IR 05000528/1988014
| ML17304A266 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1988 |
| From: | Ball J, Fiorelli G, Polich T, Richards S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17304A265 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-88-14, 50-529-88-15, 50-530-88-14, NUDOCS 8807190153 | |
| Download: ML17304A266 (29) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
Report Nos:
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
50-528/88-14, 50-529/88-15 and 50-530/88-14.
50-528, 50-529, 50-530 NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74 Licensee:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.
0.
Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ. 85072-2034 Faci lit Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 8 3.
Ins ection Condu ed pr'l 17, throug May 21, 1988.
Inspector:
Inspector:
ol
Re i ent Insp tor enior R sident Inspector dro g
Date Signed 4/yc g'ate Signdd Inspector:
Fior lli, Resident Inspector Date Signed Approved By:
S.
Richards, Chief, Engineering Section Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on A ril 17 throu h Ma
1988 Re ort Number s 50-528/88-14 50"529/88-15 and 50"530/88"14.
Areas Ins ected:
. Routine, onsite, regular and backshift inspection by the three resident inspectors.
Areas inspected included: previously identified -items; review of plant activities; areas observed on plant tours::)operating.logs and records, monitoring instrumentation, shift manning,:,equipment lineups, equipment tagging, general plant equipment conditions, fire protection, plant chemistry, security, plant housekeeping, radiation protection controls; engineered safety feature system walkdowns; surveillance testing; plant maintenance; load rejection and resultant reactor trip; forced outage due to reactor coolant pump oil leak; reactor trip during surveillance test; early criticality; control room observation of criticality; plant modifications; momentary loss of shutdown cooling; bent control element assembly 889 extension shaft; review of startup test results; follow-up licensee event report; review of periodic and special reports.
8807190153
~00052S PDR Al30CK 0-pD
During this inspection the following Inspection Procedures were covered:
25576, 30702, 32700-1, 36301-1, 60710, 61707, 61726, 62703, 62707, 70307, 71707, 71709, 71710, 72600B, 72608B, 72616B, 72624, 72701, 73753, 81034, 90712, 92700, 92703, 93702, 94702.
Results:
Of the 16 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted:
The below listed technical and supervisory personnel were among those contacted:
Arizona Nuclear Power Pro 'ect ANPP
"R. Adney,
"J. Allen, P.
Brandjes, F.
Buckingham,
"R. Butler, W.
Fernow, R.
Gouge, J.
Haynes,
"W. Ide,
"J. Kirby,
"R. Papworth, W. Quinn,
"T. Schriver, G.
Sowers, E.
Van Brunt, Jr.
"R. Younger,
"0. Zeringue, Manager, Plant Standards and Control Plant Manager, Unit 1 Manager, Central Maintenance Operations Manager, Unit 2 Director, Standards and Technical Support Manager, Training Operations Manager, Unit 3 Vice President, Nuclear Production Plant Manager, Unit 2 Director, Site Services Director, Quality Assurance Director, Nuclear Safety 8 Licensing Manager, Compliance Manager, Engineering Evaluations Executive Vice President Operations Manager, Unit 1 Plant Manager, Unit 3 The inspectors also talked with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
"Attended the Exit Meeting on May 27, 1988.
2 ~
Previousl Identified Items Units 1 2 and 3.
Closed Follow-u Item 529/87-12-01:
"Masonr Block Wall Ade uac " - Unit 2.
The licensee completed the reinforcement of the masonry block wall separating the two trains of safety related equipment housed on the basement level of the control building.
Completion of this work was identified as a license condition in the Unit 2 operating license.
This item is closed.
3.
Review of Plant Activities.
a ~
Unit 1 Unit 1 started the inspection period at 100K power.
On April 19, 1988, the reactor tripped from 100K power due to complications from the inadvertent opening of the main generator output breaker.
The reactor was restarted on April 20, 1988, and was synchronized to the grid on April 21,
1988.
The unit remained essentially at 100K power until April 28, 1988 when power was reduced and the unit was shutdown to resolve an oil leak on the 2A Reactor Coolant Pump.
The unit was restarted and synchronized to the grid on April 30, 1988.
The reactor remained at 100K power until May 12, 1988, when a reactor trip occurred during surveillance testing.
The reactor remained shutdown until May 14, 1988.
On May 14, 1988, the reactor was taken critical below the estimated critical condition and outside the transient Power Dependent Insertion Limits.
When rods were reinserted to correct this situation a reactor trip occurred.
On May 16, 1988, the unit was restarted and synchronized to the grid.
Unit 1 operated at essentially 100X power until the end of the report period.
Unit 2 Unit 2 remained shutdown during the period to continue the first refueling outage.
Major work activities completed during the period included the reload of the core, steam generator tube inspections, re-torquing of reactor coolant pump impellers, repair of the bent control element assembly (CEA)
~'xtension rod and cleanup of the upper guide structure (paragraph 14).
Major wor k yet to be completed includes the -
'ontainment integrated leak rate test and the restoration and surveillance testing of plant systems.
Startup originally scheduled for May 12th is now expected in early June, 1988.
Unit 3 Unit 3 operated at essentially full power throughout the inspection period with the exception of approximately three days from April 21 to April 24 when power was reduced to 40K to facilitate routine maintenance of both maih feedwater pumps as well as the main condensers.
Plant Tours The following plant areas at Units 1, 2 and 3 were toured by the inspector during the course of the inspection:
Auxiliary Building Containment Building Control Complex Building Diesel Generator Building Radwaste Building Technical Support Center Turbine Building Yard Area and Perimeter The following areas were observed during the tours:
0 eratin Lo s and Records Records were reviewed against Technical Specification and administrative control procedure requirements.
Monitorin Instrumentation Process instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for con-formance with Technical Specification requirements.
observed for conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.(k),
Technical Specifications, and administrative procedures.
E ui ment Lineu s
Valve and electrical breakers were verified to be in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications and administrative procedures for the applicable plant mode.
This verification included routine control board indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineups.
E ui ment Ta in Selected equipment, for which tagging requests had been initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specified.
sf General Plant E ui ment Conditions Plant equipment was observed for indications of system leakage, improper lubrication, or other conditions that would prevent the system from fulfillingtheir functional requirements.
Fire Protection Fire fighting equipment and controls were observed for conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative procedures.
Plant Chemistr Chemical analysis results were reviewed for conformance with Technical Specifications and admin-istrative control procedures.
~Secorit Activities observed for conformance with regulatory requirements, implementation of the site security plan, and administrative procedures included vehicle and personnel access, and protected and vital area integrity.
Plant Housekee in Plant conditions and material/-
equipment storage were observed to determine the general state of cleanliness and housekeeping.
Housekeeping in the radiologically controlled area was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.
During a tour of the Unit 1 spray pond pump rooms, the inspector noted excessive corrosion of the pump base hold down nuts, power supply conduits and miscellaneous supports.
The corrosion was the result of long term
contact with water leaking from the pump seals.
Unit 1 management was informed of this observation and responded that corrective action would be taken.
The Unit 2 pumps did not have a similar problem and have tygon tubing on the drains to divert any leakage that might occur.
The Unit 3 "A" pump did not show signs of corrosion; however,
~ the "B" pump showed signs of corrosion.
Unit 3 management was informed of this observation and took action to address the problem.
During a tour of the Unit 2 turbine building, the inspector noted spent cigarettes in an area surrounding the disassembled turbine stop valves, an area posted as a
Zone 4 area.
The maintenance foreman who was informed of this observation directed workers to clean up the area.
The licensee has had other recent failures to identify housekeeping or foreign material exclusion practice problems in posted housekeeping zones, as noted in previous inspection reports 528/88-02, Section 7,
(Inoperable Control Element Assembly Unit 1) and 529/88-10, Section 2.d. 10 (Plant Housekeeping).
ll.
Radiation Protection Controls Areas observed included control point operation, records of licensee's surveys within the radiological controlled areas, posting of radiation and high radiation areas, compliance with Radiation Exposure Permits, personnel monitoring devices being properly worn, and personnel frisking practices.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
4.
En ineered Safet Feature S stem Walkdowns - Units 1 2 and 3.
Selected engineered safety feature systems (and systems important to safety)
were walked down by the inspector to confirm that the systems were aligned in accordance with plant procedures.
During the walkdown of the systems, items such as hangers, supports, electrical cabinets, and cables were inspected to determine that they. were operable, and in a condition to perform their required functions.
t Unit-a Vj Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down during this inspection period.
~Setem o Emergency Spray Pond Trains "A" and "B".
o Auxiliary Feedwater System Trains "A" and "B".
o High and Low Pressure Safety Injection System Trains "A" and "B".
Unit 2 Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down during thi s inspecti on peri od.
~Se tern o Emergency Spray Pond Trains "A" and "8".
o Emergency Boration Flowpaths.
Unit 3 Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down during this inspection period.
~Setem o Emergency Spray Pond Trains "A" and "8".
o Auxiliary Feedwater System Trains "A" and "8".
o High and Low Pressure Safety Injection System Trains "A" and "8".
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Testin
- Units
2 and 3.
a.
Surveillance tests required to be performed by the Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed on a sampling basis to verify that:
1) the surveillance tests were correctly included on the facility schedule; 2) a technically adequate procedure existed for performance of the surveillance tests; 3) the surveillance tests had been performed at the frequency specified in the TS; and 4) test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.
b.
Portions of the following surveillances were observed by the inspector during this inspection period:
Unit 1 Procedure Descri tion o 72ST-1RX09 o 36ST-9SB24 m
Unit 2 Shutdown Margin CPC/CEAC Time Response Testing Procedure Descri tion o 42ST-2ZZ19 Routine Surveillance Modes 5-6 Logs
Unit 3 o 36ST-9S802 PPS Bistable Trip Functional Test o 36ST-9SA02 ESFAS Train 8 Subgroup Relay Monthly Functional Test No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
6.
Plant Maintenance
- Units 1 and
During the inspection period, the inspector observed and re-viewed documentation associated with maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, compliance with administrative and maintenance procedures, required gA/gC involvement, proper use of safety tags, proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers, personnel qualifications, and proper retesting.
The inspector verified reportability for these activities was correct.
b.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following maintenance activities:
7>
Unit 1 Descri tion o Troubleshooting Channel
"C" Log Power o Excore Startup Channel Calibration o Replacement of "A" Diesel Generator 5R Fuel Injection Pump Unit 2 Descri tion o Calibration of the Feedwater Control System o Tightening 1A Reactor Coolant Pump Impeller Nut o Calibration of the Reactor Makeup Pump Pressure Loop o Inspection of Upper Guide Structure o Diesel Generator
"B" Fuel Injector Adjustments During the replacement of the Unit 1 "A" Diesel Generator 5R fuel injection pump, the inspector observed gC involvement.
One gC inspector found that the torque specified in the work package could not be performed with the torque wrench available at the job site.
A second gC inspector determined that the nuts on the fuel line did not have the required chamfer.
The nut inspection was performed to comply with a line instruction in the work package requiring a check that the nut design meet the specifications in an Engineering Evaluation Report (EER),
a copy of which was made a part of the work package.
The nut's chamfer design was developed by ANPP engineering to correct previous diesel fuel leaks and line separations from the pumps and injectors.
As a follow-up to the observation, the inspector inspected the spare nuts in the warehouse and noted that the nuts did not have the proper chamfe An investigation conducted by the licensee as to why the unchamfered nuts were stored in and supplied by the warehouse revealed that at the time the chamfer design was developed, all unchamfered nuts which were stored in the warehouse were removed from storage, and quarantined until they could be sent to the machine shop for modification.
At the time, however, a
supply of unchamfered nuts had been issued to the field to be modified at the time of installation.
The surplus nuts were subsequently returned to the warehouse where they were stored for further issuance without having been modified with a chamfer.
The licensee's investigation, which is still ongoing, is intended to identify interface controls and generic problems which will require interdepartmental corrective actions.
The inspector will follow-up on this as part of the routine inspection program.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
7.
Load Re ection and Resultant Reactor Tri Unit l.
On April 19, 1988, Unit 1 experienced a 100K load rejection and a ~ ~
resultant reactor power cutback.
The load rejection occurred when the control room operator opened the Motor Operated Disconnect switch (MOD) PL-910 for the Unit 1 generator, instead of MOD PL-985-920 for startup transformer NAN-X01.
The opening of an MOD under load should not have occurred, since an interlock exists between the disconnect and the associated 525 kv breakers.
Following the load rejection the house loads transfer red from the unit auxiliary transformer to startup transformers NAN-X02 and -X03, as designed.
Approximately thirty seconds after the load rejection, the reactor tripped on low DNBR trip from the core protection calculators (CPC's).
No ESFAS actuations were required or occurred and the trip was classified as an uncomplicated reactor trip.
Further follow-up of this event is pending the submittal of the Licensee Event Report.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
8.
Forced Outa e
Due to Reactor Coolant Pum RCP Oil Leak - Unit 1.
tt On April 28, 1988, Unit 1 was shutdown to determine the cause for an excessive reactor coolant pump 2A motor thrust bearing oil leak.
Upon inspection it was confirmed the oil was leaking from around an oil filter in the RCP oil, system.
The cause for the leak was related to an insufficient thickness in the gasket of the oil filter.
The oil filter was an AC filter normally used in automobile oil systems.
Even though authorized by procedures, the use of the oil filter represented a misuse of that piece of equipment in this applicatio As review of the specifications by the inspector confirmed that the Technical Manual specifies a Purolator No.
PER-1 or equivalent filter.
The AC filters found in spare parts storage were supplied by the pump vendor, Combustion Engineering.
The licensee has quarantined all the AC filters.
Following shutdown, all oil filters at Unit 1 and 2 were checked.
Several filters required replacement.
A check of records at Unit 3 indicated no AC filters were installed in the RCP oil systems.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Reactor Tri Durin Surveillance Test - Unit 1.
On May 12, 1988, while operating at 91K power the Unit 1 reactor tripped.
The sequence of events printout showed the first indications to be Channel
"D" and "A" reactor trip breakers opening.
At the time of the trip, instrumentation and control (I&C) personnel were performing surveillance test 36ST-1SB04, PPS Matrix Relay Testing.
After the reactor was stabilized in Mode 3, the licensee began an investigation into the cause of the trip.
The licensee was able to recreate the trip by reperforming the I&C surveillance-test in progress at the time of the trip.
The licensee found that when tNe relay hold pushbutton was depressed, the action of the matrix relay hold coils was intermittent, apparently due to the intermittent output of the test power supply.
This caused the reactor trip breakers to open.
The relay test utilizes a separate test power supply only during testing to prevent the bistable and matrix relays from actuating.
The licensee previously had indications of instabilities of TODD power supplies.
The licensee replaced the defective power supply (TODD Model ¹SW12"5)
and plans to expedite plans to replace that type of power supply with a more reliable one.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Earl Criticalit - Unit l.
On~May g4, 1988, while conducting a reactor startup of the Unit 1 reactor, criticality was achieved below the Control Element Assembly (CEA)'lower. limit (500 PCM below the estimated critical rod position).
The resident inspector staff responded to the site following this event.
Due to the number of questions which arose in reviewing the event, it is the subject of a Special Inspection Report, 50-528/88-2 ll.
Control Room Observation of Criticalit
- Unit 1.
On May 16, 1988, the inspector observed the reactor startup of the Unit 1 reactor.
The Unit 1 plant manager and operations manager were both present in the Control Room during the startup.
The inspector observed the Reactor Operator at the controls, the Control Room Super visor directing the star tup and the Shift Supervisor, during the approach to criticality.
The evolution was conducted in a professional manner with the Reactor Operator himself checking the accuracy of the estimate critical position before each incremental control element assembly withdrawal.
During the Post Trip Review of the May 14, 1988 reactor trip, a concern was generated due to the integrated rod worth curves (below Regulating Group 3 at 60 inches)
not being included in the Core Data book.
One of the corrective actions to this concern was to require a Reactor Engineer in the Control Room during startups, in all three units, until changes to the Core Data book are completed.
The inspector observed a Reactor Engineer in the Control Room with rod worth data for rod positions below Regulating Group 3 at 60 inches.
However, the inspector did not observe the Reactor Engineer to be in a position to observe the nuclear instrumentation during 7 ~
the startup.
This finding was discussed with licensee upper management who stated the intent of having a Reactor Engineer in the Control Room was to have the individual be able to observe the startup.
The licensee plans to define the Reactor Engineer's duties in a supplement to the Post Trip Review.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
12.
Plant Modifications - Unit 2.
The inspector reviewed Unit 2 plant modifications which involved hardware changes and related Technical Specification changes, resulting from outage work.
No hardware modifications involving Technical Specification changes were required.
Technical Specification changes resulting from outage work were associated with process modifications such as the moderator temperature coefficient, l,-inear heat rate allowable limit, and shutdown margin, all-due to the"'core reload.
The inspector verified that the p'rocedures affected by these changes had been identified by the 1;icensee and that changes were in progress.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
13.
Momentar Loss of Shutdown Coolin
- Unit 2.
On April 12, shutdown cooling was momentarily lost during the performance of the portion of surveillance test 36ST-9SI05,
"Safety Injection/Shutdown Cooling System Instrumentation Surveillance Test Train B," related to the automatic opening of the safety injection tank (SIT) isolation valves (valves open when primary pressure exceeds 515 psia).
At this pressure, not only do the SIT isolation
valves automatically open, but the outside containment shutdown cooling loop valves close to prevent over pressurization of the attached piping systems.
An operator observing the board in the control room noted that shutdown cooling valve SIB-UV-656 was closing and responded by tripping the "B" LPSI pump.
Within one minute, the operator reopened the valve and restarted the pump.
The leads of valve SIB-UV-656, which had been disconnected at the start of the outage to prevent closure, were relanded as part of the surveillance procedure, which not only tested the SIT tank isolation valve operation, but also tested the automatic closure feature of the shutdown cooling valves when primary pressure increases to greater than 500 psia.
The technician after having landed the leads, failed to check with the control room to confirm that power was removed from the shutdown cooling loop valves before introducing the test signal.
The licensee's review of the matter concluded that personnel error was involved.
Factors involving procedure clarity also contributed to the incident.
The licensee is taking action to correct the problem.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
V Bent Control Element Assembl CEA
¹89 Extension Shaft - Unit 2.
On April 17, 1988, Unit 2 was proceeding with the normal installation and reassembly of the reactor vessel internals following the reload of the core.
The Upper Guide Structure (UGS)
had already been set into the vessel and the CEAs were being lowered into the core, when the mechanics noted that the extension shaft for CEA ¹89 was buckling.
The operation was immediately halted.
Inspection of the damage with binoculars and a video camera revealed that the affected CEA spider had contacted the guide fingers of the UGS'op hat, preventing further insertion of CEA ¹89.
Subsequent lowering of the CEA liftsupport plate assembly caused the extension shaft to buckle because the CEA extension shaft was constrained at each end; the top by the extension shaft Self Latching Mechanism-(SLM) at the CEA lift support plate assembly, and the bottom end by the',CEA spider which was caught on the UGS top hat guide fingers.
An.'investigation into the matter revealed that on April 14, 1988, Work Order ¹00289787 was approved to rotate the SLM for CEA ¹89 one hundred and twenty degrees to facilitate access to the mechanism.
This work was completed on April 14, 1988.
When the rotation work was performed, the CEA spider was approximately 2 feet above the UGS top hat.
The rotation of the SLM resulted in the rotation of the CEA extension shaft as well as the CEA spider since the extension shaft wah coupled to the SLM.
The CEA fingers were partially inserted into their guide tubes between the UGS support plate and the fuel alignment plat Discussion with personnel involved in the development of the work package revealed that a conscious decision had been made to not consider the rotation of the SLM as a design change based on a
review of procedures and drawings, which did not specify any defined or special orientation of the SLM.
When asked if any special consideration was given to the rotation of the extension shaft, which could possibly occur when the SLM was rotated, the individual acknowledged he did not consider the matter.
An installation procedure, used as the guide in the development of work instructions for rotating the SLM, did not consider the matter either.
This procedure dealt with the installation of the SLM with the extension shaft uncoupled.
Discussions with the maintenance personnel who rotated the SLM revealed that they were aware that the extension shaft did twist slightly when the SLM was rotated.
They believed, however, that the spider was positioned in the top hat guide, consequently the spider would always be aligned.
They did not realize the spider was positioned above the top hat when the SLM was rotated, thus allowing the assembly to misalign.'he top hat fingers allow passage of the CEA spider only when the spider is correctly aligned to the top hat.
The bent extension shaft was removed and replaced with a new shaft.'nspection of the spider, top hat fingers and tips of the CEA fingers were conducted using an underwater camera.
No damage was
'oted.
During the removal of the bent shaft, chips which were produced by the cutting operation were spilled onto the top hat and UGS while removing the plastic which was used to catch the chips.
Inspections and cleanup effort of the quadrant of the top hat and UGS encompassing CEA 889 were conducted.
Based on cleaning and inspection efforts, the licensee was confident that all of the stray chips had been removed from the top hat and UGS.
The licensee has been requested by Region V to document why the loss of control of the cutting chips will have no adverse effect on plant operation and to submit this evaluation to the NRC prior to Unit 2 returning to operation.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Review of Startu Test Results - Unit 3.
During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the Startup Report, prepared and submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9. 1.2 of Appendix A to the Palo Verde Unit 3 Operating License.
This report contains the test results of Fuel Load, Post-Core Hot Functional Testing, Initial Criticality, Low-Power Physics Testing, and Power Ascension Testing.
In particular, the inspector reviewed the results of testing conducted at various power levels up to full power, which were performed as a
part of the power ascension phase of the licensee's test program.
The inspector verified that tests were properly completed as described in the facility safety analysis report, that test
exceptions were properly addressed and that summary data was reported as required.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
16.
Follow-u Licensee Event Re ort LER
- Units 1 2 and 3.
The following LERs associated with operating events were reviewed by the inspector.
Based on the information provided in the report it was concluded that reporting requirements had been met, root causes had been identified, and corrective actions were appropriate.
The below listed LERs are considered closed based on either in-office review or inspection follow-up previously performed and documented in a prior inspection report.
Unit 1:
87-16-01, 87-18-01, 87-27, 87-27-01, 87-27-02, 88-01, 88"03, 88-04, 88-06, 88-07.
Unit 2:
87-21-01, 88-02, 88-03, 88-04, 88-05, 88-05-01.
Unit 3:
87-04, 88-03, 88-04.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
17.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts Units 1 2 and 3.
Periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9. 1 and 6.9 '
were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
the report contained the information required to be reported by NRC require-ments; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and the validity of the reported information.
Within the scope of the above, the following reports were reviewed by the inspector.
Unit 1 o
Monthly Operating Report for March and April, 1988.
Unit: 2 o.
Monthly Operating Report for March and April, 1988.
Unit 3 o
Monthly Operating Report for March and April, 1988.
o Startup Report (See Section 15).
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identifie The inspector met with licensee management representatives period-ically during the inspection and held an exit on May 27, 1988.
During the exit meeting, the inspector discussed recent operating experiences involving personnel error, emphasizing the need for greater attention to detail and additional management attentio ~ )
~