IR 05000413/2010006
| ML102250119 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 08/10/2010 |
| From: | Nease R NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB2 |
| To: | Morris J Duke Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| IR-10-006 | |
| Download: ML102250119 (27) | |
Text
UNITED STATES ugust 10, 2010
SUBJECT:
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000413/2010006 AND 05000414/2010006
Dear Mr. Morris:
On May 14, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed with you and other members of your staff. Following completion of additional review in the Region II office, another exit meeting was held by telephone with Mr. R. Ferguson and other members of your staff on June 28, 2010, to provide an update on changes to the preliminary inspection findings.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) which was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Catawba facility.
In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to the finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, RII, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at the Catawba Nuclear Station.
DEC, LLC. 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Rebecca L. Nease, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000413/2010006 and 05000414/2010006 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52 Report Nos.: 05000413/2010006 and 05000414/2010006 Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: York, SC 29745 Dates: April 26 - 30, 2010 (Week 1)
May 10 - 14, 2010 (Week 2)
Inspectors: M. Thomas, Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead Inspector)
N. Merriweather, Senior Reactor Inspector K. Miller, Resident Inspector Watts Bar Unit 2 L. Suggs, Reactor Inspector (Week 1 only)
Approved by: Rebecca L. Nease, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000413/2010-006, 05000414/2010-006; 04/26 - 30/2010 and 05/10 - 14/2010; Catawba
Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Fire Protection.
This report covers an announced two-week period of inspection by a triennial fire protection team composed of four regional inspectors. One Green non-cited violation was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, ASignificance Determination Process@ (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green: The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Catawba Unit 1 Operating License Condition 2.C(5), in that the licensee failed to install emergency lighting units (ELUs) in accordance with the approved fire protection program. Specifically, ELUs were not installed in some areas in the Unit 1 turbine building for access/egress and where local operator manual actions were required to support post-fire safe shutdown for a fire in the main control room. The licensee initiated Problem Investigation Process C-10-2815 to address the ELU issue associated with the Procedure AP/1/A15500/017.
The licensees failure to install ELUs for local operator manual actions, as required by the Catawba fire protection program, is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the reactor safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e., fire), and it affects the objective of ensuring the reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Specifically, the finding could affect the licensees ability to perform local operator actions required to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown conditions following a main control room fire. The team completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Qualitative Screening Approach, Step 1.3, and concluded that the finding, given its low degradation rating, was of very low safety significance (Green), because the operators had a high likelihood of completing the tasks using flashlights or battery-powered portable hand lights. Consideration was given to the fact that operators normally carry flashlights and would have access to the portable hand lights to provide the necessary lighting. The cause of this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Resources component of the Human Performance area, in that the licensee did not ensure that equipment such as fixed 8-hour emergency lighting units were available to support post-fire safe shutdown actions (H.2 (d)). (Section 1R05.05)
Licensee Identified Violations
None
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R05 Fire Protection
This report documents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection of the Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) Units 1 and 2. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.05TTP, Fire Protection-National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Transition Period (Triennial), dated December 24, 2009. The objective of the inspection was to review a minimum sample of 3 risk-significant fire areas to verify implementation of the fire protection program (FPP) and to verify site specific implementation of at least one B.5.b mitigating strategy as well as the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b mitigating equipment. The three fire areas (FAs) and associated fire zones (FZs) were selected after reviewing available risk information as analyzed by a senior reactor analyst from Region II, previous inspection results, plant walk downs of fire areas, relational characteristics of combustible material to targets, and location of equipment needed to achieve and maintain safe shutdown (SSD) of the reactor. In selecting the B.5.b mitigating strategy sample, the team reviewed licensee submittal letters, safety evaluation reports, licensee commitments, B.5.b implementing procedures, and previous NRC inspection reports. Section 71111.05-05 of the IP specifies a minimum sample size of three fire areas and one B.5.b implementing strategy for addressing large fires and explosions. This inspection fulfilled the requirements of the procedure by selecting three fire areas, one fire zone and one B.5.b mitigating strategy. The specific FAs/FZs chosen for review were:
FA 15 - Unit 1 4160 Volt Switchgear Room A, Elev. 577 feet
FA 17 - Unit 1 Cable Spread Room, Elev. 574 feet
FA 21 - Units 1 and 2 Main Control Room, Elev. 594 feet
FZ - Unit 1 Turbine Bldg 6900 Volt Switchgear Room 1TA/1TB Elev. 594 feet The team evaluated the licensee=s FPP against applicable requirements, including CNS Units 1 and 2 Renewed Operating License Condition 2.C(5), Fire Protection Program; Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 3, Fire Protection; 10 CFR 50.48, Fire Protection; Branch Technical Position Chemical Engineering Branch 9.5-1; Catawba Safety Evaluation Report (SER),
NUREG 0954 with Supplements 2, 3, 4, and 5; commitments to Appendix A of Branch Technical Position Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch 9.5-1; CNS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, and Section 16.9, Auxiliary Systems; other related NRC safety evaluation reports; and plant Technical Specifications. The review of the B.5.b mitigating strategies was based on the CNS Units 1 and 2 Renewed Operating License Condition 2.C(6), Mitigation Strategies; licensee B.5.b submittals; and related NRC SERs.. The team evaluated all areas of this inspection, as documented below, against these requirements. Specific licensing basis documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
.01 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities
a. Inspection Scope
The objective of the inspection was to verify the licensees ability to achieve hot and cold shutdown with and without the availability of offsite power. The inspection activities focused on ensuring the adequacy of systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring instrumentation, and support system functions.
Methodology The team walked down the selected fire areas and examined the material condition of the fire detection and suppression systems and fire area boundaries. The team compared the post fire safe shutdown analysis (SSA) with the post fire Abnormal Procedure (AP) AP/0/A/5500/045, Plant Fires, to verify that equipment required for post-fire safe shutdown was adequately protected from fire damage in accordance with the fire protection program. In cases where local operator manual actions (OMAs) were in place in lieu of cable protection of SSD components, the team verified that the OMAs were feasible and reliable based on the guidance in the IP.
Operational Implementation The team reviewed applicable sections of Abnormal Procedure AP/0/A/5500/045 utilized for post-fire SSD from the main control room (MCR) for a postulated fire in FA 15 and in the Unit 1 Turbine Building 6900 Volt Switchgear Room 1TA/1TB. The review was performed to verify that the shutdown methodology properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain SSD conditions. The team performed a walk-through of procedure steps to ensure the implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedure. The team also reviewed selected operator actions to verify that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.02 Passive Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the selected FA/FZs, the team evaluated the adequacy of fire barrier walls, ceilings, floors, mechanical and electrical fire barrier penetration seals, fire doors, and fire dampers. The team compared the installed configurations to the approved construction details, and supporting fire endurance test data, which established the ratings of fire barriers. In addition, the team reviewed licensing bases documentation, such as NRC SERs and deviations from NRC regulations, to verify that passive fire protection features met license commitments.
The team walked down accessible portions of the selected FA/FZs to observe material condition and the design adequacy of fire area boundaries to assess if they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area. Additionally, the team reviewed that as-built configurations met engineering design, standard industry practices, and were either properly evaluated or qualified by appropriate fire endurance tests. In addition, a sample of completed surveillance and maintenance procedures for selected fire doors, fire dampers, and fire barrier penetration seals were reviewed to ensure that these passive fire barrier features were properly inspected and maintained. The fire protection features included in the review are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified
.03 Active Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The team performed in-plant observations of fire detection and manual suppression systems protecting the FA/FZs selected for review, reviewed design documents, and reviewed applicable NFPA codes and standards, to assess the material condition and operational lineup of fire detection and manual suppression systems. The appropriateness of detection and manual suppression methods for the category of fire hazards in the various areas was reviewed.
The team reviewed the fire detection and manual suppression surveillance instructions, as well as the most recently completed surveillance tests for each of the selected FA/FZs. The team reviewed the fire protection water supply system and operational valve lineups associated with the electric motor-driven fire pumps.
The team reviewed the fire detection system protecting the FA/FZs selected for review to assess the adequacy of the design and installation. The team also reviewed license documentation, such as NRC SERs and deviations from NRC regulations, to verify that active fire protection features met license commitments. The inspectors walked down the fire detection and alarm systems in the selected FA/FZs to evaluate the appropriateness of detection methods for the category of fire hazards in the areas relative to the NFPA 72E - 1974 location requirements.
During plant tours, the team observed placement of the fire hoses and extinguishers to verify they were not blocked and were consistent with the fire fighting pre-plan strategies and FPP documents.
The team reviewed the fire brigade staging and dress-out areas to asses the operational readiness of fire fighting and smoke control equipment. The fire brigade personal protective equipment, self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBAs) and SCBA cylinder refill capability were reviewed for adequacy and functionality. The team also reviewed operator and fire brigade staffing, fire brigade response reports, offsite fire department communications and staging procedures, fire fighting pre-plan strategies, fire brigade qualification training, and the fire brigade drill program procedures. Fire brigade response-to-drill scenarios and associated brigade drill evaluations/critiques that transpired over the last 12 months for or in the vicinity of the selected FA/FZs were reviewed. The team also observed a fire brigade drill and post drill critique on May 12, 2010. The drill was conducted in a safety related area of the facility.
The team reviewed the fire fighting pre-plan strategies for the selected FA/FZs and fire response procedures to verify that pertinent information was provided to fire brigade members to identify potential effects to plant and personnel safety, and to facilitate suppression of an exposure fire that could impact SSD capability. The team walked down the selected FA/FZs to compare the associated fire fighting pre-plan strategy drawings with as-built plant conditions and fire response procedures. This was done to verify that fire fighting pre-plan strategies and drawings were consistent with the fire protection features and potential fire conditions described in the fire hazards analysis.
The team also evaluated whether the fire response procedures and fire fighting pre-plan strategies for the selected FA/FZs could be implemented as intended. The documents included in the reviews are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.04 Protection From Damage From Fire Suppression Activities
a. Inspection Scope
Through a combination of in-plant inspection and drawing reviews, the team evaluated the selected FAs/FZs to determine whether redundant trains of systems required for post-fire SSD could be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems. The team considered the effects of water, drainage, heat, hot gasses, and smoke that could potentially damage redundant trains.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.05 Alternative Shutdown Capability
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the systems and components credited for use during this shutdown method to verify that they would remain free from fire damage. The team reviewed the transfer logic for actuating the standby shutdown facility (SSF) to verify that the logic was tested and was in a periodic test program. The team reviewed surveillance test records for a sample of SSF hot standby instruments to verify that the instruments were periodically calibrated on a frequency consistent with the fire protection program requirements. The calibration records reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The team reviewed cable routing information by fire area for the Incore Nuclear Instrumentation Recorder ENCR9005 to verify that it would be available for use during a fire requiring the use of the SSF. Reviews also included verification that alternative shutdown could be accomplished with or without offsite power.
Operational Implementation The team reviewed selected job performance measures for licensed and non-licensed operators to verify that the training reinforced the shutdown methodology in the SSA and abnormal procedures for the selected FAs/FZs. The team also conducted interviews, reviewed shift turnover logs and shift manning to verify that personnel required for SSD using alternative shutdown systems and procedures were available onsite, exclusive of those assigned as fire brigade members.
The team performed a tabletop review of abnormal procedure AP/1/A/5500/017, Loss of Control Room, and also performed a walk-through of procedure steps to ensure the implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedure. The team checked whether the SSD procedure included steps to prevent or mitigate the consequences of spurious operations. The team walked down the in-plant location of OMAs specified in the AP with operations personnel to evaluate the environmental conditions, relative difficulty and operator familiarization associated with each OMA. The team reviewed the systems and components credited for use during this shutdown method to verify that they would remain free from fire damage. The team reviewed selected operator actions to verify that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.
b. Findings
Introduction:
The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Catawba Unit 1 Operating License Condition 2.C(5) and the FPP for the licensee=s failure to install emergency lighting units (ELUs) in all areas where local OMAs were being performed to support post-fire safe shutdown. Specifically, ELUs were not installed in some areas in the Unit 1 turbine building for access/egress and where OMAs were specified by procedure AP/1/A/5500/017 to support post-fire safe shutdown for a fire in the MCR.
Description:
The team reviewed and walked down applicable sections of Abnormal Procedure AP/1/A/5500/017 to review the procedural guidance and assess the local operator actions in support of safe shutdown operation from the SSF in the event of a MCR fire. During the walkdown of procedure AP/1/A/5500/017, the team noted that ELUs were not installed along turbine building access/egress routes and in certain turbine building areas where local OMAs were being performed to support post-fire safe shutdown conditions. For example, there was no ELU installed in the vicinity of the main feedwater (CF) pump local control panels in the turbine building, where the AP directed operators to trip the CF pumps. The team determined that this OMA was added during a revision to procedure AP/1/A/5500/017 in February 2010.
The team concluded that the feasibility of this action would be challenged if normal lighting was lost and no ELUs were available. The team noted that the licensee=s FPP (as referenced by UFSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, and described in design basis documents CNS-1435.00-00-0002, Design Basis Specification for Post Fire Safe Shutdown, and CNS-1465.00-00-0006, Design Basis Specification for the Plant Fire Protection) states that manual actions required within the initial eight hours must be provided with adequate battery-powered emergency lighting. This includes both the manual action location and the access/egress routes thereto. The team concluded that the failure to install ELUs to support the OMAs in the turbine building required by procedure AP/1/A/5500/017 did not comply with the FPP. The licensee initiated PIP C-10-2815 to address the ELU issue associated with the procedure.
Analysis:
The licensees failure to install ELUs for local OMAs, as required by the CNS fire protection program, is a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the reactor safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e., fire) and it affects the objective of ensuring the reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Specifically, the finding could affect the ability to perform local OMAs required to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown conditions following a MCR fire. The team completed a Phase 1 screening of the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Qualitative Screening Approach, Step 1.3, and concluded that the finding, given its low degradation rating, was of very low safety significance (Green), because the operators had a high likelihood of completing the tasks using flashlights or battery-powered portable hand lights. Consideration was given to the fact that operators normally carry flashlights and would have access to portable hand lights to provide the necessary lighting. The cause of this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Resources component of the Human Performance area, in that the licensee did not ensure that equipment such as fixed 8-hour ELUs were available to support post-fire safe shutdown local OMAs (H.2 (d)).
Enforcement:
Catawba Unit 1 Operating License Condition 2.C(5) requires the licensee to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved FPP, as described in the UFSAR, and as approved in the NRC SER through Supplement 5. The approved FPP, as referenced by UFSAR Section 9.5.1, is contained in licensee design basis documents CNS-1435.00-00-0002, Design Basis Specification for Post Fire Safe Shutdown, and CNS-1465.00-00-0006, Plant Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection. The FPP states that manual actions required within the initial eight hours must be provided with adequate battery-powered emergency lighting. This includes both the OMA location and the access/egress routes thereto.
Contrary to the above, the licensee did not meet the requirements of the CNS FPP, in that 8-hour battery-powered ELUs were not installed in the Unit 1 turbine building where post-fire SSD OMAs were being performed. Specifically, there were no ELUs installed along the access/egress routes or in the vicinity of the CF pump local control stations in the turbine building where procedure AP/1/A/5500/017 directed operators to trip the CF pumps in the event of a MCR fire and MCR evacuation. The condition has existed since February 2010, when this OMA was added during a revision to procedure AP/1/A/5500/017. Because this finding is of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensee=s corrective action program (PIP C-10-2815), this finding is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC=s Enforcement Policy.
This finding is identified as NCV 05000413/2010006-01, Emergency Lighting Units Not Installed as Required by the Fire Protection Program.
Because the licensee committed, prior to December 31, 2005, to adopt NFPA 805 and change their fire protection licensing bases to comply with 10 CFR 50.48(c), the team evaluated this issue for enforcement and reactor oversight process discretion in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48). The team determined that enforcement discretion was not applicable to this finding, because it should have been previously identified by routine licensee efforts during review of the procedure change.
.06 Circuit Analyses
a. Inspection Scope
The team verified that a fire in the 6900 Volt Switchgear Room 1TA and 1TB in the turbine building, would not prevent SSD assuming a loss of offsite power. The inspectors reviewed design drawings to verify that the 125 volt direct current control power for the non-safety switchgear in the turbine building was electrically and physically separated from the control power for the safety-related switchgear in the auxiliary building, and that the protective relay logic would adequately protect the safety-related switchgear from electrical failures due to postulated fire damage in the 6900 volt switchgear room. This review was performed to confirm that a fire in a non-seismic category 1 structure should not affect seismic category 1 structures, systems, or components required for SSD. The inspectors also reviewed information showing the level of coordination between incoming supply breakers and feeder breakers of motor control center (MCC) 1EMXS. After reviewing cable routing information for all feeder cables from MCC 1EMXS, one associated circuit was found to be routed in an alternative shutdown area (FA 3) for which operation of the MCC is credited for SSD.
The cable was protected with a functional, but degraded fire barrier, for which the licensee had implemented appropriate compensatory measures. The inspectors verified that fuse and breaker coordination was appropriate to prevent loss of the MCC due to potential fire damage of the cable in the fire area. The inspectors verified this by reviewing a set of time current curves plotted for the types of protective devices used in MCC 1EMXS. Other documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.07 Communications
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed plant communication capabilities to evaluate the availability of the communication systems to support plant personnel in the performance of local OMAs to achieve and maintain SSD conditions. The team also reviewed the communication systems available at different locations within the plant that would be relied upon to support fire event notification and fire brigade fire fighting activities to verify their availability at different locations.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.08 Emergency Lighting
a. Inspection Scope
The team performed plant walk down inspections with licensee staff of the post-fire safe shutdown procedures for the selected fire areas to observe if the placement and coverage area of fixed 8-hour battery pack emergency lights provided reasonable assurance of illuminating access and egress pathways and any equipment requiring local operation and/or instrumentation monitoring for post fire safe shutdown.
The team reviewed maintenance and design aspects, including manufacturers information and vendor manuals, for the fixed emergency lighting units to verify that the battery power supplies were rated with at least an 8-hour capacity as described in fire protection safety evaluation reports. Preventive maintenance and surveillance testing records were reviewed to ensure adequate surveillance testing and periodic battery replacements were in place to ensure continued reliable operation of the fixed emergency lights. The team reviewed the completed 8-hour discharge test records for the fixed emergency lights to verify they met the minimum rating of at least eight-hour capacity. The team also discussed with the licensee the maintenance rule status of the emergency lighting systems. A list of documents reviewed is included in the Attachment.
b. Findings
Findings of significance involving emergency lighting are discussed in Section 1R05.05.b of this IR.
.09 Cold Shutdown Repairs
a. Inspection Scope
The licensees SSA identified the need for post-fire repairs prior to achieving a cold shutdown condition. Thus, cold shutdown repair procedures and repair kits were reviewed during this inspection. The inspectors verified that the fire damage repair procedures were current and adequate and repair parts and equipment were being stored and maintained onsite. The inspectors toured the warehouse where the fire damage repair kits were stored, and examined the material condition of the parts being stored in the kits. The licensee annually inventories the repair kits in accordance with the inventory control procedure. The inspectors reviewed the inventory inspection check sheet records to verify that all required replacement parts were being accounted for and were available for use. The inspectors also verified by physical inspection that the special crimping tools required by the fire damage control procedure were readily available from the tool issue area for terminating new replacement electrical cables. The specific documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.10 Compensatory Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed the administrative controls for out-of-service, degraded, and/or inoperable fire protection features (e.g., detection and suppression systems and equipment, passive fire barriers, or pumps, valves or electrical devices providing SSD functions or capabilities). The team reviewed selected items on the fire protection impairment log and compared them with the FAs/FZs selected for inspection. The compensatory measures that had been established in these FAs/FZs were compared to those specified for the applicable fire protection feature to verify that the risk associated with removing the fire protection feature from service was properly assessed and adequate compensatory measures were implemented in accordance with the approved FPP. Additionally, the team reviewed the licensees short term compensatory measures to verify that they were adequate to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions could be taken, and that the licensee was effective in returning the equipment to service in a reasonable period of time.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.11 B.5.b Inspection Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed, on a sampling basis, the licensees external spent fuel pool mitigation measures for large fires and explosions to verify that the measures were feasible, personnel were trained to implement the strategies, and equipment was properly staged and maintained. Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation, and plant walk-downs, the team verified the engineering basis to establish reasonable assurance that the makeup capacity required by the strategy could be provided for the minimum time using the specified equipment and water sources.
The team reviewed the licensees capability to provide a reliable and available water source and the ability to provide the minimum fuel supply. By review of records and physical inspection, the team verified that the B.5.b equipment required to support external spent fuel pool mitigation measures was being properly stored, maintained, and tested in accordance with the licensees B.5.b program procedures. The team requested and reviewed maintenance records of required equipment. The team performed a walk-down of the storage and staging areas to verify that equipment identified for use in the current procedures were available and maintained. In the presence of licensee staff, the team conducted an independent audit and inventory of required equipment and a visual inspection of the dedicated credited power source.
The team also verified, by review of training records, that security, operations and emergency response personnel had received training on the strategy objectives and guidelines in accordance with the established training program.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a sample of PIPs related to fire protection for detailed inspection to verify that the corrective actions were appropriate, timely and effective. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On May 13, 2010, the inspection team leader presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. J. Morris, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensees staff.
Following completion of additional reviews in the Region II office, another exit meeting was held by telephone with Mr. R. Ferguson, Mechanical and Civil Engineering Manager, and other members of the licensees staff on June 28, 2010, to provide an update on changes to the preliminary inspection findings. The license acknowledged the results.
Proprietary information is not included in this inspection report.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- T. Arlow, Emergency Planning Manager
- J. Brisson, Operations Support Group
- B. Edmunds, Emergency Response Organization Training
- G. Daniels, Operations Training
- T. Daniels, Fire Brigade Coordinator
- D. Davies, RF/RY System Engineer
- A. Dickard, Breaker Coordination
- R. Ferguson, Mechanical and Civil Engineering Manager
- G. Hamrick, Station Manager
- R. Hart, Regulatory Compliance Manager
- M. Hogan, Fire Protection Engineer
- T. Jackson, Regulatory Compliance
- E. Madsen, Operations Training
- J. Morris, Site Vice President Catawba Nuclear Station
- A. Miller, Senior Reactor Operator
- J. Oldham, Fleet-wide Fire Protection Engineer
- T. Pasour, Regulatory Compliance
- B. Potter, Security Training
- B. Price, B5b Engineer
- T. Ray, Engineering Manager
- M. Sawicki, Regulatory Compliance
- S. Tripi, Operations Training
NRC personnel
- R. Cureton, NRC Resident Inspector, CNS
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
- 05000413/2010006-01 NCV Emergency Lighting Units Not Installed as Required by the Fire Protection Program (Section 1R05.05.b)
Discussed
None
LIST OF FIRE BARRIER FEATURES INSPECTED (Refer to Report Section 1RO5.02- Passive Fire Barriers)
Fire Door Identification Fire Door AX514B, Unit 1 Auxiliary Building SSF Disconnect, Elev. 577 Fire Door AX515, Unit 1 Auxiliary Building Cable Room, Elev. 574 Fire Door AX516K, Unit 1 Auxiliary Building Cable Room, Elev. 574 Fire Door AX517C, Unit 1 Corridor to RCA Exit, Elev. 574 Fire Door AX536, Unit 1 Auxiliary Building Cable Room Area, Elev. 577 Fire Damper Identification Fire Damper 1CRA-FD-21, Control Room Area Fire Damper, Elev. 574 Fire Damper 1CRA-FD-22, Control Room Area Fire Damper, Elev. 574 Fire Damper 1CRA-FD-23, Control Room Area Fire Damper, Elev. 574 Fire Damper 2CRA-FD-19, Cable Room Area Fire Damper, Elev. 574 Fire Damper 2CRA-FD-20, Cable Room Area Fire Damper, Elev. 574 Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Identification Penetration Firestop, H-AX-516-W-024, Type E-5 Electrical Cable Tray and Conduit Seal in Reinforced Concrete Wall, Auxiliary Building, Elev. 574 Penetration Firestop, H-AX-517-W-081, Type E-16 Armored Electrical Cable Seal in Masonry Block Wall, Auxiliary Building, Elev. 574 Penetration Firestop J-AX-515-W-005, Mechanical Seal in Masonry Block Wall, Auxiliary Building, Elev. 577 Penetration Firestop J-AX-536-F-004, Type M-2 Mechanical Seal in Reinforced Concrete Floor, Auxiliary Building, Elev. 577 Penetration Firestop, J-AX-514-W-027, Type E-12 Internal Conduit Seal in Electrical Conduit Embedded In Reinforced Concrete Wall, Auxiliary Building, Elev. 577