IR 05000528/1989041
| ML17305A380 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1989 |
| From: | Huey F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17305A379 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-89-41, 50-529-89-41, 50-530-89-41, NUDOCS 8911140003 | |
| Download: ML17305A380 (28) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-528/89-41, 50-529/89-41, 50-530/89-41 Docket Nos.
50-528, 50-529, 50-530 License Nos.
NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74 Licensee:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.
0.
Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Units 1, 2 and
Inspection Conducted:
September 19, 1989 through September 29, 1989 Inspector:
~Summar:
J.
Burdoin, Reactor Inspector C. Clark, Reactor Inspector C. Myers, Resident Inspector F.
Gee Reactor Inspector F.
R.
Huey, Chief, Engineering Sec on io/zc,/SW Date Signed Ins ection on Se tember 19-29 1989 Re ort Nos.
50-528/89-41 50-529/89-41 50"530 89"41 d:
A inspectors of various vital areas and equipment in the plant, and assessment of the licensee's program for facility modifications and evaluation of the licensee s program(s) for installation and testing of modifications.
Inspection Procedures Nos.
30703, 37700, 37701, 37828, 62705, 71707, and 72701 wer e used as guidance for the inspection.
Results and General Conclusion:
The licensee's actions taken to correct deficiencies resulting from inspection findings were thorough, timely, properly documented, and adequate.
The findings of this inspection were as follows:
(1)
The licensee did not adhere to the commitment stated in the UFSAR Section 11.5 of complying with ANSI N13.1-1969,
"Guide to Sampling Airborne Radioactive Materials in Nuclear Facilities."
e (2)
The engineering instructions and design control on the installation of the isokinetic air samplers were inadequate.
89iii40003 89i027 PDR ADO'. 0SOOOS28
, 9 PNU
m r
(3)
Consistency was not maintained over the installation of the isokinetic air samplers.
(4)
The cognizant APS personnel did not maintain an adequate level of system knowledge.
Si nificant Safet Mattersi None Summar of Violations or Deviations:
None 0 en Items Summar
One open item was closed, and one open item was opene DETAILS Persons Contacted The below listed technical and supervisory personnel were among those contacted:
Arizona Nuclear Power Pro 'ect ANPP R. Anderson, Nuclear Construction, Work Group Supervisor
"R. Badsgard, Nuclear Engineering, Supervisor R. Bernier, Nuclear Licensing T. Bradish, Compliance Supervisor P. Coffin, Compliance Engineer R. Collins, Radiation Monitoring System Engineer S.
Coppock, I8C Systems Engineer M. Fitzgerald, Unit 3, Planner/Coordinator W. Harrington, Bechtel Construction Engineer S. Grier, Lead Procurement Engineer
"P.
Hughes, Manager, Radiation Protection and Chemistry D. Larkin, Compliance Engineer
"D. Kanitz, guality Assurance Supervisor F. Mahala, Procurement guality Engineer C.
McAmis, Cal Test Radiation Monitoring Engineer J. McAuliffe, Procurement Engineer W. Montefour, Senior Vendor guality Engineer R. Myers, Technical guality Engineer S.
Penick, Technical Engineering Design Contractor W. Purcell, Jr.,
Vendor guality Engineering, Supervisor E. Pyle, Nuclear Construction Planner
- J. Reilly, Manager, Plant Standards Technical Support R. Roehler, Compliance Engineer A. Rogers, Manager, Licensing
"R.
Rouse, Compliance Engineer
"T. Shriver, Compliance Manager D. Smyers, Lead Electrical Engineer J.
Summy, I&C Engineering Supervisor El Paso Electric
"S. Gross, Manager, Palo Verde Services
"D. Oake, Palo Verde Services, Engineer The inspector also talked with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection.
"Attended the Exit Meeting on September 29, 1989.
In addition, the NRC Senior Resident Inspector attended the Exit Meetin.
Area Ins ection 71707 An independent inspection was conducted in the Units 2 and 3 Control Buildings and Auxiliary Buildings.
The inspectors examined areas and equipment for debris, potential hazards, oil and water leakage, and equipment condition, e. g., oil level, valve position, and electrical connection configuration and cleanliness.
The equipment and areas inspected included:
Unit 2 A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
Two 4160/480V switchgear rooms (trains A and B).
Four 125 V battery rooms.
Four battery equipment rooms.
Two remote shutdown panel rooms.
Two diesel generator rooms.
Two diesel generator control rooms.
Unit 3 e
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.I.
J.
K.
L.
Two 4160/480V switchgear rooms (trains A and B).
Four 125V battery rooms.
Four battery equipment rooms.
Two remote shutdown panel rooms.
Two diesel generator rooms.
Two diesel generator control rooms.
Two containment spray pump rooms.
Two HPSI pump rooms.
One LPSI Pump Room (train B).
Two essential cooling water pump rooms.
Three charging pump rooms.
One 480V switchgear/electrical penetration room (train B).
Housekeeping and equipment status appeared to be acceptable.
3.
Installation and Testin of Modifications 37828/62705/37701/37700 A.
Closed Item 50-528/89-37-01 Installation and Testin of Potter and Brumfield Rela s
This section follows up on the Potter and Brumfield modifications to the three units at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station; and addresses those outstanding issues identified in inspection report 50-528/89-37.
The process of dedicating commercial grade components (the Potter and Brumfield relays and Lambda power supplies) to safety grade status is described in procedure 81DP-4E(01,
"Equipment Change Evaluation" (ECE) Revision 0 dated April 30, 1989.
Lambda Power Su lies One of the initial causes of the Potter/Brumfield relay failure was operating the 28 volt DC rated relay coils at a higher voltage,
approximately 36 volts OC.
The operating voltage on the coils was increased to 36 volts when it was found the relays did not always pickup when operated at the design voltage of 28 volts.
To correct this cause of failure, the new Potter/Brumfield relay coils were purchased with 32 volt DC coils.
In determining the voltage level of the new Lambda Power Supplies to be pur'chased, field measurements were made at each relay to determine line-drop.
The new power supplies are rated at 36 volt OC nominal, adjustable to t3 volts.
The power supplies will be operated at approximately 35 volts, delivering 32 volts at the relay coils.
The inspector reviewed the following documentation in dedicating the Lambda Power Supplies to safety grade status:
OCP 1/2/3-FJ-SA-020 R-O, Replace the Power Mate Power Supply Model FPS-36-20-P2400 with Lambda Power Supply Model LRS-58-48"43054.
ECE-SA-A-050, Commercial Dedication Requirements Evaluation for Lambda Power Supply Model LRS-58-48-43054.
Purchase Order 33901234 for 30 Lambda Power Supplies, Model LRS"58-48"43054.
Licensee's Receiving Documents/gC Receiving Check Lists Vendor's Certification of Conformance Bench Functional Acceptance Test Results for thirty Lambda Power Supplies as established by licensee's Procurement Engineering and performed at Palo Verde following receipt of the power supplies The above documentation appeared to be complete and in good order.
The Lambda Power Supplies are considered dedicated for safety related use for the reasons that the critical characteristics of the power supplies were fully evaluated in equipment change evaluation (ECE) SA-A-050 and verified in the bench functional acceptance tests.
Potter/Brumfield Rela s
The inspector reviewed the following documentation in the dedication of the Potter and Brumfield relays:
DCP 1/2/3-FJ-SA-019, R-O, Replace Potter and Brumfield Rotary Relays in the NSSS, ESFAS Auxiliary Relay Cabinets...
ECE-SA-A049, Commercial Dedication Requirements Evaluation for Potter/Brumfield Relays.
Surveillance/Inspection Plan 89-003 dated January 12, 1989.
Surveillance/Inspection Plan 89-098 dated May 2, 198 Three gC Inspection Reports (89-003) of Inspections Conducted at Manufacturer's Plant during January 17-20, February 14-16, and March 2, 1989.
Five gC Inspection Reports (89-098) of Inspections Conducted at Manufacturer's Plant During the Following Dates; June 5-19, June 26-30, July 5-8, August 8, and September 1,
1989.
Licensee's Receiving Documentation/gA Receiving Check Lists.
Vendor's Certification of Conformance Vendor Relay Acceptance Test Results The above documentation appeared to be complete and in good order.
The Potter and Brumfield Relays are considered dedicated for safety related use for the reason that the critical characteristics of the relays were fully verified during the manufacturing process by a Level II electrical gC inspector and by acceptance testing as required by ECE-SA-A049.
The installation and testing of Potter/Brumfield Relays was in progress in both units 1 and 3 during this inspection period.
However, the work in Unit 3 was further advanced than Unit 1 so the following documents relating to the installation and testing of the relays in Unit 3 were selected for examination for the purpose of auditing this modification:
DCP FJ-SA-019, R-0 including "Design Change Package Retest Requirements".
W.O. 00357361, Replace Relays in Cabinet 3JSABCOl (Bays 1 and 8).
W.O. 00357364, Replace Relays in Cabinet 3JSABC01 (Bays 4 and 5).
W.O.
00357847, Replace Relays in Cabinet 3JSAACOl (Bays 1 and 8).
The inspector examined the above documents in detail.
The inspector reviewed the work order(s)
Appendix "D" records, the gC holdpoints for component verification and installation observation; torquing verification of replacement relays; component and crimp verification of relay coil wires; and component and crimp verification of contact(s)
(Appendix G).
The inspector also reviewed other aspects of the work order(s) including retest.
This included recorded pick up and dropout voltages
"Hot Conditions" for each relay (Appendix E), and voltage available for each relay for three cases, as measured across the relay's associated DIODE (Appendix F).
This retest data was available for review.
However the retest requirements which include a functional test and a time response test for each relay to verify all contacts associated with the relay are operational had not been performed at the time of the
inspection.
Consequently the functional test data was not available for examination.
The above identified documents appeared to be in good order and to be complete to the point to which the modifications had progressed.
It is concluded that the modification for the installation and testing of Potter and Brumfield relays was adequately planned, implemented, and documented.
This item is closed.
Installation and Testin of Auto Fast Bus Transfer and Di ital Fault Recorders No testing was scheduled for this inspection period for DCP's 3FEMA060 digital fault recorders and 3FEMA063 auto fast bus transfer.
SIMS work order attachment for DCP 3FEMA060, page 3, General Note 10 stated that unscheduled conduit shall be run in accordance with established site methods and the National Electrical Code.
Specific site procedure numbers and specific section numbers of the National Electrical Code were needed for the General Note 10.
SIMS work order amendment package on DCP 3FEMA060 for work performed during September 29, 1989, was received and reviewed.
The package and the work appeared to be acceptable and complete with proper precautions, initials.and gC hold points.
Auxiliar Feedwater Pum (s Sealin S stems The inspector examined design change package(s)
(DCP)
10/20/30-M-AF-090, change auxiliary feedwater pump(s) sealing systems from packing to mechanical seals.
The original pump shaft packing seal systems for turbine driven AFW pump (AFA-P01) and motor driven AFW pumps (AFB-POl and AFN-POl)
allowed excessive water leakoff to the liquid radwaste (LR) system.
It was also identified that due to the force applied to the original packing to secure the packing leakage on some pumps, the pump shaft was bound.
The installation of the mechanical seals in the applicable pumps, was accomplished to reduce the identified excessive pump shaft packing seal leakage.
The inspector.
reviewed the following documentation:
Design Change Package (DCP) 10m, 20m, 30m-AF-090, Revision 0; replace packing with mechanical seals on Aux FW pumps AFA-P01, AFB-P01 and AFN-P01.
Applicable drawings identified to accomplish the DCP.
Plant Change Package (PCP)
No. 85-03-AF-036-00; retrofit aux feedwater pumps with mechanical seal Work Order (WO) ¹00299053, Work Request (WR) ¹197027; for AFW pump AFA-POl-turbine driven - Unit 3.
Work Order ¹00308993, WR¹764492; for AFW pump AFN-P01 motor driven - Unit 3.
Licensee's receiving documents/gC receiving check lists.
Vendor's certification of conformance.
Applicable Engineering Evaluation Requests (EER's)
and other licensee documents.
The above documentation appeared to be complete and in good order.
The actual hardware installations in the units appeared to conform to the applicable drawings and DCP instructions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Radiation Monitorin A.
S stem Knowled e During the inspection for incorrect connection wiring diagrams for radiation monitors for Region V Inspection Report 89-12, dated September 20, 1989, the Unit 3 I8C foreman and the radiation monitoring system engineer were asked by the inspector to locate the Unit 3 post accident main steam line radiation monitors.
The inspector was escorted to the wrong elevation.
The cognizant licensee personnel were unable to locate the radiation monitors, even after the requirements for the location and the purpose of the post accident main steam line radiation monitors were described and explained by the inspector.
During this inspection, the inspector again asked the licensee to provide personnel who were able to show the locations of the main steam line radiation monitors.
The inspector was accompanied by the same system engineer and an APS consultant, and the locations of the monitors, RU-139 A 8 B, were identified to the inspector by the APS consultant.
Based on discussion with the licensee cognizant engineer, the following observations were made by the inspector:
(1)
Adequate system knowledge was not maintained by the cognizant APS personnel.
(2)
Insufficient training time was given to personn'el to acquire an appropriate level of system knowledge.
(3)
The system engineer did not receive an adequate system turnover.
The system was assigned to him after the previous system e'ngineer had left the compan B.
Sam lin Lines for Isokinetic Air Sam lers A walkdown of the isokinetic sampling line for the following air samplers was performed to verify the commitment stated in the UFSAR Section 11.5 of complying with.ANSI N13. 1-1969,
"Guide to Sampling Airborne Radioactive Materials in Nuclear Facilities."
The purpose of the verification was to assure that a representative sample of the emission was being monitored and used to account for the radioactive release to the public.
The following isokinetic air samplers were included in the walkdown:
Common Building Vent Monitors TSC-1J-SQN-RU-13A EOF"2J-SQN-RU-13B Unit 3 Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust Filter Inlet Monitor XJ-SQN"RU"8 Radwaste Building Ventilation Exhaust Filter Inlet Monitor XJ"SQN-RU-14 Condenser Vacuum Pump/Gland Seal Exhaust Monitor:
Low Range XJ-SQN-RU-141
.High Range XJ-SQN-RU-142 Plant Vent Monitor:
Low Range XJ-SQN-RU-143 High Range XJ-SQN-RU-144 Fuel Building Ventilation Exhaust Monitors Low Range XJ-SQN-RU-145
'igh Range XJ-SQN-RU-146 Unit 2 Radwaste Building Ventilation Exhaust Filter Inlet Monitor XJ" SQN"RU-14 Condenser Vacuum Pump/Gland Seal Exhaust Monitor:
Low Range XJ-SQN-RU-141 High Range XJ-SQN-RU-142 Plant Vent Monitor:
Low Range XJ-SQN-RU-143 High Range XJ-SQN-RU-144 Unit 1 Condenser Vacuum Pump/Gland Seal Exhaust Monitor:
Low Range XJ-SQN-RU-141 High Range XJ-SQN-RU-142 Plant Vent Monitor:
Low Range XJ-SQN-RU-143 High Range XJ-SQN-RU-144 The inspector made visual inspection of the sampling lines of the air samplers for adherence to the recommendations and methods of ANSI N13. 1-1969.
The findings are as follows:
(1)
According to ANSI N13. 1-1969, Appendix B, Particle Deposition in Sample Lines, Section B5 Deposition in Elbows in Sample Delivery Lines states:
Elbows in sampling lines should be avoided if at all possible, but when they are required, the bend radius of the elbow should be as long as practical......
Two 90-degree elbows were installed in the sampling line for the Unit 3 non-ESF Radwaste Building Ventilation Exhaust Filter Inlet Monitor XJ-SQN-RU-14 and for the Unit 3 post-accident Plant Vent Low Range Monitor XJ-SQN-RU-143 respectively.
The elbows were not required since the space was available for a long bend radius.
The licensee's nuclear engineering department committed to make an evaluation of the inspector's concern by November 15, 1989, and implement any warranted corrective actions (Followup Item 50-528/89-41-01).
(2)
A 180-degree turn (U-turn) with a bending radius of approximately one inch was installed in the sampling line to the Plant Vent High Range Monitor XJ-SQN-RU-144.
The 180-degree turn was unwarranted since there was space available for a long bend radius.
(3) It is apparent that inadequate engineering instructions were given in regards to the installation of isokinetic air samplers in accordance with ANSI N13.1-1969.
a o b.
There was no uniformity in installing the isokinetic air samplers in all three units.
The installations were all different in the three units.
There appeared to be no design control on the installation.
The length of the sampling line, in many installations, could have been kept to a minimum by locating the sampling skid closer to the sample extraction point.
Space was available.
C.
Numerous and unnecessary bends of the sampling lines could have been avoided if appropriate engineering design controls were imposed and enforce (4)
The submitted plateout study, dated October 1986, was done for a few selected isokinetic air samplers for Unit 1.
The plateout study was not applicable to Units 2 and 3 since the installations in these units were different.
(5)
The system engineer and the APS consultant accompanying the inspector did not have adequate knowledge to identify the function of the detectors and the sampling sequence in the sampling skid, similar to the concern mentioned in Paragraph 4A.
(6)
Housekeeping in and around Unit 3 Building Vent Monitor TSC-1J-S(N-RU-13A required attention.
Since the sampler skid was not covered and exposed to the surrounding, there were spider webs and debris in and around the sampler.
(7)
The inspector reviewed the.following maintenance documents and found them to be adequate:
a.
Functional test for Unit 3 RU-139 WO¹ 00372335, Task¹ 050246, ST Procedure 36ST-9S(01-3, 8/89.
b.
Calibration Test for Unit 3 RU-139 WO¹ 00301479, Task¹ 050253, ST Procedure 36ST-9S(08-3, 7/88.
c.
Functional test for Common RU-13A WO¹ 00367638, Task¹ 060560, 7/89.
d.
Functional test for Common RU-13B WO¹ 00369779, Task¹ 060561, 8/89.
e.
Calibration test for Common RU-13A WO¹ 00299048, Task¹ 038028, 9/88.
f.
Calibration test for Common RU-13B WO¹ 00299049, Task¹ 036683, ll/88.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Facilit Modifications and Testin 37701 72701 37700 37828 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for the implemention and testing of facility modifications.
The areas of rdview included design, installation, procedures revision, operator training, testing and drawing revisions.
These areas were evaluated to determine the licensee's conformance with the facility license and amendments, Technical Specifications,
CFR 50.59 requirements and applicable industry codes and standards.
The inspectors found that facility modifications were controlled under the licensee's Plant Change Program, Procedure 81PR-ODC02, and implemented by means of Plant Change Requests (PCR), Site Modifications
(SM), Engineering Evaluation Requests (EER),
Equipment Change Evaluations (ECE), or Temporary Modifications (TM).
Modifications which required prior review and approval by the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 or which resulted from a licensing amendment were identified through the licensee s screening review of the modification for 50.59 applicability.
The inspectors found that this screening review was performed for all of the implementing methods, i.e.,
TM.
Modifications requiring a technical specification change were further.
processed per Technical Specification Change Request 5N404. 01.00, with NRC approval required prior to implementation.
The inspectors reviewed Plant Change Package (PCP) 88-01-SS-001-00, Rev. 0, for the modification of the H2/02 analyzer in the gaseous radwaste system (GRS).
The analyzer was used to monitor and control the H2 and 02 concentrations in the GRS to preclude the potential for explosive concentrations from accumulating.
The modification involved replacement of the existing analyzer with a new style unit which only monitored 02 concentration while conservatively assuming a
H2 concentrations in excess of 4X to exist.
This modification required a
technical specification change to delete the requirement for H2 monitoring.
Portions. of the following modifications which did not require prior NRC review and approval were also reviewed and observed during this review:
PCP 89-02-RC-006-000 Installation of Pressure Regulators in Instrument Air Lines for Pressurizer Spray Valves.
Procedure No. 73ST-9ZZ18-3 Trevitest of Main Steam Safety Valves.
SM-3-SM-EW-02 Rewire of Limit Switches for Limitorque Valve Operator.
PCP-85-03-SG-004-00 Pressure Switch Replacement for Main Steam Isolation Valve Air Reservoir.
PCP-86-03-RD-005-00 Change to Class IE Power Supply for Containment Sump Level Receivers.
3-SM-SF-006 Change Setpoint of Feedwater Control System Low Steam Generator Water Level Alarm.
3-SM-GA-004 Improve Low Pressure Nitrogen System DCP-1-FJ-RC-151 Installation of Refueling Water Level Indication in Control Room.
PCP-85-01AF-036-00 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Mechanical Seal Installation.
The inspectors also reviewed a recent guality Audit,89-003, which addressed
.,the Design Control/Modification and Equipment gualification
programs.
The inspectors found the audits to be thorough, including review for 50.59 evaluations.
The inspectors found that the facility modifications appeared to be adequately controlled by the licensee's programs for review, approval, implementation and testing.
Desi n
Desi n Chan es and Modifications
'wo design change packages 3FEMA063 and 2FEMA060 were reviewed per the inspection objective of Inspection Procedure 37700 to ascertain that design changes and modifications that were determined by the licensee to not require approval by the NRC were in conformance with the requirements of the Technical Specification and
CFR 50.59.
DCP 3FEMA063 was implemented to reduce the possibility of the unit going into natural circulation due to the loss of power to RCP's and accomplished by initiating an Auto Fast Bus transfer upon receipt of a trip signal from one of the subsynchronous.oscillation relays.
The design changes were assessed by Electrical Distribution System Design Assessment, 22 May 1989, and did not appear to invalidate any previous modifications to the system.
General Inspection/Test requirements (ITR-MA-001) were established which included objectives, precautions, system prerequisites, acceptance criteria, and data collection.
The design change package was properly signed with a statement of work clearly defined.
Hardware changes included the addition of two Type AR Relays, the utilization of the existing cable, and the repull of one existing cable.
The design change appeared to be done in accordance with proper design drawing change control.
Documents were listed, and revision numbers were indicated.
Both existing and changed configurations were shown.
Environmental and Permit Review was included in the DCP.
A 10 CFR 50.59 review and evaluation was done and included in the package.
The review appeared to be adequate.
Fire Protection review checklist, letters to file, conversation memorandum, design review board Meeting No. 173 minutes, and response to design review board action items were part of the DCP.
Design change Package 2FEMA060 was done in the similar format as DCP 3FEMA063.
The DCP removed the existing oscillographs, installed new digital fault recorders, and added new channels for monitoring and satellite clock for system synchronization.
The purpose of this modification was to provide a more accurate and meaningful sequence of events during system disturbances.
A 10 CFR 50.59 review and evaluation was done and included in the package.
The review appeared to be adequate.
The two design change packages 3FEMA063 and 2FEMA060, that were determined by the licensee to not require approval by the NRC, were
reviewed and appeared to be adequate and in conformance with the requirements of the Technical Specification and
CFR 50. 59.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Exit Meetin 30703)
The inspectors conducted an exit meeting on September 29, 1989, with members of the licensee staff as indicated in paragraph 1.
Ouring this'eeting, the inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in this report.
The licensee acknowledged the concerns identified in the report.