Text

License Amendment Request: Revise Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation, Main Steam Isolation Valves and Add Main Feedwater Isolation Technical Specification
	ML18180A291
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	06/29/2018
From:	Mcfeaters C; Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	LAR S17-06, LR-N17-0144
	Download: ML18180A291 (59)
	v • d • e

PSEG Nuclea r LLC P.O . Box 236, Hancocks Brid g e, N ew J ersey 0 8038-0236 O PSEG Nuclear LLC 10 CFR 50.90 LR-N 17-0144 LAR S17-06 JUN 2 9 2018

u. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington , DC 20555-0001 Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75 NRC Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311

Subject:

License Amendment Request: Revise Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation, Main Steam Isolation Valves and Add Main Feedwater Isolation Technical Specification In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90, PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) is submitting a request for an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Salem Generating Station (Salem) Units 1 and 2.

The proposed amendment will revise Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.3.1 , "Reactor Trip System Instrumentation," 3/4.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation ," 3/4.7.1.5, "Main Steam Line Isolation Valves," and add a new TS for main feedwater isolation to better align the TS with the design basis analyses and the design of the instrumentation.

The Enclosure provides a description and assessment of the proposed changes . Attachment 1 provides the existing TS pages marked up to show the proposed changes. Attachment 2 provides existing TS Bases pages marked up to show the proposed changes and are being provided for information only.

PSEG requests approval of this license amendment request (LAR) in accordance with standard NRC approval process and schedule. Once approved, the amendment will be implemented within 60 days from the date of issuance.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 , a copy of this application, with attachments, is being provided to the designated State of New Jersey Official.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Brian Thomas at 856-339-2022.

JUN 2 9 2018 LR-N17-0144 10 CFR 50.90 Page 2 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on C /29/1 P (Date)

Charles V. McFeaters Site Vice President Salem Generating Station

Enclosure:

Evaluation of the Proposed Changes Mark-up of Proposed Technical Specification Pages Mark-up of Proposed Technical Specifications Bases Pages cc: Administrator, Region I, NRC NRC Project Manager, Salem NRC Senior Resident Inspector, Salem Mr. P. Mulligan, Chief, NJBNE PSEG Corporate Commitment Tracking Coordinator Salem Commitment Tracking Coordinator

LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Enclosure Evaluation of the Proposed Changes Table of Contents 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION ........................... .. .......................................... ...................... 1 2.1 System Design and Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.2 Current Technical Specifications Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2.3 Reason for the Proposed Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.4 Description of the Proposed Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.2 Precedent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

6.0 REFERENCES

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 ATTACHMENTS:

1. Mark-up of Proposed Technical Specification Pages

2. Mark-up of Proposed Technical Specifications Bases Pages

LR-N17-0144 LAR S17-06 Enclosure 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION The proposed amendment will revise Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.3.1, "Reactor Trip System Instrumentation," 3/4.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," 3/4.7.1.5, "Main Steam Line Isolation Valves," and add a new TS for main feedwater isolation to better align the TS with the design basis analyses and the design of the instrumentation. TS 3/4.3.4.1 is revised to modify the mode applicability of the reactor trip from turbine trip (TS Table 3.3-1 Functional Unit 18), revise the mode applicability of main steam isolation (TS Table 3.3-3 Functional Unit 4 and TS 3.7.1.5), revise the mode applicability of turbine trip & feedwater isolation (TS Table 3.3-3 Functional Unit 5), revise the current engineered safeguard feature actuation system (ESFAS) Functional Unit 1 description to remove turbine trip and feedwater isolation, revise ESFAS Functional Unit 5 (Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation) to add line items for automatic actuation logic and safety injection, revise the note associated with main steam isolation valve (MSIV) vent valves in ESFAS Functional Unit 4, and add a new TS for main feedwater isolation valves (FIVs), feedwater regulating valve (FRVs), FRV bypass valves (FRVBVs) and steam generator feedwater pump (SGFP) turbine steam stop valves.

2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION 2.1 System Design and Operation The proposed changes to the Salem TS are associated with the design and operation of 1) the reactor protection system (RPS) reactor trip function associated with a main turbine trip, 2) the ESFAS function for safety injection, 3) the ESFAS function for main steam line isolation including operation of the MSIVs, and 4) the ESFAS function for turbine trip and feedwater isolation.

The RPS is designed in part to trip the reactor as a result of a trip of the main turbine. This trip function is interlocked with the P-9 permissive that blocks the automatic trip input below 50%

rated thermal power.

The ESFAS is actuated by redundant logic and coincidence networks. Each network actuates a device that operates the associated ESF equipment. The redundant logic is processed through the solid state protection system (SSPS) trains. The ESFAS instrumentation associated with this proposed TS change is associated with the instrumentation and equipment designed to respond to a main steam line break (SLB), feedwater line break (FLB) and feedwater system malfunction.

The SLB is mitigated in part by the generation of a reactor trip, safety injection (SI) signal, main steam line isolation signal and feedwater isolation signal. The FLB is mitigated in part by generation of a reactor trip, Sl signal, main steam line isolation signal and feedwater isolation signal. The feedwater system malfunction is mitigated by reactor trip and feedwater line isolation signal.

An Sl signal is generated by any of the following:

Manual lnitation

2 out of 3 high containment pressure 1

LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Enclosure

2 out of 3 pressurizer pressure low

High differential pressure signals between steam lines

High steam line flow in two main steam lines in coincidence with either low-low reactor coolant system (RCS) average temperature or low steam line pressure in any two lines A main steam line isolation signal is generated by any of the following:

Manual lnitation

2 out of 3 high-high containment pressure

High differential pressure signals between steam lines

High steam line flow in two main steam lines in coincidence with either low-low reactor coolant system (RCS) average temperature or low steam line pressure in any two lines A turbine trip and feedwater isolation signal is generated by any of the following:

Safety Injection

2 out of 3 high-high steam generator level in any loop Salem is a four loop plant with a MSIV (MS167) and a main steam bypass valve (MS18) in parallel to the MSIV in each loop. A main steam line isolation signal will isolate the main steam lines by fast closure of the MSIVs and closure of the air operated bypass valves. The MSIVs are parallel slide gate valves with double discs. They are operated by means of an integral piston and cylinder, utilizing steam within the valve and piping. A vent line from the upper end of the cylinder branches to two diaphragm-operated dump valves (MSIV vent valves) which are connected in parallel to provide redundant control. Upon receipt of a closure signal, the MSIV vent valves open and release steam from the upper side of the main valve piston, thereby closing the MSIV. The MSIV vent valves are designated as MS169 and MS171. The MS169 vent valves receive the MSI signal from the "A" train of SSPS and the MS171 vent valves receive the MSI signal from the "8" train of SSPS. Only one MSIV vent valve per MSIV is required to open to initiate the fast closure of the MSIV.

Each of the four steam generators is provided main feedwater through lines that contain a motor operated stop check valve (BF22), an air operated FRV (BF19), an air operated FRVBV (BF40) in parallel to the FRV and a motor operated FIV (BF13). Upstream of the main feedwater lines are the two steam driven steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs). The SGFPs provide feedwater to all four steam generators and are steam driven pumps. The steam to the SGFP is provided by either the main steam or reheat steam.

A turbine trip and feedwater isolation signal will close the BF13s, BF19s, BF40s, trip the SGFPs by closing turbine steam stop valves (MS43s and RS15s) and trip the main turbine.

2.2 Current Technical Specification Requirements The current Salem Unit 1 and 2 TS associated with this proposed change are summarized below:

The mode applicability for reactor trip from turbine trip (Functional Unit 18) in TS Table 3.3-1, "Reactor Trip System Instrumentation," is Mode 1. The mode applicability for Functional Unit 18 in TS Table 4.3-1, "Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements," is Modes 1 and 2.

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LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Enclosure

TS Table 3.3-3, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," TS Table 3.3-4, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints," and Table 4.3-2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements," Functional Unit 1 is titled, "Safety Injection, Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation."

The mode applicability for steam line isolation (Functional Unit 4) in TS Table 3.3-3 and TS Table 4.3-2, is Modes 1, 2 and 3

Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation (Functional Unit 5) of TS Table 3.3-3, Table 3.3-4 and Table 4.3-2 only includes a line item associated with steam generator water level -

high-high. The mode applicability is modes 1, 2 and 3.

Note*** of TS Table 3.3-3 modifies the requirements for steam line isolation automatic isolation logic (Functional Unit 4.b). The note permits one solenoid vent valve on any one MSIV to be isolated provided the remaining seven solenoid vent valves remain OPERABLE.

2.3 Reason for Proposed Change The proposed changes to the Salem TS will align the mode applicability and functions associated with reactor trip on main turbine trip, main steam line isolation and turbine trip &

feedwater isolation with the assumptions in the current design basis analyses and the design of the instrumentation. The changes will also align the Salem TS with the NUREG-1431 "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants" (STS).

The changes to the mode applicability for reactor trip on main turbine trip, main steam isolation and turbine trip & feedwater isolation will allow mode ascension during plant outages to proceed while components are either aligned to their credited safety function position or the safety function is already completed.

The proposed change to the*** note of TS Table 3.3-3 for the MSIV vent valves will avoid the need to have to transition the plant to a lower mode when the safety function of having the MSIV closed is already completed. During the Salem Unit 2 refueling outage in 2015, two MSIV vent valves for different MSIVs were leaking by and needed to be isolated to perform repairs. At the time the vent valves were leaking by, the associated MSIVs were closed, completing their safety function of isolating the associated main steam line. As a result of the current wording of the***

note, Action 20 of TS Table 3.3-3 would have to be entered if both vent valves were isolated at the same time to perform work. This would have required Salem Unit 2 to transition from Mode 2 to Mode 4. Work was performed sequentially on the vent valves to allow the unit to remain in Mode 2 but this ultimately delayed restoring the MSIVs to operable status.

The current Salem TS does not contain a unique LCO associated with the FIV, FRV, FRVBV or SGFP turbine steam stop valves. Consequently, whenever one of the individual components (valves) becomes inoperable, PSEG has conservatively considered the automatic actuation logic for LCO 3.3.2.1 "Engineering Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation" Functional Unit 1.b inoperable. Specifically, PSEG has entered TS 3.0.3 since both channels of automatic actuation logic were considered incapable of completing the required function.

It is clear by the wording of the Action for LCO 3.3.2.1 Functional Unit 1.b, that the purpose and intent of this LCO action statement is directed to the inoperability of the logic channels of Solid State Protection System (SSPS) trains and not the individual components. However, in the absence of clear technical specification guidance, PSEG chose the conservative approach of 3

LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Enclosure applying the most restrictive instrumentation action statement to individual component inoperability. Application of this conservative approach places the unit in a short duration shutdown action statement when diverse means of accomplising the required feedwater isolation function remain available.

2.4 Description of Proposed Change The proposed changes to the Salem Unit 1 and 2 TS are described below and are indicated on the marked up TS pages provided in Attachment 1 of this enclosure. Deletions are indicated with a double strike through and additions are marked with underlining.

1. Revise the mode applicability for reactor trip from turbine trip (Functional Unit 18) in TS Table 3.3-1, "Reactor Trip System Instrumentation" and Table 4.3-1, "Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements," to Mode 1 above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock. This change is consistent with TS Table 3.3.1-1 in NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants" (STS), and establishes internal consistency of the Salem TS, the TS Bases, and the UFSAR.

Footnote "#" is added to Table 3.3-1:

Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.

2. Change the description of Functional Unit 1 in TS Table 3.3-3, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," TS Table 3.3-4, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints," and Table 4.3-2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements," from "Safety Injection, Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation" to "Safety Injection." Revise Functional Unit 5, Turbine Trip & Feedwater Isolation, in TS Tables 3.3-3, 3.3-4, and 4.3-2 to add new line items for "Safety Injection" and "Automatic Actuation Logic." These changes are consistent with TS Table 3.3.2-1 in NUREG-1431. The details of the changes are provided in Attachment 1 of this enclosure.

3. Revise the mode applicability for engineered safety feature actuation system (ESFAS) instrumentation for steam line isolation (Functional Unit 4) in TS Table 3.3-3, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," and Table 4.3-2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements" for Modes 2 and 3 not to apply when all of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) are closed. This change is consistent with TS Table 3.3.2-1 in NUREG-1431.

Footnote "(a)" is added to provide an exception to the operability requirements for steam line isolation in Modes 2 and 3:

(a) Except when all MSIVs are closed

4. Revise the Applicable Modes for Functional Unit 5, "Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation" in TS Table 3.3-3, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," and TS Table 4.3-2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Surveillance Requirements," consistent with TS Table 3.3.2-1in the NUREG-1431 STS.

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LR-N17-0144 LAR 817-06 Enclosure

Footnote "* " is being added to TS Table 3.3-3 and footnote "(b)" is being added to TS Table 4.3-2 to provide an exception to the operability requirements for turbine trip and feedwater isolation in Modes 2 and 3:

Except when all main feedwater lines are isolated by (1) a closed and de-activated feedwater isolation valve, or (2) closed and deactivated feedwater regulating valve (FRV) and FRV bypass valves, or (3) a closed manual valve.

5. Revise note*** associated with TS Table 3.3-3 Functional Unit 4.b, Steam Line Isolation Automatic Actuation Logic to clarify when the action statement needs to be entered when MSIV vent valves are isolated. This change will allow the vent valves associated with an inoperable and closed MSIV to be isolated. Proposed change to TS Table 3.3-3 Function 4.b Note***:

- - The automatic actuation logic includes two redundant solenoid operated vent valves for each Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV). Vent valves associated with an inoperable MSIV may be isolated provided that the MSIV is closed in accordance with actions of TS 3. 7.1.5. One vent valve on any one of the remaining OPERABLE or open Mam Steam lselatieR Valve MSIVs may be isolated without affecting the function of the automatic actuation logic provided the remaining se¥eR solenoid vent valves remain OPERABLE. The isolated MISV vent valve shall be returned to OPERABLE status upon the first entry into MODE 5 following determination that the vent valve is inoperable. For any condition where more than one ef t!;le eiRt solenoid vent valves are is inoperable for the OPERABLE or open MSIVs, entry into ACTION 20 is required.

6. Revise mode applicability of TS 3.7.1.5, Main Steam Isolation Valves, for Modes 2 and 3 not to apply when all of the MSIVs are closed. This change is consistent with TS 3.7.2 in NUREG-1431. The mode applicability is revised as follows:

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 al98 MODES 2 and 3 except when all MSIVs are closed.

7. Add new TS 3/4.7. 13, "Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (FIVs), Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (FRVs), FRV Bypass Valves (FRVBVs), and Steam Generator Feedwater Pump (SGFP) Turbine Steam Stop Valves" for feedwater isolation, based on TS 3.7.3 in the NUREG-1431 STS. The Salem safety analyses credit SGFP trip as part of feedwater isolation. Therefore, the proposed change includes the SGFP trip function.

New TS 3/4.7.13 is included in Attachment 1 of this enclosure.

B. Revise Index to add new TS 3/4.7.13 and Bases 3/4.7.13 of this enclosure includes Technical Specification Bases changes for information only. Changes to the TS Bases pages will be incorporated in accordance with Unit 1 TS 6.17 and Unit 2 TS 6.16, "Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program."

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LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Enclosure

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The proposed changes to the Salem TS are associated with the design and operation of 1) the reactor protection system (RPS) reactor trip function associated with a main turbine trip, 2) the ESFAS function for safety injection, 3) the ESFAS function for main steam line isolation including operation of the MSIVs, and 4) the ESFAS function for turbine trip and feedwater isolation. No changes to the accident analyses or system design are being made. The proposed changes to the TS more closely align the Salem TS with the current system design, accident analysis assumptions, and NUREG-1431.

Change 2.4.1 - Mode Applicability of Reactor Trip from Turbine Trip The reactor trip on a turbine trip is actuated by 2 out of 3 logic from the low autostop oil pressure or closure of the main turbine steam stop valves. A turbine trip causes a direct reactor trip when operating above P-9 and results in a controlled short-term release of steam to the condenser, which removes the sensible heat from the RCS and thereby avoids steam generator safety valve actuation. The turbine bypass system provides the capability to dump up to 40 percent of full load steam flow directly to the condenser. The turbine bypass system in conjunction with the 10 percent load follow capability of the reactor control system enables the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) to accept a 50-percent load rejection without reactor trip. The P-9 interlock prevents or defeats the automatic block of reactor trip on turbine trip with reactor power 50%> of rated thermal power. This reactor trip is anticipatory and included as part of good engineering practice and prudent design.

The reactor trip from turbine trip enhances the overall reliability of the RPS, but no credit is taken in any of the safety analyses for this trip.

The proposed change to the TS mode applicability for the reactor trip as a result of a main turbine trip is being revised to be consistent with the definition of the P-9 interlock. This will establish internal consistency among the TS, TS Bases and UFSAR, and does not affect any safety analyses. This change in mode applicability is also consistent with NUREG-1431.

The following discussion is associated with proposed TS changes 2.4.2 through 2.4.7 of Section 2.4:

The ESFAS instrumentation associated with these proposed TS changes are associated with the instrumentation and equipment designed to respond to a main steam line break (SLB), feed water line break (FLB) and feedwater system malfunction.

Steam Line Break (SLB)

A SLB is analyzed to determine the response of the reactor core and to determine the resulting mass and energy release. Two different analyses are performed since conservative assumptions for the core response analysis are different than the conservative assumptions for mass and energy release.

As discussed in UFSAR Section 15.4.2, the SLB is partially mitigated by the generation of a reactor trip, safety injection (SI) signal, main steam line isolation and feedwater isolation. The Sl signal is generated as a result of any of the following:

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LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Enclosure

Low pressurizer pressure

High differential pressure signals between steam lines

High steam line flow in coincidence with either low-low RCS average temperature or low steam line pressure in any two steam lines

High containment pressure The main steam isolation signal is generated as a result of:

High steam line flow in coincidence with either low-low RCS average temperature or low steam line pressure in any two steam lines

High-high containment pressure For steam line breaks downstream of the MSIVs, closure of the MSIVs would completely terminate the blowdown. For any steam line break, no more than one steam generator would blow down even if one of the MSIVs fails to close.

For the core response to a SLB, the bounding case was determined to be the break of the steam line upstream of the MSIV with the plant at no load conditions and offsite power maintained such that the reactor coolant pumps continue to run. Since the initial steam generator water inventory is greatest at no load conditions, the magnitude of the RCS cooldown is less for steam line breaks occurring at power. Minimum safety injection system capability for injection of borated flow into the RCS is assumed in the analysis. Due to single failure considerations, injection flow is assumed to be delivered by one high-head charging pump. The MSIVs are assumed to perform their fast closure function in 12 seconds. The feedwater isolation signal is generated as a result of the safety injection signal. Feedwater isolation is assumed to occur by closure of the FRVs and FRVBVs in the loops without the steam line rupture in 10 seconds and by closure of the FIV in the loop with the steam line rupture in 32 seconds. As stated in section 15.4.2.5 of the UFSAR, all cases had a minimum departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) greater than the design DNBR limit.

The containment analysis for a SLB inside containment is discussed in UFSAR Section 15.4.8.2. The safety features that provide the necessary protection to limit mass and energy releases to the containment are reactor trip, safety injection, feedwater line isolation, and steam line isolation. As discussed in UFSAR Section 15.4.8.2.2, four different failures were considered in evaluating the mass and energy release to the containment:

Failure of a FRV to close

Failure of a MSIV to close

Failure of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) runout protection equipment, and

Failure of containment safeguards train.

The MSIVs are assumed to close within 12 seconds of generation of the main steam line isolation signal. The failure of an MSIV to close results in the blow down of one steam generator. The steam contained in the un-isolatable portion of the steam line is considered in the analysis.

The feedwater isolation signal is generated as a result of the safety injection signal. To increase the mass and energy released to the containment, a failure of the FRV to close associated with the loop with the steam line rupture is assumed. The FIV is assumed to completely close within 7

LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Enclosure 32 seconds. In Salem Unit 1 and 2 TS Amendments 287 and 270 (Reference 3), a reduction in the feedwater mass/energy was credited in the containment analysis for the SLB: 1) a reduction in feedwater as the FIV closes and 2) SGFP trip and coast down. As discussed in Section 3.1.2 of the NRC safety evaluation report for Amendments 287/270, the FIVs are credited to be fully closed in 32 seconds which includes a 2 second Sl time delay and a 30 second valve stroke. A linear reduction in feedwater flow is taken for the last 10 seconds of the FIV valve stroke. As documented in Section 3.1.1 of the NRC SER for Amendments 287/270, credit is taken for trip of the SGFPs in 7 seconds and coast down of the pump over the next 7 seconds to further reduce the feedwater flow. This analysis demonstrates that the pressure and temperature remain below the design temperature and pressure of the containment.

Feedwater Line Break (FLB)

A FLB as documented in UFSAR Section 15.4.3 is defined as a break in a feedwater pipe large enough to prevent the addition of sufficient feedwater to the steam generators to maintain shell side fluid inventory in the steam generators. If the break is postulated in the feedwater line between the stop-check valve (BF22) and the steam generator, fluid from the steam generator may be discharged through the break. A feedline break upstream of the BF22 stop-check valves would only affect the NSSS as a loss of normal feedwater and is not part of the scope of the proposed TS changes. The following discussion is applicable to the feedline break downstream of the BF22 stop check valve.

The FLB is mitigated by a reactor trip, safety injection, auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system initiation, and main steam line isolation.

The Sl signal is generated as a result of any of the following:

High differential pressure signals between steam lines

High steam line flow in coincidence with either low-low reactor coolant system (RCS) average temperature or low steam line pressure in any two lines

High containment pressure

Low pressurizer pressure The main steam isolation signal is generated as a result of any of the following:

High-high containment pressure

High steam flow in coincidence with either low-low RCS average temperature or low steam line pressure in any two steam lines Depending on the size of the FLB, the break could cause either a RCS cool down (by excessive energy discharge through the break) or a RCS heatup. The RCS cool down for the FLB is bounded by the analysis performed for the SLB.

For the RCS heatup analysis, main feedwater is assumed to stop at the time the feed line break occurs due to all main feedwater spilling out the break. In addition the FRV and FRVBV will close as a result of the feedwater isolation signal generated from the Sl signal.

For the FLB inside containment, the containment pressure and temperature response is bounded by the evaluation performed for the SLB.

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LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Enclosure Feedwater System Malfunction Excessive heat removal due to feedwater system malfunctions as documented in UFSAR Section 15.2.10. Feedwater malfunctions were evaluated for a single feedwater line and multiple feedwater lines at hot full power (HFP) and hot zero power (HZP) conditions. For the HFP cases, feedwater is isolated by the high-high steam generator signal. For the HZP cases, feedwater is isolated by the Sl signal. Feedwater isolation is credited to occur as a result of closure of the FIVs within 32 seconds.

As stated in section 15.2.10.4 of the UFSAR, the minimum DNBR remains above the safety analysis limit and the limit on the peak linear heat generation is not exceeded.

Change 2.4.2: Revise ESFAS Functional Unit 1 and Unit 5 To align the Salem Unit 1 and 2 TS with NUREG-1431, Functional Unit 1 in TS Tables 3.3-3, 3.3-4 and 4.3-2 is being revised to remove "Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation" from the description of Functional Unit 1 such that Functional Unit 1 will only be "Safety Injection." Functional Unit 5, "Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation" of the same TS Tables is being revised to add new line items for 'Safety Injection' and 'Automatic Actuation Logic.'

The Salem Unit 1 and 2 Technical Specifications were based on the NUREG-0452, "Standardized Technical Specifications for Westinghouse PWRs." During the conversion from NUREG-0452 to NUREG-1431, the description of Functional Unit 1 was revised to reflect only "Safety Injection" and line items for "Safety Injection" and "Automatic Actuation Logic" were added to Functional Unit 5 for "Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation."

Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation was removed from the Functional Unit 1 description since the description of the functional unit was determined to be inaccurate. Functional Unit 1 identifies all of the inputs that generate a safety injection signal. The safety injection signal is an input that will generate a turbine trip and feedwater isolation signal.

Since a safety injection signal generates a turbine trip and feedwater isolation signal, a line item is added to Functional Unit 5 for safety injection. Consistent with NUREG-1431, the safety injection line item added to Functional Unit 5 refers to Functional Unit 1 for all of the initiation functions and requirements.

An automatic actuation logic line item is added to Functional Unit 5 consistent with NUREG-1431. The actuation logic for the turbine trip and feedwater isolation is processed through the two redundant logic trains of the solid state protection system (SSPS). Only one of the two logic trains is required to actuate to complete the turbine trip and feedwater isolation function. TS Table 3.3-3 is revised to require a minimum of two channels with one channel to complete the trip function. The mode applicability is modes 1, 2 and 3 which is consistent with existing mode applicability with the high-high steam generator level actuation in TS Table 3.3-3. Action 20 is added for the automatic actuation logic consistent with other functional units in TS Table 3.3-3 that have a mode applicability of modes 1, 2 and 3.

9

LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Enclosure The surveillance frequencies for TS Table 4. 3-2 Functional Unit 5.b will be contained in the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (SFCP) with the exception of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION which are not applicable for the automatic actuation logic. Salem has implemented TSTF Change Traveler TSTF-425, Revision 3 (Reference 4) as approved by the NRC with TS Amendments 299 and 282 (Reference 5) for Units 1 and 2 respectively. The initial surveillance frequency for the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the automatic actuation logic for Functional Unit 5.b will be consistent with the current frequencies of the automatic actuation logic for Functional Units 1.b, 2.b, 3.a.2, 3.b.2, 3.c.2 and 4.b.

The criteria for relocation of a surveillance frequency to a licensee controlled program in accordance with TSTF-425 were reviewed. These surveillance frequencies are periodic surveillances that: 1) do not reference other approved programs for the specified interval, 2) are not event driven , 3) do not have a time component based on event occurrence, and 4) are not related to a specific condition for performance. Therefore the periodic surveillance frequencies are within the scope of TSTF-425 for location in the licensee controlled Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Change 2.4.3 - Add Mode Applicability Exception to ESFAS Functional Unit 4 Functional Unit 4, Steam Line Isolation, of TS Tables 3.3-3, and 4.3-2 is being revised to add new note (a) to Modes 2 and 3. Note (a) adds an exception to TS applicability in Modes 2 and 3 when all MSIVs are closed. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431 Table 3.3.2-1. The steam line isolation function has already been completed when all of the MSIVs are in their closed position. Therefore the instrumentation for initiation of steam line isolation is not required when all of the MSIVs are closed in Modes 2 and 3.

Change 2.4.4 - Add Mode Applicability Exception to ESFAS Functional Unit 5 Functional Unit 5, Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation, of TS Tables 3.3-3 and 4.3-2 is being revised to add new note* to Table 3.3-3 and new note (b) to Table 4.3-2 for Modes 2 and 3. The notes add an exception to the TS applicability in Modes 2 and 3 when all of the main feedwater lines are isolated. Each individual line can be isolated by either (1) a closed and de-activated FIV (BF13), or (2) a closed and de activated FRV (BF19) and associated FRVBV (BF40), or (3) a closed manual valve.

With all of the feedwater lines isolated, the design basis function for feedwater isolation has already been completed. In Modes 2 and 3 the main turbine is not in service. Therefore the instrumentation for initiation of the turbine trip and feedwater isolation is not required when the all of the main feedwater lines are isolated. This change is consistent with NUREG-1431 Table 3.3.2-1.

10

LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Enclosure

Change 2.4.5 - Revise Note*** for ESFAS Functional Unit 4.b Note*** was added to Functional Unit 4.b of TS Table 3.3-3 by Amendment 57 (Unit

1) and 26 (Unit 2) to add operating restrictions when one MSIV vent valve is isolated.

As described in Section 2.1, each MSIV has two solenoid operated vent valves (MS169 and MS171) that open to vent steam from the main valve piston. Venting the steam performs the fast closure function of the MSIV. Only one vent valve is required to open to actuate the closure of the MSIV. Each vent valve can be individually isolated. As discussed in Amendment 57/26, restrictions were added to the main steam line isolation automatic actuation logic to allow continued operation with only one of the eight vent valves isolated (the remaining seven vent valves must remain operable). With one MSIV vent valve isolated, a single failure including failure of one train of SSPS to actuate would prevent only a single MSIV from closing which is consistent with the assumptions in the design basis accidents.

The*** note was added to address isolating a leaking MSIV vent valve at power which could cause closure of the MSIV. Since this note was added to the automatic actuation logic it is currently applicable in Modes 1, 2 and 3. Operation in Mode 1 is not possible with a closed MSIV. However, in Modes 2 and 3 one or more MSIVs could be closed. When closed, the MSIV has completed its credited design function for a design basis accident. Once an MSIV is closed, opening of the MSIV vent valves for the MSIV is no longer required. The propsed changes to note*** remove unnecessary restrictions associated with the MSIV vent valves in Modes 2 and 3 while retaining the current provisions of note***. In Modes 2 and 3, the*** is modified to allow the vent valves to be isolated that are associated with an inoperable MSIV that is closed in accordance with the actions of TS 3.7.1.5 without entering TS Table 3.3-3 Action 20. The*** is further modified to require that if more than one solenoid vent valve for all OPERABLE and inoperable but not closed MSIVs, then Action 20 is required to be entered.

The revision to note*** prevents unnecessary delays during return to operation from an outage or shutdown if more than one MSIV vent valve is found to be leaking while continuing to satisfy the design basis accident assumption that only one MSIV will fail to close as a result of a single failure.

During the return of Unit 2 from service from the Fall 2015 refueling outage, MSIV vent valves associated with two different MSIVs were determined to be leaking by and needed to be isolated to perform repairs. The leakage occurred with the unit in Mode 2 while the MSIVs were being returned to service. Isolating both MSIV vent valves to perform the work would have resulted in entry into Action 20 of TS Table 3.3-3 requiring the unit to be returned to Mode 3 although the MSIVs were closed and performing their design basis safety function. The valves were isolated and repaired sequentially to prevent transitioning the unit from Mode 2 to Mode 3, extending the duration of the unit startup.

Change 2.4.6 - Revise Mode Applicability for TS 3.7.1.5 The mode applicability for TS 3.7.1.5, Main Steam Isolation Valves, is being revised to add an exception to Modes 2 and 3 for when all MSIVs are closed. Continued 11

LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Enclosure operation in Modes 2 and 3 with all of the MSIVs inoperable but maintained in their closed position is acceptable since the design basis accident function for steam line isolation has already been completed. This change is consistent TS 3.7.2 of NUREG-1431.

Change 2.4.7 - Add New TS 3/4. 7.13 The Salem Unit 1 and 2 TS do not currently have a TS for the equipment actuated by the feedwater isolation signal. As discussed above the turbine trip and feedwater isolation signal is Funtional Unit 5 of the ESFAS instrumentation tables. During the issuance of NUREG-1431, a main feedwater isolation TS was added to address the equipment actuated by the feedwater isolation signal.

PSEG is proposing to add new TS 3/4.7.13, "Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (FIVs), Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (FRVs), FRV Bypass Valves (FRVBVs),

and Steam Generator Feedwater Pump (SGFP) Turbine Steam Stop Valves." This new TS is modeled after NUREG-1431, Diablo Canyon TS Amendment 140 (Reference 6), and Callaway TS Amendment 198 (Reference 7).

As discussed previously, the feedwater isolation function for Salem includes the following equipment actuations:

Closure of the FIVs (BF13s)

Closure of the FRVs (BF19s)

Closure of the FRVBV (BF40s)

Trip of the SGFP by closure of the turbine steam stop valves (RS15s and MS43s)

NUREG-1431 TS 3.7.3 includes only the FIVs, FRVs and FRVBVs in the scope of the main feedwater TS. In TS Amendment 140, Diablo Canyon added a limiting condition for operation (LCO), actions, and surveillance requirements for the main feedwater pump turbine stop valves to the TS. Similarly, Salem credits the trip and coast down of the SGFPs in the containment response analysis. The level of detail of the mode applicability for TS 3/4.7.13, was developed based on Callaway TS Amendment 198.

New TS 3/4.7.13 requires that the FIV, FRV and FRVBV in each of the four main feedwater lines and four SGFP turbine steam stop valves to be operable. Operability of FIVs, FRVs and FRVBVs is required in Modes 1, 2 and 3 except when either a) the individual valve is closed and deactivated, b) the redundant automatic valve(s) in the main feedwater line is closed and deactivated, or c) the individual main feedwater line is isolated by a closed manual valve. Operability of the SGFP turbine steam stop valves is required in Modes 1, 2 and 3 except when a) the turbine steam stop valve is closed and deactivated, or b) the associated steam supply to the SGFP is isolated by a closed manual valve, or c) the associated SGFP feedwater flow path is isolated. The exceptions to the mode applicability ensure that the credited safety function for the associated valve has been completed.

The TS actions allow for separate entry for each inoperable valve. Continued operation with an inoperable FIV, FRV, FRBV or SGFP turbine steam stop valve is 12

LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Enclosure permitted for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . Following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months the inoperable valve must be closed or isolated. For the SGFP in addition to closing or isolating the turbine steam stop valve, the associated SGFP feedwater flow path can be isolated. Closure or isolation of the inoperable valve or isolation of the SGFP feedwater flow path must be verified once every 7 days. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months allowed outage time takes into account that redundancy remains to complete the feedwater isolation function by the remaining OPERABLE valves. This action is consistent with NUREG-1431.

A separate TS action is added for two valves in the same feedwater flowpath being inoperable resulting in loss of feedwater isolation capability. At least one valve needs to be restored to OPERABLE status within eight hours or the affected flow path needs to be isolated. These actions are consistent with NUREG-1431.

If neither of the above TS actions can be met, the unit is required to be placed in HOT STANDY (Mode 3) within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and HOT SHUTDOWN (Mode 4) within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . This action places the plant in a mode where the TS is no longer applicable.

New surveillance requirements (SR) 4.7.13.1 and 4.7.13.2 are consistent with NUREG-1431 SR 3.7.3.1 and 3.7.3.2. The frequency of SR 4.7.3.12 will be contained in the surveillance frequency control program and will have an initial frequency of 18-months.

Change 2.4.8 - Revise Index The TS Index is revised to include the addition of the new TS 3/4.7.13 and the associated bases section. This change is an administrative nature.

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC)

Salem was designed and constructed in accordance with Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) proposed General Design Criteria published in July 1967. The applicable AEC proposed criteria, as document in Salem UFSAR Section 3.1, were compared to 10 CFR 50 Appendix A General Design Criteria (GDC) as discussed below. The applicable GDC criteria are GDC 13, 16, 20, and 21.

Criterion 13-/nstrumentation and control. Instrumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety, including those variables and systems that can affect the fission process, the integrity of the reactor core, the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment and its associated systems. Appropriate controls shall be provided to maintain these variables and systems within prescribed operating ranges.

GDC Criterion 13 is similar to AEC Criterion 12.

13

LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Enclosure Criterion 16-Containment design. Reactor containment and associated systems shall be provided to establish an essentially leak-tight barrier against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment and to assure that the containment design conditions important to safety are not exceeded for as long as postulated accident conditions require.

GDC Criterion 16 is similar to AEC Criterion 10.

Criterion 20-Protection system functions. The protection system shall be designed (1) to initiate automatically the operation of appropriate systems including the reactivity control systems, to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) to sense accident conditions and to initiate the operation of systems and components important to safety.

GDC Criterion 20 is similar to AEC Criterion 14 and 15.

Criterion 2 1-Protection system reliability and testability. The protection system shall be designed for high functional reliability and inservice testability commensurate with the safety functions to be performed. Redundancy and independence designed into the protection system shall be sufficient to assure that (1) no single failure results in loss of the protection function and (2) removal from service of any component or channel does not result in loss of the required minimum redundancy unless the acceptable reliability of operation of the protection system can be otherwise demonstrated. The protection system shall be designed to permit periodic testing of its functioning when the reactor is in operation, including a capability to test channels independently to determine failures and losses of redundancy that may have occurred.

GDC Criterion 21 is similar to AEC Criterion 19 and 20.

Following implementation of the proposed changes, Salem Units 1 and 2 will remain in compliance with AEC Criterion 10, 12, 14, 15, 19, and 20.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) requires technical specifications to include limiting conditions for operation, defined as the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When a limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the technical specifications until the condition can be met. 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) states that A technical specification limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor must be established for each item meeting one or more of the following criteria:

(A) Criterion 1. Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

(B) Criterion 2. A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

(C) Criterion 3. A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

14

LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Enclosure (D) Criterion 4. A structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

TS 3/4.7.13 is being added to the Salem Unit 1 and 2 TS in accordance with Criterion 3.

4.2 Precedent In a letter from Pacific Gas and Electric Company to the NRC dated August 10, 1998, Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 requested a license amendment to revise ESFAS Instrumentation and Main Feedwater TS to add response times for feedwater regulating valves, associated bypass valves and trip of the main feedwater pumps (MFWP). The LAR also added the MFWP to the TS for main feedwater (ADAMS Accession No. 9808170067). The Diablo Canyon license amendment request was approved as Amendment Nos. 140 and 140 dated February 22, 2000 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15132A569).

In a letter from Ameren UE to the NRC dated May 4, 2009, Callaway Unit 1 requested a license amendment to revise TS 3.7.3 for main feedwater to more accurately reflect the conditions for when the LCO should be applicable (ADAMS Accession No. ML091400202). The Callaway license amendment request was approved as Amendment No. 198 dated June 29, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101110103) 4.3 No Significant Hazards Consideration PSEG requests an amendment to the Salem Unit 1 and 2 Operating Licenses. The proposed amendment will revise Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.3.1, "Reactor Trip System Instrumentation," 3/4.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation," 3/4.7.1.5, "Main Steam Line Isolation Valves, "and add a new TS for main feedwater isolation to better align the TS with the design basis analyses and the design of the instrumentation. TS 3/4.3.4.1 is revised to modify the mod applicability of the reactor trip from turbine trip (TS Table 3.3-1 Functional Unit 18), revise the mode applicability of main steam isolation (TS Table 3.3-3 Functional Unit 4 and TS 3.7.1.5), revise the mode applicability of turbine trip & feedwater isolation (TS Table 3.3-3 Functional Unit 5), revise the current engineered safeguard feature actuation system (ESFAS) Functional Unit 1 description to remove turbine trip and feedwater isolation, revise ESFAS Functional Unit 5 (Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation) to add line items for automatic actuation logic and safety injection, revise the note associated with main steam isolation valve (MSIV) vent valves in ESFAS Functional Unit 4, and add a new TS for main feedwater isolation valves (FIVs), feedwater regulating valve (FRVs), FRV bypass valves (FRVBVs) and steam generator feedwater pump (SGFP) turbine steam stop valves.

PSEG has evaluated the proposed changes to the TS using the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92, and determined that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration. The following information is provided to support a finding of no significant hazards:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No 15

LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Enclosure The proposed changes to the TS will not alter the way any structure, system, or component (SSC) functions, and will not alter the manner in which the plant is operated. The proposed changes do not alter the design of any SSC. Therefore the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased.

The proposed changes more accurately align the TS with the design bases accident analysis for the main steam line break, feedwater line break and feedwater malfunction.

Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not increased.

Therefore, these proposed changes do not represent a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed changes do not involve a modification to the physical configuration of the plant or changes in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed changes do not impose any new or different requirement or introduce a new accident initiator, accident precursor, or malfunction mechanism.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No The proposed changes to the TS impose requirements that are consistent with assumptions in the safety analyses. The proposed changes will not result in changes to system design or setpoints that are intended to ensure timely identification of plant conditions that could be precursors to accidents or potential degradation of accident mitigation systems.

The proposed amendment will not result in a design basis or safety limit being exceeded or altered. Therefore, since the proposed changes do not impact the response of the plant to a design basis accident, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based upon the above, PSEG concludes that the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

4.4 Conclusions Therefore, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

16

LR-N17-0144 LAR S17-06 Enclosure

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

6.0 REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical Specifications"

2. NUREG-1431, Revision 4.0, Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants, April 2012

3. Letter Richard B. Ennis (NRC) to William Levis (PSEG), "Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Issuance of Amendments Re: Steam Generator Feedwater Pump Trip, Feedwater Isolation Valve Response Time Testing and Containment Cooling System (TAC Nos. MD4843 and MD4844)," dated February 27, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML080220398)

4. Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Change Traveler TSTF-425, Revision 3 ,

"Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control - RITSTF Initiative 5b," NRC approved July 6, 2009

5. Letter Richard B. Ennis (NRC) to Thomas Joyce (PSEG), "Salem Nuclear Generating Station , Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Issuance of Amendments RE: Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequencies to a Licensee-Controlled Program Based on Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF ) Change TSTF-425 (TAC Nos. M E3574 and M E3575)," March 21, 2011

6. Letter Steve D. Bloom (NRC) to Gregory M. Rueger (PG&E), "Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendment Re: Main Feedwater System (TAC Nos. MA3407 and MA3408)," Amendment Nos. 140, dated February 22, 2000 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15132A569)

7. Letter Mohan C. Thadani (NRC) to Adam C. Heflin (UE), "Callaway Plant, Unit 1-lssuance of Amendment Re: Revision to TS 3.7.3, 'Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves (MFRVBVs)' and TS 3.3.2, 'Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation,' (TAC No. ME1325)," Amendment No. 198, dated June 29, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101110103) 17

LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Attach ment 1 Mark-up of Proposed Technical Specification Pages The following Technical Specifications pages for Renewed Facility Operating License DPR- 70 are affected by this change request:

Technical Specification Page Index VII, XIV 3/4.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation 3/4 3-4, 3 -5, 3-12 3/4.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation 3/4 3-15, 3-19, 3-20, 3-21 ' 3-23, 3-26, 3-31a, 3-32a, 3-34 3/4.7.1.5, Main Steam Isolation Valves 3/4 7-10 New 3/4.7.13, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (FIVs), Main 3/4 7-38, 7-39 Feedwater Regulating Valves (FRVs), FRV Bypass Valves (FRVBVs),

and Steam Generator Feedwater Pump (SGFP) Turbine Stop Valves The following Technical Specifications pages for Renewed Facility Operating License DPR-75 are affected by this change request:

Technical Specification Page Index VII, XIV 3/4.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation 3/4 3-4, 3-5, 3-12 3/4.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation 3/4 3-15, 3-19, 3-20, 3-22, 3 -24, 3-26, 3-33, 3-35, 3-37 3/4.7.1.5, Main Steam Isolation Valves 3/4 7-10 New 3/4.7.13, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (FIVs), Main 3/4 7-38, 7-39 Feedwater Regulating Valves (FRVs), FRV Bypass Valves (FRVBVs),

and Steam Generator Feedwater Pump (SGFP) Turbine Stop Valves

LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 New Salem Unit 1 and 2 TS 3/4.7.13 Insert:

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.13 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (FIVs), Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (FRVs),

FRV Bypass Valves (FRVBVs), and Steam Generator Feedwater Pump (SGFP)

Turbine Steam Stop Valves LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3. 7.13 Four Main FIVs, four Main FRVs, four Main FRVBV, and four SGFP turbine steam stop valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

For the FIV in each main feedwater line:

MODES 1, 2, and 3 except when:

a. The FIV is closed and deactivated; or

b. The associated FRV and FRVBV are closed and deactivated; or

c. The associated main feedwater line is isolated by a closed manual valve For the FRV in each main feedwater line:

MODES 1, 2, and 3 except when:

a. The FRV is closed and deactivated; or

b. The associated FIV is closed and deactivated; or

c. The associated main feedwater line is isolated by a closed manual valve For the FRVBV in each main feedwater line:

MODES 1, 2, and 3 except when:

a. The FRVBV is closed and deactivated; or

b. The associated FIV is closed and deactivated; or

c. The associated main feedwater line is isolated by a closed manual valve For each SGFP Turbine Steam Stop Valve:

MODES 1, 2, and 3 except when:

a. The SGFP Turbine Steam Stop Valve is closed and deactivated; or

b. The associated steam supply to the SGFP turbine is isolated by a closed ,

manual valve; or

c. The SGFP feedwater flow path is isolated SALEM - UNIT 1(2) 3/4 7-38 Amendment No. ###

LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Attach ment 1 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.13 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (FIVs). Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (FRVs) .

FRV Bypass Valves (FRVBVs) . and Steam Generator Feedwater Pump (SGFP)

Turbine Steam Stop Valves LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (continued)

ACTION:

NOTE--------------------------------------- --------------------

Separate Condition Entry is allowed for each valve

a. With one or more FIVs inoperable, restore the inoperable FIV(s) to OPERABLE status or close or isolate the inoperable FIV(s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; verify the inoperable FIV(s) is closed or isolated once per 7 days.

b. With one or more FRVs inoperable, restore the inoperable FRV(s) to OPERABLE status or close or isolate the inoperable FRV(s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; verify the inoperable FRV(s) is closed or isolated once per 7 days.

c. With one or more FRVBV(s) inoperable, restore the inoperable FRVBV(s) to OPERABLE status or close or isolate the inoperable FRVBV(s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; verify the inoperable FRVBV(s) is closed or isolated once per 7 days.

d. With one or more SGFP turbine steam stop valves inoperable, restore the inoperable SGFP turbine stop valve(s) to OPERABLE status or isolate the associated steam supply to the SGFP turbine or isolate the SGFP flow path within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; verify that the inoperable SGFP steam stop valve is isolated or the SGFP flow path is isolated once per 7 days.

e. With two (2) valves in the same feedwater flowpath inoperable resulting in a loss of feedwater isolation capability for a flow path, restore at least one valve to OPERABLE status or isolate the affected flow path within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

f. With the required ACTION requirements above not met, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.13.1 Each FIV, FRV, FRVBV and SGFP turbine steam stop valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by determining the isolation time of each valve to be within limits when tested pursuant to the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM.

4.7.13.2 In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program, verify each FIV, FRV, FRVBV and SGFP turbine steam stop valve actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SALEM - UNIT 1(2) 3/4 7-39 Amendment No. ###

I NDEX L IMIT ING COND ITIONS FOR O P ERAT I ON AND SURVEI LLANC E REQUI REMENTS S ECTION PAGE 3 /4 . 7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3 /4 . 7 . 1 TURBINE CYCLE Sa f e ty Valve s . 3 /4 7 -1 Aux i l i ary Feedwa t e r Sys t em . 3 /4 7-5 Aux i l i ary Feed S t o ra ge Tank . 3 /4 7 -7 Ac t ivi ty . 3 /4 7 -8 Ma in S t e am L i ne I s o l a t i on Va lve s . 3 /4 7 -10 3 /4 . 7 . 2 STEAM GENERATOR PRE S S URE / T EMPERATURE LIM ITATION i . 3/4 7 -14 3 / 4 ." 7 . 3 C OMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM . 3 /4 7 -15 3 /4 . 7 . 4 SERVIC E . WAT ER SYSTEM . 3/4 7 -16 3/4 . 7 . 5 FLOOD PROTEC t i ON . 3 /4 7 -17 3 /4 . 7 . 6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITI ONING ' SYSTEM . 3 /4 7-18 3 /4 . 7 . 7 AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM . 3 /4 7 -22 3 /4 . 7 . 8 S EALED SOURCE CONTAMINAT ION . 3 /4 7 -26 3 /4 . 7 . 9 SN,UBBERS . 3 /4 7 -28 3 I 4 -. 7 . 10 CHILLED: WATER SYSTEM -

AUXILIARY BUILDING SUBSYSTEM . . 3 /4 7 -3 3 3 /4 . 7 . 11 FUEL STORAGE POOL BORON CONC ENTRAT I ON . 3 /4 7-35 3 /4 . 7 . 12 FUEL ASS EMBLY STORAGE IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL . . 3 /4 7 -3 6 3/4.7.13 MAI N FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES (F IVs), . . . . . 3/4 7-38 MAI N FEEDWATER REG ULATI N G VALVES (FRVs) ,

FRV BYPASS VALVES , AND STEAM G E N E RATOR FEEDWATE R P U M P (SG FP) TURB I N E STEAM STOP VALVES SALEM - UNIT 1 VI I Amendment No . 27 1

I N DE X BAS E S

= ========================= = =============================================

S EC T I ON PAGE 3/4 . 7 PLANT S Y S T EM S 3/4 . 7 . 1 TURB I N E CYCLE B 3/4 7-1 I

3/4 . 7 . 2 S T EAM GENERATOR i PRE S S URE / T EM P E RATURE L I M I TAT I ON B 3 / 4 7-4 3/4 . 7 . 3 COMPONENT COOL I NG WAT E R S Y S T EM .

B 3/4 7-4 i

3/4 . 7 . 4 S E RV I C E WAT E R S S T E M *

B 3/4 7-4 I

3/4 . 7 . 5 FLOO D PROT ECT I ON B 3/4 7-5 3/4 . 7 . 6 CONTRO L ROOM E MERGENCY A I R I

CON D I T I ON I NG S Y $ T EM . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-5 3/4 . 7 . 7 AUX I L I ARY B U I L D I NG EXHAU S T A I R F I LTRAT I ON S Y S T M . . . . . B 3/4 7-Sc 3/ 4 . 7 . 8 S EALE D SO URCE CQNTAM I NAT I ON B 3/4 7-Sc 3/ 4 . 7 . 9 SNUBBERS

I * * *

B 3/4 7-6 3/4 . 7 . 10 C H I LL E D WAT E R S Y S T E M -

AUX I LI ARY B U I L D I NG S U B S Y S T EM . . . . . ! * * *

B 3/4 7-8 I

3/4 . 7 . 11 FUEL S T ORAG E POL BORON CONC E NTRAT I ON . B 3/4 7-9 3/4 . 7 . 12 FUEL AS S EMBLY S TORAGE I N T H E S P ENT F U E L POO L . B 3/4 7-12 3/4 . 8 E LECTRI CAL POWE R S Y S T EM S 3/4 . 8 . 1 A. C. S O U RC E S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 8-1 3/4 . 8 . 2 ONS I T E POW E R D I S TR I B U T I ON S Y S T E M S . . . . . . . B 3/4 8-1 3/ 4 . 8 . 3 E LEC TRI CAL E QU I M E N T PROT ECT I VE D E V I C E S . . . . B 3/4 8-4 3/4 . 7 . 1 3 MAI N FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES (FIVs) , . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7- 1 3 MAI N FEEDWATER R EG U LATI NG VALVES (FRVs) ,

FRV BYPASS VALVES, AND STEAM G E N ERATOR FEEDWATE R PUMP (SG FP) TURB I N E STEAM STOP VALVES SAL EM - UN I T 1 XIV Ame ndment N o . 262 I

TABLE 3 . 3-1 ( Continued)

REACTO R TRI P SYSTEM IN STRUMENTATI ON MINIMOM TOTAL NUMBER CHANNEL S CHANNELS APPLI CABLE FUNCTI ONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION 18 . Turbine Trip

a. Low Autos top Oil P res sure 3 2 2 6

b. Turbine Stop Valve Clo s ure 4 4 3 6 19 . S afety Inj e ct i on Input from E S F 2 1 2 1, 2 10 20 . Rea ct o r Cool ant Pump Breaker 1 /b reaker 2 1 /b reake r 1 11 Position Trip ( above P-7 ) p e r op era-ting l o op 21 . Rea ct o r Trip Breakers 2 1 2 1, 2 1 ### , 1 4 3* , 4 * , 5* 13 22 . Automati c Trip Lo gi c 2 1 2 1, 2 10 3 * , 4 * , 5* 13 SALEM - UNIT 1 3 / 4 3-4 Amendment No . 276

TABLE 3.3- 1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position and the control rod drive system capable of rod withd rawal.

Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Fl ux) i nterlock.

I

1. 1. If ACTION Statement 1 is entered as a result of Reactor Trip Breaker (RTB) or Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers ( RTBB) maintenance testing results exceeding the following acceptance criteria, N RC reporting shall be made within 30 days in accordance with Specification 6 . 9 . 2 :

1. A RTB or RTBB trip failure during any surveillance test with less than or equal to 300 grams of weight added to the breaker trip bar.

2. A RTB or RTBB time response fai lure that results in the overall reactor trip system time response exceeding the Technical Specification limit.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the number of chan nels OP ERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OP ERABLE requirement, be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testi ng per Specification 4.3 . 1 . 1 . 1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTU P and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied :

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement i s met; however, one chan nel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4 . 3. 1 . 1 . 1 .

c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to 75°/o of RATED TH ERMAL POWER and the Power Range, Neutron Flux trip setpoint is reduced to 85°/o of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ; or, the Q UADRANT POWER Tl LT RATIO is monitored at least once per 1 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 3 1 3

TABLE 4 . 3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TR I P SYSTEM I N STRUM ENTATI ON SURVEI LLAN CE REQUI REMENTS MODES J N C HAN N EL WHI C H C H AN N EL C HANN EL F U N C TI O N AL S U RVE ILLA N C E FUNCTIONAL U N IT C H ECK'1 5' CALI BRATION ( 1 5l T E S T' 1 5 ' R EQUI R E D 1 3. Loss of Flow Two Loops N .A.

1 4. Steam G enerator Water 1, 2 Level--Low-Low 1 5. DELETED 1 6. Undervoltage - Reactor N . A.

Coolant Pumps 1 7. U nderfrequency - Reactor N . A.

Coolant Pum p s 1 8. Turbine Trip a . Low Autostop Oil Pressure N A. . N .A. S/U t 1 > 1 EJ

b. Tu rbi ne Stop Valve C losure N . A. N.A. S/U 1 1 ) 1 EJ 1 9 . Safety Injection I n p ut from N . A. N.A. ( 4)( 5) 1, 2 ESF

20. Reactor Coolant Pump N .A. N . A.

Brea ker Position Trip 2 1 . Reactor Trip Breaker N .A. N . A. (5)( 1 1 )( 1 3) 1 , 2 and *

( 14)

22. Automatic Trip Logic N A. . N . A. ( 5) 1 , 2 and

j# Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) l nterlock. j SALEM - UN IT 1 3/4 3-1 2 Amendme nt N o , 299

TABLE 3 . 3-3.

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO . CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACT I ON E

1 1.

SAFETY INJECTIONT TRIP

,AN:g FBE];)Wl\'!'ER ISOIJA'!'IGN a . Manual Initiation 2 1 2 1, 2 , 3, 4 18 b . Automatic Actuation L o g i c 2 1 2 1, 2 , 3, 4 13 c . Containment Pres sure-High 3 2 2 1, 2 , 3 19

d. Pres suri z er Pres sure-Low 3 2 2 1 , 2 , 3# 19 e . Differential Pres sure B etween 3 / s t e am line 2 / s t eam line 2 / s team 1 , 2 , 3## 19 Steam Lines - High . any steam *line line f . Steam Flow in Two Steam 2 / s t eam line 1 / s t e am line 1 / s t e am 1 , 2 , 3## 19 Lines-High any 2 s t e am line l ines COINCIDENT WITH E ITHER Tavg --Low-Low 1 Tavg/loop 1 Tavg in 1 T avg 1, 2 , 3## 19 any 2 loops in any 3 l o op s OR , COINCIDENT WITH S team Line Pres sure-Low 1 pres sure/ 1 p res sure 1 pres sure 1, 2 , 3## 19 loop any 2 loops any 3 loops SALEM - UNIT 1 3 / 4 3-15 Amendment No . 276

TABLE 3 . 3-3 ( Cont inue d )

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUAT I ON SYSTEM INS TRUMENTAT I ON MINIMUM TOTAL N O . CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLI C.BLE FUNCTO::\AL UN IT OF CHANNELS T O TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACT I ON

4. STEl LINE I SOLATION

a. Manua l 2 / s t e am l ine 1 / s t e am l ine 1 / operating s t e am l ine 1 2 (a) , 3 (a)

b. Automat i c Actuat i on Logi c 2*** 1 2

c. Containment Pres sure- - H i gh-High 4 2 3 1 1

d. S te am Fl ow in Two Line s - -Hi gh Steam 2 / s t e am l ine 1 / st e am l ine any 2 s t eam 1 / s t e am l ine I L 2 , :J## I l ines COINC I DENT WITH EITHER 1 ' 2 (a) ' 3fffl( a)

Tavg--Lot-:r-Low 1 T a vg / l o op 1 Tavg any 2 in loops 1 Tavg in any 3 l oops 1 1, 2 , :J## I OR, C OI N CIDENT W I T H S e am Line Pres sure-Low 1 p r e s sure / 1 p r e s sure 1 p r e s sure 11, 2, 3##

l o op any 2 l o ops any 3 l o op s l (a) E xcept when al l MS IVs are closed .

SALEM - UNIT 1 3 /4 3 -1 9 Amendment No . 276

TABLE 3 . 3-3 ( C ontinued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MIN IHUH TOTAL NO . CHANNELS CHANNELS AP PLI CABLE FDNCI ONAL DN I T OF CHANNELS TO TRIP O PERABLE MODES ACT I ON TURBINE TRIP & FEEDWATER I S OLATI ON r------,- 1 2* , 3* I 19 lcl LJ a- . Steam Gene rator Wat e r l evel-High-High 3 / l o op 2 / l o op any operating in 2 / l o op in each ope rat ing I f?

l o op l o op

6. SAFEGUARDS EQU I PMENT 3 2 3 1,2, 3, 4 13 CONTROL SYSTEM ( SE C )

7. UNDERVOLTAGE , VITAL BU S 1

Loss of Voltage 1 /bus 2 3 1, 2, 3 4

b. Sustained Degraded V o l t a g e 3 /bus 2 /bus 3 /bus 1, 2, 3 14

a. Safety I njection Refer to Functional U n it 1 for a l l in itiation functions and requi rements. The applicabil ity exceptions of footnote (*) also apply to Functional U n it 5.a.

b . Automatic Actuation Logic 2 1 2 1 ' 2*' 3

20 SALEM - UNIT 1 3 /4 3 -2 0 Amendment No . 276

TABLE 3 . 3 - 3 ( Cont i nued )

TABLE NOTATION

Trip func t i on may be bypas s ed in thi s MODE below P - 1 1 .

1. Trip function may be bypas s ed in thi s MODE below P - 12 .

Except when all main feedwater lines are isolated by either ( 1 ) a closed and de-activated feedwater isolation valve, or (2) a closed and de-activated feedwater regu lating valve (FRV) and FRV bypass valve, or (3) a closed manual valve.

- - The automatic astuatima logis iBslud.es t*a red.uBd.aBt saleBaid. a:Flerated. veBt valves far eash MaiB Steam IsalatiaB Valve . 0Be PeBt valve aB aay aBe 4aiB Steam I salatiaB valve may he i solated without affestiBg the fuBstian af the automatis astuatioB legis Elrauid.ed. the remaiBiBg seuea salea.aid. veBt ual. .es remaiB GPER:Mt.E . The isalated. 4SIV veBt valve shall be returBed. ta GPERA2t.E status UJ.30B the first entry iBta MGI:.lE 5 follmtJiBg d.etermiBatiaB that the veBt ualue is iBa:Flerahle . Far any eaBditioa where mare thaB aBe of the eight saleBaid. veBt values are iBaperahle I entry inta ACTIGJ dQ is req-tlired. I ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 3 -

Wi th the number of OPERABLE Channel s one l e s s than the Total Number o f Channel s , re s tore the i noperable channel t o OPERABLE s t atus wi thin 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months or , be in HOT S TANDBY wi thin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN wi thin the fol lowing 3 0 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months ; however , one channe l may be bypas sed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surve i l l ance t e s t ing per Spe c i f i cat i on 4 . 3 . 2 . 1 . 1 p rovided the other channel i s OPERABLE .

ACTION 14 - W i th the number of OPERABLE Channel s one l e s s than the Total Number o f Channe l s , operat ion may proceed unt i l performance of the next requi red CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TES T , p rovi ded the inoperable channe l is placed i n the t r ipped condi t i on wi thin 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

ACTION 15 - NOT USED ACTION 1 6 - Wi th the numbe r of OPERABLE Channel s one l e s s than the Total Number of Channel s , operat ion may proceed provided the inoperabl e chann e l i s pl aced i n the bypas s ed condi t i on and the Minimum Channe l s OPERABLE requirement is demon s t rated by CHANNEL CHECK wi thin 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; one additional channel may be bypas s ed f or up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months f o r surve i l l an c e t e s t ing p e r Speci f i ca t i on 4 . 3 . 2 . 1 . 1 .

ACTION 17 - Wi th l e s s than the Minimum Channe l s OPERABLE , ope rat ions may cont inue provided the c ontainment purge and exhau s t valves are maintained closed .

ACTION 1 8 -

With the numbe r of OPERABLE Channel s one l e s s than the Total Numbe r of Channel s , res tore the inoperable channel t o OPERABLE s t atus . wi thin 4 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or b e i n at l east OT STANDBY wi thin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and i n COLD SHUTDOWN wi thin the f o l l owing 3 0 hour0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months s .*

The a utomatic a ct uation logic i ncl udes two red u nd a nt solenoid operated vent va lves for each M a i n Ste a m Isolation Va lve ( M SIV}. Vent va lves associated with an i n o pe ra ble M S I V may be isolated p rovided t hat the M S IV is closed i n accord a n ce with a ctions o f TS 3 . 7 . 1.5. O n e v e n t va lve on a ny one o f t h e re m a i n i n g O P E RABLE o r o p e n M S IVs may be isolated without affecting the fu nct i o n of t h e a ut omatic act u at ion logic provided t h e re m a i n ing solenoid vent va lves re m a i n O P E RABLE. The isolated MSIV vent va lve s h a l l be retu rned to O P E RABLE status u pon the first e n t ry i nto M O D E 5 fol lowing d ete r m i nation that t h e vent va lve i s i nopera bl e . F o r a n y con d ition w h e re m o re t h a n o n e s o l e n o i d vent va lves is i nopera b l e for the O P E RABLE or open M S IVs, entry i nto ACTI ON 20 is req u i red.

. SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3 -21 Amendment No . 276

I

TABLE 3 . 3 - 4 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTAT I ON TRI P SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRI P SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES

1. SAFETY INJECTION , 'l'URBINE 'I'RIP AND FEEDUA'l'ER ISOLATION

a. Manual Initiat ion Not Applicable Not Appl i cable

b. Automatic Actuation Logic Not Appl icable Not Appl i cable

c. Containment Pres sure - - High s4 . 0 psig s 4 . 5 p s ig

d. Pres suri zer Pres sure- - Low 1 7 6 5 p s ig 1 755 ps ig

e. Differential Pres sure s100 psi s 1 12 p s i Between S team Lines - -High

f. S t eam Flow in Two Steam Lines - sA function defined as s A funct ion defined a s High Coincident with Tavg - - Low-Low fol lows : A !p corresponding fol lows : A !p corresponding or S t eam Line Pres sure - -Low to 4 0 % of ful l s t eam flow to 4 4 % of ful l s t eam f l ow between 0 % and 2 0 % load between 0% and 2 0% l oad and and then a !p increas ing then a !p increas ing l inearly linearly to a !p correspond to a !p corresponding to ing to 110% of full steam 1 1 1 . 5% of full steam f l ow flow at full load at full load Tavg 5 4 3 ° F Tavg 541°F 6 0 0 p s ig s t eam l ine 5 7 9 psig s t eam line pres sure pres sure SALEM - UNIT l 3 /4 3 - 23 Amendment No . 1 87

a . Safety I njection Refer to Functional U n it 1 for all i n itiation functions and req uirements.

b . Automatic Actuation Logic Not Applicable N ot Applicable TABLE 3 . 3 - 4 ( continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNC "IONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES

5. URBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION A. Steam Generator Water Level - 67% of narrow range 68% of narrow range High-High instrument span each instrument span each steam generator s t eam generator

6. SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT CONTROL Not Appl i cable Not Appl i cable SYSTEM ( SEC )

7 . UNDERVOLTAGE , VITAL BUS

a. Loss of Voltage 7 0 % of bus voltage 6 5 % of bus voltage b, Sustained Degraded Voltage 9 4 . 6 % of bus voltage for 94% of bus voltage for 13 seconds s; 1 5 seconds

8. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER

a. Automatic Actuat i on Logic Not Applicable Not App l i cable

b. NOT USED

c. Steam Generator Water Level - 1 4 . 0 % of narrow range 13 . 0 % of narrow range Low-Low instrument span each ins trument span each steam generator s t eam genera tor

d. Undervoltage - RCP 7 0 % RCP bus voltage 6 5 % RCP bus voltage

e. S. I . See 1 above ( Al l S . I . . setpoints )

f. Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps Not Applicable Not App l i cable

g. Station Blackout See _ 6 and 7 above ( SEC and Undervol tage , Vi tal Bus )

SALEM - UNIT 1 314 3 -2 6

TABLE 4.3-2 E N G I NEERED SAFETY FEATU RE ACTUATION SYSTEM I NSTR U MENTATION SURVEI LLANCE REQUI REMENTS MODES I N CHAN N EL WHICH CHAN N E L C HAN N E L F U N CTI O NAL SURVEILLA N C E FUNCTI O NAL U N IT C H ECK'7) CAL I B RATI O N (7) T EST(7) R EQU I R E D 1 . SAFETY I NJ ECTI O N ;

+bJRBI +RIFI llcg Fgl,c\4Ac+R IS9b<<\+19N

a. Manual I n itiation N.A N.A 1 , 2,3.4

b. Automatic Actuation Log ic N .A N .A ( 2) 1 , 2 , 3,4

c. Containment Pressure-H i g h (3 ) 1 , 2,3

d. Pressurizer Pressure--Low 1 ,2,3

e. Differential Pressu re 1 , 2,3 Between Steam Lines--High

f. Steam Flow in Two Steam 1 ,2 , 3 Lines--H igh coincident with Tavg--Low-Low or Steam Line Pressure-Low

2. C O NTAI N MENT S P RAY

a. Manual In itiation N.A N.A 1 , 2, 3 , 4

b. Automatic Actuation Log ic N .A N.A ( 2) 1 , 2 , 3 ,4

c. Containment ( 3) 1 , 2,3 Pressure--H i g h-H i g h SALE M - U N IT 1 3/4 3-3 1 a Amend ment No. 299

TABLE 4 . 3-2 (Continued)

E N G I NEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM I N STR U M ENTAT I ON S U RVEI LLANCE REQUI REM E NTS MODES I N C HAN N E L WHICH C HAN N E L C HAN N E L F U N CTI O NAL S U RVEI LLANC E FU NCTIONAL U N IT C H EC K' 7 l CALI BRATI O N (7) TEST '7 l R EQUI R E D

4. STEAM L I N E ISO LATI O N

a. Manual N .A. N.A.

b. Automatic Actuation Logic N .A. N.A. (2)

C. Conta inment (3)

Pressure--High-H igh

d. Steam Flow in Two Steam Lin es--H igh Coincident with Tavg --Low-Low or Steam Line Pressure--Low

5. TURBI N E TRI P AND FEEDWATER I S O LATION 1 ' 2(b), 3(b)

Steam Generator Water Level--H igh-H igh I

6. SAFEGUARDS EQU I PM E NT CONTRO L SYSTEM (SEC )

LOG I C

a. I nputs N .A. N . A. (6) 1 , 2, 3,4

b. Log ic, Timing and O utputs

N . A. N . A. (1 ) 1 , 2 , 3 ,4

7. U N DE RVO LTAG E , VITAL BUS

a. Loss o f Voltage 1 ,2,3

b. Sustained Degrad ed 1 ,2,3 Voltage

- a . Safety I njection Refer to Fu nctional U n it 1 for all in itiation fu nctions and requi rements . The applicability exceptions of footnote (b) also apply to Functional Unit 5 . a .

b. Automatic Actu ation Log ic N .A. N .A. (2 ) 1 , 2(b), 3(b)

SALEM - U N IT 1 3/4 3-32a Amend ment No. 299

TABLE 4. 3-2 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION Outputs are u p to , but not including, the output rel ays.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

(1 ) Each logic channel sha l l be tested in accordance with the Surve i l lance Frequency Control Program. The CHAN N E L FU N CTI ON TEST of each logic channel shall verify that its associated diesel generator automatic load seq uence timer is OPERABLE with the interval between each load b lock within 1 second of its desig n interval .

(2 ) Each train o r logic channel sha l l b e tested in accordance with the Survei llance Freq uency Control Prog ram .

(3 ) The CHANNEL FU NCTIONAL TEST sha l l include exercising the transm itter b y applying either a vacuum or pressure to the appropriate side of the transmitter.

(4 ) NOT USED

( 5) NOT USED (6) I nputs from Undervoltage, Vital Bus, shall be tested in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program . I nputs from Solid State Protection System sha l l be tested in acco rdance with the Surveilla nce Frequency Control Prog ram .

(7 ) Frequencies are specified i n t h e Surveillance Frequency Control Prog ram unless otherwise noted in the table.

(a) Except when all MS IVs are closed .

(b) Except when all main feedwater lines are isolated by either ( 1 ) a closed and de-activated feedwater isolation valve, or (2) closed and de-activated feedwater regu lating valve (FRV) and FRV bypass valves, or (3) a closed manual valve.

SALEM - U NI T 1 3/4 3-34 Amendment No. 299

P LANT SYSTEM S MAIN STEAM LI NE I SOLATI O N VALVES LIMITitJitCONDlilQN.fOB OPJ;BATION 3 . 7 . 1 . 5 Each main steam line isolation valve sha l l be OP ERABLE .

I A P PL I CABILITY: M ODES 1 . 2 and 3. I I MOD E S 2 and 3 except when all M S I Vs are closed .

MODES 1 - With one main steam line isolation valve i noperable, POWER OP ERAT I O N may continue provided the inoperable valve is either restored to OP ERABLE statu s or closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ; otherwise, be in MODE 2 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

MODES 2 - With o n e o r more main steam line isolation valve(s) i nopera ble , su bsequent and 3 operation in MODES 2 or 3 may proceed provided:

a. The isolation valve(s} is (are) mamtained closed. and

b. The isolation valve(s} is (are) verified closed once per 7 days.

O therwise, be in M O D E 3, HOT STANDBY, wilhn the next 6 h ours and M O D E 4, HOT SH UTDOWN, within the following 6 h ours.

SURYElLLANCE R_£QU.!BEMENTS

4. 7 . 1 . 5 E ac h main steam line isolation valve shall be demon strated OPERABLE by verifying fuiJ closure within 5 SilConds when tested pursuant to the I NS ERVJCE TESTI NG P ROGRAM. The provisions o f Specification 4 0 4 are not applicable.

SAL EM - U NI T 1 3/4 7- 1 1 Amendment No . 3 1 !

INDEX L IMITING CONDITIO S FOR O PERATION AND SURVE ILLANCE REQUI REMENTS SECTION PAGE

3/4 . 7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4 . 7 . 1 TUBINE : CYCLE Sa fety ya l ves . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7 -1 Auxi l i ary Feedwa t e r Sys tem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 7 -5 Auxi l i a y Feed .S t o rage Tank . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . 3 /4 7 -7 Ac t ivity . . . *. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 7 -8 Ma i n S t e am Line I so l a t i on Va lve s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-10 3 /4 . 7 . 2 STEAM GENERAOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE L IMITATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 7 -11 3 / 4 .*7 . 3 COMPONENT COOL ING WATER SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 7-12 3/4 . 7 . 4 SERVIC E WATER SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 7 -13 3 /4 . 7 . 5 FLOOD P OTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 / 4

7 -14 3 /4 . 7 . 6 CONTROL : ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING : SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 I4 7 -15 3/4 . 7 . 7 AUXILIARY BUILDING VENT ILAT I ON SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 7 -18 ° 3/4 . 7 . 8 SEALED SOURC CONTAMINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 / 4* 7 - 2 1 3 / 4 . *7 . 9 SNUBBERS . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 / 4 7 -- 2 3 3 /4 . 7 . 10 CHILLED : WATER SYSTEM -

AUXILIARY BUJLDING SUBSYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3/4 7 -2 8 3 / 4 . 7 . 11 FUEL STORAGE

POOL BORON CONC ENTRATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 / 4 7-3 0 3 /4 . 7 . 12 FUEL ASSEMBLY STORAGE IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL . . . . . . . . . . . 3 / 4 7 -3 1 3/4.7. 1 3 MAI N FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES (FIVs) , . 0 * * * * * * * * * * *

3/4 7-33 MAI N FEEDWATER REG U LATI N G VALVES (FRVs),

FRV BYPASS VALVES, AND STEAM G E N E RATOR FEEDWATER P U M P (SG FP) TURB I N E STEAM STOP VALVES SALEM - UNIT 2 VI I Amendmen t No . 2 5 2

I N D EX BAS E S

============== = = ======================== = = = ======================

S EC T I ON PAG E 3/4 . 7 P LANT S Y S T EMS 3/4 . 7 . 1 T U RB I NE CYCLE ................................... ............................................ ........................................ .......... B 3/4 7-1 3/4 . 7 . 1 S T EAM G E N ERATOR P RE S S U RE / T EM P E RAT URE L I M I TAT I ON ............... ............................. ............. ................................................................................. B 3 / 4 7-4 3/4 . 7 . 3 COMPON E N T COOL I N G WAT ER S Y S TEM ..............................................................................B 3 / 4 7-4 3/4 . 7 . 4 S E RV I C E WAT E R S Y S T EM .......... .................................................................................................. B 3 / 4 7-4 3/4 . 7 . 5 FLOOD PROT E C T I ON ............................. . .. . .................. .................................................... .... ............. B 3 / 4 7-5 3/4 . 7 . 6 CON T ROL ROOM EMERGENCY AI R CON D I T I ON I N G S Y S T EM ........................ ................ ................. : .............................. ............. .......... B 3 / 4 7-5 3/4 . 7 . 7 AUX I L I RY BU I L D I N G EXHAU S T A I R F I L T RAT I ON S Y S T E M ..... ........ ............................... ....................................... ......... .............. ........ B 3/4 7-5c 3/4 . 7 . 8 S EAL E D S OU RCE CON TAM I NAT I ON .............. ............................................................ .......... B 3 / 4 7-5c 3/4 . 7 . 9 S N U BBERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-6 3/4 . 7 . 10 CH I L L E D WAT E R S Y S T E M AUX I L I ARY B U I L D I N G S Y S T EM ... ....................... ............... . .............. ...... .................. ............. B 3 / 4 7-8 3/4 . 7 . 1 1 F U E L S T ORAG E POOL BORON CON CENTRAT I ON ................... ...................................... B 3 / 4 7-9 3 /4 . 7 . 12 F U E L AS S EMBLY S T ORAGE I N T H E S PE N T F U E L POOL ................................. B 3/4 7-12 3/4 . 8 ELECTRI CAL POWER S Y S T EMS 3I4 . 8 . 1 A. c. S OU RC E S ................................................................... ..............................................................B 3 I 4 8-1 3/4 . 8 . 2 ONS I T E POWER D I S T R I BU T I ON S Y S T EMS ................................................... .................. B 3 / 4 8-1 3/4 . 8 . 3 E L ECTRI CAL E Q U I PME NT PROT E C T I VE D E V I C E S ........ ....... .................................... B 3 / 4 8-4 3/4 . 7 . 1 3 MAI N FEE DWATER ISOLATION VALVES ( FIVs) , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7- 1 3 MAI N FEEDWATER REG U LATI NG VALVES (FRVs) ,

FRV BYPASS VALVES , AND STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER P U M P (SG FP) TU RBI N E STEAM STOP VALVES SALEM - UNIT 2 XIV Ame ndme n t N o . 244

TABLE 3 .3-1 * * ( Continued )

REACTOR TRI P SYSTEM INSTRUMENTAT ION

}1;INI_UM.

TOTAL NUMBER CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRI P OPERABLE MODES ACTION 18 . Turbir.. e Trip

a. Low Autos top Oil P re s sure 3 2 2 1 6

b. Turbine Stop Valve Cl o sure 4 4 3 1 6 19 . S a fety Inj e cti on Input from ESF 2 1 2 1, 2 10

20. Re a ctor Coolant Pump Breaker 1 /breaker 2 1 / b rea ker 1 11 P o s i tion Trip ( ab ove P-7 ) per op era ting l o op 21 . Rea ctor Trip Breakers 2 1 2 1, 2 1###, 14 3 * , 4 * , 5* 13 22 . Automati c Trip Logi c 2 1 2 1, 2 10 3* ,4* ,5* 13 SALEM - UNIT 2 3 / 4 3-4 AITndment No . 258

TABLE 3 . 3-1 (Continued)

TABLE N OTATION With the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

Above the P-9 ( Power Range Neutron Fl ux) i nterlock.

1. 1. If ACTI ON Statement 1 is entered as a result of Reactor Trip Breaker ( RTB ) or Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker (RTBB ) maintenance testing results exceeding the following acceptance criteria, NRC reporting shall be made within 30 days in accordance with Specification 6.9.2:

1. A RTB or RTBB trip failure during any surveillance test with less than or equal to 300 g rams of weight added to the breaker trip bar.

2. A RTB or RTBB time response failure that results in the overall reactor trip system time response exceeding the Technical Specification limit.

ACTION STATEM ENTS ACTI ON 1 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the M inimum Channels O PERABLE requirement, be in H OT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; h owever, one channel may be bypassed for u p to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4 . 3. 1 . 1 . 1 provided the other chan nel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTU P and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. T h e i n opera ble channel is placed i n t h e tripped condition with i n 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. T h e M inimum Channels OPERABLE requ i reme nt is met; h owever, one channel m ay be bypassed for u p to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4 .3 .1 . 1 .1 .

c. E ither, TH ERMAL POWER is restricted to s 75°/o of RATED TH ERMAL POWER and the Power Range, Neutron F lux trip setpoint is reduced to s 85°/o of RATED THERMAL POWER withi n 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ; or, the Q UADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 1 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

d. The Q UADRANT POWER TILT RATIO, as ind icated by the remaining three detectors, is verified consistent with the normalized symmetric power distri bution obtained by using either the movable in-core detectors i n the four pairs of symmetric thimble locations or the power distribution monitoring system at least once per 1 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months whe n THERMAL POWER is g reater than 75% of RATED TH ER MAL POWER.

SALEM - U N IT 2 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 294

TABLE 4. 3-1 (Conti nued)

REACTOR TR I P SYSTEM I NSTRUMENTATION S URVEI LLANCE R EQ U I REMENTS MODES I N C HAN N E L WH ICH CHAN NEL CHA N N E L FUNCTI ONAL SU RVEJLLANCE C H EC K'15' 15 15 FUNCTI O NAL U N I T CALI BRATI ON ( ' TEST ( 1 REQUIRED 1 3. Loss of Flow Two Loops N . A.

1 4 . Steam Generator Water 11 2 Level--Low-Low 1 5 . DELETED 1 6. Undervoltage - Reactor N . A. 1 Coolant Pumps 1 7 . Underfrequency - Reactor N .A. 1 Coolant Pumps 1 8 . Turbi ne Trip

a. Low Autos to p O i l N .A. N .A. S/U < 1 1 1 P ressure

b. Turbine Stop Valve N .A. N . A. S/U < 1 1 1[!]

Closure 1 9. Safety I njection I nput from N .A. N .A. (4)(5) 1, 2 ESF

20. Reactor Coolant Pu mp N .A. N .A. 1 Breaker Pos ition Trip 2 1 . Reactor Trip Breaker N .A. N .A. (5)( 1 1 ) ( 1 3)(1 4) 1 2 and

I

22. Automatic Trip Log ic N .A. N .A. (5) 1 , 2 and *

Above the P-9 ( Power Range Neutron Fl ux) I nterlock SALEM - UN IT 2 3/4 3-1 2 Amendment No. 282

TABLE 3 . 3 - 3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUAT ION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO . CHANNELS CHANNE Ls * . APPLI CABLE ' . . . .

FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRI P OPERABLE MODES ACTION

1. SAFETY INJECTION, TYRBI:NE TRIP NlD FEEDWA'I'ER ISOlATION

a. Manual Initiation 2 1 2 1, 2, 3 , 4 18

b. Automati c Actuation Logi c 2 1 2 1 , 2 , 3 , 4. 13

c. Containment Pre s s ure-High 3 2 2 1, 2 , 3 19

d. Pre s s uri z e r Pre s s ure-Low 3 2 2 1 , 2 , 3# 19

e. Di fferential Pres s ure Between 3 / s team line 2 / steam line 2 / s team 1 , 2 , 3 ## 19 S team Lines - High any s team line lines

f. Steam Flow in Two 2 / s team line 1 / s team line 1 / s t e am 1 , 2 , 3 ## 19 Steam Lines -High any 2 s team line lines COINCIDENT WITH EITHER Tavq --Low-Low 1 Tavq/loop 1 Tavq in 1 T avq 1 , 2 , 3 ## 19 any 2 l o op s in any 3 l o op s OR, COINCI DENT WITH Steam Line Pre s sure-Low 1 pres sure/ 1 pres sure 1 p re s s ure 1 , 2 , 3 ## 19 loop any 2 loop s any 3 l o op s SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3-15 Amendment No . 258

TABLE 3 . 3-3 ( Continue d )

ENGI NEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUAT I ON SYS TEM I N S TRUMENTAT I ON MIN IMUM TOTAL NO . CHANNELS CH..Z\NNELS ll._P P L I CABLE FUNCTI ONAL UN I T OF CHANNELS. TO TRI P OPERABLE MODES ACT I ON

4. S TEAM LINE I S OhT I ON

a. Manual 2 / s t e am line 1 / s t e am line 1 / operating 23 s t e am line 1 , 2(a), 3(a)

b. Aut omatic Actuation Logi c 2*** 1 2 20

c. Containment Pres sure- 4 2 3 16 Hi gh-High

d. S t eam Flow in Two 2 / s t e am line 1 / st eam line 1 / s t e am line 19 Steam Line s --Hi gh any 2 s t e am lines 1 , 2(a), 3##(a)

COINCI DENT WI TH EI THER Tav9--Low-Low 1 Tavg- /loop 1 Tavg in 1 Tavg- in 19 any 2 l oop s any 3 l oop s ORr COINCI DENT WI TH Steam Line Pre s s ure-Low 1 pr e s s ur e / 1 pre s s ure 1 pre s s ure 19 loop any 2 l oop s any 3 lo op s j (a) E xcept when all MSIVs are closed .

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 3 -1 9 Amendment No . 25 8

.. TABLE 3 . 3 -3 { Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATI ON SYS T EM INSTRUMENTAT ION MINIMUM TOTAL NO -

. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTI ONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRI P OPERABLE MODES ACTION

5. TURBINE T RI P @ FEEDWATER I S OLAT I ON j1 , 2*, 3*

c a. S team Generator Water 3 / l o op 2 / l o op in 2 / loop in l k ] 19 level--High-High any op erating e a ch op erating l o op l o op

6. SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT CONTROL 3 2 3 13 SYSTEM ( SEC )

7. UNDERVOLTAGE , VITAL BUS

a. Lo s s of Voltage 1/bus 2 3 1, 2 , 3 14

b. Sust ained Degraded Vo ltage 3 /bus 2 /bus 3 /bus 1, 2 , 3 14

a. Safety I njection 1 Refer to Functional U n it for all i nitiation fu nctions and requirements. The applicability exceptions of footnote (*) a lso apply to F unctional U n it S.a.

b . Automatic Actuation Logi c 2 1 2 1' 2* , 3* 20 SALEM - UNI T 2 3/4 3-2 0 Amendment No . 258

Vent valves associated with an inoperable MSIV TABLE 3 . 3- 3 ( Co n t i n ue d ) may be isolated provided (MS IV )

that the MSIV is closed i n TABLE NOTA T I ON accordance with actions i Trip func t i on may be MODE of TS 3 . 7 . 1 . 5 .

1. Trip fun c t i o n ma y be MODE App l i e s to Funct i o na l Uni t 8 i t ems c The a u t oma t i c a c t ua t i on l o g i c inc l ud e s tlundant s o l en o i d ope r a t e d v a l ve s for e a c h Ma i n S t e arn I s o l a t ion Va l v . One vent va l ve on any one Steam IaolatioA ';.talve may be .isolated wi thout a f fecting the funct i on a u t oma t i c a c t u a t i o n l o g i c provided t he rema i n ing se¥eA solenoid vent v l ves

_ remai n OPERABLF. . The i s o l a t e d M S I V vent va l ve s ha l l be re t u rn e d to OPE BL E status upon the fi r s t e n t ry i n t o MODE 5 fol l ow i n g de t e rmi n a t i o n that th vent va l v e i s _ inop e rabl e . For any condi t i on whe re mo re than o n e s o l e n o i d vent v a l ve e rabl e , entry i n t o ACT ION 20 is re q u i re d .

lfor the O P E RAB L E or open MSIVs I *en oN TATEMENTS

.-o-=- th_e_r_

f -=- e_

or open MS IVs m_a--=-in---=-i-n g o---=p=-=E=-=RA

=---:-B LE_______,

ACT I ON 1 3 - Wi th t h e numbe of O PERABLE Channe l s one l e s s than t he T o t a l Number o f Channe l s , re s t o re t h e i nope rab l e cha nne l to O PERABLE s t a t u s wi t hi n 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months or , be in at least HOT S TANDBY wi t h i n t h e n e xt 6 hou rs a n d in COLD S H UTDOWN wi t h i n t h e fo l l owing 30 hours ; howeve r , o n e c h annel may be byp a s s e d for up t o 4 hours fo r s ur ve i l l a nce t e s t i ng pe r Spe c i f i c a t i o n 4 . 3.2.1.1 p rovided t h e o t h e r channel is OPERABLE .

ACT I ON 14 - With t h e numb e r o f OPERABLE Cha nnel s one less than the Total Numb e r o f Cha nn e l s , ope r a t i on m a y p roceed unt i l p e r fo rma nce o f t he n e xt requ ired C HANNE L FUNCT I ONAL TEST , p rovided the i n op e r a b l e channe l is p l a ced i n the tripped condit ion within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

ACTlON 15 - NOT U SE D ACT I ON 16 - With the numb e r of OPERABLE Channe l s o n e l e s s t h a n t h e Tot a l N umbe r o f Cha n n e l s , op e ra t i on ma y p roceed provided t h e i n op e r a b l e c h a n n e l i s p la ced in t he byp a s s e d cond i t i o n and t he Min imum Channe l s O PERABLE requi remen t is demon s t ra t e d by C HANNEL CHECK wi t h i n 6 hours ; one addi t i onal channel may b e byp a s s e d fo r up to 4 hou r s fo r s u rve i l l ance t e s t ing per Speci f i ca t i on 4 .3.2.1.1.

ACT I ON 17 - With l e s s t h a n t h e M i nimum Cha nne l s OPERABLE, op e r a t i o n m a y c o n t i nue p rovi ded t h e cont a i nme nt purge and exha u s t va l ve s a re ma i nt a i ne d c l o s e d .

ACT I ON 1 8 - Wi t h the numb e r of O PERBLE Channe l s one less than t h e Total Numbe r of Channe l s , re s t o re t h e i nope rabl e channel to OPERABLE s t a t us wi t h i n 4 8 h o u r s o r be i n a t l e a s t HOT STANDBY wi t h i n t he next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and i n COLD S H UTDOWN wi t h i n the fol l owing 30 hours .

Except when all main feedwater l ines are isolated by either ( 1 ) a closed and de-activated feedwater isolation valve, or (2) closed and de-activated feedwater regu lati ng valve (FRV) and FRV bypass valves, or (3) a closed manual valve.

SAL EM - UN I T 2 3/4 3-22 Amendment No . 2 58

TABLE 3 . 3- 4 ENGI NEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATI ON S Y S T EM I NSTRUMENTAT I ON TRI P S ET P O I NT S FUNCTI ONAL UN I T TRI P S ET P O I NT ALLOWABLE VALUES

1. SAFETY I NJECT I ON, URlH)JE :RI P :0 FEE:OWA'rE:R I aO:blriO)l

a. Manual I ni t i a t i on Not App l i cabl e Not App l i c ab l e

b. Automati c Actua t i o n Logi c N o t Appl i cabl e N o t Appl i cabl e

c. Containment P r e s s ure--Hi gh 4.0 psig 4.5 psig

d. P r e s s uri z e r P r e s s ure--Low t! 1 7 65 psig t! 17 5 5 psig

e. D i f fe rential P r e s s ure B etwe en 100 psi 112 psi S t eam L i n e s --Hi gh

f. Steam F l ow i n Two Steam L i n e s - A fun ction de fined a s A fun ct i on de fined a s H i gh Coinci dent w i t h Tav9--Low-Low fol l ows : A A p corresponding fol l ows : A Ap corresponding or S t e am Line P re s s u re- -Low to 40% of full s te am flow to 44% of ful l s t eam fl ow between 0% and 20% l oad b e tween 0% and 20% l o a d and and then a Ap increas ing then a Ap in crea s in g l i n e a rl y l inearl y t o a Ap correspond to a 4 p corresponding t o ing to 110% of ful l s t eam 111 . 5% of ful l s t e am fl ow a t flow at ful l load ful l load Tavg t! 543 ° F Tavg 2:: 541 ° F t! 600 p s i g s t e am l ine t! 57 9 p s i g s team l ine p re s s u re p re s s u re S_LEM - UNI T 2 3 / 4 3-24 Amendment No . 170

DIL' J , l-4 tPW:'-'

c:

z IJIIQ!Ift' WI% IL JIIIftOI 'I .. .... , .. ..

-t N

J. COAtat I I8 _...,.._.

a. .... *ahztt&w&tr

.. ......1 IIDt .lppl lo*l*

c.

d. * - ..1.., .1. trMD a- u-- A hlllftlott del1.-d a* s

funat.loJl def"-4 ..

ttlh COiacl._t villl foll.,ja a .lp IACJ loll,.. , A .. a.>&a & ; wtdJ.ng Yavo -- IAW-UM o to co. ot full flow lr.O t4* Of f--11 -...... l lo.t lt.... LIM ca - Law .._.,.... R ... 2-0t. lcae4 and .._.....,.

. .,. ... 20. load and tMa

Ap ho-l.. ll..uly a Ap 1acreaa l.ftg li...r ll' to a a. .._.. to to a A.>> cor**PJftdlftl to 1 1M ol 1.. 11 -.- tl* at 1 1 1 .5* ol tull -. ... f low *t ftll load. fol l l c-.1.

" *.,. a & t.J** 7 awe §ltJ: *

600 .. ltl .... l l* . ,. ,.,. ..... l l ..

,,....d pt***l:"*

i S. 2VUID TIIP MD ....m 1 ...2'101 1.

i D a. *..._ ae.l'a

Level - &1' of AU"CGII c... "' ol nar_.ow, r 3

ln*t .... a.ac.t. . ... tn*tna.eat .,.n .ac IU.eb-Bqb

.. rat:t* at- ..... ator

)

N 6. suJGUAJtDS aQUa a.no£ ari7U

( a&e l a . Safety I njection Refer to Functional U n it 1 for a ll i nitiation fu nctions and req u i rements .

1....----f b . Automatic Actuation Log ic Not Appl icable Not App licable

TABLE 4. 3-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATI ON SYSTEM I N STRUMENTATION SURVEI LLANCE REQ U I REME NTS MODES I N CHAN N EL WH I C H C HAN N EL C HAN NEL F U NCTIO NAL S U RVEI LLAN C E C H EC K<7l CALI BRATI O N ( 7l ?

FU NCTIO NAL U NIT TEST( > R EQU I R ED 1 . SAFETY I NJECTI O N; I IEIIIe A H;;)

FeeD'"'AE ISOI:ATIOI

a. Manual Initiation N .A. N .A. 1 ,2,3.4

b. Automatic Actuation Log ic N .A. N.A. (2 ) 1 ,2, 3,4

c. Containment Pressure-- ( 3) 1 ,2 , 3 H igh

d. Pressu rizer Pressu re--Low 1 ,2 , 3

e. Differential Pressure 1 ,2,3 Between Steam Lines--

H igh

f. Steam Flow in Two Steam 1 ,2 , 3 Lines --H igh Coincident with Tavg --Low-Low or Steam Line Pressu re--

Low

2. C ON TA I NMENT SP RAY

a. Manual I nitiation N . A. N .A. 1 , 2 ,3.4

b. Automatic Actuation Log ic N.A. N .A. (2 ) 1 ,2, 3.4

c. Conta inment Pressure-- (3) 1 ,2, 3 High-High SALEM - U N IT 2 3/4 3-33 Amendment No. 282

TABLE 4. 3-2 (Continued)

ENGI NEERED SAFETY FEATU RE ACTUATION SYSTEM I NSTRUME NTATION S U RVEI LLANCE REQUI REME NTS MODES I N C HAN N E L WHICH CHAN N EL CHANN E L F U NCT I O NAL S U RVEI LLAN C E 7 7 FU NCTI O NAL U N IT C H ECK ( l CALI BRATION ( 1 TEST( 71 REQUI R E D

4. STEAM L I N E 'SO LATIO N

a. Man ual N .A. N . A.

b. Automatic Actuation Log ic N . A. N .A. (2 )

c. Contain men t P ressure- (3)

H ig h-H ig h

d. Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines--H igh Coincident with Tavg -- Low Low or Steam Line Press ure-Low

5. TURBI N E TRIP AND FEEDWAT ER ISO LATION

@]1' Steam Gen erator Water Level-H ig h-H igh 11 , 2(b), 3(b)

.___1_,2_,_J---'

6. AFEGUARDS E Q U I P M ENT CO NTRO L SYSTEM (S EC)

... OGIC

a. Inp uts N.A. N . A. (6) 1 ,2,3 ,4

b. Log ic, Timing and O utputs N.A. N .A. (1) 1 , 2 , 3 ,4

7. U NDERVOLTAG E , VITAL BUS

a. Loss of Voltage 1 ,2,3

b. Sustained Deg raded 1 ,2,3 Voltage

a. Safety I njection 1 Refer to Functional U nit for all i nitiation fu nctions and L req uirements . The applicability exceptions of footnote (b ) also apply to Functional Unit 5 . a .

b. Automatic Actuation Log ic N .A. N .A. (2 ) 1, 2(b), 3(b)

SALEM - U N I T 2 3/4 3-35 Amend ment No. 282

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION Outputs are u p to, but not including , the Output Relays.

The provisions of Specification of 4. 0.4 are not applicable.

(1 ) Each logic channel shall be tested in accordance with the Survei llance F requency Control Prog ram . The CHAN NEL FU NCTIO N TEST of each log ic channel shall verify that its associated diesel generator automatic load sequence timer is O PERABLE with the interval between each load block within 1 second of its desig n interval.

(2 ) Each trai n or logic channel shall be tested in accord ance with the Surveil lance Freq uency Control Prog ram .

(3 ) The CHANNEL FUNCTIO NAL TEST shall include exercising the trans mitter by applying either a vacuu m or pressure to the appropriate side of the transmitter.

(4 ) If not performed in the previous 92 days.

( 5) N OT USED (6 ) I nputs from undervoltage, Vital Bus, shall be tested in accordance with the Surveillance Freq uency Control Prog ram . Inputs from Solid State Protection System, shall be tested in accordance with the Survei l lance Freq uency Control Prog ram .

( 7) Frequencies are specified in t h e Surveillance Freq uency Control Prog ram un less otherwise noted in the table.

(a) Except when all MS IVs are closed .

(b) Except when each main feedwater line is isolated by ( 1 ) a closed and de-activated feedwater isolation valve, or (2) a closed and de-activated feedwater regu lating valve (FRV) and FRV bypass valve, or (3) a closed manua l valve.

SALEM - U N IT 2 3/4 3-3 7 Amend ment No. 282

PLANT SY§TEMS MAI N STEAM l i E I SOLATI O N VALVES UMIIJNG C.ONDIIION..EQB_QPEBAilON 3 .7 . 1 . 5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.

I AP P L I CABI LII'C MODES 1 .----r and 3. I ACT I ON:

! MOD E S 2 and 3 except when all M SIVs are closed .

MODES 1 - With one main steam line i solation valve inoperable. P OWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable vaNe is either restored to OPERABLE status or closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ; Otherwise. be in MODE 2 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

MODES 2

With one or more main steam line isolation va lve(s ) inopera ble. subsequent a nd 3 operation in MODES 2 or 3 may proceed provided:

a. T h e i solation va lve(s) i s (are) maintained closed, and

b. The i solation va lve(s) is (are) verified cl ose* 1nce per 7 days.

Otherwise. be i n MODE 3. HOT STAN D BY. within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . and M O D E 4. H OT SHUT DOWN, within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

SURYEiktktNCE BEQUIREMENTS

4. 7 . 1 . 5 Each main steam lirle isolation va lve shall be dem onstrated OPERAB LE by verifying full closure within 5 s econds when tested pursuant to the INSERVI CE TEST I NG P ROGRA M . The provisi ons of Specification 4 . 0 . 4 are not applicable_

SALEM UNIT 2 3/4 7- 1 0 _

Amendment N o 300

LR-N17-0144 LAR S17-06 Attach ment 2 Attach ment 2 Mark-up of P roposed Technical Specification Bases Pages The following Technical Specifications pages for Renewed Facility Operating License DPR-70 are affected by this change request:

Technical Specification Page New 3/4.7.13, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (FIVs), Main B 3/4 7-13 Feedwater Regulating Valves (FRVs), FRV Bypass Valves (FRVBVs),

and Steam Generator Feedwater Pump (SGFP) Turbine Stop Valves The following Technical Specifications pages for Renewed Facility Operating License DPR-75 are affected by this change request:

Technical Specification Bases Page New 3/4.7.13, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (FIVs) , Main B 3/4 7-13 Feedwater Regulating Valves (FRVs), FRV Bypass Valves (FRVBVs),

and Steam Generator Feedwater Pump (SGFP) Turbine Stop Valves

LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Attach ment 2 Bases Insert for Page B 3/4 7-13:

B 3/4.7.13 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (FIVs) . Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (FRVs) .

FRV Bypass Valves (FRVBVs) . and Steam Generator Feedwater Pump (SGFP) Turbine Steam Stop Valves The OPERABILITY of the FIVs (BF13s), FRVs (BF19s), FRVBVs (BF40s) and SGFP turbine steam stop valves (MS43s and RS15s) ensures that the valves will be capable of performing their intended safety function. The safety function of these valves is to rapidly close following:

(1) a steam line or feedwater line rupture, thereby limiting the Reactor Coolant System cooldown and limiting the total energy release to the containment; or (2) a feedwater system malfunction, thereby limiting Reactor Coolant System cooldown.

The analysis of excessive RCS heat removal due to a feedwater system malfunction (UFSAR Section 15.2.10) assumes full opening of one or more FRVs, due to a control system malfunction or operator error, resulting in a step increase in feedwater flow to one or more steam generators. The analysis assumes a feedwater isolation signal is generated by a high high steam generator level or a safety injection (SI) signal. Feedwater isolation is assumed to occur as a result of the FIV(s) closing in 32 seconds and failure of the FRV(s) and associated FRVBV(s) to close as a result of the feedwater isolation signal. The trip of the SGFPs is not credited in the feedwater system malfunction analysis.

Rupture of a steam line (UFSAR Section 15.4.2) is analyzed to determine the response of the reactor core and to determine the resulting mass and energy releases. Two separate analyses are performed since conservative assumptions for the core response analysis are different than the conservative assumptions for the mass and energy release analysis.

The core response analysis credits feedwater isolation as a result of the safety injection signal which results in a feedwater isolation signal. For the steam generators with the non-faulted steam line, feedwater isolation is assumed to occur as a result of closure of all FRVs and FRVBVs in 10 seconds following receipt of the Sl signal. For the steam generator with the faulted steam line, the FRV is assumed to fail with feedwater isolation achieved by closure of the FIV in 32 seconds following receipt of the Sl signal.

The mass and energy release analysis assumes feedwater isolation occurs as a result of the Sl signal which generates the feedwater isolation signal. The most limiting case for mass addition to the containment assumes failure of the FRV to close in the loop with the faulted steam line.

Feedwater isolation occurs as a result of closure of the FIVs in 32 seconds and tripping of the SGFPs in 7 seconds. Reduction of feedwater flow due to SGFP coast down and closure of the FIV is credited in the containment analysis.

Rupture of a feedwater line between the feedwater stop-check valve and the steam generator (UFSAR Section 15.4.3) is analyzed to determine the response of the reactor core. The feedwater line break could cause either a reactor coolant system (RCS) cooldown or a heat up depending on the size of the rupture.

The RCS cooldown for a feedwater line rupture is bounded by the analysis for a steam line rupture. For the RCS heatup analysis, main feedwater to all steam generators is assumed to stop at the time of the feedwater line rupture due to the feedwater spilling out the break. A

LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 Attach ment 2 feedwater isolation signal is generated as a result of the safety injection signal and is accomplished by closure of the FRVs and FRVBVs in 1 0 seconds following receipt of the Sl signal.

The mass and energy release that would result from a rupture of a main feedwater line inside containment is bounded by the analysis of the rupture of a main steam line.

The APPLICABILITY of this specification is MODES 1 , 2 , and 3, except when:

a FIV or FRV and FRVBV valve are closed and deactivated or the main feedwater line is isolated by a closed manual valve; or

the SGFP turbine steam stop valve is closed and deactivated or the steam supply to the SGFP turbine is isolated, or the SGFP discharge to the steam generators is isolated.

The basis for the mode applicability is that in MODES 1 and 2 there is significant mass and energy in the RCS and steam generators and in MODE 3 there may be significant mass and energy in the RCS and steam generators. With significant mass and energy in the RCS and

steam generators, the valves are needed for isolation of the steam generators in the event of a secondary system pipe rupture. The mode applicability is modified by exception based upon the impacted valve or SGFP being placed in its required accident-analysis assumed position or the flow path being isolated such that the credited accident analysis function has already been completed.

The ACTION statements for an inoperable FIV, FRV, or FRVBV require that action must be taken to restore the affected valves to OPERABLE status, or to close or isolate the inoperable affected valves within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . When these valves are closed or isolated, they are performing their required safety function. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months action time takes into account the redundancy afforded by the remaining OPERABLE valves and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period that would require isolation of the feedwater flow paths. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months action time is reasonable, based on operating experience.

The ACTION statement for an inoperable SGFP turbine steam stop valve requires that action must be taken to restore the affected valves to OPERABLE status, or isolate the associated steam supply to the SGFP, or isolate the associated SGFP feedwater flow path within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

When the SGFP steam stop valves are closed or isolated, or the SGFP feedwater flow path is isolated, the required safety function has been completed. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months action time takes into account the redundancy afforded by the remaining OPERABLE valves and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period that would require isolation of the MFW flow paths.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months action time is reasonable, based on operating experience.

Inoperable valves that are closed or isolated must be verified on a periodic basis that they are closed or isolated. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day action time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of valve status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls, to ensure that these valves are closed or isolated.

Separate ACTION entry is allowed for each inoperable valve unless there is a loss of feedwater isolation capability for a flow path. Redundant components in the flow path would perform the feedwater isolation function.

LR-N17-0144 LAR 517-06 With either (1) a FRV or FRVBV and FIV inoperable, or (2) SGFP turbine steam stop valve (resulting in a loss of SGFP trip function) and FRV or FRVBV inoperable, there may be no redundant system to operate automatically and perform the required safety function. Under these conditions, affected valves in each flow path must be restored to OPERABLE status, or the affected flow path isolated within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . This action returns the system to the condition where at least one valve in each flow path is performing the required safety function. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to complete the actions required to close the FIV, FRV, FRVBV, or SGFP turbine steam stop valve, or otherwise isolate the affected flow path. With both a SGFP turbine steam stop valve and FIV inoperable, the FRV and FRVBV will operate automatically to provide feedwater isolation for the flow path.

If the FIV(s), FRV(s), FRVBV(s) and SGFP turbine steam stop valves cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, or closed, or the flow path isolated within the associated allowed outage time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least HOT STANDBY (MODE 3) within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in HOT SHUTDOWN (MODE 4) within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SR 4 . 7 .13.1 verifies that the closure time of each FIV, FRV, FRV bypass and SGFP turbine steam stop valve is within the limit in the Technical Requirements Manual and is within that assumed in the accident and containment analyses. This SR also verifies the valve closure time is in accordance with the lnservice Testing Program. The Frequency for this SR is in accordance with the lnservice Testing Program.

SR 4 . 7. 13.2 verifies that each FIV, FRV, FRV bypass and SGFP turbine steam stop valve can close on an actual or simulated actuation signal. This Surveillance is normally performed upon returning the plant to operation following a refueling outage. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

P LANT S Y S TEMS BAS E S 3 / 4 . 7 . 12 FUEL A S S E MB L Y S TORAGE IN THE S PENT FUEL POOL ( CONT I NU E D )

The r e s t r i c t i on s on the p l a c eme nt o f fu e l a s s emb l i e s w i thin the spent fu e l p o o l i n a c c o rdance w i t h T S 3 / 4 . 7 . 1 2 , i n the a c c omp anying LCO ,

e n s ur e s t h e keu o f t h e spent fuel s t o r a g e p o o l w i l l a l wa y s r ema i n < 0 . 95 ,

a s s umi ng the p o o l t o be f l o o d e d wi th unb o r a t e d wa t e r .

Thi s LCO app l i e s whenever any fue l a s s emb l y i s s t o r e d in Re g i on 1 or R e g i on 2 o f the fue l s t o ra g e pool .

The R e qu i r e d Ac t i on s a r e modi f i e d indi c a t i ng t h a t LCO 3 . 0 . 3 do e s not appl y . S t o r a g e o f fue l a s s emb l i e s and the b o r on c oncent r a t i on i n the spent fue l s t o r a g e p o o l a r e i ndepende nt o f r e a c t or ope r a t i on . The r e f o r e T S 3 / 4 . 3 . 7 . 1 1 and T S 3 / 4 . 3 . 7 . 1 2 inc lude t h e exc ept ion t o L C O 3 . 0 . 3 t o p r e c l ude a n i napp r opr i a t e r e a c t o r shut down . Whe n t h e con f i gu r a t i on o f fue l a s s embl i e s s t or e d i n R e g i o n 1 o r R e g i on 2 o f t h e spent fue l s t o r a ge p o o l i s not in a c c o rdan c e w i t h TS 3/4 . 7 . 12 , the imme di a t e a c t i on i s t o i n i t i a t e a c t i on t o ma ke t h e n e c e s s ar y fue l a s s emb l y movement ( s ) t o b r i ng the conf i gur at i on i n t o c omp l i ance with TS 3/4 . 7 . 12 . I f unab l e t o move fue l a s s emb l i e s whi l e i n MO DE 5 or 6 , LCO 3 . 0 . 3 would not be app l i c ab l e .

I f unab l e to move fue l a s s emb l i e s whi l e in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the a c t i on i s i ndependent of r e a c t o r op e r a t i on . Th e r e f o r e , i n ab i l i t y t o move fue l a s s emb l i e s i s not s u f f i c i ent r e a s on t o r e qu i r e a r e a c t o r shut down .

The SR ve r i f i e s by admi n i s t r a t i ve me a n s t h a t the ini t i a l e n r i chment and burnup o f t h e fue l a s s emb l y i s i n a c c o r dan c e w i th T S 3/4 . 7 . 12 i n the a c c omp anying LCO .

S a l em - Uni t 1 B 3/4 7-13 Amendme nt N o . 276

PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7. 1 2 FUEL ASS E M BLY STORAG E I N THE SPENT F U E L POOL (CONTI N U E D)

The restrictions on the placement of fuel assemblies within the spent fuel pool in accordance with TS 3/4. 7. 1 2 , in the accompanying LCO, ensures the keff of the spent fuel storage pool will always remain < 0 . 9 5 , assuming the pool to be flooded with u n borated water.

This LCO appl ies whenever any fuel assembly is stored in Reg ion 1 or Region 2 of the fuel storage pool .

The Required Actions are modified indicating that LC03 .0.3 does not apply. Storage of fuel assemblies and the boron concentration in the spent fuel storage pool a re independent of reactor operation. Therefore TS 3/4 . 3 . 7. 1 1 and TS 3/4.3.7. 1 2 include the exception to LCO 3 . 0 . 3 to preclude an i n appropriate reactor sh utdown . When the configuration of fuel assemblies stored in Region 1 or Region 2 of the spent fuel storage pool is not in accordance with TS 3/4.7. 1 2 , the immediate action is to i nitiate action to make the necessary fuel assembly movement(s) to bring the configuration into compliance with TS 3/4.7. 1 2 . If unable to move fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not be applicable. If unable to move fuel assemblies whi le in MODE 1 , 2 , 3 , or 4, the action is independent of reactor operation.

Therefore, inability to move fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to req u i re a reactor sh utdown.

The SR verifies by administrative means that the initial enrichment and burn u p of the fuel assembly is in accordance with TS 3/4.7. 1 2 in the accompanying LCO.

SALEM - U N IT 2 8 3/4 7- 1 3 Amend ment N o .2 5 8

v t e Letter Sequence Request
EPID:L-2018-LLA-0189, TSTF-425 (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request Acceptance Supplement Administration Questions Answers Results Approval Other:
MONTHYEAR2018-06-29 [Table View]

LR-N17-0144, License Amendment Request: Revise Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation, Main Steam Isolation Valves and Add Main Feedwater Isolation Technical Specification

Text

Subject:

Enclosure:

SUMMARY

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

6.0 REFERENCES

SUMMARY

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

6.0 REFERENCES

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LR-N17-0144, License Amendment Request: Revise Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation, Main Steam Isolation Valves and Add Main Feedwater Isolation Technical Specification

Text

Subject:

Enclosure:

SUMMARY

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

6.0 REFERENCES

SUMMARY

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

6.0 REFERENCES

= ========================= = =============================================

============== = = ======================== = = = ======================

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