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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARL-24-002, Late LLRW Shipment Investigation Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2024-02-0202 February 2024 Late LLRW Shipment Investigation Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G ML23342A1182024-01-0909 January 2024 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Plan L-23-019, Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.152023-12-18018 December 2023 Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.15 ML23334A1822023-11-30030 November 2023 Biennial Report for the Defueled Safety Analysis Report Update, Technical Specification Bases Changes, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation Summary, and Regulatory Commitment Change Summary November 2021 Through October 2023 L-23-012, Master Decommissioning Trust Agreement Changes for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2 and 3, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Palisades Nuclear Plant and the Non-Qualified Trust for Big Rock Point2023-11-13013 November 2023 Master Decommissioning Trust Agreement Changes for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2 and 3, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Palisades Nuclear Plant and the Non-Qualified Trust for Big Rock Point ML23306A0992023-11-0202 November 2023 and Indian Point Energy Center, Notification of Changes in Schedule in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(7) L-23-011, 10 CFR 72.48 Biennial Change Summary Report2023-10-27027 October 2023 10 CFR 72.48 Biennial Change Summary Report IR 05000293/20234012023-08-31031 August 2023 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2023401 & 2023001 (Cover Letter Only) IR 05000293/20230022023-08-0404 August 2023 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2023002 L-23-008, Correction to Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI)2023-05-23023 May 2023 Correction to Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI) ML23136A7792023-05-15015 May 2023 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, January 1 Through December 31, 2022 ML23135A2152023-05-15015 May 2023 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, January 1 Through December 31, 2022 L-23-004, HDI Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Reports - 20222023-04-24024 April 2023 HDI Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Reports - 2022 L-23-003, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations2023-03-31031 March 2023 Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations ML23088A0382023-03-29029 March 2023 Stations 1, 2, & 3, Palisades Nuclear Plant, and Big Rock Point - Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance ML23069A2782023-03-13013 March 2023 Request for Scoping Comments Concerning the Environmental Review of Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1 Subsequent License Renewal Application ML22361A1022023-02-24024 February 2023 Reactor Decommissioning Branch Project Management Changes for Some Decommissioning Facilities and Establishment of Backup Project Manager for All Decommissioning Facilities IR 05000293/20220042023-02-15015 February 2023 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2022004 ML22356A0712023-01-31031 January 2023 Issuance of Exemption for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ISFSI Regarding Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report - Cover Letter ML22347A2782022-12-21021 December 2022 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Plan Dated December 21, 2022 L-22-042, Oyster, Pilgrim, Indian Point, Palisades and Big Rock Point - Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.152022-12-14014 December 2022 Oyster, Pilgrim, Indian Point, Palisades and Big Rock Point - Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.15 L-22-041, Supplemental Information to Enhance Exemption Request Detail for Pilgrim ISFSI Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report Due Date Extension2022-12-0909 December 2022 Supplemental Information to Enhance Exemption Request Detail for Pilgrim ISFSI Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report Due Date Extension IR 05000293/20220032022-11-18018 November 2022 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2022003 L-22-036, Decommissioning Trust Fund Agreement2022-11-0808 November 2022 Decommissioning Trust Fund Agreement ML22276A1762022-10-24024 October 2022 Decommissioning International Proposed Revisions to the Quality Assurance Program Approval Forms for Radioactive Material Packages ML22266A1922022-09-23023 September 2022 and Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Request to Withdraw Prior Submissions from NRC Consideration ML22272A0352022-09-22022 September 2022 S. Lynch-Benttinen Letter Regarding U.S. Citizen Intent to Sue U.S. Fish and Wildlife and NOAA Fisheries Representing the Endangered Species (Na Right Whale) Which Will Be Adversely Affected by Holtec International Potential Actions ML22269A4202022-09-22022 September 2022 Citizen Lawsuit ML22241A1122022-08-29029 August 2022 Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 72.212(a)(2), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), (B)(5)(i), (b)(11), and 72.214 for Pilgrim ISFSI Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report IR 05000293/20220022022-08-12012 August 2022 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2022002 ML22215A1772022-08-0303 August 2022 Decommissioning International (HDI) Proposed Revisions to the Quality Assurance Program Approval Forms for Radioactive Material Packages ML22206A1512022-08-0101 August 2022 NRC Office of Investigations Case Nos. 1-2022-002 & 1-2022-006 ML22221A2592022-08-0101 August 2022 LTR-22-0217-1-NMSS - Town of Duxbury Letter Opposing the Irradiated Water Release from Pilgrim (Docket No. 05000293) ML22193A1662022-07-28028 July 2022 LTR-22-0154-1 - Heather Govern, VP, Clean Air and Water Program, Et Al., Letter Regarding Radioactive Wastewater Disposal from the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Docket No. 05000293) ML22175A1732022-07-28028 July 2022 LTR-22-0153-1 - Response Letter to D. Turco, Cape Downwinders, from A. Roberts, NRC, Regarding Holtec-Pilgrim Plans to Dump One Million Gallons of Radioactive Waste Into Cape Cod Bay ML22154A4882022-06-0101 June 2022 Letter from Conservation Law Foundation Regarding Irradiated Water Release from Pilgrim ML22154A1622022-05-26026 May 2022 Letter and Email from Save Our Bay/Diane Turco Regarding Irradiated Water Release from Pilgrim ML22136A2602022-05-16016 May 2022 Submittal of Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for January 1 Through December 31, 2021 ML22136A2572022-05-16016 May 2022 Submittal of Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for January 1 Through December 31, 2021 ML22102A0932022-05-12012 May 2022 LTR-22-0067 Response to Matthew P. Levesque, President, Barnstable Town Council Regarding Irradiated Water Release from Pilgrim IR 05000293/20220012022-05-11011 May 2022 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000293/2022001 ML22104A0542022-04-30030 April 2022 LTR-22-0093 Response to Sheila Lynch-Benttinen, Regarding Irradiated Water Release from Pilgrim L-22-026, Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Report - 20212022-04-29029 April 2022 Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Report - 2021 ML22152A2592022-04-25025 April 2022 Zaccagnini Letter Dated 04/25/22 ML22152A2642022-04-19019 April 2022 Flynn Letter Dated 04/19/22 ML22091A1062022-04-0101 April 2022 Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance (10 CFR 50.54(w)(3)) L-22-022, and Indian Point Nuclear Generating Stations 1, 2, & 3 - Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations - Holtec.2022-03-25025 March 2022 and Indian Point Nuclear Generating Stations 1, 2, & 3 - Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations - Holtec. ML22130A6762022-03-14014 March 2022 Decola Ltr Dtd 03/14/22 Re Potential Discharge of Radioactive Water from Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML22041B0762022-03-0707 March 2022 03-07-22 - Letter to the Honorable William R. Keating, Responds to Letter Regarding Proposed Release of Irradiated Water at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Into Cape Cod Bay ML22054A2962022-02-23023 February 2022 Annual ISFSI Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2021 2024-02-02
[Table view] Category:Report
MONTHYEARL-21-078, Late LLRW Shipment Investigation Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2021-07-0606 July 2021 Late LLRW Shipment Investigation Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G ML18158A1332018-06-0606 June 2018 Extent of Condition Review in Response to Findings Associated with Inspection 95003: Evaluation of NRC Assessment and Inspection Processes at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML19056A1932017-08-17017 August 2017 Attachment 2 Design Input Record ML17212A5712017-07-28028 July 2017 Recovery Plan ML16153A3722016-06-20020 June 2016 Final ASP Analysis Pilgrim (LER 293-15-001) ML15043A7542015-03-24024 March 2015 Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Phase 1 of Order EA-13-109 (Severe Accident Capable Hardened Vents) ML15075A0822015-03-12012 March 2015 Entergy'S Required Response of the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Flooding-Hazard Reevaluation Report ML14294A5912014-11-0404 November 2014 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (LER 293-13-009) ML14171A2002014-06-26026 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident (MF0264) ML14176A9612014-06-24024 June 2014 Submittal of Non-Proprietary BWROG Technical Product, BWROGTP-11-006 - ECCS Containment Walkdown Procedure, Rev 1 (January 2011), as Formally Requested During the Public Meeting Held on April 30, 2014 ML14324A0402014-04-17017 April 2014 HI-2104715, Seismic Analysis of the Loaded HI-TRAC in the SFP and SFP Slab Qualification. ML14092A0232014-03-31031 March 2014 Entergy'S Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima... ML13338A6672013-12-0909 December 2013 Mega-Tech Services, LLC Technical Evaluation Report Regarding the Overall Integrated Plan for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, TAC No.: MF0777 ML13232A1322013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment C, Page C85 of C413 Through Page C173 of C413 ML13232A1342013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment C, Page C174 of C413 Through Page C250 of C413 ML13232A1352013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment C, Page C251 of C413 Through Page C331 of C413 ML13232A1372013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment C, Page C332 of C413 Through Page C413 of C413 ML13232A1382013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment D, Page D1 of D127 Through Page D73 of D127 ML13232A1402013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment D, Page D74 of D127 Through Attachment H, Page H12 of H12 ML13232A1412013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment I, Page I1 of I9 Through Attachment J, Page J77 of J134 ML13232A1312013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment C, Page C1 of C413 Through Page C84 of C413 ML13232A1302013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment a Through Attachment B ML13232A1292013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment J, Page J78 of J134 Through End ML13232A1282013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Cover Through Page 37 of 37 ML12342A3862012-12-0606 December 2012 Fifth Ten-Year Inservice Testing Program and Request for Approval of IST Relief Requests, PR-03 and PR-05 ML12333A3212012-11-27027 November 2012 Flooding Walkdown Report - Entergy'S Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) the Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML12160A3712012-06-11011 June 2012 Review of 60-Day Response to Request for Information Regarding Recommendation 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Related to Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant Accident ML13196A1892012-04-12012 April 2012 Email from B. Balsam, NRR to J. Crocker, NOAA Pilgrim: NRC Complete Responses to 4-9-12 NMFS Questions ML13196A2362012-04-12012 April 2012 Email from M. Smith, OGC to S. Uttal OGC Et Al., on Additional Pilgrim Exhibits ML12047A1192012-02-29029 February 2012 Request to Include Atlantic Sturgeon in Ongoing Informal Section 7 Consultation for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML1204403512012-02-27027 February 2012 Acknowledgement of Withdrawal and Results of Acceptance Review Proposed License Amendment Request for Rod Withdrawal Minimizer Bypass Allowance to Allow Reactor Startup ML11346A5682011-12-0909 December 2011 Report Entitled - Regulatory Meltdown: How Four Nuclear Regulatory Commissioners Conspired to Delay and Weaken Nuclear Reactor Safety in the Wake of Fukushima ML1127000692011-09-26026 September 2011 Enclosure 2, Mfn 10-245 R4, Description of the Evaluation and Surveillance Recommendations for BWR/2-5 Plants ML14086A5022011-06-13013 June 2011 Enclosure 1 to PNPS Letter 2.14.027 - Entergy Nuclear Engineering Report No. PNPS-RPT-11-00001, Re-assessment of Pilgrim Seismic Core Damage Frequency ML1104203062011-01-31031 January 2011 GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Report, NEDC-33532, Revision 2, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Safety Valve Setpoint Increase, Enclosure 4 to 2.11.007 ML1007704512010-03-31031 March 2010 NEDO-33532, Rev 0, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Safety Valve Setpoint Increase. ML1019004142009-03-12012 March 2009 Condition Report, CR-PNP-2009-00879 ML0821900132008-08-0707 August 2008 Monthly Operating Reports Second Quarter 2008 ML0712300162007-05-0202 May 2007 FSEIS Reference - Nonradioactive Waste Information ML0712102522007-04-21021 April 2007 Weld Filler and Welding Electrode Materials for Structural Weld Overlays within the Scope of Pilgrim Relief Request, PRR-15 ML0711303842007-04-10010 April 2007 GE-NE-0000-0066-0380-R1-NP, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Torsion Arm Clamp Stress Evaluation Report. ML0710802222007-04-10010 April 2007 Repair of the Core Shroud Stabilizer Assemblies - Torsion Arm Clamp Stress Evaluation Report ML0708701322007-03-22022 March 2007 Request for Authorization Under the Provision of 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i) for Modification of the Core Shroud Stabilizer Assemblies ML0708701342007-03-21021 March 2007 GE-NE-000-0064-9392-R2-NP, Pilgrim Unit 1, IGSCC Assessment of Shroud Repair X-750 Component Other than the Replacement Upper Support Assembly and Tie Rod Nut. ML0709303132007-03-14014 March 2007 GE-NE-0000-0061-6306-R4-NP, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Shroud Repair Replacement Upper Support Assembly-Stress Analysis Report. ENOC-07-00002, Units 1, 2 & 3; Pilgrim and Vermont - Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July 2006 - December 20062007-02-28028 February 2007 Units 1, 2 & 3; Pilgrim and Vermont - Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July 2006 - December 2006 ML0629104322006-11-17017 November 2006 Final Response to Task Interface Agreement 2006-01 Related to the Adequacy of Emergency Diesel Generator and Shutdown Transformer Load Testing at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML0634804022006-11-0606 November 2006 E-MAIL: (PD) Fwd: Entergy Nuclear Cultural Resources Protection Plan ML0707901202006-10-0606 October 2006 CR-PNP-2006-03702, an Issue Was Raised During the Region I Inspection for License Renewal Regarding the Expected Service Life of a Protective Coating for Buried Piping ML0707901152006-10-0404 October 2006 CR-PNP-2006-03677, Controls to Prevent and Monitor for Corrosion of the Drywell Shell Need to Be Assessed and Strengthened 2021-07-06
[Table view] Category:Technical
MONTHYEARML19056A1932017-08-17017 August 2017 Attachment 2 Design Input Record ML14294A5912014-11-0404 November 2014 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (LER 293-13-009) ML14176A9612014-06-24024 June 2014 Submittal of Non-Proprietary BWROG Technical Product, BWROGTP-11-006 - ECCS Containment Walkdown Procedure, Rev 1 (January 2011), as Formally Requested During the Public Meeting Held on April 30, 2014 ML14324A0402014-04-17017 April 2014 HI-2104715, Seismic Analysis of the Loaded HI-TRAC in the SFP and SFP Slab Qualification. ML14092A0232014-03-31031 March 2014 Entergy'S Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima... ML13338A6672013-12-0909 December 2013 Mega-Tech Services, LLC Technical Evaluation Report Regarding the Overall Integrated Plan for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, TAC No.: MF0777 ML13232A1342013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment C, Page C174 of C413 Through Page C250 of C413 ML13232A1282013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Cover Through Page 37 of 37 ML13232A1292013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment J, Page J78 of J134 Through End ML13232A1302013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment a Through Attachment B ML13232A1312013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment C, Page C1 of C413 Through Page C84 of C413 ML13232A1322013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment C, Page C85 of C413 Through Page C173 of C413 ML13232A1352013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment C, Page C251 of C413 Through Page C331 of C413 ML13232A1372013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment C, Page C332 of C413 Through Page C413 of C413 ML13232A1382013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment D, Page D1 of D127 Through Page D73 of D127 ML13232A1402013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment D, Page D74 of D127 Through Attachment H, Page H12 of H12 ML13232A1412013-06-17017 June 2013 PNPS-CS-12-00001, Rev. 1, Pilgrim Station Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Attachment I, Page I1 of I9 Through Attachment J, Page J77 of J134 ML13196A2362012-04-12012 April 2012 Email from M. Smith, OGC to S. Uttal OGC Et Al., on Additional Pilgrim Exhibits ML12047A1192012-02-29029 February 2012 Request to Include Atlantic Sturgeon in Ongoing Informal Section 7 Consultation for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML1204403512012-02-27027 February 2012 Acknowledgement of Withdrawal and Results of Acceptance Review Proposed License Amendment Request for Rod Withdrawal Minimizer Bypass Allowance to Allow Reactor Startup ML14086A5022011-06-13013 June 2011 Enclosure 1 to PNPS Letter 2.14.027 - Entergy Nuclear Engineering Report No. PNPS-RPT-11-00001, Re-assessment of Pilgrim Seismic Core Damage Frequency ML1104203062011-01-31031 January 2011 GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Report, NEDC-33532, Revision 2, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Safety Valve Setpoint Increase, Enclosure 4 to 2.11.007 ML1007704512010-03-31031 March 2010 NEDO-33532, Rev 0, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Safety Valve Setpoint Increase. ML0821900132008-08-0707 August 2008 Monthly Operating Reports Second Quarter 2008 ML0710802222007-04-10010 April 2007 Repair of the Core Shroud Stabilizer Assemblies - Torsion Arm Clamp Stress Evaluation Report ML0711303842007-04-10010 April 2007 GE-NE-0000-0066-0380-R1-NP, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Torsion Arm Clamp Stress Evaluation Report. ML0708701322007-03-22022 March 2007 Request for Authorization Under the Provision of 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i) for Modification of the Core Shroud Stabilizer Assemblies ML0708701342007-03-21021 March 2007 GE-NE-000-0064-9392-R2-NP, Pilgrim Unit 1, IGSCC Assessment of Shroud Repair X-750 Component Other than the Replacement Upper Support Assembly and Tie Rod Nut. ML0709303132007-03-14014 March 2007 GE-NE-0000-0061-6306-R4-NP, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Shroud Repair Replacement Upper Support Assembly-Stress Analysis Report. ML0634804022006-11-0606 November 2006 E-MAIL: (PD) Fwd: Entergy Nuclear Cultural Resources Protection Plan ML0707901742006-07-26026 July 2006 CR-PNP-2006-02799, Fair Amount of Water in Torus Room Floor ML0612206302006-04-26026 April 2006 License Renewal Audit and Review Plan for Plant Aging Management Review and Programs for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant, Docket Number 50-293 ML0603000282006-01-25025 January 2006 2006/01/25-Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station License Renewal Application ML0707906472005-11-0101 November 2005 Procedure No. 2.1.8.7. Rev. 4, ASME Code Visual Examination of Primary Containment (Rtype H6.02) BVY 04-088, Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period January - June 20042004-08-30030 August 2004 Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period January - June 2004 ML0411704722004-03-0909 March 2004 Engineering Report No. PNPS-RPT-04-00001, Rev. 0, Risk Impact Assessment of Extending Containment Type a Test Interval. ML0802902312004-02-12012 February 2004 Westinghouse Technical Bulletin: Information Regarding Recent Crossflow Ultrasonic Flow Measurement System Performance Observations, TB-04-4 ML0305202692003-02-15015 February 2003 Follow-up Report, Reference Event #39516 ML0212302992002-03-25025 March 2002 Transmittal of Written Summary of Recent Reactor Water Level Indication Issues at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station NRC Generic Letter 1979-451979-09-25025 September 1979 NRC Generic Letter 1979-045: Transmittal of Reports Regarding Foreign Reactor Operation Experiences 2017-08-17
[Table view] |
Text
Entergy Nuclear Generation Co.
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360 Mike Bellamy March 25, 2002 Site Vice President U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
SUBJECT:
Entergy Nuclear Generation Company Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Docket No. 50-293 Recent Reactor Water Level Indication Issues LETTER NUMBER: 2.02.026
Dear Sir or Madam:
Recently we have had several conversations with members of the NRC Regional Staff concerning three operating events in the year 2001 in which erroneous reactor water level indications were observed at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim). As a result of these discussions, we believed that it was appropriate to provide you a written summary, beyond that already provided in Licensee Event Reports, of the causes andcorrective actions for each event as well as a current status of our future corrective actions.
As we have discussed, it is important to emphasize that although the three events shared the common attribute of erroneous reactor water level indication, the causes of the events were not the same. It is also important to note that in none of the events were required safety system actuations actually adversely impacted by erroneous water level indication. Furthermore, in each event other reactor water level indication was available. Therefore, each of these events was of minimal safety significance.
Pilgrim management fully recognizes and appreciates the importance of ensuring accurate and reliable reactor water level indication under all operating conditions. We believe that the actions we have taken to date in response to each of these events have been timely and appropriate commensurate with the safety significance of the issues.
If you desire further information, please contact Mr. Steve Bethay at 508-830-7800.
Sincerely, Mike Bellamy
Attachment:
- 1. Recent Reactor Water Level Indication Issues 202026
Letter Number 2.02.026 Page 2 cc: Mr. Travis Tate, Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mail Stop: 0-8B-1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1 White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. Robert Hallisey Radiation Control Program Commonwealth of Massachusetts Exec Offices of Health & Human Services 174 Portland Street Boston, MA 02114 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. Steve McGrail, Director Mass. Emergency Management Agency 400 Worcester Road P.O. Box 1496 Framingham, MA 01701-0313 Senior Resident Inspector Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 202026
Attachment 1 Letter Number 2.02.026 Page 1 Attachment 1 Recent Reactor Water Level Indication Issues 202026
Attachment 1 Letter Number 2.02.026 Page 2 Attachment 1 Recent Reactor Water Level Indication Issues A. Background In the late 1980's and early 1990's, several Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) experienced events in which erratic reactor water level indication was observed during periods of reactor depressurization.
As a result, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Bulletin 93-03, Generic Letter 92-04, and Information Notices 92-54 and 93-27 describing reactor water level instrument operating problems resulting from non-condensable gases coming out of solution and forming "bubbles" in the instrument reference legs when the reactor depressurizes. This phenomenon came to be known as "Level Notching" due to the characteristic reactor water level recorder traces which showed sudden step changes in indicated water level at certain reactor pressures. The magnitude and duration of these step changes or "notches" could be correlated very closely to changes in static head in the instrument reference legs as bubbles moved upward through the reference leg toward the condensing chamber. In response to Bulletin 93-03, Pilgrim committed to perform hardware modifications via Reference 1 to the Emergency Core Cooling system (ECCS) and Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) initiation instruments reference legs. The NRC acknowledged the Pilgrim response via Reference 2. The Pilgrim design change, installed in 1993, is consistent with recommendations and resolutions provided by the BWR Owner's Group.
The intent of the installed system, the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System, was to prevent migration of non-condensable gases from the two condensing chambers to the reference legs of the ECCS and ATWS initiation instruments. This system was not installed on all of the reactor water level instrumentation reference legs (e.g., the feedwater level instrumentation reference leg). The system installed was to provide a continuous flow (.008 gpm) of water to the reference leg side of the instruments. The Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System takes its water supply from the Control Rod Drive (CRD) system charging water header between the CRD header isolation valve and the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Control Units (HCUs). The system then feeds the two reference legs through independent flow control stations and two in-series check valves (See Figure 1). Following installation of this system Pilgrim did not experience "notching" due to non condensable gases during reactor shutdowns on the modified reference legs until the December 2001 event.
B. Recent Reactor Water Level Indication Issues Three operating events occurred in the year 2001 in which erroneous reactor water level indications were observed at Pilgrim. Although the three events shared the common attribute of erroneous reactor water level indication, the causes of the events were not the same. It is important to note that in none of the events were required safety system actuations actually adversely impacted by erroneous water level indication. Furthermore, in each event, other level instrumentation remained fully functional. Therefore, each of these events was of minimal safety significance.
The following is a summary of the causes and corrective actions for each event as well as a current status of our future corrective actions.
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- 1. Event During the Reactor Shutdown on 4/21/01
- a. Event On April 21, 2001, during reactor cool down to commence Refueling Outage #13, episodes of multiple, rapid level indication errors occurred which were characterized by positive level indication errors sometimes followed by negative level indication errors; oscillating and eventually converging at actual reactor water level.
The actual water level was normal at the time of the event and alternate level indication was available to assess reactor conditions. Operations personnel have been trained on water level indication issues including notching. During this event, Operations personnel were aware that the signals were invalid and responded appropriately.
- b. Cause The investigation revealed that the level swings originated from the instrument racks where the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System injects into the reference legs and commenced at approximately 100 psig reactor pressure. Although the level notches were similar to the notching in the early 1990's (i.e., traceable to piping geometry), no notching was observed at approximately 400 psig as is typical of non-condensable gas evolving out into the reference leg. Also, the frequency and magnitude of the notching was not consistent with prior notching events due to non-condensable gas migration in the reference legs.
Based on this information, it was concluded that this event was not indicative of level notching caused by non-condensable gas migration in the instrument reference legs.
Further investigation identified that significant CRD system maintenance had been performed in early 2001. This maintenance included opening the CRD system to repair one of the two CRD pumps. Inadequate filling and venting of the CRD system following this maintenance is believed to have allowed a volume of air to become trapped in the water source for the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System.
The Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System takes suction from the CRD charging water header near the CRD System high point vent. Therefore, air trapped in the charging water header during maintenance moved into the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System as the reactor vessel (and instrument reference legs) depressurized relative to the charging water header during the reactor cool down process. As the air moved through the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System into the instrument racks and reference legs, oscillations between train "A" level indication error episodes and train "B" level indication error episodes occurred. Apparently, air injection shifted from one parallel flow path to the other because of pressure differences created by the air injection itself. Normally, the flow paths are balanced (i.e., the same amount of flow to each train from a common header).
Based on the above, the cause of this event was determined to be air injection through the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System to both trains as the result of previous CRD system maintenance.
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- c. Corrective Actions Corrective actions taken for this event included the following:
- Backfilled the affected reference legs.
- Inspected Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System components.
- Performed maintenance on Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System components as necessary.
- Improved procedures for venting and draining of the CRD system, backfilling of the reference legs, and the operation and maintenance of the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System.
- Performed training on venting and draining of the CRD system and the operation and maintenance of the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System.
- 2. Event During the Unplanned Automatic Reactor Scram on 8/13/01
- a. Event On August 13, 2001, Pilgrim experienced an unplanned automatic reactor scram from 100%
power. Following the scram, the Operators manually closed the CRD charging water header isolation valve as a part of procedural steps to allow the control rods to settle and confirm "00" position indication. Once all control rods indicated "00" position, the Operators "reset" the scram. Per design, this action closed all 145 scram inlet valves. In the resultant configuration (i.e., CRD charging water header isolation valve closed and all scram inlet valves closed), the CRD charging water header was "floating" at essentially the CRD hydraulic control unit accumulator residual pressure.
In this configuration, both the "A" and "B" trains of reactor water level indication began to slowly increase with the "A" train eventually indicating off scale high. As the scram recovery progressed, the operators reopened the CRD charging water header isolation valve thus restoring full CRD system pressure to the charging water header and the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System. As a result, indicated reactor water level converged to "normal" level indication. No "notching" or "entrained air" reactor water level indication anomalies occurred.
The actual water level was normal at the time of the event and alternate level indication was available to assess reactor conditions. Operations personnel have been trained on water level indication issues. During this event Operations personnel were aware that the signals were invalid and responded appropriately.
- b. Cause Subsequent event investigation revealed that in this unique situation (i.e., CRD charging water header isolation valve closed, scram reset, and reactor pressure very close to and slowly raising with respect to residual accumulator pressure), a portion of the reference leg water inventory drained from both independent trains into the common Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System piping and CRD charging water header. This caused the reactor water level indication to read high. Although each train of the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System is equipped with two in-series check valves that are intended to prevent 202026
Attachment 1 Letter Number 2.02.026 Page 5 such an event, the differential pressure between the reactor vessel and the CRD charging water header was too low to cause valve closure. The installed check valves have a design closure differential pressure of about 6 psi to preserve reference leg inventory during pipe break scenarios. In this event, the differential pressure across the check valves was less than 6 psi.
Further complicating this event was the discovery that the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System had been operating at 10 times the normal flow rate. While this erroneous flow rate setting was beneficial from the perspective of preventing non-condensable gas migration and thus level notching, it also allowed a larger reverse flow rate under the unique differential pressure conditions experienced in the August 2001 event.
Ultimately, the event investigation determined the root cause of the erroneous level indication was an inadequate boundary isolation scheme between the common Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System and both reference legs. This inadequate boundary isolation allowed the reference leg inventory to drain from both independent reactor water level instrumentation trains into the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System piping and CRD charging water header.
Given that there were now two operating events in which erroneous reactor water level indication had been observed, Pilgrim brought in outside experts to independently evaluate our cause determinations and corrective actions to date. Individuals from other BWR plants as well as a retired industry expert performed a detailed assessment of Pilgrim actions for both the April 2001 and August 2001 events. They concluded that the root cause evaluations were correct and that corrective actions taken were appropriate.
- c. Corrective Actions Corrective actions taken for this event included the following:
"* Isolated the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System, as a result of the discovery of this common mode failure mechanism.
"* Prepared an engineering evaluation to specify the frequency at which the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System would need to be placed in service. This evaluation was performed due to recognizing the need to minimize the possibility for level notching due to non-condensable gas migration with the system isolated. The evaluation concluded that with an assumed leakage rate of 15 ml/day, the system would need to be placed in service to purge the reference legs every 90 days.
"* Filled and vented the instrument reference legs during the start-up from the August 13 scram.
"* Established a weekly surveillance to monitor for external leakage from the instrument racks and verify that the assumption of the engineering evaluation was maintained valid.
"* Brought in outside experts to independently evaluate the cause determinations and corrective actions to date.
" Placed the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System in service for several hours, in late October 2001, on both the "A" and "B" instrument racks to purge non-condensable gasses from the reference legs.
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- 3. Event During the Unplanned Automatic Reactor Scram on 12/27/01
- a. Event On December 27, 2001, Pilgrim experienced an unplanned automatic reactor scram due to an unanticipated equipment failure. During reactor cool down, reactor water level notching was experienced on the level instruments fed from condensing pot 12B (i.e., the "B" reference leg). The level instruments associated with the "A" reference leg were not affected.
The actual water level was normal at the time of the event and alternate level indication was available to assess reactor conditions. Operations personnel have been trained on water level indication issues. During this event Operations personnel were aware that the signals were invalid and responded appropriately.
- b. Cause The event investigation determined that the reactor water level instrument notching was caused from off-gassing of dissolved gasses in the "B" train instrument reference leg fed from Condensing Pot 12B while the reactor was being slowly depressurized. The dissolved gasses in the reference leg were the result of migration of gas-laden condensate from the condensing pot into the reference leg.
The following mechanisms for the transport of the non-condensable gases down the "B" reference leg were investigated and ruled out:
"* A thermal gradient transporting the non-condensable gas was ruled out because no heat source could be identified to provide the necessary thermal gradient.
"* Degraded equalizing valves providing an internal leakage path which drew the non condensable gas down the reference leg was ruled out by testing the suspect valves for leakage.
"* External leakage drawing the non-condensable gas down the reference leg was ruled out by testing the method used to monitor for external leakage and the results for the leakage surveillances since the August shutdown.
A review of the history of "notching" at Pilgrim was performed. This review identified that the reference legs can be expected to remain free of "notching" for a period of time without a flushing or backfill. Additionally, this review determined that the time varied depending on the reference leg. The time identified from the system operating history that the reference leg can be expected to remain free of "notching" without flushing of the non-condensables is at least 30 days for the "B" reference leg and at least 100 days for the "A" reference leg.
This historical data is consistent with the event in December 2001, in that flushing of the reference legs had not been performed for 71 days and the "B" reference leg experienced "notching" and the "A" reference leg did not.
Efforts continue to determine the transport mechanism for non-condensable gas migration in the "B" reference leg prior to the December 27, 2001 scram. But based on the historical data actions can be taken to effectively preclude occurrence of "notching" without the identification of the specific mechanism.
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- c. Corrective Actions Corrective actions taken for this event included the following:
"* Flushing the reference legs to ensure that all non-condensibles had been removed.
"* Testing the suspect equalizing valves for leakage.
"* Reviewing the external leakage monitoring program including testing the leakage monitoring methods.
"* Increasing the frequency of flushing the "B" reference leg to once per 14 days. The 90 day frequency on the "A" reference leg was maintained.
C. Conclusions and Current Plans concerning the Recent Reactor Water Level Indication Issues
- 1. Event Summary
- a. Event During the Reactor Shutdown on 4/21/01 Online CRD pump maintenance and air entrapped during system restoration led to air injection through the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System.
- b. Event During the Unplanned Automatic Reactor Scram on 8/13/01 Reference leg inventory drained from 2 independent reactor water level instrumentation trains into the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System piping and CRD charging water header.
- c. Event During the Unplanned Automatic Reactor Scram on 12/27/01 Notching was seen on a single train of reactor water level indication due to non condensable gas in the instrument reference leg fluid coming out of solution.
- 2. Lessons Learned from the Events
- a. Event During the Reactor Shutdown on 4/21/01 A common backfill system has the potential to inject air and cause level indication errors on both trains of RWL instrumentation.
- b. Event During the Unplanned Automatic Reactor Scram on 8/13/01 A common backfill system provides opportunity for internal system leakage, reference leg drain down and level indication errors on both trains of RWL instrumentation under very specific operating conditions.
- c. Event During the Unplanned Automatic Reactor Scram on 12/27/01 Intermittent backfill and vigilant leakage controls are needed to prevent RWL instrumentation notching. Leakage control must include not only external paths but all internal paths as well. Continuous backfill of the reference legs provides an effective method of preventing the introduction of non-condensables into the reference legs.
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- 3. Summary of Corrective Actions Taken Corrective actions taken for these events include the following:
a Established investigation teams.
b Revised or issued procedures for the following activities:
"* venting of the CRD System,
"* surveillance and maintenance of the instrument reference legs,
"* operation and maintenance of the Instrument Reference Backfill System,
"* testing of specific instrument equalizing valves for leakage,
"* testing of the external leak detection methods, and
"* training of Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System requirements.
c Isolated the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System to prevent further draining events and instituted reverence leg surveillance and periodic backfill.
d Performed an independent review of the investigation.
- 4. Future Plans Current plans are to prepare the design and licensing documents to support placing at least the "B" side of the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System into continuous service with the "A" side placed inservice on an intermittent basis. This approach will eliminate the potential for a common mode "drain down" event as was experienced in August 2001 while ensuring that the classical level indication notching will not occur. A permanent modification to the Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System is under development that will address all three of the 2001 events.
D. References
- 1. BECO letter to the NRC, NRC Bulletin 93-03: Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs, Letter Number 2.93.089, dated 7/16/93
- 2. NRC letter to the BECO, Response to Bulletin 93-03, dated 8/11/93.
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Attachment 1 Letter Number 2.02.026 Page 9 Figure 1 Simplified Instrument Reference Leg Backfill System Arrangement Condensing Chamber Condensing Chamber 12B 12 A Instrument Instrument reference leg To Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Control Units
( From CRD Pumps 202026