IR 05000528/1988038
| ML17304A849 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1988 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17304A848 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-88-38, 50-529-88-36, 50-530-88-36, TAC-69593, TAC-69594, TAC-69595, NUDOCS 8901090156 | |
| Download: ML17304A849 (79) | |
Text
SALP BOARD REPORT U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE 50-528/88-38, 529/88-36, 530/88-36 ARIZONA NUCLEAP, POWER PROJECT PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION NOVEMBER 1, 1987 THROUGH OCTOBER 31, 1988
$90i090i56
$8i223 PDR ADOCK 0 00052$
lg PDC
I.
Introduction SUMMARY (11/01/87 10/31/88)
Palo Verde Unit 2 Functional Area Ins ections Conducted Inspection*
Percent Hours of Effort Enforcement Items Severity Leve I
II III IV V
A.
Plant Operations B.
Radiological Controls C.
Maintenance/
Surveillance D.
Emergency Prep.
E.
Security F.
Engineering/
Technical Support G.
Safety Assessment/
Quality Verif.
871 291 200 104
156 48.3 16.1 5.8 5.3 8.6 4.8
3
Totals 1804 100.00
3
- Allocations of inspection hours to each functional area are approximations based upon NRC form 766 data.
These numbers do not include inspection hours by NRC contract personnel.
Severity levels are in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C).
No deviations were identified during this SALP period.
,
This violation which resultd in a civil penalty also applies to Unit 1.
One of these violations which resulted in a civil penalty also applies to Units 1 and TABLE 1 INSPECTION ACTIVITIES AND ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY (11/01/87 - 10/31/88)
Palo Verde Unit 3 Functional Area Ins ections Conducted Inspect~on Percent Hours of Effort Enforcement Items Severity Leve I
II III IV V
A.
Plant Operations B.
Radiological Controls C.
Maintenance/
Surveillance 0.
Emergency Prep.
E.
Security F.
Engineering/
Technical Support G.
Safety Assessment/
Quality Verif.
804 224 138 104
129 54.7 15.2 9.4 7.1 3.8 1.0 8.8
1 Totals 1469 100.00
Allocations of inspection hours to each functional area are approximations based upon NRC form 766 data.
These numbers do not include inspection hours by NRC contract personnel.
Severity levels are in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy (10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C).
No deviations were identified during this SALP period.
&
This viol'ation which resulted in a civil penalty also applies to Units
and Table
Pa~oVeo e
Enforcement Items Report Number Subject Severity Functional Level Area Unit I 87-37 87-37 Limitorque valve operators inside containment were not shown to be qualified because of deviations from qualification test specimen configuration.
ANPP files did not adequately document qualification of skinner solenoid valves because design and material differences between the plant equipment and test speciments were not evaluated in detail.
87-40 Radiation areas within the west mechanical penetration access room of the auxiliary building were not conspicuously posted.
87-40 88-01 88-01 88-01 West mechanical penetration access room of the auxiliary building had two areas where the intensity of radiation measured between 100 and 800 mi llirem per hour and were not posted An access door, vital static inverters,thumb screws,and battery spacers were found contrary to their respective drawings. Eyewash station installed without comparison to seismic category
requirements.
Licensee did not consider or make calculations to demonstrate that pressure relief valves were sized to accommodate flows from failure of upstream regulating valves in the fully open position.
A temporary modification that installed tanks to supply-'hypochlorite for emergency spray ponds was completed with an unacceptable written safety evaluation.
88-01 Spacers were missing between battery jars and eyewash stations were installed without revising the calculation isometric drawing and were never compared to seismic category 9 requirements.
88-02 Unit I entered mode 4 and operated for approximately one hour and twenty-five minutes without an operable HPSI pum Table
Palo Verde Enforcement ftems Report Number Subject Severity Functional Level Area 88-03 A copy of the notice of violation involving radiological working conditions received by the licenses was not posted.
B 88-07 88-12 Contrary to tech specs, unit I operated with only two operable independent steam gener ator AFW pumps. Modifications to valves were not reviewed by plant manager or other proper authority.
Contrary to Reg Guide le97, wide range steam generator level instrumentation had a range from 32K to 112% of the range described in the Reg Guide.
88-13 Licensee radwaste shipments were made with loose chain restraints and had shifted during transport as evidenced by loosened or broken bracing.
88-14 Nonconservative operator performance combined with errors in information used to calculate boron concentration resulted in an inadvertent cri'tica 1 ity.
88-15 Protected area portals were not alarmed and monitored as required.
88-18 Contrary to stated requirements, a valve was found to be in the open position following the addition of chemicals to the system.
88-24 88-27 Contrary to specific technical specification requirements while Unit 1 was operating in'Mode 1, both loops of the essential chilled water system were rgpdered'inoperable.
s No wren-safety evaluation addressing the proces's$ ng of radioactive equipment in a trailer recently'onverted into a respiratory processing facility was performed.
88-31 Improper Protection of safeguards information Unit 2 88-02 Unit 2 operated with less than
AFW pumps operable due to the discharge valve on a
pump being close Table
Pa~oVer e
Enforcement Items Report Number 88-07 Subject Operation occurred with only two AFW independent steam generator pumps operable.
Valves were modified without review by the proper individual/group.
Severitv Functional Level Area
G 88-08 A principle gamma emitter analysis performed on a
gas grab sample from waste gas decay tank did not achieve the required LLD.
88-14 Radioactive noble fission product gases were vented from portions of the gaseous radwaste system without prior evaluation of the potential release.
88-22 An enclosed area with a door which was not locked had an intensity of radiation accessible to a
major portion of the body measured up to at least 3 Rem/hr.
Failure to provide an exposure report.
88-26 No written safety evaluation addressing the processing of radioactive equipment in a trailer converted into a respiratory processing facility was performed.
88-22, Occupational radiation exposure in excess of the 26/27 quarterly limit.
Failure to perform radiation surveys.
Failure to implement the ALARA program.
Unit 3 88-18 Valves",.were found to be in the open position following the addition of chemicals to the system.
88-25 No wr')tCen safety evaluation addressing the processing of radioactive equipment in a trailer recently converted into a respiratory processing facility was performed.
88-33 Failure to control access to high radiation area.
- Enforcement action is being considered for this item.
Deviation from regulatory requirement t tl I
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TABLE 3 SYNOPSIS OF PALO VERDE
LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (LERs)
Functional Area SALP Cause Code*
A B
C D
E X
Totals A.
Plant Operations B.
Radiological Controls C.
Maintenance/
Surveillance D.
Emergency Prep.
E.
Security F.
Engineering/
Technical Support G.
Safety Assessment/
Quality Verification
3
2
I I
Total s
1
7 I
The above data are based upon LERs 87-24 through 88-24
.
LERs 88-09, 88-20, and 88-23 will be included in the next SALP assessment period.
LER 84-01 was received during this SALP assessment period.
- Cause, Code A - Personnel Error B - Design, Manufacturing or Installation Error C - External Cause D - Defectivd Procedures E - Component failure X - Other
TABLE 3 SYNOPSIS OF PALO VERDE 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (LERs)
Functional Area SALP Cause Code*
A B
C D
E X
Totals A.
B.
Plant Operations Radiological Controls
1
I I
C.
'aintenance/
Surveillance D.
Emergency Prep.
E.
Security F.
G.
Engineering/
Technical Support Safety Assessment/
equality Verification Totals
2
3 I
The above data are based upon LERs 87-18 through 88-13.
- Cause Code A - Personnel Error B - Design, Manufacturing or Installation Error C - External Cause 0 - Defective Procedures E - Component Failure X - Other
TABLE 3 SYNOPSIS OF PALO VERDE 3 LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (LERs)
Functional Area A.
Plant Operations B.
Radiological Controls C.
Maintenance/
Survei 1 1 ance D.
Emergency Prep.
E.
Security F.
Engineering/
Technical Support G.
Safety Assessment/
equality Verification SALP Cause Code*
A B
C D
E X
1 Totals Totals
1
I The above data are based upon LERs 87-03 through 88-06.
- Cause Code A - Personnel Error B - Design, Manufacturing or Installation Error C - External Cause D - Defective Procedures E - Component Failure X - Other
"*4 C.;
ATTACHMENT 1 ENCLOSURE AEOD INPUT TO SALP REVIEW FOR PALO VERDE Arizona Public Service Company submitted about 52 reports for the three units at Palo Verde, not including updates, in the SALP assessment period from November 1, 1987 to October 31, 1988.
This review fnc1uded the following LER numbers:
Unit
87-025 to 87-028 88-001 to 88-024 Untt 2 87-018 to 87-021 88-001 to 88-012 Untt 3 87-004 to 87-005 88-001 to 88-007 Our findings from the review of these LERs follows:
1.
Abnormal Occurrences There were no abnormal occurrences fn the assessment period.
However, an event that occurred in late October 1987 (just prior to the start of the assessment period) at Unit 1 was identified as an Appendix C item, and reported fn the fourth quarter 1987 Report to Congress.
In the event, ultrasonic testing revealed cracks fn all four reactor coolant pumps (RCPs).
Althouah the failure of one RCP is an analyzed accident, concerns were raised that there could be a potential for multiple RCP shaft failures.
However, addftional analysis concluded that once a crack initiates, the crack propogates slow1y in a circumferential manner over millions of stress cycles.
No LER was submitted for this event.
2.
Sf nfficant 0 rating Events There were four events, each at Unft 1, fn the assessment period that were identified as particularly significant by the ROAB screening and review. process.
These events were:
(a)
LER 88-010,
"Ground Fault in 13.8 KV Bus Causes Fire in Unit Auxiliary Transformer and Reactor Trip," on July 6, 1988; (b)
LER 87-025 "Hodffication to Steam to Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Isolation Valves Render Pump Inoperable,"
dated November 27, 1987; (c)
LER 88-013 "Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Degradation,"
dated March 25, 1988; and (d)
LER 88-022 "Shutdown Cooling Systems Valve Bolting Failure," dated July 25,'98 lt t
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3.
AEOD Technical Stud Re orts There were no events identified at any of the units that were considered sufficiently serious to merit an in-depth. technica1 study by AEOD in this assessment period.
4.
PNs Issued in Assessment Period There were many Preliminary Notification of Event or Unusual Occurrence issued for the three units.
For the PNs that were issued for reportable events, the licensee submitted a
LER for each event, so by this method of verification, the licensee appears to be reporting all events that are required to be reported.
The content of the information in the LER was in substantial agreement with the event as described in the PH, so the licensee appears to be reporting these events accurately.
5.
LER ualit The LER submittals for all units were identical, so this review would be applicable to any of the three units.
The licensee used two format styles in the assessment period; a narrative form prior to about mid-1988 and an outline form subsequently.
Xe found the narrative sty1e to fully comply with the reporting guidelines listed in pages 5 through 7 of NUREG-1022.
All aspects of the event were described in substantial detail and we thought the submittals were uniformly outstanding.
The outline form of LER submittal was an improvement over the previous narrative form.
Qe thought these later LERs were the best of any licensee that we review.
Previous similar occurrences were properly referenced in the LERs as applicable.
The licensee updated several LERs that were promised to be updated in the assessment period.
The updated LERs provided new information and the portion of the report that was revised was denoted by a vertical line in the right hand margin so the new information could be easily determined by the reader.
No reports were submitted on a voluntary basis in the assessment period.
As stated on page 10 of NUPEG-1022, licensees are encouraged to report any event that does not meet reporting criteria, if the licensee believes that the event might be of safety significance, might be of generic interest or concern or contains a lesson to be learned.
6.
Effective Corrective Action There were 43 events at the three units available for imnediate review where a designated root cause had been fully determined for the event.
The casual distribution of these events were:
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Human Factor Deficiency Equipment Failures Spurious Malfunctions Inadequate Plant Design 32 events 8 events 2 events I events 74K 19%
5X 2%
The Human Factor Deficiencies would include:
personnel errors 25 events, inadequate procedures 4 events, bad engineering evaluation, inadequate administrative controls and error in.the work document, I each.
Although there seemed to be a relatively high frequency of human factor deficiencies in the casual pattern of LERs, only one of the events rated as significant by ROAB was caused by cognitive personnel error (LER 87-025).
The root cause of the other three events were equipment failur I
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