IR 05000528/1988016
| ML17304A272 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1988 |
| From: | Brown G, Fish R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17304A270 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-88-16, 50-529-88-17, 50-530-88-16, NUDOCS 8807200049 | |
| Download: ML17304A272 (11) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
Licensee:
50-528/88-16, 50-529/88-17, and 50-530/88-16 Arizona Public Service Company P.O.
Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85836 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 and
Inspection at:
Palo Verde Site, Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection dates:
Jun 6-10, 1988 Inspector:
rown, Emergency Preparedness Analyst D te Team members:
Approved by:
R.
A. Meek, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRC T. Polich, Senior Resident Inspector, NRC D. Schultz, Comex Corporation 3'o gI'.
F. Fish, Chief, Emergency D te Preparedness Section
~Summar:
Areas Ins ected:
Routine announced inspection of the emergency preparedness exercise.
The exercise was unannounced and involved only site participation.
Inspection procedures 82301, 92701, and 30703 were covered.
Results:
No violations of NRC requirements were identified.
8807200049 880701 PDR 4DOCK 05000528
DETAILS Contacts Licensee Personnel A'J
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A'J 8'J
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~A'D Allen, Plant Manager, Unit 1 Barsuk, Lead Site Emergency Planner Bieling, Supervisor, Emergency Planning Driscoll, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Production Haynes, Vice President, Nuclear Production Kirby, Director, Site Services Mann, Manager, Central Radiological Protection Papworth, Director, Quality Assurance/Quality Control Rouse, Compliance Engineer Shriver, Manager, Compliance Yows, Manager, Emergency Planning and Fire Protection NRC Personnel
"T. Polich, Senior Resident Inspector, Region V
"D. Schultz, Comex Corporation
"R. Meek, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRR, Headquarters
" Denotes those in attendance at the June 10, 1988 exit interview
+ Denotes those in attendance at the June 21, 1988 post-exit meeting 2.
Followu On 0 en Items Module 92701 (Closed)
Open Item 86-15-02.
Provide a backup communications system that would survive a loss of the communications room.
The licensee has installed Panasonic Model EF-6106EA cellular phones in each emergency response facility.
These phones are independent of the primary system and may function as completely portable units.
The system tested satisfactorily during this exercise.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Open Item 87-33-02.
Need training in transmitting technique during communications.
The inspectors monitored radio communications between field teams, the TSC, and the EOF during this exercise.
They noted that all communications were formal and proper.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Open Item 87-33-01.
Need training of FMTs in accurately conducting and reporting field data.
The inspector accompanied Field Team RFAT ¹2.
The team adequately performed and communicated its assigned tasks.
This item is closed.
( Open ) Open Item 87-33-04.
Inconsistency of protective action recommendations (PARs) between the MESOREM, Jr.
computer program and manual procedures.
The open item was generated by a concern that the procedures (EP-ll) and the new MESOREM, Jr.
computer program conflicted to such a degree as to cause confusion when members of the STSC attempted
to make PARs.
Using identical data for the two systems, the users developed different sets of PARs.
Even though Procedure EP-11 was modified in an attempt to correct the problem, a similar problem now exists with the new method requiring them to use EP-15 instead of EP-ll.
This item will remain open pending resolution.
Emer enc Pre aredness Exercise Plannin (Module 82301)
The Emergency Preparedness and Planning (EP8P) staff has the overall responsibility for developing and conducting the emergency preparedness exercise.
The licensee issued a contract to HMM Associates which provided for scenario development.
Persons involved in the scenario development were not participants in the exercise.
The scenario package was controlled so that players were not allowed access to it prior to the exercise.
Prior access was given only to authorized agencies, such as the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), who reviewed the exercise objectives and scenario, and others with a need to know the information.
The exercise was intended to meet the requirements of Section IV.F.3 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
Exercise Scenario (Module 82301)
The exercise scenario was to begin with an event classified as an Alert, then escalate to a Site Area Emergency.
The scenario did not require the classification of an Unusual Event or a General Emergency.
The Alert classification was to result from either of two events, a condenser vent monitor high radiation alarm or reactor coolant system leakage rate greater than 60 gpm.
The Site Area Emergency classification condition would be brought on by an uncontrolled loss of RCS inventory greater than
gpm and primary to secondary leakage greater than
gpm with steam being released to the atmosphere.
Control Room and Satellite Technical Su ort Center (Module 82301)
The NRC observers evaluated the Control Room (CR) and Satellite Technical Support Center (STSC) staff's ability to detect and classify emergency events, formulate protective actions, perform required notifications, analyze plant conditions and take corrective actions.
The Control Room crew's responses were satisfactory.
No violations were noted in this program area.
Technical Su ort Center (Module 82301)
The NRC observers evaluated the Technical Support Center (TSC) staff's ability to activate in a timely manner, assess and classify accidents, make dose assessments, decide on appropriate PARs, make proper and timely notifications, support the Control Room, and maintain radiological monitoring.
The TSC staff's actions were satisfactor 'I
No violations were noted in this program area.
7.
0 erations Su ort Center (Module 82301)
The NRC observers evaluated the OSC staff's ability to timely activate and staff the facility and to support the CR and TSC with appropriate skills and craftsmen.
Overall, the OSC staff's actions were satisfactory, however, the following items were observations of sufficient importance to warrant NRC examination during a future inspection.
a.
Command and control of OSC operations appeared indecisive.
For instance, when the staffing resources of the OSC appeared to be inadequate, there appeared to be confusion and indecision as to what to do about it.
A similar problem occurred with respect to whether a particular team needed a dedicated driver, and there was indecision as to whether a particular repair team needed protective clothing or not.
The licensee's response to this item will be tracked as Open Item No. 88-16-01.
b.
OSC communicators did not maintain a communications log as required in Section 4.3.6.3 of EP-12.
The licensee's response to this item will be tracked as Open Item No. 88-16-02.
C.
The field team had difficulty in determining precise locations from which radiological samples were taken.
In providing readings for the plume location, they transmitted their positions based on rough estimates of the distance from the nearest crossroad.
In one instance, when transmitting the location of the edge of the plume, they were in error by two miles from their true location.
This item will be tracked as Open Item 88-16-03.
No violations were identified in this program area.
8.
Emer enc 0 erations Facilit (Module 82301)
The NRC observers evaluated the EOF staff's ability to timely activate the facility with appropriate skills and disciplines, provide offsite dose assessment capabilities, make appropriate and timely notifications, implement protective actions onsite, make protective action recommendations offsite, interface with offsite officials, and issue information to the media.
The EOF staff's actions were satisfactory.
No violations were identified in this program area.
9.
Exit Interview (Module 30703)
An exit interview was held on June 10, 1988 with licensee repre-sentatives.
Attendees of this interview are identified in Section 1 of this report.
The licensee was advised that no violations were identified during this inspection, but that three open items were identified which
e would be evaluated during future inspections.
The items and observations described in Sections 5, 6, 7, and 8 were also discussed during this interview.
On June 21, 1988 a post-exit meeting was held at the Region V
office between licensee representatives and Mr.
R. Fish and G.
Brown of the NRC staff.
Attendees of that meeting are also denoted in Section l.
The purpose of the meeting was to clarify certain exercise observations presented at the exit interview.
Particulars of the meeting are discussed in Section 10 of this report.
10.
Post-Exit Meetin of June
1988 During the June 10, 1988 exit interview the NRC inspection team discussed several observations for which the licensee was not prepared to respond.
The licensee investigated each of the findings in detail.
The results of the licensee's investigation were discussed during a meeting held at the NRC Region V office on June 21, 1988.
The observations and licensee responses are listed below.
a.
OBSERVATION:
The Shift Supervisor made an improper declaration of Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) based on a condenser vent high radiation alarm condition that did not exist at the time.
LICENSEE RESPONSE:
The NOUE was classified at 0822 on 0820 data.
The data sheets provided to the NRC inspectors contained data only for 0815 and 0830.
Through an oversight the 0820 and 0825 data sheets only appeared in the data sheet deck that was being distributed at the Radiation Monitoring Station console.
Also, the 0820 and 0825 Emergency Response Facilities Data Acquisition and Display System (ERFDADS) sheets were only inserted in the Control Room and STSC binders.
This oversight resulted in the NRC inspectors not having the missing data sheets which supported the NOUE classification.
b.
OBSERVATION:
The Emergency Coordinator made an untimely and improper General Emergency declaration based on failure/ challenge of the fission product barriers.
Conditions for a General Emergency declaration possibly existed at 0915 but the EC did not make the declaration until 1006 when conditions had significantly improved.
LICENSEE RESPONSE:
At 0922 the Main Steam Isolation System shocked the degrading steam generator tube causing it to completely rupture and increase the primary to secondary leak rate from 60 gpm to over 400 gpm, indicating an uncontrolled loss of reactor coolant system inventory.
Also, there was a release to the atmosphere in progress from a pressure relief valve that had stuck open.
Then at 1000 a
PASS sample report showing RCS activity greater than 300 uCi/gm dose equivalent iodine that provided the third barrier failure/challeng It was noted that there were no NRC inspectors covering the TSC at the time so the PASS sample results may have been unknown to them.
OBSERVATION:
During the Site Area Emergency the Emergency Operations Director (EOD) issued an ultra-conservative PAR to evacuate all sectors out to 5 miles and evacuate Sectors B,C,D, and E out to 10 miles.
Since conditions (less than 50 mr/hr at site boundary) were such that EPA guidelines were projected not to be exceeded,
.this action appears excessive when compared to the usual guidance for this condition requiring 'sheltering within two miles radius and out to 5 miles in the affected sectors.
LICENSEE RESPONSE:
The PAR was based on plant conditions as per Step 3.2 of EPIP-15, which states,
"PARs are based on plant and containment conditions and these recommendations are made even when no release is in progress."
Statements from both the EOD and the Radiological Assessment Coordinator indicate that a conscious decision-making process was used to arrive at the PAR.
This recommendation, although conservative, was appropriate considering the EPZ population density and given the flexibilityintended in EPIP-15, as per Step 3.6, which states,
"At times, selection of protective actions should be considered subjectively as conditions beyond the scope of this procedure may exist."
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