IR 05000528/1988018
| ML17304A350 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/1988 |
| From: | Ball J, Fiorelli G, Polich T, Richards S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17304A347 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-88-18, 50-529-88-19, 50-530-88-18, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, NUDOCS 8808220230 | |
| Download: ML17304A350 (22) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos:
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
50-528/88-18, 50-529/88-19 and 50-530/88-18.
50-528, 50-529, 50-530 NPF-41, NPF.-51, NPF"74 Licensee:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.
0.
Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ. 85072-2034 Facilit Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 & 3.
Ins ection Conducted:
Inspector:
T.
o h,
Sen or s
t Inspector Date Si ned Inspector:
J.
Bal Re dent Inspector D
e Signed Inspector:
Approved By:
G. Fio>elli, Resident Inspector S.
Richards, Chief, Engineering Section Date Signed 8/s jcB Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on Ma
throu h Jul
1988 Re ort Numbers 50-528/88-18 50-529/88-19 and 50-530/88-18.
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, onsite, regular and backshift inspection by the three resident inspectors.
Areas inspected included:
review of plant activities; areas observed on plant tours:
operating logs and records, monitoring instrumentation, shift manning, equipment lineups, equipment tagging, general plant equipment conditions, fire protection, plant chemistry, security, plant housekeeping, radiation protection controls; engineered safety feature system walkdowns; surveillance testing; plant maintenance; both trains of essential chilled water inoperable - Unit 1; cooling water system chemical addition tanks found unisolated - Units 1 and 3; verification of containment integrity - Unit 2; containment local leak rate testing - Unit 2; reactor startup - Unit 2; work clearances
- Unit 2; inspection and enforcement bulletin (IEB)85-03; temporary instruction 2500/26 - inspection requirements for fastener testing -
NRC bulletin 87-02; followup licensee event report-Units 2 and 3; review of periodic and special reports - all three units.
SSOS2202
'0 SSOS05 PDR ADOCK 0500052S O
During this inspection the following Inspection Procedures were covered:
30703, 60710, 61707, 61708, 61710, 61715, 61720, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71709, 71710, 71711, 71881, 72701, 93702, 92703.
Results:
Of the 15 areas inspected, two potential violations were identified.
Both violations involved failure to follow procedures when adding chemicals to cooling water system DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted:
The below listed technical and supervisory personnel were among those contacted:
Arizona Nuclear Power Pro ect ANPP R.
Adney, Manager, Plant Standards and Control
"J. Allen, Plant Manager, Unit 1 P. Brandjes, Manager, Central Maintenance F.
Buckingham, Operations Manager, Unit 2 R. Butler, Director, Standards and Technical Support
- W. Doyle, Manager, Radiation Protection, Unit 2
"J. Driscoll, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Production W.
Fernow, Manager, Training
"R. Gouge, Operations Manager, Unit 3
"J.
Haynes, Vice President, Nuclear Production
- W. Ide, Plant Manager, Unit 2
"D. Karner, Exec.
Vice President, ANPP Administration
"J. Kirby, Director, Site Services
"R.
Logan, Supervisor, Central Radiation Protection
"K. Oberdorf, Manager, Radiation Protection, Unit 1 R.
Papworth, Director, guality Assurance W. guinn, Director, Nuclear Safety 8 License
"H. Riley, Jr.
Lead Mechanical Engineer
- T. Schriver, Manager, Compliance
- J. Sills, Supervisor, Radiation Protection Standards G.
Sowers, Manager, Engineering Evaluations E.
Van Brunt, Jr.,
Executive Vice President R. Younger, Operations Manager, Unit 1 0. Zeringue, Plant Manager, Unit 3 The inspectors also talked with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
2,
- Attended the Exit Meeting on July 8, 1988.
Review of Plant Activities.
a.
Unit 1 Unit 1 started the inspection period at 100X power and essentially operated at this power level until the end of the report period with occassional reductions to 95K power.
These power reductions were necessary to maintain condenser vacuum due to high circulating water differential pressure.
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Unit 2 Unit 2 remained shutdown to complete outage maintenance work and surveillance testing until June 18, 1988, at which time the reactor was taken critical.
The main generator was synchronized on to the grid on June 22, 1988, following the completion of main turbine generator testing.
While at 40X power, the main feedwater pump tripped while feedwater controls were being adjusted.
Alert response on the part of control room operator resulted in the restart of the feedwater pump with only a minor drop in steam generator level.
Unit 2 was operating at 100X power at the close of the inspection period.
Unit 3 Unit 3 operated at essentially full power throughout the inspection period with the exception of a period extending from June 24 to June 25, 1988.
On June 24, 1988, Unit 3 entered Technical Specification limiting condition for operation 3.0.3 when the operating crew determined that they were unable to meet the action requirements of limiting condition for operation 3. 1.3.2, CEA Position Indicator Channels - Operating, with the failure of Control Element Assembly Calculator (CEAC) No.
2 and the previous inoperability of CEA No.
1 and No.
31 pulse counters.
Power level was reduced to 79 percent of rated thermal power before CEAC No.
was returned to an operable status and LCO 3. 0. 3 was exited.
While maintaining reactor power at 84 percent, the licensee undertook troubleshooting efforts to repair the pulse counter for CEA No.
31.
During the troubleshooting effort, a new circuit board was installed; however when an attempt was made to exercise the CEA the circuit board failed and the CEA fell into the core.
Another circuit board was installed and the operating crew was able to retrieve the dropped control rod.
The CEA remained in the core less than 20 minutes.
The. new circuit board was successfully tested and the pulse counter for CEA No.
31 shown to be working properly.
The licensee proceeded with monthly functional testing of all CEA's.
After successful completion of testing, the unit was returned to 100K power on June 25, 1988, and remained there throughout the remainder of the period.
Plant Tours The following plant areas at Units 1, 2 and 3 were toured by the inspector during the course of the inspection:
Auxiliary Building Containment Building Control Complex Building Diesel Generator Building Radwaste Building Technical Support Center Turbine Building Yard Area and Perimeter
The following areas were observed during the tours:
1.
0 eratin Lo s and Records:
Records were reviewed against Technical Specification and administrative control procedure requirements.
Monitor in Instrumentation:
Process instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements.
for conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.(k), Technical Specifications, and administrative procedures.
4.
E ui ment Lineu s:
Valve and electrical breakers were verified to be in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications and Administrative procedures for the applicable plant mode.
This verification included routine control board indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineups.
Instances of improper valve lineups were observed and documented in paragraph 7 of this report.
5.
E ui ment Ta in
Selected equipment, for which tagging requests had been initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specified.
Instances of clearance problems were identified in paragraph ll of this report.
General Plant E ui ment Conditions:
Plant equipment was observed for indications of system leakage, improper lubrication, or other conditions that would prevent the system from fulfillingtheir functional requirements.
7 ~
Fire Protection:
Fire fighting equipment and controls were observed for conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative procedures.
On June 29, 1988, the inspector noted a locker in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building 140 foot elevation corridor north of the chemistry laboratory to have an expired flammable storage permit.
This is the second time the inspector has noted lockers in this corridor with expired flammble storage permits.
This condition was discussed at the inspection exit meeting, where licensee management stated that the issue would be taken under review.
8.
conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative control procedures.
~Secure it:
Activities observed for conformance with regulatory requirements, implementation of the site security plan, and
administrative procedures included vehicle and personnel access, and protected and vital area integrity.
The inspector received Safeguards Information through the company mail that appeared to be compromised.
The inspector reported the incident to the licensee s Security organization.
The licensee started an investigation into the matter which concluded the Safeguards Information was not compromised.
However, the licensee will initiate corrective actions to prevent a possible recurence.
The corrective actions will be reviewed in a future security inspection.
10.
Plant Housekee in
Plant conditions and material/equipment storage were observed to determine the general state of cleanliness and housekeeping.
Housekeeping in the radiologically controlled area was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.
The inspector observed, following the conclusion of the outage, that except for the mechanical penetration rooms, the licensee had restored the Unit 2 plant housekeeping to a near normal condition in a very timely mariner.
Licensee management acknowledged the inspector's observations concerning the mechanical penetration rooms.
11.
Radiation Protection Controls:
Areas observed included control point operation, records of licensee's surveys within the radiological controlled areas, posting of radiation and high radiation areas, compliance with Radiation Exposure Permits, personnel monitoring devices being properly worn, and personnel frisking practices.
On June 23, 1988, the inspector observed a mechanic changing the Unit 1 Train "A" Containment Spray Pump oil. The worker was dressed in anti-contamination clothing as required for entry to that area;, however, his security badge and dosimetry were left hanging in the upper level of the pump room where he had donned the anti-contamination clothing.
The inspector informed the individual of a potential for unmonitored exposure by not wearing dosimetry.
The inspector further informed the licensee's Health Physics Manager.
This issue will be followed by Regional Health Physics inspectors.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
3.
En ineered Safet Feature S stem Malkdowns - Units 1 2 and 3.
Selected engineered safety feature systems (and systems important to safety)
were walked down by the inspector to confirm that the systems were aligned in accordance with plant procedures.
During the walkdown of the systems, items such as hangers, supports, electrical cabinets, and cables were inspected to determine that they were operable, and in a condition to perform their required function Unit 1 Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down during this inspection period:
o Auxiliary o Emergency o Emergency o Essential Feedwater System, Trains "A" and "8".
DC Electrical Systems, Channels
"A" and
"8".'iesel Generator, Train "8".
Chilled Water System, Trains "A" and "8".
Unit 2 Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down during this inspection period:
o Shutdown Cooling System Train "8".
o Emergency DC Electrical Systems, Channels
"A" and "8".
o Containment Spray System, Trains "A" and "8".
o Emergency Diesel Generator, Train "8".
Unit 3 Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down during this inspection period:
o Auxiliary o Emergency o Emergency o Essential Feedwater System, Trains "A" and "8".
DC Electrical Systems, Channels
"A", and "8".
Diesel Generator, Train "8".
Cooling Water System, Trains "A" and "8".
For a discussion of concerns in this area, see paragraph 7 of this report.
Surveillance Testin
- Units 1 2 and 3.
a ~
Surveillance tests required to be performed by the Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed on a sampling basis to verify that:
1) the surveillance tests were correctly included on the facility schedule; 2) a technically adequate procedure existed for performance of the surveillance tests; 3) the surveillance tests had been performed at the frequency specified in 'the TS; and 4) test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.
b.
Portions of the following surveillances were observed by the inspector during this inspection period:
Unit 1 Procedure Descri tion o 36ST-1SE03 Excore Safety Linear Channel quarterly Calibratio Unit 2 Procedure o 36ST-2SE03 Excore Safety Linear Channel quarterly Calibration.
o 42ST-2RC01 o 72ST-2RX09 o 42ST-2ZZ35 o 73ST-9RK01 o 42ST-2ZZ20 RCS and Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown Rates.
RMS Surveillance Modes 5-.6 Logs.
CEA Drop Time.
Remote Shutdown Disconnect Switch and Control Circuit Operability.
Unit 3 o 43ST-3SI03 Containment Spray Pump Operability Test.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
5.
Plant Maintenance - Units 1 2 and
a.
During the inspection period, the inspector observed and reviewed documentation associated with maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, compliance with administrative and maintenance procedures, required gA/gC involvement, proper use of safety tags, proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers, personnel qualifications, and proper retesting.
The inspector verified reportability for these activities was correct.
b.
The inspector witnessed por tions of the following maintenance activities:
Unit 1 Descri tion Trouble Shooting Channel
"A" Reactor Trip Breaker.
Power Supply Installation To Radiation Monitor Control Panel.
Nuclear Cooling Water Flow Orifice Replacement.
Containment Spray Pump "A" Bearing Oil Change.
Unit 2 Inspection of "A" Train Essential Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Protective Coating.
Repair of "A" Train Essential Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Relief Valve.
Unit 3 Descri tion o
Testing of Main Steam Safety Valve Preventive Maintenance/Inspection of Charging Pump Train "A".
Preventive Maintenance/Inspection of Essential Chiller and Chilled Water Circulating Pump Train "A".
Preventive Maintenance/Inspection of Diesel Generator Train "A".
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Both Trains of Essential Chilled Water Ino erable - Unit 1.
On May 29, 1988, the licensee determined both trains of Essential Chilled Water had been inoperable for approximately nine days.
The resident inspector staff followed the licensee's initial investigation as part of the routine inspection program.
However, due to the questions which arose as to the adequacy of the licensee's review of the early criticality, the inoperable essential chilled water event will be the subject of a Special Inspection Report 50-528/88-24.
This was made a
special inspection report because of the NRC increased concern for reactor safety.
Coolin Water S stem Chemical Addition Tanks Found Unisolated Units
and
On June 13, 1988, during a routine walkdown of the Train "A" Essential Cooling Water system in Unit 3, the inspector observed that the inlet and outlet isolation valves, EWA-V005 and EWA-V051 respectively, for chemical addition tank, EWN-XOlA, appeared to be in the open position.
The inspector discussed this with the on-shift shift supervisor requesting that he have verified the actual position of the valves.
This resulted in a determination that the valves were indeed open.
A review by the inspector of the system PAID and normal operating procedures indicated that the valves sho'uld have been closed and maintained in the closed position at times other than when chemicals were being added to the system since these valves constituted a break between class and non-class portions of the system.
The licensee's along with the inspector's own review of the circumstances surrounding the valves being found in the open position, indicated that the valves were most likely left in that position after chemicals were added to the system on June 7, 1988.
The inspector interviewed the Unit 3 auxiliary operator involved in the evolution in an attempt to determine whether or not there were any special circumstances surrounding the event.
From the inspector's interview, it appears that steps outlined in Section 11.0 of the normal operating procedure 430P-3EWOl, Revision 2, which was in affect at the time of the event were not explicitly followed.
Had the operator followed the procedure, the valves should not have remained open.
Failure to follow the prescribed procedure is considered a violation of NRC requirements (Violation No. 530/88-18-01).
Subsequent to the inspectors discovery in Unit 3, while performing a
similar walkdown of the Train "B" Essential Chilled Water system in Unit 1, on June 14, 1988, the inspector again found the inlet and outlet valves, in this case, valves ECB-V102 and V101 for chemical addition tank, ECN-X01B appeared to have been left open.
This was brought to the attention of the on-shift shift supervisor who subsequently had the
position of each valve verified.
In this case, it was determined that only the outlet valve, ECB-V101 was in the open position.
However, both the system PAID and normal operating procedure required this valve to remain closed since it constitutes a class break within the system as was the case for valves found open in the essential cooling water system in Unit 3.
Review of recent operating logs in Unit 1 determined that chemicals had been added to the Train "B" essential chilled water system on June 10, 1988.
In discussing the circumstances surrouding the chemical addition with the operators involved, it appears again that portions of applicable procedure, in this case 410P-lEC02, Revision 6, Section 7. 0, "Chemical Addition to Essential Chilled Water Train B" were not followed.
Failure to follow the prescribed procedure is considered a
violation of NRC requirements (Violation No. 528/88-18-01).
In response to the inspector's concern with regard to the operability of these two systems during the time interval in which the chemical addition tanks remained unisolated, the licensee initiated two separate engineering evaluation requests, one addressing the essential cooling water system and the other addressing the essential chilled water system.
The results of these evaluations showed that in each case should a
postulated break occur within the non-class portion of the system, the leakage rate out of the system would be greater than the safety grade makeup capability from the condensate transfer system.
However, additional analysis provided by the licensee has shown that the non-safety portions of both of these systems would be able to withstand the affects of a safe shutdown earthquake and as such a postulated break is unlikely to occur thus mitigating the safety significance of the events.
However, in light of the valving errors which resulted in rendering both trains of Essential Chilled Water inoperable in Unit 1 as mentioned in paragraph 6 of this report, the failure to adequately control the positioning of the valves in the essential cooling water system in Unit 3 and essential chilled water in Unit 1 as cited above is still considered significant and appears corrective actions of a more generic nature should be taken by the licensee to prevent recurrence.
Verification of Containment Inte rit Unit 2.
The inspector verified that mechanical barriers and isolation valves associated with ten separate containment penetrations were positioned in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.
These included containment purge valves, blank flanges, isolation valves, electrical penetr ations and the equipment hatch door.
In addition the inspector observed the local leak rate test conducted on the 140 foot personal hatch seal also required by Technical Specifications.
The tests was performed in accordance with approved procedures and with the test acceptance criteria being met.
The inspector also walked down both trains of the containment spray system and confirmed that the equipment was properly aligned.
No violations of NRC requii ements or deviations were identifie Containment Local Leak Rate Testin
- Unit 2.
The inspector witnessed local leak rate testing of several penetrations during the recent Unit 2 outage.
The tests were conducted in accordance with approved procedures at the required pressure.
A review of test results confirmed that all required penetrations had been tested.
The
"as found" values of several isolation valves indicated the valves had failed the test.
The valves, however, were repaired and retested successfully.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Reactor Startu Unit 2.
The inspector observed portions of the Unit 2 reactor startup following the conclusion of an extended refueling and maintenance outage.
Criticality was reached at 1:26 AM on June 18, 1988.
The inspector observed that the Mode 3-2 check list had been completed.
Technical staff meetings regarding plant startup were held as was a meeting between the unit operations manager and several shifts, during which time topics such as, the new startup procedure, administrative controls and organizational responsibilities were discussed.
The startup operations were noted to be conservative and cautious, well supervised, and supported by the technical staff and Unit 2 management who maintained a constant presence during the operation.
Startup activities were controlled by approved procedures 72PY-2RX01 "Reactor Criticality and Low Power Physics Tests" and 420P-2ZZ03 Revision
"Reactor Startup".
Low power physics testing was performed following achievement of criticality.
Several of the tests involving moderator temperature coefficient, control rod worth measurements, and reactor shutdown margin were observed to have been conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Work Clearances Unit 2.
The inspector became aware of two instances involving work associated with clearances which involved operator error.
In both cases the equipment was non-safety related; however, the clearance procedure used is the same as that used in connection with safety related work.
In one case electrical fuses were not installed in a portion of the main generator circuitry when the clearance was removed.
This was contrary to the intent of the clearance restoration.
This condition was discovered when a scheduled test of the main generator could not be performed because of the missing fuses.
In another case an operator opened the wrong breaker causing a downpower of one train of air-start compressors in the emergency diesel generator system.
The condition was only momentary and the second air compressor train was unaffected.
Only one train of compressors is required for operability of the diesel ANPP management was informed that additional training of staff in the implementation of the clearance procedure appeared to be in order.
ANPP's management responded that appropriate training action would be taken.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Ins ection and Enforcement Bulletin IEB 85-03.
As requested by action item e. of Bulletin 85-03, "Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings," the licensee identified the selected safety-related valves, the valves'aximum differential pressures and the licensee's program to assure valve operability in their letters dated June 30 and October 27, 1986.
Review of these responses indicated the need for additional information which was contained in Region Y letter dated June 30, 1987.
Review of the licensee's August 3, 1987, response to this request for additional information indicates that the licensee's selection of the applicable safety-related valves to be addressed and the valves'aximum differential pressures meets the requirements of the bulletin and that the program to assure valve operability requested by action item e. of the bulletin is now acceptable.
The results of the inspections to verify proper implementation of this program and the review of the final response required by action item f.
of the bulletin will be addressed in additional inspection reports.
Tem orar Instruction 2500/26 - Ins ection Re uirement For Fastener Testin
-
This item is documented in NRC Inspection Report 528/88-02, paragraph 15.
This item is closed for all three units.
Followu Licensee Event Re ort LER The following LERs were reviewed 'by the inspector.
Based on the information provided in the report, it was concluded that reporting requirements had been met, root causes had been identified, and corrective actions were appropriate.
The below listed LERs are considered closed.
Unit 2 LER NUMBER DESCRIPTION 87-19 Reactor Trip Occurs During Startup Due to Axial Shape Index Out-of-Bound Unit 3 LER NUMBER DESCRIPTION 87-03 87-05 88-01 88"02 Valve Bolting Non-Conformances MSIS Actuation Due to Faulty Logic Board Containment Pressure Transmitter Isolated Interval Not Adjusted for Valve Stroke Time Testing No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Review of Auxiliar Feedwater Pum s - Justification for Continued
~Oeration.
The NRC staff has completed the review of the licensee's Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) concerning the recent Auxiliary Feedwater Pump degradation event, and agrees that continued operation is justified.
A meeting was held with licensee representatives on this subject on May 31, 1988, at NRC Headquarters in Rockville, Maryland.
At this meeting the licensee presented a failure analysis and corrective action plan similar to that specified in the JCO.
The NRC recommended that corrective maintenance on the pumps be performed as soon as feasible within Technical Specification time limits, instead of deferring maintenance until the next outage.
The licensee subsequently informed the NRC that their course of action would be to conduct corrective maintenance when the replacement parts are received from the pump manufactures.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts - Units 1 2 and 3.
Periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9. 1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
the report contained the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and the validity of the reported information.
Within the scope of the above, the following reports were reviewed by the inspector.
Unit 1 o
Monthly Operating Report for May, 1988.
Unit 2 o
Monthly Operating Report for May, 1988.
Unit 3 o
Monthly Operating Report for May, 1988.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identifie The inspector met with licensee management representatives periodically during the inspection and held an exit on July 8, 1988.
During the exit meeting, the inspector discussed recent operating experiences involving personnel error emphasizing the need for greater attention to detail and management attention.