IR 05000528/1988010
| ML17303B137 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 05/05/1988 |
| From: | Ball J, Fiorelli G, Polich T, Richards S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17303B136 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-88-10, 50-529-88-10, 50-530-88-10, IEIN-87-034, IEIN-87-34, NUDOCS 8805260011 | |
| Download: ML17303B137 (29) | |
Text
0 U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos:
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
Licensee:
50-528/88-10, 50-529/88-10 and 50-530/88-10.
50-528, 50-529, 50-530 NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74 Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.
0.
Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ. 85072-2034 Ins ection Conducted:
March 6 through April 16, 1988.
Inspectors:
,
S niov essdent nspector Date Signed esident In ctor G: Fio i, Resi ent spector Date Signed Date Signed Approved By:
S.
ards, Chic ngineerin Sect>on Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on March 6 throu h A ril 16 1988 Re ort Numbers 50-528/88-10 50-529/88-10 and 50-530/88-10.
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, onsite, regular and backshift inspection by the three resident inspectors'reas inspected included:
review of plant activities, plant tours, operating logs and records, monitoring instrumentation, shift manning, equipment lineups, equipment tagging, general plant equipment conditions, five protection, plant chemistry, security, plant housekeeping, radiation protection controls, and control room annunciators, engineered safety feature system walkdowns, surveillance testing, plant maintenance, initial criticality and low power physics testing following refueling outage, auxiliary feedwater pump failure, refueling activities, integrated safeguards testing, inservice inspection, piping support and restraint systems, operations support, Information Notice 87-34, work control, and review of periodic and special reports.
8305260011 330510 PDR ADOCK 05000528 DCD
During this inspection the following Inspection Procedures were covered:
30702, 30703, 36301, 37700-2, 60705, 60710, 61701, 61710, 61720, 61726, 62703, 70307, 70370, 71707, 71707-1, 71709, 71010, 71711, 71881, 72700, 72701, 73753, 86700, 92700, 92701, 92703 and 94600.
Results:
Of the fourteen areas inspected, no violations were identifie DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted:
The below listed technical and supervisory personnel were among those contacted:
Arizona Nuclear Power Pro 'ect ANPP AJ L.
F.
"R.
B.
W.
R.
AJ
"W.
AJ AR
~W AT G.
- D R.
5'O Al 1 en, Brown, Buckingham, Butler, Cederquist, Fernow, Gouge, Haynes, Ide, Kirby, Papworth, Quinn, Schri ver, Sowers, Stover, Van Brunt, Jr.
Younger, Zeringue, Plant Manager, Unit 1 Manager, Radiation Protection and Chemistry Operations Manager, Unit 2 Director, Standards and Technical Support Manager, Chemical Services Manager, Training Operations Manager, Unit 3 Vice President, Nuclear Production Plant Manager, Unit 2 Director, Site Services Director, Quality Assurance Director, Nuclear Safety 5 License Manager, Compliance Manager, Engineering Evaluations Manager, Nuclear Safety (Acting)
Executive Vice President Operations Manager, Unit 1 Plant Manager, Unit 3 The inspectors also talked with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
"Attended the Exit Meeting on April 21, 1988.
2.
Review of Plant Activities.
a.
Unit 1 Unit 1 was brought critical on March 5, 1988.
While in Mode 2, readings on one channel of reactor coolant pump (RCP)
1 8 vibration monitoring instrumentation was observed to be erratic.
The licensee commenced a reactor shutdown on March 7, 1988, entered Mode 3 and stopped the affected pump.
After it was determined that a loose wire was the cause of the erratic vibration readings the pump was restarted and on March 8, 1988, the unit again entered Mode 2 to continue startup testing.
After startup testing was completed, the unit ran at 100K power through the end of the inspection period.
b.
Unit 2 Unit 2 continued the first refueling outage throughout the period.
Work activities accomplished included the off-load of
the fuel from the reactor vessel, removal and rework of the reactor coolant pump (RCP) shafts, ultrasonic testing of all fuel bundles, completion of emergency diesel/generator inspections and engineered safeguards testing, and installation of the control element assembly extension rod guide assembly on top of the upper guide structure.
Major activities remaining include RCP reassembly, steam generator tube inspections, containment integrated leak rate testing, and core reloading.
Startup is expected late May, 1988.
Unit 3 Unit 3 operated essentially at full power throughout the inspection period.
Plant Tours The following plant areas at Units 1, 2 and 3 were toured by the inspector during the course of the inspection:
Auxiliary Building Containment Building Control Complex Building Oiesel Generator Building Radwaste Building Technical Support Center
'Turbine Building Yard Area and Perimeter The following areas were observed during the tours:
l.
0 eratin Lo s and Records:
Records were reviewed against Technical Specification and administrative control pro-cedure requirements.
2.
Monitorin Instrumentation:
Process
'instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for con-formance with Technical Specification requirements.
3.
Shift Manning:
Control room and shift manning were observed for conformance with 10 CFR 50.54. (k), Technical Specifications, and administrative procedures.
4..
E ui ment Lineu s:
Valve and electrical breakers were verified to be in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications and Administrative procedures for the applicable plant mode.
This verification included routine control board indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineups.
5.
E ui ment Ta ing:
Selected equipment, for which tagging requests had been initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specifie General Plant E ui ment Conditions:
Plant equipment was observed for indications of system leakage, improper lubrication, or other conditions that would prevent the system from fulfillingtheir functional requirements.
Fire Protection:
Fire fighting equipment and controls were observed for conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative procedures.
Plant Chemistr:
Chemical analysis results were reviewed for conformance with Technical Specifications and admin-istrative control procedures.
~Securit:
Activities observed for conformance with regulatory requirements, implementation of the site security plan, and administrative procedures including vehicle and personnel access, and protected and vital area integrity.
Plant Housekee ing:
Plant conditions and material/-
equipment storage were observed to determine the general state of cleanliness and housekeeping.
Housekeeping in the radiologically controlled area was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.
Specifically, the inspector toured the Zone III housekeeping area in Unit 2 containment and found grease and dirt in the corner of the Upper Guide Structure (UGS)
pit, a wood sliver in a tool rack in the UGS pit, and a
self locking nut on the top of the reactor vessel head.
The reactor vessel head was in place at the time of the inspector's tour.
Additionally, the Zone III control point personnel did not log any of these items removed from the area until prompted by the inspector to do so.
These findings were particularly vexing do to the problems with material'ontrol that have recently occurred on Unit l.
Radiation Protection Controls:
Areas observed included control point operation, records of licensee's surveys within the radiological controlled areas posting of radiation and high radiation areas, compliance with Radiation Exposure Permits, personnel monitoring devices being properly worn, and personnel frisking practices.
Specifically during this inspection period, the inspector found cigarette butts and matches on the Auxiliary Building roof of all three units.
These conditions were observed multiple times.
Also, wrappers from cookies and cough drops were observed in the same areas during various tours of the are The Auxiliary Building roofs are within the Radiologically Controlled areas of the units.
The potential for internal contamination was discussed with licensee unit management and upper management.
Various actions are in place or planned at the three units to deal with the problem.
Violating radiological control procedures and the potential for internal contamination of workers is of concern and the licensee's actions will be monitored closely by the Resident Inspectors and Regional based inspectors.
12.
Control Room Annunciators:
During tours of the Unit 1 control room the inspectors have noted various annunciators being left in fast flash.
Leaving annunciators in this condition disables any audible re-annunciation by the same or other inputs.
The inspector brought this to the attention of upper management who reiterated their position that leaving annunciators in fast flash was unacceptable.
During tours of Unit 3 control room the inspectors have not observed the practice of leaving annunciators in fast flash.
Additionally, bogus annunciators appear to be more aggressively pursued by Unit 3 operators and management.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
3.
En ineered Safet Feature S stem Walkdowns - Units 1 2 and 3.
Selected engineered safety feature 'systems (and systems important to safety) were walked down by the inspector to confirm that the systems were aligned in accordance with plant procedures.
During the walkdown of the systems, items such as hangers, supports, electrical cabinets, and cables were inspected to determine that they were operable, and in a condition to perform their required functions.
Unit 1 Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down during this, inspection period.
~Sstem o
Auxiliary Feedwater System, Trains "A" and "B".
o Emergency Diesel Generator, Trains "A" and "8".
Unit 2 Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down during this inspection perio ~Setem o
Shutdown Cooling, Trains "A" and "8".
o Emergency Diesel/Generator, Train "A".
o Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System, Train "A".
Unit 3 Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down during this inspection period.
~Sstem o
Auxiliary Feedwater System, Trains "A" and "8".
o Emergency Diesel Generators, Trains "A" and "8".
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Surveillance Testin Units 1 2 and 3.
a ~
Surveillance tests required to be performed by the Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed on a sampling basis to verify that:
1) the surveillance tests were correctly included on the facility schedule, 2) a technically adequate procedure existed for performance of the surveillance tests, 3) the surveillance tests had been performed at the frequency specified in the TS, and 4) test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.
b.
Portions of the following surveillances were observed by the inspector during this inspection period:
Unit 1 Procedure Descri tion 36ST-9SB12 Unit 2 Safety Channel Calormetric Compensation.
Procedure Descri tion 73ST" 9CL01 Containment Leakage Type "8" and "C" Testing (Valves CHV 854, NCV118, and CPUV-4A).
42ST-2ZZ35 RMS Surveillance Modes 5-6 Logs.
73ST-2DG01 73ST-2DG02 Class 1E Diesel Generators Integrated Safeguards Surveillanc Unit 3 36ST-3SE06 Log Power Functional Test 43ST-3AF01 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump AFN-P01 Operability.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
5.
Plant Maintenance - Units 1 2 and 3.
a.
During the inspection period, the inspector observed and re-viewed documentation associated with maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, compliance with administrative and maintenance procedures, required gA/gC involvement, proper use of safety tags, proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers, proper personnel qualifications, and proper retesting.
The inspector verified reportability for these activities was correct.
b.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following maintenance acti vities:
Unit 1 Descri tion o
Troubleshooting Control Problem With CEA ¹86.
o Train "B" Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rotating Element Replacement.
Unit 2 Descri tion Repair of ¹2 Steam Generator
"C" Channel Level Setpoint Drift Problem.
Reassembly of Main Steam Isolation Valve SG-UV-180.
Calibration of ¹1 Steam Generator Level Instrumentation Loop SG-LT-1113.
Installation of the Upper Guide Structure Control Element Assembly Guide.
Magnetic Particle Testing of Reactor Coolant Pump Bolt,
Unit 3 Descri tion o
Troubleshooting of Train "B" Containment Hydrogen Analyzer.
o Inspection of Reactor Trip Switchgear in Accordance With Requirements of NRC Bulletin 88-01.
o Preventive Maintenance Inspection of Control Room Train
"B" Essential Air Handling Unit Outside Air Supply Dampener.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
6.
Initial Criticalit and Low Power Ph sics Testin Followin Refuelin Outa e - Unit l.
The inspector confirmed that key tests had been performed prior to, or. were scheduled to be performed after achievement of initial criticality of Unit 1 after its first refueling outage.
Before plant startup the inspector performed a walkdown of both trains of auxiliary feedwater, high pressure and low pressure safety injection and the Train "B" emergency diesel generator.
Prior to witnessing initial criticality, the inspector reviewed procedure 72PY-9RX01,
"Reload Criticality and Low Power Physics Tests" and attended a crew briefing conducted by the reactor engineering group.
The inspector observed the approach to criticality to be performed in a controlled manner in accordance with approved procedures.
The inspector subsequently observed low power physic tests including the determination of boron worths, control rod worths and moderate temperature coefficient of reactivity.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Auxiliar Feedwater Pum Failure - Unit l.
On March 25, 1988, during the performance of the monthly surveillance test 'for operability of the Train "B" safety-related motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the pump was found to be unable to develop the required minimum pressure differential across the pump.
The pump was declared inoperable and the licensee entered a 72-hour Technical Specification action statement on pump operability.
The pump involved is an eight stage centrifugal pump with horizontal split case supplied by Bingham-Wi lliamette.
Upon disassembly of the pump, it was found that the fourth stage impeller had become free of the shaft.
As an immediate response, the licensee replaced the failed rotating assembly with a spare assembly and the pump was returned to an operable status; A root cause analysis of the failure was also initiated by the licensee.
The inspector considered this failure to be significant in that it was the second -such failure of a pump of this particular design experienced by the licensee.
The previous failure occurred with the
I l
nonsafety related motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump in Unit l.
In both case it appears that a thrust brushing separating the eighth and fourth stages of the pump came free of the shaft subsequently boring itself through the fourth stage impeller.
The thrust bushing is normally both shrunk fit and keyed to the shaft.
To date the licensee's investigation has included metallurgical analysis of the thrust bushing which exhibited cracking in the area of the keyway, review of pump operating history, a review of industry experience with similar pumps and disassembly and inspection of both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps in Unit 2.
At present the licensee in conjunction with the pump vendor believe the cause of failure to be a combination of parts material selection and pump operating history.
In particular, system hydraulic instabilities which were experienced with the auxiliary feedwater system during startup testing in Unit 1 which were later rectified by changes in the mini-flow rates of the pumps is viewed as a primary contributor to the pumps failure.
Inspections of the Unit 2 pumps identified no discrepancies which the licensee attributes in part to the system instability problems having been rectified prior to Unit 2 startup.
The inspector will continue to follow the licensee's investigation into the pump fai lure and corrective actions taken.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Refuelin Activities - Unit 2.
During the current outage the inspector observed several outage related activities in progress.
These included the off-loading of the fuel from the reactor vessel, the storage of the elements in the spent fuel pool, the ultrasonic testing of the off-loaded fuel and the reconstitution of failed bundles.
In each of the activities, the inspector observed that staff members performing the operations were knowledgeable of the equipment and procedures, housekeeping and material storage was proper, staffing levels were proper and in accordance with Technical Specifications and the testing of refueling and inspection equipment was effective.
During the removal of the fuel from the reactor vessel, the inspector observed that the controls required by procedure 72IC-2RX03, "Core Reloading" were being implemented properly.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Inte rated Safe uards Testin
- Unit 2.
During the current outage the licensee performed the emergency diesel/generator and integrated safeguards testing required by Technical Specifications.
The inspector observed portions of testing of both engineered safety features trains and noted that the tests were performed using approved test procedures 73ST-2DG01 and 73ST-2DG02 "Class 1E Diesel Generator and Integrated Safeguards Surveillance Test", Train "A" and Train "B" respectively.
The tests were performed by experienced test engineers who had performed the
tests at Unit 1.
Recordings of equipment alignments were documented prior to the test as well as after each safeguards actuation.
The testing and operations staff appeared well coordinated.
No difficulties were noted by the inspector.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Inservice Ins ection - Unit 2.
The inspector observed the implementation of the licensee's inservice inspection program.
Specific inspections observed included the Ultrasonic Testing (UT) and Magnetic Particle Testing (MT) of reactor coolant pump bolts and the eddy current testing of steam generator tubes.
The inspector confirmed that the valid certifications existed for the technicians performing the testing and reviewing the test data.
The sample size of the reactor coolant pump bolts and steam generator tubes exceeded the licensee's program commitments and Technical Specification requirements.
Procedures governing UT, MT and visual inspections were also confirmed to be approved.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
Pi in Su ort and Restraint S stem Ins ections - Unit 2.
During the current outage the licensee conducted inspections and functional tests of snubbers in accordance with Technical Specification surveillance requirement 4.7.9.
The licensee used the functional test plan described in paragraph 4. 7. 9 e (2) of the Technical Specification.
The inspector observed the testing of one of the snubbers.
The tests incorporated the use of the Paul-Monroe Stadas test machine which is computerized to test, display and record break-away forces in tension and compression, drag forces in tension and compression, and acceleration in tension and compression.
The inspector confirmed that an approved surveillance procedure governing the inspections and functional testing being used was in accordance with the provisions of the Technical Specification.
The inspector also reviewed a random selection of test reports and inspection reports of snubbers and noted the required information arid. con'clusions of operability appeared appropriate.
During tours of"..th'e plant by the inspector, observations of numerous pipe supports did not reveal any signs of degradation or damage.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
0 erations Su ort - Unit 2.
As a result of the recent plant reorganization, several lead operator positions in the Unit 2 Operations Support organization were needing to be filled.
Licenses are not required by individuals holding these positions, consequently two of the positions were
filled (acting capacity)
by two technicians from the plant chemistry organization.
Both had previous nuclear Navy experience.
The inspector was informed from discussions with the Unit 2 operations support shift supervisor that the operations support staff including the lead operators are required to successfully complete a qualification program.
The two referenced lead operators are in the process of doing so.
In addition the inspector was informed that a new qualification program is currently being developed and will soon be implemented.
This new program which incorporates INPO's task oriented format recommendations should increase the qualification performance of the staff.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
l3.
Information Notice 87-34 Sin le Failures In Auxiliar Feedwater S stems AFWS
.
This Information Notice provides an alert to licensees to the potential for single failures of auxiliary feedwater pump starts and protective pump trip circuitry that could cause partial or complete loss of capability to supply auxiliary feedwater.
A design review of the circuitry conducted by the ANPP Nuclear Engineering Instrumentation and Control Group revealed no evidence that a single failure could prevent the AFWS from performing as designed.
This matter is closed for all 3 units.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
14.
Work Control During this inspection period several work activities were poorly planned and performed resulting in potential injury to personnel, unexpected actuations of safety systems, and potential equipment problems.
a.
On February 28, 1988, clearance 88-00340 to tagout the Unit 2 steam generator secondary side was initiated.
On March 2,
<<1988, a Technical review and Authorization to perform work associated with work order 232910 was added to the clearance.
The Work Order was for a check valve down stream of the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine steam supply valves.
Subsequently on March 7, 1988, the clearance was accepted so that work could be performed.
On March 13, 1988 clearance 88-00508 to tagout the steam supply valves to auxiliary feedwater pump turbine to work a down stream check valve was initiated and the tags were hung.
This clearance was never accepte On March 17, 1988 clearance 88-00508 was in the process of being removed when the auxiliary operator (AO) observed the check valve was disassembled and removal of the clearance would not isolate the work in progress.
The AO was instructed by the shift supervisor to rehang the clearance.
On March 21, 1988, clearance 88-00508 was removed because it had never been signed onto or accepted, was interfering with the performance of integrated safeguards testing, and clearance 88-00340 had been accepted for work on the check valve.
The licensee's review of this situation indicated that clearance 88-00340 was inadequate to perform the work on check valve SG"V043 and clearance 88-00508 was adequate for the scope of work.
The inspector concurs with these conclusions.
The technical review, authorization, and acceptance of clearance 88-00340 were found to be inadequate.
The failure to initiate actions more than rehanging the tags for clearance 88-00508 on March 17, 1988, after identifying an inadequate clearance and the subsequent removal of clearance 88-,00508 on March 21, 1988, appears to be a gross inattention to control of work.
After clearance 88-00508 was removed integrated safeguards testing was performed.
This testing caused the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine steam supply valves to cycle.
When the valves opened nitrogen from the nitrogen blanket on the steam generator secondary side flowed through the steam supply valves and out the disassembled check valve SG-V043 into the room.
With the room ventilation secured to perform work nitrogen levels increased.
On'arch 22, 1988, two workers entered the area to perform work and felt acute signs of physical discomfort which was attributed to low oxygen levels.
The potential for serious injury to personnel further exacerbates the previously mentioned concerns.
On March 27, 1988, while performing a downpowering of the Unit 2 BOP-ESFAS (Balance of Plant - Engineered Safety Features Actuation System) cabinet the following actuations were initiated:
Containment Pur ge Isolation Control Room Essential Filtration Fuel Building Essential Ventilation Control Room Ventilation Isolation CPIAS CRVIAS FBEVAS CRVIAS These actuations were not expected by the control room personnel and the document which controlled the evolution (Work Order 279385) did not adequately address the effects of downpowering the "B" train BOP-ESFAS cabinet.
The inspectors investigation indicated that several operators have addressed the need to proceduralize this evolution.
The licensee is still in the process of performing a special plant engineering evaluation report (SPEER)
on this even The safety significance of this evolution was mitigated due to the plant configuration Mode 6 with all fuel off-loaded.
However, a refueling purge was in progress at the time of the actuation of the CPIAS which was reset within four minutes.
On April 6, 1988, Unit 3 experienced a loss of one of two offsite power sources as a result of startup transformer X01 relaying out due to tripping of the transformer's differential current protective device.
The tripping of the protection relay was determined to have been caused by testing of current transformers on the Unit 2 output side of the transformer.
The testing of the current transformers was being conducted under an approved work order issued by the licensee's central maintenance organization.
A review by the licensee of the circumstances surrounding this incident indicate that the work order lacked necessary caution statements which could have
'alerted the Unit 3 operations staff of the potential loss of the startup transformer during the planned testing allowing the source of offsite power to the Unit 3 Train "B" essential bus to be transferred to an alternate source.
This is considered to be another example of poor work planning on the part of the licensee.
The licensee determined that the Unit 2 reactor coolant pump (RCP) impeller shaft nuts were undertorqued.
This occurred due to an error made 'in transcribing the calibration data from the hyto0q arm GU-5524.
The hytorq arm calibration label read
.722 ft.-lbs:
1 psi; however, the ratio was recorded as
.722 psi:
1 ft.-lbs. in the maintenance procedure.
Due to the inaccessibility of the hytorq arm calibration sticker during the torquing process the sticker was not visually observed by the guality Control (gC) inspectors observing the torquing of RCP 1A, 1B and 2A.
The gC inspectors did review the calculations verifying the pressure which was incorrect and subsequently observed this pressure on the pressure gauge.
When the gC inspector observing RCP 1B torquing found the calibration tag illegible he reviewed the calibration issue record only finding the ratio to be.722:1.
He calculated a
higher "correct" pressure.
The inspector then asked another gC inspector to independently. calculate the pressure; the second inspector calculated a lower "incorrect" pressure.
At that time an operations engineer was contacted, he also calculated the lower "incorrect" pressure and the torquing resumed at the lower pressure.
This incorrect value was approximatly 50K less than correct value.
On April 9, 1988, an illegible calibration sticker again prompted a
gC inspector to ask for the calibration ratio of the hytorq arm torquing of the RCP hold down bolts.
The Central Maintenance foreman involved with the original impeller shafts nut torquing observed the pressure being applied and thought the bolts were being overtorqued.
Further discussions revealed that the RCP hold down bolts were correctly torqued; however, all the RCP impeller nuts were undertorqued.
This problem was
turned over to Operations Engineering who initiated Engineering Evaluation Request 88-RC-090.
The licensee plans to retorque the RCP impeller shaft nuts to the correct value.
Further corrective actions and root cause analysis continues.
While each of the above examples was identifed by the licensee and corrective actions were initiated to correct the individual occurrences, the generic problem of independent review and thoroughness of reviews in the planning and performance of work does not currently appear to be adequately addressed by management or control systems.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
15.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts - Units
2 and 3.
Periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9. 1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
the report contained the information required to be reported by NRC require-ments; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and the validity of the reported information.
Within the scope of the above, the following reports were reviewed by the inspector:
Unit 1 o
Monthly Operating Report for February, 1988.
o Special Report 1-SR-88-003 "Valid Diesel Generator Failure on March 4, 1988".
Report 1-SR-88-003 noted that the root cause of the improper breaker operation has been initiated and not yet determined.
This item will remain open pending a determination of the root cause of the failure and the subsequent corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence (88-10-01).
Unit 2 o
Monthly Operating Report for February, 1988.
Unit 3 o
Monthly Operating Report for February, 1988.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
The inspector met with licensee management representatives period-ically during the inspection and held an exit on April 21, 1988.
During the exit meeting, the inspector discussed recent operating
experiences involving personnel error emphasizing the need for greater attention to detail and management attentio