IR 05000445/1996013

Insp Repts 50-445/96-13 & 50-446/96-13 on 961004-11.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Nondestructive Examinations,Documentation Reviews & Discussions W/Plant Personnel Associated W/Inservice Insp Program

ML20129F920
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	10/23/1996
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20129F894	List: IR 05000445/1996013 ML20129F888
References
50-445-96-13, 50-446-96-13, NUDOCS 9610290237
Download: ML20129F920 (11)

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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket Nos.: B0-445 50-446 License Nos.: NPF-87 NPF-89 Report No.: 50-445/96-13 50-446/96-13 ,

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Licensee: TU Electric Facility: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: FM-56 -

Glen Rose, Texas Dates: October 4-11,1996 Inspector: Clifford A. Clark, Reactor Inspector Approved By: Dr. Dale A. Powers, Chief, Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety ATTACHMENTS:

Attachment 1: Partial List of Persons Contacted i List of Inspection Procedures Used List of Documents Reviewed items Opened Attachment 2: MOVs with Questionable Actuator Stud and Nut Fastener Assemblies

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9610290237 961023 PDR ADOCK 05000445 G PDR m l

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-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-445/96-13:50-446/96-13 This inspection was performed using the guidance of NRC Inspection Procedure 73753,

" Inservice Inspection," dated May 4,1995, to determine whether the inservice inspection, repair, and replacement of Class 1,2, and 3 pressure retaining components at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1 and 2, were performed in accordance with Technical Specifications, the applicable ASME Code, correspondence between NRC and the licensee l concerning relief requests, and requirements imposed by NRC/ industry initiative l l

Maintenance

• Approved equipment /f astener configumtions were not maintained on two valve actuators. This finding and the concern of whether approved fastener configurations may not have been maintained during the performance of l maintenance activities in other areas on these actuators, valves, or other safety l l

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related equipment is an unresolved item for NRC review (Section M2).

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• The inservice inspection program continued to be well implemented (Section M3).

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-3-Report Details Summarv of Plant Status Unit 1 changed from Mode 1 to Mode 6, in preparation for refueling outage 1RFOS, and Unit 2 was operating at 100% power during this inspection perio II. Maintenance M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment Insoection Scooe (92902)

The inspector observed the material condition of the plant to determine the effectiveness of licensee's actions implemented to maintain the appropriate material condition of the plan Observations and Findings During tours of various areas of the plant the inspector noted the following:

• Containment Spray Pump 1-02 recirculation Motor Operated Valve 1FV-4773-1 MO actuator limit switch compartment cover installation was missing two f astener assemblies, and Safety injection Pump 1-02 crosstie j Motor Operated Valve 1-8821B MO actuator limit switch compartment cover  ;

installation was missing one fastener assembly. The licensee issued a l

corrective action document (ONE Form 96-001057)to document these i nonconformance fastener condition j

• On October 7,1996, the licensee's identified vendor (Limitorque Corporation) Technical Manual 661-76268-003[629], as applicable for the motor operated valves identified in Attachment 2 of this report. Referenced figures in this technical manualindicated that the valve actuator limit switch compartment covers were installed with either hex head or socket head cap screws, but did not indicate the number of f asteners installed, a part or piece number for each of the fasteners, or if a lockwasher was installed with each applicable f astener. Also, the technical manual figures did not indicate an approved limit switch compartment cover installation with stud and nut fastener assemblies. As a result of the limited, as built design fastener information contained in the applicable technical manual, the design descriptions of various vendor provided actuator fastener assemblies could not readily be identified to the inspector. Approximately 16 motored operated valves, identified in Attachment 2, had at least one stud and nut fastener assembly installed in the valve actuator limit switch compartment cove i

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The actuator vendor noted that they employed two types of fastener hardware to assemble the housing covers and motors on the SMB series of actuators, either hex head cap screws SAE Grade 5, or socket head cap screws SAE Grade 8 (or strength equivalent). The SAE Grade 5 l

, identification grade marking was not always readily apparent on the head of I l some of the hex head cap screws installed in various valve actuators I identified in Attachment 2 of this repor I

Procedure MSE-CO-8805, "Limitorque Actuator Refurbishment for Type l SMB-000/SMB/SB/SBD-00," Revision 0, Section 8.9.16, stated to " install limit switch compartment cover, gasket and mounting screws... ." This !

current valve actuator maintenance procedure failed to require the removal or l installation of stud and nut fastener assemblies in the limit switch

compartment cover.

l The licensee noted that they believed the subject valve actuators were provided to i Comanche Peak by the vendor with some of the stud and nut fastener assemblies installed in the limit switch compartment covers. The licensee noted that they would cont:ct the valve actuator vendor to obtain written documentation for updating the applicable vendor technical manuals in the following areas:

The description (size, type, and materialidentification) of all approved as-built fastener assemblies provided by the vendor to mount the actuator limit switch compartment covers, on the motor operated valves actuators l shipped to Comanche Peak.

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• The description (size, type, and material identification) of the f astener assemblies the vendor currently approves and/or provides for replacement of the motor operated valve actuator limit switch compartment cover fasteners.

NRC will review the licensee actions taken to verify the approved design fastener l configurations for the actuator limit switch compartment cover f asteners as an inspection followup item (445/9613-01).

l The inspector noted that the actuators installed on Valves 1FV-4773-1 MO and i 1-8821B MO, that were observed with the nonconforming missing f astener l configurations, had various past maintenance activities performed where the subject l limit switch compartment covers and associated fasteners (along with other actuator / valve fasteners) were removed. The licensee noted that it was their expectation that during the performance of any maintenance activities, the approved equipment configuration would be maintained and/or restored. This included equipment fasteners which should be reinstalled or replaced with fasteners of an approved material and configuration.

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1-l 5-The fact that fasteners were missing on the two valves actuators identified above, raised the concern that approved f astener configurations may not have been maintained during maintenance activities in other areas on these actuators, valves, or other safety-related equipmen The licensee updated the NRC on the latest actions implemented to address this unresolved item during an October 16,1996 followup telephone conference cal Based on the information available as of October 16,1996, the inspector could not determine the scope of this fastener problem during this inspection. This is an unresolved item (445/9613-02). Conclusions Although the above observed examples of nonconforming fastener configurations on the valve actuator limit switch compartment covers were of minor safety significance, they indicated potential problems with fasteners installed in other safety-related equipment locations. Except for the examples of nonconforming f astener configurations noted above, the general material condition of other plant areas observed appeared to be goo M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation . inspection Scope (73753)

The inspector reviewed the documents identified in Attachment 1 during the review of inservice inspection activities. The inspector reviewed these documents to determine if they had been developed in accordance with regulatory requirements and the applicable ASME code requirement Observations and Findinas The inservice inspection examinations were scheduled to be performed in accordance with the Unit 1 ASME Section XI inservice inspection program Plan, First interval, Second Period, and Second Outage (96) schedule. The Unit 1 inservice inspection program Plan was written in accordance with the requirements of the 1986 Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code,Section IX, and no addenda. The inspector found that the documents (procedures, records, reports, and persormel certifications) reviewed had been developed in accordance with licensee procedures, regulatory requirements, and applicable ASME code requirements.

k Conclusions

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The inspector concluded that the inservice inspection procedures and documents were well developed for the identified tasks.

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M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance insoection Scoce (73753)

As a result of various outage schedule changes as Unit 1 came down for the '

refueling outage, the inspector was only able to witness a total of six liquid penetrant tests and ultrasonic tests performed on welds, Observations and Findinos t The inspector observed both penetrant tests and ultrasonic tests properly performed t by qualified nondestructive examination personnel on containment spray system piping welds (identification numbers TBX-2-2537-5,6, and 7). , Conclusions -

The inspector concluded that the observed nondestructive examinations were performed in accordance with the appropriate procedure ;

111. Enaineerina

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E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.3 Review of Final Safety Analvsis Report Commitments A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to their Final Safety Analysis Report description highlighted the need for a special focused i review that compares plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters to the Final Safety Analysis Report descriptions. While performing the inspection discussed in i

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this report, the inspector reviewed Sections 5.2.4 and 6.6 of the Final Safety Analysis Report associated with the inservice inspection program. The inspector did not identify any discrepancies between the Final Safety Analysis Report and the .

reviewed inservice inspection program activitie !

V. Manaaement Meetinas

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

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The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings

presented. The licensee updated the NRC on the latest actions implemented to

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address the unresolved item discussed in Section M2 of this report during an  ;

I October 16,1996 followup telephone conference cal ;

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. i-7-The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie i l

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ATTACHMENT 1 '

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee )

O. Bhatty, Senior Regulatory Compliance Engineer i J. DeBonis, inservice inspection Engineer D. Davis, Nuclear Overview Manager l

R. Mays, Codes and Standards Mechanical Engineering Supervisor J. Muffett, Station Engineering Manager J. Ragan, Codes and Standards Site Levellli Examiner D. Snow, Regulatory Affairs Senior Specialist

, C. Terry, Group Vice President, Nuclear Production

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R. Walker, Regulatory Affairs Manager Hartford Steam Boiler and Inspection Company J. Hair, Authorized Nuclear inservice inspector NRC T. Gody, Senior Resident inspector

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LIST OF INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 73753 Inservice inspection IP 92902 Followup - Maintenance LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED l Procedures Procedure Revision Title ISI Schedule O Comanche Peak Unit 1 Inservice Schedule; Scheduled Components; First Period, Second Period, Second Outage I_

(96RF)

l TX-ISI-8 4 VT-1 and VT-3 Visual Examination l

TX-ISI-11 6 Liquid Penetrant Examination

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TX-ISI-70 6 Magnetic Particle Examination

1 TX-ISI-210 3 Ultrasonic Examination Procedure for Welds in Ferritic Steel

Vessels l

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-2-TX-ISI-212 4 Ultrasonic Examination Procedure of Nozzle inner Radius Sections

TX-ISI-214 1 Ultrasonic Examination Procedure for Welds in Piping Systems )

and Vessels i TX-OPS-101 5 Preservice and Inservice Examination Documentation STA-109 2 Conduct of Maintenance STA-703 8 Inservice inspection Program NOE-EVAL 95-000033 0 Nuclear Overview Department Evaluation Report inservice insoection Reoort Unit 2, First Interval, First Period, Second Outage (2RFO2)

I Inservice inspection Summary Report ,

l Unit 2, First Interval, First Period, Second Outage (2RFO2) l ISI Examination Reports issued for the Current Unit 1 Refuelina Outaae (1RFO5)

l TBX-1120-(1-3,1-4) / PT TBX-1120-(2-1,2-3, 2-4) / UT <

TBX-1180-(2-3,2-4, 2-1WS, 2-2WS) / PT TBX-2-2537-(5,6, 7) / PT TBX-2-2537-(5,6,7) / UT TBX-2-2564-(42,45, 46) /PT TBX-2-2566-(2,3) / PT' )

. TBX-2-2567-(50,51) / PT I TBX-2-2568-(24,31,32) / PT TBX-2-2573-1/ PT TBX-2-2573-1/ UT Contractor Examiner Certifications WesDyne international l Sonic Systems International, Inc.

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-3-ITEMS OPENED 50-445/9613-01 IFl review of Limitorque operator design fastener 50-445/9613-02 URI equipment / fastener configurations were not maintained i

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MOVS WITH QUESTIONABLE ACTUATOR STUD AND NUT FASTENER ASSEMBLIES 1-88028-MO (SBD/00) 1-HV-4395-M0 (SMB/000)

l 1 8806-MO (SB/00) 1-HV-4396-MO (SMB/000)

] 1-8807A MO (SB/00) 1-FV-4773-1 MO (SMB/00)

l 1-88078-MO (SB/00) 1-HV-6076 MOV (SMB/000)

j 1-8814 A-MO (SMB/00) 1-HV-6077 MOV (SMB/000)

l 1-88148-MO (SMB/00) 2-HV-4699-MO (SB/00S)

,' 1-88210-MO (SB/00) 2-HV-4708-MO (SB/00S)

2 1-883E-MOV (SBD/00) 2-HV-6084-MO (SB/00)

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