IR 05000397/1993006
| ML17290A341 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia, Satsop  |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1993 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17290A339 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-93-06, 50-397-93-6, 50-508-93-02, 50-508-93-2, NUDOCS 9305240046 | |
| Download: ML17290A341 (41) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
Report Nos:
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
Licensee:
Facility Name:
Inspection at:
Inspection Conducted:
Inspectors:
50-397/93-06, 50-508/93-02 50-397, 50-508 NPF-21, CPPR-154 Washington Public Power Supply System P. 0.
Box 968 Richland, WA 99352 Washington Nuclear Project No.
(WNP-2)
Washington Nuclear Project No.
(WNP-3 WNP-2 site near Richland, Washington WNP-3 site near Elma, Washington I
February 16 March 29, 1993 (WNP-2)
February 24, 1993 (WNP-3)
R.
C. Barr, Senior Resident Inspector D. L. Proulx,'esident Inspector W. L. Johnson, Resident Intern J.
F. Melfi, Resident Inspector Approved by:
~Summa':
P.
H.
o nson, Chief Reacto Projects Section
Date Signed Ins ection on Februar 16 March
1993 Re ort No. 50-397 93-06 Ins ection on Februar
1993 Re ort No. 50-508 93-02 Areas Ins ected:
At WNP-2, a routine inspection by the resident inspectors of control room operations, licensee action on previous inspection findings, operational safety verification, surveillance program, maintenance program, licensee event reports, special inspection topics, and procedure adherence.
During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 61726, 62703, 71707, 71710, 90712, 92700, 92701, 92702 and 93702 were used.
At WNP-3, a routine inspection through the containment, control room, auxiliary building and warehouses and observation of the condition of the licensee's in-place and stored equipment (Paragraph 11).
The inspector used Inspection Procedure 92050 as guidance during the inspection.
Safet Issues Mana ement S stem SIMS Items:
None.
9305240046 930506 PDR ADOCK 05000397
Results WNP-2
General Conclusions and S ecific Findin s
Si nificant Safet Hatters:
None Summar of Violations and Deviations:
Ten examples of a previous violation were identified involving the fai lure to follow the procedure for tagging hoses containing radioactive material (Paragraph 5.b(6)).
One non-cited violation was also identified involving the failure to maintain a contaminated area barrier (Paragraph S.b(9)).
0 en Items Summar
Six followup items and three LERs were closed.
Five unresolved items were opened.
One non-cited violation was opened and closed during the inspection period.
Results WNP-3
Site inspection acti vities indicated that the WNP-3 site is being appropriately maintained (Paragraph ll).
DETAILS Persons Contacted WNP-2
- V. Parrish, Assistant Managihg Director for Operations
- J. Gearhart, Director, guality Assurance
- J. Baker, Plant Manager G. Smith, Operations Division Manager L. Harrold, Maintenance Division Manager G. Sorensen, Regulatory Programs Manager
- D. Pisarcik, Radiation Protection Hanager A. Hosier, Licensing Manager
- S. Davison, guali ty Assurance Manager J. Peters, Administrative Hanager
- H. Mann, Assistant Operations Manager
- R. Webring, Technical Services Manager
- D. Atkinson, Reactor Engi.neering Manager
- T. Messersmith, Maintenance Support Hanager
- J. Rhoads, Hanager, Operational Events Analysis and Resolution
- J. Harmon, Maintenance
- M. Davidson, Supply System Legal Department
- C. Fies, Licensing Engineer
- K. Pisarci k, Licensing Assistant
- Attended the WNP-2 exit meeting on April 15, 1993.
WNP-3 Para ra h
QC. Butros, WNP 3/5 Site Manager QJ.
Cooper, Project Business Manager QS.
DeLoe, Acting Administration Manager QM. Deboard, Program Support Manager QW. Drinkard, guality Assurance Manager QJ.
Hayes, Warehouse Supervisor QL. Hill, Plant (Operations/Maintenance)
Manager QR. Harzano, Security and Safety Manager J. Perreault, Engineering Manager S. Ratcliff, I&C Supervisor QC. Reid, Preservation Engineering Manager QJ. Rett, Site Support. Services Manager D. Strassburger, Records and Document Control Supervisor QAttended the WNP-3 exit meeting on February 24," 1993.
The inspectors also interviewed various control room operators, shift supervisors and shift managers, maintenance, engineering, quality assurance, and management personne '.
Plant Status At the start of the inspection period, the plant was in Node 1 at 25~
power.
The plant achieved full power on February 20, 1993.
The reactor continued to operate at 100~
power, until the licensee declared the End-of-Cycle (EOC) recirculation pump trip (RPT) inoperable due to a missed surveillance.
After applying more conservative operating limits because the EOC RPT was inoperable, operators reduced reactor power to 99~.
On Narch 19, 1993, the licensee declared the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system inoperable because a design review identified that a poten-tial accident scenario could result in excessive containment leakage.
The licensee received an NRC Notice of Enforcement Discretion since the RCIC system could not be restored to operability prior to the end of its 14-day Technical Specifications action statement.
The reactor continued to operate at 99~ power (except for momentary downpower maneuvers to support control rod exercises and bypass valve testing) until the end of the inspection period.
3.
Previousl Identified NRC Ins ection Items 92701 92702 The inspectors reviewed records, interviewed personnel, and inspected plant conditions relative to licensee actions on previously identified inspection findings:
a.
Closed Followu Item 397 91-39-02
Verification and Validation V&V not erformed for EOP-Referenced Procedures During the referenced inspection period, the inspector found that V&V had not been performed for several procedures called out by the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs).
The inspector was concerned that there may have been undetected errors in these procedures.
During development of the
"Phase II" EOPs, the licensee performed V&V of these procedures and approved appropriate deviations.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's documentation, and considered the actions and the records to be satisfactory.
This item is closed.
b.
Closed A
arent Violation 397 92-37-02
Desi n and 0 eration of Core not in Accordance with General Desi n Criteria GDC 12.
During followup inspection after the Augmented Inspection Team (AIT)
assessment of the August 15, 1992, power oscillation event, the inspector noted that the licensee's basic design and operation of the core did not. appear to adhere to GDC 12.
The inspector questioned whether operators could readily and reliably detect and suppress regional core power oscillations.
Further NRC evaluation and analysis of licensee procedures indicated that the licensee's procedures were adequate to detect and suppress this condition.
This item is closed.
C.
Closed A
arent Violation 397 92-37-03
- Inade uate 50.59 Review for C cle 8 Core.
During followup inspection after the core power oscillation AIT of the August 15, 1992, power oscillation event, the inspector
questioned whether the licensee's safety evaluation per
CFR 50.59 was adequate, in that, it did not ',dentify the reduced margin to stability.
Further NRC evaluation of the licensee's methodology indicated that the
CFR 50.59 review was adequate despite this concern.
The Supply System used technical information and computer codes licensed for.use for the Cycle 8 core.
Therefore, the licensee did not violate
CFR 50.59.
This item is closed.
d.
Closed Part 21 Notification 397 92-004-P21 Im ro er Desi n of Anchor Darlin Motor 0 crated Valve MOV Yoke Clam s.
e.
The licensee submitted a
CFR Part 21 notification of potential defects in safety-related equipment concerning the improper design of Anchor/Darling MOV yoke clamps.
Three MOVs in the high pressure core spray system had undersized yoke clamps that could potentially fail, due to cyclic fatigue, during the valve's closure.
The licensee performed non-destructive examination (NDE) on each of
'hese valve's yoke clamps to determine if the valves were previously inoperable.
The licensee found no degradation of the valves, and determined that HPCS was previously operable, and that an LER was not required.
After performing the NDE, WNP-2 replaced the undersized yoke clamps with the proper size.
This item is closed.
Closed Part 21 Notification 397 92-005-P21 Limitor ue Model SMB-000 MOV Ca screws.
The licensee submitted a
CFR Part 21 notification of potential defects in safety-related equipment concerning the use of commercial-grade fasteners in Limitorque Model SMB-000 HOV capscrews.
The vendor had provided WNP-2 with seven Limitorque Model SMB-000 motor operators which had grade 1 or 2 capscrews instead of grade 5.
Licensee testing of the actual material properties of the capscrews indicated that they were acceptable for the applied loads.
This item is closed.
Closed Part 21 Notification 397 92-006-P21 Siemens Power Cor oration SPC Minimum Critical Power Ratio MCPR Calculations The licensee submitted a
CFR Part 21 notification of a poten-tially defective analysis provided by SPC.
SPC found that errors in the computer code for calculating HCPR during a loss of feedwater transient resulted in a non-conservative analysis late in the fuel cycle.
SPC corrected these errors and resubmitted the analysis.
No loss of feedwater events challenged the HCPR limit at WNP-2.
The inspector reviewed the second submittal with respect to the loss of feedwater transient and it appeared to be satisfactory.
This item
>s closed.
4.
Event Followu 93702 a ~
Reactor Core Isolation Coolin RCIC S stem Ino erabi lit On March 19, 1993, the licensee identified that if a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) were to occur simultaneously with a
ff
)t
loss of Division 1 direct current (DC) power, primary containment integrity through the RCIC system could be compromised.
For this scenario, the licensee assumed RCIC to be aligned to the suppression pool.
The loss of DC power, which causes DC motor-operated valves to fai 1 in the as-.is condition and the loss of the vacuum tank drain pump, results in a 5-10 gpm flow path through the RCIC suction valve, the lube oil cooling water supply valve, the barometric condenser, the vacuum tank, and vacuum tank relief valve.
Mith the loss of the vacuum tank drain pump, the static head of water from the suppression pool is sufficient to fill the vacuum tank and lift the relief valve.
Mater from the suppression pool would then flow from the relief valve to the equipment drain in secondary containment.
The licensee took compensatory action to prevent this flow path by opening the breaker that allows transfer of the RCIC suction from the condensate storage tank (CST) to the suppression pool.
Because the TS require the RCIC system to be capable of taking a suction from the suppression pool, the licensee declared the RCIC system inoperable.
At the end of the inspection period, the RCIC system was in the 13th day of the action statement.
Subsequently, the NRC issued a Notice of Enforcement Discretion to allow the licensee to continue to operate in this condition until the refueling outage.
Shortly thereafter, WNP-2 received a TS amendment that allowed operation until the upcoming refueling outage.
Among other items in the Noti'ce of Enforcement Discretion, the inspectors verified that the licensee completed the compensatory actions to which they had committed, and verified that no work was performed on the HPCS system.
In addition, the inspectors interviewed operators to confirm t$at the operators understood the reasons for RCIC inoperability, and the actions necessary in the unlikely event of a LOCA.
The licensee intends to submit an LER for this event.
Until the NRC revi ews the LER to determine if the root cause and effective corrective actions were identified, this is an
. unresolved item.
(Unresolved Item 397/93-06-01)
End-of-C cle EOC Recirculation Pum Tri RPT Ino erabilit On March 4, 1993, the licensee, found that the EOC RPT breakers had not been properly tested.
TS 4.3.4.2.3 requires that the RPT breakers be tested every 60 months to verify that the arc suppression time is less than or equal to 83 milliseconds.
Plant Procedures Hanual (PPN) 7.4.3.2.3.3A and PPN 7.4.3.2.3.3B perform this surveillance for the RPT 3-and 4-series breakers.
The tests are conducted by recording the amount of time between actuation of a trip coil in the breaker and the time when the breaker arc has been interrupted.
The procedures used to conduct these tests initiate the trip through actuation of a different trip coil (TC-1) than the trip coil which performs the safety function for the breaker (TC-2).
The licensee stated that if TC-1 and TC-2 have only slightly different characteristics the response time for the breaker would be inaccurate.
These inadequate response time tests existed for RPT breakers 3A, 3B, 4A, and 4 I(
'
Ce Subsequent to this discovery, the licensee declared both EOC-RPT systems inoperable.
The licensee's Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) requires operators to increase the limit for the Hinimum Critical Power Ratio (HCPR) if the EOC-RPT is inoperable.
The licensee inserted these new limits into the plant computer, which resulted in the licensee restricting operation of the plant to 99~
power.
The inspectors verified that the licensee took the proper actions, and that the correct limits were being used.
The licensee had not determined if the HCPR limits had been exceeded prior to discovery that the EOC-RPT had been inoperable.
The licensee intends to properly test the EOC RPT breakers during. the RB
'efueling outage.
Because the licensee had not yet determined through testing whether the EOC RPT could have performed its intended safety function, the inspectors will perform additional followup when the licensee submits their LER for this event, and after proper testing of the TC-2 coil.
This is an unresolved item.
(Unresolved Item 397/93-06-02)
Hain Turbine B
ass S stem Set oint Discre anc On Harch 4, 1993, the licensee found that the turbine bypass system setpoint that enables the system above 25~ power was set improperly.
The licensee had set the enabling relays based on 25~ of rated electrical power.
However, TS 3.7.9 states that the main turbine bypass system shall be operable when thermal power is greater than 25~ of rated thermal power.
At low power levels, plant efficiency is lower than at full power due to reduced feedwater heating.
Therefore, 25~ electrical power does not correlate well with 25~0 thermal power.
The licensee determined that the reactor produces 33~ thermal power when generator output is 25~ electrical power.
Therefore, the licensee determined that their design and setpoint violated the TS.
The licensee stated that the main turbine bypass system would be declared inoperable when reactor power is less than 35'hermal power.
- The action statement for this condition requires the reactor to be less than 25~ power within four hours.
Licensee management stated that they will reset the arming relays for the bypass system during the R8 refueling outage, and the new setpoint will conserva-tively correlate to 25~0 thermal power.
The licensee intends to submit an LER for this event.
Until the HRC reviews the LER to determine if the root causes and corrective actions have been iden-tifieded, this is an unresolved item.
(Unresolved Item 397/93-06-03)
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
0 eratiooal Safet Veri ficati o~7r1707 a
~
Plant Tours The inspectors toured the following plant areas:
Reactor Building e
Control Room
Diesel Generator Building Radwaste Building Service Water Buildings Technical Support Center Turbine Generator Building Yard Area and Perimeter b.
The inspectors observed the following items during the tours:
0 eratin Lo s and Records.
The inspectors reviewed records against Technical Specification and administrative control procedure requirements.
(2)
(3)
Monitorin Instrumentation.
The inspectors observed process instruments for correlation between channels and for conform-ance with Technical Specification requirements.
~Ehif N
i
.
Tl i
p t b
d
d hfdf manning for conformance with 10 CFR 50.54(k), Technical Speci-fications, and administrative procedures.
The inspectors also observed the attentiveness of the operators in the execution of their duties and the control room was observed to be free of distractions such as non-work related radios and reading materials.
(4)
(5)
E ui ment Lineu s.
The inspectors verified valves and electrical breakers to be in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications and administrative procedures for the applicable plant mode.
This verification included routine control board indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineups.
Technical Specification limiting condi tions for operation were verified by direct observation.
E ui ment Ta in
.
Selected equipment, for which tagging requests had been initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment was in the condition specified.
General Plant E ui ment Conditions.
Plant equipment was observed for indications of system leakage, improper lubr ica-tion, or other conditions that would prevent the system from fulfillingits functional requirements.
Annunciators were observed to ascertain their status and operability.
During a tour of the Reactor Building on March 22, 1993, the inspector noted several instances in which the licensee did not appear to be following their procedure for the tagging of temporary hoses and electrical lines in the plant.
Paragraph 4.2. 11 of PPM 1.3. 19, "Plant Material Condition Inspection Program," requires that all rubber and tygon hoses used in the power block to route equipment drains, vents, leaks, pump from sump to sump, etc. shall be tagged with a
'Work in Progress'ag.
The tag shall show the procedure number for performing the vent or drain operation, or in cases of hoses used in conjunction with a Maintenance Work Request (MWR) or equipment
lj
deficiency identification, the MWR number or equipment deficiency tag number shall be used.
For hoses used to route leakage from leaking valves or other components to a drain or catch basin the equipment piece number (EPN) of the leaking equipment, the date the drain was installed, and the name of the individual authorizing installation of the drain will be recorded on the 'ta'g.
The number of the hose, if applicable,
.
will be recorded on the tag.
In addition, licensee management interpreted this procedure to also require tagging of temporary electrical cables.
During the tour, the inspector observed the following examples of personnel not following PPM 1.3. 19:
A tag attached to a hose in the 8 residual heat removal (RHR)
pump. room was missing a signature for the individual authorizing the hose installation.
A tag attached to a hose in the B reactor feedwater pump room was missing the signature for the individual authorizing the hose installation.
A tag attached to a hose in the auxiliary condensate pump room was missing a signature for the individual installing the hose, and for the person authorizing the hose installation.
A tag attached to a hose in RHR A pump room was missing the EPN, hose number, date, and signatures for installing and authorizing the hose.
A tag attached to a hose in the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)
pump room was missing the EPN, hose number, date, and signatures for installing and authorizing the hose.
A tag attached to a hose in the fuel pool cooling pump room was missing the EPN, hose number, date, and signatures for installing and authorizing the hose.
A hose connected to a drain on CMS-SR-13 was missing the Work in Progress tag.
On the 572-foot level of the reactor building, near the reactor building ventilation units, a tag attached to a hose going to a barrel
.was missing the EPN, hose number, date, and signatures for ".nstalling and authorizing the hose.
A tag attached to a hose coming out of the traversing incore probe (TIP) room was missing the EPN, the hose number, date, and signatures for installing and authorizing the hos H
,(
t f
~
A tag attached to a hose connected to a drain line from DW-V-100-60 was missing the procedure number, estimated completion date, and authorizing signatures.
In addition, the inspector found 6 instances in which temporary power cables were not tagged.
PPM 1.3. 19, Revision 13, was signed by the Plant, Manager on January 28, 1993, and issued on January 29, 1993.
This procedure was issued pursuant to a Supply System commitment in, their response to the Notice of. Violation (NOV) issued with NRC
Inspection Report
No. 50-397/92-35,
to establish
a hose control
program by February
1,
1993.
The procedure
had
been
approved.
by the Plant Operating
Committee
(POC) in December
1992,
and
.
placed
on administrative hold to allow time for personnel
training on the
new procedure
requirements.
However,
as noted
by licensee
management
in a subsequent
NOV response,
personnel
training and compliance verification by plant supervision
were
inadequate
for implementation of Revision
13 of PPM 1.3. 19.
During an
NRC inspection
conducted
on February
16 through
22,
1993 (refer to
NRC Inspection
Report
No. 50-397/93-07),
the
inspector identified a violation of PPM 1.3. 19, Revision
13,
involving four instances
of failure to properly tag hoses
containing radioactive liquids.
This was cited in a Notice of
Violation issued
on March 25,
1993.
On February
24,
1993, in response
to the NRC-identified
violation, line management
was directed to conduct walkdowns to
ensure
compliance with Revision
13 of PPM 1.3. 19.
On
February
26,
1993,
a procedure deviation
was approved in an
attempt to make it less restrictive.
On March 2,
1993,
gA
initiated
a Problem Evaluation
Request
(PER) to address their
findings that approximately ten percent of the hoses
in the
'lant were not properly tagged.
Licensee
management
stated that lack of effective supervision
in the plant was
a partial
cause of these
problems,
and that
more frequent plant tours
and work observation
would be
undertaken
to ensure that personnel
understood
and followed
PPM 1.3. 19.
However,
based
on the additional discrepancies
identified by the inspector
on March 22,. 1993,
as noted above,
it appeared 'that the licensee
had not taken effective steps
to
ensure
proper implementation of PPM 1.3. 19.
Because
the Notice of Violation for this violation was not
forwarded unti l March 25,
1993,
and
%ho licensee's
corrective
actions for the violation of PPM 1.3. 19 had not been in effect
for very long, these
occurrences
were not cited as
a new
violation.
However, the inspector
was concerned that these
new
examples
indicate that the actions for the previous violation
have not been effective in preventing recurrence
of this
problem.
The effective implementation of the corrective
if,
actions for this violation will be followed in a future
inspection
as
a review of Violation 50-397/93-07-01.
The inspector also noted that the licensee's
April 23,
1993;
response
to the Notice of Violation issued
on March 25,
1993,
included
an apparently incorrect statement.
Item 5 under
"Corrective Steps
Taken/ Results
Achieved" in Appendix A
incorrectly stated that
PER 293-318
was initiated on March 22,
1993, to address
PPM 1.3. 19 discrepancies
identified during
management
housekeeping
tours.
These discrepancies
were
actually identified by the
NRC inspector,,as
discussed
above.
This incorrect statement
was identified to licensee
management
in a telephone call
on May 4,
1993.
The licensee
committed to
provide by May 14,
1993,
a letter correcting
and explaining
this error.
The inspectors will determine during the next
inspection period whether this incorrect statement violated
NRC
requirements.
(Unresolved
Item 397/93-06-04)
Fire Protection.
The inspectors
observed fire fighting
equipment
and controls for conformance with administrative
procedures.
Plant Chemistr
.
The inspectors
reviewed chemical
analyses
and'rend
results for conformance with Technical Specifications
and
administrative control procedures.
Radiation Protection Controls.
The inspectors periodically
observed radiological protection practices
to determine
whether
the licensee's
program
was being implemented in conformance
with facility policies
and procedures
and in compliance with
regulatory requirements.
The inspectors
also observed
compliance with Radiation
Work Permits,
proper wearing of
protective
equipment
and personnel
monitoring devices,
and
personnel
frisking practices.
Radiation monitoring equipment
was frequently monitored to verify operability and adherence
to
calibration frequency.
On February
11,
1993, during the previous inspection period,
the inspector
found
a contamination
area
boundary sign and rope
down on the
422 foot level of the reactor building. 'everal
licensee
employees
were in the room at the time; however,
none
of these
employees
were aware that the boundary
was
down, or
had
been in the contaminated
area.
Section
3. 1.7.4.3 of the
WNP-2 Health Physics
Program Description states
that "an area
shall
be posted
as
a contaminated
area
when loose surface
contamination exists
above
100 dpm/100
cm~ alpha and/or
1000
dpm/100cm~
beta-gamma
as determined
by smear tests.
Posting of
such
an area shall include
a sign reading
CAUTION
CONTAMINATED
AREA."
TS 6.8. I.k requires
procedures
to be established,
implemented,
and maintained for the Health Physics/Chemistry
Support Program.
The failure to post
a contaminated
area is
a
violation of TS 6.8. 1 which requires
the licensee
to follow
health physics procedure,
I
-10-
(Io)
The licensee
conducted
an incident review board
and found that
personnel
error was the cause of the event.
Because
of this
event,
and previous instances
in which
HP boundaries
were not
restored
during personnel
passage,
HP supervision
toured the
plant and installed swing gates
in place of rope boundaries
to
preclude
any further instances
of roper boundaries
not being
restored.
In addition,
the licensee
employed assistance
from
INPO for additional
improvements in radiological postings.
Due to the low safety significance,
and because
the criteria of
Section VII.B(l) of the
NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied,
this violation was not cited.
(NCV 397/93-06-05,
Closed)
Plant Housekee
in
.
The inspectors
observed plant conditions
and material/equipment
storage to determine
the general
state
of cleanliness
and housekeeping.
Housekeeping
in the radio-
logically controlled area
was evaluated with respect
to
controlling the spread of surface
and airborne contamination.
During tours performed
on February
22-23 and March 22, the
inspector
found a number of items which indicated that
housekeeping
and plant material condition problems
may be
increasing.
The inspectot
discussed
the following items with
licensee
management:
N
~
A 24-inch flanged elbow stored
near safety-related
instrument tubing.
~
Four valves in the
RCIC missing
handwheels
~
Unrestrained
tool boxes in the
RHR A and
B pump rooms.
A loose fire extinguisher
on the floor of the
RHR A pump
room.
~
All lights burned out in the
B heat exchanger
room,
and four of five lights burned out in the
RHR A heat
exchanger
room.
~
Temporary
power cables
wrapped
around Division I and
Division 2 power cable.
~
A personnel
safety chain attached
to safety-related
cabling.
In addition, the inspector
found loose rags
and unsecured
ladders
throughout the reactor building.
The inspector discussed
the above observations
with the
maintenance
Division Nanager,
who stated that these
problems
did not meet.his
expectations
and corrected
them in a timely
manner.
The inspector will continue to monitor plant
housekeeping
in future inspection r
I
- 11
(ll) ~Securit
.
The inspectors periodically observed security
practices
to determine if the licensee
followed the security
plan per site procedures,
search
equipment at the access
control points
was operational, vital area portals
were kept
locked and alarmed,
personnel
allowed access
to the protected
,area
were badged
and monitored,
and the monitoring equipment
was functional.
c.
En ineered Safet
Features
Walkdown
The inspectors
walked
down selected
engineered
safety features
(and
systems
important to safety)
to confirm that the systems
were
aligned in accordance
with plant procedures.
During walkdown of the
systems,
items
such
as hangers,
supports,
electrical
power. supplies,
cabinets,
and cables. were inspected
to determine that they were
and in a condition to perform their required functions.
The inspectors
checked major components
for adequate
lubrication and
cooling.
The inspectors
also verified that certain
system valves
were in the required position by both local
and remote position
indication,
as applicable.
The inspectors
walked
down accessible
portions of the following
systems
on the indicated dates:
.
~Sstem
Diesel
Generator
Systems,
Divisions 1,
2, and 3.
Hydrogen Recombiners
Low Pressure
Coolant Injection (LPCI)
Trains "A"j "B", and
"C"
Low Pressure
(LPCS)
Reactor
Core Isolation Cooling
(RCIC)
Residual
Heat Removal
(RHR), Trains
"A" and "B"
Scram Discharge
Volume System
(SLC) System
Standby Service Water System
125V
DC Electrical Distribution,
Divisions
1 and
250V
DC Electrical Distribution
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Dates
March
March
Harch
18,
March 18,
March
March
March
Harch
March
March
March 18,
rJ
e
-12-
6.
Survei l 1 ance
Tes tin
61726
The inspectors
reviewed
a sampling of Technical Specifications
(TS)
surveillance tests verify that:
(1)
a technically adequate
procedure
existed for performance of the surveillance tests;
(2) the surveillance
tests
had been performed at the frequency specified in the
TS and in
accordance
with the
TS surveillance
requirements;
and
(3) test results
satisfied
acceptance
criteria or were properly dispositioned.
The inspectors
observed
portions of the following surveillance
on the
dates
shown:
Procedure
Descri tion
Dates
Performed
.
7.4.8.2.1.20
7.1. 1-
7.1.2
7.4.5.1.9
12.13.34
Meekly Surveillance for
Battery E-Bl-1
Health Physics Shiftly
Channel
Checks
Chemistry Daily Channel
and Source
Checks
B System Operability
Stack Monitor Daily
Monitoring Data
March
March
March
March 25
March
On March 25,
1993, during the performance of PPM 7.4.5. 1.9, the inspector
noted that the licensee
obtained
7423 gallons per minute
(gpm) while
operating
RHR loop
B in the suppression
pool cooling mode
(SPCM).
However,
paragraph
7.2, step
20, allows the operator to augment the flow
for suppression
pool cooling by opening
RHR-V-27B, the wetwell spray
valve.
Operators
opened
RHR-V-278 and flow increased
to 7500 gpm.
Operators
recorded
7500
gpm in the procedure
and signed off the step
as
satisfactory.
TS 4.6.2.3.b states,
"The suppression
pool cooling mode of the
RHR system
shall
be demonstrated
by verifying that each of the required
pumps develops at least
7450
gpm on recirculation flow through the
heat exchanger
and the suppression
pool
when tested
pursuant to 4.0.5."
The inspector questioned
the licensee's
practice of augmenting
SPCM with
spray flow because it'id not appear to meet the intent of this TS.
The
inspector considered
that the intent of the
TS was to test the
SPCM as in
actual plant operations
to meet the surveillance requirement.
The
inspector also questioned
the ability to trend degraded
flow conditions
in SPCM in a manner which would be possible if the operators
only
recorded
flow through the test return line (RHR-V-24B).
The inspector also noted that neither the Emergency Operating
Procedures
(EOPs)
nor the system operating procedure
(PPM 2.4.2) recognize
the
practice of augmenting
SPCM with wetwell spray flow.
The
EOPs only allow
spraying the wetwell when certain containment
parameters
exist,
due to
. differential pressure
considerations
.
Also,
FSAR Section 7.3. 1. 1. 5
I'
f
f
e
(
t
provides
a valve-by-valve'description
of the
SPCM flow path of RHR.
This
flow path
does not include
RHR-V-27B.
In addition,
FSAR Section 6.2.2.1
states
that the
RHR system is capable of obtaining the full flow of 7450
gpm through the test return line.
The licensee
responded
by stating that because all flow went through the
RHR heat
exchanger
and eventually returned to the suppression
pool, the
RHR flow path complied with the
TS requirement.
Furthermore,
preliminary
licensee
calculations
indicated that only 7000
gpm were required,
and
that the system
was operable.
The inspector did not agree with the
licensee's
logic for compliance with the TS,
and questioned
the
licensee's
methodology for determining if adequate
flow was available for
SPCM.
The licensee's
calculation
assumed
that the design
basis
heat load
for SPCN was the decay heat
20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> after shutdown.
However,
Section 5.4.7. 1. 1.3 states,
"The functional design basis for the
suppression
pool cooling mode is that it shall
have the capacity to
ensure
that the suppression
pool temperature
immediately after a blowdown
shall not exceed
170 degrees."
Therefore, it appears
that incorrect
assumptions
were
used in the preliminary calculations.
The licensee
stated that neither the
A or
B SPCN loop could meet the
required
SPCM flow rate of 7450
gpm during startup testing in 1983,
and
that
PPM 7.4.5. 1.9 was changed
to include augmenting with wetwell spray
flow at that time.
The licensee
plans to submit a
FSAR amendment
to
provide the actual
flow rate of SPCN,
and the actual
system design basis.
In addi tion, the licensee
changed
PPN 7.4.5. 1.9 to include
an extra data
block for recording
SPCN flow prior to augmentation with wetwell spray
flow.
The
NRC must complete further evaluation to determine
whether the
licensee
complied with TS 4.6.2.3.b,
and whether or not the system is
within its design basis.
This is an unresolved
item (Unresolved
Item
397/93-06-06).
One unresolved
item was identified,
as discussed
above.
Plant Maintenance
62703
During the inspection period,
the inspector
observed
and reviewed
documentation
associated
with maintenance
and problem investigation
activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements
and with
administrative
and maintenance
procedures,
required
OA/gC involvement,
proper
use of clearance
tags,
proper equipment alignment
and use of
jumpers,
personnel
qualifications,
and proper retesting.
The inspector
verified that reportabi lity for these
maintenance activi ties
was correct.
The inspector witnessed
portions of the following maintenance activities:
Dates
Performed
PPN 1.6.63,
Replace
Cell
on Battery
E-BI-I
March
-14-
AP 3030,
Repair
OG-RF-20B
(Offgas Chiller)
AR9492, Fabricate
and Install Anchor
Bolts and Seismic Supports for Stack
Radiation Monitor
AP2141, Install
New Stack Radiation
Monitor Panel
March
March
March
No violations or deviations
were identified.
8.
L'icensee
Event
Re ort
LER
Fol lowu
90712
92700
The inspector
reviewed the following LERs associated
with operating
events.,
Based
on the information provided,
the
NRC concluded that
reporting requirements
had been met, root causes
had
been identified,
and
corrective actions
were appropriate.
The below LERs are considered
closed.
LER NUMBER
DESCRIPTION
50-397/88-05-01
50-397/91-05-01
50-397/91-06-01
B Control
Room Emergency Filtration System
Bypass
Flow Exceeded
Technical Specifications
Wetwell Oxygen Concentration
Not Measured
per.
Technical Specification Surveillance
requirements
Due to High Particulate
in the
Generator
Lubricating Oil
In addition, the corrective actions for the following LER were evaluated.
0 en
50-397 92-044
"Hi h Pressure
Core
S ra
S stem
Pum
Suction Valve Automatic Switchover Actuation"
This
LER described
an automatic switchover, that occurred
on December
8,
1992, of the
HPCS suction valve from the condensate
storage
tank
(CST) to
the 'suppression
pool
(SP)
when the conditions required for the switchover
did not exit.
The licensee
concluded that the root cause of the switch-
over was indeterminate,
but suspected
the cause of the switchover
was
spurious actuation of'either one or both of the
CST pipe break detectors,
since the detectors
had been
found to have excessive
setpoint drift.
As
immediate corrective action,
the license
changed
the calibration interval
of those detectors
from every
18 months to every month.
Longer term
corrective actions included evaluating
replacement of the detectors
and
investigating the susceptibility of the detectors
to radio frequency
emissions.
The licensee
did not expect to submit a supplemental
report.
The inspectors
made the following observations
during review of this
LER:
The licensee
investigation of the event found that from September
8,
1991,
to April 7,
1992,
the detectors
had drifted; however,
the
}
t
~
licensee's
investigation did not determine
why the calibration
frequency
had not been previously increased.
In subsequent
discussion with the licensee,
the inspector
learned
the licensee
believed it was inappropriate
to change calibration frequency
based
on
a single set of drift values.
The inspector also noted the
system engineer for the system
had not been
aware that the
instruments
had previously exhibited drift.
~
The inspector
found that the setpoint of the instrument
had recently
been
changed
as
a result of the licensee's
setpoint program.
The
change in setpoint,
which required the instrument to respond faster
to
a pipe break,
caused
the instrument to be at the limits of its
reproducible
response
band.
In reviewing licensee
documentation
associated
with the
LER, the inspector
found that, prior to
implementing the setpoint
change,
the licensee
had not evaluated
the
instrument's
performance characteristics.
The inspector
found the
licensee's
investigation of the event recognized that
a= setpoint
change
had occur red, but considered this not to be
a contributing
cause of the event.
The potential implication of the effect of the
setpoint
change
was not described
in the
LER.
The licensee's
corrective actions did not include further evaluation of the
implementation of the setpoint
program to determine if reviews of
setpoint
changes
are of appropriate detail.
The inspectors
concluded that the licensee's
documentation of events that
led to the switchover of the
HPCS suction valves
was poor.
As a result,
the licensee's ability to effectively determine root cause for this event
was documented
as indeterminate
and could potentially result in
additional
events
due to inappropriate setpoint
change
implementation.
The licensee
stated
they would evaluate
the inspectors
concerns with
respect
to out-of-calibration reviews
and the implementation of setpoint
changes.
This
LER remains
open for further evaluation of these
issues.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
9.
1993 Refuelin
Outa
e
R-8
Pre arations
The R-8 Outage,
which includes major work items
such
as refueling, motor
operated
valve testing, ventilation
system modifications,
and jet pump
cleaning,
was scheduled
to begin
on April 15,
1993,
and take
approximately
45 days.
At the request of Bonneville Power Administration
(BPA), the Supply System deferred
the beginning of R-8 until Hay 1,
due
to regional
power demand.
Outage duration is still planned for 45 days.
The inspectors
discussed
preparations,
in progress for the
WNP-2 R-8
Outage,
with the Outage
t1anager
and other members of the plant staff.
The discussions
included topics
such
as
ALARA planning,
maintenance
work
package
preparation,
and work coordinators.
The inspectors
also
examined
a limited number of the work packages
that had
been completely planned
for the Outage.
From the discussions
and work package
reviews the
inspectors
made the following observations:
Planning for the R-8 Outage,
as
compared to the R-7 Outage,
was
improved.
On Harch
18,
1993,
the inspectors
found that about
25'. of
I
H
-16-
the approximately
1300 work packages
were fully planned;
however,
according to the Outage
Manager, at the
same
time last year only
about
15~ of the work was completely planned.
Most of the remaining
work packages
were in the planning process.
~
A significant amount of the ALARA planning rema'ined to be completed.
~
Most of the parts required for the worked planned to begin early in
the outage
were available.
The licensee
plans to assign
area coordinators for specific areas
within the plant to control work activities within those areas.
In
addition,
the licensee
plans to use work control field managers
to
identify and resolve
emergent
work restraints that occur during the
course of daily activities.
t
The licensee
plans to evaluate
the daily schedule for shutdown risk
to ensure
the number of available safety systems
remains
high and
never gets
below the minimum required
by technical specifications.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
10.
En ineered
Safet
Feature
S stem Malkdown
71710
The inspectors
performed
a detailed
walkdown of accessible
portions of
the high pressure
(HPCS)
system.
The inspectors
made the
following observations:
The
HPCS lineup procedures
matched plant drawings
and the as-built
configuration.
Generally,
HPCS equipment
and components
were in acceptable
condition.
However,
several
equipment deficiencies
were noted to be
greater
than 24-months old.
The inspectors
noted several
housekeeping
discrepancies
and
a poor
work practice.
Several
T-handles
on small
HPCS globe valves were
loose
and
one
had
no retaining nut.
During the repair of a
fluorescent light fixture on the mezzanine
level of the
pump
room, the craftsmen left the area with the light suspended
from its
power cord and the fluorescent
tubes upright on
a grated floor.
The
inspectors
referred these
observations
to the licensee
and the
deficiencies
were corrected.
The inspectors
found that
HPCS component labeling was generally
satisfactory.
They observed that the components
located in the
higher areas of the
pump room were labeled with small metal
tags
and that those
components
were especially difficult to identify
from the grating level..
Some of those valves were
on the facility
locked-valve list.
The inspectors
noted that many of the doors in areas
that contained
HPCS components
or support equipment
had fire impairments.
Some of
the impairments
were greater
than
12-months old.
The impaired doors
fl
were veri fied to be part of periodic fire tours.
Upon further
facility touring, the inspectors
observed that
a very high
percentage
of facility fire doors
had impairments,
some of which
were greater
than
18-months old.
The inspectors
discussed
this
observation with the licensee at the exit meeting.
~
The inspectors
observed that
HPCS instruments
were within their
calibration periodicity
and that process
parameters
were within the
expected
band for the operational
state of the system.
~
The inspectors
observed
proper electrical
breaker position at the
local distribution panel
and at remote locations.
In general,
the inspectors
found that the
HPCS system
was maintained
adequately.
The discrepancies
the inspectors
observed
suggest that the
quality and attention to detai
1 of operator
and supervisory tours require
strengthening.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
11.
WNP-3 Ins ection
92050
On February
24,
1993,
an inspector visited the
WNP-3 site.
The
WNP-3
site is in an extended construction
delay status.
The inspector toured
the containment,
control
room, auxiliary building and warehouses,
observi ng the condition of the licensee's
in-place
and stored equipment.
The condition of the equipment
was satisfactory.
Instrumentation
monitoring the temperature
and humidity was in-place, in calibration,
and
operating.
The inspector
concluded that the plant equipment
was
satisfactorily maintained.
a ~
Back round and Plant Status
WNP-3 is in a construction
delay status
and is approximately
76~
completed.
There is no fuel
on site.
Plant equipment is maintained
according to WMC-051,
"WNP-3 Preventive
Maintenance
Program."
These
documents
describe
the equipment
storage
requirements
that have
been
implemented,
and specify periodic equipment preservation
maintenance.
Personnel
assignments
at the site has
been stable.
WNP-3 management
consists of both Supply System
and
Ebasco
employees.
Events that occurred at WNP-3 in 1992 include:
~
The licensee
sold
WNP-5 components
and these
components
were
removed
from site.
The licensee
combined several
WNP-3
warehouse
items into this space.
~
The licensee is doing an extensive
re-lamping effort, replacing
incandescent
fixtures with high efficiency florescent fixtures.
This reduces
the energy
used
on site.
In order to maintain the status
and material condition of the site
equipment,
the licensee
has designated
four levels of equipment
warehouse
storage,
Levels A, B,
C,
and
D, which are consistent with
ANSI/ASME N45.2.2-1973 classifications.
The inspector
observed that
equipment
storage within areas
A,
B and
C appeared
proper and
appropriate for each classification level.
Work Observation at
WNP-3
The inspector
observed part of a non-routine maintenance activity at
WNP-3.
This activity was
a flush of a
pump filled with Vaportec,
an
additive the licensee
previously used to inhibit corrosion
and
preserve
internals of plant equipment.
The addition of the Vaportec
degraded
some elastomeric
components
and caused sticking of
internals,
making them difficult to rotate.
The licensee
reported
this to the
NRC as
a potential
CFR 50.55(e) report
on April 21,
1989, which the
NRC will continue to followup until the issue
concerning
Vaportec is fully dispositioned.
The licensee is
investigating different ways to remove the Vaportec without
disassembly of equipment.
The inspector
observed that the licensee
tested
an approach
by using citric acid to flush some
pump internals
that were difficult to rotate.
After the flush, the licensee
inspected
the
pump internals.
The Vaportec
had substantially
dissolved,
but some remained
(where the flowrates were lower).
The
licensee is continuing to resolve
the Vaportec problem and will
inform the
NRC if this approach will be used.
Plant
E ui ment and Material
Ins ection at
WNP-3
The inspector
conducted
a walk-through inspection of equipment
and
material
storage
areas.
These storage
areas
included the
containment,
control
room, reactor auxiliary building (RAB), and
Warehouse
Nos.
1, 2, 3, 4,
6 and 7.
These
areas
contained
Levels A,
B and
C storage.
Naterial storage
and use of dunnage
appeared
adequate
and in accordance
with the licensee's
procedures.
Dunnage
for pipes stored in outside
areas
appeared
adequate.
The licensee's
Level
A and
B storage
areas
had operable
automatic fire protection
systems.
No evidence of water or abnormal
material
corrosion
was observed in
any of the inside storage
areas.
Cleanliness,
preservation,
and
protection
o'f equipment,
including housekeeping,
were satisfactory.
Corrosion
coupons
or bare metal
surfaces
in the containment
and
auxiliary bui ldiggs did not show any significant deterioration.
Hygrothermographs
(instruments monitoring humidity and temperature)
inside these
storage
areas
were in calibration, in operation,
and
reading in specification.
Heasurin
and Test
E ui ment
HSTE
The inspector observed that the.licensee
had replaced
the previous
hygrothermographs
with a newer model.
These
hygrothermographs
monitor the temperature
and humidity within the storage
areas,
and
provide the
gA record that the ANSI storage
requirements
are
maintained.
Since this was
a newer model,
the inspector
reviewed
the calibration procedure,
10.700.76,
"Calibration of Hygrothermo-
l
't
I
t)
'
-19-
graphs, All Hakes
All Hodels," to assess
the adequacy of the
procedure.
After reviewing calibration procedure
10.700.76,
the inspector
questioned
whether this procedure
was adequate
for calibrating the
instruments,
since only two points
(approximately
32% and
75%
humidity) were checked.
The licensee
stated that their calibration
procedure is based
on the vendor's
manual.
The inspector's
concern
was assuring
the linearity of the humidity instrument,
since this
was not a standard five-point calibration.
In further discussions,
the licensee
showed that the instrument
was
accurate
to within 3~ for a humidity between
20~ and 90~.
Based
on
this information and discussions
with the licensee,
this concern is
resolved.
The licensee further stated that the humidity readings
correlate well when checked against different humidity instruments.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
12-.
Unresolved
Items
Unresolved
items are matters
about which the
NRC requires
more infor-
mation to determine whether they are acceptable
items, violations, or
deviations.
Paragraphs
4.a, 4.b, 4.c, 5.b(6),
and
6 of this report
discuss
unresolved
items addressed
during this inspection.
i3.
~Ei
The inspectors
met with licensee
management
representatives
periodically
during the report period to discuss
inspection status.
An exit meeting
was conducted with the indicated personnel
(refer to Paragraph
1)
on
April 15,
1993.
The inspectors
discussed
the scope of the inspection
and
the inspection findings with licensee
management.
Licensee
representatives
acknowledged
the inspectors'indings.
An exit meeting
was held with the licensee's
staff (refer to Paragraph
1)
at WNP-3 on February
24,
1993.
The inspection
scope
and findings of
.
Paragraph
11 were discussed.
The licensee did'not identify as proprietary any of the information
reviewed
by or discussed
with the inspectors
during the inspectio I
I]
bcc w/copy of enclosure:
Docket File
Project Inspector
Resident
Inspector
B. Faulkenberry
J. Martin
R.
Huey
C. VanDenburgh
P. Johnson
J. Clifford, NRR
G.
Cook
S. Richards
bcc w/o enclosure:
M. Smith
J. Bianchi
J. Zollicoffer
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4/
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RBarr
4/
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Fi 1 e Location:
G: ~PS I~M2-93-06. REV
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bcc w/copy of enclosures:
Docket File
Project Inspector
Resident
Inspector
B. Faulkenberry
J. Hartin
R.
Huey
C. VanDenburgh
P. Johnson
J. Clifford, NRR
G.
Cook
S. Richards
bcc w/enclosure I:
M. Smith
J.
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J.'ollicoffer
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