IR 05000424/1986065
| ML20206R961 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1986 |
| From: | Jape F, Larry Nicholson, Schnebli G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206R959 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-86-65, NUDOCS 8609190290 | |
| Download: ML20206R961 (9) | |
Text
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. & ' Report No.: 50-424/86-65 _ Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 . Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket No.: 50-424 License No.: CPPR-108 ] Fac.ility Name: Vogtle 1 ' Inspection Conducted: July 21 - August 15, 1986 . E. N1 Yo1 on ~ hW - Inspectors: 4AqA - f f ' Date Signed " M-Q WMlN . A. Schnebli A' Date Signed Approved by: /f A_ f #[[d L F. Jape, Section Chief ff Date Signed Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety . SUMMARY .
Scope: This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the area of hot
functional test witnessing.
, Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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- e b I 8609190290 860715 PDR ADOCK 05000424 PDR K7 ____C_____________ __
_ . . REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. G. Aufdenkampe. Lead Integrated Test Supervisor
- C. E. Belflower, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Operations
- R. M. Bellamy, Test and Outage Manager B. D. Carter, Lead Integrated Test Supervisor M. E. Chance. Test Supervisor W. T. Forehand, Test Supervisor
- W. C. Gabbard, Regulatory Specialist R. H. Garrett, Test Supervisor R. L. Mansfield, Test Coordinator B. Lide, Preoperational Procedures Supervisor H. P. Walker, Manager Unit Operations Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engi-neers, technicians, operators, mechanics, and office personnel.
Other Organizations H. M. Handfinger, Preoperational Test Superintendent - Bechtel G. L. Greenwood, Lead Test Supervisor - Westinghouse A. E. Schaefer, Test Supervisor - Westinghouse NRC Resident Inspectors J. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector - Operations
- R. J. Schepens, Resident Inspector - Operations
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 8 and 15, 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph one above.
The inspector de-scribed the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The following new items were identified during this inspection.
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 424/86-65-01, " Review Corrective Action for Dresser RTD Bypass Valves" - paragraph 6.c.
(0 pen) IFI 424/86-65-02, " Review Corrective Action to Prevent 'C' AFW Turbine Exhaust into 'B' Diesel Building" - paragraph. .
(0 pen) IFI 424/86-65-03, " Followup on Final Resolution to MSIV Coil Failures and Subsequent Retesting" - paragraph 6.g.
(0 pen) IFI 424/86-65-04, " Review Resolution for Documentation of Deficiencies When Using Operations Procedures to Satisfy Preoperational Tests" - paragraph 6.f.
(0 pen) 424/86-65-05, " Verify FSAR Revision to Specify Variable Pressurizer PORV Setpoint" - paragraph 6.a.
(0 pen) IFI 424/86-65-06, " Followup on Final Resolution to Erroneous Safety Injection Signal During Shift of Control to Remote Shutdown Panels" - paragraph 6.f.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectort during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
1-300-07 Hot Functional Test (70314) The inspectors observed conduct of the Hot Functional Test (HFT) portion of the preoperational test program. This review included attendance at coordi-nation meetings, discussions with the test program director and test engi-neers, general observation of testing and operations in the control room as well as observation of the specific tests described below.
A broad review of all incident reports and major test procedure changes was conducted to verify that problems were being adequately documented and procedure changes administratively controlled.
The inspectors reviewed the HFT controlling procedure to verify that all prerequisites and initial conditions were met during RCS heatup.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee was conducting a well organized program, personnel had a good understanding of responsibilities and conduct of specific tests, control of organizational interfaces was good, procedures were properly approved and current drawings and manuals were being utilized.
Management involvement in every aspect of the test program was evident.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Preoperational Test Witnessing The inspectors observed specific tests being conducted to determine if requirements were being met relative to NRC requirements such as contained
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in Regulatory Guide 1.68 and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The following attributes were verified in this review: Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
- Latest revisions of the approved test procedures were available and in - use by personnel performing the tests.
Test equipment required by the procedures was calibrated and installed.
- ' Test data were properly collected and recorded.
- Adequate coordination existed among personnel involved in the test.
- Test prerequisites were met.
- - Proper plant systems were in service.
Temporary modifications such as jumpers were installed and tracked in - accordance with administrative controls.
Problems encountered during testing were properly documented.
- The following tests were witnessed: a.
1-3BB-05, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control (70447) The inspectors witnessed portions of the pressurizer control system test that demonstrated the response and control of pressurizer pressura and level resulting from an induced step change in the process.
A review of the test results indicated that the pressurizer power operat-ed relief valve (PORV) HV-455A had opened at a setpoint lower than the 2335 psig given in Table 5.4.10-2 of the Final. Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
The licensee indicated that this is acceptable due to the integrating function in the control system of this particular valve.
Further indication of this. integrating function was realized on July 22, 1986, when HV-455A relieved open at approximately 2290 psig.- Reduced spray ficw from a secured reactor coolant pump combined with a set of heaters energized in the manual mode caused the reactor pressure to drift up, resulting in a PORV lift at a lower integrated setpoint.
The inspectors expressed concern that this integrating function within the pressure control system is not adequately described in the appro-priate section of the FSAR.
The licensee concurred with this concern and agreed to pursue a change to the FSAR.
This item will be tracked es Inspector Followup Item 424/86-65-05, " Verify FSAR Revision to Specify Variable Pressurizer PORV Setpoint."
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- b.- 1-3BJ-02, Safety Injection System Check Valves (70315) J The inspectors witnessed. portions of section 6.1 that demonstrated the integrity of the accumulator and safeguard systems injection line check valves by performing a back leakage check. A preliminary. review of.the recorded results indicated that back leakage flowrates did not exceed i the prescribed limit for the safety injection system injection line check valves.
c.
1-38B-10,RTDBypass(70314) The inspectors witnessed portions of this test that determined the flowrate necessary to achieve the. design reactor coolant transport time in each RTD bypass loop.
The low flow alarm setpoint could not be , e verified because of off-scale high flow due to the lack of a flow restricting orifice.
Data was taken to size the proper orifices with further testing scheduled during power ascension. Test result analysis is also pending regarding RTD calibration offset noticed during testing at the various cooldown plateaus.
! RTD bypass testing was complicated due to recurring problems with the bypass isolation valves. These packless diaphragm valves (similar to a stop check valve) have exhibited a history of sticking in a closed or partially closed position when attempting to open the valve.
The.
. . ' j licensee submitted an evaluation of this problem pursuant to the criteria of 10 CFR 50.55(e) in-a letter dated February 25, 1986.
The corrective action detailed at that time was to install a vendor provid-ed modification kit that included a redesigned disc cap. This correc-tive action was completed as change control package B10224P prior to i hot -functional testing.
Operations Deficiency Report T-1-86-2639 documented additional problems with the valves sticking shut during hot functional testing, indicating potentially. inadequate - corrective action.
The licensee is preparing to disassemble RTD bypass valves , 1-1201-U4-130 and 1-1201-U4-132 to evaluate the continuing problem and
i specify further corrective action.
This item will be tracked as Inspector Followup Item 50-424/86-65-01, " Review Corrective Action for , l Dresser RTD Bypass Valves."
' . 1-3AL-01-02 Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) (70438, 70446) d.
The inspectors witnessed a large portion of the-testing of both the motor-driven and turbine-driven AFW pumps that demonstrated the ability < to supply feedwater to the steam generators.
This testing included a r 48 hour continuous pump run, a one hour pump restart after cooldown and F an operability check of the pump house HVAC.
A concern was expressed to the licensee regarding the AFW pump "A" train cavitation occurring as a result of a safety injection signal causing the pump discharge valves to cycle full open. The inspectors witnessed the performance of a special AFW flow test required as part of the evaluation of Opera-tions Deficiency Report T-1-86-2569. System performance appeared to be normal with no detectable cavitation or runout.
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i During the performance of the 48 hour endurance run on the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater. pump, the pump was tripped at hour 43:02 due to operator error.
The operator intended to secure feedflow.to steam , generator 4 by shutting the feed valve to the generator with handswitch i IHS-5120A.. However, the operator inadvertently turned handswitch.
i' 1HS-5113A which is located adjacent to the switch he intended to operate.
1HS-5113A is the suction supply valve from condensate storage tank 2.
Upon realizing his mistake, the operator immediately took the handswitch to the open position and tripped the turbine steam supply to protect the pump.
The pump externals were checked and the pump-was rotated by hand and then restarted and monitored.
All pump turbine bearing temperatures and vibration readings remained normal. The pump was off for ten minutes and the 48 hour run was continued for five , hours and 13 minutes which acquired a total run time of 48 hours and 15 minutes.
FSAR Section 14.2.8.1.6.C.5. requires 48 hours of continuous ' operation of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The licensee initiated an Operations Deficiency Report (ODR), T-1-86-2848, and i Incident Report 86-0026 to document the occurrence.
An engineering evaluation was conducted and the licensee considers the test was - .successfully completed.
This was based on a review of the test data collected which showed that the pump remained within design limits with
! respect to bearing / bearing oil temperature and vibration for the 48-hour run as required by NUREG-0611.
Variation in-bearing / bearing oil i temperatures during the 48 hour run followed changes in steam pressure and pump load as would be expected such that no anomalies were indicat-. . " ed which would be indicative of a pump endurance problem. Additional-
ly, the ten minute discontinuity which occurred at hour 43 did not significantly affect the trend in pump parameters.
With respect to pump room ambient conditions, no appreciable change resulted from the F discontinuity.. Therefore, the licensee concluded that the test objec- ! tive was met. Based.on_ discussions between the licensee, the Region II Inspectors and NRR, the NRC also considers that the intent of the test ' was met.
The inspectors noted that one of two steam exhausts from the "C" turbine driven AFW pump is directed into-the "B" diesel building emergency ventilation intake.
A tour of the "B" diesel building following a turbine AFW pump run revealed such an extreme amount of moisture introduced into the building that visibility was severely limited and diesel performance could be compromised. Temporary correc-tive action was to weld a plate over the end of that particular turbine exhaust.
This item will be tracked as Inspector Followup Item 50-424/86-65-02, " Review Corrective Action to Prevent 'C' AFW l Turbine Exhaust into 'B' Diesel Building."
e.
1-300-06, RCS Pipe Vibration (70431, 70450) Reactor coolant system vibration testing using flow induced transients was observed during the course of hot functional testing. This testing also included balancing the reactor coolant pumps at normal operating temperature and pressure. The inspectors observed the operation of the , . .- -. .. .. . ..
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metal impact monitoring system during the above testing for evidence of foreign objects within the primary system.
f.
1-300-10, Remote Shutdown (70452) This procedure was modified extensively in order to use the existing plant Abnormal Operating Procedure, A0P 18038-1, Operation from Remote Shutdown Panels.
The procedure change was reviewed to ensure confor-mance to administrative requirements.
The inspectors witnessed the portion of the test in which control is shifted from the control room to the remote shutdown panels and the plant then cooled down from 350 F to 250 F using both RHR trains. One inspector remained in the control room and one inspector was present at the remote shutdown panels throughout the test.
The inspectors considered the test was conducted satisfactorily. Two areas of concern identified by the inspectors were as follows: (1) When control was shifted to the remote shutdown panels a safety injection signal was initiated.
The actual safety injection did not occur due to system configuration.
At the close of this inspection, the licensee was still. in the process of determining the reason the signal was initiated.
This was identified as Inspector Followup Item 424/86-65-06,. Followup on final resolution to erroneous safety injection signal during shift of control to remote shutdown panels.
(2) The inspectors noted that deficiencies occurring during the test l were not being documented.
The deficiencies were minor in nature and would not invalidate the test.
However, the inspectors considered all deficiencies should be documented in order to ensure they were eventually corrected.
Examples included: valve controllers malfunctioning; indication lights burned out; limit ! switch for valve position indication out of adjustment. When the test director was questioned by the inspector as to the reason deficiencies were not being documented he state that since the test was being conducted using. an operations procedure he felt operations personnel should document problems. Operations person-nel considered they were using an operations procedure to perform a preoperational test, therefore, test personnel should document problems.
The inspector considered that test personnel should , document the problems and after further discussions with test personnel they agreed to document the deficiencies for this test.
In a subsequent discussion with the Stariup Manager over this issue, he indicated he would resolve the issue.
This is identi- , ' fied as IFI 424/86-64-04, Review resolution for documentation of deficiencies noted when using operations procedures to satisfy preoperational tests.
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1-3AB-01, Main Startup System Preoperational Test (70437) The inspectors witnessed portions of this preoperational test including-the : verification that the main ' steam isolation valves (MSIVs) would closed in five seconds or less.
During the performance of this test, problemsiwere encountered with the MSIVs in which the valve would not , close in the required time or the valve would fail shut.. Troubleshoot - ing by the licensee determined the cause was due to faulty coils in the closing circuit solenoid valves.
The coil is normally-energized when the valve is open and when de-energized causes a port in the control- ,
valve to bleed off hydraulic fluid and shut the MSIV. The faulty coils ~ were burning out or sticking which in turn caused MSIV closure or slow closure.
New coils were obtained from Unit 2 MSIVs and shifted from-
valve to valve until all MSIVs were tested satisfactorily. The problem with the solenoids is currently under evaluation by the licensee and will be' resolved prior to initial plant startup.
Additional discus-
sions were held with responsible licensee personnel in the area of retest requirements for the MSIVs after the solenoids were repaired, m modified or replaced. _ The licensee indicated that the stroke timing '
- tests of the preoperational test procedure would be reperformed with the unit in a cold shutdown condition since the coil failure was not temperature related. The inspector considered the licensee proposal to
, ! perform test cold to be inadequate' and-that the test should be conduct-ed with the steam lines at normal operating temperature and pressure.
' . The licensee indicated they would evaluate the retest requirements further.
This is identified as Inspector Followup Item 424/86-65-03, Followup on Final Resolution to MSIV Coil Failures and Subsequent-L Retesting.
h.
Events That Occurred While Testing (1) A large plastic trash bag was drawn into the air intake of reactor coolant pump motor No. 3.
The motor was subsequently secured and ' an effort to retrieve the bag resulted in recapturing approximate- !. ly 25% of the total bag. Operations Deficiency Report T-1-86-2693 documented the situation with an interim disposition to continue ' with motor operations while monitoring temperature and vibrations.
(2) Rectifier component CR-8 in the train "B" diesel generator control panel melted during a diesel run, resulting in extensive damage within panel 1-2403-PS-DC3.
Operations Deficiency Report T-1-86-2783 was written to document the problem with final resolu-tion pending.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Inspector Followup (92701, 92703) a.
(Closed) IFI 86-57-01, concerning the omission of the preoperational testing of the containment heat removal system during hot functional l testing.
The_ inspectors reviewed a change to test procedure 1-300-07, l . . .. . - . .. -.... - . . . .. - - - - . - __ - ....
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. RCS Hot Functional, that added the FSAR requirement.
This item is considered closed, b.
(0 pen) IE Bulletin 85-03 regarding improper switch settings on motor-operated valves.
The inspectors witnessed baseline testing of valve 1HV3019 (steam supply to turbine AFW pump) using the _ Motor Operated Valve Analysis and Test System (M0 VATS).
This particular test was to obtain baseline operating data on the valve with no differential pressure across the seat. This item remains open.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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