IR 07200006/2010002

IR 0720006-10-002, on 04/12/2010 Through 04/15/2010, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Crane Inspection

ML101450293
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick, 07200006
Issue date:	05/21/2010
From:	Mark Franke NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB3
To:	Annacone M Carolina Power & Light Co
References
IR-10-002
Download: ML101450293 (11)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION May 21, 2010

SUBJECT:

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - UNIT 2 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) CRANE INSPECTION REPORT 07200006/2010002

Dear Mr. Annacone:

On April 15, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a portion of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Dry Run inspection at your Brunswick Unit 2 facility. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection findings between April 12-15, 2010, for the Unit 2 Reactor Building crane and Heavy Loads Program, which was performed in accordance with Inspection Procedure 60854, Pre-operational Testing of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.

The inspection covered aspects associated with the preparation of the crane to move spent fuel into the ISFSI facility and consisted of field observations, extensive examination of procedures and documents, and interviews with personnel. The enclosed report represents the results of that inspection. Based on results of this inspection; no violations or findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible

CP&L 2 from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Mark E. Franke, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-325, 50-324, and 72-006 License Nos.: DPR-71, DPR-62

Enclosure:

Unit 2 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Crane Inspection Report 07200006/2010002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.: 50-325, 50-324,72-006 License Nos.: DPR-71, DPR-62 Report No.: 07200006/2010002 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light (CP&L)

Facility: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2 Location: 8470 River Road, SE Southport, NC 28461 Dates: April 12, 2010 through April 15, 2010 Inspectors: C. Fletcher, Reactor Inspector, RII/DRS/EB3 R. Prince, Fuel Facility Inspector, RII/DFFI Approved by: Mark E. Franke, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Progress Energy selected the Transnuclear NUHOMS-61BT Horizontal Modular dry cask storage system for spent fuel storage at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant. The Transnuclear NUHOMS-61BT Dry Cask Storage System (DCSS) is licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 1004, Amendment 10. The Brunswick Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) consists of a series of reinforced concrete horizontal storage modules (HSMs). The NUHOMS DCSS consists of a dry shielded canister (DSC) which holds 61 fuel assemblies. The DSC is placed into a transfer cask (TC) to provide shielding for protection of workers during transfer operations and during the drying, helium backfilling, and welding of the DSC. The DSC is loaded with spent fuel, drained of water, vacuum dried, filled with helium gas, and sealed by welding. The TC (loaded with the DSC) is then moved from the cask preparation area within the Reactor Building and is placed onto a transfer trailer (TT) located in the railroad bay of the Reactor Building. The transfer trailer, with the loaded TC, is transported from the plant to the ISFSI. The DSC is inserted into a shielded HSM for storage. Each HSM holds a single, loaded DSC.

The licensee has developed a cask loading plan in accordance with approved procedures.

Procedures governing the lifting of heavy loads contained the appropriate requirements specified in national standards. Controls governing the lifting, handling, and movement of heavy loads are adequately addressed in approved procedures. Maintenance and testing activities to ensure the ability of the Reactor Building crane to safely handle anticipated loads were properly performed and documented in accordance with approved procedures.

No findings of significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

Report Details

.1 Inspection of Unit 2 Reactor Building Crane

a. Inspection Scope

(Inspection Procedure (IP) 60854)

The objective of this inspection was to determine if the licensee had developed, implemented, and evaluated preoperational testing activities with regard to the Unit 2 Reactor Building bridge crane, to safely load spent fuel from the spent fuel pool (SFP) into a dry cask storage system, and to transfer the loaded dry cask storage system to the ISFSI.

Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the licensees recent modifications to the Unit 2 Reactor Building bridge crane, which will be utilized for handling the Transnuclear Transfer Cask (TC), and the licensees programs associated with the handling of heavy loads, maintenance, inspection, and periodic testing of the crane. The inspection consisted of field observations, interviews with cognizant personnel, and a review of documentation associated with the Heavy Loads Program.

b. Observations and Findings

The Brunswick Unit 2 Reactor Building crane is a single-trolley Seismic Category 1 overhead crane with a 125-ton capacity main hoist. The crane was previously reviewed by the NRC and found to meet the single-failure proof criteria specified in NUREG-0612 and NUREG-0554. The licensee implemented Engineering Change 71206, Reactor Building (RB) Crane Wire Rope Upgrade, in 2009. The design modification replaced the existing wire rope with a rope of sufficient load capacity to handle the fully-loaded 110-ton transfer cask to be utilized for dry cask storage activities.

To ensure that the crane cannot travel over areas of the SFP where spent fuel is stored, the licensee has designated safe load paths on the 117 elevation of the Reactor Building. These restrictions are specified in Procedure OMMM15, Operation and Inspection of Cranes and Material Handling Equipment.

Procedure OMST-CR51R, Operating and Visual Inspection of Reactor Building Crane, provides instructions for verifying the operability of the crane interlocks, which prevent travel over stored spent fuel assemblies.

The crane will be used to move the TC containing the DSC from the cask loading area located in the southeast corner of the SFP to the cask preparation area, located on the 117 elevation of the RB, and back again. The crane is also used to lift the TC from the transport trailer from the 20 elevation to the 117 elevation refuel floor.

The inspectors reviewed the preventative maintenance and inspection programs for the Unit 2 RB crane. The inspectors found that procedures adequately addressed test requirements, frequent and periodic inspections, pre-operational checks, and inspections prior to use. The inspectors reviewed recently performed quarterly and annual inspection work packages for completeness and accuracy.

The inspectors were accompanied by licensee personnel as they performed an inspection of the Unit 2 RB crane. The inspectors observed the overall material condition of the crane components. The new rope on the main hoist was inspected for the presence of defects or indications of damage. At the request of the NRC inspectors, licensee personnel described the procedure to manually lower a load in the event of a loss-of-power incident. Personnel were knowledgeable of the procedural steps and the location of the components required to be accessed in the event that manual operation had to be performed.

The inspectors reviewed the work packages and design analysis associated with the seismic and tornado qualification modifications installed on the Unit 2 RB crane. The review also included a walkdown of the newly installed tornado latches on the bridge and trolley of the Unit 2 RB crane.

The inspectors toured the ISFSI facility to observe ongoing construction activities. The ISFSI presently contains 20 horizontal storage modules (HSM).

Ongoing construction activities include final grading of the ISFSI apron and activities to prepare the ISFSI pad and the heavy haul path for incorporation into the existing plant Protected Area. The inspectors reviewed receipt inspection documents for the HSM components and the work package for installation of HSMs on the ISFSI pad. Material discrepancies noted during receipt inspections were properly dispositioned and issues were entered into the licensees corrective action program as necessary.

At the time of the inspection, the licensee had not decided if Progress Energy personnel would perform the entire ISFSI operation or if certain aspects of the ISFSI operation would be contracted to a vendor. Therefore, a review of qualifications and training of personnel involved in ISFSI operations was not performed.

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to M. Annacone and other Brunswick personnel at the conclusion of the inspection on April 15, 2010. The licensee acknowledged the results presented.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

M. Annacone, Site Vice President

E. Willis, Plant General Manager

S. Gordy, Operations Manager

W. Brewer, Maintenance Manager

B. Davis, Engineering Manager

P. Mentel, Environmental & Radiological Controls Manager

K. Ward, Major Projects

C. Rajendra, Major Projects

B. Bellamy, Major Projects

R. Tripp, Major Projects

W. Worthington, NFM & SA

B. Murray, Licensing

T. Sherrill, Licensing

B. Howath, Whiting Corporation

NRC Personnel

P. OBryan, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

None