IR 05000400/2002002

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IR 05000400-02-002, on 03/31/2002 - 06/29/2002, Carolina Power & Light, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. Baseline Integrated Resident Inspection Report
ML022040180
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/22/2002
From: Brian Bonser
NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4
To: Scarola J
Carolina Power & Light Co
References
IR-02-002
Download: ML022040180 (27)
v • d • e


Text

uly 22, 2002

SUBJECT:

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-400/02-02

Dear Mr. Scarola:

On June 29, 2002, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Shearon Harris facility. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on July 2, 2002, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) components of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Brian R. Bonser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-63

Enclosure:

Inspection Report

REGION II==

Docket No: 50-400 License No: NPF-63 Report No: 50-400/02-02 Licensee: Carolina Power & Light (CP&L)

Facility: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Location: 5413 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC 27562 Dates: March 31, 2002 - June 29, 2002 Inspectors: J. Brady, Senior Resident Inspector R. Hagar, Resident Inspector W. Sartor Jr., Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector (1EP2 -

1EP6, 40A1.1)

S. Vias, Senior Reactor Inspector (1R02 and 1R17)

W. Bearden, Reactor Inspector (1R02 and 1R17)

W. Crowley, Senior Reactor Inspector (1R02 and 1R17)

E. Lea, Senior Reactor Inspector (1R11.2)

K. ODonohue, Reactor Inspector (1R11.2)

Approved by: B. Bonser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000400-02-02, on 03/31/2002 - 06/29/2002, Carolina Power & Light, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. Baseline integrated resident inspection report.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, regional emergency preparedness inspectors, and regional reactor inspectors. No findings of significance were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html.

A. Inspector Identified Findings None B. Licensee Identified Violations None

Report Details The unit operated at 100 % of rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection a. Inspection Scope The inspectors selected for inspection the following two systems that could be affected by adverse (hot) weather:

  • Main Condensate System For these systems, the inspectors reviewed related licensee activities to verify that protection features were monitored. The inspectors also reviewed section 2.0, Engineering Evaluation Report for Condensate/Feedwater/Feedwater Heaters and section 7.0, Engineering Evaluation Report for Normal and Emergency Service Water of MDES-TR-78704, Balance of Plant Engineering Evaluation Report dated June 17, 2002, to determine whether evaluations performed for the recently implemented power uprate had revealed any problems related to component operation during hot weather.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests or Experiments a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed selected samples of evaluations to verify that the licensee had appropriately considered the conditions under which changes to the facility or procedures could be made, and tests conducted, without prior NRC approval. The inspectors reviewed 20 evaluations. The inspection included review of additional information, such as calculations, supporting analyses and drawings, to determine that the licensee had appropriately concluded that the changes could be accomplished without obtaining a license amendment. The 20 evaluations reviewed are listed in the List of Documents Reviewed.

The inspectors also reviewed samples of design/engineering packages, engineering evaluations, calculations, and procedure changes for which the licensee had determined that evaluations were not required, to verify that the licensees conclusions to screen out these changes were correct and consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The 14 screened-out changes reviewed are listed in the List of Documents Reviewed.

The inspectors also reviewed the results of the licensees recent quality assurance audit and reports for engineering activities related to the 10 CFR 50.59 process.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment a. Inspection Scope Partial Walkdown For the systems identified below, the inspectors reviewed the identified plant documents to determine correct system lineup, and observed equipment to verify that the system was correctly aligned:

A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump with B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump out of service on April 22

  • Drawing 2165-S-544, Simplified Flow Diagram Feedwater System Unit B train emergency service water with A train out of service on April 29
  • Drawing 2165-S-0547 Simplified Flow Diagram Circulating & Service Water Systems A train high head safety injection with B train out of service on May 23
  • Procedure OP-110, Safety Injection System
  • Drawing 2165-S-1308 Simplified Flow Diagram Safety Injection System A train emergency service water with B train out of service on June 12
  • Drawing 2165-S-0547, Simplified Flow Diagram Circulating & Service Water Systems

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection a. Inspection Scope For the areas identified below, the inspectors reviewed a set of fire-protection-related attributes, to determine whether any conditions adversely affected fire protection defense-in-depth features. The inspected areas included:

  • A switchgear room
  • B switchgear room
  • cable spreading rooms
  • A chiller area
  • B chiller area
  • control room For these areas and for the attributes listed below, the inspectors either observed the attribute in the plant and/or reviewed results from performance of the identified plant procedure(s). The inspected attributes and procedures included:
  • any welding or cutting being performed in the area;
  • the physical condition of the fire detection devices, and/or results from procedures:

FPT-3205 Fire Detector Functional Test Local Fire Detector Panel 5 12 Month Interval performed September 5, 2001 FPT-3206, Fire Detector Functional Test Local Fire Detector Panel 6 12 Month interval performed August 16, 2001 FPT-3207, Fire Detector Functional Test Local Fire Detector Panel 7 12 Month Interval performed March 6, 2002

  • the physical condition of the automatic suppression system (where used);
  • the availability and general condition of portable fire extinguishers, and/or results from FPT-3151 Fire Extinguisher Inspection: Auxiliary Building Monthly Interval performed March 26, 2002, and May 16, 2002;
  • the physical condition of manual suppression systems, including fire hoses and hose stations, and/or results from OPT-3010 Fire Hose Service Test Various Intervals performed January 17, 2000 (required every three years)
  • the material condition of electrical raceway fire barrier systems;
  • the material condition of the fire door(s);
  • the condition of ventilation fire dampers, and/or results from FPT-3425, Fire Damper Inspection 18 Month Interval performed August 29, 2001;
  • the material condition of the structural steel fire-proofing (where used);
  • the physical condition of seals in accessible electrical and piping penetrations, and/or results from FPT-3550 Fire Penetration Seal Visual Inspection 18 Month Interval performed May 30, 2002; and
  • the adequacy of compensatory measures, where degraded features were identified.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees internal flooding analysis, and selected the reactor auxiliary building 190-foot elevation for detailed review. That elevation includes both residual heat removal pumps and both containment spray pumps. For that elevation, the inspectors reviewed the licensees analysis of the effects of flooding resulting from postulated piping failures, as described in the following documents, to determine whether that analysis contained reasonable assumptions and conclusions based on the current plant configuration:

  • FSAR section 3.6A.6, Flooding Analysis
  • Calculation #PRA-F/E-4, RAB Unit 1 Elevation 190' & 216' Flood Analysis To verify that the procedures for coping with flooding can be used to achieve the desired actions, the inspectors reviewed procedure AOP-022, Loss of Service Water and OP-139, Service Water System

The inspectors performed a field walk-down of the selected area to determine whether the physical configuration of the area was consistent with the assumptions in the documents.

The inspectors reviewed Action Request (AR) 31044, Emergency service water intake structure potential flooding condition, to determine whether the licensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance a. Inspection Scope To determine the licensees approach to heat exchanger performance monitoring, the inspectors reviewed the following documents:

  • Licensee Generic Letter 89-13 responses The inspectors reviewed results of the 1B-SB charging/safety injection pump gear oil cooler heat exchanger performance inspection conducted on October 25, 2001, using procedure EPT-163, to verify that:
  • potential fouling situations were identified and corrected;
  • inspection results were appropriately categorized against pre-established acceptance criteria;
  • the frequency of inspection was sufficient to detect degradation prior to loss of heat removal capability below design basis values; and
  • the licensee had developed acceptance criteria for its bio-fouling controls.

The inspectors reviewed photographs of the service water side of the heat exchanger taken during the inspection but did not physically observe the inside of the heat exchanger.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed AR 50768, Service Water System Performance, which investigated a trend of increased fouling of the service water system heat exchangers, to determine whether the licensee had identified appropriate corrective actions.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

.1 Simulator Training Observation a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed licensed operator requalification simulator training for crew C on April 30 and May 1. This observation included emergency operating procedure (EOP) and abnormal operating procedure (AOP) scenarios. The scenarios tested the operators ability to respond to a loss of ultimate heat sink, a steam generator tube leak, a loss of an instrument bus, and a component cooling water leak. The inspectors focused on clarity and formality of communication, use of procedures, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics and supervisory oversight. The training was completed using Exercise Guides EOP-SIM-17.56 and INPO-AOP-17.03.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Annual Operating Test Results a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the overall pass/fail results of the biennial written examination, the individual job-performance-measure operating tests, and the simulator operating tests (required to be given per 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)) administered by the licensee during calender year 2002.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation a. Inspection Scope For the equipment issues described in the ARs listed below, the inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) with respect to the

characterization of failures, the appropriateness of the associated a(1) or a(2)

classification, and the appropriateness of either the associated a(2) performance criteria or the associated a(1) goals and corrective actions:

AR Number Subject/Description.

52462 Failure of reactor makeup water flow to the boric-acid blender 54450 Failure of 1SW-1055 to modulate position in response to a control signal 56873 Core exit thermocouple TE-01RE-0032SBW failed 49928 Reactor auxiliary building emergency exhaust system dampers AV-D11 & D33 failure to close 56276 Failure of chilled water expansion tank isolation valve 1CH-1398 60873 Reactor vessel level indication system train A functional failure b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees risk assessments and the risk management actions used by the licensee to manage risk for the plant configurations associated with the following planned activities:

  • Work activities for week of 3/31 - 4/6 involving emergent work on turbine digital electro-hydraulic control and the venting of air out of a check valve located in the refueling water storage tank line to the charging/safety injection pump suction header.
  • Work activities for week of 4/22 - 4/26 involving B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump breaker maintenance and pump discharge pressure control valve outage maintenance.
  • Work activities for week of 6/1 - 6/7 involving A train residual heat removal/ A train component cooling system outages.

The inspectors reviewed the emergent work activities listed below, as described in the referenced Work Orders (WOs) and/or ARs, to verify that any increase in risk was promptly assessed, and that any required risk management actions were implemented.

The inspectors observed whether licensee actions were appropriate to minimize the probability of initiating events, maintain the functional capability of mitigating systems, and maintain barrier integrity.

WO Number Subject/Description WO 268746 Turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump inboard shaft seal loose WO 278390 1B-SB Emergency diesel generator overspeed trip will not reset b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations a. Inspection Scope For the operability evaluations described in the ARs listed below, the inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations, to ensure that operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred:

AR Number Subject/Description 56692 High particle count in the C charging safety injection pump and speed changer 60584 Internal corrosion of water-filled differential pressure units on Barton flow indicating switches, as reported under 10CFR21 60991 Emergency service water through-wall pipe leak b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated design change packages for 11 modifications, to verify that the modifications did not degrade system availability, reliability, or functional capability.

These modifications affected the Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity cornerstones. The inspectors verified inspection procedure attributes such as:

  • energy requirements can be supplied by supporting systems;
  • materials and replacement components were compatible with physical interfaces;
  • replacement components were seismically qualified for the application;
  • code and safety classification of replacement system, structures, and components were consistent with design bases;
  • modification design assumptions were appropriate;
  • post-modification testing established operability;
  • failure modes introduced by the modification were bounded by existing analyses;
  • and appropriate procedures or procedure changes had been initiated.

For selected modification packages, the inspectors conducted walk downs to verify that the as-built configuration accurately reflected the design documentation.

Documents reviewed included procedures, engineering calculations, modifications, work orders, site drawings, corrective action documents, applicable sections of the living Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, supporting analyses, Technical Specifications, and design basis documentation. The major documents reviewed are listed in the List of Documents Reviewed.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing a. Inspection Scope For the post-maintenance tests listed below, the inspectors reviewed the identified test procedure and either witnessed the testing and/or reviewed test records to determine whether the test was adequate for the scope of the maintenance work performed and demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable:

Test Procedure Number Title Related maintenance task OST-1077 Auxiliary Feedwater Valves Preventive maintenance on B Operability Test Quarterly motor-driven auxiliary feedwater and Interval pump discharge pressure control valve 1AF-34 OST 1311 Auxiliary Feedwater Valves Remote Position Indication Test

OP-137 Auxiliary Feedwater System Perform maintenance on inboard Section 5.5, Manual Operation mechanical shaft seal.

of the Turbine-driven AFW Pump OST-1093 CVCS/SI System Operability Complete oil system flush of pump, Train B Quarterly Interval speed changer, and motor OST-1020 Remote Shutdown Monitoring Adjusted 5-volt power supply and and Accident Monitoring replaced the central processing unit Instrumentation Channel Check on the reactor vessel level Monthly Interval Modes 1-2-3 indication system OST-1073 1B-SB Emergency Diesel Replaced 2 leaking shuttle valves in Generator Operability Test the diesel generators overspeed Monthly Interval Modes 1-2-3-4- trip control circuit 5-6 OST-1215 Emergency Service Water Replace stuffing box packing on the System Operability Train B Train B emergency service water Quarterly Interval Modes 1-2-3- pump

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing a. Inspection Scope For the surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the identified test procedure and either witnessed the testing and/or reviewed test records to determine whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable:

Number Title MST-I0140 Delta T/Tavg Loop (T-0412) Operational Test MST-E0010 1E Battery Weekly Test OST-1073* 1B-SB Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test Monthly Interval OST-1122 Train A 6.9 KV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Trip Actuating Device Operational Test and Contact Check Modes 1-6 OST-1118 Containment Spray Operability Train A Quarterly Interval

  • This procedure included inservice testing requirements.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the temporary modification described in Engineering Service Request 02-005, Modify Alarm Cards for Reactor Coolant Pump B & C Standpipe Level Alarm, to determine whether the modification was properly installed, the modification did not affect system operability, drawings and procedures were appropriately updated, and post-modification testing was satisfactorily performed.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness 1EP2 Alert Notification System Testing a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the testing program for the alert and notification system (ANS),

which comprised 81 pole-mounted sirens within the ten-mile emergency planning zone.

The testing program involved bi-weekly silent tests, quarterly tests, and an annual full volume test. The inspectors also reviewed maintenance records to ascertain the effectiveness and timeliness of repairs when siren problems were identified.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation Testing a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the documentation supporting the maintenance and testing of the licensees emergency response organization augmentation system.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed changes to the Emergency Plan and the emergency action levels (EALs) to determine whether any of the changes decreased the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. The current Emergency Plan was Revision 43. The review was performed against 10CFR50.54(q).

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the efficacy of licensee programs that addressed weaknesses and deficiencies in emergency preparedness. Items reviewed included exercise and drill critique reports and the licensees Drill & Exercise Corrective Action Status Report.

No emergency declarations had been made since the last inspection of this program area (conducted in June 2000).

b. Findings:

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation a. Inspection Scope On April 16 the inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill to verify licensee self-assessment of classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development. The drill simulated a reactor coolant system leak that escalated into a loss-of-coolant accident, coincident with an unisolable leak from a steam generator due to a partially open safety valve. Although the drill did not simulate a release of radioactive materials, the scenario did include conditions that would satisfy the licensees criteria for declaring an Alert, a Site Area Emergency, and a General Emergency. The inspectors monitored the licensees activities related to classifying the simulated accident, notifying appropriate offsite agencies, and developing and communicating appropriate protective action recommendations. Following the drill, the inspectors also reviewed the licensees self-assessment of their performance during the drill.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

.1 Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity Cornerstones a. Inspection Scope The inspectors verified the PIs listed in the table below, to determine their accuracy and completeness against requirements in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events Performance Indicator Verification Period Records Reviewed Unplanned Scrams * Licensee Event Reports 2nd quarter, 2001, * NRC Inspection Reports Scrams with Loss of Normal through * Monthly Operating Reports Heat Removal 1st quarter, * operator logs 2002 * licensee power history curves Unplanned Power Changes Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems Performance Indicator Verification Period Records Reviewed Safety System Unavailability, 2nd quarter, 2001, * records of inoperable Residual Heat Removal through equipment 1st quarter, * Maintenance Rule event logs Safety System Unavailability, 2002 * equipment tagout records Auxiliary Feedwater Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity Performance Indicator Verification Period Records Reviewed Reactor Coolant System 2nd quarter, 2001, * plant chemistry data Specific Activity through 1st quarter, Reactor Coolant System 2002 * operator logs Leakage The inspectors also reviewed the following ARs associated with this area to determine whether the licensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:

AR Number Subject/Description 55035 NRC Emergency Planning Key Performance Indicator Missed Performance Opportunity 53811 Saving Unavailability Time by Scheduling Concurrent System Outages 49486 Potential Trend in Quality of Information Sent to NRC

.2 Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed licensee records to determine whether the submitted PI values (through the first quarter of 2002) were calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in Section 2.4 (Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone) of NEI 99-02. The inspectors assessed the accuracy of the following PIs related to emergency preparedness:

  • Drill/Exercise Performance, assessed through review of a sample of drill records (aggregate value for the past eight quarters was 94.0 percent);
  • Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation, assessed through review of the training records for the 36 individuals assigned to key positions in the ERO as of the end of the first quarter of 2002 (value was 97.2 percent); and
  • Alert and Notification System reliability, assessed through review of a sample of the licensees records of siren tests conducted from July 1, 2001, to March 31, 2002 (value was 98.6 percent).

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the issue described in AR 54450, in accordance with inspection procedure 71152. The subject AR described the inoperability of an essential services chilled water chiller due to the failure of a service water flow valve to modulate. The licensee classified this issue as a Significant Adverse Condition, because this failure was a Maintenance Rule Functional Failure that caused the number of failures for the chiller to exceed the established performance criteria.

This issue affected the Mitigation Systems cornerstone, in that it involved the reliability of safety-related equipment.

During this review, the inspectors determined whether:

  • identification of the problem was complete and accurate;
  • the problem was identified in a timely manner;
  • the licensee properly classified and prioritized resolution;
  • the licensee evaluated and dispositioned operability and reportability issues;
  • the licensee considered extent of condition, generic implications, common causes, and previous occurrences; and
  • corrective actions were completed in a timely manner.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up (Closed) LER 50-400/2001-004-00,Reactor Coolant Loops Mode 4 Technical Specification Violation. This LER reported a violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.1.3 that occurred on December 25, 2001, during Refueling Outage 10. The plant entered Operational Mode 4 from Operational Mode 3 without satisfying TS 3.4.1.3 requirements for having steam generator wide range level greater than 74% (actual values were A-72.4%, B-72.5%, C-72.4%). TS 3.4.1.3 had been revised for steam generator replacement to require monitoring of wide range level instead of narrow range level in Mode 4. However, the TS still allowed a minimum steam generator narrow range level limit of 30% if the wide range level instrumentation was inoperable. Narrow range level was above 30% during this period (A-58%, B-56%, C-58%). Because the wide range level was operable and the narrow range level was above the minimum, the inspectors concluded that this violation had no safety significance and, in accordance with the guidance in Manual Chapter 0610*, was minor.

4OA6 Meetings, including Exit

.1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Scarola, Site Vice President, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 2. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee D. Alexander, Nuclear Assessment Manager G. Attarian, Harris Engineering Support Services Manager R. Bassett, Acting Emergency Preparedness Supervisor J. Caves, Licensing Supervisor R. Duncan, Director Site Operations T. Hobbs, Operations Manager J. Holt, Site Support Services Manager J. Laque, Maintenance Manager M. Munroe, Training Manager T. Natale, Outage and Scheduling Manager J. Scarola, Harris Plant Vice President P. Summers, Environmental & Radiation Control Manager B. Waldrep, Harris Plant General Manager NRC B. Bonser, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4 J. Goshen, Harris Project Manager, NRR ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Closed 50-400/2001-004-00 LER Reactor Coolant Loops Mode 4 Technical Specification Violation (Section 4OA3)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Engineering Service Requests (ESR) - Modifications [R017B]

Document No. Title ESR 99-00273 Pressurizer Safety Valve Capacity Document Changes ESR 99-00407 Installation of Flow Balancing Orifices in [High Head Safety Injection]

System ESR 00-00253 Sequencer Timer Technical Specification Change ESR 00-00326 Abandonment of Unnecessary Monitors ESR 01-00170 Add Trend Capability for [Service Water Differential Pressure] across

[Component Cooling Water] Heat Exchangers ESR 01-00171 PP-1E211-18 Breaker Discrepancy ESR 01-00191 Full Power Operation at Reduced [Feedwater] Temperature Analysis ESR 01-00205 Tube Leak in Containment AH-37 Cooling Coil ESR 01-00222 [Auxiliary Feedwater] Accident Analyses Determination for [the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater] Flow Controller ESR 01-00231 Delta Temperature/[Average Temperature]. Loop Scaling, TE-432D ESR 01-00405 Feed Regulating Bypass Valves Solenoid Discharge Tubing Screened Out Engineering Evaluations (10 CFR 50.59) [R02]

Document No. Title APP-A2, Rev 14 Auxiliary Control Panel EST-230, Rev. 0 Determination of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Differential Pressure Controller Set Point GP-009, Rev. 31 Refueling Cavity Fill, Refueling and Drain of the Refueling Cavity, Modes 5-6-5 OMM-001 Off Normal Audit, May 2001 for 1CS-8 OP-116, Rev. 20 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup OP-149, Rev. 21 Fire Protection OST-1506, Rev. 10 [Reactor Coolant System] Isolation valve Leak Test - 18 Month Interval, Modes 3 & 4 OST-1823, Rev. 17 1A-SA Emergency Diesel Generator Operability Test, 18 Month Interval, Modes 1 through 6 and Defueled ESR 99-00273 Pressurizer Safety Valve Capacity Document Changes ESR 01-00066 AH-82 Diffuser Modification ESR 01-00170 Add Trend Capability for [Service Water Differential Pressure]

across [Component Cooling Water] Heat Exchangers Attachment

ESR 01-00171 PP-1E211-18 Breaker Discrepancy ESR 01-00205 AH-37 Tube Leak in Containment Cooling Coil ESR 01-00231 Delta Temperature/[Average Temperature]. Loop Scaling, TE-432D Safety Evaluations [R02]

Document No. Title 01-1513 B [Emergency Service Water] Strainer Control in Hand AOP-010, Rev. 19 Feedwater Malfunctions Procedure AP-013, Rev. 25 Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Procedure ESR 99-00407 Installation of Flow Balancing Orifices in HHSI System ESR 00-00326 Abandonment of Unnecessary Monitors ESR 00-00253 Sequencer Timer Technical Specification Change ESR 01-00087 [Charging/Safety Injection Pump] Recirculation Flow Path Change ESR 01-00191 Full Power Operation at Reduced [Feedwater] Temperature Analysis ESR 01-00222 [Auxiliary Feedwater] Accident Analyses Determination for

[the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater] Flow Controller ESR 01-00405 Feed Regulating Bypass Valves Solenoid Discharge Tubing ESR 02-00005 Modify Alarms Cards for [Reactor Coolant Pump trains] B&C Standpipe Level Alarm FSAR 5.4.7 [Residual Heat Removal System] Operation from Main Control Room FSAR (various sections) FSAR Changes to Support New 10 CFR 50.59 Rule FSAR 9.2.1.2 [Emergency Service Water Pump Operation OP-134.01, Rev. 15 Feedwater System Procedure ORT-8001, Rev 4 Digital Electro-Hydraulic Computer System Dynamic Simulation Test OST-1825, Rev. 12 Safety Injection: [Engineered Safety Feature] Response Time, Train A, 18 Month Interval on a Staggered Test Basis, Modes 5-6 PLP-106, Rev. 27 [Technical Specification] Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report PLP-114, Rev. 14 Relocated [Technical Specification] and Design Basis Requirements Procedure PLP-632T, Rev. 1 Power Ascension Testing Program After RFO-10 Refueling Outage

Licensee Procedures and Documents [R02 & R17B]

Document No. Title REG-NGGC-0002, Rev. 4 10 CFR 50.59 and Other Regulatory Evaluations REG-NGGC-0010, Rev. 4 10 CFR 50.59 Reviews EGR-NGGC-0011, Rev. 5 Conduct of Engineering Products Review EGR-NGGC-0005, Rev. 17 Engineering Change AR 64082 [10CFR]50.59 [Unreviewed Safety Question Determination] did not meet expectations for review performed for PLP-632T AR 29316 10CFR50.59 Evaluation Quality Improvements AR 02915 Pressurizer [Safety Relief Valve] Capacity HNP-F/NFSA-0061 HNP Cycle 10 Changes to Plant Parameters Document WO 88589 05 Install [High Pressure Safety Injection] Flow Orifice 2SI2-585B-1 WO 88589 11 Install [High Pressure Safety Injection] Flow Orifice 2SI2-725B-1 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) (including Amendment 50)

Technical Specifications, Amendment 107 Licensee Assessment Documents [R02 & R17B]

Document No. Title AR 28644-02 Self Assessment of Engineering Product Quality

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