IR 05000482/1979018
| ML19262C472 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1979 |
| From: | Oberg C, Tapia J, Tomlinson D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19262C470 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-79-18, NUDOCS 8002140044 | |
| Download: ML19262C472 (11) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report No. STN 50-482/79-18 Docket No. STN 50-482 Category A2 Licensee:
Kansas Gas and Electric Company Post Office Box 208 Wichita, Kansas 67201 Facility Name: Wolf Creek, Unit No. 1 Inspection at: Wolf Creek Site, Burlington, Kansas Inspection conducted:
October 22-25, 1979 (Wolf Creek Site) and October 26, 1979 (Meeting with management in Wichita, Kansas)
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Inspectors:
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p C. R. Oberg, Reac r Inspector, Projects Section Ifate'
(Paragraphs 1, 2,
, 4, 9, 10, 11)
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12 20 7'1
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J. 1. papia,'Reacto[jInspector, Engineering Support i Datie Se ti an (ParagrapfM 2, 7, 8)
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D' 'P. Tomhisos,~ Keactor Inspector, Engineering Support Date Section (Paragraphs 5 & 6)
Other Accompanying Personnel (October 26, 1979 only)
W. C. Seidle, Chief, Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch W. A. Crossman, Chief, Projects Section O
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Approved:
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k W. A. Crossman, Chief, Projects Section Date r
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.x R. E. Hall, Chief, Engineering Suppart Section Date
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Inspection Summary Inspection on October 22-25, 1979 (Report No. STN 50-482/79-18)
Areas Inspected:
Licensee action on previous inspection findings; ultimate heat sink (UHS) dam; ESW backfill; and safety related piping.
Construction deficiency reports (10 CFR 50.55(e) matters) and other licensee reporting requirements were discussed during a meeting with KG&E management.
The inspection involved sixty inspector-hours by three NRC inspectors and two Region IV supervisors.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were disclosed.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees
- Wilson K. Cadman, President, KG&E
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- Glenn L. Koester, Vice-President, Operations
- R. Rives, Vice President, System Senior
- R. B. Foster, General Counsel
- R. C. Hagen, Director of Plant Services
- G. P. Rathbun, Senior Licensing Engineer
- W. B. Wood, Attorney
- H. R. Macklin, Superintendent of Production, Fossil Plants
- M. L. Johnson, Director, Plant Engineering
- B. N. Ruddick, Vice-President, Engineering
- G. L. Fouts, Construction Manager, Wolf Creek Site
- E. W. Creel, Director, Quality Assurance
- J. L. Sippel, Assistant Project Enginecr, KCPL
- W. R. Seiple, Resident Geotechnical Representative, Dames & Moore
- W. A. Eales, Jr., Senior QA Engineer
- D. W. Prigel, Assistant QA Manager, Site
- R. M. Stambaugh, QA Engineer
- R. D. Brown, Site Representative, SNUPPS
- J. P. Burns, Lead A/E Director, SNUPPS Staff Daniel International Corporation (Daniel) Personnel
- W. E. H1. t, Project Manager T. C. Nesman, Mechanical Engineering Supervisor A. Jantz, Area Mechanical Engineer P. Sturgil, QA Engineer M. Hotateson, Area Engineer E. D. Kelly, General Foreman R. E. Campbell, QA Engineer T. Damashek, QC Engineer T. Baker, Technical Superintendent - Concrete F. Cherry, Concrete Superintendent C. Griffin, Concrete Placement Superintendent The IE inspector also talked with and interviewed other licensee employees and contractor personnel including members of the QA/QC and engineering staffs.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
- Denotes those attending meeting on October 26, 1979.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance Item (STN 50-482/78-11): Failure to Have Fork Lift Loading Certification. Maximum load certifications for fork lift trucks manufactured by Yale (6000 lb. max.) and Pettibone-Alabama Corporation (High-Lift 5000 lb. max.) were reviewed by the IE inspector. These are in place and in view of the fork lift operator.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (STN 50-482/79-12): Essential Service Water (ESW) System Bedding Material.
Correspondence regarding analysis of the acceptability of the ESW system bedding material as discussed in paragraph 7.b of this report was inspected.
Based on three analyses which indicated acceptability of the backfill material, this matter is considered resolved.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (STN 50-482/79-17):
Placing of Reinforcing Steel in Reactor Containment Building Wall.
The licensee issued a Nonconformance Report (ISN 1268C) on September 20, 1979, on the field bending of rebar shear ties beyond fabrication tolerances.
This was reviewed by Bechtel.
They agreed with the recommendation by Daniel that the rebar may be used "as is."
The basis is that sufficient vertical and horizontal shear bar resistant reinforcement is obtained and that anchorage and proper end development of the shear ties were obtained by the envelope of both faces of vertical wall reinforcement.
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) Construction Deficiency (STN 50-482/79-03):
Concrete Voids in Containment Building.
Review was performed of the corrective actions taken to repair the construction deficiency and of the final report which was submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e).
This item is considered closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (STN 50-482/78-12): Reactor Vessel Supports Review.
The Daniel Procedure QCP-IV-106, now contains an appropriate reference to Bechtel Technical Specification 10466-C-202(a)-(q), "Erec-tion of Pipe Whip Restraints, Pipe Whip Restraint Embeds, and Nuclear Steam Supply System Support Embeds for SNUPPS."
This iter is considered closed.
3.
Site Tour The IE inspectors walked through the various construction areas to observe the general progress of construction activities and housekeeping.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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4.
ASMI Certification System Requirement During the inspection, the IE inspector reviewed documentation and held discussions with licensee representatives concerning the process of satisfying ASME Section III, Article NA-3000 requirements.
The following was determined.
KG&E is the holder of ASME Certificate of Authorization (N-1811) to a.
complete Form N-3.
Daniel has been issued an ASME Certificate of Authorization to use the NA symbol of ASME (N-2119) and NPT symbol (N-2120).
Daniel at Wolf Creek site has been issued an ASME Certificate for use of the NA symbol (N-2119-2) and the NPT symbol (N-2120-2).
The IE inspector also determined that code work at the Wolf Creek site is performed in accordance with the Quality Assurance Program for Nuclear Construction and Addendum No. 2 and is governed by the 1974 Edition of Sectior III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code including addenda through Summer 1975.
Work to be performed includes:
NA, Field Installation of Class 1, 2, 3, & MC Component Sup-ports & Penetration Assemblies; Class 1, 2, & 3 Components, Parts Appurtenances & Piping Subassemblies and Class CS Core Support Structures at the Wolf Creek Nuclear flant, Unit No.
1, Strawn, Kansas only NPT, Field Fabrication of Class 1, 2, 3 & MC C amponent Supports and Penetration Assemblies and Class 1, 2, &.' Pipiag Subassemblies at the Wolf Creek Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 1. Strawn, Kansas only Class 3 construction will be subjected to the same quality assurance and control system as Code Classes 1, 2, and MC.
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b.
KG&E has provided for the constructor, Daniel, to assume the responsibilities assigned in Article NA-3000,Section III. This assignment is contained in the SNUPPS Standard QA Manual, Para-graph 5.1.
Each certificate holder possesses a valid and current certificate c.
of Authorization.
These are as follows:
Certificate Number Expiration Date N-1811 August 1, 1980 N-2119 June 9, 1981 N-2120 June 9, 1981-5-
N-2119-2 March 5, 1982 N-2120-2 March 5, 1982 d.
An on-site ASM2 survey was conducted November 13-15, 1979.
The Quality Assurance Manual for Nuclear Construction (Daniel) was e.
issued October 23, 1978.
The work to be accomplished is given in paragraph "a" above.
Through discussion with licensee representatives and based on inspection experience to date, it appears that the activities being performed by the constructor are in accordance with the approved QA manual and are limited to the work authorized in the Authorization Certificates.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Observation of Work and Work Activities - Safety-Related Piping The IE inspector toured the material lay-down area to observe the segregation and storage of safety-related piping hardware prior to installation. All piping observed appeared to be properly protected.
End caps and plugs were securely in place and piping was placed on wooden blocks to prevent contact with the ground. Areas for storage of safety-related piping and parts were noted to be clearly marked and physically separated from storage areas for other systems.
Following a general tour of the lay-down area three specific parts were selected and checked for proper identification.
Selected parts BG-22 S-004 from the Chemical and Volume Control (CVC) system, were:
EN-02 S-056 from the containment spray system and EJ-02 S-030 from the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Review of Quality Records - Safety-Related Piping The IE inspector reviewed field isometric drawings of safety-related piping showing the as-built configuration of sections of various systems.
Included in this review were drawing numbers M-03EG06 (Rev. 7) and M-03E607 (Rev. 6) for the Component Cooling Water system, drawing number M-03EM01 (Rev 7) for the High Pressure Coolant Injection system, and drawing number M-03EN01 (Rev 8) and M-03EN02 (Rev. 9) for the Containment Spray system. Eight parts were randomly selected from the completed portions of these systems, as noted on the drawings, and the quality records for these parts were retrieved from storage for a thorough review.
Included in these data packages were records of material chemical composition, physical characteristics and the vendors manufacturing, inspection and NDE certifications.
Records of the on-site receiving inspection with regard to material condition, cleanliness, protection and packaging were examined along with the records of installation and testing. These were compared to the ordering data for each part and to the requirements of KP-6-
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12-1 Revision 1 " Storage and Maintenance of Quality Assurance Records." Qualifications were also reviewed for inspection per-sonnel whose names or other identification appeared on these records.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Earthwork a.
Ultimate Heat Sink An inspection of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) area was conducted with the Dames and Moore Resident Geotechnical Engineer (RGE). Discussions with the RGE indicated that construction of the impervious UHS Dam core is approximately twenty percent complete as of this inspection. Mapping of the UHS perimeter was ongoing during the inspection.
All activities observed and reviewed by the IE inspector were found to conform to the Sargent and Lundy Specification No. A-3854, Amendment 2, "Lakework," and Dames and Moore Project Memorandum PM-4.3, "Geotechnical Construction Surveillance and Consulting."
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, b.
Essential Service Water Pipeline Backfill Backfilling activities were observed in the section of the Essential Service Water (ESW) system pipeline west of the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks.
The activities which were observed were in conformance to the procedural requirements delineated in Daniel Construction Procedure No. WP-II-102, " Backfill Material Selection, Preparation, Placement and Compaction," and Sargent and Lundy Speci-fication No. A3852, " Pipe Bedding Material."
The unresolved item identified in NRC Inspection Report No. STN 50-482/79-12 was reviewed.
This unresolved item involved the use of six alternative gradations (as compared to the single gradation specified originally) and their adequacy with respect to minimum relative density and liquefaction potential.
The IE inspector re-viewed correspondence from Sargent and Lundy Engineers to Kansas Gas and Electric Company concerning their review of the six alter-native bedding material gradations.
This review determined that the bedding materials (alternatives one through six) would not liquefy under the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) loading.
In conjunction with this portion of the inspection, the IE inspector reviewed QC records of the pipe bedding material.
Specifically, the results of twenty-nine gradation sieve analysis reports performed on the pipe bedding material, covering the period from March 5, 1979, to October 7, 1979, were reviewed. The results of three Relative Density of Cohesionless Soil analyses performed between April 17, 1979, and July 30, 1979, were also reviewed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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8.
Concrete placement a.
Observation of Work The IE inspector observed portions of the following concrete place-ments:
(1)
Placement No. QC-621-WO2, which consisted of a portion of the exterior southwest corner of the Fuel Handling Building, and (2) Placements No. QC-145-W17 and WO4, which involved two interior walls in the Auxiliary Building.
The first placement involved 89 cubic yards while the later two combined totaled 39 cubic yards.
The work activities which were observed were found to be within the requirements of Daniel Con-struction Procedure WP-IV-106, " Concrete Preplacement, Placement, and Postplacement," and with Bechtel Specification No. 10466-C103(Q),
Revision 17, " Technical Specification for Contract for Forming, Plac-ing, Finishing and Curing of Concrete for the Standardized Nuclear Unit Power Plant System (SNUPPS)."
Concrete testing activities during the Auxiliary Building placement were observed for one batch ticket. A review of the Concrete Placement Card and the Pre-Placement Checklist was also performed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
Records Review A review was also conducted of quality assurance records relative to the repair of the void in the containment building wall beneath the equipment hatch.
Specifically, the Concrete Pre-Placement Checklist, the Concrete Placement Checklist and the Report of Compressive Strength of Cylindrical Concrete Specimens were reviewed.
As a result of this review, and the inspection performed during NRC inspection No. STN 50-482/79-13, and the review of the final report regardin the concrete void (submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)gj), the construction deficiency is considered closed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Fuel Pool Liner Plate (50.55(e))
During the inspection, the IE inspector examined the visual damage caused by an apparent overpressurization of a portion of the leak chase channels of the fuel transfer canal liner during testing.
It was not known at the 1/KG&E letter to NRC Region IV, dated September 2, 1979-8-
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time of the inspretion if the lifting and handling of approximately four liner plates Lad caused damage to the concrete by lifting of embedded I beams.
Concrete supporting the transfer canal liner is safety-related while the actual liner plate is nonsafety-related (the embeds are excepted).
Subsequent to the inspection, on November 6, 1979, KG&E did report the matter as a significant construction deficiency to Region IV in accord-ance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
10.
Meeting With Kansas Gas and Electric Company Management Officials On October 26, 1979, tb Region IV Reactor Construction and Engineer Support Branch Chief, z.he Chief of Projects Section and the Wolf Creek Project Inspector met with officials of the Kansas Gas and Electric Company. The KG&E attendees are denoted in paragraph 1 of this report.
The Region IV Construction and Engineering Support Branch Chief made a presentation on the following items a-d.
A summary of remarks is given below.
a.
Reporting of 10 CFR 50.55(e) Matters The purpose of 10 CFR 50.55(e) is to ensure that the NRC is promptly notified of significant design and construction deficiencies. The responsibility for reporting rests on the holder of the Construction Permit. Reportable deficiencies must be safety-related design or construction activities, could adversely affect safety of plant operation if not cor-rected and must be significant (pertain to 9perational safety not cost of corrective action).
Examples of types of defi-cienies were discussed.
Prompt notification to NRC is required within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the licensee and his agent first finds the deficiency.
In order to alleviate any lack of time to properly evaluate an event, a " potential 50.55(e)" matter should be reported to the Region IV office. A short letter to the NRC will close out the item if, after further evaluation, it is determined that the item is not reportable. However, appropriate records, including necessary engineering analysis, must be maintained for possible review by the NRC.
In those cases where a report is required, it must be made within 30 days of initial reporting.
If more than 30 days are required to make the evaluation an interim report may be made. The interim rcport must indicate when the next report (interim or final) will be made.
If in doubt about an item, the project inspector should be contacted.
If a licensee habitually evaluates cases as nonreportable, the NRC would take appropriate action.
Using the above guidance, the licensee can provide prompt notification, and still maintain the option to clarify significance of matter as further information is developed.
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b.
Reporting of 10 CFR_Part 21 Matters The purpose of Part 21 is to ensure that deviations in safety-related activities are immediately reported to the NRC. Duplicate reporting is not required.
If the licensee is notified by a vendor that an item accepted on site has a reportable deficiency, a Part 21 report must be made by vendor or licensee (if agreed to by vendor).
If the deficiency is found in an accepted item on site by a licensee or his agent, either a Part 21 or a 50.55(e) report may be made, but all information required by Part 21 must be included in the 50.55(e) report.
A copy of NUREG-0302, Revision I was left with the licensee.
Examples of Part 21 reportable items were discussed.
Low;r Threshold of Reporting c.
There is increased Commission intcrest in information regarding incidents, accidents and other site related occurrences which would have high public interest.
The following criteria should be used for telephoning matters to the Region IV office:
(1) serious natural occurences and their effect (flooding, icing, hurricane, tornadoes)
(2)
serious fire or explosions (3)
significant environmental events (4) actual or threatened sabotage, malicious mischief (5) bomb threats (6) demonstrations resulting in violence and/or arrests (7)
lost or stolen licensed material (8)
strikes which result in violence, damage or delay in critical path of more than one month (9)
deficiencies in design or construction of nuclear facilities which have potential for delay in critical path of more than one month (10) an event which results in a fatality or a serious injury (11)
events in which national, state, or local news media interest already exists or is expected, and up dates to these events (12)
other events of similar importance to those identified-10-
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d.
Resident Reactor Inspector Assignment at Wolf Creek The NRC expects to place a Resident Reactor Inspector (RRI) at Wolf Creek in January, 1980. This depends upon results of recruitment efforts. The RRI will come under normal site security arrangements of the licensee.
Reporting of RRI inspection effort, organizational relationships, and RRI duties were discussed.
It is acceptable for the licensee to make 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> initial notification reports on 10 CFR 50.55(e) matters to the RRI.
e.
KG&E Organizational Changes (Presented by KG&E)
Recent changes in the KG&E management organizatien were discussed.
An offical announcement of the changes will be made to the NRC in the near future.
11.
Exit Interview The IE inspectors met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on October 25, 1979.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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