS*PSVl21 red light lit and DIV I in Suppression Pool Cooling.

MSS*PSVl21 OPEN white postage stamp lit o IF RHS is placed in indicating valve is open. Suppression Pool Cooling, At P603, MWe drop is observed as turbine declares RHS inoperable for control valve closes slightly. LPCl mode and enters Tech Spec 3.5.1 CONDITION A Suppression Pool temperature rises and REQUIRED ACTION A.l with 7 approaches 90 F. day COMPLETION TIME.

IF Suppression Pool Temperature exceeds 90°F, enters EOP-PC.

Notifies Operations and Plant Management.

Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning.

Conducts post event brief.

EVENT 5 BOP RO Actions BOP RO Reports annunciators Enters and executes N2-SOP-34 Identify which SRV is open. (PSV121)

Place the keylock switch for PSV21 to the OFF position.

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACT1ONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Did the SRV close? NO (Detail 1)

Use one or more of following indications to verify SRV status:

SPDS Computer ERF Computer Points MSSZCI 11; MSSZCI 28 Reactor Power Change Generator Output Change Steam FlowlFeed Flow Mismatch Accoustic Monitor Reduce power to approximately 85%

per N2-SOP-101D. (NIA, currently below 85% power)

IF Average Suppression Pool temperature is approaching 110°F.. . .. .

THEN Scram the reactor per N2-SOP-101C and continue here.

Proceeds to back panel P628 with fuse pullers and protective safety equipment (PPE). Using Detail 2, remove the fuses for the affected SRV in the following order until the SRV closes:

1. C Solenoid fuse

2. A Solenoid fuse (CT-1.O)

- PSV121 remains open after pulling F79 and 0 For 2MSFPSV121 C Solenoid P628 Strip K F79 and F80 NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS F80. At P601 position indicating (red and pulled green) lights for PSVl21 are now deenergized. 0 For 2MSS*PSVl21 A Solenoid P628 Strip F9A and FlOA PSV 121 closes when F9A and FlOA are (CT-1.O) pulled.

Did SRV close? NO for C solenoid but YES when A solenoid fuses are pulled.

Generator MWe rises and ERF Computer Detail 1 Points indicate SRV is closed. Use one or more of following indications to verify SRV status:

SPDS Computer ERF Computer Points MSSZC111; MSSZC128 Reactor Power Change Generator Output Change Steam FlowlFeed Flow Mismatch Accoustic Monitor Exits SOP-34 and informs SRO SRV is closed.

If directed starts RHS in Suppression Pool Cooling.

EVENT 5 ATC RO Actions ATC RO 3 Monitors parameters to assist in determining SRV position.

7 Monitors and control RPV water level in directed band in manual.

NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 6 Rising Main Turbine Vibration with minor Main Condenser Air In-leakage PO-6.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F6 key:

TU02 Main Turbine Vibration High (F6)

Value 9; Ramp Time 3:OO minutes MCOI Main Condenser Air lnleakage (F6)

Value 15; Ramp Time 3:OO minutes Main Turbine vibration and Offgas Train flow rise. May direct fur her power reduction After about 1:30 minutes Turbine vibration by Cram rod insertion reaches 7 mils and the following annunciators When vibration or vacuum limits alarm: are exceeded, directs reactor 851 140 TURBINE GENERATOR VIBRATION scram and turbine trip.

HIGH Notifies Operations and Plant 851306 OFFGAS SYSTEM TROUBLE Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning Conducts post event brief NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Reports and implements annunciator 851 129 actions by monitoring for condition that require further actions:

May initiate Process Computer Group Point 14 to monitor turbine vibration on CRT display.

0 IF any Bearing Vibration is 10 mils for 15 minutes. Trip OR verify Main Turbine Tripped in accordance with N2-SOP-21, Turbine Trip.

After about 3 minutes Turbine vibration 0 IF any Bearing Vibration is 12 reaches 12 mils requiring a manual reactor mils, verify Main Turbine Trip in scram and turbine trip. The following accordance with N2-SOP-21.

annunciators alarm:

0 Refer to N2-0P-21 Section 851 129 TURBINE GENERATOR VIBRATION H.l.O, Operation With High HIGH-HIGH Vibration in Alarm or High Vibration Trip Disabled.

IF any Bearing Vibration is >9 mils with >3 mils/minute rate of change THEN trip OR verify Main Turbine Tripped in accordance with N2-SOP-21, Turbine Trip.

0 IF Bearing Vibration is projected to exceed 30 mils NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS following a Turbine Trip THEN break condenser vacuum in accordance with N2-OP-21, Subsection H.1.4.

7 WHEN any vibration limit is exceeded or when directed, enters N2-SOP-21 and implements flowchart actions Has Tubine tripped? NO Power >25%? YES SCRAM the reactor per N2-SOP-I 01C. (ATC RO to perform action).

Manually trip Turbine using TRIP pushbuttons. (BOP RO to perform action).

Did the Turbine trip using TRIP pushbuttons? YES Verify MSV/ CV/ ClVs closed AND TBVs open to control pressure.

Verify the following:

House loads transfer Megawatts are -0 R230, R925 open 41 M, 41 E open MDS1/233N open NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACT1ONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 6 ATC RO actions ATC RO Monitors reactor power, level and pressure If directed, implements N2-SOP-9 actions for lowering condenser vacuum 0 If directed, lowers power per N2-SOP-101 D to stabilize vacuum. (Since already operating at reduced power, a further power reduction is not likely to be directed).

Verify proper operation of:

SJAE per N2-OP-9 Off-gas per N2-OP-42 Circ Water per N2-OP-1OA Reactor Power >25%? YES Tthe crew is directed to manually scram and IF Condenser vacuum is trip the turbine on either of two parameters approaching 22.1 inches Hg.....

during this event. The crew must take these THEN ....

actions based on high turbine vibration Scram the reactor per

(> 12mils) or lowering condenser vacuum (prior N2-SOP-101C to 22.1 inch Hg, automatic turbine trip Trip the turbine per N2-setpoint. SOP21 NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 7 and 8 PO-7.0 and 8.0 Manual Reactor Scram and ATWS Directs Mode Switch placed in The following preset malfunction become Shutdown active: Repeats back scram report RD17Z RD17 for All Banks, 17 QUEUED Enters EOP-RPV on low RPV RP12A RRCS Failure (Div I) QUEUED water level (4% and level above 100 inches directs terminating and prevent injection at P603 except boron, CRD and RClC to standard level band of 50 to 80 inches with Feedwater system.

When SPT reaches 1 10 F terminate and Directs terminating and prevent injection a second time is required. preventing injection at P601.

Per override L-5, IF power is NOTE >4% AND level > -14 inches When using Fuel Zone Instruments, the value (TAF) AND an SRV is open of -14 inches (TAF) and -39 inches (MSCRWL) AND SPT >1 IOOF, directs is corrected for RPV pressure using Fig. Z injection terminated and curves. Typically at 800 -1 000 psig, -14 inches prevents again UNlTlL either

= -55 inches AND -39 inches = -70 inches. APRM are dnsc OR Therefore a level band between -14 and -39 is 0 RPV Level reaches TAF directed as -55 to -70 inches when corrected (about -55 inches corrected per using Fig. Z Fig Z)

Records Fuel Zone Level NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS

~

Directs injection using only Detail G systems to restore and maintain level above MSCRWL As the SRO directs initial EOP-CS actions and Directs from EOP-C5 PRESSURE the ROs perform those actions, the following Act ions conditions should be achieved, before conditions further degrade (loss of Condensate RPV pressure stabilized below Booster Pumps occurs eight minutes after the 1052 psig with EHC (Bypass Mode Switch is placed in Shutdown: Valves) and SRVs. Standard pressure band 800 to 1000 psig Level stabilized and controlled 50 to 80 inches with F W and RCIC. Other injection sources When MSlV close, standard have been "terminated and prevented" from pressure band 800 to 1000 psig injecting except boron, CRD and RCIC. with SRVs Pressure stabilized and controlled 800 to 1000 Restore pneumatics to the psis with BPVs and SRVs. SRVs only after Drywell MSlV closure.

Both loops of SLS are injecting at 86 gpm. As WAIT until Cold Shutdown Suppression Pool water temperature rises, boron weight is injected (SLS RHS is placed in Suppression Pool Cooling tank level below 1450 gallons).

lineup.

Directs from EOP-C5 POWER Actions Mode switch in Shutdown NRC Scenario 1 -32 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Initiate RRCS (EOP-6 Att 13)

Reduce Recirc to minimum With power >4%, trip the RCS Pumps When pressure and level are under control, directs control rod insertion per EOP-6 Attachment 14 BEFORE SPT reaches 1IOOF, directs SLS boron injection WAIT until boron injection is no longer required before terminating SLS injection.

WHEN SPT reaches 90°F enters EOP-PC Directs both loops of RHS placed in Suppression Pool Cooling EVENT 8 and 9 ATC RO Actions as ATC RO directed. PO-8.0 0 Places Mode Switch in Shutdown 0 Provides scram report, including APRMs are not downcale and all rods are not fully inserted 0 Initiates RRCS by arming and depressing manual initiation pushbuttons per EOP-6 Att 13 0 Terminates and prevents P603 injection by placing FW control in NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS manual and fully closing LV1Os E When level drops below 100 inches, establishes RPV injection by reopening LVlOs to maintain level in directed band (50 to 80 inches).

EVENT 7 and 8 BOP RO Actions as BOP RO directed. Inhibits ADS using 2 keylock switches Places HPCS pump control switch in PTL CONSOLE OPERATOR 0 If directed, bypasses MSlV low IF requested to bypass MSlV low level level isolations per EOP-6 isolations per EOP-6 Attachment 10, Attachment 10 immediately activate remote timer by Manually operates SRV to maintain depressing F7 key THEN WAIT until the 1:30 pressure in directed band (800 to minute TUA timer times out and report the 1000 psig) jumpers are installed Restores pneumatics (at P851) to Drywell by using keylocks to MSOGA Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, override and reopen IAS*SOVI66 DEFEATED, TUA 1:30minutes and 184.

MSOGB Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, Restores pneumatics (at P601) to DEFEATED, TUA 1:30minutes Drywell by using keylocks to override and reopen IAS*SOV164 MSOGC Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, and 165.

DEFEATED, TUA 1:30minutes MSOGD Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, DEFEATED, TUA 1:30 minutes Terminates and prevents Div I NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS ECCS injection at P601 by performing:

Arm and depress Div I ECCS manual initiation pushbutton.

Override closed CSL Injection MOV (amber light stays on).

Place CSL pump in PTL.

Override closed RHS A Injection MOV (amber light stays on).

Terminates and prevents Div II ECCS injection at P601 by performing:

1 :00 minute after RClC starts, ET03 actives Arm and depress Div II ECCS malfunction RC02 RClC FAILURE - manual initiation pushbutton.

ISOLATION OF RCIC, TRUE Override closed RHS C Injection MOV (amber light stays on).

Place RHS C pump in PTL.

Override closed RHS B Injection MOV (amber light stays on).

When RClC isolates, reports RCIC isolation to SRO EVENT 9 WCS Isolation Failure PO-9.0 Injects SLS boron injection using keylock switches NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CU08 Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation Fail, SLS*MOVIA and 1B open TRUE malfunction becomes effective SLS*PIA and 1B start Explosive Valves fire WCS*MOVIU2 and I I 2 isolation valves fail to Pump pressure and flow rise close when SLS switches are placed in ON. SLS tank level begins to lower When P602 control switches are used, the Identifies failure of WCS isolation WCS isolation MOVs will close.

0 Manually closes WCS isolation valves MOVI 02 and 1 12 at P602 EVENT 10 Trip of all Condensate Booster Pumps PO-10.0 Eight minutes after the Mode Switch is placed in Shutdown, ET02 automatically activates the following malfunctions:

FWO2A Condensate Booster Pump Trip P2A ATC RO FWO2B Condensate Booster Pump Trip P2B Reports loss of all Condensate FWO2C Condensate Booster Pump Trip P2C Booster Pumps and Feedwater Pumps Reports lowering RPV water level Closes FWS-LV1Os for tripped Feedwater Pumps Lineup systems as directed NRC Scenario 1 March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Acknowledges loss of Feedwater All three Condensate Booster Pumps trip. Directs RHS injection through Feedwater pump suction pressure drops. Shutdown Cooling per EOP-6 Feedwater pumps automatically trip on low Attachment 30. (Requires suction pressure. installation of jumpers to defeat RHS Shutdown Cooling interlocks RPV water level falls below MSCRWL and AND RPV pressure reduced below cannot be restored until additional systems are 350 psig) lined up for injection. As RPV water level Per L-10 Conditional Step, drops, core voiding results in lowering reactor determines RPV water level cannot power and pressure. be restored and maintained above MSCRWL with Detail G Preferred Systems AND EOP-C2 has not been entered yet.. . . . . EXITS C5 Level and Pressure legs AND ENTERS EOP-C2 to perform an RPV Blowdown Executes EOP-C2 as follows:

Determines reactor will NOT stay shutdown without boron (Step 2)

Determines SPL is above 192 feet (Step 3)

Directs terminate and prevent all RPV injection except boron, CRD and RClC (Step 4)

Directs all 7 ADS valves open NRC Scenario I March 2005

INSTRUCTOR ACT1ONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS (Step 5 )

When all 7 ADS valves are reported open, continues in C2 to WAIT blocks (Step 16 then

17) AND ENTERS (RETURN TO ) EOP-C5 at 10 RETURNS TO EOP-C5 at 10 Determines 2 or more SRVs are open (L-12)
WAITS until RPV pressure drops below value in Table J (below 165 psig with 7 SRVs open; L-13)
Directs injection using only Detail G systems slowly start injecting to restore and maintain level above MSCRWL (RHS through Shutdown Cooling per EOP-6 Attachment 30 should now be established; L-14)
Determines capability of RHS to restore and maintain level above MSCRWL (L-15)
SRO may decide that RHS alone will not restore water level above MSCRWL and NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS direct Alternate ATWS System Injection from Detail H systems (L-I 6 and L-I 7)
Likely to direct injection with HPCS, LPCS or RHS LPCl Returns to EOP-C5 at 9, since level was intentionally lowered prior to entering EOP-C2 Restores and maintains water level between MSCRWL and level recorded in step L-9 number 4 using Detail G and its OK to use Detail H systems EVENT 10 BOP RO Actions, when directed BOP RO Performs RPV Injection Via Shutdown Cooling Return per EOP-6 Attachment 30 Injection via RHS B (A)
Verify closed the following valves:
RHS*MOV15B (A), OUTLET TO DRYWELL SPRAY RHS*MOV8B (A), HEAT EXCHANGER 1B (A) INLET BYPASS VLV (WHEN possible)
RHS*MOV33B (A), OUTLET TO SUPPR POOL SPRAY RHS*FV38B (A), RETURN TO NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACT1ONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SUPPR POOL COOLING RHS*MOV24B (A), LPCl B (A)
INJECTION VLV RHS*MOV40B (A), SDC B RETURN RHS*MOV104, RHR B TO REACTORHEADSPRAY CONSOLE OPERATOR Defeat Group 5 isolation interlocks When requested by BOP RO/ATC RO to for 2RHS*MOV40B as follows defeat Group 5 isolation interlocks for (Figure 30-2):
2RHS*MOV40A or B per EOP-6 Attachment (2CEC*PNL622)(NOT actually 30, immediately activate remote timer by performed) depressing FIO key THEN WAIT until the 2:OO Lift AND tape the lead on minute TUA timer times out and report the terminal point BB-62 jumpers are installed and leads are lifted. Install EOP Jumper #9 on terminal points BB-41 AND RH08 Group 5 Isolation Failure SDC MOVs, BB-60 0 Verify RHS*Pl B (A), PMP 1B TRUE (F10)
(A) is running.
NOTE Verify open SWP*MOVSOB (A),
HEAT EXCHANGER 1B SVCE Per EOP-C5 Step L-13 and L-14, injection is WTR INLET VLV.
NOT allowable until RPV pressure drops below WAIT UNTIL reactor pressure 165 psig with 7 SRVs open. The crew SHALL has been reduced to less than NOT establish injection when RPV pressure 350 drops below 350 psig. This would violate the Throttle open RHS*MOV40B EOP step and Critical Task. (A), SDC B (A) RETURN to a maximum of 7450 gpm on E12-603B (A), RHR B (A) TOTAL NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS FLOW meter to control RPV water level Throttle open SWP*MOV33B (A), HEAT EXCHANGER 1B SVCE WTR OUTLET VLV THROTTLE to establish approximately 7400 gpm on CONSOLE OPERATOR E12-R602B (A), SVCE WTR When requested by BOP RO/ATC RO to place TO RHR B (A) HX FLOW meter radiation monitor SWP*RE23B (A) in service (if not already in service), manually activate Request Rad Monitor remotes, then report RE23B (A) is in service: SWP*RE23B (A) placed in NOTE: USE REMOTES FOR RE 23A IF service APPROPRIATE: EOP-6 Attachment 30 is co mplete RM02 SWP23B Rad Detector Online/Offline, Confirms P601 system injection to ON RPV is terminated and prevented RM03 SWP23B Process Monitor Sample Pump, ON Opens all 7 ADS valves by arming and depressing ADS MANUAL INITIATION pushbuttons on P601 Reports 7 ADS valves are open Reports when RPV pressure drops below Table J value of 165 psig with 7 SRVs open Injects with systems to restore NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONSI PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS and maintain RPV water level in directed band (CT-3.0)
RHS Via Shutdown Cooling HPCS 0 LPCS 0 LPCl CONTINGENCY: IF ALL (including Fuel Zone) water level instruments are downscale, the Crew will enter EOP-C4, RPV Flooding temporarily. When RPV water level starts to rise (level can now be determined, EOP-C4 is exited (step 1 override) and EOP-CS re-entered at 6 and EOP-C2 re-entered at 25.
Alternate Control Rod Insertion ATC RO Using EOP-6 Attachment 14 Appropriate sections to be performed are Flowchart determines appropriate 3.3 Additional Manual Scram Initiation sections (3.3 and 3.5) to be 3.5 Manual Control Rod Insertion (Driving rods performed.
with RDS). These sections are performed Performs section 3.3 concurrently. 0 Reset ARI by directing fuses pulled CONSOLE OPERATOR per 3.3.1 WHEN requested to reset ARI per EOP-6 b Attachment 14, immediatelv activate remote timer by depressing F8 key THEN WAIT until NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS the I:30 minute TUA timer times out and report the fuses are pulled RP14A RRCS ARI FailurelDefeated Div I, TRUE TUA I:30 minutes RP14B RRCS ARI FailurelDefeated Div II, TRUE TUA 1:30 minutes CONSOLE OPERATOR 0 Defeat RPS interlocks by WHEN requested to defeat RPS per EOP-6 directing/installing RPS jumpers 4, immediately activate remote timer by depressing F9 key THEN WAIT until 0 Reset RPS by momentarily placing the 1:30 minute TUA timer times out and the following switches to RESET:
report the jumpers are installed (2CC*PNL603)
REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC A RP02 RPS Failure to Scram Automatic, REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC C TRUE REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC B TUA 1 :30 minutes REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC D CONSOLE OPERATOR 0 Ensure the eight white PILOT WHEN RPS is reset, verify change in status of SCRAM VALVE SOLENOIDS malfunction R D I 72 lights are lit.
0 Ensure SCRAM DISH VOLUME RDI 72 RD17 for All Banks, 00 ET01 VENT VLVS RDS*AOVI 24/132 TUA 5 seconds indicate open.
ET01 Mode Switch in Shutdown with 0 Ensure SCRAM DISH VOLUME NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 0PERATOR ACT1ONS Scram Reset. DRAIN VLVS RDS*AOV123/130 indicate open.
IF ET01 fails to reset RD17Z to 00.. . . . .MANUALLY delete RDI 72 after RPS is reset to allow control rod inserting when additional manual scram signal is inserted.
NOTE: 0 Using one OR more of the After RPS is reset and while waiting for following, ensure the Scram indication that the SDV is drained, ATC RO Discharge Volume (SDV) is should proceed to section 3.5 to implement drained :
action to manually insert rods by driving in Annunciator 603109, RPS A using RDS. It takes about 10 minutes for the DISCH VOLUME HIGH LEVEL SDV annunciators to clear, indicating that the TRIP, clear SDV is drained Annunciator 603409, RPS B DISCH VOLUME HIGH LEVEL TRIP, clear Annunciator 603130, SDV LEVEL HIGH, clear NOTE: ATC RO At the examiners discretion, time compression may be used to shorten the time while waiting While waiting for SDV to drain for the SDV to drain. This is accomplished by performs section 3.5 directing the CONSOLE OPERATOR to override OFF SDV annunciator 603109 or Verify the following pumps are 603409, to simulate SDV is drained. running (starts zndRDS pump using control switch):
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0 RDS-PlA, CRD PUMP 1A RDS-PlB, CRD PUMP 1B Place controller 2RDS-FC107, CRD FLOW CONTROL, in MANUAL CAUTION To prevent pump motor damage or tripping the supply breaker, motor current shall not exceed 40 amps for RDS-P1A or RDS-P1B.
Depress the OPEN pushbutton on 2RDS-FCl07 UNTIL the controller output meter shows 100% OR RDS pump motor current approaches 40 amps Check that RDS System flow rises on C12-R606, CRD SYSTEM FLOW.
NOTE: In the following step it is expected that RDS System Flow will drop.
Close 2RDS-PV101, DRIVE WTR PRESS CONTROL MOV, to maximize Drive Water AP.
Ensure RDS Drive Water AP rises on C12-R602, DRIVE WTR DlFF NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS PRESSURE Using an SHH 5366 key, bypass the RWM by taking the RWM Operator Console BYPASS/OPERATE/TEST switch to the BYPASS position Using Figures 14-2 AND 14-3, track the status of the control rods, as the rods are inserted.
Starting with a control rod at OR near the center, select a control rod to be driven in on the Rod Select Matrix When the SDV alarms clear the ATC RO will ATC RO initiate another scram by tripping RPS using manual scram pushbuffons. All rods will fully Return to Section 3.3 insert.
3 WHEN the SDV is drained, initiate a manual scram 0 Arm and depress manual scram pushbutton (CT-4.0)
Check for control rod motion AND control rod positions Confirm all rods fully inserted Report control rod status to SRO NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS TERMI NATION C RITERIA RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is restored and maintained in normal level band 160 to 200 inches and all control rods are fully inserted.
EVENT 11 SRO Admin JPM 5-1 SRO Classify the event as SAE 2.2.2 Evaluator to perform SRO Admin JPM for emergency classification.
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE L
A. NA, NRC Exam VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events None
6. Commitments
1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST
1. Additional Information about these checks:
For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.
For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.
X ReaIism/CredibiIity X Event Sequencing X Simulator Modeling X Evaluating Crew Competencies 6 Total Malfunctions 2 Malfunctions after EOP Entry 2 Abnormal Events 1 Major Transients 2 EOPsUsed 2 EOP Contingency Procedures Used Simulator Run Time EOP Run Time 4 Crew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)
4. Developmental Checks:
Does every event have either a Critical Task(s) or Performance Objective?
Is Criteria given for sequencing to subsequent events?
Is termination criteria clear and unambiguous?
Does termination criteria allow verification that all CT, PO standards are met?
Constellation Energy Group OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE
Title:
Emergency Classification for Scenario 1 Revision: NRC 2005 Task Number: 3440190303 Approvals:
NA EXAMINATION SECURITY Dde ' General Supervisor Date Operations Training (Designee) Operations (Designee)
NA EXAMINATION SECURITY Configuration Control Date Perform e r: (RO)
TrainerIEvalu ator:
Evaluation Method: PERFORM Evaluation Location: SIMULATOR FOLLOWING SCENARIO AS SRO Expected Completion Time: 15 minutes Time Critical Task: YES Alternate Path Task: NO Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:
JPM Overall Rating: Pass Fail NOTE: A JPM overall rating of fail shall be given if any critical step is graded as fail. Any grade of unsat or individual competency area unsat requires a comment.
Comments:
Evaluator Signature: Date:
NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-1 1 311712005
Recommended Start Location: (Completion time based on the start location)
Simulator or other designated location.
Simulator Set-up:
N/A Directions to the Instructor/Evaluator To be performed as an administrative JPM.
Directions to Operators:
Read Before Every JPM Performance:
For the performance of this JPM, I will function as the SSS, CSO, and Auxiliary Operators. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cuesasnecessary.
Read Before Each Evaluated JPM Performance:
This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Control Room Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional / concurrent verification will not be provided; therefore it should not be requested.
Read Before Each Traininq JPM Performance:
During this Training JPM, applicable methods of verification are expected to be used. Therefore, either another individual or I will act as the additional / concurrent verifier.
Notes to Instructor / Evaluator:
1. Critical steps are identified as PassIFail. All steps are sequenced critical unless denoted by a d.
2. During Evaluated JPM:
Self-verification shall be demonstrated.
3. During Training JPM:
Self-verification shall be demonstrated.
0 No other verification shall be demonstrated.
References:
1. EPIP-EPP-02, Classification of Emergency Conditions at Unit 2.
2. EPMP-EPP-0102, Unit 2 Emergency Classification Bases.
3. EPIP-EPP-18, Activation and Direction of the Emergency Plan.
4. NUREG K/A 2.4.40 Knowledge of the SROs responsibilities in emergency plan implementation (4.0).
Tools and Equipment:
1. None.
Task Standard: Scenario properly diagnosed and classified as a Site Area Emergency Initial Conditions:
1. High Turbine vibration led to a reactor SCRAM and turbine trip
2. Control rods inserted to position 17
3. RPV injection was terminated and prevented per EOP-CS to lower power
4. Ask the operator for any questions NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-1 2 311512005
Initiating Cue:
(Operators name), assume the role of the SM/ED and determine the emergency classification of this event.
~
Proper communications used for Sat/Unsat Evaluator Acknowledge repeat back repeat back (GAP-OPS-01) providing correction if necessary RECORD START TIME Start time is logged to determine total classification time. I
2. *Obtain a copy of the reference o EPIP-EPP-02 obtained. SatIUnsat procedure and reviewhtilize the Attachment 1, Section 2.2.2 is correct section. referenced,
3. RPS setpoint has been exceeded o Site Area Emergency is declared PasslFail The time elapsed between START TIME AND Automatic & Manual scrams per EAL 2.2.2. and determination MUST BE c15minutes have failed to assure the reactor is to pass the JPM.
shudown under all conditions AND either Reactor power was >4%
Suppression Pool temperature was
>11OF.
End of JPM TERMINATING CUE: Scenario properly diagnosed and classified as a Site Area Emergency.
RECORD STOP TIME NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-1 3 311 712005
Initial Conditions:
1. High Turbine vibration led to a reactor SCRAM and turbine trip
2. Control rods inserted to position 17
3. RPV injection was terminated and prevented per EOP-C5 to lower power
4. Ask the operator for any questions Initiating Cue:
(Operators name), assume the role of the SM/ED and determine the emergency classification of this event.
NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-1 4 311512005
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont) 2.2.2 Site Area Emerqency A~J RPS scram setpoint has been exceeded AND Automatic and manual scrams fail to result in a control rod pattern which assures reactor shutdown under all conditions without boron.
AND Either:
Reactor power >6%
OR Torus temperature >llO°F NUMARC IC:
Failure of Reactor Protection system instrumentation to complete or initiate an automatic reactor trip once a Reactor Protection system setpoint has been exceeded and manual scram trip was not successful.
FPB LosdPotential Loss:
NIA Mode Applicability:
Power Operation Basis:
This condition indicates failure of the Reactor Protection System to shut down the reactor (automatically or manually) and maintain it shutdown under ail conditions without boron. Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than can be removed using available safety systems. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist leading to imminent or potential loss of both the fuel clad and the primary containment.
The failure of automatic initiation of a reactor scram followed by an unsuccessful manual initiating actions which can be rapidly taken at the reactor control console does not, by itself, lead to imminent loss of either fuel clad or primary containment barriers, It is the continued criticaiity under conditions requiring a rector scram along with the continued addition of heat to the containment which poses the imminent threat to primary containment or fuel clad barriers. In accordance with the EOPs, Liquid Poison System is initiated based on heat addition to containment in excess of safety system capability under failure to scram conditions.
Page 33 EPMP-EPP-0101 Rev 07
AllACHMENT 1 (Cont)
An immediate manual scram is any set of actions by the reactor operator at the reactor control console which causes control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core and brings the reactor subcritical, including manual scram pushbuttons, ARI and mode switch.
PEG Reference@):
ss2.1 Basis Reference@):
1. N1-EOP-3, Failure to Scram
2. "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Level" NUMARClNESP-007 Revision 2 -
Questions and Answers, June 1993 Page 34 EPMP-EPP-0101 Rev 07
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 2 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 42 RDS PUMP SWAP/RCS SEAL LEAK/LOSS OF LINE 5 WITH EDG FAILUREWRCS LEAK WITH DEGRADED ECCS REQUIRES RPV BLOWDOWN PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 2/1/05 VAL1DATED B. Weaver, B. Moore, P. Brennan DATE 3/7/05 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE ~ ) J ~ / J J -
OPE RATIONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE CON FIG URAT10N CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Initial Power Level: loo%, above the 100°/~Rod Line The scenario begins at 100% reactor power. The crew will swap Control Rod Drive Pumps to return RDS-PI B to service and remove RDS-P1A from service. After the normal evolution is complete, an outer seal leak develops on Recirc Pump (RCS) A. N2-SOP-29.1 is entered RCS pumps is removed from service and isolated. The crew will also enter N2-SOP-29 due to reduced core flow and insert Cram Rods to lower rod line below 100%. The crew will stabilize the plant in single loop and the SRO will implement the required single loop Tech Spec actions.
With the plant now stable, Control Rod Drive suction filter clogging results in the trip of the operating RDS pump and several accumulator trouble alarms. The crew will enter N2-SOP-30, trip Reactor Water Cleanup due to loss of pump seal cooling, swap RDS pump suction filters and restart an RDS pump.
A loss of one offsite 115 KV power Line 5 will occur. The Division I and Division Ill EDGs will fail to start. Manual operator action will be required to start the Division I EDG and preclude a manual scram. The Division Ill High Pressure Core Spray EDG cannot be started. The crew will implement the actions required by N2-SOP-3 to restore Service Water System flow to the Turbine and Reactor Building non safety related headers which have isolated due to the off site power loss.
A small reactor coolant leak develops inside the Drywell. This results in rising drywell temperatures and pressure. The crew will take manual action and scram the reactor. N2-EOP-RPV, PC are entered. The event is complicated by degraded ECCS response and loss of NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
electrical power. An RPV Blowdown is required to establish injection with the only remaining Low Pressure ECCS systems RHR B and C. Suppression Chamber Spray and Drywell Spray should be established to control primary containment pressure and temperature, as the LOCA becomes more severe. Drywell and Suppression Chamber Sprays will be complicated by loss of electrical power and degraded ECCS systems. The only remaining system that can be used for sprays, will also be required for RPV injection.
Major Procedures Exercised: EOP-RPV, PC, C-2. SOP-29.1, 29,30 and 3 EAL Classification: ALERT 3.1 .IPrimary containment pressure cannot be maintained loo%
Division I Low Pressure ECCS systems are INOPERABLE (pre-planned)
Corrective Maintenance on broken motor operator for RHS*MOV30A Return to Suppression Pool. Scheduled return to service is late on the next shift.
TS 3.5.1 Required Action C . l was entered 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago. Required Action C . l Action to restore one subsystem with 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time.
TS 3.6.1.6 Drywell Spray Required Action A.l with 7 day Completion Time TS 3.6.2.3 Suppression Pool Cooling Required Action A . l with 7 day Completion Time TS 3.6.2.4 Suppression Pool Spray Required Action A.l with 7 day Completion Time 0 Corrective Maintenance has been completed on RDS-P1B and it is to be placed in service for Post Maintenance Testing. When the pump is running contact the WEC to dispatch the assembled PMT crew to the pump to obtain all required data.
PART 111: RemarkslPlanned Evolutions:
Place RDS-PI B in service for Post Maintenance Testing.
PART IV: To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SRO BOP RO ATC RO NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
Scenario ID#
INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What we did? Why? (Goals) Other Options? I NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
Ill. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES
-- A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1 .O Given the plant at power with RPV pressure >900 psig and two inoperable scram accumulators, the crew will restore charging water pressure >940 psig within 20 minutes of meeting conditions for entering TS 3.1.5 Condition B, by restarting an RDS pump and avoiding the requirement to immediately scram the reactor per N2-SOP-30 and Tech Spec 3.1.5.
CT Justification: Failure to restore Charging Header Pressure by restarting RDS pump results in direct adverse consequences and a challenge to plant safety by requiring a manual scram transient to be initiated. Per Tech Spec Basis 3.1.5 With two or more control rod scram accumulators inoperable and reactor steam dome pressure >900 psig, adequate pressure must be supplied to the charging water header. With inadequate charging water pressure, all of the accumulators could become inoperable, resulting in a potentially severe degradation of the scram performance.
Therefore, within 20 minutes from discovery of charging water header pressure < 940 psig concurrent with Condition B, adequate charging water header pressure must be restored. The allowed Completion Time of 20 minutes is considered a reasonable time to place a CRD pump into service to restore the charging header pressure, if required. This Completion Time also recognizes the ability of the reactor pressure alone to fully insert all control rods.
CT-2.0 Given degraded RPV injection sources, the crew will establish RPV injection using available Preferred Injection Systems listed in Table E l of EOP-RPV to RESTORE AND MAINTAIN RPV water level above MSCRWL (-39 inches Fig 2)to preclude executing EOP-C3 or Flooding the Drywell by entering SAPS, per N2-EOP-RPV.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
CT Justification: Failure to restore and maintain RPV water level above -39 inches by implementing actions per EOP-RPV will result in adverse consequences to the plant by abandoning the EOP injection strategy and implementing Drywell Flooding (from EOP-RPV Step L-16) used in the SAPs. It is expected that proper implementation of EOP-RRV will result in performing an RPV Blowdown by opening 7 ADS valves to reduce RPV pressure and manual injecting RHS Pump B and RHS Pump C (either both or any one pump) which are capable of recovering level above -39 inches and ultimately above -14 inches (TAF). Water level is expected to drop below -39 inches for several minutes while executing the steps to blowdown and establish injection. There is no specific time constraints attached to this CT. As long as the crew recovers level without entering EOP-C3, Steam Cooling or the SAPs, this would demonstrate satisfactory completion of the CT.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-I .o Given the plant with direction to swap Control Rod Drive pumps, the crew will start RDS-PI B and secure RDS-PIA per N2-OP-30 PO-2.0 Given the plant with an RCS pump seal leak, the crew will remove the pump from service per N2-SOP-29.1 and N2-SOP-29, then continue to operate the plant in single loop per with N2-0P-29.
PO-3.0 Given the plant operating at power and a Control Rod Drive pump trip with accumulator trouble alarms, the crew will restart an RDS pump within 20 minutes per N2-SOP-30 PO-4.0 Given the reactor plant operating at power when a loss of offsite line 5 with EDG failures occurs, the crew will take action to start the NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
failed EDG and stabilize service water in accordance with N2-SOP-
03. (Operator actions with PRA significance)
PO-5.0 Given a reactor plant operating at power with a LOCA in progress, the crew will manually scram the reactor plant prior to reaching 1.68 psig in the Containment.
PO-6.0 Given a loss of all high pressure injection the crew will restore and .
maintain RPV water level above TAF after performing an RPV Blowdown per N2-EOP-RPV and N2-EOP-C2. (Operator actions with PRA significance)
PO-7.0 Given a failure of Low Pressure ECCS pumps to start on high drywell pressure signal, the crew will manually start the Low Pressure ECCS pumps per EOP Bases and Operations Manual PO-8.0 Given the plant with a LOCA and conditions met for containment spray, the crew will initiate Containment Spray per N2-EOP-PC and EOP-6 Attachment 22.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 0PERATOR ACT IONS Crew 0 Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.
EVENT 1 -
SRO RDS Pump Swap PO-I .o Directs RDS-PIB started and RDS-PIA placed in standby per N2-OP-30, F.2.0 After RDS-PlB is placed in service, contacts WEC to dispatch team to perform Post Maintenance Testing requirements.
Dispatches A 0 to perform prestart Role Play lineup When dispatched as additional operators to support the pump swap with activities such as IF RDS is supplying WCS pump performing prestart verifications and seal cooling, THEN station monitoring, respond as required. There will be personnel at locations to no unusual conditions or readings to be simultaneously monitor WCS reported for this evolution. pump seal parameters during RDS pump changeover.
Start the standby CRD pump NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 2RDS-PI B CRD PUMP 1B by placing its control switch to START, THEN release to Normal-After-START.
0 Stop the CRD pump to be shutdown 2RDS-PlA, CRD PUMP 1A by taking its control switch to STOP AND releasing to Normal-After-STOP.
0 Directs local monitoring of operating WCS pump(s) seal cavity tem peratures 0 IF WCS pump seal cooling is being supplied from RDS, THEN directs verification of seal cooling flow between 1-4 gpm as indicated locally.
0 As required, directs adjusting RPV Level Instrumentation Backfill 0 Reports RDS-PIB in service and RDS-PIA in standby.
NRC Scenario 2 -1 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 2 RCS Pump A outer seal leakage PO-2.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR BOP RO When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate Identifies and reports annunciator malfunction by depressing F3 key: 602109 to SRO Implements ARP 602109 actions RR16A, 0.25, Ramp Time 1:00 Min (F3) Monitor DW Equipment Drain Tank leak rate. Refer to ITS RRPIA upper seal cavity press lowers to 3.4.5 RCS Operational about 220 psig Leakage.
Annunciator 602109 Recirc Pump 1A Outer SL Monitor upper and lower seal Leak High alarms after about I minute. cavity pressures using P602 pressure indicators.
Monitor upper and lower seal cavity temperatures using P614 recorder points 8 and 9 and Process Computer points RCSTAI 5 and RCSTAI 7.
Enter N2-SOP-29.1 and performs concurrently with ARP actions.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO/BOP RO 3 Implements SOP-29.1 Actions while monitoring Seal Action leg conditions that may require pump trip Establish periodic monitoring of pump conditions.
If applicable, monitor DERlDFR leakage for indication of degradation (TS 3.4.5).
If conditions warrant, shutdown the affected pump per N2-OP-29, G.2.0.
Refer to N2-OP-29, H.4.0, if both seal injection and cooling water are lost.
BOP RO Implements SOP-29.1 Seal CONSOLE OPERATOR Act ions After the crew enters N2-SOP-29.1 and is IF ANY of THESE OCCUR monitoring parameters activate malfunction by Upper seal cavity pressure depressing F4 key: < 100 psig Upper seal cavity pressure >
RRIGA, 0.75, Ramp Time 1:OO Min (F4) 920 psig Lower seal cavity pressure >
Upper Seal pressure drops below 100 psig 1200 psig L
which requires the RCS pump to be tripped Outer seal leakage > 1.2 gpm NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Annunciator 6021 15, Recirc Pmp 1A seal Seal staging flow > 1.8 gpm staging flow h ig h/low DFR > 1 gpm rise RCS Pump A is manually tripped and isolated .....THEN CONTINUE AT A (when by closing RCS*MOVIOA and 18A with the seal pressure drops below following alarms 100 psig) 602207 RECIRC PMP I A LOW SPEED AUTO Trip the affected pump TRANSFER NOTAVAILABLE AND enter N2-SOP-29.
603139 REACTOR WATER LEVEL Recirculation pump should HlGH/LO W be tripped by opening 603218 OPRM TRlP ENABLED RECIRC PMP IA(1B)
Reactor Water Cleanup is manually realigned MOTOR BRKR 5A by for single loop by lowering system flow and placing control switch to closing WCS*MOVlO5. When WCS flow is STOP or PTL.
lowered, the in-service filter demineralizer HOLD Pumps start with the following P602 Lower WCS flow to < 450 alarms gpm (by throttling MOV200) 602317 RWCU FILTER DEMlN 1 TROUBLE Close WCS*MOV105.
602318 RWCU FILTER DEMlN I TROUBLE Close RCS*MOVIOA Close RCS*MOV18A When time permits, perform N2-OP-29, H. (Single Loop Operations SRO/BOP RO/ATC RO Note Enter and implement the flowchart Crew initiates N2-SOP-29 flowchart decision actions per N2-SOP-29 when blocks by answering YES/NO questions. directed from SOP-29.1 Is a Recirc pump in service?
YES NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Is core flow to left of natural circ line? NO Core flow AND Power in Scram Region? NO Note Core flow AND Power in Exit With operation above the 100% rod line, the Region? NO crew will insert CRAM rods. It is expected that Reduce rodline below 100% by the ATC RO will insert the first four cram rods inserting CRAM rods. (EVENT to position 00 using P603 CONTINUOUS 2 Reactivity Manipulation for INSERT pushbutton. (EVENT 2 Reactivity ATC RO)
Manipulation for ATC RO) > 3 OPRMs operable? YES Plant in Heightened Awareness Reactor Power will lower and Rod Line will be Zone? YES reduced below 100% rod line Recover per Attachment 2 SOP-29 Attachment 2 actions IF one Recirc. Pump tripped AND NOT in Natural Circulation, perform the following:
Verify Recirc Flow Controller in LOOP MANUAL for BOTH loops Close Flow Control valve for the tripped pump Reduce flow rate of operating loop to less than 41,800 gpm NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS as indicated by flow recorder at 2CEC*PNL602 Notify I&C to perform APRM Scram AND Rod Block AND rod block monitor setpoint change 0 Reduce thermal power to less than 70% of rated 0 IF pump speed does NOT indicate 0 rpm one minute AFTER pump trip, close 2RCS*MOVI 8A OR 2RCS*MOVI OA 0 IF NOT able to start the tripped pump, perform N2-OP-29, Subsection H.6.0, Single Recirculation Loop Operation AND exit this attachment.
EVENT 2 SRO ACTIONS SRO Direct trip of RCS Pump A and ensure actions of SOP-29, Attachment 2 and OP-29, G.2.0 are taken to place in shutdown cond ition.
NRC Scenario 2 -16 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0 Enters N2-SOP-29.
0 Directs cram rods inserted.
0 Refer to ITS 3.4.5 for RCS leakage requirements.
0 Refer to ITS 3.4.1 for single loop operation. Condition C LCO requirements are currently not met until actions are complete to adjust APLHGR, MCPR, RPS APRM Scram and Rod Block settings for single loop operation. The Completion Time is 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months 0 Notify I&C to reduce APRM scram and rod block monitor trip setpoints. May be done by contacting WEC SRO.
0 Notifies Operations and Plant Management 0 Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and wok planning.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 3 PO-3.0 Operating Control Rod Drive Pump trip CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate ATC RO malfunction by depressing F5 key: Acknowledge and report Enter N2-SOP-30 RD18 CRD Suction Filter Clogged, TRUE Monitor for override conditions and RD063419 34-1 9 Rod Failure Accum performs actions if required Trouble, TRUE, TUA 2:OO minutes RD062227 22-27 Rod Failure Accum Trouble, TRUE, TUA 2:20 minutes (F5)
IF THESE OCCUR ....
RDS P I A trips RDS flow and charging pressure drop to 0 RPV pressure is >900 psig AND The following annunciators alarm: Two or more accumulators 603318 CRD Pmp Suction Fltr Diff Press for withdrawn control rods are inoperable AND High (first alarm)
Charging water header After the RDS pump trips then:
pressure e940 psig for 20 minutes 603308 CRD Pmp I A / I B Auto Trip THEN 603309 CRD Pmp ?A Suct Press Low SCRAM the reactor per N2-60331 I CRD Charging Wtr Press Low SOP-101c.
603315 CRD PMP I B Suet Press Low 603446 CRD Pmp Disch Hdr Press Low NRC Scenario 2 -18 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS After 2:OO minutes, 60344 I Rod Drive Dispatches operator to report Accumulator Trouble alarms accumulator pressure for 34-19 and Rod and Detector Display Amber Trouble light 22-27 is lit for the affected accumulators Implements pump recovery actions Accumulator 34-19 after 2:OO minute delay Accumulator 22-27 after 2:20 minute delay Note While executing actions to restart an RDS pump the crew will monitor the flowchart override conditions and initiate a manual scram, if required. It is NOT expected to meet any of the required manual scram conditions.
ROLE PLAY Report as operator dispatched that both accumulator 34-19 and 22-27 pressure read IsRDSpump 900 psig. operating? NO IF Annunciator 602324, RWCU Annunciator 602324, RWCU PUMP CLG WTR PUMP CLG WTR TEMP HIGH, TEMP HIGH, is expected to be received after is received. THEN .....Remove several minutes with no operating RDS pump. WCS from service as follows:
Throttle WCS*MOV200 until in service filters on hold.
Trip WCS pumps.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE IF An RDS pump can NOT be RDS pump restoration is expected to be restored to service within 15 completed in less than 15 minutes. minutes OR indications of system breech exist.
THEN.. . . . .Isolate RDS backfill by closing 2RDS-V20 (preferred) OR 2RDS-V2058.
0 Shift 2RDS-FC107 (RDS flow CONSOLE OPERATOR controller) to Manual.
WHEN dispatched to swap RDS suction filter 0 Close FCV to minimum DELETE malfunction RD18 WAIT 3 minutes position.
and report to control room that suction filters 0 Determines trip is caused by are swapped. low suction pressure 0 Dispatches operator to swap AFTER RDS pump is operating delete RDS suction filters per N2-OP-malfunction RD06 to clear accumulator 30, Section F.I.O.
trouble condition. 0 Start a RDS pump (within 20 minutes of 2"d inoperable accumulator with Charging header pressure 940 psig.
(CT-I .O) 0 WHEN a RDS pump is running, Following RDS pump restart and flow control perform the following:
valve operation, system flow and pressure are Adjust RDS flow using restored to normal. Associated alarms will 2RDS-FC107 to clear. approximately 63 gpm.
0 Place 2RDS-FC107 in Auto.
0 IF WCS OR RPV backfill NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS was removed from service, THEN restore per SMICRS.
Verify WCS/RCS seal flows and backfill flows per N2-OP-30, Sections F.2.5 through F.2.9 WHEN charging water header pressure has been restored above 940 psig, exit this procedure (N2-S0P-30).
Report RDS pump is restarted EVENT 3 SRO Actions 7 Directs entry into SOP-30 J Declares two accumulators inoperable with their pressure below 940 psig and enters Tech Spec 3.1.5 Condition B and implements the REQUIRED ACT10NS B. Two or more control rod scram accumulators inoperable with reactor steam dome pressure >900 psig.
B . l Restore charging water header pressure to >940 psig. Completion NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACT10NS Time is 20 minutes from discovery of Condition B concurrent with charging water header pressure <
940 psig AND B.2.1 Declare the associated control rod scram time "slow."
Completion Time is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .
OR B.2.2 Declare the associated control rod inoperable.
Completion Time is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .
EVENT 4 PO40 Loss of Line 5 with EDG Failures CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F6 key: BOP RO Recognize and report Loss of Line ED02A, Loss of Off-Site 115KV Line 5, 5 and Division I and Division Ill TRUE EDGs failed to start.
DG04A, DG 1 UV LOCA Start Failure is now Enters and executes N2-SOP-3 in effect Determines that both Divisions Multiple 86 devices and annunciators actuate (I and II) have not lost power on P852. Div I and Div 111 EDG fail to start on Determines Division I EDG did undervoltage. 4 I60 VAC Emergency not energize the bus Switchgear ENS*SWGIOI and IO2 Starts Division I EDG from deenergize. HPCS is now unavailable due to P852 and reports EDG started NRC Scenario 2 -22 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SWG102 loss and is not recoverable. o Verifies output breaker 101-1 SWP Non Essential MOVs close, isolating closes and observes SWP flow to CCS and CCP heat exchangers. ENS*SWGI 01 is energized The Div I EDG will start when manually started 0 At P601, verifies Div I I SWP fro P852. Non-Essential MOVs close 0 After EDG energizes ENS*SWGlOI, verifies:
Div I SWP Non-Essential MOVs close One Div I SWP pump restarts 0 WHEN SWP Pump restarts 0 Open ALL SWP Non-Essential MOVs 0 Throttle SWP Pump Discharge MOV74's to maintain pump flow below 10,000 gpm Start a 3rdDiv II SWP Pump and reopen MOV74's 0 Verify proper operation of EDG Voltage 41 60 VAC Frequency 60 Hz SWP flow > 780 gpm 0 Restore pneumatics to Drywell At P851 open IAS*SOV166 At P601 open IAS*SOV164 0 Refer to Attachment 1 for subsequent actions and fault NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS identification Role Play: If dispatched to perform switchyard ATC RO to electrical power distribution panel Subsequent Actions (N2-SOP-3 walkdowns, wait approximately 5 minutes then Attachment 1) report back that all indications are good and Reports GTS running on the only targets found were Div I under voltage Reactor Building trips. Restores drywell cooling by restarting unit coolers on P873.
Secures CWS blowdown if required.
Restores CMS.
0 Open 2CMS*SOV62B 0 Open 2CMS*SOVGOA 0 Open 2CMS*SOV62A 0 Open 2CMS*SOV6OB 0 Restart or verify in standby the Div I H2/02 Monitor in CONSOLE OPERATOR accordance with N2-OP-82 WHEN requested to start CMSlO sample (May not be performed) pumps, manually activate remotes as 0 Notify Rad Protection to start requested 2CMS*RE1OA AND verify the RM03 for CMS*REIOA, ON monitor is on line and working properly 0 Notify Rad Protection to start 2CMS*RE1OB AND verify the monitor is on line and working properly SRO NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Directs entry into N2-SOP-3 Directs subsequent and fault Line 5 loss with CSH EDG failing to start identification actions results in loss of power to HPCS. HPCS is Declares HPCS inoperable AND now inoperable and with LPCS already with LPCS already inoperable inoperable for maintenance, Tech Spec 3.5. I enter Tech Spec 3.5.1 Condition H Condition H is entered. This is the most restrictive L CO.
Condition H not met for HPCS and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)
Systems inoperable.
REQUIRED ACTION H . l Enter LCO 3.0.3 COMPLETION TIME Immediately Enters Tech Spec LCO 3.0.3 LCO 3.0.3 When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to place the unit, as applicable, in:
a. MODE 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months ;
b. MODE 3 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months ; and C. MODE 4 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days 0.0103 hours 6.117725e-5 weeks 1.40785e-5 months .
3 Enters Tech Spec 3.5.1 Condition B NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS for HPCS inoperable High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System inoperable.
REQUIRED ACTIONS B. 1 Verify by administrative means RClC System is OPERABLE when RClC is required to be OPERABLE.
Completion Time is Immediately AND B.2 Restore HPCS System to OPERABLE status.
Completion Time is 14 days TS 3.8.1 Condition D is most restrictive after Enters Tech. Spec. 3.8.1 and LCO 3.0.0 considerations, with 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Condition A completion time for line or EDG restoration. Condition A not met for Line 5 Then 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for the other component. REQUIRED ACTION A . l directs N2-OSP-LOG WOO1 performed within Ihour and every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter.
AND A.2 is not applicable under current conditions AND A.3 Restore required offsite circuit to OPERABLE status. Completion Time 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Condition B not met for Div Ill EDG Condition D not met Line 5 AND Div Ill EDG One required offsite circuit inoperable.
AND One required DG inoperable.
REQUIRED ACTION D.l Restore required offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.
Completion Time 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR D.2 Restore required DG to OPERABLE status. Completion Time 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Conducts crew briefing 0 Notifies Operations and Plant Management 0 Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and wok planning.
EVENT 5 RCS Coolant Leakage into the Drywell PO-5.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
\.
When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F7 key:
RR20 RR Loop Rupture - DBA LOCA BOP RO Value 1.5 Reports alarm 851254 and RCS coolant leakage into DW is initiated. IF implements actions CMS*RlOs have been returned to service Determine the source(s) of the following power loss, annunciator 851254 alarm by reviewing the status of PROCESS AIRBORNE RAD MONITOR the DRMS monitors using the A C TIVATED alarms. STATUS GRID function of the DRMS console. Color-coded DRMS computer indicates CMS*REIOs identification is used for status alarming . of normal (green), alert alarm Drywell floor drain leak rate rising. (yellow), high radiation (red),
Drywell pressure begins to rise. suspect data (white), and equipment failure (blue). For applicable alarm response refer to Table 851254. For alert response refer to step e.
If there has been an increase in containment activity as evidenced by an alert or High Rad alarm on the gaseous or particulate channel of DWP slowly rises and 603140 DRYWELL CMS*RElOA or B:
PRESSURE HIGH/LOW alarms at about 0.78 Notify the SM.
Notify the Rad. Prot.
PW Department.
A manual scram should be directed prior to the Attempt to identify the cause NRC Scenario 2 -28 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS automatic high drywell pressure RPS trip of the increase, notify setpoint of I . 68 psig Chemistry to sample containment .
Verify Reactor Coolant leakage is within Tech.
Spec. limits (see Tech.
Spec. 3.4.3.2). {ITS 3.4.5)
EVENT 5 and 6 SRO Actions SRO PO-5.0 and 6.0 Updates crew and identifies the threshold DWP value that the CONSOLE OPERATOR reactor will be scrammed at when WHEN Mode Switch is placed in Shutdown , reached.
verify change in status of malfunction RR20 When DWP threshold is reached, RR20 RR Loop Rupture - DBA LOCA Value directs manual scram 10; Ramp Time 1O:OO minutes ET01 Receive and repeat back scram report ET01 Mode Switch in Shutdown.
Enters EOP-RPV on low RPV IF ET01 fails to trigger RR20 ......MANUALLY water level at 159 inches enter RR20, 1O%, Ramp Time 1O:OO minutes Directs initial level restored and maintained 160 inches to 200 inches with Feedwater, CRD, RClC (L-3)
Directs RPV pressure band 800 to 1000 psig with EHC in automatic using BPV (P-5)
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Enters EOP-PC on high Drywell pressure when DWP reaches 1.68 Psig May direct Suppression Chamber and Drwyell spray initiation. If this is directed, the SRO will have to redirect RHS for injection, when level drops below TAF -14 inches.
When loss of high pressure feed systems occurs determines RPV water level cannot be maintained above -14 inches (TAF)
May direct SLS injected from Boron Tank Transition to EOP-RPV at Directs ADS inhibited (L-5)
Detail E l Preferred Injection Systems Directs level restored and Condensate/Feedwater (tripped) maintained above -14 inches (Fig RClC (available) Z) with Preferred Injection Systems 0 HPCS (power loss) from Detail E l (L-6) 0 LPCS (not available) Are 2 or more Subsystems Detail F 0 LPCl (B and C only available) lineup? (L-7) YES; LPCl B and 0 RHS through Shutdown Cooling (RHS B LPCl c after depressurizing) WAIT until level drops to -14 inches (Fig Z) (L-9)
Is any Subsystems Detail F lineup Detail F Injection Subsystems with a pump running? (L-IO) YES; LPCl B and LPCl C CondensateIFeedwater (NO)
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0 HPCS(N0) Is any injection source lineup with 0 LPClA(N0) a pump running? (L-12) YES; LPCl 0 LPCl B (YES) B and LPCl C 0 LPCl C(YES)
LPCS(N0)
After applying Fuel Zone Correction using Fig 0 BEFORE water level drops to -39 Z, TAF -14 inches is abut -52 inches AND inches (Fig Z) .......ENTER EOP-MSCRWL -39 inches is about -72 inches at C2 RPV Blowdown while 800 psig. continuing here (EOP-RPV step L-16) 0 Executes EOP-C2 as follows:
0 Determines reactor WILL stay shutdown without boron (Step 2) 0 Drywell Pressure? Above 1.68 psig (Step 9)
Prevent LPCS and LPCl injection not needed for core cooling.
(Step IO) Current conditions require injection, so NO system injection is to be prevented.
0 Determines SPL is above 192 feet (Step 1I) 0 Directs all 7 ADS valves open (Step 12) 0 When all 7 ADS valves are reported open, continues in C2 to WAIT blocks (Step 16 then 17)
When RPV injection is established with RHS B 0 Continues EOP-RPV actions at and C systems, RPV water level will turn and step L-16 and directs RPV water be restored above -39 inches. After level is level restored and mainatained restored, SRO should direct RHR system A above -39 inches (Fig Z) with NRC Scenario 2 -31 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS lined up for Containment Spray Preferred Injection Systems from Detail E l RHS B and RHS C (LPCI) are to be injected (CT-2.0)
Determines RPV water level can be restored and maintained above
-14 inches (Fig Z) per Step L-4 override and returns to EOP-RPV at @
Directs RPV water level is restored and maintained 160 to 200 inches using RHS C and RHS B WHEN water level is restored above -14 inches, directs RHS B lined up for Containment Spray SRO Actions directed from EOP-PC These actions are directed from EOP-PC Directs RHR Loop B placed in Suppression Chamber Spray but only if pump is not needed fore core cooling.
WAIT until Suppression Chamber Pressure is above 10 psig Verify DW parameters are inside Drywell Spray Initiation Limit (EOP-PC Fig K)
Directs tripping RCS Pumps (Should already be tripped)
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS o Directs Drywell Unit Coolers tripped (Should already be tripped)
Directs RHS B lined up for Drywell Defeating Drywell Spray interlocks is Spray per EOP-6 Attachment 22 necessary due to Div II ECCS initiation logic Defeating Drywell Spray failure (malfunction RH14B). interlocks is necessary EVENT 5 and 6 ATC ROlBOP RO as ATC RO directed WHEN DWP reaches pre-PO-5.0 and PO-6.0 determined value and when directed by the SRO, places Mode Switch in Shutdown Provides scram report to SRO Performs Scram Actions per N2-SOP-101c Verify automatic responses:
All rods full in Rx power lowering Turbine tripped/TSVs &
TCVs shut Generator tripped and house loads transferred SDV Vents &Drain valves closed RCS pumps downshift RPV pressure on TBVs OR SRVs
. FWLC controlling level >
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 159.3 inches IF all Feedwater pumps have tripped THEN place all FWS-LVlO and 55 controllers in manual and verify valves are full closed IF scram cannot be reset, if directed by SRO closes RDS-V28 Charging Header lsol by dispatching operator.
Perform the following as time permits:
o Fully insert IRMs AND SRMs.
Energize 2WCS-MOVI 07 (2NHS-MCC008-2E).
If required, secure makeup to the Cooling Tower.
At 2CEC-PNL842, shutdown HWC.
IF WCS is in one pump three filter lineup.. ...THEN throttle close 2WCS*MOV200 (AND if required, throttle open 2WCS-MOVI I O ) to obtain approximately 225 gpm WCS flow.
Maintains RPV water level in directed band NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Reports NPS-SWG003 de-energized and resulting loss of Feedwater system BOP RO Actions performed as directed BOP RO When RPV level drops to 108 When RPV water level drops to 108.8 inches inches report RCIC start RClC starts and water Level 2 containment Inhibits ADS using 2 keylock isolation occurs. Standby Gas Treatment switches systems and Control Building Special Filter When DWP reaches 1.68 psig Trains start.
Inform SRO of EOP entry co nd ition EVENT 7 Division II Low Pressure ECCS Verify Div I1 ECCS systems Systems fail to start PO-7.0 start Report failure to start Manually start RHS C Pump (CT-2.0)
Manually start RHS B Pump (CT-2.0)
Report pumps started Opens all 7 ADS valves by arming and depressing ADS MANUAL INITIATION pushbuttons on P601 Reports 7 ADS valves are open Injects with systems to restore After RPV Blowdown, RHS Injection MOVs and maintain RPV water level in must be opened from P601 to establish directed band (CT-2.0) injection. When level begins to rise and RHS Via Shutdown Cooling L
transitions from Fuel Zone to Wide Range LPCl B (RHS), opens MOV24B instruments, action should be taken to NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
\
close RHS LPCl injection MOVs to prevent LPCl C (RHS), opens MOV24C overfilling the RPV (control level below 202 inches). This will also allow RHS B loop to be diverted to Containment Spray.
ZI When directed initiates Drywell Containment Spray Spray using RHS B per EOP-6 PO-8.0 Attachment 22 step 3.2.2 (2CEC*PNL60 7 ).
CONSOLE OPERATOR WHEN requested to defeat Drywell Spray IF Drywell spray valve interlocks valve interlocks per EOP-6 Attachment 22, WAIT 2 minutes then activate remote by are not met, defeat the depressing F8 key. Report the jumpers are RHS*MOV15B/25B interlock by installed performing the following:
RH48 2RHS*MOV15B EOP Jumper, TRUE F8 NOTE: Dispatches another operator RH50 2RHS*MOV25B EOP Jumper, TRUE to install jumpers F8 At 2CEC*PNL704A, install EOP Jumper #33 from terminal strip T C I 10, TI32 terminal 7 to terminal strip TC112, TB2 terminal 19.
(Figure 22-2) 0 At 2CEC*PNL704AI install EOP Jumper #34 from terminal strip TC108, T B I terminal 2 to terminal strip TC108, TB1 terminal 4.
(Figure 22-3)
NRC Scenario 2 -36 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE: Verifying SWP*MOVSOB open may be delayed until after sprays are in service.
0 Verify open SWP*MOVSOB, HEAT EXCHANGER 1B SVCE WTR INLET VLV 0 Verify closed AND IF possible overridden, RHS*MOV24B, LPCl B INJECTION VLV 0 Verify running RHS*PI B, PMP IB 0 IF Suppression Chamber Sprays are required concurrently with Drywell Sprays, perform the following:
0 Open RHS*MOV33B, OUTLET TO SUPPR POOL SPRAY Verify approximately 450 gpm on SUPPR SPRAY HEADER FLOW (2RHS*F/64B) 0 Verify closed, RHS*FV38B, RETURN TO SUPPR POOL COOLING 0 Verify open, RHS*MOV4B, PMP 1B MINIMUM FLOW VLV 0 Open RHS*MOV25B, OUTLET TO DRYWELL SPRAY Open RHS*MOVI 5B, OUTLET NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS TO DRYWELL SPRAY Verify closed, RHS*MOV4B, PMP 1B MINIMUM FLOW VLV Verify approximately 7450 gpm on DRYWELL SPRAY HEADER FLOW (2RHS*F/63B)
Verify open SWP*MOV90B, HEAT EXCHANGER 1B SVCE WTR INLET VLV Throttle open SWP*MOV33B, HEAT EXCHANGER 1B SVCE WTR OUTLET VLV to establish Service Water flow to RHR Heat Exchanger 1B of approximately 7400 gpm (12-R602B)
WHEN possible, close RHS*MOV8B, HEAT EXCHANGER 1B INLET BYPASS VLV CONSOLE OPERATOR When requested by BOP RO/ATC RO to place Request Rad Monitor radiation monitor SWP*RE23B in service (if SWP*RE23B placed in service.
not already in service), manually activate remotes, then report RE23B is in service:
RM02 SWP23B Rad Detector Online/Offline, ON RM03 SWP23B Process Monitor Sample Pump, ON TERM I NATION CRITERIA RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is L
maintained above TAF. Drywell Spray is initiated .
NRC Scenario 2 -38 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 8 SRO Admin JPM 5-2 SRO Classify the event as ALERT 3.1 .I Evaluator to perform SRO Admin JPM for emergency classification.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. After the second caucus, convene the crew in the classroom for a facilitative critique on:
1. What the crew saw and how they responded to each event?
2. Why the crew responded the way they did or their goal?
3. What went well during the scenario (STRENGTHS)?
4. What the crew could have done better (AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT)?
B. Ensure the expectations in each performance objective are discussed.
C. PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS (Attachment 7), that were not met, should be addressed.
D. Review the Critical Tasks if applicable.
E. At the conclusion, review the strengths and areas for improvement for improvement. Review video tape if appropriate.
F. Significant comments from the post scenario discussion should be recorded to allow later retrieval and follow-up.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events None B. Commitments
1. 10CFR55.45
2. 10CFR55.59 VII. LESSONS LEARNED None NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST
1. Additional Information about these checks:
For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.
For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.
2. Qualitative Attributes X ReaIism/CredibiIity X Event Sequencing X Simulator Modeling X Evaluating Crew Competencies 3.
2 Malfunctions after EOP Entry 3 Abnormal Events 1 Major Transients 2 EOPsUsed 1 EOP Contingency Procedures Used Simulator Run Time EOP Run Time 2 Crew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)
~~
4. Developmental Checks:
Does every event have either a Critical Task(s) or Performance Objective?
Is Criteria given for sequencing to subsequent events?
Is termination criteria clear and unambiguous?
Does termination criteria allow verification that all CT, PO standards are met?
Constellation Energy Group OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE
Title:
Emergency Classification for Scenario 2 Revision: NRC 2005 Task Number: 3440190303 Approvals:
NA EXAMINATION SECURITY Dale 1 General Supervisor Date Operations Training (Designee) Operations .(Designee)
NA EXAMINATION SECURITY Configuration Control Date Performer: (RO)
TrainedEvaluator:
Evaluation Method: PERFORM Evaluation Location: SIMULATOR FOLLOWING SCENARIO AS SRO Expected Completion Time: 15 minutes Time Critical Task: YES Alternate Path Task: NO Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:
JPM Overall Rating: Pass Fail NOTE: A JPM overall rating of fail shall be given if any critical step is graded as fail. Any grade of unsat or individual competency area unsat requires a comment.
Comments:
Evaluator Signature: Date:
NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-2 1 3/17/2005
Recommended Start Location: (Completion time based on the start location)
Simulator or other designated location.
Simulator Set-up:
N/A Directions to the Instructor/Evaluator To be performed as an administrative JPM.
Directions to Operators:
Read Before Every JPM Performance:
For the performance of this JPM, I will function as the SSS, CSO, and Auxiliary Operators. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary.
Read Before Each Evaluated JPM Performance:
This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Control Room Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional / concurrent verification will not be provided; therefore it should not be requested.
Read Before Each Traininq JPM Performance:
During this Training JPM, applicable methods of verification are expected to be used.
Therefore, either another individual or I will act as the additional / concurrent verifier.
Notes to Instructor / Evaluator:
1. Critical steps are identified as PasdFail. All steps are sequenced critical unless denoted by a ".".
2. During Evaluated JPM:
Self-verification shall be demonstrated.
3. During Training JPM:
0 Self-verification shall be demonstrated.
0 No other verification shall be demonstrated.
References:
1. EPIP-EPP-02, Classification of Emergency Conditions at Unit 2.
2. EPMP-EPP-0102, Unit 2 Emergency Classification Bases.
3. EPIP-EPP-18, Activation and Direction of the Emergency Plan.
4. NUREG K/A 2.4.40 Knowledge of the SROs responsibilities in emergency plan implementation (4.0).
Tools and Equipment:
1. None.
Task Standard: Scenario properly diagnosed and classified as an Alert NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-2 2 311 512005
Initial Conditions:
1. A LOCA has occurred causing a SCRAM on high DW pressure
2. NZ-EOP-C2 was performed to allow low pressure injection to recover RPV water level.
3. The lowest actual RPV water level during this event was -50 inches
4. Ask the operator for any questions Initiating Cue:
(Operators name), assume the role of the SM/ED and determine the emergency classification of this event.
I Performance Steps I Standard Grade Comments Evaluator Acknowledge repeat back repeat back (GAP-OPS-01) providing correction if necessary Start time is logged to determine total RECORD START TIME classification time.
2. .Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and review/utilize the correct section.
3. Primary Containment pressure has a Alert is declared per EAL 3.1.1. PasslFail The time elapsed between START TIME exceeded 1.68 psig. and determination MUST BE <Itiminutes to pass the JPM.
End of JPM TERMINATING CUE: Scenario properly diagnosed and classified as a Alert.
RECORD STOP TIME NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-2 3 311712005
Initial Conditions:
1. A LOCA has occurred causing a SCRAM on high DW pressure
2. N2-EOP-C2 was performed to allow low pressure injection to recover RPV water level.
3. The lowest actual RPV water level during this event was -50 inches
4. Ask the operator for any questions Initiating Cue:
(Operators name), assume the role of the SM/ED and determine the emergency classification of this event.
NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-2 4 311 512005
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont) 3.1 Containment Pressure 3.1.1 Alert Drywell pressure cannot be maintained c 3.5 psig due to coolant leakage NUMARC IC:
NIA FPB LosdPotential Loss:
RCS Loss Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Hot Shutdown Basis:
The primary containment pressure value is the drywell high pressure scram setpcint and is indicative of a LOCA event. The term "cannot be maintained below" is intended to be consistent with :he conditions specified in the Primary Containment Control EOP indicative of a high energy release into containment for which normal containment cooling systems are insufficient.
PEG Reference(s):
RCS2.1 Basis Reference($:
1. N1-ARP-F1, annunciator 1-5
2. N1-ARP-F4, annunciator 1-4
3. N1-EOP-4, Primary Containment Control Page 38 EPMP-EPP-0101 -
Rev 07
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 3 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 39 TRANSFER MODE SWITCH TO RUNKONTROL ROD DRIFT/UNISOLABLE RCIC STEAM LEAK WITH RPV BLOWDOWN PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 2/10/05 VAL IDATED R. Lanqe, B. Moore, M. Smith DATE 2/16/05 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE <//6,hk
/
OPE RATlONS MANAGER NA Exam Securitv DATE CON FIGURATlON CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months Initial Power Level: 4.5% with Mode Switch in STARTUP The scenario begins at about 4.5% reactor power, during plant startup. The crew will continue the startup by withdrawing control rods to raise power above 5% with subsequent Mode Switch transfer to RUN. IRM A failure due to an inop trip occurs resulting in a trip if RPS trip system A. The crew will bypass the failed instrument and reset the resulting RPS channel trip.
Feedwater Pump A minimum flow valve fails open with a concurrent failure of RPV Narrow Range level input to Feedwater Level Control System (FWLC). With the level transmitter failed as-is, an RPV water level transient results requiring crew to take manual control of level control valve to prevent an automatic protective trip function per N2-SOP-6. When level is stabilized the crew will then transfer to redundant Narrow Range transmitter per normal operating procedures and subsequently return FWLC to automatic control.
The startup now continues by withdrawing control rods to raise power to above 5% and the Mode Switch is transferred to RUN. The scenario can continue regardless of whether the crew actually places the Mode Switch to RUN. Control Rod 34-27 will drift out. N2-SOP-8 will be executed to fully insert and isolate the control rod. With power level below RWM setpoint the RWM must be bypassed to insert the drifting rod. Service Water Pump A trips occurs requiring a standby pump to be placed in service.
The major transient begins when a RClC Steam Leak into Reactor Building occurs. Automatic and manual attempts to isolate the RClC steam line will be unsuccessful. Entry in EOP-SC is required and the reactor will be manually scrammed. Reactor Building Ventilation System fails to isolate on high radiation level. This requires action to close Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers and
\
manually start Standby Gas Treatment systems to terminate a potential ground level release pathway. When Reactor Building temperatures exceed 212°F an RPV Blowdown is required. EHC NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
Pump A trips to disable the Bypass Valves as a means of rapidly reducing RPV pressure to mitigate the steam leak. ADS/SRV PSV 126 fails to open during RPV Blowdown due to Loss of N2 supply, requiring operator action to open an additional SRV to obtain the number directed by EOP-c2.
Major Procedures Exercised: EOP-RPV, SC, C-2. N2-SOP-6 and N2-SOP-8 EAL Classification: SAE 3.4.1Main Steam Line, RClC steam line or Reactor Water Cleanup isolation failure AND release pathway, outside normal process system flowpaths from unisolable system exists outside primary containment SAE 4.1.I Primary system is discharging into RB resulting in RB area temperatures >212"Fin more than one area, N2-EOP-SC Termination Criteria:RPV Blowdowrr is complete and RPV level is maintained above TAF NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-10 or equivalent.
RWM Step29 Pull rods to raise power to about 4.5%. Initial IC power level is 2.5%. Start of RWM step 31 will result in the proper initial scenario power level.
Remote MS03 Cond Low Vac Bypass OFF Reset CSH HI WTR LEVEL SEAL IN Place EHC Pump B (TME-P1B) in P-T-L and hang red clearance tag on control switch.
B. Presets/Function Key Assignments
1. Malfunctions:
a. PC06, Secondary Containment Isolation Failure, TRUE QUEUED
b. RCI 1, RClC Isolation Failure, TRUE QUEUED
c. AD08C, ADS Valve N Supply Severed (MSS*PSV126), TRUE QUEUED
d. NMOSG, IRM Channel Failure INOP (A), TRUE F3
e. FW30A, Reactor NR Level Transmitter Failure As Is (4A), TRUE F4
f. FW 16A, FW Pump Recirc Valve Failure Open (FVZA), TRUE F4 TUA 3 seconds
g. RD05 3427, Control Rod Failure Drift Out, TRUE F5
h. CWOIA Service Water Pump Trip A, TRUE F6
i. RC12, RClC Steam Leak in RB 215 Elevation 25% Ramp Time 10 minutes F8
j. RC12, RClC Steam Leak in RB 215 Elevation 60% F9
k. TC15A, EHC Pump A Trip, TRUE ET02 I. TC15B, EHC Pump B Trip, TRUE ET02
2. Remotes:
a. MS03 Cond Low Vac Bypass OFF QUEUED
3. Overrides:
a. MOV 121, Switch Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard), OPEN Queued
b. MOV 128, Switch Steam Supply Line Isolation (Inboard), OPEN Queued
c. MOV 128, Light Steam Supply Inboard Isolation INOP Amber, ON F7
d. MOV 128, Light Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Green, OFF F7 NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
e. MOV 128, Light Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Red, OFF F7
f. MOV 121, Light Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Green, ON ET01
g. MOV 121, Light Not Fully OPEN, Amber , ON ET0 1
4. Annunciators:
a. AN601305 RClC System Inoperable, ON F7
b. AN601 319, RClC Valves Motor Overload, ON F7 C. Equipment Out of Service
a. TMB-PI B EHC Pump B in P-T-L with red clearance on control switch D. Support Documentation
a. N2-OP-IOIA, Plant Startup complete through E.3.3 E. Miscellaneous
1. EVENT TRIGGERS
a. ET01 ANN 601 157 RB GEN TEMP HIGH IN ALARM (Event Trigger 68)
When alarm actuates this results in indications of cause of the isolation failure.
b. ET02 650 psig PAM A (Event Trigger 001). Trips EHC pump resulting in loss of Turbine Bypass Valves.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
II SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA)
Lit Control Room Annunciators 0 Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
(SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
0 Reactor Power = 4.5% approx RWM Step31 0 RPV Pressure 925 psig 0 Bypass Valve #1 is full open and #2 is partially open 0 Feedwater Pumr, A in service with FWS-LV55A in AUTO (HICI 37) 0 EHC Pump B is out of service for motor repair. Red clearance issued.
Scheduled return to service date is May 20.
PART 111: RemarkslPlanned Evolutions:
0 Continue plant startup to place the reactor mode switch to RUN per N2-OP-101A.
Currently at step E.3.3 PART IV: To be reviewedlaccomplishedshortly after assuming the shift:
0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS) 0 SRO ATC RO ~
BOP RO NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
Scenario ID#
INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened? 0the r 0ptions?
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1 .O Given a condition requiring automatic isolation of Secondary Containment and a failure of Ventilation isolation, the crew will manually isolate the reactor building by closing Secondary Containment isolation dampers and start GTS, within 5 minutes of d iscovery.
CT-2.0 Given an unisolable RClC steam leak and secondary containment temperature approaching maximum safe values in one area, the crew will enter EOP-RPV and initiate a manual reactor scram before performing an RPV Blowdown.
CT-3.0 Given an unisolable RClC steam leak and secondary containment temperature above maximum safe values in more than one area, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown per EOP-C2.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-I .o Given the plant during startup and an IRM INOP trip, the crew will bypass the failed IRM and reset RPS trip systems per N2-OP-92 and N2-OP-97.
PO-2.0 Given a failed open Feedwater pump minimum flow valve with RPV level instrument failure resulting in lowering RPV water level, the crew will manually control level to avoid a reactor scram per N2-SOP-6 and N2-0P-3.
PO-3.0 Given the reactor plant during startup and a control rod drifting out, the crew will fully insert and disarm the control rod per N2-SOP-8.
PO-4.0 Given a Service Water Pump trip the crew will start a standby pump to restore the plant to 4 operating pumps per N2-OP-11 NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
PO-5.0 Given a RClC steam leak and temperatures approaching 212OF, the crew will manually scram per N2-EOP-SC and EOP-RPV.
PO-6.0 Given a RClC steam leak and temperatures in two areas exceeding 212OF, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown per N2-EOP-C2.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Crew 0 Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.
SRO Directs plant startup continued ATC RO The crew continues the startup per N2-OP- Continue to withdraw control rods 101A E.3.3 (EVENTS 3 and 4)
UNTIL APRM downscale lights have cleared.
Verify APRMs reading greater than 5% by placing IRM/APRM recorder select switch to APRM.
In EACH Reactor Protection Division leave one IRM/APRM recorder select switch placed in the APRM position.
EVENT 1 IRM A Failure h o p Trip PO-I .o CONSOLE OPERATOR SRO When power is above 5% or when directed by Acknowledges report of IRM A Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by INOP trip and RPS A half scram depressing F3 key: Directs IRM A bypassed NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Directs RPS trip system A reset NMOSA, IRM CHANNEL FAILURE-INOP (A), Notifies Operations and Plant TRUE, (F3) Management I R M A channel fails upscale resulting in RPS Contacts WEC SRO for assistance trips system A trip. On left side of P603, the 4 and work planning white RPS scram lights are off. For IRMA the Enters Tech Spec 3.3.1 . I RPS RED UPSC TR OR lNOP light is on, indicating Function 1 IRMs. No action is the effected channel. Rod withdrawal block. required since only 1 IRM channel is inoperable. (NOTE Also see The following annunciators alarm: TRM 3.3.2 Control Rod Block 603102 RPS A NMS TRIP Instrumentation Function 2) 6031 I O RPS A AUTO TRIP Conducts post event brief 603201 IRM TRIP SYSTEM A UPSCALE/INOPERABLE May place startup activities on hold 603442 CONTROL ROD OUT BLOCK to resolve IRM failure ATC RO Identifies and reports annunciators to SRO Implements ARP 603102 actions.
6031 10 actions are similar.
These are 603102 actions IF a SCRAM has occurred, THEN enter N2-SOP-101C, Reactor Scram. (Scram should NOT have occurred)
IF NO SCRAM has occurred, THEN perform the following:
Check the other IRM channels to verify that NO SCRAM should have occurred.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0 IF a SCRAM should have occurred, THEN enter the Emergency Operating Procedures.
(Scram should NOT have occurred)
IF NO SCRAM should have occurred, THEN perform the following:
Troubleshoot AND correct the cause of the alarm.
Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
IF desired, THEN bypass the applicable IRM per N2-OP-92.
WHEN the initiating signal is cleared OR bypassed, THEN reset the half SCRAM per N2-OP-97.
ATC RO These are 603201 actions At P603 determine by red UPSCLANOP light which IRM channel is tripped. (Determines IRM A is INOP)
NRC Scenario 3 -11 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Verify associated range switch setting is correct.
Consult with S.S.S. and bypass faulty channel.
ATC RO Bypass IRM A ATC RO These actions are taken to bypass IRM A, when directed CAUTION Bypass joysticks can become electrically misaligned after numerous bending motions due to "Metal Creep". Any bypass function should be verified by channel BYPASS lights to ensure that only the intended channel is bypassed.
Verify NO other IRM in bypass for the instrument to be bypassed.
Place the IRM BYPASS joystick to the bypass position.
When IRM is bypassed the following IF IRM A was bypassed, THEN ann unciators clear: verify the IRM A BYPASS light is lit 603102 RPS A NMS TRIP on 2CEC*PNL603 OR H13-P606 603201 IRM TRIP SYSTEM A UPSCALE/INOPERABLE 603442 CONTROL ROD OUT BLOCK NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
ATC RO Reset of Tripped Protective System ATC RO Channel (RESET HALF SCRAM) These actions are taken to reset the RPS trip, when directed Determine which protective channel is tripped by verifying which SCRAM solenoid lights on 2CEC*PNL603 are de-energized.
At 2CEC*PNL603, reset SCRAM signals by momentarily placing the When RPS A trip system is reset the following applicable switches to RESET as PILOT SCRAM VALVE SOLENOID white follows:
lights A, C, E AND G light and 6031 10 RPS A For RPS A:
AUTO TRIP clears.. REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC A REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC C Verify PILOT SCRAM VALVE SOLENOID white lights A, C, E AND G are lit.
EVENT 2 Feedwater Pump A Minimum Flow Valve fails open with RPV Narrow Range A level transmitter failed as is. PO-2.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate ATC RO malfunction by depressing F4 key: Reports alarms Monitors RPV water level and FWIGA, FW PUMP RECIRC VALVE identifies difference between RX
- FAILURE - OPEN (FVZA), TRUE LEVEL NARROW RANGE A indicator and B and C indicators NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS FW30A, REACTOR NR LEVEL 01 Determines FWR-FV2A is ramped TRANSMITTER FAILURE - A S IS (C33- to 100% open N004A), TRUE 0 Enter SOP-6 due to lowering water level 0 Places FWS-LIK1055A (LV55A) to manual RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE A indicator is now failed at current value of about 183 0 Restores water level as directed.
inches. Feedwater Pump A minimum flow (178 to 187 inches) valve opens diverting feedflow from the RPV. 0 Determines RX LEVEL NARROW RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE B and RX RANGE A indicator is LEVEL NARROW RANGE C indicators slowly malfunctioning. Recommends lower. With A failed, FWLC does not changeover to RX LEVEL compensate for the transient. NARROW RANGE B 0 If directed, inserts control rods to lower power The following annunciator alarm: 0 Per N2-OP-3 F.8.5, change 851456 CNST SYSTEM TROUBLE/ NO BACKUP PMP Narrow Range Level Instruments AVAILABLE as follows:
851457 CNST BSTR PMP SYS TROUBLE/NO BACKUP IF B Level Instrument is PMP AVAILABLE required, place LEVEL A/B 851546 CNST PUMP DISCH HEADER FLOW LOW CONTROL switch REACTOR WTRLEVEL C33A-SI in LEVEL B position NOTE:
May have to prompt SRO to use N2-OP-3 0 As directed, place FWLC in auto steps E.3.27 - E.3.30 to place FWLC in AUTO (N2-0P-3 E.3.27 - E.3.30) with HlCl37 controlling FWS-LV55A. Adjust adjust 2CNM-HICI 37, FEEDWATER LO FLOW NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 3PERATOR ACTIONS CONTROLLER, tape setpoint to obtain equal signals as read in the input (vertical) AND output (horizontal) signal on 2FWS-LV55A(B) controller.
Verify 2CNM-HICI 37 indicator is in the green band.
Depress Auto (A) pushbutton on 2FWS-LV55A(B) controller.
Verify that Reactor water level is being maintained at the desired set point.
3RO 7 Directs entry into SOP-6 due to malfunctioning FWLC 3 Determines RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE A instrument is inoperable LI Refers toTech Spec 3.3.2.2 for Feedwater System and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation LCO 3.3.2.2 Three channels of feedwater system and main turbine high water level trip nstrumentation shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: THERMAL POWER 1 2 5 % RTP.
No action is required since power is below 25%.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE: May direct control rods inserted to May have to prompt SRO to use N2-0P-3 lower power steps E.3.27 - E.3.30 to place FWLC in AUTO Directs FWLC system placed on with HlCl37 controlling FWS-LV55A. RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE A instrument and FWLC returned to automatic control per N2-OP-3 Notifies Operations and Plant Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning Conducts post event brief Note: Events 3 and 4 were performed in parallel with malfunction related events.
EVENT 5 PO-3.0 Control Rod 34-27 Drift CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F5 key:
RD05 3427, Control Rod Failure Drift Out, TRUE F5 SRO Directs entry into N2-SOP-8 Control Rod 34-27 slowly drifts outward and 0 Provides reactivity oversight power slowly rises. RWM Display indicates 0 Refer to TS 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 34-27 is drifting out. C Refer to TS 3.1.5, Control Rod The following annunciators alarm Scram Accumulator Operability.
603307 RWM ROD BLOCK 1 Notifies Operations and Plant 603443 CONTROL ROD DRIFT Management 0 Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning 0 Conducts post event brief 0 May place startup continuation on hold to resolve current equipment deficiencies.
ATC RO Reports alarms and implements Annunciator 603443 actions Determine whether alarm is valid by checking the Full Core Display AND Four Rod Display.
IF alarm is valid, enter N2-SOP-08, Unplanned Power Changes, AND execute concurrently with this ARP.
Refer to N2-OP-95A, F.3.0, Rod Drift Indication, to reset Drift alarm.
Note 0 Enters N2-SOP-8 Crew initiates N2-SOP-8 flowchart decision IF More than one control rod blocks by answering YES/NO questions. has scrammed OR drifted, THEN SCRAM the reactor per N2-SOP-101C. Scram not required, only 1 rod is drifting NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 3PERATOR ACTIONS
~
Power change due to Recirc FCV motion? NO Power on APRMs rising OR expected to rise? YES Reduce Reactor power to approximately 85% per N2-SOP-I01 D. NA, Power is below 5%
Monitor Offgas AND Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors for evidence of Fuel Element Failure.
IF Cause due to Control Rod Drift ....THEN Continue at A (of SOP-8)
ATC RO These are Aactions C Identify which control rod is drifting and in what direction CR IN / OUT 1 Using INSERT pushbutton, fully insert drifted control rod.
Bypass the RWM if necessary.
Uses keylock switch and Rod will insert to full in after bypassing RWM bypasses RW M.
and using INSERT pushbutton. 0 Can control rod be fully inserted? YES After releasing the insert pushbutton, the rod 13 Release the insert pushbutton.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
~
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS will drift out again.
Did the control rod remain fully inserted? NO Depress and hold INSERT CONSOLE OPERATOR pushbutton to maintain control When dispatched to isolate HCU 34-27, rod fully inserted.
manually enter REMOTE : When control rod is fully inserted, close the following RD08 34-27, HCU Isolation for Inserted Rod valves at the HCU for the Wait one minute, then report HCU 34-27 drifting control rod.
isolated. 2RDS*V103
................................................ 2RDS*V105 CAUTION FOR CONSOLE OPERATOR Release INSERT pushbutton.
IF Instructor Station locks up with REMOTE Is the control rod drifting out?
RD08 core grid displayed THEN select rod 31- NO 18 on the map. This should release the grid and allow continued console operation.
After isolating the HCU, and the INSERT IF required, disarm the control pushbutton is released, 34-27 no longer drifts rod per N2-OP-30.
out. With rod fully inserted, A PRM power is Refer to TS 3.1.3, Control Rod lower. Annunciator 6032 I5 A PRM TRIP Operability.
SYSTEM DOWNSCALE may alarm WHEN directed by the SM, exit intermittently (at 4%). this procedure.
Refer to TS 3.1 5,Control Rod Scram Accumulator Operability.
Contact Maintenance for troubleshootlrepair plan as required.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 6 Service Water Pump A Trip PO40 CONSOLE OPERATOR When power directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F6 key: SRO CWOIA, Service Water Pump Trip (PIA), Refers to Tech Spec TRUE, (W 3.7.1 Service Water (SW) System Service Water (SWP) Pump A trips. Flows rise and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) on the remaining operating S WP pumps.
LCO 3.7.1 Division 1 and 2 SW The following annunciators alarm: subsystems and UHS shall be 601 I 13 Service Water Pump lA/1 C/lE PUMP OPERABLE.
AUTO TRIP/FAIL TO START AND 601 114 Service Water Pump lA/IC/IE Motor/ Four OPERABLE SW pumps Feeder Electrical Fault. shall be in operation.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 Role Play CONDITION E. One required SW IF dispatched to perform prestart checks when pump not in operation.
starting pump per N2-0P-I 1 E.2.0, WAIT REQUIRED ACTION E . l Restore about 2 minutes and report ready to start the required SW pump to operation.
standby pump. COMPLETION TIME 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS!
PLANT RESPONSE 3PERATOR ACTIONS Notifies Operations and Plant Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning Conducts post event brief BOP RO Recognizes and reports condition of the SWP*PIA tripped to the SRO.
Performs actions required by N2-ARP-01,601113 (or 601 114 actions are the same):
IF required, throttle 2SW P*MOV74A(B,C,D,E,F) to maintain running SWP Pump flow 10,000 gpm. (Pumps 3, C and D will require throttling)
Start additional Service Water Pumps, as required, at P601 as follows:
IF time permits per N2-OP-11 Section E.2.0, OR Place associated pump control switch to START Role Play: As the AO, wait three minutes and Place the tripped Service Water report that Service Water Pump PIA, 86- Pump control switch in "PULL-lockout relay is tripped. TO-LOCK", at P601.
Notifies SRO to refer to Technical Specifications.
Dispatches A 0 to investigate the cause of P I A trip.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTO R ACT IONSI PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Reopen any MOV74s previously throttled EVENT 7 SRO Tech Spec 21CS*MOVI 28 Breaker Trip, Containment Isolation Valve Failed Open CONSOLE OPERATOR:
When directed by the Lead Evaluator, insert the following overrides for ICS*MOV128 breaker trip, by depressing F7 key:
MOV*128, Steam Supply Line Isolation (Inboard) Green OFF MOV*128, Steam Supply Line Isolation BOP RO (Inboard) Red OFF Recognizes and reports RClC MOV*128, Steam Supply Inboard Isolation - Inboard Isolation Valve failure.
INOP Amber ON These are 601305 actions AN601 305, RClC System Inoperable ON At 2CEC*PNL6OI1determine IF AN601 319, RClC Valve Motor Overload any INOP Status Lights are ON energized.
7 IF any INOP Status Lights are All on F7 energized, refer to their applicable MOV*128 Steam Supply Line Isolation Alarm Response Procedure.
(Inboard) - OPEN Queued J Determines INOP status light lit for TURB STM SPLY INBD ISOL VLV ICS*MOVI28 NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 3PERATOR ACTIONS These are MOV128 h o p Status light actions Using the energized red OR green indicating lights, confirm power 0 available to ICS*MOV128, TURBINE STM SUPPLY INBOARD ISOL VLV.
0 IF power is NOT available, dispatch an operator to 2EHS*MCC302.
Confirm 2EHS*MCC302 Bkr. 14A, 21CS*MOVI 28 Power Supply, is ON.
SRO Acknowledges BOP RO report.
Refers to T.S. 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation failure.
From Bases B.3.6.1.3 The power operated, automatic isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits and actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO are listed with their associated stroke times in Ref. 1. (TRM)
CONDITION A One or more penetration flow paths with one PClV inoperable except due to leakage not NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 3PERATOR ACTIONS within limit.
REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.
COMPLETION TIME (for A . l ) 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months except for main steam line.
(Determines penetration must be isolated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .)
AND REQUIRED ACTION A.2 Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.
COMPLETION TIME (for A.2) Once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment Refer to TRM If necessary TRM 3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Valves The Primary Containment Isolation Valves and, if applicable, valve groups, isolation signals, and isolation times are listed in Table T3.6.1-2.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS May enter Tech. Spec. 3.5.3 for RClC inoperable.
Notifies Operations and Plant Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning Conducts post event brief Role Play: When dispatched by the BOP RO, ask for panel and breaker numbers.
Wait two (2) minutes and report breaker in the tripped condition. No cause is apparent.
EVENT 8 and 9 Unisolable RClC Steam Reactor Building Ventilation Fails to isolate CONSOLE OPE RAT0R:
After Tech Specs are reviewed by the SRO for MOV*128 failure or when directed by Lead Evaluator, insert the following malfunction by depressing F8 key:
RC12, RClC Steam Leak in Reactor Building, 25% over 10 minute ramp F8 BOPRO Check DRMS CRT Display to The following annunciator alarms: determine RB HVR*RE32A/B 851254 Process Airborne Rad Monitor alarming.
Activated These are 851254 Corrective Actions On High Radiation Level Verify Automatic Response has NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE DPERATOR ACTIONS occurred, as applicable.
L Gaseous Rad Level High initiates the following (CT-1.0, also Malfunction PC06 becomes active redirected from EOP-SC):
PC06, Secondary Containment Isolation RX Bldg Vent Emergency Failure, TRUE
UC413A(B) starts. Suction Test DMPR*AOD34A(B) will be open after manual start.
Reactor Building Ventilation fails to isolate Shuts RX Bldg Ventilation Supp Air Is01 DMPR *AODIAIB.
Shuts RX Bldg Ventilation Exh Air lsol DMPR *AODSAIB.
Shuts RX Bldg Ventilation Refuel Area Exh Air Is01 DMPR
AODI ONB.
Initiates Standby Gas Treatment Filter Train A or B Start Signal.
0 Identify Area affected, and verify level reading.
0 Refer to Emergency Plan Procedure EPIP-EPP-21.
Evacuates Reactor Building, when directed.
0 Refer to N2-EOP-SC (SRO).
Event 8 SRO enters and directs EOP-SC -
SRO actions. Enters and directs actions per EOP-SC when HVR Exhaust radiation is above an isolation setpoint (HVR*RE32A/B exceed DRMS Red setpoint)
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
IF HVR Exhaust radiation exceeds an isolation setpoint THEN verify (Override SC-1) (CT-1.O)
HVR isolates HVR*UC413A or B starts GTSstarts HVR Unit Coolers start IF any area temperature is above Annunciator 601 I57 Reactor Building General the isolation setpoint THEN GO to Areas Temperature High is received and RClC 28 (Step SC-2)
Steam Line should isolate as temperature rises Isolate all discharges into affected above 135OF. WCS system isolates. WHEN areas except systems needed for 601 157, Reactor Building General Areas fire fighting or other EOP actions Temperature High is received, Event Trigger (Step SC-4)
ET01 activates:
Directs BOP RO to MOV*121, Steam Supply Line Isolation manually isolate RClC (Outboard) - Green - ON Steam Line.
MOV*121, Not Fully Open - Amber - ON IF primary system is discharging ET01 into the Reactor Building (YES MOV*121 Steam Supply Line Isolation RCIC, Conditional Step SC-(Outboard) - OPEN Queued 4) ....THEN GO to 29 (Prevents valve from closing)
MOV*128 has no power and MOV*121 appears to be closing.
However, RClC steam line pressure stay up and temperatures in the area are still rising.
Thus, no isolation of the RClC Steam Line has occurred. Fire panel 849107 FIRE DETECTED PNL 103 SE QUAD 215 alarms as a result of steam discharging into the area.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE IPERATOR ACTIONS 1 BEFORE any area temperature reaches Maximum Safe Value (Detail S; 212°F) (Step SC-7 and SCS) ....ENTER RPV Control, while continuing in EOP-SC (CT-Event 8 SRO enters and directs EOP-RPV 2.0) a c tions. rhese actions are directed by the SRO from EOP-RPV 7 ENTERSCRAMPROCEDURE N2-SOP-101C, while continuing in EOP-RPV (Step 3)
I Executes LEVEL and PRESSURE legs concurrently EOP-RPV Detail E l Systems LEVEL ACTIONS DIRECTED BY CondensatelFeedwater SRO CRD Restore and maintain RPV water RClC level between 159.3 inches and HPCS 202.3 inches using one or more 0 LPCS Preferred Injection Systems (Detail 0 LPCl E l ) Step L-3. SRO should direct RHS through Shutdown Cooling control between I59 to 200 inches.
IF level cannot be restored and EOP-RPV Detail E2 Systems maintained above 159.3 RHS Service Water Crosstie inches.. ..THEN maintain level Fire Systems above -14 inches (Fig Z)
ECCS Keep-Full OK to augment with Alternate SLS, test tank Injection systems if needed SLS, boron tank (Detail E2) (Use of these is Condensate Transfer NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE IPERATOR ACTIONS NOT expected)
'RESSURE ACTIONS DIRECTED 3Y SRO I IF RPV Blowdown (EOP-C2) is anticipated.. ...THEN Rapidly depressurize the RPV using the Main Turbine Bypass Valves. OK to exceed 100"Flhr cooldown.
(Step P-1 Override). (This is an expected action because EOP-C2 will be necessary due to rising Reactor Building temperatures).
3 Is any SRV Cycling? NO (Step P-2) 7 Stabilize RPV Pressure below 1052 psig using Main Turbine Bypass Valves. (Step P-4). SRO should direct control between 800 to 1000 psis with BPVs.
0 Use Alternate Pressure Control Systems, if needed.
Restore pneumatics to drywell, if necessary.
WAIT until shutdown cooling pressure interlock clears 128 psig (Step P-7) BEFORE proceeding to Step P-8. While in Step P-7 orsooner, the SRO will likely return to EOP-SC actions and may be waiting for 2 areas to reach 212°F NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO enters and directs EOP-SC actions. These actions are directed by SRO when returning to EOP-SC 0 WAIT until 2 or more areas are above Maximum Safe Value for the same parameter (Step SC-9 and IO), THEN proceed to SC-10 to enter EOP-C2.
Event 8 BOP RO Actions BOP RO Recognize and reports increasing area temperatures and in the At back panel L DS Temperature Monitoring Reactor Building.
Panels P632 and P642 the first area in alarm Uses EOP-6 Attachment 28 to and to reach 212 F monitor and report temperature E31-N619A and N620A conditions.
31-N619B and N620B Confirms WCS and RHR isolation.
Reports failure of RClC to automatically isolate.
Attempts to manually isolate the RClC Steam Line by closing MOV*121 using keylock switch.
Monitors back panels for trending area temperatures and radiation levels.
Reports levels and trends to the SRO.
IF directed to rapidly depressurize the RPV using the Main Turbine Bypass Valves, opens all 5 BPVs using the BYPASS JACK INCREASE pushbutton. OK to If anticipating RPV Blowdown, all 5 BPVs are exceed 1OO°F/hr cooldown. (Step NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 3PERATOR ACTIONS opened. RPV pressure lowers. RPV pressure P-I Override). (This is an expected drops to about 650 psig, the following action because EOP-C2 will be malfunction activate from ET02: necessary due to rising Reactor T C I 5A, EHC Pump A Trip, TRUE Building temperatures).
TC15B, EHC Pump B Trip, TRUE Reports trip of EHC pumps and loss of BPVs, if used for rapid EHC Pump A trips and as EHC pressure depressurization.
lowers, the BPVs will close to to loss of fluid pressure.
ATC RO Event 8 ATC RO Scram Actions These are N2-SOP-101C Scram Actions IF Automatic Scram is anticipated AND time permits.. ... .THEN Reduce Recirc Flow to 55 mlbm/hr per N2-SOP-101D. (NA, at 4%
power)
IF Mode switch is NOT in REFUEL position .....THEN Place MODE Switch to SHUTDOWN position . (CT-2.0) 0 Provides Scram report to SRO IF RPS is NOT tripped.. ....THEN Arm AND depress BOTH Manual Scram pushbuttons on either side of 2CEC*PNL603. (NA, RPS trips)
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 3PERATOR ACTIONS 0 Verify automatic responses.
All rods full in Rx power lowering Turbine tripped/TSVs & TCVs shut Generator tripped and house loads transferred SDV V&D valves closed RCS pumps downshift RPV pressure on TBVs OR SRVs FWLC controlling level > 159.3" 0 IF All feedwater pumps have tripped.. .THEN Place ALL 2FWS-LVlO and LV55 controllers to "manual" and verify the valves are full closed.
IF the Reactor scram can be promptly reset (and remain reset). ... THEN Reset the scram.
IF the Reactor scram CANNOT be reset....THEN Close 2RDS-VZ8 if directed by the SM/CRS.
0 Performs LEVEL control actions as directed by SRO from EOPs 0 Performs PRESSURE control actions as directed by SRO from EOPs 0 WHILE continuing, perform the following as time permits:
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
___ - ~~ - _ _ _
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Fully insert IRMs AND SRMs.
Energize 2WCS-MOVI 07 (2NHS-MCC008-2E).
If required, secure makeup to the Cooling Tower.
At 2CEC-PNL842, shutdown HWC.
IF WCS is in one pump three filter lineup.. ..THEN Throttle close 2WCS*MOV200 (AND if required, throttle open 2WCS-MOVI I O ) to obtain approximately 225 gpm WCS flow.
IF Feedwater Pumps trip on high level (above These actions are used to restart a 202.3 inches), an FWS Pump Restart can be tripped Fedwater pump, if directed performed per N2-SOP-101C, Level Control Is at least 1 condensate pump Actions Detail 1. Since RPV pressure will drop running? YES below 500 psig during the scenario (RPV Verify the following:
Blowdown), Condensate Booster Pump Out of service condensate, injection can be used instead of Feedpump booster and feedpumps in PTL.
restart. 2 condensate pumps running.
2 booster pumps running.
2FWR-FV2s closed.
The following controllers in manual with 0% output:
2FWS-HIC55s 2FWS-HlC1010~
2FWS-HIC1600
. 0 IF required, reset Level 8 NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
____ ~~ ~
~
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
pushbuttons.
Start feedwater pump as follows:
0 Confirm suction pressure > 500 psi.
0 Verify aux oil pump running.
0 Place pump switch to red flag.
0 WHEN 2FWS-FV2A/B/C - 15%
open, confirm pump start.
0 Confirm flow - 8000 gpm.
0 Inject with 2FWS-LV55NB (open 2FWS-VI 03A/B if required) 0 OR verify open 2FWS- MOV47 A/B/C AND inject with ZFWS-LV1OA/B/C as required.
0 IF required, reset setpoint setdown per N2-OP-3, H.l .O.
0 For automatic control, refer to N2-OP-3, H.9.12 OR H.9.13.
0 Verify aux oil pump stops.
Event 10 Second Area Temperature reaches 212°F Second area temperature reaches 212 F (31-N601E and N601F). RPV Blowdown is required.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS!
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event 10 BOP RO actions BOP RO Report second area temperature reaching 21 2°F.
If required restore pneumatics to drywell At P851 IAS*SOV166 and 184 At P601 IAS *SOV164 and 165 When directed, open seven (7)
ADS / SRVs by using keylock switch for EACH ADS valve at control room back panel P631 and P628. (CT-3.0)
Recognizes and reports failed ADS
/ SRV to the SRO.
Open additional non-ADS SRV from P601 control switch to achieve 7 open valves.
Event 10 SRO enters and directs EOPC2 These actions are directed by the actions. SRO from EOP-C2 Will the reactor stay shutdown without boron? YES all rods are fully inserted (Step 2)
Drywell Pressure? Below 1.68 psig (Step 9, then bypass step IO)
Suppression Pool Level?
Above El 192 ft (Step 11)
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 10 ADS Valve fails to open 0 Open all 7 ADS Valves (Step 12)
(CT-3.O)
When ADS Valves are opened AD08C, ADS OK to exceed 10O0F/hr Valve NZsupply severed becomes active. 0 Restore pneumatics to drywell if necessary PSV 126 does not indicate open at P601, even Per Ops Manual, with no RHS though back panel indication is that the valve pumps running, opening the 7 opened (ADS solenoid is energized). ADS valves is performed by placing individual keylock switch for EACH ADS valve to open at control room back panel P631 and P628.
0 Can all 7 ADS Valves be opened?
NO (Step 13) 0 Open other SRVs until a total of 7 are open (Step 14)
WAIT until shutdown cooling pressure interlock clears 128 psig (Step 16) BEFORE proceeding to Step 17.
TERM INAT10 N C RITERIA RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is maintained above TAF.
NOTE SRO Classification is not required because Surrogate SRO is used in this scenario.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE
- A. NA. NRC Exam VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events None B. Commitments
1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST
1. Additional Information about these checks:
For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.
For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.
2.
X Realism/Credibility X Event Sequencing X Simulator Modeling X Evaluating Crew Competencies 3.
6 Total Malfunctions 2 Malfunctions after EOP Entry 2 Abnormal Events I 1 I Major Transients I 2 IEOPsUsed 1 EOP Contingency Procedures Used NA Simulator Run Time I
NA IEOP Run Time I 2 ICrew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)
4. Developmental Checks:
Does every event have either a Critical Task(s) or Performance Objective?
Is Criteria given for sequencing to subsequent events?
Is termination criteria clear and unambiguous?
Does termination criteria allow verification that all CT, PO standards are met?
Constellation Energy Group OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE
Title:
Emergency Classification for Scenario 3 Revision: NRC 2005 Task Number: 3440190303 Approvals:
NA EXAMINATION SECURITY G&&ral flpervisor Dgte I General Supervisor Date Operations Training (Designee) Operations -(Designee)
NA EXAMINATION SECURITY Configuration Control Date Performer: (RO)
Trainer/Evaluator:
Evaluation Method: PERFORM Evaluation Location: SIMULATOR FOLLOWING SCENARIO AS SRO Expected Completion Time: 15 minutes Time Critical Task: YES Alternate Path Task: NO Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:
JPM Overall Rating: Pass Fail NOTE: A JPM overall rating of fail shall be given if anv critical step is graded as fail. Any grade of unsat or individual competency area unsat requires a comment.
Comments:
Evaluator Signature: Date:
NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-3 1 311712005
Recommended Start Location: (Completion time based on the start location)
Simulator or other designated location.
Simulator Set-up:
\ .
N /A Directions to the Instructor/Evaluator To be performed as an administrative JPM.
Directions to Operators:
Read Before Everv JPM Performance:
For the performance of this JPM, I will function as the SSS, CSO, and Auxiliary Operators. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cuesas necessary.
Read Before Each Evaluated JPM Performance:
This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Control Room Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional / concurrent verification will not be provided; therefore it should not be requested.
Read Before Each Traininq JPM Performance:
During this Training JPM, applicable methods of verification are expected to be used. Therefore, either another individual or I will act as the additional / concurrent verifier.
. Notes to Instructor / Evaluator:
1. Critical steps are identified as Pass/Fail. All steps are sequenced critical unless denoted by a I..
2. During Evaluated JPM:
Self-verification shall be demonstrated.
3. During Training JPM:
0 Self-verification shall be demonstrated.
No other verification shall be demonstrated.
References:
1. EPIP-EPP-02, Classification of Emergency Conditions at Unit 2.
2. EPMP-EPP-0102, Unit 2 Emergency Classification Bases.
3. EPIP-EPP-18, Activation and Direction of the Emergency Plan.
4. NUREG K/A 2.4.40 Knowledge of the SROs responsibilities in emergency plan implementation (4.0).
Tools and Equipment:
1. None.
Task Standard: Scenario properly diagnosed and classified as a Site Area Emergency Initial Conditions:
1. Reactor building temperatures rise to an isolation setpoint.
2. RCIC has failed to isolate.
3. Reactor building temperatures and radiation levels continue to rise.
4. N2-EOP-SC does not yet require RPV Blowdown.
5. Ask the operator for any questions.
NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-3 2 3/15/2005
Initiating Cue:
(Operators name), assume the role of the SM/ED and determine the emergency classification of this event.
1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue. Proper communications used for Sat/Unsat Evaluator Acknowledge repeatback repeat back (GAP-OPS-01) providing correction if necessary Start time is logged to determine total RECORD START TIME classification time.
2. .Obtain a copy of the reference EPIP-EPP-02 obtained. Sat/Unsat procedure and reviewhtilize the Attachment 1, Section 3.4.1 is correct section. referenced.
3. RClC Steam Line isolation failure o Site Area Emergency is declared PasslFail AND a release pathway outside per EAL 3.4.1. and determination MUST BE top of active fuel - 0 R - RPV Flooding is required.
Termination Criteria: RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is maintained at the elevation of the main steam lines and containment sprays in service.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-20 or equivalent.
6. Presets/Function Key Assignments
1. Malfunctions:
a. DGOIC, Diesel Generator Number 3 Failure to Start, TRUE QUEUED
b. RP03, Reactor Protection System Failure To Scram, TRUE QUEUED
c. CSOIA, HPCS Inadvertent Initiation K29 (Drywell Pressure High),
TRUE F3
d. FW15, Feedwater Master Controller Failure As - Is, TRUE F4
e. FW22A6, FW Heater Tube Leak (A6), 50%, 3 min ramp F4
f. MS03, Steam Leakage Inside the Primary Containment, 5Oh,lrnin F5 ramp (Relative)
g. MS03, Steam Leakage Inside the Primary Containment, 30% ET04
h. MS04, Steam Line Rupture Inside Primary Containment, 75% ET02
i. ED026, Loss of Off-Site 115KV Line 6, TRUE ET02
j. RR50, Reference Leg Flashing, TRUE, TUA=30 sec ET02
k. CS06, Low Pressure Core Spray Pump Trip, TRUE, TUA = 15 ET01 Seconds
2. Remotes:
a. RH27, RHS*MOV15A 600 V BKR Status, OPEN F6
b. RH16, Manual Handwheel Ops - RHS*MOV15A, OPEN F7
3. Overrides:
a. P628 Lamp, Vacuum Bkr 21SC*RV34A Inboard Green, ON Queued
b. P628 Lamp, Vacuum Bkr 21SC*RV34A Inboard Red, ON ET03
c. P601 Switch, RHR A injection MOV24A, CLOSE ET02
4. Annunciators:
a. AN601556, Drywell Vac Bkr lnbd Disc Open, ON ET03 C. Equipment Out of Service
a. 2EGS*EG3 Start switch in P-T-L with red clearance applied.
D. Support Documentation
a. N2-OSP-ISC-M@002, DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKER OPERABILITY TEST, completed up to and including step 8.2.4.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
E. Miscellaneous
1. EVENT TRIGGERS
a. ET01 #005 DRYWELL PRESSURE greater than 1.68 psig
b. ET02 #030 Drywell Pressure >5# (19.7 psia)
c. ET03 #092 21SC-RV34A test pushbutton depressed
d. ET04 #008 Mode Switch in Shutdown
2. At P851, open IAS*SOV167, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT OUTBOARD ISOLATION TO DRYWELL , for N2-OSP-ISC-M@002
3. At P851, open IAS*SOV185, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INBOARD ISOLATION TO DRYWELL, for N2-OSP-ISC-M@002 NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)
PART It: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, 'STA)
Lit Control Room Annunciators 0 Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
(SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Reactor Power = 100% Loadline = > l O O o / ~
0 N2-OSP-ISC-M@002, DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKER OPERABILITY TEST is in moaress.
2EGS*EG3, is out of service for preplanned maintenance. Day one of three day LCO (Tech. SDec. 3.8.1 condition B.). Scheduled return to service is late next shift.
PART 111: RemarkslPlanned Evolutions:
Continue with N2-OSP-ISC-M@002, DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKER OPERABILITY TEST and perform step 8.3 only.
PART IV: To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
Shift Crew Composition (SMKRS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SRO I BOP RO I I I I NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
I Scenario ID# 1 INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What we did? Why? (Goals) 0the r 0ptions?
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
I NSTRUCTOR ACT1ONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Ill. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1 .O Given an unplanned power change that is or is likely to cause reactor power as indicated on APRMs to rise, the crew will make an initial reactor power reduction to approximately 85% as indicated on APRMs per SOP-8 and in accordance with SOP-I 01D.
CT-2.0 Given RPV level indication is no longer valid, the crew will execute EOP-C4 to open SRVs with a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 7 ultimately opened.
CT-3.0 Given RPV Flooding in progress with RPV level below the main steam lines, the crew will establish injection to the RPV to restore and maintain RPV level at or above the main steam lines.
CT-4.0 Given the situation, RPV flooded to the main steam lines and RHR Loop A not needed to run in the LPCl mode to maintain level, divert RHR A to spray the Suppression Chamber and the Drywell.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-I .o Given the plant experiencing an inadvertent initiation of HPCS the crew will act to place the HPCS in a safe configuration.
PO-2.0 Given the plant operating at rated power and a loss of a high pressure heater, the crew will lower power and monitor feedwater temperature and verify limits per N2-SOP-8.
PO-3.0 Given a reactor plant performing a power reduction from rated with a feedwater control malfunction, the operating crew will take NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS manual control of feedwater level prior to any automatic actions occurring.
PO-4 .O Given a reactor plant operating at power with a LOCA in progress, the crew will manually scram the reactor plant prior to reaching 1.68 psig in the Containment.
PO-5.0 Given the situation, RPV flooded to the main steam lines and RHR Loop A not needed to run in the LPCl mode to maintain level, divert RHR A to spray the Suppression Chamber and the Drywell.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Crew 0 Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.
EVENT 1 PO-1.o SRO 21SC*RV34A Exercise and Position Indication Test Directs N2-OSP-ISC-M@002, DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKER OPERABILITY TEST continued at step 8.3.
Repeats back communication of Vacuum breaker failure.
Refers to Tech. Spec. 3.6.1.7 and performs required actions.
o Enters condition A and takes required action A . l to restore to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months o Enters condition B and takes required action B.l to close RV34A within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .
BOP RO Opens 21SC*RV34A, VACUUM BREAKER INBOARD, by depressing AND holding VACUUM BREAKER 21SC*RV34A NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS When 21SC*RV34A pushbutton is depressed INBOARD TEST pushbutton.
the valve will indicate intermediate position (both red and green light on) and will not Verifies the following:
re close. Position indication lights for 21SC*RV34A indicate open.
Annunciator 601556 DRYWELL VACUUM [(Green Light ON, Red Light BRKR INBOARD DISC OPEN alarms ON1 Annunciator 601556 DRYWELL VACUUM BRKR INBOARD DISC OPEN alarms on 2CEC*PNL601.
Computer pt. ISCBC37, RV33N34A DW VAC BRKR IN is generated in the OPEN cond ition.
Position indication lights for 21SC*RV34B indicate closed.
(Green illuminated, Red extinguished)
Reports to SRO that 21SC*RV34A failed to fully .
Releases VACUUM BREAKER 21SC*RV34A INBOARD TEST pushbutton.
Reports to SRO that 21SC*RV34A failed to reclose and remains intermediate.
EVENT 2 L
Spurious start and injection of HPCS.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
~
PO-I .o CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing (F3) key:
CSOIA, HPCS Inadvertent Initiation K29 (Drywell Pressure High)
SRO HPCS automatically starts and injects into the RPV. Reactor pressure lowers and FWS-LVIO Repeats back start of HPCS and controllers respond by closing down to EGS*EG2.
maintain RPV level in normal band. The Directs RO to verify Drywell Division 111 diesel generator starts and runs pressure and reactor water level in unloaded in response to HPCS start signal.
- normal band.
Acknowledges report that RPV The following annunciators alarm:
85231 1 EDG 2 TROUBLE level and Drywell pressure are 85231 7 EDG2 RUNNING normal 603139 REACTOR WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW Directs RO to place HPCS control switch in P-T-L and/or closure of CSH*MOV107.
Refers to Tech. Spec. 3.5.1 and performs required actions.
o Enters condition B and takes required action B.l to verify by administrative means that RClC is 0PERABLE immediately NRC Scenario 4 -1 1. March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS and action B.2 to restore HPCS to OPERABLE status within 14 days.
Identifies 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months reportable condition requirement of 10CFR50.72.b.3.v and 50.73.a.2.v.
for unplanned inoperability.
o Notifies Operations and Plant management.
Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning.
CONSOLE OPERATOR ATC RO If requested for HPCS trip unit indication, o Identifies and reports annunciators report all trip units are indicating normal and to SRO.
untripped. u Implements the actions of ARP 6031 39 FWLC system will respond and no operator u Confirms FWLC system is actions are expected to occur other than responding properly to the rise in confirming proper FWLC response. water level.
These are 603139 actions:
IF RPV pressure 2 900 psig, enter N2-SOP-06, Feedwater FaiIures.
o IF RPV pressure < 900 psig, perform the following as required:
u HIGHLEVEL NRC Scenario 4 -12. March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS D Reduce feed rate to the RPV by the following as required:
o Closing Feedwater Level Control valves FWS-LVlOs, LV55s OR CNM-LV137.
o Raise reject flow rate by throttling open WCS*FV135.
o Reduce CRD flow by throttling closed RDS-FC107.
o Shutdown Feedwater pumps, Feedwater Booster pumps OR Condensate pumps.
Closing ZFWS-MOV21s OR ZFWS-MOV47s OR ZCNM-MOV84s.
0 Restore feed AND condensate to the RPV per N2-OP-3.
BOP RO o Recognizes and reports HPCS injecting.
o Verifies Drywell pressure and reactor water level are normal.
o Places HPCS control switch in P-T-L and/or closes CSH*MOV107.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS o Implements ARP 852317, 601706 and 851311 and 852319.
These are 85231 1 actions:
Dispatch an operator to 2CES*IPNL413, 2EGS*EG2 GENERATOR SWITCHBOARD.
o IF a local alarm is energized, refer to the applicable Alarm Response Procedure.
These are 852317 actions:
Confirm that 2EGS*EG2 is required to be running.
IF 2EGS*EG2 is required to be running, operate the diesel generator in accordance with N2-OP-IOOB, HPCS DIESEL GENERATOR.
IF 2EGS*EG2 is NOT required to be running, shutdown the diesel NOTE: Crew is likely to have 2EGS*EG2 generator per N2-0 P- 1OOB.
remain running until additional resources can AFTER 2EGS*EG2 is shutdown, be obtained. confirm the alarm clears.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS These are 852319 actions:
Using the Process Computer, determine which computer point(s) brought in the alarm.
Notify the SM to evaluate the effect on the operability of 2EGS*EG2, DIVISION 3 diesel generator AND 2ENS*SWG102, Division 3 Emergency Switchgear.
Dispatch an operator to 2ENS*SWG102 to check for de-energized amber circuit monitoring lights.
When HPCS is placed in P-T-L the following occurs: These are 601706 actions:
85231 I EDG 2 TROUBLE clears o Refer to the applicable INOP 603139 REACTOR WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW clears STATUS LIGHT for response.
601706 HPCS SYSTEM INOPERABLE 852319 EDG 2 DC CONT POWER FAILURE Refer to Technical Specifications Pump Motor BRKR # 2 system status light illuminates. for required action.
EVENT 3 High pressure feedwater heater tube leak and feedwater master controller failure.
PO-2.0 & PO-3.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunctions by depressing (F4) key:
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS F W I 5, Feedwater Master Controller Failure ATC RO AS - IS Reports alarms to CRS FW22A6, FW Heater Tube Leak (A6), 50%, Performs ARP 603139 actions.
3 min ramp Recognizes and reports megawatts electric change, thermal power rise and rise in APRM power.
Monitors and reports RPV water level and identifies that during the downpower the Feedwater master controller is not responding.
Enters SOP-6 due to lowering reactor water level as directed by CRS.
Places 2FWS-HIC1600 (Feedwater Master Controller) in manual.
Controls water level in manual in assigned band.
These are 603139 actions:
o IF RPV pressure 2 900 psig, enter N2-SOP-06, Feedwater Failures.
IF RPV pressure < 900 psig, perform the following as required:
LOWLEVEL Raise feed rate to the RPV by NRC Scenario 4 -16. March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS ANY of the following:
o Reduce reject flow by closing WCS*FVI 35.
Raise CRD injection flow to approximately 63 gpm.
Restore feed AND condensate to the RPV per N2-OP-3.
The following annunciators alarm: BOP RO Implements ARP actions for 603139 REACTOR WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW 851420and 851430 851420 6TH PT HEATER 6A/66/6C WATER LEVEL HIGH 85 1430 6TH PT HEATER EMER DRN VLV 26A/266/26C OPEN Reactor water level high alarm due to reduced steam flow and failed feedwater controller These are 851420 actions:
o Using computer point HDLLC07 (08,09), determine which heater level is high.
o Dispatch an operator to 2CES-IPNL204 to verify the validity of the alarm and stabilize heaters as required.
o Verify the normal and emergency drain controllers are in automatic and setpoints correct per N2-OP-08.
NRC Scenario 4 -17 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Verify HDH-LVGA (B,C), normal level control valve, is modulating.
If required, adjust 6th point heater level per N2-OP-08, Subsection F . l .O.
If required, request Tech Support/l&C assistance to determine cause.
To reset normal level control valves to automatic operation, perform Section H.13.0 of N2-OP-08.
Return the system to normal operation per N2-0P-8.
These are 851430 actions:
Using computer points HDHZCOl ,
HDHZC02, AND HDHZC03, determine which valve is alarming.
At 2CES-IPNL204, verify alarming valve is modulating.
Verify the NORMAL DRAIN AND EMERGENCY DRAIN Controllers for the alarming valve are in automatic AND the setpoints are per N2-OP-8, Attachment 1.
Investigate AND determine the cause of the open valve.
Take the appropriate actions to return the system to normal NRC Scenario 4 -18. March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS operation.
After approximately 3 minutes annunciator 851410 6TH o Implements ARP actions for PT HEATER 6A/6B/6C WATER LEVEL HI-HI alarms 851410.
These are 851410 actions:
ESS-MOV3A closes Enter N2-SOP-08, UNPLANNED The following annunciators alarm due to auto isolation of POWER CHANGES, AND execute 6'hpoint heater:: concurrently with this procedure.
851418, 4TH PT HEATER 4A/46/4C WATER LEVEL Using computer points HDHLC04, HIGH 851419, 5TH PT HEATER 5A/5B/5C WATER LEVEL HDHLCOS, OR HDHLCO6, HIGH 851420, 6TH PT HEATER 6A/68/6C WATER LEVEL determine which heater level is HIGH HIGH-HIGH.
Dispatches operator to 2CES-Core thermal power rises IPNL204 to confirm the validity of APRM power rises. the alarm.
Verify the automatic responses have occurred.
Verify the NORMAL DRAIN AND EMERGENCY DRAIN Controllers for the alarming heater are in automatic AND the setpoints are per N2-OP-8, Attachment 1.
IF 2FWS-E6A (B, C) high level is valid, verify 2DSR-LVX65A AND B (LVY65A AND B, LVZ65A AND B) are closed.
Verify 6TH PT HTR E6A (B, C)
NORMAL LVL DR, HDH-LV6A (LVGB, LV6C) is open.
Verify the 6TH PT HTR E6A (B, C)
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS HIGH LVL DR, HDH-LV26A (LV26B, LV26C) is modulating.
investigate further IF necessary AND determine the cause of the high-high level.
Take the appropriate actions to return the system to normal operation.
Enters and performs the actions of N2-SOP-8 for unplanned power changes as directed by the CRS.
Lowers power to approximately 85% using recirc. flow IAW SOP-I01 D as directed by CRS. (CT-1.O)
Monitors Main steam line and offgas radiation monitors for evidence of fuel failure.
Verifies feedwater temperatures are within limits of figure 1 of N2-SOP-8.
Verifies 2CNM-AOV101 LOW PRESS HTR STRING BYPASS VLV, is closed.
Verify that 2ESS-MOV3Al 6TH POINT HEATER A EXTRACTION STM ISOL VLV, for the affected Heater is closed NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS R At 2CES-IPNL204, transfer Sixth Point Feedwater Heater A level control to 2HDH-LV26A as follows:
Lower 2 HDH-LIC26A tape setpoint UNTIL 2HDH-LV26A begins to open Place 2HDH-LIC6A in MANUAL AND close 2HDH-LV6A Exit this procedure AND enter N2-OP-8 at Subsection H.2.0 u Makes plant announcement Stating entry into N2-SOP-6 and N2-SOP-8 using GAITRONICS.
SRO i~ Acknowledges report of feedwater Master controller Failure.
ZI Directs entry into SOP-6.
ZI Assigns reactor water level band.
LI Acknowledges report of power rise.
u Directs entry into N2-SOP-08 unplanned power changes due to loss of feedwater heating.
Directs power reduced to approximately 85% IAW N2-SOP-101D using recirc. Flow.
NRC Scenario 4 -21 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Repeats back communication that feedwater is not responding.
Directs entry into N2-SOP-06 for feedwater failures.
Notifies Operations and Plant management.
Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning.
Determines further power reduction to 80% required per N2-OP-8 using N2-OP-101D.
EVENT 4 Steam Leak inside the primary containment.
PO-4.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR After power reduction is complete, reactor water level is stable in assigned band and when directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing (F5) key:
MS03, Steam Leakage Inside the Primary Containment at 5%.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONSI PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event 4 BOP RO Actions BOP RO Annunciator 851254, PROCESS AIRBORNE o Reports annunciator 851254 to RADN MON ACTIVATED alarms CRS.
o Reviews ARP actions.
DRMS system indicates CMS-IOA-1 and CMS 1OB- 1.(Gaseous Drywell area radiation monitors)channels in red alarm.
Drywell pressure starts to slowly rise Drywell floor drain leak rate rises After approximately 2.5 minutes drywell pressure reaches 0.75 psis which causes annunciator 603140, DRYWELL PRESSURE HIGH/LOW to alarm.
After approximately 3.5 minutes DRMS system These are 851254 actions:
indicates CMS-1OA-2 and CMSIOB- o Identifies from table 851254 that
2. (Particulate Drywell area radiation corrective action b is required.
monitors)channels in alarm which causes If there has been an increase in annunciator 851254, PROCESS AIRBORNE containment activity as RADN MON ACTIVATED to reflash. evidenced by an alert or High Rad alarm on the gaseous or particulate channel of CMS*REl OA or B:
o Notify the SM.
o Notify the Rad. Prot.
Department.
o Attempt to identify the cause of NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS I
the increase, notify Chemistry to sample containment.
D Verify Reactor Coolant leakage is within Tech. Spec. limits (see Tech. Spec. 3.4.3.2). {ITS 3.4.5)
These are 603140 actions:
Check Drywell pressure indications to determine whether drywell pressure is high OR low.
Monitor other primary containment parameters such as:
3 Drywell Pressure in PSlA (2CMS-PI 178 or Computer Point CMSPAOS)
Drywell Temperatures o Drywell Leak Rates o Radiation Levels IF Drywell pressure change is NOT due to Barometric change, OR as directed by SM/CRS, perform the following:
IF pressure is high, perform N2-OP-61A, Subsection H . l .O.
Reports DRMS indications to CRS If directed by CRS, reduces power NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS IAW N2-SOP-101D to 55mlbm/hr.
o Recognizes and reports drywell floor drain leak rate rising.
Determines high Drywell pressure scram is imminent.
May direct power reduction per SOP-101D, by directing Recirc
- Flow reduced to 55 Mlb/hr.
When Mode Switch is taken to shutdown Directs mode switch to shutdown.
malfunction MS03, Steam Leakage Inside Acknowledges RPS failure.
the Primary Containment, 30% becomes Acknowledges scram report.
active.
PO-4.0 The Rate of Drywell Pressure rise increases BOP RO o If directed reduces Recirc Flow reduced to 55 Mlb/hr Places the mode switch in shutdown when directed by CRS.
Provides scram report.
0 Recognizes and reports RPS failure to trip.
NRC Scenario 4 -25. March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0 Arms and depresses manual scram pushbuttons.
Performs actions of N2-SOP-101c.
Event 4 SRO enters and directs EOP-CS SRO Actions and EOP-RPV actions. 0 Acknowledges failure to scram 0 Enters EOP-RPV 0 Exits EOP-RPV and enters EOP-c5.
0 Directs ADS inhibited 0 Directs HPCS be placed / verified in P-T-L.
0 Directs RRCS initiation per EOP-6 Att. 13.
0 Acknowledges all rods fully inserted.
0 Exits EOP-C5 and enters EOP-RPV.
0 Directs Level control with condensate and feedwater with a band between 159.3 and 202.3 inches.
0 Directs pressure control with EHC in automatic with a band of 800-1000 psig.
0 Directs actions of N2-SOP-101C.
0 Acknowledges high drywell pressure trip (1.68 psig) 0 Enters EOP-PC on high DWP.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACT1ONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS o May direct RHR A or 6to suppression chamber sprays.
o May Direct start of a fifth service water pump.
o May direct restoration of pneumatics.
u May direct LPCS and LPCl injection prevented if determined not needed for core cooling.
ATC RO o Maintains reactor water level in manual.
BOP RO Inhibits ADS Verifies HPCS in P-T-L o Initiates RRCS Reports ARI successful and provides scram report.
u Verifies:
u All rods full in o Rx power lowering n Turbine tripped/TSVs & TCVs shut o Generator tripped and house loads transferred o SDV V&D valves closed RCS pumps downshift RPV pressure on TBVs OR S RVs.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS The following annunciator alarms:
851244, REACTOR BLDG AREA RADN MON A C TI VATED May perform the following as time permits:
Fully insert IRMs AND SRMs.
o Energize 2WCS-MOVI 07 (2 NHS-MCC008-2E).
o If required, secure makeup to the Cooling Tower.
At 2CEC-PNL842, shutdown HWC.
IF WCS is in one pump three filter lineup.. ..THEN Throttle close 2WCS*MOV200 (AND if required, throttle open 2WCS-MOVI I O ) to obtain approximately 225 gpm wcs flow.
Drywell pressure reaches 1.68 psig Low pressure ECCS systems receive initiation signal.
When Drywell Pressure reaches 1.68 psig malfunction CS06, Low Pressure Core Spray Pump Trip, TRUE, TUA = 15 seconds becomes active.
NRC Scenario 4 -28. March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event 4 SRO enters and directs EOP-PC These actions are directed by the actions when drywell pressure exceeds SRO from EOP-PC 1.68 psig.
Executes DRYW ELL Annunciator 601559, Primary Containment TEMPERATURE, SUPPRESSION Temperature High Alarms POOL WATER LEVEL, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PRESSURE, SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE and HYDROGEN legs concurrently.
Verifies Suppression Pool Water Level below 217 ft.
Directs RHRA(B) placed in suppression chamber sprays IAW EOP-6 Att 22.
Acknowledges report that CSL trip ped.
Acknowledges EOP-PC entry on primary containment high.
Event 4 RO EOP-PC actions These are the RO EOP-PC actions:
o Suppression Chamber Spray using RHS A(B). (2CEC*PNLGO?)
NOTE: Verifying SWP*MOVSOA(B) open may be delayed until after sprays are in service.
Verify open SWP*MOVSOA(B),
HEAT EXCHANGER IA(B), SVCE WTR OUTLET INLET VLV NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Verify closed AND IF possible overridden, RHS*MOV24A(B),
LPCl A(B) INJECTION VLV Verify running RHS*PIA, PMP WB)
IF operation in Containment Spray mode AND a trip of 2RHS*PIA(B) occurs, perform emergency refill per Section 3.3 Open RHS*MOV33A(B), OUTLET TO SUPPR POOL SPRAY Verify approximately 450 gpm on SUPPR SPRAY HEADER FLOW (2RHS*F/64A(B))
Verify RHS*MOV4A(B), PMP IA(B) MINIMUM FLOW VLV position as follows:
IF RHS A(B) is in Suppression Pool Cooling/Spray, verify closed 2RHS*MOV4A(B)
OR 0 IF RHS A(B) is in Suppression Chamber Spray ONLY, verify open 2RHS*MOV4A(B)
Verify open SW P*MOVSOA(B),
HEAT EXCHANGER IA(B), SVCE WTR INLET VLV.
NOTE: Post LOCA, in order to supply greater than 2000 gpm SWP to RHR Heat Exchangers with less than 5 SWP pumps in service it may be necessary to isolate Turbine Bldg. loads IAW N2-OP-31Section H.12.0.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 2 Throttle open SWP*MOV33A(B),
HEAT EXCHANGER IA(B) SVCE WTR OUTLET VLV to establish Service Water flow to RHR Heat Exchanger 1A(B) of approximately 7400 gpm. (12-R602A(B))
NOTE: 2RHS*MOV8A(B) is interlocked in the open position for I O minutes following a Division I ECCS initiation.
3 WHEN possible, close RHS*MOV8A(B), HEAT EXCHANGER IA(B) INLET BYPASS VLV.
3 Notify Radiation Protection to start Radiation Monitor 2SW P*RE23A(B)
Drywell pressure rises and exceeds 5 psig.
When Drywell Pressure reaches 5.0 psig, the following malfunctions become active:
MS04, Steam Line Rupture Inside Primary Conta inment , 75 YO ED02B, Loss of Off-Site 115KV Line 6, TRUE RR50, Reference Leg Flashing, TRUE, TUA=30 sec With Loss of line 6 and division I1 EDG out of service, Division I1 LP ECCS lose power
. Drywell pressure rises more rapidly Reactor water level rises to level 8 due to swell NRC Scenario 4 -31. March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS and trips FWS pumps.
Reactor pressure drops rapidly within the discharge head of both CSL and RHR A, however CSL tripped on motor electrical fault and RHR A injection valve fails to open.
No injection is attained from LP ECCS.
3RO Actions 11 Acknowledges the following:
u Loss of 1 15KV off-site line 6.
o Loss of division II power, loss of Division II LP ECCS.
Level 8 Feedwater pump trip o Rapidly lowering reactor pressure Rapidly rising containment pressure.
o Reference leg flashing indications on all level instruments.
3 Exits EOP-RPV and Enters EOP-c4.
Event 4 S R O RPV Flooding Actions SRO RPV Flooding Actions:
o Will the reactor stay shutdown without boron. YES Verifies Suppression Pool level above 192 ft.
o Directs opening of all 7 ADS valves Restore pneumatics to the drywell if necessary NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS o O.K. to exceed lOOF/hr Cooldown.
o Can 7 ADS valve be opened. YES o Directs closure of:
o MSIVs o Main Steam Line Drain Detail Q1 Isolations Conde nsate/Feedwater RClC / RHS steam Isolations O.K. to defeat the high RPV water level 3 Using RPV Flooding Systems interlock (EOP-6 Att 20) (Detail Q l ) , flood the RPV to the CRD (OP-30, Section H.3.0) main steam lines.
HPCS (EOP-6 Att 3) 3 Acknowledges report that Use the CST suction if possible. OK to RHS*MOV24A will not open.
defeat the high suppression pool level 3 May direct RO to dispatch field suction transfer (OP-33 Section H.7.0) operator to open RHS*MOV24A LPCS (EOP-6 Att 3) manually.
LPCl (EOP-6 Att 3) ;1 WAIT until:
Inject through the HXs as soon as possible RPV level can be determined RHS through shutdown cooling (EOP-6 Att 30) OR OK to defeat isolations o Main Steam Lines are flooded Inject through the HXs as soon as OR possible Core damage is detected RHS service water crosstie (EOP-6 Att 5) 2 IF RPV has been flooded to the Fire System (EOP-6 Att 6) Main Steam Lines perform the ECCS Keep Full (EOP-6 Att 7) fo Ilow ing:
Condensate Transfer (EOP-6 Att 8) o Close the following valves:
SLS, test tank (EOP-6 Att 9) u MSIVs (slow close, OP-1 SLS, boron tank (OP-36A, Section H . l ) Section G.2.0 u Main Steam line drain isolations NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS o RClC / RHS steam isolations o Control injection into the RPV to maintain Main Steam Lines flooded with injection as low as practicable.
o WAIT until:
3 RPV level can be determined OR 3 Core damage is detected ATC RO o Reports the following to SRO:
Loss of 115KV off-site line 6 .
FWS pumps tripped on level 8.
Rapidly lowering RPV pressure.
Rapidly rising containment pressure.
Loss of division II power and loss of division II LP ECCS.
Indications of reference leg flashing on Panel 603.
o Closes MSIVs when directed by SRO.
Verifies steam line drains shut.
Injects with condensate as directed by SRO.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS With the loss of Division II power, no Division 11 BOP RO LP ECCS will be running and therefore only Reports indications of reference the 7 division I ADS solenoids will illuminate. leg flashing on panel 601.
Opens 7 ADS valves, when directed, by arming and depressing all four ADS pushbuttons o n panel 601.
(CT-2 .O) o Verifies seven division I ADS solenoid lights illuminate.
o Verifies 7 ADS tank accumulator pressure indicate normal.
. Reports to SRO that 7 ADS valves are open.
When directed, takes HPCS out o f P-T-L Verifies and reports HPCS injection.
Console Operator If directed, attempts injection If directed as auxiliary operator to manually with RHR A.
open 2RHS*MOV24A, perform the following: Reports failure of (2 options available, see below) RHS*MOV24A to open.
o May dispatch field operator to If RHRA injection is not desired perform manually open RHS*MOV24A.
the following: (CT-3.0)
Insert remote function RH33, RHS*MOV24A 600 Volt Breaker Status, OPEN L
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Wait 5 minutes and report that 2RHS*MOV24A clutch will not engage and you cant get the valve open.
If RHRA injection is desired perform the following:
Insert remote function RH33, RHS*MOV24A 600 Volt Breaker Status, OPEN Insert remote function RH22, Manual Ops -
RHS*MOV24A, Final Value 1.O, 2 minute ramp.
Report that 2RHS*MOV24A is being manually L. opened.
Console Operator When directed as auxiliary operator to defeat the HPCS high water level interlock, perform the following:
Insert remote function CS14, OPS-CSHOI PNL 625 TST. SW CSH*MOVI 07, TEST Report that the HPCS high water level trip has o Defeats HPCS high RPV water been defeated. level interlock per EOP-6 Att 20.
o Verifies and reports reactor water level at the main steam lines as
~
Reactor water level continues to rise to the NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS level of the main steam lines. indicated by lowering ADS SRV tailpiece temperatures on Panel Level verified at main steam lines as indicated 614 temperature recorder B22-by ADS SRV Tailpipe temperatures lowering R614.
below 200°F while all Non-ADS SRV tailpipe temperatures remain approximately 220°F.
Event 4 SRO Actions for Drywell and SRO suppression Chamber sprays Determines that level is being PO-5.0 maintained at the main steam lines using HPCS.
Verifies suppression pool water level below EL. 217 ft.
Verifies suppression chamber pressure is above 10 psig.
Verifies inside the drywell spray initiation limit (Fig K).
Verifies all recirculation pumps tripped.
Verifies all drywell unit coolers tripped.
Directs RHR A be placed in Drywell and Suppression Chamber sprays IAW EOP-6 Att 22.
Acknowledges report from RO that Drywell and Suppression Chamber Sprays are in service.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 4 RO Actions for Drywell and Suppression Chamber spay: EOP-6 Att 22 RO actions for Drywell spray and suppression chamber sprays: (CT-4.0) o Drywell Spray using RHS A (2CEC*PNL60 1).
NOTE: Verifying SWP*MOVSOA open may be delayed until after sprays are in service.
Verify open SWP*MOVSOA, HEAT EXCHANGER 1A SVCE WTR INLET VLV.
Verify closed AND IF possible overridden, RHS*MOV24A, LPCl A INJECTION VLV.
Verify running RHS*PIA, PMP I A .
IF RHS A Suppression Chamber Spray is required concurrently with Drywell Sprays, perform the following:
o Open RHS*MOV33A, OUTLET TO SUPPR POOL SPRAY.
o Verify approximately 450 gpm on SUPPR SPRAY HEADER FLOW (2RHS*f/64A).
IF operating in the Containment Spray mode AND a trip of NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 2RHS*PlA occurs, perform emergency refill per Section 3.3.
Verify closed, RHS*FV38A, RETURN TO SUPPR POOL COOLING.
Verify open, RHS*MOV4A, PMP 1A MINIMUM FLOW VLV.
Open RHS*MOV25A, OUTLET TO DRYWELL SPRAY.
Open RHS*MOV15A, OUTLET TO DRYWELL SPRAY.
Verify closed, RHS*MOV4A, PMP 1A MINIMUM FLOW VLV.
Verify approximately 7450 gpm on DRYWELL SPRAY HEADER FLOW (2RHS*F/63A).
Verify open SWP*MOV9OA, HEAT EXCHANGER 1A SVCE WTR INLET VLV.
NOTE: Post LOCA, in order to supply greater than 2000 gpm SWP to RHR Heat Exchangers with less than 5 SWP pumps in service it may be necessary to isolate Turbine Bldg. loads IAW N2-OP-31 Section H.12.0.
Throttle open SWP*MOV33A, HEAT EXCHANGER 1A SVCE NRC Scenario 4 -39. March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS WTR OUTLET VLV to establish Service Water flow to RHR Heat Exchanger 1A of approximately 7400 gpm (12-R602A).
NOTE: 2RHS*MOV8A is interlocked in the open position for 10 minutes following a Division I ECCS initiation.
o WHEN possible, close RHS*MOV8A, HEAT EXCHANGER 1A INLET BYPASS VLV.
o Notify Radiation Protection to start Radiation Monitor 2SWP*RE23A Reports to SRO that Drywell and Suppression Chamber Sprays are in service using RHR A.
T ERMINAT ION C RIT ERIA RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is maintained at the elevation of the main steam lines and containment sprays in service.
Event 4 SRO Admin JPM 5-4 SRO Classify the event as SAE 2.1.2 Evaluator to perform SRO Admin JPM for emergency classification.
NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA, NRC Exam VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events None B. Commitments
1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC Scenario 4 March 2005
EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST
1. Additional Information about these checks:
For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.
For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.
X RealismEredibility X Event Sequencing X Simulator Modeling X Evaluating Crew Competencies 6 Total Malfunctions 2 Malfunctions after EOP Entry 2 Abnormal Events 1 Major Transients 2 EOPsUsed 1 EOP Contingency Procedures Used NA Simulator Run Time NA EOP Run Time 2 Crew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)
4. DeveIo pment a I Checks :
Does every event have either a Critical Task(s) or Performance Objective?
Is Criteria given for sequencing to subsequent events?
Is termination criteria clear and unambiguous?
Does termination criteria allow verification that all CT, PO standards are met?
Constellation Energy Group OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE
Title:
Emergency Classification for Scenario 4 Revision: NRC 2005 Task Number: 3440190303 Approvals:
h 3h7/0{ NA EXAMINATION SECURITY G'e7ieral SuDervisor 'ode General Supervisor Date Operations Training (Designee) Operations '(Designee)
NA EXAMINATION SECURITY Configuration Control Date Perform er : (RO)
Trainer/Evaluator:
Evaluation Method: PERFORM Evaluation Location: SIMULATOR FOLLOWING SCENARIO AS SRO Expected Completion Time: 15 minutes Time Critical Task: YES , .Iternate Path Task: NO Start Time: Stop Time: Completion Time:
JPM Overall Rating: Pass Fail NOTE: A JPM overall rating of fail shall be given if any critical step is graded as fail. Any grade of unsat or individual competency area unsat requires a comment.
Comments:
Evaluator Signature: Date:
NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-4 1 3116/2005
Recommended Start Location: (Completion time based on the start location)
Simulator or other designated location.
Simulator Set-up:
N/A Directions to the Instructor/Evaluator To be performed as an administrative JPM.
Directions to Operators:
Read Before Every JPM Performance:
For the performance of this JPM, I will function as the SSS, CSO, and Auxiliary Operators. Prior to providing direction to perform this task, I will provide you with the initial conditions and answer any questions. During task performance, I will identify the steps to be simulated, or discuss and provide cues as necessary.
Read Before Each Evaluated JPM Performance:
This evaluated JPM is a measure of your ability to perform this task independently. The Control Room Supervisor has determined that a verifier is not available and that additional / concurrent verification will not be provided; therefore it should not be requested.
Read Before Each Traininq JPM Performance:
During this Training JPM, applicable methods of verification are expected to be used.
Therefore, either another individual or I will act as the additional / concurrent verifier.
Notes to Instructor / Evaluator:
1. Critical steps are identified as PasslFail. All steps are sequenced critical unless denoted by a e.
2. During Evaluated JPM:
Self-verification shall be demonstrated.
3. During Training JPM:
Self-verification shall be demonstrated.
No other verification shall be demonstrated.
References:
1. EPIP-EPP-02, Classification of Emergency Conditions at Unit 2.
2. EPMP-EPP-0102, Unit 2 Emergency Classification Bases.
3. EPIP-EPP-18, Activation and Direction of the Emergency Plan.
4. NUREG K/A 2.4.40 Knowledge of the SROs responsibilities in emergency plan implementation (4.0).
Tools and Equipment:
1. None.
Task Standard: Scenario properly diagnosed and classified as a Site Area Emergency.
NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-4 2 311612005
i Initial Conditions:
1. MODE Switch and Manual SCRAM pushbuttons failed to trip RPS.
2. Manual initiation of RRCS caused all control rods to insert to 00.
3. LOCA occurs causing loss of RPV level instrumentation.
4. RPV has been flooded to the Main Steam Lines.
5. Ask the operator for any questions Initiating Cue:
(Operators name), assume the role of the SM/ED and determine the emergency classification of this event.
1. Provide repeat back of initiating cue.
Evaluator Acknowledge repeat back repeat back (GAP-OPS-01) providing correction if necessary RECORD START TIME Start time is logged to determine total classification time. I
2. .Obtain a copy of the reference procedure and reviewhtilize the correct section.
3. RPV water level cannot be o EPIP-EPP-02 obtained.
Attachment 1, Section 2.1.2 is referenced.
Site Area Emergency is declared SaUUnsat maintained > top of active fuel per EAL 2.1.2. and determination MUST BE 15minutes OR to pass the JPM.
RPV flooding is required.
End of JPM TERMINATING CUE: Scenario properly diagnosed and classified as a Site Area Emergency.
RECORD STOP TIME NRC SRO ADMIN JPM 5-4 3 3/16/2005
Initial Conditions:
1. MODE Switch and Manual SCRAM pushbuttons failed to trip RPS.
2. Manual initiation of RRCS caused all control rods to insert to 00.
3. LOCA occurs causing loss of RPV level instrumentation.
4. RPV has been flooded to the Main Steam Lines.
5. Ask the operator for any questions Initiating Cue:
(Operators name), assume the role of the SM/ED and determine the emergency classification of this event.
NRC SRO ADMlN JPM 5-4 4 311 612005
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont) 2.1.2 Site Area Emerqencv RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained > -84 in.(TAF)
OR RPV Flooding is required NUMARC IC:
Loss of reactor vessel water level has or will uncover fuel in the reactor vessel.
FPB LosdPotential Loss:
Fuel Clad Potential Loss, RCS Loss Mode Applicability:
Power Operation, Hot Shutdown, Cold Shutdown, Refuel Basis:
The RPV water level used in this EAL is the top of active fuel (TAF). This value corresponds to the level which is used to indicate challenge to core cooling and loss of the fuel ciad barrier.
Uncovery of the fuel irrespective of the event that causes fuel uncovery is justification alone for declaring a Site Area Emergency. This includes events that could lead to fuel uncsvety in any plant operating mode including cold shutdown and refuel. Escalation to a General Emergency occurs through radiological effluence addressed in EAL 1.3.3for drywell radiation and in the EALs defined for Category 5.0, Radioactivity Release.
The terminology of "cannot be restored and maintained" that is used is intended to be consisfent with the EOP terminology using the same wording. Momentary drops below the level limit would not require classification at this level.
This determination includes making an evaluation that considers both current and future system performance in relation to the current value and trend of the parameter(s). Neither implies that the parameter must actually exceed the limit before the classification is made nor that the classification must be made before the limit is reached.
This definition would require the emergency classification be made prior to water level dropping below TAF if, based on an evaluation of the current trend of RPV water level and in consideration of current and future injection system performance, that RPV water level will not likely be maintained above TAF Page 29 EPMP-EPP-0101 Rev 07
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont)
The EOPs require RPV Flooding under conditions where RPV water level cannot be determined. The operator is directed to establish RPV Flooding conditions to assure adequate core cooling while attempting to restore RPV water level indication. Because actual RPV water level is not known under these conditions, it must be assumed that RPV water level is below the TAF thus warranting declaration of a Site Area Emergency.
PEG Reference@):
SS5.1 FC2.1 RCS4.1 Bases Reference(s):
1. N1-EOP-2, Level Control
2. N1-SAP-2, RPV/Containment/Radioactivity Release Control Page 30 EPMP-EPP-0101 Rev 07

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