IR 05000528/1989055
| ML17305A473 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/28/1989 |
| From: | Wong H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17300B251 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-89-55-MM, 50-529-89-55, 50-530-89-55, NUDOCS 9001170366 | |
| Download: ML17305A473 (43) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.:
50-528/89-55, 50-529/89-55, 50-530/89-55 Docket Nos.:
50-528, 50-529, 50-530 License Nos.:
NPF-41, NPF-51, and NPF-74 Licensee:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.
0.
Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and
Meeting Location:
Arizona Public Service Company (APS) Corporate Offices Phoenix, Arizona Meeting Conducted:
D mber 1, 1989 Approved by:
ng, ref Proje sSection II ate
)gne A management meeting was held on December 1,
1989 at APS corporate offices to discuss the NRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance for the period ending October 31, 1989.
The NRC's-initial SALP report was issued as Report Nos.
50-528/529/530/89-48.
Recent operational problems, management issues, and licensee corrective actions were also discussed.
90011703&6 S91229 PDR ADOCK 05000528 PDC
DETAILS Meetin Attendees Arizona Nuclear Power Pro 'ect (ANPP)
0. DeMichele, Chief Executive Officer W.
Conway, Executive Vice President J.
Levine, Vice President Nuclear J. Bailey, Vice President, Licensing and Nuclear Safety, B. Ballard, Director, quality Assurance J. Allen, Director, Engineering and Construction W. Marsh, Plant Director T. Cogburn, Acting Director, Standards and Technical Support W. Ide, Unit 1 Pla'nt Manager D. Heinicke, Unit 2 Plant Manager R. Adney, Unit 3 Plant Manager P.,Hughes, Manager, Radiation Protection and Chemistry D. Andrews, Public Affairs Nuclear Re u]ator Commission J. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region V
G. Knighton, Director PDV, NRR A. Chaffee, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects G.
Yuhas, Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Radiation Protection Branch S. Richards, Section Chief, T.
Chan, NRR Project Manager T. Polich, Senior Resident Inspector W. Ang,'roject Inspector G.
Cook, Senior Public Affairs Officer D.
Coe, Resident Inspector F. Ringwald, Resident Inspector
',
Sloan, Resident'nspector S stematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)
Mr. Martin started the meeting by stating that the purpose of the meeting was to go over the recent]y concluded Palo Verde SALP, the conclusions reached by the SALP board, and to provide an opportunity to discuss the SALP before it is finalized.
In addition, Mr. Martin stated that the meeting also provided an opportunity for a general status review of the'icensee's Unit 3 restart effort and for a discussion of recent plant problems.
The SALP board chairman, Mr. Chaffee, provided an overview of the recently concluded SALP by stating that the board found the overa]]
performance of licensed activities at Pa]o Verde to be satisfactory and directed toward safe facility operation.
Mr. Chaffee noted that th'
board found that licensee performance continued to decline during the first half of the evaluation period and appeared to improve during the second half.
Mr. Chaffee discussed examples noted in the SALP report for
both the declining performance trend and the subsequent improving trend.
Nr. Chaffee emphasized that licensee management attention was still needed in the following areas to continue the positive trend:
1)
Establish needed engineering presence in all plant activities through the system engineer program and other engineering programs that enhance maintenance and qua'Jity Assurance (gA) performance.
2)
Improving the abi'lity of oversight groups and gA to take a leading role in surfacing and resolving significant plant problems.
3)
Enhancing the performance of maintenance functions to maintain plant systems in an operable condition.
Nr. Chaffee concluded by stating that significant effort needs to be focused on the above noted areas while still continuing progress in other areas like radiological protection and operations that improved to weak Category 2's during the recently concluded SALP period.
Nr. Richards continued the discussion by reviewing the SALP board conclusions in the areas of Operations, Maintenance/Surveillance, Engineering/Technical Support and Safety Assessment/equality Verification.
He stated that Operations improved due to the relative absence of events attributable to the operations department.
However, he also noted that continuing indications of weak performance were still being observed and licensee management needed to further instill a conservative questioning manner in plant operations.
Nr. Richards stated that performance in the area of maintenance declined and needed improvement in engineering involvement, improvement of the maintenance backlog, and attention to detail in performance of maintenance activities.
The engineering area had the largest number of concerns and its weaknesses were felt in all areas resulting in the Category 3 rating for this functional area.
Nr.
Richards provided several examples of both negative and positive observation by the SALP board in this area.
He stated the need for better focused system engineer functions and their more direct involvement in identifying problems in their systems.
Mr. Richards stated that the Category 3 rating in Safety Assessment was indicative of the compliance-oriented gA activities performed in the first half of the evaluation period and the weak performance of the oversight groups.
He emphasized that gA and the oversight groups share an equal responsibility for plant problems and recommended that licensee management should insist that they identify problems before the problems become self-revealing.
Nr.
Yuhas briefly discussed the appraisal for the areas of Radiological Controls, Emergency Preparedness and Security.
Nr. Yuhas attributed the improved Category 2 performance in the Radiological Control area to the increased management commitment to good radiological controls and to improvements in the management staff itself.
He stated that licensee management attention was needed to continue the improvement in this area and specifically to devote.attention to maintaining radiation monitoring equipment.
Mr. Yuhas stated that the area of Emergency Preparedness was rated as a Category 2 with an improving trend due to the increased management involvement in this area and to the improved training
provided.
He stated that licensee management should assure that the new management team is fully qualified and staffed for emergencies.
Mr. Yuhas stated that. the area of security was rated a Category 2 and noted that training and qualifications were one of its strengths.
He recommended management attention to reduce excessive overtime for security personnel and to improve the poor quality of the licensee's closed circuit television security monitoring equipment.
Mr. Martin concluded the NRC discussion of the SALP by stating that the apparent improving trend in the later half of the assessment period gave some reason to be optimistic about future performance.
However, he cautioned that the previously discussed recommendations still need attention.
Specifically, the need for special attention to improvements in the definition of the system engineer function was important due to the engineering involvement in most problems.
Mr. Conway responded for APS by stating that he agreed in general with the SALP findings.
He stated his intentions to continue the improvements initiated and to sustain the management attention to the weaknesses identified by the SALP.
He stated that he would provide a written.
response to the SALP and would continue to keep the NRC informed by meetings, correspondence and briefings.
Status Briefin on Unit 3 Pre-Restart Action Items The NRC-licensee management meeting continued with a briefing on the status of licensee completion of pre-restart action items for Unit 3.
Mr.
R. Adney, Unit 3 Plant Manager, stated that 152 of 204 action items had been completed and that the remaining 52 items were to be completed prior to entry into Mode 2.
Mr. Adney further stated that gA was performing a 100 percent independent review of the action items by performing physical walkdowns and that the management review committee was performing a process overview function.
Mr. Martin questioned the completion of various action items.
He had observed examples during a plant walk-through the previous day, including a handwheel for a manual operator on an atmospheric dump valve that had "open" direction arrows going both clockwise and counter-clockwise.
Mr. Adney reported that they had corrected the condition the previous night by grinding off the incorrect direction arrow on the handwheel.
Mr. Martin further expressed a concern with the status of control room discrepancies, with annunciators and instruments which appeared to have existed for several years in some cases.
He felt that during a six month outage many of the discrepancies should have been corrected.
Mr. Adney responded that they are currently tryin~ to correct the deficiencies and are attempting to have a "black board by 100 percent power but that the number of annunciator discrepancies is still less than 10. 'r.
Conway added that APS would strive to clear up the control room discrepancies.
Mr. Martin emphasized that if operators are to be expected to give their best, management should also give their best by correcting the discrepancies that they identify.
Toward the end of the meeting Mr. Adney reported, in response to NRC inquiries, that Unit 3 had a work order backlog of approximately 602 work
orders.
He further stated that approximately 150 of those are fire protection program related items.
Mr. Bailey<
Chairman of the Management Review Committee (NRC), reported on the MRC s activities and its involvement in the Unit 3 restart program.
Mr. Bailey noted that the MRC -function was to provide a second look at the activities and not to take the place of the line organization responsibilities.
In the process of this discussion, Mr. Bailey stated that the MRC had concluded that the current Unit 3 work backlog of approximately 800 corrective maintenance items and no overdue preventative maintenance items was acceptable for restart.
. Mr. Ballard continued the discussion by enumerating the role played by gA in the Unit 3 restart effort.
Mr. Ballard stated that a special gA monitoring team had been formed to monitor the conduct of operations with operations experienced personnel that has been added to the gA organization.
Nr..
Ballard added that gA was in the process of reviewing Engineering Evaluation Requests (EER's),
perfor'ming modification walkdowns, reviewing
.restart commitment reviews and participating in 'the MRC.
I Mr. Cogburn discussed engineering activities including performance of system walkdowns and EER.reviews for Unit 3 restart impact.
He stated that joint Engineering Evaluations Department (EED) and Nuclear Engineering Department system walkdowns had been performed on three systems.
The walkdowns were critiqued by a senior consultant to obtain enhancements and improved effectiveness for the walkdowns.
The walkdowns resulted in identification of various discrepancies such as valve packing leaks and in calculation checks.
Nr. Cogburn stated that the walkdowns would be continued in the future.
Mr. Allen agreed to provide copies of the walkdown reports to Nr. Nartin.
Mith respect to the EER reviews, Mr.
Cogburn reported that no items were identified that affected Unit 3 restart that were not already being resolved.
Review of Recent Units 1 and 2 Events Mr. Ide, Unit 1 Plant Manager, continued the discussion by describing the Unit 1 stuck fuel assembly sequence of events and corrective actions.
Mr. Ide stated that the stuck fuel assembly resulted from installation of additional assemblies after one of the assemblies (L-14) had been installed without fully seating on its locating pins.
Mr. Ide stated that they would be closely evaluating any observed damage to any of the affected fuel assemblies.
Mr.'artin questioned the continuance of fuel assembly operations after the first indication of a problem was observed without obtaining management involvement and without a thorough evaluation of the problem at the time it was first identified.
Mr.
Martin further expressed a concern with the licensee proceeding with the fuel assembly operations in the face of 'uncertainty when.the cause of the problem had not yet been identified.
Mr. Ide continued the discussion by describing another fuel assembly operational occurrence when a wrong fuel assembly was transferred from the spent fuel pool to location K-9 in the reactor.
Mr.'de reported that the occurrence resulted from a typographical error in the material balance area sheets which specified the wrong spent fuel pool location for-the affected fuel assembly.
Mr. Ide stated that the error was caught
during the installation of the assembly, the operation was halted, the discrepancy was investigated, and the fuel assembly was temporarily stored until the appropriate time for its installation.
Nr. Ide continued by describing another occurrence where an incorrect fuel assembly had been partially removed from the spent fuel pool but the error again was caught, the assembly reseated and the correct assembly
'ocated and moved.
However, the operations manager was not immediately informed by the reactor engineer and consequently had no involvement in the activities occurring at the time.
Mr. Martin commented. that the occurrences represented continuing examples of the lack of management involvement in the resolution of problems and consequent failure to stop in the face of uncertainty.
The occurrences also appeared to show a
general lack of respect for the.inherent difficulties associated with refueling operations and that management expectations in this regard needed to be'made clear.
Mr. Cogburn agreed by stating that these occurrences presented further "conditioning opportunities" for the licensee.
Mr. Heinicke, Unit 2 Plant Manager, continued the discussion by reviewing the October 31, 1989 Un'it 2 reactor trip which resulted from several failures'n the plant protection system.
Nr. Heinicke reported that all Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Pump speed probe circuitry had since been inspected and associated problems corrected.
He further stated that a
temporary modification to jumper the excore instrumentation signal around the linear calibrate switches had been completed and that the switches would be replaced with new style switches in the future.
Mr. Heinicke also described the excessive heatup event on November 21, 1989.
He stated that an existing Combustion Engineering analysis indicates that the actual conditions that occurred did not adversely affect plant components.
He also stated that guidance had been added to operating procedures, lessons learned discussed with the operations crews and unit management has monitored control room supervisors to confirm their ability to exercise adequate command and control.
Mr. Cogburn continued the discussion by describing problems experienced with Auxiliary Feedwater System valves in Units 2 and 3.
Nr. Cogburn described problems with overheating motor operators, bent valve stems, and valve part substitutions by the valve vendor.
Nr. Cogburn stated that the problems had been and will continue to be resolved accordingly.
Specifically valve operability was being verified by testing and parts problems were being resolved by more stringent inventory and parts identification controls.
5.
Rkikkkk1 Nr. Martin concluded the meeting by stating that the licensee's progress generally provided a favorable impression.
He stated that reviews of licensee activities such as this provide a good opportunity to judge the current state of mind.
He recognized that the licensee had made a
significant effort to get new managers involved in plant activities.
He concluded by stating that the effects of the licensee's efforts would be judged in the futur APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING AGENDA DECEMBER 1, 1989 OPENING REMARKS STATUS OF PRE-RESTART ACTION ITEMS SUMMARY ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVES (ADV'S)
STEAM BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM (SBCS)
EMERGENCY LIGHTING STATUS OF GENERIC POST-RESTART ACTION ITEMS UNIT 3 SCHEDULE REPORT OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITIES SUMMARY ROLE OF QUALITY ASSURANCE ENGINEERING WALKDOWNS ENGINEERING EVALUATION REQUEST REVIEW EVENT REVIEWS UNIT 1 FUEL ASSEMBLY UNIT 2 TRIP UNIT 2 HEAT-UP RATE AUXILIARYFEEDWATER VALVES CLOSING REMARKS
OPENING REMARKS REMARKS BY J.
B. MARTIN, NRC ADMINISTRATOR, REGION V AND W.
F.
CONWAY, APS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, NUCLEAR APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89
STATUS OF PRE-RESTART ACTION ITEMS
REVIEWS THE REVIEWS IDENTIFIED 204 PRE-RESTART ITEMS
'HE PRE-RESTART ACTION 'ITEMS LISTING HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO THE NRC
VERIFICATION VERIFICATION OF PRE RESTART ITEMS 100 o INDEPENDENT REVIEW BY QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT
PROCESS OVERVIEW MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 RJA-1
STATUS OF PRE-RESTART ACTION ITEMS
CURRENT STATUS (11/30/89),
OF THE 204 IDENTIFIED PRE-RESTART ACTION ITEMS 152 HAVE BEEN COMPLETED 52 IDENTIFIED PRE-RESTART ACTION ITEMS REMAIN TO BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO MODE 2 ENTRY APS/NRC.MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 RJA-2
STATUS OF PRE-RESTART ACTION-ITEMS ADV RESTART PROGRESS 41 TOTAL RESTART ITEMS 31 RESTART ITEMS CLOSED 10 RESTART ITEMS REMAIN OPEN
ITEMS ARE COMPLETED
-
CLOSURE DOCUMENTATION IS IN REVIEW-2 ITEMS REQUIRE MODE 3 TESTING
ITEM IS PENDING COMPLETION OF ALL ADV INSTRUMENT. AIR ITEMS APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/Ol/89 RJA-3
STATUS OF PRE-RESTART ACTION ITEMS
SBCS RESTART PROGRESS 9 TOTAL RESTART ITEMS 6 RESTART ITEMS CLOSED 3 RESTART ITEMS REMAIN OPEN ALL ITEMS REQUIRE MODE 3 TESTING
-*
EMERGENCY LIGHTING RESTART PROGRESS 12 TOTAL RESTART ITEMS
RESTART ITEMS CLOSED 7 RESTART ITEMS REMAIN OPEN
ITEMS ARE COMPLETED -
CLOSURE DOCUMENTATION IS IN REVIEW
ITEMS HAVE PM PERFORMANCE ONGOING-MODE 2 RESTRAINT APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89
STATUS OF GENERIC POST-RESTART ACTION ITEMS
REVIEWS THE REVIEWS IDENTIFIED 140 POST-RESTART ITEMS POST-RESTART LIST WAS REVIEWED BY APPROPRIATE PVNGS SITE DEPARTMENTS POST-RESTART ACTION ITEMS LISTING HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO THE NRC
VERIFICATION VERIFICATION OF POST-RESTART ITEMS.
100'NDEPENDENT REVIEW BY QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPARTMENT
PROCESS OVERVIEW MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 RDA-5
STATUS OF GENERIC POST-RESTART ACTION ITEMS
. *
CURRENT STATUS (11/30/89)
THERE ARE 140 IDENTIFIED POST-RESTART ACTION ITEMS
ITEMS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND VERIFIED 50 IDENTIFIED ITEMS REMAIN TO BE COMPLETED
OF THE REMAINING ITEMS ARE ARE EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETED NO LATER THAN APRIL 30, 1990 APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/Ol/89 R3A-6
UNIT 3 SCHEDULE
MODE 3 ENTRY
ADV TESTING 11/29/89 COMPLETE 12/03/89
SBCS TESTING 12/08/89
MODE 2 ENTRY 12/12/89
'* 'YNCHRONIZE TO GRID 12/18/89 APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/Ol/89
REPORT OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITIES
MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE -
MRC SCOPE UNIT 3 RESTART PROGRAM ;
MRC REVIEW STATUS I
UNIT 3 RESTART PROGRAM -
MRC HIGHLIGHTS
MRC RESULTS I
APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 JNB-1
REPORT OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITIES
MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (MRC)
SCOPE ESTABLISHED:
OCTOBER 12, 1989
SCOPE:
TO PROVIDE DISCIPLINED MANAGEMENT REVIEW, OVERSIGHT AND SELF ASSESSMENT IN CONNECTION 'WITH STARTUP READINESS, POWER ASCENSION THROUGH 100:
POWER OPERATIONS FOR-UNIT 3.
COMMITTEE MEMBERS:'ICE PRESIDENT
-
NUCLEAR SAFETY & LICENSING (CHAIRMAN)
VICE PRESIDENT
-
NUCLEA'R PRODUCTION PLANT DIRECTOR PLANT MANAGER - UNIT 3 DIRECTOR
-
ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION DIRECTOR
- QUALITY ASSURANCE/QUALITY CONTROL DIRECTOR
- SITE SERVICES DIRECTOR
- STANDARDS & TECHNICAL SUPPORT APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 JNB-2
'
REPORT OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITIES
UNIT 3 RESTART PROGRAM -
MRC REVIEW STATUS'ANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND INVOLVEMENT PLANT EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL READINESS APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01189
UNIT 3 RESTART PROGRAM ACTIVITY IH PRCERESS Q ACTIVITY SCHEDULE CCMPLETE
+ ACTIVITYCCMPLETE QQ MRC REVIEW MANAGEMENT OyERSIgHT OCT 13 MODE 4 MODE 2 MODE 1 30%
60%
100%
+10 POWER POWER POWER DAYS A.
ESTABLISH MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE 1.
ISSUE CHARTER 2.
DEFINE EVALUATIONAREAS 3.
MEETING SCHEDULE B.
ISSUE POLICY STATEMENT 1.
REVIEW WITH MANAGERS 2.
REVIEW WITH SUPERVISORS 3.
REVIEW WITH OPERATING STAFF C. UPGRADE MANAGEMENT OBSERVATION 1.
LINE MANAGEMENT REVIEWS 2.
PLANT MANAGEMENT READINESS TOURS 3.
SELECTED SENIOR MANAGEMENT OBSERVATIONS 4.
MANAGEMENT OBSERVATION TOURS D.
PERFORM SELF ASSESSMENTS AT KEY MILESTONES 1.
MODE CHANGE READINESS 2.
PLATEAU WALKDOWNS 3.
MRC REVIEW OF EFDT 4 LONGSTANDING CONCERN LIST STATUS 12/01/89
UNIT 3 RESTART PROGRAM ACTIVITY IN PROCEEDS Q ACTIVITY SCNEDULE COMPLETE
+ ACTIVITY COMPLETE Oo MRC REVIEW MP NAGEMEN7 PyERSIgH T OCT 13 MODE 4 MODE 2 MODE
30%
60%
100%
s10 POWER POWER DAYS E.
EMPHASIZE QA INVOLVEMENT 1.
ASSIGN DIRECTOR QA/QC TO MRG 2.
EXPAND OPERATIONS QA SURVEII.LANCE 3.
REVIEW OUTSTANDING CARS 4. IMPL/g)T NCR PROGRAM 6.
IMPLEMENT AND EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS
.
F. UPGRADE RGTS 1.
ESTABLISH MILESTONES FOR COMPLETION 2.
DEFINE REPORTS 3.
NOTIFY NRC OF CHANGES Q.
MANAGEMENT COORDINATION 5 TEAM BUILDING 1.
WEEKLY STAFF MEETINGS WITH EXECUTIVE VP 2.
NUCLEAR PROD. MANAGEMENT MEETING WITH MID-MANAGEMENT 3.
ESTABLISH MRC (SEE 1A)
4.
ISEQ 4 NSG REVIEWS 6.
MRC REVIEW OF PRS'S A% NEEDED AS NEEDED STATUS 12/01/89
2.
PLANT EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL A.
REVIEW REQUIRED ACTIONS FOR STARTUP 1.
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS 2.
CHEMISTRY CONTROLS S.
TRAINING 4.
ENGINEERING 5.
MATERIAL CONDITION 5.
QUALITY ASSURANCE B.
WORKPLAN COMPLETION 1.
UNIT 5 RESTART LIST 2.
UNIT 2 POST RESTART 3.
SCHEDULED OUTAGE WORK C.
WORK BACKLOG REDUCTION 1.
ENGINEERING EVALUATIONREQUEST 2.
CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE S.
PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE 4.
OPERATIONS PROCEDURE CHANGES 5.
I IR/PT R/SP EE R D.
READINESS SELF ASSESSMENT 1.
FIRE PROTECTION 2.
CONTROL ROOM INST. STATUS S.
INST RETURN TO SERVICE 4.
SECURIT Y 5.
MODIFICATION RELATED DOCUMENTS A.
CONTROL ROOM DOCUMENT AUDIT B.
VALIDATEKEY DRPWINGS 5.
TEST PROCEDURE 5 SCHEDULE AVAILABLE
UNIT 3 RESTART PROGRAM ACTIVITYIN PROGRESS 0 ACTIVITY SCHEDULE COMPLETE
+ ACTIVITYCOMPLETE OO MRC REVIEW OCT 13 MODE 4 MODE 2 MODE 1 30%
B0%
100%
+10 POWER, POWER POWER DAYS STATUS 12/01/89
UNIT 3 RESTART PROGRAM ACTIVITY IN PROGRESS Q ACTIVITYSCHECULE COMPLETE
+ ACTIVITYCOMPLETE IIRC REVIEYI
PLANT EQUIPMENT AND OCT 13 MODE 4 MODE 2 MODE 1 SD'%0%
100%
~ 10 POWER POWER POWER SUPPORT PERSONNEL 7.
M 5 TE PERFORMANCE 8.
VALVE/ELECTRICALREVIEW 9.
RADMONITOR SYSTEM ACTION PLAN 10.
JOINT EED/NED SYSTEM VALKDOWN STATUS 12/Ol/89
ACTIVITYIN PROGRESS Q 3.
OPERATIONS PERSONNEL R EAD IN ESS A.
TRAINING K OUALIFICATION 1.
REORIENTATION TIME ON OPERATING UNIT
-
I UNIT 3 RESTART PROGRAM ACTIVITY SCHEDULE COMPLETE
+ ACTIVITY COMPLETE OO MRC REVIEW OCT 18 MODE 4 MODE 2 MODE 1 80%
B0%
100%
+10 POWER POWER POWER DAYS 2.
SHIFT MANNING 8.
REVIEW OF UNIT 2 I.ESSONS LEARNED 4.
SIMULATOR III CLASSROOM T RAINING 6.
BRIEFINGS FOR SPECIAL EVOLUTIONS B.
USE OF PROCEDURES STATUS 12/01/89 r
. ~
~
REPORT OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITIES
'MRC RESULTS
'INCREASED MANAGEMENT FOCUS EXISTING PROGRAMS EFFECTIVENESS, EXPANDED MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT DISCIPLINED MANAGEMENT REVIEW INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT REVIEW REINFORCED MANAGEMENT STANDARDS PROACTIVE MANAGEMENT TEAM PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED AND ADDRESSED EFFECTIVE TEAM BUILDING
'APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 3 NB-ROLE OF QUALITY ASSURANCE
INCREASED QUALITY ASSURANCE INVOLVEMENT SPECIAL QUALITY ASSURANCE MONITORING TEAM F
ENGINEERING EVALUATION REQUEST REVIEW EFFORT-UNIT 3 MODIFICATION WALKDOWN PRE-RESTART COMMITMENT REVIEWS POST-RESTART COMMITMENT REVIEWS MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE PARTICIPATION APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 BEB-1
UNIT 3 ENGINEERING WALKDOWNS
PURPOSE
. *
DOINT EED/NED SYSTEM WALKDOWNS WERE PERFORMED ON 3 SYSTEMS INPUT FROM UNIT MANAGEMENT ON SYSTEMS SELECTED SYSTEMS CHOSEN WERE CHARGING AND VOLUME CONTROL (CH)
AUXILIARYFEEDWATER (AF)
'LASS 125 VDC BATTERY SYSTEM (PK)
A SENIOR CONSULTANT WAS RETAINED TO CRITIQUE THE WALKDOWN AND GIVE GUIDANCE TO ENGINEERING STAFF IN THE PERFORMANCE OF WALKDOWNS
RESULTS OF THE WALKDOMNS
=
.FUTURE CONTINUE WALKDOWNS LESSONS LEARNED e
APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 THC-1
ENGINEERING EVALUATION REQUEST REVIEW
REVIEWED ALL ENGINEERING-EVALUATION REQUESTS (EERS)
ISSUED BUT NOT COMPLETED PRIOR TO OCTOBER 1,1989
NEW NON-CONFORMANCE REPORTING (MNCR) AND EER PROGRAM PROCEDURE EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 1989
REVIEW BY TWO (2) MULTI-DISCIPLINED TEAMS COMPRISED OF:
TEAM LEADER (ENGINEERING SUPERVISOR)
EED ENGINEER NED ENGINEER SRO (ALSO DEGREED ENGINEER)
QUALITY ASSURANCE ENGINEER (
ME, IEC AND EE)
NOTE:
QUALITY ENGXNEERING MANAGER PERFORMED AN
~
INDEPENDENT CHECK OF'PPROXIMATELY 100 EERS APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 THC-2-
ENGINEERING EVALUATION REQUEST REVIEW
EER REVIEW CRITERIA POTENTIAL MNCR POTENTIAL TECHNICALSPECIFICATION/UFSAR IMPACT POTENTIAL TURBINElREACTOR TRIP IMPACT VALID EER
THREE (3)PAGE CHECKLIST USED FOR EACH EER
2510 EERs REVIEWED 127 POTENTIAL MNCRs 33 POTENTIAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION/UFSAR IMPACT 32 POTENTIAL TURBINE/REACTOR TRIP IMPACT 93 POTENTIAL RESTART IMPACT APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING -.12lOll89
~
~
ENGINEERING EVALUATION REQUEST REVIEW THOSE EERs WITH UNIT RESTART IMPACT POTENTIAL WERE REFERRED TO THE SYSTEM ENGINEER AND HIS SUPERVISION
THESE EERs WERE EITHER:
DISPOSITIONED AND IMPLEMENTED, OR CORRECTIVE ACTION.TAKEN WITH EER REMAINING OPEN, OR FURTHER REVIEWED AND DETERMINED NOT TO IMPACT RESTART
NO ITEMS AFFECTING UNIT 3 RESTART WERE IDENTIFIED THAT WERE NOT ALREADY (BEING) RESOLVED APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 THC-4
UNIT 1 STUCK FUEL ASSEMBLY NOVEMBER 18 - 25, 1989
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ATTEMPTED TO INSERT ASSEMBLY L-17 TO COMPLETE ROM L REMOVED ASSEMBLY L-16 LOADED ASSEMBLIES M-17 AND L-17 ATTEMPTED TO INSERT ASSEMBLY L-16 REMOVED ASSEMBLY L-15 INSERTED ASSEMBLY L-16 FUEL'SSEMBLY L-15 INSERTED AND JAMMED
EVALUATION OF CONDITION LOWERED UNDERWATER VIDEO CAMERA OBSERVED ASSEMBLY L-14 ON BOTTOM OF CORE BUT NOT ON LOCATING PINS OBSERVED FULL LENGTH OF ASSEMBLY; APPEARED TO ONLY BE FRICTION HOLDING ASSEMBLY L-15 CONSULTED WITH COMBUSTION ENGINEERING (CE) AND PAR MANUFACTURING APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 WEI-1
UNIT 1 STUCK FUEL ASSEMBLY CE RECOMMENDED INCREASING OVERLOAD SETTING PAR CONCURRED WITH SYSTEM ENGINEER RECOMMENDATION TO USE MANUAL OPERATION OF HOIST TO INCREASE TENSION ON ASSEMBLY ABOVE OVERLOAD SETTING CE AND PAR AGREED TENSION COULD BE INCREASED TO 1937 POUNDS
CORRECTIVE ACTION CONTACTED NRC TO DESCRIBE PROBLEM AND METHOD OF RETRIEVAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS DEVELOPED DETAILED PROCEDURE AND 10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATION USED MANUAL HOIST OPERATION TO FREE ASSEMBLY REMOVED FUEL ASSEMBLIES L-14, L-15, L-16, AND L-17,,TO SPENT FUEL POOL FOR EXAMINATION.
ASSEMBLIES K-14, K-15, K-16, AND K-17 WERE EXAMINED IN PLACE WITH A VIDEO CAMERA CE AND APS EVALUATING RESULTS OF INSPECTION APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 WEI-2
UNIT 1 STUCK FUEL ASSEMBLY
ACTIONS TO PREVENT FURTHER OCCURRENCES INCLUDE STEP(S)
IN PROCEDURE TO VERIFY FUEL ASSEMBLY IS SEATED PROPERLY BEFORE PROCEEDING CONSULT WITH INDUSTRY ABOUT 'OTHER GOOD PRACTICES FOR FUEL LOADING APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 MEI-.3
POTENTIAL FUEL ASSEMBLY MISPOSITIONING UNIT 1
- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS -
NOVEMBER 16, 1989 DURING PREPARATION OF MATERIAL BALANCE AREA (MBA) SHEETS, A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR OCCURRED REGARDING.THE SPENT FUEL'OOL (SFP)
LOCATION OF THE FUEL ASSEMBLY TO 'BE PLACED IN REACTOR LOCATION K-9.
SUBSEQUENT REVIEWS OF THE MBA SHEETS DID NOT REVEAL THE TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR r
DURING THE RELOAD, THE SPENT FUEL HANDLING OPERATOR REACHED THE STEP IN THE MBA SHEETS TO RETRIEVE.THE FUEL ASSEMBLY IN SFP LOCATION P-38, HOWEVER, THE MBA SHEETS SPECIFIED TO RETRIEVE THE FUEL ASSEMBLY IN SFP LOCATION P-28 r
AS THE FUEL ASSEMBLY WAS BEING LOWERED INTO CORE LOCATION K-9, THE REACTOR ENGINEER OVERSEEING THE EVOLUTION NOTICED A DISCREPANCY IN THE COLORING OF THE FUEL TAGS ON THE TAG BOARD THE EVOLUTION WAS HALTED, AND THE DISCREPANCY WAS INVESTIGATED r
THE TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR WAS DETECTED, AND THE FUEL ASSEMBLY WAS TEMPORARILY STORED UNTIL THE APPROPRIATE TIME FOR ITS LOADING OCCURRED APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89'EI-4
e POTENTIAL FUEL ASSEMBLY MISPOSITIONING UNIT 1
- CORRECTIVE ACTION THE REMAINING MBA SHEETS WERE REVIEWED TO, ENSURE THAT NO ADDITIONAL ERRORS EXISTED REVIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AND A HUMAN PERFORMANCE EVALUATION ILLUSTRATED A
WEAKNESS IN THE REVIEW AND LACK OF INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF THE MBA'HEETS THE ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS WERE STRENGTHENED TO REQUIRE AN INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF THE MBA SHEETS AFTER THEY ARE PREPARED
- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS -
NOVEMBER 29, 1989 AFTER COMPLETING THE MOVES REQUIRED FOR FUEL ASSEMBLY IN SFP LOCATION A-29, THE SPENT FUEL HANDLING MACHINE (SFHM)
OPERATOR WENT TO THE NEXT STEP IN THE MBA SHEETS WHICH SPECIFIED MOVES FOR FUEL ASSEMBLY IN SFP LOCATION AA-
DUE TO A PERSONNEL ERROR, THE SFHM OPERATOR INADVERTENTLY BELIEVED THAT THE MOVES HAD ALREADY BEEN COMPLETED AND PROCEEDED TO THE NEXT SET OF MBA SHEET MOVES FOR FUEL ASSEMBLY IN SFP LOCATION N-31 APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 WEI-5
POTENTIAL FUEL ASSEMBLY MISPOSITIONING UNIT 1 WHEN THE SFHM OPERATOR CONFIRMED THE SFP LOCATION (N-31)
WITH THE REACTOR ENGINEERING REPRESENTATIVE IN THE CONTROL ROOM, THE REACTOR ENGINEER RECOGNIZED THAT THE INCORRECT FUEL ASSEMBLY HAD BEEN LOCATED, AND INFORMED THE SFHM OPERATOR OF.
THE ERROR THE FUEL ASSEMBLY WAS RESEATED IN THE SFP RACKS AND RELEASED, AND THE CORRECT FUEL ASSEMBLY (AA-29) WAS LOCATED AND GRAPPLED
.+ CORRECTIVE ACTION INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING FORMAL COMMUNICATIONS WERE INCORPORATED INTO THE REFUELING PROCEDURE APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 WEI-6
UNIT. 2 TRIP OCTOBER 31, 1989
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 10/30/89 CHANNEL B & D EXPERIENCED A LOW EXCORE SIGNAL COMPARED TO CHANNELS A & C DECLARED, BOTH CHANNELS INOPERABLE CHANNEL B LINEAR CALIBRATE SWITCH WAS,-
EXERCISED AND SIGNAL RETURNED TO NORMAL CHANNEL D LINEAR CALIBRATE SWITCH WAS EXERCISED AND DID NOT RETURN TO NORMAL.
PLACED CORE PROTECTION CALCULATOR (CPC)
CHANNEL D TRIPS IN BYPASS WORK REQUEST WRITTEN TO TROUBLESHOOT EXCORE CHANNEL D 10/31/89 CHANNEL C EXPERIENCED INTERMITTENT REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SPEED SIGNAL CAUSING AN INTERMITTENT CPC TRIP PARALLEL PATH WORK ORDER GENERATED SINCE THE
'LANT WAS IN A 1 OUT OF 2 TRIP CONDITION CHANNEL D TAKEN OUT OF BYPASS, CHANNEL C PLACED IN BYPASS IN ORDER TO ACCESS REASON FOR TRIP 10/31/89 CHANNEL B MIDDLE EXCORE DETECTOR OUTPUT GOES LOW TO RESPECTIVE CPC APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 DRH-1
UNIT 2 TRIP
CHANNEL'
EXCORE TROUBLESHOOTING CHANNEL D EXCORE SHOWED DETECTOR INPUT TO THE PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET TO HAVE AN OPEN CONNECTOR CHANNEL D
CONNECTOR PROBLEM WAS THE FIRST OCCURRENCE IN THIS APPLICATION
RCP SPEED PROBES REPLACED SPEED PROBE RCP SPEED PROBE MAS DETERMINED TO HAVE AN ELECTRICAL CONNECTION PROBLEM
.A PROCEDURE MILL BE IMPLEMENTED TO ENSURE THAT RCP SPEED PROBES ARE CHECKED FOR PROPER RESISTANCE AND SIGNAL CONDITIONING PRIOR TO RESTARTING THE UNITS FROM EACH REFUELING UNIT 2 HAS CHECKED RCP SPEED PROBES AND THEIR CIRCUITRY.
THIS REVIEW REVEALED SEVERAL MINOR GROUNDING AND CONNECTOR PROBLEMS WHICH WERE CORRECTED UNIT 3 RCP PROBE CHECK IS IN PROGRESS APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 DRH-2
UNIT 2 TRIP
LINEAR CALIBRATE SWITCHES
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS REVEALED SMITCH IS MARGINAL IN LOM CURRENT APPLICATIONS
-
" INSTALLATION OF A T.-MOD IN UNIT 2 TO BUMPER EXCORE SIGNAL AROUND THE LINEAR CALIBRATE
'SMITCHES REPLACE THE LINEAR CALIBRATE SWITCH WITH NEW STYLE USING GOLD CONTACTS.(EER 89-SE-021)
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING MILL PERFORM AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION'F THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED MITH THE INTERMITTENT LOSS OF LINEAR EXCORE POMER SIGNALS AND PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONALSUGGESTIONS.
(EER 89-SE-026)
EXPECTED RESPONSE BY 1/9/90 APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 DRH-3
UNIT 2 HEAT-UP NOVEMBER 21, 1989 A.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 1245 1315 1415 RCS AT 190 F;
OPERATOR BYPASSES SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER RCS AT 208 'F; HEAT-UP RATE =
36'/HR.
RCS AT 232';.HEAT-UP RATE =
'8 F/HR; OPERATOR ACTED TO STOP HEAT-UP.
RCS AT 252 F;
HEAT-UP RATE =
F/HR.
1420 HEAT-UP STOPPED AT 258 F;
EER SUBMITTED FOR EVALUATION.
B.
SYSTEM EVALUATION AN EXISTING ANALYSIS FROM COMBUSTION ENGINEERI INDICATES THAT IF RCS TEMPERATURE >180'
60'/HR HEAT-UP RATE DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT PLANT COMPONENTS APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 DRH-4
~
Jl UNIT 2 HEAT-UP C.
PROGRAM EVALUATION CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR (CRS) DID NOT EXERCISE ADEQUATE CONTROL AND COMMAND FUNCTION AS REQUIRED CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS DID NOT ADEQUATELY MONITOR HEAT-UP RATE OR ENSURE HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY AFTER ISOLATING SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM D.
CORRECTIVE ACTION GUIDANCE ADD
/
ED TO PROCEDURE.
BRIEFING HELD FOR ALL CREWS AND DISCUSSION HELD WITH CREWS BY UNIT MANAGEMENT.
REGARDING LESSONS LEARNED.
UNIT MANAGEMENT HAS MONITORED CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISORS TO CONFIRM THEIR ABILITY TO EXERCISE ADEQUATE COMMAND AND CONTROL APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 I
DRH-5
V pip AUXILIARYFEEDWATER VALVES FUNCTION VALVE TYPE STACK (DRAG VALVE)
VALVE MANUFACTURER MOTOR OPERATORS FLOW CONTROL (MODULATING)
l PRESSURE BREAKDOWN DISK CONTROL COMPONENTS, INC.
LIMITORQUE MODEL SMB 00
DC OPERATORS/UNIT (TURBINE DRIVEN TRAIN)
2 AC OPERATORS/UNIT (MOTOR DRIVEN TRAIN)
-* 'ECENT PROBLEMS MOTOR OVERHEATING AF30 - UNIT 3 AF33 - UNIT 2 BENT VALVE STEMS AF30 - UNIT 3 AF30 - UNIT 2 AF31 - UNIT 2 PARTS SUBSTITUTION AF30 - UNIT 3 APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 THC-1
e AUXILIARYFEEDWATER VALVES MOTOR OVERHEATING PROBABLE CAUSE TORQUE SMITCH DRIFT.
CORRECTIVE ACTION VALVE STEM LUBRICATION, MODIFY MOTOR OPERATED VALVE-(MOV)
BENT VALVE STEMS CAUSE MATERIAL (316 STAINLESS STEEL) IS MARGINAL FOR THE APPLICATION CORRECTIVE ACTION VERIFY ALIGNMENT/REPLACE STEMS WITH STRONGER MATERIAL (410 STAINLESS, 17-4 PH STAINLESS)
APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 THC-2
AUXILIARYFEEDWATER VALVES PARTS SUBSTITUTION CAUSE VALVE VENDOR SUPPLIES DIFFERENT DESIGNS UNDER SAME PART NUMBER
.CORRECTIVE ACTION OPERABILITYVERIFIED BY TESTING; INVENTORY WAREHOUSE AND DEVELOP UNIQUE PARTS IDENTIFICATION METHOD APS/NRC MANAGEMENT MEETING - 12/01/89 THC-3