IR 05000528/1989023
| ML17304B260 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 06/01/1989 |
| From: | Burdoin J, Richards S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17304B259 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-89-23, 50-529-89-23, 50-530-89-23, NUDOCS 8906210266 | |
| Download: ML17304B260 (10) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
$C
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-528/89-23, 50-529/89-23 and 50-530/89-23 Docket Nos.
50-528, 50-529, 50-530 License Nos.
NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74 Licensee:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.
0.
Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Units 1, 2 and
Inspection at:
Palo Verde Site, Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection Conduc e
y
,
thro May 12, 1989 Inspector:
Approved by:
J
. Bur oi
, React r Inspector S
. Richards ref, E
ineering Section Date Signed W-r-Date Signed
~Summa'ns ection on Ma
1989 -
Ma
1989 Re ort Nos.
50-528/89-23 50-529/89-23
~/
of various vital areas and equipment in the plant, and an assessment of follow-up items from the augmented inspection team report 89-13.
Inspection Procedure Nos.
30703, 71707, 92701 and 93702 were used as guidance for the inspection.
Results:
General Conclusions The licensee's actions taken to clarify follow-up items and to correct deficiencies resulting from follow-up items were thorough, timely, properly documented, and adequate.
Si nificant Safet Matters:
None Summar of Violations or Deviations:
None 0 en Items Summar
No inspection open items were closed, and three items were left open.
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DETAILS Persons Contacted The below listed technical and supervisory personnel were among those contacted:
Arizona Nuclear Power Pro 'ect ANPP
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The of Ballard, Director, QA/QC Barrows, Jr., Electr ical Engineering Supervisor Bernier, Nuclear Licensing Coffin, Compliance Engineering Fernow, Director, Training Ide, Plant Manager, Unit 1 Kirby, Director Nuclear Production Support Karimi, Compliance Engineer Larkin, Compliance Engineer Marsh, Plant Director Papworth, Director, Site Services Russo, Assistant Director, QA/QC Rogers, Manager Licensing Schroeder, Electrical Engineer Shriver, Compliance Manager Stewart, Quality Investigation Administrator Thompson, Resident Engineering, Electrical Winsor, Lead Mechanical Engineer Adney, Plant Manager, Unit 3 inspector also talked with'ther licensee personnel during the course the inspection.
"Attended the Exit Meeting on May 12, 1989.
Area Ins ecti on (71707)
An independent inspection was conducted of the Units 1 and 2 Control, Auxiliary Buildings and MSS Structure.
The inspector examined areas and equipment for debris, potential hazards, oil and water leakage, and equipment condition, e. g., oil level, valve position, and electrical connection configuration and cleanliness.
The equipment and areas inspected included:
Units 1 and
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
Two 4160/480V switchgear rooms (trains A and B).
Four 125V battery rooms.
Four battery equipment rooms.
Two remote shutdown panel rooms.
Two diesel generator machine rooms.
Two diesel generator control room G.
Two auxiliary feedwater pump rooms.
H.
MSS structure 100/140 elevations.
3.
Follow-u of 0 en Items Identified In the Au mented Ins ection Team AIT Re ort 50-528/89-13 Dated A ri1 19 1989 92701/93702.
A.
Item VI.4.b, Review Special Training Performed to ensure operators are knowledgeable of procedures for resetting protective relays.
Problems were experienced with resetting 86 type lockout relays in both Units 1 and 3.
Difficultywas encountered during the Unit 1 March 5, 1989, event while attempting to reset lockout relay No.
286 on reactor coolant pumps 1B and 2B (page 19 of AIT report).
During the March 3rd event at Unit 3, operators experienced some difficulty in resetting generator protective relay No.
186G-9 (page 25 of AIT report).
The licensee initiated corrective actions to preclude a
recurrence of these types of incidents.
Some of the corrective measures for the Unit 1 No.
86 type lockout relays incident include:
o The Protective Relaying and Control (PR8C) department committed to the training department for operators and auxiliary operators to present a "Lecture and Hands-on" program in resetting No.
86 type lockout relays.
This program is scheduled in the new operator/auxiliary operator training cycle which was implemented April 3, 1989."
o The PR8C department in cooperation with the operation standards department reviewed and modify existing operations procedures to provide additional guidance on resetting No.
86 type/lockout relays as follows:
a.
ICR No.
05830 "Degraded Electrical Power" Procedure No.
b.
ICR No.
05833 "Operations" Procedure No.
4XOP-XRCOl Some of the corrective measures for the Unit 3 No.
86 type lockout relay incident include plans to modify procedure 4XAO-XZZ12, Appendix G, and also to modify emergency operator procedure (4XEP-XZZ01) Appendix P, resetting SIAS/CIAS...
The inspector monitored a training class on May ll, 1989, where a demonstration was presented on resetting the No.
86 type lockout relay.
Seventeen operator type persons attended the class.
The inspector also examined the attendance records for two other= training periods (April 27 and 28) on the same subject which afforded training to 27 licensed operators.
The inspector examined the course overview on "Manually Reset HEA L.O. Relay" for non-licensed operators conducted on April 5, 12, and May 10, 1989.
The inspector also examined the attendance, records for these three classes which were attended by 63 auxiliary operators.
The training appeared adequat The above identified procedures are presently in the process of being revised to include additional guidance on resetting No.
86 type lockout relays; however, to date none of the procedures has been completed.
The schedule for completing these revisions is prior to entering Mode 2 for the Unit in
.question.
This item remains open and an update of the status will be reported in a future inspection report, open item (50-528/89-23-01, 50-529/89-23-01, and 50-530/89-23-01).
B.
Item V.D. 1, Confirm licensee testing of emergency lighting met FSAR requirements.
An evaluation was performed to investigate the adequacy of the back-up lighting systems.
This evaluation was initiated due to the problems encountered after a Unit 3 trip and during subsequent attempts to manually operate the ADV's under less than normal lighting conditions.
Those areas where safe shutdown procedures require activities were walked down in Unit 2 to verify that the plant physical configuration of lighting requirements complies with the design requirements.
The walkdowns reviewed all lighting requirements in these areas to, assure worst case lighting conditions.
The normal lighting was
"de-energized to test the essential lights, followed by the de-energizing of both normal and essential lighting to test the emergency lights (battery pack lights).
This testing was done during swing and grave yards shifts to eliminate the effects of day light.
Some testing in those areas at. the lower elevations of the auxiliary building not effected by day light was conducted during the normal day shifts.
These walkdowns verified not only the local operability of equipment with essential/emergency lighting but also access/egress to those areas.
It was determined from these walkdowns that the emergency lighting in the following six areas in Unit 2 wi 11 be upgraded:
P Diesel Generator Control Cabinet areas (two).
D.
C. Control Areas (four).
Boration Sampling Areas in the Auxiliary Building.
Auxiliary Relay Cabinets Area (one).
Containment Spray Isolation Control Valve Area (one).
ADV Areas (two).
Auxiliary Feed Pump Area (still under evaluation).
The field work orders had been issued and the upgrading of the essential and emergency lighting in the two ADV areas for Unit 2 was in process.
The essential lighting in each of these areas was increased from one of three fixtures to two of three fixtures.
In the case of emergency lighting (battery energized),
several additional lighting fixtures were added in each area.
The inspector examined this field work which was approximately ninety percent completed, and concluded that the upgraded emergency lighting
systems for the ADV areas in Unit 2 appear adequate.
The eight hour testing of the new emergency lighting remains to be completed.
Design Change Package (DCP) 123-FEgD-023 was issued on Friday of this inspection period.
The modification work of the emergency lighting systems in the other five areas identified wi 11 be accomplished under this DCP.
Present plans call for completing all upgrading of emergency lighting in the above areas before Unit 2 will be returned to power.
The licensee plans to complete an identical program as described above for Units 1 and 3 prior to returning to power from their present refueling outages.
This item remains open and an update of the status of the emergency lighting program for the three Units wi 11 be reported in future inspection reports, open items (50-528/89-23-02, 50-529/89-23-02 and 50-530/89-23-02).
C.
Item VI.B.2.b, Confirm licensee has revised procedures for loss of power to re-energize lighting promptly.
The licensee is presently reviewing and re-evaluating procedures 4XAO-XZZ27 and 4XAO-XZZ44 for the re-energization of lighting and essential lighting following loss of power.
This item remains open and an update of status wi 11 be reported in future inspection reports, open item (50-528/89-23-03, 50-529/89-23-03, and 50-530/89-23-03).
Pre-operation test procedure 93GT-OZZ47, "Pre-operational Specific test Unit 1" test results for emergency lights operated from circuits ZCL-72A-14-140-09 and 10 which were not retrieved from the, records archives during the AIT inspection has been found and a copy was turned over to the inspector during this inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Exit Meetin 30703 The inspector conducted an exit meeting on May 12, 1989, with members of the licensee staff as indicated in paragraph 1.
During these meetings, the inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in this report.
The licensee acknowledged the concerns identified in the report.