IR 05000413/2015007

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IR 05000413/2015007 and 05000414/2015007; on 08/10/2015 - 09/17/2015; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Component Design Bases Inspection
ML15296A142
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/21/2015
From: Bartley J
NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1
To: Henderson K
Duke Energy Carolinas
References
IR 2015007
Download: ML15296A142 (19)


Text

UNITED STATES ber 21, 2015

SUBJECT:

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2015007 AND 05000414/2015007

Dear Mr. Henderson:

On, September 17, 2015, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, and discussed the results of this inspection with Tom Simril and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA: Eric Stamm for/

Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000413/2015007 and 05000414/2015007, w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.: 050000413, 05000414 License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52 Report Nos.: 05000413/2015007, 05000414/2015007 Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: York, SC 29745 Dates: August 10 - September 17, 2015 Inspectors: E. Stamm, Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead)

D. Kern, Senior Reactor Inspector (Region I)

S. Sanchez, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector T. Su, Reactor Inspector G. Gardner, Contractor S. Gardner, Contractor Approved by: Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000413/2015-007 and 05000414/2015-007; 08/10/2015 - 09/17/2015; Catawba Nuclear

Station, Units 1 and 2; Component Design Bases Inspection.

This inspection was conducted by a team of three Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)inspectors from Region II, one NRC inspector from Region I, and two NRC contract personnel.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process, (SDP), dated April 29, 2015.

All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated February 4, 2015. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process Revision 5.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R21 Component Design Bases Inspection

.1 Inspection Sample Selection Process

The team selected risk-significant components and related operator actions for review using information contained in the licensees probabilistic risk assessment. In general, this included risk significant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that had a risk achievement worth factor greater than 1.3 or Birnbaum value greater than 1E-6. The sample included 15 SSCs, 1 SSC associated with containment large early release frequency (LERF), and 3 operating experience (OE) items.

The team performed a margin assessment and a detailed review of the selected risk-significant components and associated operator actions to verify that the design bases had been correctly implemented and maintained. Where possible, this margin was determined by the review of the design basis and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). This margin assessment also considered original design issues, margin reductions due to modifications, or margin reductions identified as a result of material condition issues. Equipment reliability issues were also considered in the selection of components for a detailed review. These reliability issues included items related to failed performance test results, significant corrective action, repeated maintenance, maintenance rule status, Inspection Manual Chapter 0326 conditions, NRC resident inspector input regarding problem equipment, system health reports, industry OE, and licensee problem equipment lists. Consideration was also given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design, OE, and the available defense-in-depth margins. An overall summary of the reviews performed and the specific inspection findings identified is included in the following sections of the report.

.2 Component Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

SSCs

  • Unit 1 Component Cooling Heat Exchangers (KCHX-1A and KCHX-1B)
  • Unit 1 Diesel Ventilation System (VD)
  • Unit 1 Diesel Fuel Oil System (FD)
  • Unit 1 Charging Pumps (NV-1A and NV-1B)
  • Unit 1 Refueling Water Storage Tank (Unit 1 FWST)
  • Unit 1 4160V Emergency Switchgear (1ETB)
  • Unit 1 4160V Component Cooling (KC) Pump Circuit Breakers (1ETB-6 and 1ETB-7)
  • Unit 2 Diesel Batteries (2DGBA and 2DGBB)
  • Unit 1 125V Vital I&C Power Distribution Center (1EDE)
  • Unit 1 Auctioneering Diode Assembly (1VADB)
  • Unit 1 Channel D Vital Power (1EID, 1EBD, 1ECD)
  • Unit 1 120V AC Panel (1ERPD)

Components with LERF Implications

  • Unit 1/Unit 2 Hydrogen Ignition System (EHM)

For the 16 components listed above, the team reviewed the plant technical specifications (TS), UFSAR, design bases documents, and drawings to establish an overall understanding of the design bases of the components. Design calculations and procedures were reviewed to verify that the design and licensing bases had been appropriately translated into these documents. Test procedures and recent test results were reviewed against design bases documents to verify that acceptance criteria for tested parameters were supported by calculations or other engineering documents, and that individual tests and analyses served to validate component operation under accident conditions. Maintenance procedures were reviewed to ensure components were appropriately included in the licensees preventive maintenance program. System modifications, vendor documentation, system health reports, preventive and corrective maintenance history, and corrective action program documents were reviewed (as applicable) in order to verify that the performance capability of the component was not negatively impacted, and that potential degradation was monitored or prevented.

Maintenance Rule information was reviewed to verify that the component was properly scoped, and that appropriate preventive maintenance was being performed to justify current Maintenance Rule status. Component walk downs and interviews were conducted to verify that the installed configurations would support their design and licensing bases functions under accident conditions, and had been maintained to be consistent with design assumptions.

Additionally, the team performed the following specific reviews:

  • The team observed a simulator scenario involving time critical operator actions for aligning emergency core cooling system suction from the refueling water storage tank to the containment emergency sump (cold leg recirculation). The team verified that the required operator actions could be accomplished within the required times and as relied upon in design assumptions and in accordance with approved licensee procedures.
  • The team observed a simulator scenario involving time critical operator actions to identify and terminate a boron dilution event for Modes 3, 4, or 5. The team verified that the actions could be accomplished as relied upon in design assumptions and in accordance with approved licensee procedures.
  • The team performed table-top reviews, with a licensed operator, of several abnormal and emergency procedures to better understand actions to be taken to:

1) throttle auxiliary feedwater (CA) flow to intact steam generators (SGs) after a loss of instrument air 2) manually secure CA flow to a ruptured SG within required times 3) establish safety injection flow from initiation of a shutdown loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

The team also conducted in-field walkdowns of these procedures to verify the actions could be accomplished within the assumed timeframe, that there was sufficient guidance in the procedures to properly complete the tasks, that equipment or tools necessary to assist in accomplishing these tasks were available in the designated locations, and that the areas requiring accessibility were indeed accessible. In addition, the team interviewed operators qualified to these tasks to ensure their knowledge and training was sufficient to successfully accomplish the tasks.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed three operating experience issues for applicability at Catawba Nuclear Station. The team performed an independent review for these issues and, where applicable, assessed the licensees evaluation and disposition of each item. The issues that received a detailed review by the team included:

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On September 17, 2015, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Tom Simril and other members of the licensees staff. Proprietary information that was reviewed during the inspection was returned to the licensee or destroyed in accordance with prescribed controls.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

S. Andrews, Senior Engineer
G. Black, Electrical Engineering
J. Brady, Regulatory Affairs, General Office
M. Brigman, Mechanical Systems Engineer
B. Cauthen, System Engineer
W. Coble, SSPS System Engineer
M. Dickson, Design Engineering
K. Fleischer, Consultant
C. Fletcher, Regulatory Affairs Manager
A. Goodman, Regulatory Affairs, General Office
E. Haack, Principle Mechanical Design Engineer
K. Hear, Electrical System Engineer
K. Henderson, Catawba Site Vice President
R. Herring, Mechanical Systems Engineer
C. Holden, Consultant
C. Hood, System Engineer
T. Jackson, Lead Licensing Engineer
D. Kulla, Design Engineering Supervisor
P. Lomoriello, Component Engineer
D. Mason, Component Engineer
A. Michalski, AOMT
M. Miller, System Engineer
T. Pasour, Regulatory Affairs Staff
T. Poetzsch, Director, Mechanical Systems Engineering
D. Shever, System Engineer
P. Simpson, EDG System Engineer
T. Simril, Plant Manager
S. Steele, Mechanical Procurement Engineering Manager
M. Swim, Regulatory Affairs, General Office
R. Treadway, Regulatory Affairs, General Office
R. White, Electrical Engineering
B. Zimmerman, System Engineer

NRC personnel

J. Bartley, Chief, Engineering Branch 1, Division of Reactor Safety, Region II
R. Bernhard, Senior Reactor Analyst, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II
A. Hutto, Senior Resident Inspector, Division of Reactor Projects, Catawba Resident Office
L. Pressley, Resident Inspector, Division of Reactor Projects, Catawba Resident Office
J. Parent, Acting Resident Inspector, Division of Reactor Projects, Catawba Resident Office

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED