Text

Issuance of Amendment No. 198, Revise TS 3.7.3, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves, Main Feedwater Regulating Valves, and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves, and TS 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation
	ML101110103
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	06/29/2010
From:	Thadani M; Plant Licensing Branch IV
To:	Heflin A; Union Electric Co
	Thadani, M C, NRR/DORL/LP4, 415-1476
References
	TAC ME1325
	Download: ML101110103 (62)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 June 29, 2010 Mr. Adam C. Heflin Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Union Electric Company P.O. Box 620 Fulton, MO 65251 SUB~IECT:

CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: REVISION TO TS 3.7.3, "MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES (MFIVS) AND MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES (MFRVS) AND MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE BYPASS VALVES (MFRVBVS)," AND TS 3.3.2, "ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS)

INSTRUMENTATION" (TAC NO. ME1325)

Dear Mr. Heflin:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 198 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-30 for the Callaway Plant, Unit 1.

The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated May 4, 2009 (ULNRC-05608).

The proposed changes consist of the following:

Revise TS 3.7.3, "Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves (MFRVBVs)," so that the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) and Applicability more accurately reflect the conditions for when the LCO should be applicable and more effectively provide appropriate exceptions to the Applicability for certain valve configurations.

Revise the title of TS 3.7.3 to "Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs), Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs), and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves (MFRVBVs)," and the associated page header to "MFIVs, MFRVs, and MFRVBVs."

Revise the exception footnotes in TS 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," Table 3.3.2-1, in order to improve the application of existing notes and/or incorporate more appropriate notes as applicable.

A. Heflin

- 2 A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

~

Mohan C. Thadani, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-483

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 198 to NPF-30

2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-483 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 198 License No. NPF-30

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Union Electric Company (UE, the licensee),

dated May 4, 2009, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

- 2

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-30 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan*

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 198 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, and shall be implemented within 90 days of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Michael T. Markley, Chief Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Facility Operating License No. NPF-30 and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: June 29, 2010

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 198 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-30 DOCKET NO. 50-483 Replace the following pages of the Facility Operating License No. NPF-30 and Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Facility Operating License REMOVE INSERT

-3

-3 Technical Specifications REMOVE INSERT 3-4 (Table of Contents) 3-4 (Table of Contents) 3.3-42 3.3-42 3.3-43 3.3-43 3.3-44 3.3-44 3.7-9 through 3.7-46 3.7-9 through 3.7-47

- 3 (4)

UE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source of special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (5)

LIE, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

C.

This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1)

Maximum Power Level UE is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3565 megawatts thermal (100% power) in accordance with the conditions specified herein.

(2)

Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan*

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 198 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

(3)

Environmental Qualification (Section 3.11, SSER #3)**

Deleted per Amendment No. 169.

Amendments 133, 134, & 135 were effective as of April 30, 2000 however these amendments were implemented on April 1, 2000.

The parenthetical notation following the title of many license conditions denotes the section of the Safety Evaluation Report and/or its supplements wherein the license condition is discussed.

Amendment No. 198

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.6 3.6.4 3.6.5 3.6.6 3.6.7 3.6.8 3.7 3.7.1 3.7.2 3.7.3 3.7.4 3.7.5 3.7.6 3.7.7 3.7.8 3.7.9 3.7.10 3.7.11 3.7.12 3.7.13 3.7.14 3.7.15 3.7.16 3.7.17 3.7.18 3.7.19 3.8 3.8.1 3.8.2 3.8.3 3.8.4 3.8.5 3.8.6 3.8.7 3.8.8 3.8.9 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued)

Containment Pressure 3.6-16 Containment Air Temperature 3.6-17 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems 3.6-18 Recirculation Fluid pH Control (RFPC) System 3.6-21 Hydrogen Recombiners 3.6-22 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7-1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) 3.7-1 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Valves (MSIVBVs), and Main Steam Low Point Drain Isolation Valves (MSLPDIVs) 3.7-5 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs), Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs), and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves (MFRVBVs) 3.7-9 Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (ASDs) 3.7-12 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System 3.7-15 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) 3.7-19 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System 3.7-21 Essential Service Water System (ESW) 3.7-23 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) 3.7-26 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) 3.7-28 Control Room Air Conditioning System (CRACS) 3.7-32 Not Used 3.7-35 Emergency Exhaust System (EES) 3.7-36 Not Used 3.7-39 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level 3.7-40 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration 3.7-41 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7-43 Secondary Specific Activity 3.7-45 Secondary System Isolation Valves (SSIVs) 3.7-46 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8-1 AC Sources - Operating 3.8-1 AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8-16 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8-20 DC Sources - Operating 3.8-23 DC Sources - Shutdown 3.8-26 Battery Cell Parameters 3.8-28 Inverters - Operating 3.8-32 Inverters - Shutdown 3.8-34 Distribution Systems - Operating 3.8-36 CALLAWAY PLANT 3

Amendment 198

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.8 3.8.10 3.9 3.9.1 3.9.2 3.9.3 3.9.4 3.9.5 3.9.6 3.9.7 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS (continued)

Distribution Systems - Shutdown 3.8-38 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9-1 Boron Concentration 3.9-1 Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves 3.9-3 Nuclear Instrumentation 3.9-5 Containment Penetrations 3.9-7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level 3.9-9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level 3.9-11 Refueling Pool Water Level 3.9-13 DESIGN FEATURES 4.0-1 Site Location 4.0-1 Reactor Core 4.0-1 Fuel Storage 4.0-1 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.0-1 Responsibility 5.0-1 Organization 5.0-2 Unit Staff Qualifications 5.0-4 Procedures 5.0-5 Programs and Manuals 5.0-6 Reporting Requirements 5.0-22 High Radiation Area 5.0-27 CALLAWAY PLANT 4

Amendment 198

3.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation Table 3.3.2-1 (page 5 of 11)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation FUNCTION

5.

Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation

a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (SSPS)

b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (MSFIS)

c. SG Water Level High High (P-14)

d. Safety Injection APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a)

Ul Ul Ul 1,2,3 2 trains G

SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 NA SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.32.14 2 trains(o)

S SR 3.3.2.3 NA 1Ul,2Ul 4 per SG SR 3.3.2.1

'> 91.4%(5) of SR 3.3.2.5 Narrow Range SR 3.3.2.9 Instrument SR 3.3.2.10 Span Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements. The Applicability exceptions of Footnote U> also apply to Function 5.d.

(a)

The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system setting except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2),

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpoint defines the limiting safety system setting for these Functions). See the Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

U>

Except when:

1. All MFIVs are closed and de-activated:

AND

2. All MFRVs are:

2.a Closed and de-activated, or 2.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; AND

3. All MFRVBVs are:

3.a Closed and de-activated, or 3.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or 3.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

(I)

Except when all MFIVs are closed and de-activated.

(0)

Each train requires a minimum of two programmable logic controllers to be OPERABLE.

(s)

1. If the as-found instrument channel setpoint is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, but outside its as-found test acceptance criteria band, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. If the as-found instrument channel setpoint is not conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, the channel shall be declared inoperable.

2. The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left setpoint tolerance band on either side of the Nominal Trip Setpoint, or to a value that is more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. The Nominal Trip Setpoints and the methodology used to determine the as-found test acceptance criteria band and the as-left setpoint tolerance band shall be specified in the Bases.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-42 Amendment No. 198

3.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation Table 3.3.2-1 (page 6 of 11)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a)

5.

Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation

e. Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low(q)

(1) Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low (Adverse Containment Environment) 1Ul, 2Ul, 3Ul 4 per SG D

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10

~ 20.6%(5) of Narrow Range Instrument Span (2) Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low (Normal Containment Environment) 1U)(r), 2Ul(r), 3Ul(r) 4 per SG D

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10

~ 16.6%(5) of Narrow Range Instrument Span (a)

The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system setting except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2),

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpoint defines the limiting safety system setting for these Functions). See the Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

0)

Except when:

1. All MFIVs are closed and de-activated; AND

2. All MFRVs are:

2.a Closed and de-activated, or 2.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; AND

3. All MFRVBVs are:

3.a Closed and de-activated, or 3.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or 3.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

(q)

Feedwater isolation only.

(r)

Except when the Containment Pressure - Environmental Allowance Modifier channels in the same protection sets are tripped.

(s)

1. If the as-found instrument channel setpoint is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, but outside its as-found test acceptance criteria band, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. If the as-found instrument channel setpoint is not conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, the channel shall be declared inoperable.

2. The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left setpoint tolerance band on either side of the Nominal Trip Setpoint, or to a value that is more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. The Nominal Trip Setpoints and the methodology used to determine the as-found test acceptance criteria band and the as-left setpoint tolerance band shall be specified in the Bases.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-43 Amendment No. 198

3.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation Table 3.3.2-1 (page 7 of 11)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a)

5.

Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation

e. Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low(q)

(3) Not used.

(4) Containment Pressure Environmental Allowance Modifier 1m, 2m, 3m 4

N SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10

s; 2.0 psig (a)

The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system setting except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2),

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpoint defines the limiting safety system setting for these Functions). See the Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

(j)

Except when:

1. All MFIVs are closed and de-activated; AND

2. All MFRVs are:

2.a Closed and de-activated, or 2.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; AND

3. All MFRVBVs are:

3.a Closed and de-activated, or 3.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or 3.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

(q)

Feedwater isolation only.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-44 Amendment No. 198

MFIVs, MFRVs, and MFRVBVs 3.7.3 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.3 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs), Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs),

and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves (MFRVBVs)

LCO 3.7.3 The MFIV, MFRV, and MFRVBV in each of the four main feedwater lines shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

For the MFIV in each main feedwater line:

MODES 1, 2, and 3 except when:

a.

The MFIV is closed and de-activated; or

b.

The MFRV is closed and de-activated or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; and the MFRVBV is closed and de-activated, or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or isolated by two closed manual valves.

For the MFRV in each main feedwater line:

MODES 1, 2, and 3 except when:

a.

The MFIV is closed and de-activated; or

b.

The MFRV is closed and de-activated or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve.

For the MFRVBV in each main feedwater line:

MODES 1, 2, and 3 except when:

a.

The MFIV is closed and de-activated; or

b.

The MFRVBV is closed and de-activated, or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or isolated by two closed manual valves.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-9 Amendment No. 198

3.7.3 MFIVs, MFRVs, and MFRVBVs ACTIONS

NOTE ----------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each main feedwater line.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more MFIVs inoperable.

A.1 AND A.2 Close MFIV.

Verify MFIV is closed.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Once per 7 days B.

One or more MFRVs inoperable.

B.1 AND Close or isolate MFRV.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months B.2 Verify MFRV is closed or isolated.

Once per 7 days C.

One or more MFRVBVs inoperable.

C.1 AND Close or isolate MFRVBV.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months C.2 Verify MFRVBV is closed or isolated.

Once per 7 days D.

Two valves in the same flow path inoperable.

0.1 Isolate affected flow path.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months E.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

E.1 AND Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months E.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-10 Amendment 198

3.7.3 MFIVs, MFRVs, and MFRVBVs SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1

NOTE ---------------------------

Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2.

Verify the closure time of each MFRV and MFRVBV is within limits.

In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.3.2

NOTE ---------------------------

For the MFRVs and MFRVBVs. only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2.

Verify each MFIV, MFRV and MFRVBV actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

18 months SR 3.7.3.3 Verify the closure time of each MFIV is within limits.

In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-11 Amendment 198 I

3.7.4 ASDs 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (ASDs)

LCO 3.7.4 Four ASD lines shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One required ASD line inoperable for reasons other than excessive ASD seat leakage.

A.1 Restore required ASD line to OPERABLE status.

7 days B.

Two required ASD lines inoperable for reasons other than excessive ASD seat leakage.

B.1 Restore all but one required ASD line to OPERABLE status.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months C.

Three or more required ASD lines inoperable for reasons other than excessive ASD seat leakage.

C.1 Restore all but two required ASD lines to OPERABLE status.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (continUed)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-12 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.4 ASDs ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

With one or more of the required ASD(s) inoperable because of excessive seat leakage.

0.1 AND 0.2 Initiate action to close the Associated manual isolation valve(s).

Restore ASD(s) to OPERABLE status.

Immediately 30 days E.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

E.1 AND E.2 Be in MODE 3.

Be in MODE 4.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 12 hours CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-13 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.4 ASDs SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.1

NOTE ---------------------------

Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2.

Verify one complete cycle of each ASD.

In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.4.2 Verify one complete cycle of each ASD manual isolation valve.

In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-14 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.5 AFW System 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System LCO 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1,2, and 3.

ACTIONS

NOTE ----------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0A.b is not applicable when entering MODE 1.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One steam supply to turbine driven AFW pump inoperable.

A.1 Restore steam supply to OPERABLE status.

7 days AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO B.

One ESW supply to turbine driven AFW pump inoperable.

B.1 Restore ESW supply to OPERABLE status.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-15 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.5 AFW System ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

One AFW train inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B.

C.1 Restore AFW train to OPERABLE status.

72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months s*

AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time for Condition A, B or C not met.

D.1 AND Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months OR Two AFW trains inoperable.

D.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months E.

Three AFW trains inoperable.

E.1

No-rE ----------

LCO 3.0.3 and all other LCO Required Actions requiring MODE changes are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status.

Initiate action to restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status.

Immediately

With the exception that the Completion Time associated with the Condition C entry on 2/3/04 for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump has been extended on a one-time only basis to 144 hours0.00167 days 0.04 hours 2.380952e-4 weeks 5.4792e-5 months . At the time a formal cause of the inoperability is determined, Condition D will be entered immediately.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-16 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.5 AFW System SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.1

NOTE ---------------------------

Only required to be performed for the AFW flow control valves when the system is placed in automatic control or when THERMAL POWER is > 10% RTP.

Verify each AFW manual, power operated, and automatic valve in each water flow path, and in both steam supply flow paths to the steam turbine driven pump, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

31 days SR 3.7.5.2

NOTE ---------------------------

Not required to be performed for the turbine driven AFW pump until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after ~ 900 psig in the steam generator.

Verify the developed head of each AFW pump at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head.

In accordance with the Inservice Test Program SR 3.7.5.3 Verify each AFW automatic valve that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

18 months (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-17 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.5 AFW System SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.4

NOTE ---------------------------

Not required to be performed for the turbine driven AFW pump until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after 2: 900 psig in the steam generator.

Verify each AFW pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

18 months SR 3.7.5.5 Verify proper alignment of the required AFW flow paths by verifying flow from the condensate storage tank to each steam generator.

Prior to entering MODE 2 whenever unit has been in MODE 5 or 6 for> 30 days CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-18 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.6 CST 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST)

LCO 3.7.6 The CST contained water volume shall be 2: 281,000 gal.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1,2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

CST contained water volume not within limit.

A.1 AND A.2 Verify by administrative means OPERABILITY of backup water supply.

Restore CST contained water volume to within limit.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months AND Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter 7 days B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 AND B.2 Be in MODE 3.

Be in MODE 4.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 12 hours CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-19 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.6 CST SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.6.1 Verify the CST contained water volume is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

~ 281,000 gal.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-20 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.7 CCW System 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System LCO 3.7.7 Two CCW trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One CCW train inoperable.

A.1

NOTE ----------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 4,"

for residual heat removal loops made inoperable byCCW.

Restore CCW train to OPERABLE status.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

B.1 AND Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months B.2 Be in MODE 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-21 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.7 CCW System SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.7.1

NOTE ---------------------------

Isolation of CCW flow to individual components does not render the CCW System inoperable.

Verify each CCW manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path servicing safety related equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

31 days SR 3.7.7.2 Verify each CCW automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

18 months SR 3.7.7.3 Verify each CCW pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

18 months CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-22 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.8 ESW 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Essential Service Water System (ESW)

LCO 3.7.8 Two ESW trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One ESW train inoperable.

A.1

NOTE ----------

1. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating,"

for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by ESW.

2. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 4," for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by ESW.

(continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-23 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.8 ESW ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One ESW train inoperable.

A.1 (continued)

Restore ESW train to OPERABLE status.

NOTE-------

A one-time Completion Time of 14 days is allowed to support planned replacement of ESW 'B' train piping prior to April 30, 2009.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months B.2 Be in MODE 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-24 Amendment 198 I

3.7.8 ESW SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.8.1

NOTE ---------------------------

Isolation of ESW flow to individual components does not render the ESW inoperable.

Verify each ESW manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path servicing safety related equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

31 days SR 3.7.8.2 Verify each ESW automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

18 months SR 3.7.8.3 Verify each ESW pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

18 months CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-25 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.9 UHS 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)

LCO 3.7.9 The UHS shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One cooling tower train inoperable.

A.1 Restore cooling tower train to OPERABLE status.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

OR UHS inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.

B.1 AND B.2 Be in MODE 3.

Be in MODE 5.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 36 hours CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-26 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.9 UHS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.9.1 Verify water level of UHS is;::: 831.25 ft mean sea level.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months SR 3.7.9.2 Verify average water temperature of UHS is ::; 90°F.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months SR 3.7.9.3 Operate each cooling tower fan for;::: 15 minutes in both the fast and slow speed.

31 days CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-27 Amendment No. 198 I

CREVS 3.7.10 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)

LCO 3.7.10 Two CREVS trains shall be OPERABLE.

I\\l0 TE --------------------------------------------

The control room envelope (CRE) and control building envelope (CBE) boundaries may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One CREVS train inoperable for reasons other than Condition B.

A.1 Restore CREVS train to OPERABLE status.

7 days (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-28 Amendment No. 198 I

CREVS 3.7.10 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

One or more CREVS trains inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary or an inoperable CBE boundary in MODE 1,2,3, or4.

B.1 AND B.2 AND B.3 Initiate action to implement mitigating actions.

Verify mitigating actions to ensure CRE occupant radiological exposure will not exceed limits and CRE occupants are protected from chemical and smoke hazards.

Restore the CRE boundary and CBE boundary to OPERABLE status.

Immediately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 90 days C.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or4.

C.1 AND Be in MODE 3.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months C.2 Be in MODE 5.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-29 Amendment No. 198 I

CREVS 3.7.10 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

0.1 OR 0.2.1 AND 0.2.2 Place OPERABLE CREVS train in CRVIS mode.

Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Immediately Immediately Immediately E.

Two CREVS trains inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

OR One or more CREVS trains inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary or an inoperable CBE boundary during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

E.1 AND E.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Immediately Immediately F.

Two CREVS trains inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 for reasons other than Condition B.

F.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.

Immediately CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-30 Amendment No. 198 I

CREVS 3.7.10 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.10.1 Operate each CREVS train pressurization filter unit for ~ 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating and each CREVS train filtration filter unit for

~ 15 minutes.

31 days SR 3.7.10.2 Perform required CREVS filter testing in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP).

In accordance with the VFTP SR 3.7.10.3 Verify each CREVS train actuates on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

18 months SR 3.7.10.4 Perform required unfiltered air inleakage testing of the CRE and CBE boundaries in accordance with the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program.

In accordance with the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-31 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.11 CRACS 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.11 Control Room Air Conditioning System (CRACS)

LCO 3.7.11 Two CRACS trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One CRACS train inoperable.

A.1 Restore CRACS train to OPERABLE status.

30 days B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met in MODE 1,2,3, or4.

B.1 AND B.2 Be in MODE 3.

Be in MODE 5.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 36 hours (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-32 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.11 CRACS ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

C.1 Place OPERABLE CRACS train in operation.

OR C.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND C.2.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Immediately Immediately Immediately D.

Two CRACS trains inoperable in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

0.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND 0.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

Immediately Immediately E.

Two CRACS trains inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or4.

E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.

Immediately CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-33 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.11 CRACS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.11.1 Verify each CRACS train has the capability to remove 18 months the assumed heat load.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-34 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.12 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.12 Not Used.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-35 Amendment No. 198 I

Emergency Exhaust System 3.7.13 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.13 Emergency Exhaust System (EES)

LCO 3.7.13 Two EES trains shall be OPERABLE.

NOTE --------------------------------------------

The auxiliary or fuel building boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

NOTE --------------------------------------------

The SIS mode of operation is required only in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. The FBVIS mode of operation is required only during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

ACTIONS

NOTE ----------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable to the FBVIS mode of operation.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One EES train inoperable.

A.1 Restore EES train to OPERABLE status.

7 days B.

Two EES trains inoperable due to inoperable auxiliary building boundary in MODE 1,2,3 or4.

B.1 Restore auxiliary building boundary to OPERABLE status.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-36 Amendment No. 198 I

Emergency Exhaust System 3.7.13 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

OR Two EES trains inoperable in MODE 1,2,3, or4 for reasons other than Condition B.

C.1 AND C.2 Be in MODE 3.

Be in MODE 5.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 36 hours D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

0.1 OR 0.2 Place OPERABLE EES train in the FBVIS mode.

Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

Immediately Immediately E.

Two EES trains inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

E.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

Immediately CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-37 Amendment No. 198 I

Emergency Exhaust System 3.7.13 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.13.1 Operate each EES train for 2': 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating.

31 days SR 3.7.13.2 Perform required EES filter testing in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP).

In accordance with the VFTP SR 3.7.13.3 Verify each EES train actuates on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

18 months SR 3.7.13.4 Verify one EES train can maintain a negative pressure 2': 0.25 inches water gauge with respect to atmospheric pressure in the auxiliary building during the SIS mode of operation.

18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.7.13.5 Verify one EES train can maintain a negative pressure 2': 0.25 inches water gauge with respect to atmospheric pressure in the fuel building during the FBVIS mode of operation.

18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-38 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.14 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.14 Not Used.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-39 Amendment No. 198 I

Fuel Storage Pool Water Level 3.7.15 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.15 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level LCO 3.7.15 The fuel storage pool water level shall be ~ 23 ft over the top of the storage racks.

APPLICABILITY:

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

Fuel storage pool water level not within limit.

A.1

NOTE ----------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.15.1 Verify the fuel storage pool water level is ~ 23 ft 7 days above the storage racks.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-40 Amendment No. 198 I

Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration 3.7.16 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.16 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration LCO 3.7.16 The fuel storage pool boron concentration shall be ~ 2165 ppm.

APPLICABILITY:

When fuel assemblies are stored in the fuel storage pool and a fuel storage pool verification has not been performed since the last movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

Fuel storage pool boron concentration not within limit.

NOTE ------------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

A.1 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

Immediately AND A.2.1 Initiate action to restore fuel storage pool boron concentration to within limit.

Immediately OR A.2.2 Verify by administrative means that a non-Region 1 fuel storage pool verification has been performed since the last movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

Immediately CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-41 Amendment No. 198 I

Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration 3.7.16 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.16.1 Verify the fuel storage pool boron concentration is 7 days within limit.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-42 Amendment No. 198 I

Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.17 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.17 Spent Fuel Assembly Storc:lge LCO 3.7.17 The combination of initial enrichment and burnup of each spent fuel assembly stored in Region 2 or 3 shall be within the Acceptable Domain of Figure 3.7.17-1 or in accordance with Specification 4.3.1.1.

APPLICABILITY:

Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

Requirements of the LCO not met.

A.1

NO-rE ----------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Initiate action to move the noncomplying fuel assembly to Region 1.

Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.17.1 Verify by administrative means the initial enrichment andburnup of the fuel assembly is in accordance with Figure 3.7.17-1 or Specification 4.3.1.1.

FREQUENCY Prior to storing the fuel assembly in Region 2 or 3 CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-43 Amendment No. 198 I

3.7.17 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 55000 50000

J I

~,-.

45000 0**

3:

~

40000 w

e:::

J (J) 35000 0

0 X

w w

30000 I<<

..J 25000

J

~

J U

20000

..J CD

~

w 15000 (J)

(J) <<

..J 10000 w

J u

5000 o

ACe FOR

~EPTAB REGIO~

_E BUR 2 AN NUP D D 3 S

)MAIN ORAGE

/

~

c,"V p<<:-~

/

v

~

~o

/V

/

~

~o<<:- V

/ /

~ /

~~

<)0

~~~ V h

v

~/

V (;0

~G/

/

V UNAC FOR CEPTAE

~EGION LE aUF 2 OR NUP 0 3 STO OMAIN

~AGE I

I I

I 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 FUEL ASSEMBLY INITIAL ENRICHMENT (w/o U-235)

Figure 3.7.17-1 (page 1 of 1)

MINIMUM REQUIRED FUEL ASSEMBLY BURNUP AS A FUNCTION OF INITIAL ENRICHMENT TO PERMIT STORAGE IN REGIONS 2 AND 3 CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-44 Amendment No. 198 I

Secondary Specific Activity 3.7.18 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.18 Secondary Specific Activity LCO 3.7.18 The specific activity of the secondary coolant shall be ~ 0.10 I-lCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

Specific activity not within limit.

A.1 AND A.2 Be in MODE 3.

Be in MODE 5.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.18.1 Verify the specific activity of the secondary coolant is 31 days

0.10 /lCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-45 Amendment No. 198 I

SSIVs 3.7.19 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.19 Secondary System Isolation Valves (SSIVs)

LCO 3.7.19 The SSIVs shall be OPERABLE.

NOTE --------------------------------------------

Locked closed manual SSIVs may be opened under administrative controls.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3 except for each secondary system flow path when:

a.

At least one of the two associated SSIVs is closed and de-activated; or

b.

At least one of the two associated SSIVs is closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; or

c.

The SSIV flow path is isolated by two closed manual valves, or two closed de-activated automatic valves, or a combination of a closed manual valve and a closed de-activated automatic valve.

ACTIONS

NO-rE ----------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each secondary system flow path.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more SSIVs inoperable.

NOTE ------------------

Closed or isolated automatic SSIVs may be opened or unisolated under administrative controls.

A.1 AND A.2 Close or isolate SSIV.

Verify SSIV is closed or isolated.

7 days Once per 7 days (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-46 Amendment No. 198 I

SSIVs 3.7.19 ACTIONS (continued)

B.

CONDITION Required Action and Associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 AND B.2 REQUIRED ACTION Be in MODE 3.

Be in MODE 4.

COMPLETION TIME 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 12 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.19.1 Verify the isolation time of each automatic SSIV is within limits.

In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.19.2 Verify each automatic SSIV in the flow path actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

18 months CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-47 Amendment No. 198 I

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 198 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-30 UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-483

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated May 4, 2009 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML091400202), Union Electric Company, the licensee for Callaway Plant, Unit 1, requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-30. The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.3, "Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves (MFRVBVs)," so that the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) and Applicability more accurately reflect the conditions for when the LCO should be applicable and more effectively provide appropriate exceptions to the Applicability for certain valve configurations. The proposed amendment would also revise the title of TS 3.7.3 to "Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs), Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs), and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves (MFRVBVs)," and the associated page header to "MFIVs, MFRVs, and MFRVBVs." In addition, the proposed changes for the exception footnotes in TS 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation,"

Table 3.3.2-1, in order to improve the application of existing notes and/or incorporate more appropriate notes.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, requires applicants for licenses to operate nuclear power plants to include TSs as part of the license application. These TSs become part of any license issued and are derived from the plant safety analyses.

The regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.36, "Technical specifications," in part, contain the requirements for the content of TSs. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TSs are required to include items in the following categories: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) LCOs; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls.

- 2 The regulations in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) list four criteria used to determine whether or not LCOs must be established in the TSs for items related to plant operation. If the item meets one or more of the four criteria listed below, an LCO must be established in the TSs to ensure the lowest functional capability or performance level of equipment required for safe operation of the facility will be met. The four criteria are:

Criterion 1. Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

Criterion 2. A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

Criterion 3. A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

Criterion 4. A structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

In its application dated May 4,2009, the licensee identified the following General Design Criteria (GDC) in Appendix A to 10 CR Part 50, as being applicable to this amendment request:

GDC-2 requires that structures, systems, and components important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without the loss of the capability to perform their safety functions.

GDC-4 requires that structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to accommodate the effects of and to be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents, including loss-of-coolant accidents. These structures, systems, and components shall be appropriately protected against dynamic effects, including the effects of missiles, pipe whipping, and discharging fluids, that may result from equipment failures and from events and conditions outside the nuclear power unit. However, dynamic effects associated with postulated pipe ruptures in nuclear power units may be excluded from the design basis when analyses reviewed and approved by the Commission demonstrate that the probability of fluid system piping rupture is extremely low under conditions consistent with the design basis for the piping.

GDC-13 requires that instrumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated

- 3 operational occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety, including those variables and systems that can affect the fission process, the integrity of the reactor core, the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment and its associated systems.

GDC-16 requires that the reactor containment and associated systems shall be provided to establish an essentially leak-tight barer against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment and to assure that the containment design conditions important to safety are not exceeded for as long as postulated accident conditions require.

GDC-20 requires that the protection system(s) shall be designed (1) to initiate automatically the operation of appropriate systems including the reactivity control systems, to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) to sense accident conditions and to initiate the operation of systems and components important to safety.

GDC-21 requires that the protection system(s) shall be designed for high functional reliability and testability.

GDC-22 through GDC-25 and GDC-29 require various design attributes for the protection system(s), including independence, safe failure modes, separation from control systems, requirements for reactivity control malfunctions, and protection against anticipated operational occurrences.

GDC-34 requires the capability to remove residual heat, i.e., to transfer fission product decay heat and other residual heat from the reactor core at a rate such that specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded. The auxiliary feedwater system provides this capability until the RCS is depressurized and the residual heat removal system can perform the function to satisfy this requirement. Isolation of the main feedwater system, i.e., isolation of the non-safety portion from the safety-related portion of the system piping, supports the auxiliary feedwater function.

GDC-50 requires that the reactor containment structure, including access openings, penetrations, and the containment heat removal system shall be designed so that the containment structure and its internal compartments can accommodate, without exceeding the design leakage rate and, with sufficient margin, the calculated pressure and temperature conditions resulting from any loss-of-coolant accident. This margin shall reflect consideration of (1) the effects of potential energy sources which have not been included in the determination of the peak conditions, such as energy in steam generators and energy from metal water and other chemical reactions that may result from degraded emergency core cooling functioning, (2) the limited experience and experimental data available for defining accident phenomena and containment responses, and (3) the conservatism of the calculational model and input parameters.

- 4 GDC-53 requires that the reactor containment shall be designed to permit (1) appropriate periodic inspection of all important areas, such as penetrations, (2) an appropriate surveillance program, and (3) periodic testing at containment design pressure of the leaktightness of penetrations which have resilient seals and expansion bellows.

GDC-54 requires that piping systems penetrating primary reactor containment shall be provided with leak detection, isolation, and containment capabilities having redundancy, reliability, and performance capabilities which reflect the importance to safety of isolating these piping systems. Such piping systems shall be designed with a capability to test periodically the operability of the isolation valves and associated apparatus and to determine if valve leakage is within acceptable limits.

GDC-57 requires that each line that penetrates primary reactor containment and is neither part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary nor connected directly to the containment atmosphere shall have at least one containment isolation valve which shall be either automatic, or locked closed, or capable of remote manual operation. This valve shall be outside the containment and located as close to the containment as practical. A simple check valve may not be used as the automatic isolation valve.

The regulations in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) specify that, when an LCO of a nuclear reactor plant is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the technical specification until the condition can be met.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1

System Description

The following system description was provided by the licensee in Section 3.0 of Attachment 1 to the license amendment request to aid the technical evaluation of the requested changes.

The MFIVs isolate main feedwater flow to the secondary side of the steam generators following a high energy line break. The MFRVs and MFRVBVs function to control feedwater flow to the steam generators and to provide backup isolation of main feedwater flow in the event an MFIV fails to close. Because an earthquake is not assumed to occur coincident with a spontaneous break of safety related secondary piping, loss of the non-safety grade MFRVs and MFRVBVs is not assumed. If the single active failure postulated for a secondary pipe break is the failure of a safety grade MFIV to close, then credit is taken for closing the non-safety grade MFRVs and MFRVBVs.

- 5 Feedwater is supplied to the four steam generators by four feedwater lines. One MFIV and one MFRV are installed in each of the four feedwater lines outside but close to containment. The MFRVBVs are located in six-inch lines that bypass flow around the MFRVs when in service. For each feedwater line, the MFIV is located downstream of the MFRV and MFRVBV.

The MFIV is a 14-inch gate valve with a system-medium actuator. The MFRV is an air-operated angle valve which automatically controls main feedwater flow between 20 percent and full power. The MFRVBV is an air-operated globe valve, which is normally used up to 25 percent power. It is normally closed during plant power operation above 25 percent power, but may be occasionally open to support maintenance, post-maintenance testing, or other plant activities.

As shown in FSAR Figure 10.4-6 (Sheet 1 and 2), an MFIV cannot be isolated with closed manual valves; the MFRV can be isolated upstream by a closed manual valve; and the MFRVBV can be isolated both upstream and downstream with a closed manual valve.

Closure of the MFIVs or MFRVs and MFRVBVs terminates flow to the steam generators, thereby terminating the event for feedwater line breaks occurring upstream of the MFIVs or MFRVs and MFRVBVs. Since the MFIVs are located upsteam of the point where the auxiliary feedwater lines connect to the main feedwater check valves (located in containment), closure of the MFIVs or the MFRVs and MFRVBVs ensures delivery of auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators for support of the auxiliary feedwater specified safety function.

Similarly, the consequences of events occurring in the main steam lines or in the main feedwater lines downstream of the MFIVs will be mitigated by valve closure.

Closure of the MFIVs or MFRVs and MFRVBVs effectively terminates the addition of feedwater to an affected steam generator and limits the mass and energy release for main steam line breaks or feedwater line breaks inside containment.

The MFIVs and MFRVs and MFRVBVs close on receipt of any safety injection signal, a Tavg [average reactor coolant system temperature] -

Low coincident with reactor trip [permissive] (P-4) (not credited in any accident analysis), a low low steam generator level, or steam generator water level -

high-high signal.

The MFIVs may also be actuated manually.

In addition to the licensee's system discussion of actuation signals above, Section 7.3.7 of Revision 14 to the Callaway Plant Final Safety Analysis Report describes the Main Steam and Feedwater Isolation System (MSFIS). This system uses a signal from the solid state protection system (SSPS) to actuate the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) and the MFIVs. The system actuates neither the MFRVs nor the MFRVBVs. The MSFIS actuates on low steam line pressure, high steam line negative pressure rate, high-high containment pressure, or manual initiation.

- 6

3.2 Proposed TS Changes

The NRC staff reviewed the proposed changes for compliance with 10 CFR 50.36. The following is the NRC staff's detailed evaluation of the licensee's proposed changes to the TSs.

3.2.1 TS 3.7.3, "MFIVs, MFRVs, and MFRV Bypass Valves" In its application dated May 4,2009, the licensee proposed the following changes to TS 3.7.3:

editorial changes to the title; clarification that the LCO defines the lowest functional capability necessary for isolation of each feedwater line; modification of the LCO applicability to clearly indicate each valve is required to be operable in Modes 1,2, and 3, unless the valve is closed and deactivated or the line is otherwise isolated; modify a note to specify that separate condition entry is allowed for each line rather than each valve; and editorial changes to the required action for an inoperable MFRVBV.

These changes include the following specific, substantive changes to TS 3.7.3:

Current TS 3.7.3 LCO states:

Four MFIVs, four MFRVs, and four MFRVBVs shall be OPERABLE.

Revised TS 3.7.3 LCO would state:

The MFIV, MFRV, and MFRVBV in each of the four main feedwater lines shall be OPERABLE.

Current TS 3.7.3 Applicability states:

MODES 1, 2, and 3 except when:

a.

MFIV is closed and de-activated; or

b.

MFRV is closed and de-activated or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; or

c.

MFRVBV is closed and de-activated, or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or isolated by two closed manual valves.

- 7 The revised TS 3.7.3 Applicability would state:

For the MFIV in each main feedwater line:

MODES 1, 2, and 3 except when:

a.

The MFIV is closed and de-activated; or

b.

The MFRV is closed and de-activated or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; and the MFRVBV is closed and de-activated, or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or isolated by two closed manual valves.

For the MFRV in each main feedwater line:

MODES 1, 2, and 3 except when:

a.

The MFIV is closed and de-activated; or

b.

The MFRV is closed and de-activated or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve.

For the MFRVBV in each main feedwater line:

MODES 1, 2, and 3 except when:

a.

The MFIV is closed and de-activated; or

b.

The MFRVBV is closed and de-activated, or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or isolated by two closed manual valves.

Current Note applicable to the Conditions and Required Actions for TS 3.7.3 states:

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each valve.

The revised Note would state:

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each main feedwater line.

The proposed changes to the LCO, Note, and Required Actions clarify the Applicability for each main feedwater line. For each feedwater line, the MFIV serves as one isolation barrier and the combination of the MFRV and MFRVBV (which are in parallel) serve as the other barrier. Thus, the proposed changes to the LCO Applicability more clearly designate the conditions where operability of the specified valve is necessary to accomplish the safety function for each specified feedwater line. By requiring valve operability, unless the affected valve is closed and

- 8 deactivated or the line is otherwise isolated by redundant means, the applicability appropriately considers a single active component failure. When the safety function of the valve in isolating the feedwater line is accomplished in a reliable manner, the valve itself need not be operable for automatic isolation. Thus, the changes to TS 3.7.3 maintain the LCO required by 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) and specify appropriate remedial actions when the LCO is not met. Therefore, the changes to the LCO Applicability are acceptable.

The licensee also proposed two minor changes to the title and page header for TS 3.7.3. The staff found these changes to be editorial in nature. Therefore, these changes are acceptable.

3.2.2 TS 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation" In its application dated May 4, 2009, the licensee proposed the following changes to TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation":

Replace exception footnote U) in TS Table 3.3.2-1 Function 5.b, which applies to automatic actuation logic and actuation relays for the MSFIS, with new exception footnote (I).

New exception footnote (I) will state, "when all MFIVs are closed and de activated."

Existing footnote U) allows an exception to the applicability of the function when the safety function is satisfied by all valves being closed and deactivated or the safety function of the valve is otherwise being assured.

Because the MFRVs and the MFRVBVs do not receive the MSFIS signal, the existing footnote U) is not correct for the feedwater isolation function related to the MSFIS; therefore, TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 5.b, which applies to automatic actuation logic and actuation relays for the MSFIS, would be revised to incorporate new footnote (I) applicable to all modes.

Existing exception footnote (j) will be applied to MODE 1 for the applicable sub parts of Function 5, "Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation."

In addition, Applicability exceptions for turbine trip and feedwater isolation after a safety injection signal (Function 5.d) should also reflect footnote (j). Accordingly, the Function 5.d, "Safety Injection," statement will include a sentence that reads, "The Applicability exceptions of Footnote (j) also apply to Function 5.d."

The current Function 5 and the revised Function 5 are provided in the following tables:

- 9 Current Function 5, "Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation," of TS Table 3.3.2-1 states:

FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE (a)

5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation

a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (SSPS) 1,20),30) 2 trains G

SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.14 NA

b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (MSFIS) 1, 20), 3u) 2 trains(O)

S SR 3.3.2.3 NA

c.

SG Water Level - High High (P-14) 1, 20) 4 per SG SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10

5. 91.4%(5) of Narrow Range Instrument Span

d. Safety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.

e. Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low(q)

(1) Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low (Adverse Containment Environment) 1, 20), 3U) 4 per SG D

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10

~ 20.6%(5) of Narrow Range Instrument Span (2) Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low (Normal Containment Environment) 1('1, 2uXr), 3u)(r) 4 per SG D

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10

~ 16.5%(5) of Narrow Range Instrument Span (3) Not used.

(4) Containment Pressure-Environmental Allowance Modifier 1, 20), 3u) 4 N

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10

5. 2.0 psig

- 10 Revised Function 5, "Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation," of TS Table 3.3.2-1, showing the revisions as highlighted below, would state:

APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE (a)

5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation

a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (SSPS)

b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (MSFIS)

c. SG Water Level - High High (P-14)

d. Safety Injection

e. Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low (q)

(1) Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low (Adverse Containment Environment)

(2) Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low (Normal Containment Environment)

(3) Not used.

(4) Containment Pressure Environmental Allowance Modifier 10>, 2U), 3Ul 2 trains 1(1), 2ltJ(1), 3ltJ(')

2 trains(O) 4 per SG G

SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.14 S

SR 3.3.2.3 SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 NA NA

5. 91.4%(5) of Narrow Range Instrument Span Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.

The Applical:>i1ity eXC<:lPliqo$ofFootOQte (j) also applyto Functioo 5.d.

10>, 2Ul, 3U) 4 per SG 10)(r), 2U)(r), 3U)(r) 4 per SG 4

D SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 D

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 N

SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10

20.6%(5) of Narrow Range Instrument Span

16.5%(5) of Narrow Range Instrument Span

5. 2.0 psig Footnote (I) would make an exception for operability of the MSFIS feedwater isolation logic and actuation when all MFIVs are closed and deactivated. The licensee had reviewed the logic schematic drawings for the MFRVs and MFRVBVs and determined that the closing signal from the SSPS cabinets for main feedline isolation goes through reactor protection auxiliary relay racks, which are separate from the MSFIS that actuates the MFIVs. The MSFIS cabinets only provide signal processing for the MFIVs. Because the MFRVs and the MFRVBVs do not receive the MSFIS signal, the existing footnote (j) is not correct for the feedwater isolation function related to the MSFIS. Footnote (I) applies when the safety function of the MFIVs is already assured (Le., all MFIVs are closed and deactivated) and the MFIV isolation signal addressed by Function 5.b is not required. Therefore, NRC staff concludes the proposed replacement of footnote (j) with footnote (I) for Function 5.b (MSFIS) is acceptable.

- 11 Because the exception footnotes in TS Table 3.3.2-1 should be consistent with the exceptions allowed in the TS3.7.3 Applicability for the MFIVs, MFRVs, and MFRVBVs, the NRC staff concludes the proposed changes to TS Table 3.3.2-1 are acceptable.

3.3

NRC Staff Evaluation

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed changes to TS 3.7.3 are conservative, because the changes more clearly define the conditions for Applicability of the TS for all three sets of valves (MFIVs, MFRVs, and MFRVBVs) performing the main feedwater isolation function, and, therefore, satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36. The staff also concludes that the proposed changes to TS 3.3.2 Applicability for the feedwater isolation function were acceptable because the changes accurately aligned the Applicability of the actuation instrumentation TSs with the Applicability of the associated valve TSs.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATIOI'J In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Missouri State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration as published in the Federal Register on August 25, 2009 (74 FR 42932), and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: S. Jones Date: June 29, 2010

A. Heflin

- 2 A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely, IRA!

Mohan C. Thadani, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-483

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 198 to NPF-30

2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC LPLIV Reading RidsAcrsAcnw_MailCTR Resource RidsNrrDirsltsb Resource RidsNrrDorlDpr Resource RidsNrrDorlLpl4 Resource RidsNrrDssSbpb Resource RidsNrrPMCallaway Resource RidsNrrLAJBurkhardt Resource RidsOgcRp Resource RidsRgn4MailCenter Resource MHamm, I'JRR/DIRS/ITSB SJones, I\\IRRlDSS/SBPB ADAMS Accession No ML101110103

SE memo dated OFFICE NRR/LPL4/PM NRR/LPL4/LA DIRS/ITSB/BC DSS/SBPB/BC OGC NRR/LPL4/BC NRRlLPL4/PM NAME MThadani JBurkhardt RElliott GCasto*

AJones MMarkley MThadani DATE 5/28/10 5/24/10 5/28/10 2/16/10 6/15/10 6/29/10 6/29/10 OFFICIAL RECORD COpy

v t e Letter Sequence Approval
TAC:ME1325, (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Acceptance Administration Questions Answers Results Approval Other:
MONTHYEAR2009-05-21 [Table View]

ML101110103

Text

Dear Mr. Heflin:

Enclosures:

Attachment:

1.0 INTRODUCTION

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

System Description

3.2 Proposed TS Changes

NRC Staff Evaluation

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

6.0 CONCLUSION

Enclosures:

Navigation menu

Search