IR 05000528/1989033
| ML17305A258 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1989 |
| From: | Clark C, Huey F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17305A257 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-89-33, 50-529-89-33, 50-530-89-33, NUDOCS 8910030457 | |
| Download: ML17305A258 (34) | |
Text
'
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
Report Nos.
50-528/89-33, 50-529/89-33, 50-530/89-33 Docket Nos.
50-528, 50-529, 50-530 License Nos.
.
Licensee:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.
0.
Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 I
Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Units 1, 2 and
Inspection at:
Palo Verde Site, Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection Conducted:
July 17 August 30, 1989
'
Inspector:
C.
A.
ar Reactor Inspector Approved by:
F.
R.
Huey, Chief Engineering Section Date Signed
~li ~isa Date Signed Ins ection Summar
Ins ection Durin the Period Jul 17 - Au ust 30 1989 (Re ort Nos.
50-528/
89-33 50-529 89-33 50-530 89-33)
'""'w!
""":
on closing out NRC open items.
Inspection Procedure Nos.
30703, 92701 and 92702 were used as guidance for the inspection.
Results:
General Conclusions and S ecific Findin s:
f The licensee followup actions for identification and tracking of NRC identified concerns, was found to have been inefficient for several of the concerns reviewed during this inspection.
There has been inadequate priority and resources assigned to resolve NRC identified concerns in a timely manner.
8910030457 8909i8 PDR ADOCK 05000528 Q
PNU
The licensee has'cknowledged the above identified inadequacies/problems in resolving some NRC identified concerns, and identified that the increase work load from all three units being in an outage status at the same time, was the main reason for the noted problems.
The licensee stated they would review this area and identify additional corrective actions to ensure that NRC identified concerns are addressed in a more efficient and timely manner.
The
'inal corrective actions taken by the licensee to resolve these identified inadequacies/problems, will be the subject of future inspections.
Si nificant Safet Matters:
None Summar of Yiol'ations:
None 0 en Items Summar
During 'this inspection eight open items were close.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- T. Shriver, Compliance Manager S.
Karimi, Compliance Engineer G. Irick,Section XI Engineer W. Simko, Supervisor, Civil/Mechanical Engineering The inspector also held discussions with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
"Attended the Exit Meeting on July 21, 1989 and a followup discussion was held August 30, 1989 per telecon.
a.
(Closed) 50-528/88-01-10 Followu
- "Essential Coolin Water (EW)
S stem Ca culatson oncerns n>t 1 Inspection Report No. 50-528/88-01 identified that the January 1988 NRC Safety System Function Inspection (SSFI)
Team reviewed calculation No.
13-JC-EW-200, Revision 1, regarding the. sizing of the EW surge tank.
The team was concerned that the tank relief valve might not be sized to accommodate flows resulting from coolant thermal expansion initiated at the level at which makeup supply is turned off.
Based on preliminary calculations performed by ANPP 18C engineering, the team concluded -that sufficient margin exists in the tank volume to bound this condition.
However, this observation was left open pending development of'inal level setpoint calculations for the tank.
Followup inspection reports 50-528/88-39 and 50-528/89-05 identified that the licensee's design engineers agreed that calculations confirmed that the relief valve setpoint of 15 PSIG wou'ld be reached prior to completion of the coolant thermal expansion into the surge tank, resulting in relief valve actuation under normal operation, i.e.; plant cooldown.
The licensee initiated an Engineering Evaluation Request (EER) ¹88-EW-017 for a design change, and Plant Change Request (PCR)
No.
89-13-EW-002 to resolve this issue.
During this inspection it was verified that PCR No.
89-13-EW-002 was approved by the Plant Modification Committee (PMC) on April 18, 1989, and,as of June 1, 1989, bids for the work have been submitted.
This new PCR adjusts setpoints and adds a vent valve to the EW surge tank N2 fill line, to allow venting at 8+1 PSIG.
Based on review of the above information and other documents, it appears the licensee has taken appropriate actions for this concer ~ 2 This item is closed b.
(Closed 50-528/88-06-01 Unresol ved
"Potential Failure of Automat>c Preaction Fsre Su ression 5 stems All 3 Units The initial NRC inspection report identified the following:
There are approximately forty five (45) automatic pre-action fire suppression system installations (15 in each unit).
Quality Assurance (QA) audit (No.87-021) 'indicated that the actual installation arrangement of the systems creates
"double interlocked dry systems" rather than "single interlocked preaction systems.
That is, fire detector actuation combined with relief of high air pressure in 'the system piping is required to. pressurize the system with water rather'than the single actuation of a fire detector.
Section 5-2.7 of Nat'ional Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
13-1976 requires that the'ir pressure in a dry-pipe. system be maintained 20 PSI in excess of the calculated trip pressure of the dry pipe valve, based on the highest normal water pressure of the system supply.'he manufacturer's technical data indicates that an air pressure of 20 PSI is to be established in the sprinkler piping, when placing pre-action systems in service.
The inspector observed air pressure gauge readings of greater than 50 PSI on the Unit 1 lower and upper cable spreading room pre-action systems.
The licensee's QA Audit No.87-021 findings cited one case where system air pressure was as high as 70 PSI.
In response to the concern over the observed high air pressures in the systems, the licensee disposition of Engineering Evaluation Report (EER)
No. 87-FP-078 concluded that "The system is designed such that the loss of air through a pipe break or open sprinkler head will result in a decrease in air pressure in the piping.
When the low pressure setting (7 PSI)
is reached, both local and remote alarms are actuated.
A higher air pressure setting may delay or prevent the alarm condition."
Therefore,
"The air pressure should be kept within the recommended range of 15-25 PSI."
In response to the inspector's request for test results that vei ify operability of the systems, the licensee indicated that contractor's material and test certificates were not available and periodic testing (i.e., technical specification surveillance tests)
did not include actual discharge tests flowing water through the system.
Therefore, the licensee could not provide evidence.
(based on actual system operation)
that these systems have. in the past or will now perform their intended functio The inspector requested that the licensee, perform functional discharge testing of the. largest capacity Pre-Action Fire Suppression System installed in Unit 1.
The licensee provided the inspector with drawings of three Unit 1 systems, of which the lower cable spreading room system with approximately 100
'eet of sprinkler main piping and 56 sprinkler heads was the largest system.
The inspector requested that the licensee perform functional discharge testing of this system.
However',
the licensee's position was that this was not possible because
'he process of draining the system and restoring it back to service after the test would place an unplanned hardship on licensee personnel resources.
The licensee further indicated that this testing would be scheduled and performed at a later date and the results documented for Region V to review.
During this inspection the inspector reviewed the following'icensee documents:
A July 26, 1988 letter no.
102-00885-DBK/TDS/KLMC, to J.
B Martin from D.
B. Karner
A July 22, 1988 letter no.
110-00383-WMS/SAL, to file from S.
A.
Lopez.
A July 22, 1988 letter no.
110-00382-WMS/SAL, to file from S.
A.
Lopez.
A July 1, 1988 letter no.
089-00485-CWB, from C.
W. Belford to D.
G.
Vows.
A May 25, 1988 risk management services record of telephone conversations from F. Garrett to C.
Ramsey.
Revision 3 to Licensee Procedure No.
14MT-9FPOl," "Fire Protection Equipment Testing and Maintenance for the Power Block.
After reviewing the latest revisions of the original documents, the above documents and discussions with licensee personnel, the following was identified:
The original concern with high pneumatic/air system pressurize for supervisory purposes,
.has been addressed in the licensee response to EER No. 87-FP-078, and revision 3 to Licensee Procedure No.
The licensee has identified the location 'of the original installation contractor's material and test certificates to the NRC.
Since there is no NFPA code requiremen't to perform followup functional discharge testing of a pre-action fire suppression system after the original acceptable installation testing, and
I
This the licensee has reduced the system air pressure, the concern with functional discharge testing has been resolved.
The licensee and system designer/supplier have verified the actual subject system installations are single interlocked preaction systems.
item is closed.
Closed) 50-528/88-06-03 Followu
- "Nuisance Fire Alarms - An Alarm S stem'Des)
n Ade uac All 3 Units The original inspection report identified the following:
IP The licensee's response to position no.
E. 1 of NRC Branch Technical Posstion APCSB 9.5-1 requires the licensee to install a fire detection system which provides audible and visual alarms in the control room by means of a Cathode Ray Tube.(CRT)
which displays a printout description of any encountered alarm condition.
The governing code used by the licensee for the system is NFPA Standard No.
During Unit 1 control room observation, the inspector interviewed an operator on the CRT alarm system.
The operator expressed a lack of confidence in the system because of the significant number of nuisance alarms r'eceived.
The operator indicated that other control room operators were equally, concerned about the nuisance alarms and the negative impact they have on operators'ttention to reactor operations.
Normal actions taken by the control room upon receipt of an alarm consist of dispatching an auxiliary operator to the field to verify the alarm before advising the fire team to respond.
Nuisance alarms make this action necessary in order to limit the number of false alarms that the fire team responds, to.
To correct this problem, the licensee indicated that an evaluation would be performed to determine if the cause is related to a system design deficiency or if the system as designed should be modified.
During this inspection the inspector reviewed the following licensee documents:
A July 1, 1988 letter no.
089-00485-CWB, to D.
G.
Yows from C.
W. Belford.
A October 18, 1988 letter no.
106-00042-TPB, to J.
F.
Schmadeke from T.
P. Burton.
A December 7,
1988 letter no.
106-00048-TPB, to.J.
F.
Schmadeke from T.
P. Burto After reviewing the above documents and discussions with applicable licensee personnel, the following was identified.
The licensee Ops Computer Service has completed its evaluation of the nuisance fire alarms, and determined that the Fire Protection Computer Systems are basically sound, with a few problems and they will make corrections to deficiencies on a
priority basis.
Instructions have been issued to attempt to correct the reported problems by resetting, activated systems or through the Work Control procedure.
Problems found to be computer related are directed to Computer Service.
A report of spurious nuisance alarms reported on the CRT, has been. completed on a per shift basis and provided to the Fire Protection Supervisor.
The licensee has disposition EERs, addressing problems with standing alarms spuriously resetting and signal grounding of all Security and Fire Protection signal-cables.
These dispositions will be implemented in site mods 1, 2 and 3-SN-SK-024.
Problems with signal distortion in the General Purpose Interface cables, which caused prob'lems with computer communications to this board, were dispositioned in EER 88-SK-023.
Work in this area was scheduled to start July 21, 1989, in Unit 2.
One system in one loop, will have a test installation installed, and if the modification is found acceptable, the other loops in Unit 2 will have the same equipment installed for a total system evaluation of this latest modification.
Based on the above information, it appears that the licensee had taken and scheduled appropriate corrective action for this concern.
This item is closed.
d.
Closed)
50-528/88-06-04 Unresolved - "Licensee Followu on ualit Assurance Audit Findin s (All 3 Units)
The original NRC inspection report identified the following two weaknesses identified by licensee audit reports, which required additional NRC followup:
Failure to properly review design changes
"to the facility for fire protection impact.
Significant backlog of fire protection equipment related work.
During this'inspection the inspector reviewed the following licensee
.documents:
-Corrective Action Report (CAR) No. 86-0161
A October 19, 1988 Letter No.
226-00222-GWS, to E.C. Sterling from G.
W. Sowers.
A October 25, 1988 Letter No.
089-00523-CWB, to distribution from C.
W. Belford.
A March 6, 1989 Letter No.
089-00578-CWB, to H. Bieling from C.
Be 1 ford.
A April 4, 1989 Letter No.
089-00608-CWB, to H. Bieling from C.
Bel ford.
A May 1, 1989 Letter No.
226-00422-GWS, to distribution from G.
W.
Sowers.
After reviewing the above documents and discussions with licensee personnel, the following was identified:
In response to the concern with the failure to properly review design changes to.the facility for fire protection impact, the following licensee actions were taken:
(1)
A Bechtel review was performed on ten (10) randomly selected Design Change Packages (DCP's),
and found no instances where the
CFR 50.59 review-failed to address or incorrectly addressed im'pacts of fire protection features of PVNGS or other safety related features of PVNGS.
Based on this review it was concluded that the condition concerning DCP 20J-RK-033 was an isolated case.
(2)
A Bechtel interoffice memorandum/desk instruction (File No. D.5.02.N.37, IOM-E-13513 MOC-452689, dated January 30, 1987)
on fire protection aspects of DCP's was issued to personnel.
This desk instruction was prepared for use as
.a training aide and provided guidance for the review of fire protection related issues within DCPs to assure fire protection requirements are not compromised.
(3)
Revision 19 to Bechtel Internal Procedure IP 4.34,
"Design Change Package" was issued to communicate the latest fire protection procedural requirements.
In response to the concern with the significant backlog of Fire Protection equipment related work, the 'following was identified:
(1)
In October of 1988 the licensee identified that there was a back log of work orders for all three units in excess of 695, and that over 255 work requests had not yet been processed.
(2)
In March of 1989 the licensee identified that the procedure on establishing priority of work orders had been revised to give a slightly higher priority on Fire
Protection equipment, and engineering had implemented a
task force to review and resolve all fire door EER's.
(3), In April of 1988 the licensee identified that the number of outstanding work orders/work requests issued on fire.
protection, detect>on, suppression and passive systems was estimated to be approximately 700 site wide.
This number of outstanding work orders/work requests, was approximately the same as that identified in October of 1988.
The number of work orders/work request affecting the operability of the systems identified above, was identified as 64.
(4)
As of August 18, 1989, the licensee identified the number of outstanding work orders/requests issued of Fire Protection detection, suppression and passive systems, as in the range of 350 to 400 site wide.
Since the licensee is in an outage status on two units, the numbers have been changing daily.
Based on the above information, it appears that the l,icensee has taken the initial steps and actions to address these identified weaknesses/concerns.
The status of the number of outstanding work orders/requests will be covered in future Fire Protection inspections, as applicable.
'Thi s i tern i s cl osed (Closed) 50-529/88-42-01 Followu
- "Loss of Both En ineered Safet Features ESF) Service Transformers (Unit 2 The original NRC inspection report identified that repairs to ESF service transformers 2E-NBN-X03 and 2E-NBN-X04, included the replacement of two bushings on each transformer.
During replacement of the bushings, it was identified that the replacement bushings obtained from the warehouse were 21 inches long, while the damaged bushings were 19 inches long.
Twenty-one inch bushings were also installed in the spare transformer stored on site.
Both size
'ushings were identified with the same catalog number.
Replacement bushings of identical size to the damaged bushings were eventually located at another ANPP storage location in Phoenix and installed in the subject tiansformers.
During this inspection the inspector reviewed the following documents and obtained the information noted below:
Engineering Evaluation Request (EER) ¹88-NB-001, dated February 1,
1989.
This EER. stated:
(1)
There is a difference. in the bushings between transformers E-NBN-X03 and E-NBN-X04, and according to their respective technical manuals they should be the sam (2)
A walkdown of all'applicable site transformers
[main generator startup (GSU), unit aux (UAT), ESF and normal service] will be performed as access is available, to evaluate and compile a listing of the as built/installed bushings.
There are approximately eight of,these transformers per unit:
During this inspection the licensee identified that the damaged bushings installed in ESF transformer (E-NBN-X03 and E-NBN-X04)
were the'ame length and the initial supplied replacement
'bushings were longer.
As to the actual length of the bushings, this is in accordance with attachment 1 to licensee letter no.
228-00848-SJG dated June 9,
1989.
NRC inspection report 50-529/89-16, dated May 23, 1989, ident'ified that there were two sizes of bushings (B0-5 and BO-6) for the ESF auxiliary transformers.
This report stated these two sizes of bushings were not interchangeable and that only the longer size (BO-6) of bushings was on hand in the licensee site warehouse, when the applicable transformers experienced damaged to the shorter size (BO-5) of bushings.
During this inspection the licensee identified that the correct identification for the subject bushings, were G05 (style no.
234C115G05)
and G06 (style no.
234C115G06).
Licensee letter no.
228-00848-SJC, dated June 9, 1989, to A.
C.
Rogers from S., J. Grier, which stated:
(1)
The Instruction, Manual for the ESF Service Transformers (Log No.
was reviewed, and there were six different styles of high voltage bushings identified in the manual (dimension sheet 48:061.63).
Two of the six style numbers were located in the Material Management Information System (MMIS) data base, style no.
234C115G05 (CI 4561-0205,
"L" dimension of 20 inches)
and style no.
234C115G06 (CI 4561-0021,
"L" dimension 24.5 inches).
(2)
No basis could be found for the statement:
"Both size bushings were identified with the same catalog number."'he instruction manual has unique numbers for each combination of size and color, and the bushings stored in the warehouse have unique numbers and corresponding sizes.
After reviewing the above documents and discussions with licensee personnel, the following was identified:
It appears that during the original bushing replacement work,.
there were communications problems in identification of the complete bushing material identification data for the damaged installed bushings, and replacement bushings.
The licensee has now identified the correct bushing material identification data for the applicable transformer The licensee is in the process of completing a listing of the as built/installed bushings for the transformers identified above, to ensure similar replacement bushings are readily available for any future transformer repair work.
Based on the above information, it appears that the licensee has taken and scheduled the initial actions to resolve this concern.
This item is closed.
(Closed) 50-530/87-07-02'ollowu
- "Items Ex ected Not To Be Com leted Prior to Fuel Load Unit 3 A Unit 3 NRC inspection report no.
50-530/87-07 was initially identified as report no. 50-530/87-09, and later changed to report no.
50-530/87-07.
This change of the report number from 87-09 to 87-07, also changed the identification of open item 87-09-2 to 87-07-02.
Followup open item 87-07.-02 identified that the licensee had identified that the following fire protection systems/work might not be completed prior to the Unit 3 initial fuel load, due to ongoing construction activities:
(1')
Approximately five (5) penetrations through fire barriers would not be sealed.
(2)
Several fire doors would not be operable.
(3)
The application of fire barrier wrap (thermo-lag)
on redundant safe shutdown trains would be in progress.
(4)
All work per section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 for redundant safe shutdown trains located in the seismic gap between the Diesel Generator Building and the Control Building, would not be completed, since the licensee had submitted requests for deviation in this. area to the NRC.
For startup, the licensee proposed to put in place the same compensatory measures that would be required by plant fire protection technical specifications, and fire protection system deficiencies would be corrected and the systems placed in an operable status prior to Unit 3 exceeding five (5) percent power.
During this inspection the inspector reviewed the following licensee documents:
Engineering Evaluation Request (EER)
No. 86-ZZ-058, with a closure date of December 2, 1987.
A Nay 1, 1989 Letter No.
226-00422-GMS to distribution from G.
M. Sowers.
After reviewing the above identified documents and discussions with the licensee personnel, the following was identifie The licensee identified that the work on the approximately five (5) penetrations through fire barriers had been completed per deficiency evaluation report (DER) No. 86-18, which had its corrective action signed off complete July. 10, 1986.
The original identified fire doors were worked per EER No.
86-ÃN-054 and later problems are being followed by the Engineering Evaluation Group, which has assumed the role as overall Project Manager to resolve fire door deficiencies.
The installation of fire barrier wrap (Thermo-Lag)
on redundant safe shutdown trains was addressed in EER No. 86-ZZ-058 and Design Change Package No.
Licensee Commitment No.
037750, which address this area, had its status identified as closed.
- The subject work per section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50
'for redundant safe shutdown trains located in the identified seismic gap area, was addressed in DER No. 86-03 and DCP No.
AZY-179.
Licensee commitment no.
035398, which address this area,
'had its status identified as closed.
Based on the above information, the fact that Unit 3 has exceeded five (5) percent power and the licensee actions in the subject areas are being followed by the applicable licensee personnel and the NRC, the initial concerns in this area appear to have been addressed satisfactory by the licensee.
Thi s item is closed.
g.
(Cl osed 50-528/TI-15-78 Tem orar Instr ucti on 2515/78-Ins ection of ualit Verification Functions This temporary instruction was superseded by change notice 88-16 to the NRC inspection manual, dated November 3, 1988.
This item is closed.
3.
Foll.ow-U on Items of Noncom liance and Deviations (92702 (Closed)
50-528/89-02-03 Enforcement - "Interface with Phoenix Fire De artment Inspection Report 50-528/89-02 identified that offsite fire department assistance.
is required to be provided by the NRC approved fire protection program, as implemented by the license condition.
This offsite support is required to supplement the licensee fire brigade, in the suppression of a major fire, so that a safe shut down can be achieved and maintained.
This'inspection report identified that the Phoenix Fire Department (PFD) had no preplanned emergency strategies for the site, since such planning with the licensee had not'een performe During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the following documents:
February 15, 1989'icensee letter no.
089-00575 CWB, to Harry Bieling.from Charles Belford.
r A February 28, 2989 letter from Alan V. Brunacini, Fire Chief, Phoenix Fire 'Department (PFD) to Bill Durham (APS), which established the terms of an agreement between the City of Phoenix Fire Department and the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station for back-up fire suppression assistance.
Item 7 of this letter, identified that the PVNGS Fire Department and the PFD agreed to participate in joint training and familiarization activities to meet the objectives of the agreement.
A March 7, 1989 licensee letter no.
247-00076-RAD, to Tom White from Ray Dunlap.
/
A March 14, 1989 licensee letter no.
089-00033-STD, to Gary P.
Morris, Deputy Chief/Paramedic, PFD, from Scott Dodd, PVNGS Training Officer.
A March 23, 1989 licensee letter no.
240-00442-HFB, to Don Karner from Harry F. Bieling.
A April 3, 1989 licensee letter no.
089-00035-STD, to Charlie Belford from Scott Dodd.
A April 17, 1989 licensee letter no.
089-00039-STD to Charlie Belford from Scott Dodd.
A April 27, 1989 licensee letter no.
089-00043-STD, to Charlie Belford from Scott Dodd.
0, A July 18, 1989 licensee letter no.
089-00055 STD, to Charles Belford from Scott Dodd.
'I After reviewing the above identified documents, other documents and discussions with the licensee personnel, the following was identified.
'I The licensee has received a February 28, 1989 letter from the City of Phoenix Fire Department, which establishes the terms of the latest agreement for back-up fire suppression assistance.
The licensee conducted a table top drill with the PFD on April 15, 1989, and video tape footage was taken for a training tape.
Approximately six members of the PFD were involved in this dri 1 l.
Since the PFD. has approximately 1600 personnel and radiation training is part of the basic PFD hazardous material training program, the licensee and the PFD agreed to develop a video tape for training.
This video will be approximately 20 minutes
in length, and will show members of the PFD how'to get to the site, and what actions they will take when they arrive on site.
During this inspection a draft copy of the training video tape was provided to the inspector, for review.
Once the licensee and the PFD agree on the content of the final video tape, the PFD will identify the number of tapes they will require for training.
Based on the above information, it appears the licensee has initiated actions to address the NRC concerns in this area.
This item is closed.
4.
Status of Remainin 0 en Items The following open items were not ready to be closed by the licensee at this time and/or another NRC inspector was reviewing the open item.
When available, the licensee provided additional information/unofficial estimates of when the items may be ready for closure review.
Unit 1 (50-528)
Unresolved Items 88-01-03 Cable tray support for NRR evaluation (additional information supplied to NRR in February/April 1989,
. waiting for NRR reply)
89-02-02 gualification of fire protection staff to perform maintenance (Region V, NRC working)
88-01-04 Hydrogen generation in battery room.
(Licensee not ready to close, performing additional testing).
88-06-02 'able tray cover interference with sprinkler effectiveness all 3 units (Licensee waiting on NRR review)
89-02-01 OIL retention pit potential overflow (Region V, NRC wor king)
89-06-01 CEDM fan "B" bolt failure causing fans B and D to be rendered inoperable (licensee not ready to close).
89-06-02 Feeder breaker 1R NAN-SOZ failure to trip (Licensee state this will be part of restart package).
89-09-01 IST - Licensee procedures do not identify what corrective actions are required for unacceptable data (licensee not ready to close).
89-09-02 IST - Licensee's procedures do not identify when corrective actions should beinitiated (licensee not ready to close).
Re ortabl e Occurrence 88-02-LO Nonconservative setpoints on Hi Log Power Trip (licensee is writing a supplement LER, not ready to close).
88-20-LO Apparent ground caused CEA slip (licensee not ready to close).
88-23-LO 88-25-LO 88-26-LO Broken essential HVAC damper fasteners (licensee not ready to close).
Missed survei 1 1 ance - di es el fuel.cathodi c protecti on (licensee not ready to close).
Apparent ground caused CEA slip (licensee not ready to close).
89-01-LO 89-02-LO 89-04-LO 89-05-LO Missed RCP vibration monitoring and engineering analysis.
(licensee not ready to close).
Non-qualified parts - Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs)
(licensee not ready to close,'art of restart package for unit 1).
Reactor (Rx) trip due to CEA calculator failure (licensee not ready to close, stated Augmented Inspection Team
,
Report No. 50-528/89-13, picked this item up also, should be in unit j. restart package).
Atmospheric dump valve deficiencies (licensee not ready to close, part of Unit,l restart package).
Unit 2 (50-529)
'nforcement Items 88-31-01 Stepwise signoff of maintenance work order. not performed.
(Region V, NRC working for inspection report-89-30).
89-06-01 89-06-03 (licensee not Failure to follow operating procedures.
ready to close).
Failure to post radiologically controlled area on BAMP.
(Licensee not ready to close).
88-28-01 Letdown containment isolation valve post maintenance retest.
(licensee 'not ready to close).
'0 88-42-02 Damaged battery cell.
(Region V, NRC working for inspection report 89-30).
88-42-03 Reactor power cutback.
(Licensee not ready to close).
Re ortable Occurrence 88-14-LO Reactor trip due to low SG level.
(Licensee not ready to close).
89-Ol-LO ESF actuation due to loss of 4. 16 KVIE busses.
(Licensee not ready to close).
'9-03-LO Rx trip due to LO SG level.
(Licensee not ready to close).
Unit 3 (50-530)
Enforcement Item 89-06-04 Failure to conduct quality control review for reactor vessel level indicator during midloop.
(Licensee not ready to close).
Followu Items 88-41-01 Chemistry spec deviation authorization not clear for entry into mode 5.
(Region V, NRC working for inspection report 89-30).
88-41-02 Dropped part length control element assemblies.
(L'icensee not ready to close)
~
Re ortable Occurren'ce 89-Ol-LO Rx trip due to LO SG level (licensee not ready to close).
89-04-LO EDG rocker arm failure/spurious NS isolation.
(Licensee not ready to close).
5.
Comment On Licensee Performance In Followin U
On NRC 0 en Items/
Concerns During this inspection, while reviewing the identified NRC open items/concerns with cognizant licensee personnel, the inspector noted the following:
The licensee tracking system for NRC identified open items/concerns did not appear to be current.
The licensee could not readily identify what licensee actions were scheduled or had been completed for some items/concerns, and could only state that they were not ready to close those items/concerns yet.-
'
There appears to have been inadequate priority resources or timeliness on the part of licensee personnel to follow up on some NRC open items/concerns'he above inspector observations were discussed with the licensee, and the licensee acknowledged the above noted observations/problems.
The licensee stated that the recent increase work load from all three units being in an outage status at the same time, was the main reason for the noted problems.
The licensee committed to provide additional review of this area, to determine what additional corrective actions could be taken to ensure that all NRC identified concerns are addressed in an efficient and timely manner.
Review of these corrective actions will be the subject of future inspections.
6.
-
Exit Meetin The inspector met with licensee management representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on July 21, 1989.
The scope of the inspection and the
'nspector's finding up to the time of the meeting were discussed.
At this meeting the inspector identified that he had obtained some information that would be reviewed later in the region, with the findings documented in this report.
The information was reviewed, additional discussions were held with the licensee, and the findings included in paragraphs 2,
3 and 5 of this repor