ML040490131
ML040490131 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Surry ![]() |
Issue date: | 02/02/2004 |
From: | Casto C Division of Reactor Safety II |
To: | Christian D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
References | |
EA-04-005 IR-03-008 | |
Download: ML040490131 (25) | |
See also: IR 05000280/2003008
Text
ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3 CONTAIN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
EA-04-005 February 2, 2004
Virginia Electric and Power Company
ATTN: Mr. David A. Christian
Senior Vice President and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Innsbrook Technical Center
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA 23060
SUBJECT: SURRY POWER STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2003008
AND 05000281/2003008; PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING
Dear Mr. Christian:
On January 7, 2004, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an open item
inspection for your Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report
documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on February 2, 2004, with
Mr. R. Blount and other members of your staff.
This inspection was an in-office examination of three unresolved items (URIs) which were
identified in NRC Inspection Report 05000280/2003007 and 05000281/2003007 (ADAMS
Accession Number ML030930560) forwarded to you on March 31, 2003. The three URIs were:
URI 05000280/2003007-001, Fire Response Procedures 1-FCA-4.00 And 0-FCA-14.00 Not
Adequate To Assure Safe Shutdown Of Unit 1; URI 05000280/2003007-002, Fire Response
Procedures 1-FCA-3.00 And 1-FCA-14.00 Not Adequate To Assure Safe Shutdown Of Unit 1;
and URI 05000280,281/2003007-003, Alternate Shutdown Panel Ventilation System Not
Independent From Impacts Of A Main Control Room Fire. These issues were unresolved
pending a safety significance determination.
Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified that the Surry fire response
procedures were not effective in ensuring a safe shutdown of Unit 1 during a severe fire in
Emergency Switchgear and Relay Room (ESGR) Number (No.) 1 (URI 05000280/2003007-
001). Specifically, these procedures may not preclude an extended loss of reactor coolant
pump seal injection flow and may initiate a reactor coolant pump seal loss of coolant accident
which could result in pressurizer level failing to be maintained within the indicating range as
required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. This inspection finding was assessed using the applicable
DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED HEREWITH CONTAINS SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3, THIS DOCUMENT IS DECONTROLLED
VEPCO 2
ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3 CONTAIN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
significance determination process (SDP) and preliminarily determined to be White (i.e., an
issue with low to moderate increased importance to safety, which may require additional NRC
inspections.) This issue was also determined to be an apparent violation of NRC requirements.
In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement
Actions - May 1, 2000" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, this apparent violation is being
considered for escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a White finding.
Additionally, because relative equipment and cable locations in Unit 2s ESGR No. 2 are similar
to those in Unit 1s ESGR No. 1, the fire ignition frequencies for both areas are similar, and the
procedures used to respond to a severe fire are similar, the inspectors determined that the safe
shutdown of Unit 2 during a severe fire in ESGR No. 2 may be similarly impacted. This issue is
documented in this report as a new finding on Unit 2 (URI 05000281/2003008-001) that has
potential safety significance greater than very low significance. This finding did not present an
immediate safety concern. To date, no SDP of this new finding on Unit 2 has been completed
by the NRC staff. Accordingly, you are requested to provide any information as to why the
outcome of the SDP for ESGR No. 1 should not be applied to Unit 2s ESGR No. 2.
Before the NRC makes a final decision on these matters, we are providing you an opportunity
to request a regulatory conference where you would be able to provide your perspectives on the
significance of the findings, the bases for your position, and whether you agree with the
apparent violation. If you choose to request a regulatory conference, we encourage you to
submit your evaluation and any differences with the NRCs evaluation at least one week prior to
the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. Should you
request a conference, the NRC requests that you provide information in your written evaluation
and at the conference on the design and performance of the reactor coolant pump breakdown
bushings, and their effect on limiting reactor coolant system leakage in the event of a seal
failure. If a regulatory conference is held, it will be open for public observation. The NRC will
also issue a press release to announce the regulatory conference.
In addition, the report documents two NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance
(Green). These findings which resulted from URI 05000280/2003007-002 and URI 05000280,
281/2003007-003 were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. However,
because of the very low safety significance and because they are entered into your corrective
action program, the NRC is treating these two findings as non-cited violations (NCVs)
consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV in this
report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with
the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control
Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region II; the
Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Surry Power Station.
Please contact Mr. Charles R. Ogle at (404) 562-4605 within seven days of the date of this
letter to notify the NRC of your intentions regarding the regulatory conference for the
preliminary White finding. If we have not heard from you within 10 days, we will continue with
DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED HEREWITH CONTAINS SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3, THIS DOCUMENT IS DECONTROLLED
VEPCO 3
ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3 CONTAIN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
our significance determination and associated enforcement processes on this finding, and you
will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
Since the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no Notice of Violation is being
issued for the inspection finding at this time. In addition, please be advised that the number
and characterization of the apparent violation described in the referenced inspection report may
change as a result of further NRC review.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,
portions of its enclosure and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public
inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS)
component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). However, the NRC is continuing to review
the appropriate classification of the Summary of Phase 2 SDP Risk Analysis and Phase 3 SDP
analysis (Attachments 2 and 3) within our records management program, considering changes
in our practices following the events of September 11, 2001. Using our interim guidance, the
attached analyses have been marked as Proprietary Information or Sensitive Information in
accordance with Section 2.790(d) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Please
control the document accordingly (i.e., treat the document as if you had determined that it
contained trade secrets and commercial or financial information that you considered privileged
or confidential). We will inform you if the classification of these documents change as a result
of our ongoing assessments. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact me at 404-562-4600.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Charles A. Casto, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281
Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000280,281/2003008
w/Attachments: 1. Supplemental Information
2. Summary of Phase 2 SDP Risk Analysis
3. Phase 3 SDP Analysis
cc w/encl and Attachments: See page 4
DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED HEREWITH CONTAINS SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3, THIS DOCUMENT IS DECONTROLLED
VEPCO 4
ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3 CONTAIN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
cc w/encl and Attachments:
Chris L. Funderburk, Director
Nuclear Licensing and
Operations Support
Virginia Electric & Power Company
6000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA 23060
Richard H. Blount, II
Site Vice President
Surry Power Station
Virginia Electric & Power Company
5570 Hog Island Road
Surry, VA 23883
cc w/encl and Attachment 1:
Virginia State Corporation Commission
Division of Energy Regulation
P. O. Box 1197
Richmond, VA 23209
Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq.
Senior Counsel
Dominion Resources Services, Inc.
Millstone Power Station
Building 475, 5th Floor
Rope Ferry Road
Rt. 156
Waterford, Connecticut 06385
Attorney General
Supreme Court Building
900 East Main Street
Richmond, VA 23219
Distribution w/encl and Attachments:
F. Congel, OE
N. Kalyanam, NRR
M. Sykes, NRR
R. Laufer, NRR
D. Nelson, OE
C. Ogle, RII
Distribution w/encl and Attachments contd - See page 5:
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WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3, THIS DOCUMENT IS DECONTROLLED
ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3 CONTAIN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
Distribution w/encl and Attachments cont;d)
L. Garner, RII
K. Landis, RII
C. Evans, RII
G. McCoy, RII
G. Wiseman, RII
W. Rogers, RII
S. Sparks, RII
OEMAIL
Distribution w/encl and Attachment 1:
RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB
PUBLIC
(*) - SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCURRENCES
OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRP RII:EICS RII:DRS
SIGNATURE * * * *
NAME PAYNE ODONOHUE ROGERS OGLE LANDIS EVANS CASTO
DATE 1/ /2004 1/ /2004 1/ /2004 1/ /2004 1/ /2004 1/ /2004 1/ /2004
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\ORPCheckout\FileNET\ML040490131.wpd
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3 CONTAIN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
REGION II
Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281
Report Nos.: 05000280/2003008 and 05000281/2003008
Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
Facility: Surry Power Station
Location: 5850 Hog Island Road
Surry, VA 23883
Dates: April 21, 2003 - January 7, 2004
Inspectors: C. Payne, Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead Inspector)
W. Rogers, Senior Reactor Analyst
Approved by: C. Casto, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000280/2003-008, 05000281/2003-008; 04/21/2003 -01/7/2004; Surry Power Station,
Units 1 and 2; Significance Determination of Unresolved Items from Triennial Fire Protection
Inspection.
This in-office review was conducted by a regional inspector and a senior reactor analyst. One
preliminary White finding with an apparent violation, one unresolved item with potential safety
significance greater than Green and two Green non-cited violations (NCVs) were identified.
The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using
IMC 0609 Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not
apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The
NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is
described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems
- Preliminary White. An apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections
III.L.2.b and III.L.3 was identified, in that, for a severe fire in the Emergency
Switchgear and Relay Room Number 1 (Fire Area 3), the licensees fire
response procedures were not effective in assuring a safe shutdown of the
Unit 1 reactor. The licensee has revised the affected fire response procedures
and is evaluating the need for additional corrective action.
This finding is greater than minor because it was associated with protection
against one of the external factors attribute. It affected the objective of the
Initiating Events cornerstone to limit the likelihood events that challenge critical
safety functions as well as affected the objective of the Mitigating Systems
cornerstone to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that
respond to initiating events. This degraded condition increased plant risk
because, if a severe fire occurred in Fire Area 3, these procedures may not
preclude an extended loss of reactor coolant pump seal injection flow and may
initiate a reactor coolant pump seal loss of coolant accident which could result in
pressurizer level failing to be maintained within the indicating range as required.
(Section 4OA5.01)
- TBD. The inspectors identified a violation having potential safety significance
greater than very low significance because the licensees safe shutdown strategy
and related fire response procedures may be inadequate to ensure a safe
shutdown of the Unit 2 reactor for a severe fire in Emergency Switchgear and
Relay Room (ESGR) Number (No.) 2. This finding is similar to one for ESGR
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No. 1. The licensee has revised the affected fire response procedures and is
evaluating the need for additional corrective action.
This finding is unresolved pending completion of a significance determination.
The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the ability to
achieve a safe shutdown of the Unit 2 reactor following a fire in ESGR No. 2 and
affects the Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems cornerstone objectives. The
finding has potential safety significance greater than very low, safety significance
because RCP seal package failure could cause a seal loss-of-coolant accident
and failure of the specified alternative shutdown strategy. (Section 1R05)
- Green. A Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.L.2.b
and III.L.3, was identified, in that, for a severe fire in the Unit 1 Cable Vault and
Tunnel (Fire Area 1), the licensees alternative shutdown capability may not
ensure that the reactor coolant makeup function would be capable of maintaining
the reactor coolant level within the level indication of the pressurizer. The
licensee has entered this finding into its corrective action program.
This finding is greater than minor because it was associated with protection
against one of the external factors attribute. It affected the objective of the
Initiating Events cornerstone to limit the likelihood events that challenge critical
safety functions as well as affected the objective of the Mitigating Systems
cornerstone to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that
respond to initiating events. This finding was determined to be of very low safety
significance because the likelihood of a severe fire in the service building cable
vault (SBCV) or the cable tunnel that could cause a loss of all three Unit 1
charging pumps is very low and a 3-hour rated fire door would prevent a severe
fire in the remaining sections of Fire Area 1 from spreading through the cable
tunnel to the SBCV. (Section 4OA5.02)
- Green. A Green non-cited violation was identified for failure to comply with
10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.3.a and III.L.3. Specifically, the shared
ventilation system between the main control room (MCR) and the Unit 1 and Unit
2 emergency switchgear and relay rooms (ESGRs), did not have adequate
separation, isolation, or barriers to preclude smoke and toxic gases from being
transported to the ESGRs during a fire in the MCR. The alternative shutdown
capability for an MCR fire is located in each units ESGR, respectively.
Consequently, operators may not have the environmental conditions or visibility
to safely man and accomplish a successful shutdown of either Unit 1 or Unit 2
from the Auxiliary Shutdown Panels. The licensee has entered this finding into
its corrective action program.
This finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the protection
against external factors attribute and affected the objective of the Mitigating
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Systems cornerstone to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of
systems that respond to initiating events. This finding was determined to be of
very low safety significance because heat from a fire, and the natural buoyancy
of smoke, will cause the smoke gas layer to accumulate near the ceiling of the
MCR (away from the ESGRs), the likelihood of a severe fire in the MCR is low,
and the prompt response and actions of the MCR operators and the fire brigade
would prevent any fires that start from becoming severe. (Section 4OA5.03)
B. Licensee-identified Violations:
None
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Report Details
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity
1R05 FIRE PROTECTION (71111.05T/SDP)
Section 4OA5.01 of this inspection report documents the resolution of unresolved item
(URI)05000280/2003007-001, Fire Response Procedures 1-FCA-4.00 And 0-FCA-
14.00 Not Adequate To Assure Safe Shutdown Of Unit 1 (NRC Inspection Report
05000280, 281/2003007, dated March 31, 2003, ADAMS Accession Number
ML030930560). Following completion of the significance determination process (SDP)
for this Emergency Switchgear and Relay Room (ESGR) Number (No.) 1 finding, the
inspectors recognized that an evaluation of the finding for applicability to Unit 2s ESGR
No. 2 would be appropriate. [ESGR No. 2 was not included in the original scope of the
baseline triennial fire protection inspection. Thus, it was not evaluated as part of the
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted an in-office review of plant drawings 11448-FE-27C and
11548-FE-27A (arrangement drawings for ESGR No. 1 and ESGR No. 2, respectively)
to compare the location and design features of safe shutdown equipment and fire
protection features. [The inspectors had walked down both these areas during the
triennial fire protection inspection.] The inspectors also compared Fire Contingency
Action (FCA) procedure 2-FCA-4.00, Limiting ESGR Number 2 Fire, Revision 14, with 1-
FCA-4.00, Limiting ESGR Number 1 Fire, Revision 13, to identify any differences in
operator implementation of the alternative safe shutdown strategies for Unit 1 and
Unit 2. In addition, the Surry Non-Seismic Individual Plant Examination of External
Events (IPEEE) was reviewed for plant fires in ESGR No. 1 and ESGR No. 2. This
included a review of the applicable fire area/compartment Ignition Source Data Sheets.
b. Findings
Because relative equipment and cable locations in Unit 2s ESGR No. 2 are similar to
those in Unit 1s ESGR No. 1, the fire ignition frequency for both areas is similar, and
the alternative safe shutdown procedures used to respond to a severe fire are similar,
the inspectors determined that the finding associated with URI 05000280/2003007-001
was applicable to Unit 2. Specifically, for a severe fire in ESGR No. 2 the procedural
guidance in 2-FCA-4.00, Limiting ESGR Number 2 Fire, may not prevent loss of seal
injection cooling to the Unit 2 reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal packages nor be timely
in restoring seal injection flow, via the charging system cross-connect line with Unit 1, to
prevent damage to the RCP seal packages. Additionally, procedural guidance in 0-
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FCA-14.00, Charging and Seal Injection Flow Paths, to restore seal injection flow
following cross-connect with Unit 1 may aggravate potential damage to the seal
packages and, consequently, increase the severity of leakage from the RCP seals.
Thus, safe shutdown of Unit 2 during a severe fire in ESGR No. 2 would not be ensured.
The licensee captured this issue in its corrective action program under Plant Issue (PI)
S-2003-0637 [during review of this similar issue in ESGR No. 1]. This finding has
potential safety significance greater than very low significance and is a URI pending
completion of the SDP.
10 CFR 50.48 states, in part, Each operating nuclear power plant must have a fire
protection program that satisfies Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part. Surry Unit 1
Operating License DPR-32, and Surry Unit 2 Operating License DPR-37 Condition 3.I,
specifies, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the
approved fire protection program as described in the UFSAR and as approved in the
Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated September 19, 1979, and subsequent
supplements.
The licensees UFSAR commits to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G and III.L.
Section III.G.3 states that alternative shutdown capability should be provided where the
protection of systems whose function is required for hot shutdown, does not satisfy the
requirements of III.G.2.Section III.L of Appendix R provides requirements to be met by
alternative shutdown methods.Section III.L.2.b states, in part, that The reactor coolant
makeup function shall be capable of maintaining the reactor coolant level...within the
level indication in the pressurizer in PWRs.Section III.L.3 specifies that procedures
shall be in effect to implement this capability.
Contrary to the above, on February 14, 2003, the alternative shutdown capability and
response procedures specified for a fire in ESGR No. 2, an Appendix R,Section III.G.3
area, were not effective and did not meet this requirement. Specifically, the licensees
procedures may not preclude an extended loss of reactor coolant pump seal injection
flow and may initiate a reactor coolant pump seal loss of coolant accident which could
result in pressurizer level failing to be maintained within the indicating range. Pending
determination of the safety significance, this finding is identified as URI
05000281/2003008-001, Fire Response Procedures 2-FCA-4.00 And 0-FCA-14.00 Not
Adequate To Ensure Safe Shutdown Of Unit 2.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA5 OTHER
.01 (Closed) URI 05000280/2003007-001: Fire Response Procedures 1-FCA-4.00 And 0-
FCA-14.00 Not Adequate To Assure Safe Shutdown Of Unit 1
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Introduction: An apparent violation (AV) was identified for failure to comply with 10 CFR
50, Appendix R, Sections III.L.2.b and III.L.3, in that, for a severe fire in the ESGR
No. 1, the licensees alternative shutdown capability did not ensure that the reactor
coolant makeup function would be capable of maintaining the reactor coolant level within
the level indication of the pressurizer. This inspection finding was assessed using the
SDP and preliminarily determined to be White (i.e., an issue with low to moderate
increased importance to safety, which may require additional NRC inspections.)
Description: During the baseline triennial fire protection inspection, the inspectors
identified a finding having potential safety significance greater than very low
significance, involving the strategy, and related fire response procedures, for assuring a
safe shutdown of the Unit 1 reactor during a severe fire in ESGR No. 1. Specifically, the
procedural guidance in 1-FCA-4.00, Limiting ESGR Number 1 Fire, may not prevent loss
of seal injection cooling to the Unit 1 RCP seal packages nor be timely in restoring seal
injection flow, via the charging system cross-connect line with Unit 2, to prevent damage
to the RCP seal packages. Additionally, procedural guidance in 0-FCA-14.00, Charging
and Seal Injection Flow Paths, to restore seal injection flow following cross-connect with
Unit 2 may aggravate potential damage to the seal packages and, consequently,
increase the severity of leakage from the RCP seals. The licensee captured this issue
in its corrective action program under PI S-2003-0637. Subsequent licensee
investigation of this issue generated two additional PIs (S-2003-1490 and S-2003-
5254). Pending determination of the safety significance, this finding was documented
as a URI in the triennial fire protection inspection report.
Analysis: This finding affects the protection against external factors and procedure
quality cornerstone attributes. It affects the objective of the Initiating Events
Cornerstone to limit the likelihood of events that challenge critical safety functions
because existing procedural guidance may result in RCP seal package damage and
increase the likelihood of an RCP seal loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Additionally, the
finding affects the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone to ensure the availability, reliability,
and capability of systems that respond to initiating events [fire] because continuous RCP
seal injection flow is not maintained nor, once seal injection is lost, is it restored quickly
enough to preclude RCP seal damage so that pressurizer level can be maintained in the
indicating range. Because the finding affects fire protection, it was assessed in
accordance with the NRC Reactor Oversight Processs SDP as described in NRC
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F (MC 0609, App. F). However, the MC 0609, App. F, Phase 1 screening criteria did not apply to the deficiencies related to
Surrys safe shutdown strategy or fire response procedures. As a result, a Phase 2 risk
analysis was performed. A Summary of the Phase 2 analysis is provided as
Attachment 2.
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Summary of Phase 3 SDP Analysis
This evaluation was performed by contractors supporting the Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation with the assistance of senior reactor analysts from headquarters and Region II.
The Surry Phase 3 SDP Analysis is included in this inspection report as Attachment 3.
The Phase 3 analysis discusses the approach, site visit observations, assumptions,
screening analysis, fire ignition frequencies, fire scenario analysis, contributors to fire risk,
integrated assessment of fire-induced core damage frequency, and conclusions developed
from this analysis. The report also contains four appendices documenting supplemental
information used in the Phase 3 analysis (circuit analysis, fire propagation, accidental water
spray on both switchgears and event tree analysis).
Five fire scenarios were developed and considered during the Phase 3 analysis.
1. A severe fire in emergency bus room 1H damaging equipment or cables in emergency
bus room 1J. In this scenario, both emergency buses fail without a possibility of
recovery.
2. A severe fire in emergency bus room 1J damaging equipment or cables in emergency
bus room 1H. (Similar to Scenario 1 above.) In this scenario, both emergency buses
fail without a possibility of recovery.
3. A relatively severe fire occurs in emergency bus room 1H. The fire brigade uses water
to extinguish the fire. Water is accidentally sprayed on equipment in emergency bus
room 1J. It is assumed that as a result, both emergency buses fail without a possibility
of recovery.
4. A relatively severe fire occurs in emergency bus room 1J. The fire brigade uses water
to extinguish the fire. Water is accidentally sprayed on equipment in emergency bus
room 1H. (Similar to Scenario 3 above.) It is assumed that as a result, both emergency
buses fail without a possibility of recovery.
5. A severe fire in emergency bus room 1J leads to complete loss of emergency bus 1J,
loss of some of the cable above the electrical cabinets, and recoverable loss of
emergency bus 1H.
Based on an analysis (Appendix B of the Phase 3 SDP Analysis), it was determined that
multi-compartment fires were very unlikely. Thus, Scenarios 1 and 2 were not analyzed
further for risk significance. As a result, only Scenarios 3, 4 and 5 were analyzed in detail
with probabilistic modeling.
The core damage frequency (CDF) for each scenario was calculated by multiplying the
scenario frequency and associated conditional core damage probability (CCDP). The table
below presents the set of scenarios, their associated occurrence frequencies, CCDPs and
CDFs.
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3. Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 1H 1.1E-06 3.3E-01 3.6E-07 16.0
4. Water Spray on Both Buses - Room 1J 1.9E-07 3.3E-01 6.1E-08 2.7
5. Severe switchgear fire in Room 1J 5.8E-05 3.2E-02 1.8E-06 81.3
Total 5.9E-05 2.3E-06
As the table above indicates, the total CDF for the entire set of scenarios (the non-
conforming case) was calculated to be 2.3E-06 per reactor year. Due to the low base case
CDF, the risk analysts concluded that the delta CDF [the difference between the base case
CDF and the non-conforming case CDF] was essentially the same as the non-conforming
case CDF (i.e., 2.3E-06). This result indicates the risk significance of the finding is of low to
moderate importance to safety.
SDP/Enforcement Review Panel (SERP) Evaluation
The total change in CDF due to the performance deficiency was found to be 2.3E-06. The
key factors in the risk determination which most influenced this result were the CDF
associated with a severe fire in the 1J 4160V switchgear and the lack of an automatic fire
suppression system in the fire area. The color associated with this magnitude of change in
CDF is White. Therefore, the SERP has preliminarily determined this issue to be a White
finding.
Enforcement: 10 CFR 50.48 states, in part, Each operating nuclear power plant must have
a fire protection program that satisfies Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part. Surry Unit 1
Operating License DPR-32, and Surry Unit 2 Operating License DPR-37 Condition 3.I,
specifies, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the
approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR) and as approved in the SER dated September 19, 1979, and subsequent
supplements.
The licensees UFSAR commits to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G and III.L.
Section III.G.3 states that alternative shutdown capability should be provided where the
protection of systems whose function is required for hot shutdown, does not satisfy the
requirements of III.G.2.Section III.L of Appendix R provides requirements to be met by
alternative shutdown methods.Section III.L.2.b states, in part, that The reactor coolant
makeup function shall be capable of maintaining the reactor coolant level . . . within the level
indication in the pressurizer in PWRs.Section III.L.3 specifies that procedures shall be in
effect to implement this capability.
DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED HEREWITH CONTAINS SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3, THIS DOCUMENT IS DECONTROLLED
Enclosure
6
ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3 CONTAIN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
Contrary to the above, on February 14, 2003, the alternative shutdown capability and
response procedures specified for a fire in ESGR No. 1, an Appendix R,Section III.G.3
area, were not effective and did not meet this requirement. Specifically, the licensees
procedures may not preclude an extended loss of reactor coolant pump seal injection flow
and may initiate a reactor coolant pump seal loss of coolant accident which could result in
pressurizer level failing to be maintained within the indicating range. This apparent violation
is identified as AV 05000280/2003008-002, Alternative Shutdown Capability and Response
Procedures Not Adequate to Ensure Safe Shutdown of Unit 1.
.02 (Closed) URI 05000280/2003007-002: Fire Response Procedures 1-FCA-3.00 And 0-FCA-
14.00 Not Adequate To Assure Safe Shutdown Of Unit 1
Introduction: A Green non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for failure to comply with 10
CFR 50, Appendix R, Criterion III.L.2.b and III.L.3, in that, for a severe fire in the Unit 1
Cable Vault and Tunnel (CV&T), the licensees alternative shutdown capability did not
ensure that the reactor coolant makeup function would be capable of maintaining the
reactor coolant level within the level indication of the pressurizer.
Description: During the triennial fire protection inspection, the inspectors identified a finding
having potential safety significance greater than very low significance, involving the
strategy, and related fire response procedures, for assuring a safe shutdown of the Unit 1
reactor during a severe fire in Unit CV&T (Fire Area 1). Specifically, the procedural
guidance in 1-FCA-3.00, Limiting Cable Vault and Cable Tunnel Fire, may not prevent loss
of seal injection cooling to the Unit 1 RCP seal packages nor be timely in restoring seal
injection flow, via the charging system cross-connect line with Unit 2, to prevent damage to
the RCP seal packages. In addition, procedural guidance in 0-FCA-14.00, Charging and
Seal Injection Flow Paths, to restore seal injection flow following cross-connect with Unit 2
may aggravate potential damage to the seal packages and, consequently, increase the
severity of leakage from the RCP seals. The licensee captured this issue in their corrective
action program under PI S-2003-0637. Subsequent licensee investigation of this issue
generated two additional PIs (S-2003-1490 and S-2003-5254). Pending determination of
the safety significance, this finding was documented as a URI in the triennial fire protection
inspection report.
Analysis: This finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the protection
against external factors and procedure quality cornerstone attributes. It affects the
objective of the Initiating Events Cornerstone to limit the likelihood of events that challenge
critical safety functions because existing procedural guidance may result in RCP seal
package damage and increase the likelihood of an RCP seal LOCA. Additionally, the
finding affects the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone to ensure the availability, reliability, and
capability of systems that respond to initiating events [fire] because continuous RCP seal
injection flow is not maintained nor, once seal injection is lost, is it restored quickly enough
to preclude RCP seal damage so that pressurizer level can be maintained in the indicating
range.
DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED HEREWITH CONTAINS SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3, THIS DOCUMENT IS DECONTROLLED
Enclosure
7
ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3 CONTAIN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
During the significance determination period, the inspectors determined that the issue was
of very low safety significance (Green). Some of the factors (including assumptions used in
the SDP, MC 0609, App. F) causing the issue to be of very low safety significance were:
- The Unit 1 CV&T is comprised of four interconnected rooms - the service building cable
vault (SBCV), the cable tunnel, the cable penetration vault (CPV) and the motor control
center (MCC) room. A normally open 3-hour rated fire door (and wall) separates the
CPV and the MCC room from the cable tunnel and the SBCV. The operators and fire
brigade can enter the Unit 1 CV&T through several different doors: from the outside
yard to the MCC room, from the auxiliary building (15'-0" elevation) to the CPV, or from
ESGR No.1 to the SBCV (two separate doors).
system. The CO2 system is divisional such that a fire in one section of the fire area will
only dump CO2 in that section. The cable tunnel fire door automatically shuts upon
actuation of the CO2 suppression system within the CV&T. This essentially creates two
separate fire zones: 1) the MCC room and the CPV and 2) the cable tunnel and the
SBCV. No findings were associated with this rated fire door.
- The alternative safe shutdown procedure for the Unit 1 CV&T (i.e., cross-connecting the
Unit 1 charging system with Unit 2's) would only be implemented if all Unit 1 charging
flow is lost. Control and power cables for all three Unit 1 charging pumps pass from
ESGR No. 1 into the SBCV. The cables for the 1A and 1C charging pumps then pass
from the SBCV directly into the auxiliary building. In contrast, the cables for the 1B
charging pump first pass from the SBCV, down through the cable tunnel into the CPV,
and then into the auxiliary building. Assuming the cable tunnel fire door functions
correctly, only a severe fire in the SBCV and/or cable tunnel could cause a loss of all
Unit 1 charging flow.
- The cable tunnel contains no ignition sources. The only ignition sources in the SBCV
are three relay panels associated with the cooling water canal level system. All three
panels contain only relays and cables that are energized by low voltage power.
Combined with their low fire ignition frequency, the likelihood of these relay panels
causing a severe fire in the SBCV is very low.
- Implementation of the alternative safe shutdown procedures directs the performance of
twenty-nine manual operator actions in the Unit 1 CV&T. All twenty-nine steps would be
performed in the CPV. Assuming the cable tunnel fire door and the divisional CO2 fire
suppression system function as designed, the effects of a severe fire in the SBCV would
not prevent the operators from entering the CPV to perform their required actions. [To
avoid the fire, the operators could enter the CPV from either the MCC room or the
auxiliary building.]
DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED HEREWITH CONTAINS SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3, THIS DOCUMENT IS DECONTROLLED
Enclosure
8
ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3 CONTAIN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
Enforcement: Because this failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections III.L.2.b
and III.L.3, is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the corrective action
program (PI S-2003-0637), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section
VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000280/2003008-003, Fire Response
Procedures 1-FCA-3.00 And 0-FCA-14.00 Not Adequate To Ensure Safe Shutdown Of Unit
1.
.03 (Closed) URI 05000280,281/2003007-003: Alternate Shutdown Panel Ventilation System
Not Independent From Impacts Of A Main Control Room Fire
Introduction: A Green NCV was identified for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R,
Sections III.G.3 and III.L.3. Specifically, the shared ventilation system between the MCR
(Fire Area 5) and ESGR No. 1 and ESGR No. 2 (Fire Areas 3 and 4, respectively), did not
have adequate separation, isolation, or barriers to preclude smoke and toxic gases from
being transported to the ESGRs during a fire in the MCR. The alternative shutdown
capability for an MCR fire is located in each units ESGR, respectively. Consequently,
operators may not have the environmental conditions or visibility to safely man and
accomplish a successful shutdown of either Unit 1 or Unit 2 from the Auxiliary Shutdown
Panels (ASP).
Description: During the triennial fire protection inspection, the inspectors identified a
finding of having potential safety significance greater than very low significance,
involving the lack of adequate separation, isolation, or barriers to preclude smoke and
toxic gases from being transported to the ESGRs during a fire in the MCR. The Surry
Appendix R Report identified the MCR fire area as an alternative shutdown area. During
a severe fire in the MCR, the operators would abandon the MCR and utilize the Unit 1
and Unit 2 ASPs, located in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESGRs respectively, to achieve a safe
shutdown of the units. The ESGRs share a common ventilation system with the MCR.
Fire dampers, located in the ventilation system ducts, were designed to isolate the
ESGR area to contain the Halon within the ESGRs, and to prevent smoke and toxic
gases from spreading from the ESGRS to the MCR. Although an ESGR fire alarm
signal or manual actuation of the Halon system (in response to an ESGR fire) would
signal these dampers to close, the inspectors found that there were no smoke or fire
actuation devices to signal them to shut during a fire in the MCR. Additionally these
dampers do not have the capability of being manually actuated from the MCR. During a
severe fire in the MCR, large amounts of heavy black smoke and toxic gases could be
generated. The open dampers could permit smoke and toxic gases to spread from the
MCR to the ESGR. This situation could present a habitability concern for the operators
attempting to achieve shutdown at the respective units ASP.
Fire procedure 0-FCA-1.00, Limiting MCR Fire, Revision 29, does not require the
operators to bring self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) gear to the ESGR nor are
any SCBAs readily available at the ESGRs. The Surry Appendix R Report did not
include an evaluation of potential maloperation of the ventilation system, its
DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED HEREWITH CONTAINS SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3, THIS DOCUMENT IS DECONTROLLED
Enclosure
9
ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3 CONTAIN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
components, or its effect on habitability at the ASP. As a result, the alternative
shutdown capability was not physically independent of the fire area as required by
Sections III.G.3 and III.L of Appendix R. The licensee initiated PI S-2003-0643 to
evaluate the independence and operability of the ESGR ventilation system during an
MCR fire.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the finding was associated with the protection
against external factors attribute and affected the objective of the Mitigating Systems
cornerstone to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond
to initiating events. Therefore, the finding is greater than minor.
During the significance determination period, the inspectors determined that the issue
was of very low safety significance (Green). Some of the factors (assumptions used in
the SDP, MC 0609, App. F) causing the issue to be of very low safety significance were:
- Heat from a fire and the natural buoyancy of smoke will cause the smoke gas
layer to accumulate near the ceiling of the MCR. Because the ESGR is located
below the MCR, smoke and toxic gases must nearly fill the MCR envelope in
order to drive the smoke gas layer down through ventilation ducts to the room
below.
- Due to the large volume in the MCR, more than two bench boards would need to
be involved in a fire to generate sufficient smoke to fill the MCR. The likelihood
of fire spreading to more than two bench boards is very low due to their low fire
ignition frequency and due to their construction (self-contained cabinets).
Additionally, the MCR is a normally manned station so the MCR operators would
attempt to fight the fire in its early stages.
- The fire brigade nominally responds in 10-15 minutes (based on fire drills over
the last 18 months) of fire notification. At that time, an MCR door(s) would be
opened to allow fire brigade access to fight the fire. This action would serve to
vent smoke out of the MCR to the turbine building and reduce the likelihood of
smoke migration down to the ESGRs. In addition, the fire brigade would set up
portable ventilation equipment to enhance smoke removal from the area.
Enforcement: This finding was considered a failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix
R, Sections III.G.3 and III.L.3, which specify that the alternative shutdown capability
shall be independent of the affected fire area(s). Contrary to the above, the shared
ventilation system between the MCR and the ESGRs did not have adequate separation,
isolation, or barriers to preclude smoke and toxic gases from being transported to the
ESGRs during a fire in the MCR. Because this finding is of very low safety significance
and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program (PI S-2003-0643),
this violation is been treated as an NCV, consistent with section VI.A of the NRC
DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED HEREWITH CONTAINS SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3, THIS DOCUMENT IS DECONTROLLED
Enclosure
10
ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3 CONTAIN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000280,281/2003008-004, Alternate Shutdown Panel
Ventilation System Not Independent From Impacts Of A Main Control Room Fire.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On February 2, 2004, the inspectors presented the inspection results by telephone to
Mr., and other members of your staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors
confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the
inspection.
DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED HEREWITH CONTAINS SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3, THIS DOCUMENT IS DECONTROLLED
Enclosure
11
ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3 CONTAIN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
M. Adams, Site Engineering Manager
R. Blount, Site Vice President
T. Carlisle, Nuclear Engineering
B. Garber, Licensing
T. Gunning, Fire Protection Engineer
J. Kloecker, Mechanical Engineer
H. Le, Supervisor Engineering
M. Smith, Systems Engineering Manager
T. Sowers, Director Operations and Maintenance
B. Staley, Maintenance Manager
J. Swientoniewski, Operations Manager
M. Thomas, Electrical
NRC personnel
G. McCoy, Senior Resident Inspector, Surry
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000281/2003008-001 URI Fire Response Procedures 2-FCA-4.00 And 0-FCA-14.00
Not Adequate To Ensure Safe Shutdown Of Unit 2
(Section 1R05)05000280/2003008-002 AV Alternative Shutdown Capability and Response
Procedures Not Adequate to Ensure Safe Shutdown of
Unit 1 (Section 4OA5.01)
Opened and Closed
05000280/2003008-003 NCV Fire Response Procedures 1-FCA-3.00 And 0-FCA-14.00
Not Adequate To Ensure Safe Shutdown Of Unit 1
(Section 4OA5.02)
DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED HEREWITH CONTAINS SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3, THIS DOCUMENT IS DECONTROLLED
Attachment 1
12
ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3 CONTAIN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
05000280,281/2003008-004 NCV Alternate Shutdown Panel Ventilation System Not
Independent From Impacts Of A Main Control Room Fire
(Section 4OA5.03)
Closed
05000280/2003007-001 URI Fire Response Procedures 1-FCA-4.00 And 0-FCA-14.00
Not Adequate To Assure Safe Shutdown Of Unit 1
(Section 4OA5.01)05000280/2003007-002 URI Fire Response Procedures 1-FCA-3.00 And 0-FCA-14.00
Not Adequate To Assure Safe Shutdown Of Unit 1
(Section 4OA5.02)
05000280,281/2003007-003 URI Alternate Shutdown Panel Ventilation System Not
Independent From Impacts Of A Main Control Room Fire
(Section 4OA5.03)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Procedures:
0-FCA-14.00, Charging and Seal Injection Flow Paths, Rev. 2
1-FCA-3.00, Limiting Cable Vault and Cable Tunnel Fire, Rev. 12
1-FCA-4.00, Limiting ESGR Number 1 Fire, Rev. 13
2-FCA-4.00, Limiting ESGR Number 2 Fire, Rev. 14
Drawings:
(Note: 11448 indicates Unit 1, 11548 indicates Unit 2)
11448-FAR-205, Equipment Location - Appendix R Auxiliary Building Plan El 13-0", sh. 2,
Rev. 16
11448-FB-25A, Ventilation & Air Conditioning Service Building, sh. 1, Rev. 9
11448-FB-25B, Ventilation & Air Conditioning Service Building, sh. 2, Rev. 9
11448-FB-25C, Ventilation & Air Conditioning Service Building, sh. 1, Rev. 17
11448-FB-25D, Ventilation & Air Conditioning Service Building - El. 9-6", sh. 1, Rev. 16
11448-FB-25E, Ventilation & Air Conditioning Service Building - El. 9-6", sh. 1, Rev. 22
11448-FB-25F, Ventilation - Service Building Floor El. 42'-0" and 47'-0" Columns 21/4 to 6, sh. 1,
Rev. 13
11448-FB-25G, Ventilation - Service Building Floor El. 42'-0" Columns 10 to 131/2, sh. 1, Rev.
12
11448-FB-25H, Ventilation - Service Building Floor El. 27'-0" Columns 21/4 to 5, Rev. 7
11448-FB-25J, Ventilation & Air Conditioning Service Building, sh. 9, Rev. 9
DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED HEREWITH CONTAINS SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3, THIS DOCUMENT IS DECONTROLLED
Attachment 1
13
ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3 CONTAIN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
11448-FB-25K, Ventilation - Service Building Floor El. 27-0" Columns 10 to 14, sh. 1, Rev. 10
11448-FB-25L, Ventilation & Air Conditioning Service Building, sh. 1, Rev. 10
11448-FB-25M, Ventilation & Air Conditioning Service Building, sh. 12, Rev. 4
11448-FB-25N, Ventilation & Air Conditioning Service Building, sh. 13, Rev. 3
11448-FB-25K, Ventilation - Service Building Roof El. 60'-0" and 75'-0" Columns 21/2 to 14,
Rev. 6
11448-FB-25R, Ventilation - Service Building Floor El. 27'-0" Columns F to 21/4, Rev. 4
11448-FB-25S, Ventilation - Service Building Floor El. 42'-0" Columns F to 21/4, Rev. 2
11448-FB-25T, Ventilation - Service Building Roof/Floor El. 56'-0" and 70'-0" Columns F to 21/4,
Rev. 3
11448-FB-25U, Ventilation - Service Building Floor El. 27'-0" Part Plans, Sections and Detail,
Rev. 2
11448-FB-25V, Ventilation - Service Building Part Plans El. 42'-0" Columns 11 to 121/2, Rev. 4
11448-FE-3FH, Wiring Diagram Control Cabinet 1-CW-PNL-1A & 1-CW-PNL-1B, sh. 1, Rev. 2
11448-FE-3FJ, Wiring Diagram Control Logic Cabinet 1-CW-PNL-2, sh. 1, Rev. 0
11448-FE-27C, Arrangement Emergency Switchgear and Relay Rooms El. 9'-6", sh. 1, Rev. 31
11448-FE-42T, Conduit Plan Emergency Swgr Rm El. 9'-6", Rev. 18
11448-FE-45A, Conduit & Cable Tray Plan Cable Tunnel & Vaults, sh. 1, Rev. 19
11448-FE-48C, Conduit Plan Auxiliary Building - El. 13'-0", sh. 1, Rev. 19
11448-FE-48F, Cable Terminations & Conduit Sleeve Loading Tables Auxiliary Building, sh. 1,
Rev. 31
11448-FE-90BA, Appendix R Block Diagram Charging Pump System, sh. 1, Rev. 2
11448-FE-90BB, Appendix R Block Diagram Charging Pump System, sh. 2, Rev. 2
11448-FM-5B, Arrangement Auxiliary Building, sh. 1, Rev. 13
11548-FE-27A, Arrangement Emergency Switchgear and Relay Rooms El 9'-6", sh. 1, Rev. 25
Plant Issue Reports Reviewed:
S-2003-1490, Review FCA procedures to determine the need for additional guidance on
establishment of charging flow to both units via the charging pump cross-tie.
S-2003-5254, The design data used to support Dominions methodology for maintaining
pressurizer level following an Appendix R fire in the Unit 1 emergency switchgear room
appears to be inadequate and non-conservative.
Other Documents:
Non-Seismic Individual Plant Examination for External Events, dated 12/15/94
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WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3, THIS DOCUMENT IS DECONTROLLED
Attachment 1
14
ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3 CONTAIN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ASP Auxiliary Shutdown Panel
AV Apparent Violation
BTU British Thermal Units
CCDP Conditional Core Damage Probability
CDF Core Damage Frequency
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CPV Cable Penetration Vault
CV&T Cable Vault and Tunnel
EIHP Early Inventory High Pressure Injection
ESGR Emergency Switchgear and Relay Room
FCA Fire Contingency Action
IEL Initiating Event Likelihood
IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident
NCV Non-cited Violation
No. Number
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
MCC Motor Control Center
MCR Main Control Room
PARS Publicly Available Records System
PI Plant Issue
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
SBCV Service Building Cable Vault
SCBA Self-contained Breathing Apparatus
SDP Significance Determination Process
SER Safety Evaluation Report
SERP SDP/Enforcement Review Panel
UFSAR Undated Final Safety Analysis Report
URI Unresolved Item
VEPCO Virginia Electric and Power Company
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WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS 2 AND 3, THIS DOCUMENT IS DECONTROLLED
Attachment 1
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
REMOVED
Attachment 2
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
REMOVED
Attachment 3