LD-92-030, Forwards Response to NRC 910926 Request for Addl Info to Enable NRC to Continue Review of Ssar - Design Certification (CESSAR-DC).Info Covers Damping Values & Groundwater Condition

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Forwards Response to NRC 910926 Request for Addl Info to Enable NRC to Continue Review of Ssar - Design Certification (CESSAR-DC).Info Covers Damping Values & Groundwater Condition
ML20094H053
Person / Time
Site: 05200002
Issue date: 02/25/1992
From: Brinkman C
ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LD-92-030, LD-92-30, NUDOCS 9203060343
Download: ML20094H053 (24)


Text

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ABB ASEA BRCWN BOVERI February 25,1992-LD-92 030 Docket Nu.52-002 U.S. Nuclear Regulatonj Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Response to NRC Hequests for AdditionalInformation

Reference:

Letter, Structural and Geosciences Branch RAls, T. V. Wambach (NRC) to E. H. Kennedy (C-E), dated September 26,1991

Dear Sirs:

The Reference requested additional- information for the NRC staff review 'of the Combustion Engineering Standard Safety Analysis Report - Design Certification (CESSAR-DC). Enclosure I to this letter provides our responses to RAIs 220.9,230.6, and 230.8.'

L in additior, Enc.losure II contains revised responses to RAls 220.,410.102a,500.25(b), and l Question 1 (Task Action Plan Item B-17).

Should you have any questions on the enclosed material, please contact me or Mr. Stan Ritterbusch of my staff at (203) 285-5206.

Very truly yours, COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.

1 w C. B. Brinkman Acting Director Nuclear Systems Licensing gdh/lw

Enclosures:

As Stated cc: J. Trotter (EPRI)

T. Wambach (NRC)

I ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power G U N '" 3 '

c~ce Eene, ine 5xc Prosoe:1 sii acao Tesenn one (203) 688-1911 l 9203060343 92022S Ndt$106005-0500 Yd$9ICOEEN WSOR PDR ADOCK 05200002 C 'DR , _ _, __ _,_

Enclosure I to

. . LD-92 030 h

h RESPONSE TO NRC REOUESTS FOR ADDrrIONAL INFORMATION STRUCTURAL AND GEOSCIENCES BRANCH i-I-

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  • D339 - 119 -

v Question 2J0.9 Section 3.7.1.2 - Figures 3.7-25 through 3.7-27 are for damping values of 5 percent. To show the appropriateness of these time histories, provide and discuss similar figures for other damping values that will be used in the design of all Category I structures, systems, and components.

ILepoonse 220.R The synthetic time histories lil, H2 and V wers generated by obtaining a reasonably conservative envelope to the target smooth spectrum at a spectral damping ratio of 5 percent.

The response spectra calculated for these synthetic time histories are presented in CESSAR-DC Figs. 3.7-25 through 3.7-77. The procedure used to obtain the synthetic time histuries and the frequencies at which spectral ordinates were calculated are summarized in the response to RAI 220.8.

Ine spectral ordinates of the target smooth spectrum were estimated for spectral damping ratios other than 5 percent using, as a basis, the spectral amplification factors recommended by Newmark and Hall (1982). The following median and 84th percentile factors were proposed by Newmark and IIall:

Cumulative Equation for Spectral Region Probability, % Amplification Factors Acceleration 84.1 (one sigma) 4.38 - 1.04 Lit ( )

  • Velocity 3.38 - 0.67 Lit ( )

Displacement 2.73 - 0.45 Ln( )

Accel:: ration 50 (median) 3.21 - 0.68 Ln( )

Velocity 2.3 ~ 41 Ln( )

Displacement 1.82 - 0.27 Ln(E)

  • # is spectral damping in percent The above equations were used as follows: (i) the spectral amplification factor for a given spectral damping ratio was divided by that for $ = 5 percent to obtain an " adjustment f actor" for the given spectral damping ratio; and- (ii) the adjustment factor was then multiplied by the spectral ordinates of the target smooth spectruu (for = 5 percent) i to obtain the spectral ordinates of the target smooth l spectrum at the desired spectral damping ratio. The adjustment f actors were calculated _'or both the median and

, the 84th percentile amplification iactors; as expected the j two sets of adjustment factors-were very close (differences

were no more than about 6%). For tho' reasons outlined in response to RAI 230.4, the adjustment factors based on the median amplification factors were used herein to obtain spectral ordinates for the target smooth spectrum at spectral damping ratios of 1, 2 and 7 percent in addition to those that had been developed for 5 percent damping.

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- . . - . _ = . . - _ _ . . . . - - - - - - - - . - . . . _ - ..- . . -- . _ .

D339 - 120 -

The adjustment factors calculated using the above equations are as follows:

, Spectral Frequency Adjustment Factor Region _ Range,f for a spectral damping ratio of in IIz 1 percent 2 percent 5 percent - 7 percent 1.517 1.619 1.295 1.352 1 1 0.892 0.871 Acceleration f 2 3.4 0.916 0.902 Velocity 0.5 < f < 3.4 1.400 1.468 '228 1.267 .. 1 1 0.934 0.925 Displacement fs0.5 1.314 1.361 1.179 1.206 1 1

  • based on ratio of median spectral amplification factors

" based on ratio of 84th percentile spectral amplification factors Note that Newmark and Hall (1982) suggested the use of the above equations for the horizontal components of earthquake ground motions. For simplicity, the same equations were considered appropriate to obtain adjustment factors (ie, ratios) for the vertical component as well.

Finally, the_ spectral-ordinates for-damping ratios of 1, 2,5 and 7 percent were calculated for the synthetic _ tine histories, H1,-H2 and V and these were compared with the target smooth spectrum for the appropriate damping ratio.

These comparisons are provided herein in Figs. la through 3d.

Figure la shows the comparicon for H1 at a damping ratio of 1 percent, Fig. 1b is-a similar comparison at a damping ratio of 2 percent, Fi g. .lc.is for a-damping ratio of 5 percent and Fig. 1d is for a damping: ratio of 7 percent.

Corresponding comparisons are presented in. Figs. 2a, 2b, 2c and 2d for H2 and in Figs.- 3a, 3b, 3c-and 3d_for the vertical synthetic-time history, V.

The results shown in Figs., la through 3d indicate: (i) the spectral-ordinates of the synthetic time histories. provide.-

a 1eaconably conservative envelope to the target-smooth spectrumLat--damping ratios from 1 to 7 percent for the 1

-frequencies of-interest; and-(ii) the-amount of.c_onservatism-increases with decreasing damping. . .

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, .D339 - 189 -

0 Ouestion 230.6 Section 2.5.2.5.2 - Ground water condition is not discussed for the four selected-site categories. If the soil-is saturated with ground water, the soil stiffness will be less

  • due to reduced effective confining pressure. - Several other parameters (e.g.,, soil density,-Poisson's Ratio,'etc.) will be affected where ground water fluctuations could occur.

Provido=information on how such parametric changes are considered.

Re_Goonse 230.6 The possible variations in ground water. conditions are not explicitly considered in the-System 80+ design. The maximum .

- shear' wave velocities were selected to represent a very w!de:

range of possible subsurface conditions. Accordingly,fas long as the site specific set of. measured shear wave- <

velocities is within the range 11dentified in CESSAR-DC, the effects of-water level,-unit weights...etc. are implicitly accounted for.

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, D339 - 191 -

Question JJL_q Section 2.5.2.5.2 - Figures 2.5-3 and 2.5-4 woro published in 1970. Now data have boon published by the same authors in 1984 and 1988. There is significant difference betwoon the nov and the old data. Provido justification for the uso of old data.

Epopones.230.8 Figure 1, which is provided with the responso to RAI 230.7, includes the range of availablo modulus reduction curvos-for both cohosivo as well as cohesionless soils. The responso ,

to that RAI indicatos the adequacy of the selected modulus reduction curves. While there are some differences in the measured damping values, the curve of soil damping versus shour strain given in CESSAR-DC (the lower range in Fig.

2.5-4) is still a lower range for the now data .

Accordingly, the modulus and damping relationships presented in CESSAR-DC are considored appropriato.

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A 4 Enclosure 11 to <

LD 92 030 REVISED RAI RESPONSES l.

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O QUESTION 220.55 SECY-90-016 1ssues in CESSAR-DC; 1ssues 1 ana 11 - Public Safety Goals and Containment Performance.

Section 5.4 Appendix B addresses the staff guidance of Containment Conditional Failure Probability (CCFP) of 0.1. The SRM related to SECY-90-016 also recommends the use of deterministic objectives. As such, the staff (ESGB) would prefer a deterministically established containment performance objective, such as establishing containment structural failure criteria based on the maximum strains (in general shell and in localized areas) as limited by global restraints and functionality of various features related to the mitigation of the consequences of accidents. Provide information regarding the ultimato capacity of the containment considering the above attributes. (see also RAI 720.24 in Section 7 of Appendix B).

dSPONSE 220.55[6w,s/en1)

Combustion Engineering agrees that the staff position on Issue 11 of SECY-90-016 permits a demonstration of adequate containment performance by either a 0.1 Containment Conditional Failure Probability (CCFP) criterion or by a deterministic goal that offers equivalent protection. It is our understanding that the staff is concerned with the use of the 0.1 CCFP criterion because of the uncertainties inherent in the PRA methods, especially those associated with seismic hazards. Therefore, C E is investigating the use of an al+ernate, deterministic criterion to gain additional insight into System 80+ containment performance for severe accident conditions.

For this investigation, the choice of the severe accident sequences and the assumptions on degraded core behavior will be based on best-estimate judgments which will be consistent with the MAAP analysis reported in the PRA documented in Appendix B of CESSAR-DC. The purpose of this analysis is to determine the time response of the containment pressure and temperature for a representative severe accisent scenario. Using this inform' tion, the length of time the containment pressure remains below the ASME Service Level C criterion is determined. For the System 80+ containment, the ASME service Level C criterion (isabout156psiaatacontainmenttemperatureof350degreesF. l Using the above guidelines, a station blackout scenario was simulated using the MAAP computer code. With battery power available, auxiliary feedwater flow is assumed to be provided by the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump for a period of eight hours. Following the unavailability of auxiliary feedwater at eight hours, the vessel falls at 15.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> due to the loss of core cooling.

Cavity flooding is assumed to occur prior to vessel failure. Combined with the deentraining characteristic of the System 80+ cavity, this will result in the retention of approximately 87.5% of the cori u. within the cavity. For this scenario, the containment pressure remains below 100 psia for up to 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> after the' initiation of the station blackout (Please see attached Figare 1). The containment temperature does not exceed 350 degiees F during this time frame (Please see Figure 2). These results demonstrate that, for this best estimate severe accident scenario, the containment pressure remains l well below ASME Service Level C criterion of 156 psie for more than 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />. l

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The ultimate pressure capacity for the System 80+ containment is approximately l

185 psia at a temperature of 290 degrees F. This value is not considered l I- specifically in the above evaluation, blit is included here to demonstrate the additional margin to System 80+ containment integrity during a severe accident.

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Question 410.10Za In Section 6.8.3 of the CESSAR the statement is made that the instrumentation  !

requirements for the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) are l described in Section 7.4.1.3. However, this section was not provided in Amendment I. Therefore, provide information on the instrumentation requirements for the operation of the IRWST, including level, temperature, and pressure indication and alarms.

Response 410.LQL4 (Reut3 ton 1)  !

A description of In-Containment Water Storage System instrumentation will be added to Section 6.8.3 in the next amendment of CESSAR-DC. The description that will be added is attached to this response.

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v 6.8.3 INFfRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS I

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Amendment'I 6.8-8 December 21, 1990 l

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6.8.3 INSTRUMENTATION In-Containment Water Storage System instrumentation is designed in accordance with the applicable portions of IEEE Standards and hRC Regulatory Guides identified in Section 7.1.2.

6.8.3.1 Level A. In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank Three full range 0100% level indication channels are provided.

One channel is designated as non-lE and indicates IRWST fluid level locally.

Two channels provide level indication in the control room. These channels are designe<! to electrical class IE requirements. Level alarms are provided in the control room. A high level setpoint is established to warn tl.c operator when the IRWST may be overfilled. A low level alarm setpoint is established to warn the operator when the level is reduced to the volume required for safety injection / containment sp ay pump operation and for steam relief system operation.

The two electrical class lE level channels are used for post-accident monitoring of IRWST fluid level.

B. Holdup Volume Tank Two level switches and two full range 0-100% level indication channels are ec-"idad.

The level switches are used to detect the presence of fluid in the holdup tank; the switches are non-1E. The switches will actuate an alarm in the control room to alert the operator that the HVT is filling with water.

The two full r: age 0-100% channels are powered by the vital instrument bus. Level indication is provided in the control room to allow the operator to monitor HVT level after an accident.

C. Reactor Cavity A single level switch and two full range 0-100% level indication channels are provided.

The level switch is used to detect the presence of fluid in the reactor cavity; the switch is non-lE. The switch will actuate an alarm in the control room to alert the operator that the reactor cavity is filling with water.

4 (0

  • 102n lhe two full range 0-100% channels are powered by the vital instrument bus. Level indication is provided in the control room to allow the operator to monitor reactor cavity fluid level after an accident.

6.8.3.2 Lerperatur_q A. In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank Three IRWST fluid temperature measurement channels are provided.

One channel is designated as non-lE and provides IRWST fluid temperature indication locally inside the containment.

The two remaining channels are designed to electrical class IE requiremen:s. These channels provide IRWST fluid temperature indication in the control room; a high/ low temperature alarm is provided to alert the operator when IRWST temperature approaches the minimum or maximum allowable Technical Specification limits. The range of the channels is adequate to cover the maximum temperature condition expected to occur during steam relief system operation, l

i G.8.3.3 Pressure A. In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank Two wide range channels powered by the vital instrument bus are provided.

Each channel provides an indication of IRWST pressure in the control room. The range of the instrumentation is adequate to cover the maximum pressure expected to occur during steam relief system operation.

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Ouestion 500.25 (b)

Section 6, item II, of Appendix 13A notes that the Nuplex 80+ instrumentation and controls design incorporates "on-line monitoring of Guid and electrical systems making detection of sabotage attempts more likely " Would this system be able to detect mispositioning of manual isolation valves in these systems. If not, discuss timeliness of discovery should a locked valve outside containment be either mistakenly or deliberately mispositioned.

Response 500.25 (b) et//Sion 1)

Detection of inadvenently or intentionally mispositioned valves located outside of containment would take place as pan of routine and suiveillance testing, system walk downs, and valve position verification procedures performed prior to plant and system start up.

Administrative controls are provided to minimize the possibility of mispositioning a manual valve. These controls include administrative control of keys for locked valves, maintenance procedures which require authorization by the control room staff prior to valve operation, and indication of the effect of the valve's new pcsition (as input by tlic control room staff) on system, train, or flow path availability. This effect, if any, would be indicated on the Success Path Monitoring function of the DPS. This cednued indication of the effect on system, train, or flow path availability would serve as a ~anstant reminder to the control room staff that the valve is not in it's required position.

These administrative controls, which will minimize the possibility of mispositioning a manual valve, combined with the valve position verification procedures will reduce the likelihood of either inadvertently or deliberate mispositioning of manual valves occurring or going undetected i

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Ouestion TASK ACTION PLAN ITEM B-17 CRITERIA FOR SAFETY-RELATED OPERATOR ACTIONS C-E did not address this item. An assessment of how the System 80+ design meets Item B-17 is required to close out this issue.

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et//Sion j)

Task Action Plan Item B-17 .s addressed in Table Al-1, CESSAR-DC, Appendix A, dated 12/15/89. Item B-17 was identified as a category le item which is defined on Page A-1 of Appendix A as follotis: "The issue has been superseded by one or more USI's and GSI's."

TMI Action Plan Item I.D.1, Control Room Design Review, will address this concern. Automated, redundant, safety grade controls will be employed to reduce the potential for operator error during accident conditions.

The Operational Support Information (OSI) Program will provide or reference the material necessary to determine what safety related operator actions may be necessary in the emergency procedure guides. -t d scrip +4mn nr +h! plar will -

he cubmittad in +hn naar futurac-4 e e

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ -