IR 05000397/1993033

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Insp Rept 50-397/93-33 on 930830-0903.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Qa Activities & Previously Identified Items
ML17290A666
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 09/29/1993
From: Ang W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML17290A665 List:
References
50-397-93-33, NUDOCS 9310130228
Download: ML17290A666 (25)


Text

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

~Re ort No.:

Docket No.:

License No.:

Licensee:

50-397/93-33 50-397 NPF-21 Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS)

Washington Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Benton County, Washington Ins ection Conducted:

August 30 through September 3,

1993

~Ins ectors:

D. Acker, Reactor Inspector Ins ection Summar

ng, C ie

,

ngineering Section Ins ection durin the eriod of Au ust 30 throu h Se tember

1993 Re ort No. 50-397 93-33 Areas Ins ected:

During this routine announced inspection the inspector reviewed quality assurance (gA) activities and previously identified items.

Inspection Procedures 35702, "guality Verification Function;" 92700,

"Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Non-Routine Events;"

92701,

"Followup;" 92702,

"Followup of Enforcement Items;"

and Temporary Instruction 2515/ill, "Electrical Distribution System Followup Inspection,"

were used for this inspection.

Safet Issues Mana ement S stem SIMS Item:

None Results:

General Conclusions and S ecific Findin s:

The licensee had improved the planning and preparations for audits.

In addition, gA surveillance audits were being issued in a more timely manner.

9310l30228 930930 PDR ADOCK 05000397

PDR

However, the quality and timeliness of gA technical assessments had not improved.

The following specific examples were noted.

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A technical assessment of the licensee's setpoint program was performed in 1992.

The draft assessment report had a number of findings, including,.potential Technical Specification compliance issues.

At the time of the inspection, the technical assessment had not been issued and none of the potential findings had been issued as advance findings.

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The technical assessment of the Cycle 9 core reload design was not issued until after the plant had started up for Cycle 9.

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A technical assessment of design modifications was performed by gA in January and February, 1993, and a report was issued on July 8, 1993; The NRC found procedure and procedure compliance problems with the same design modifications reviewed by the gA technical assessment, during a July 12-23, 1993 inspection (Inspection Report 93-25).

The procedure and procedure compliance problems identified by the NRC were missed by the gA technical assessment.

The licensee had adequately.

performed the technical reviews and calculations committed in response to the January 1992 NRC Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection team's findings.

Si nificant Safet Natters:

None Summar of Violation or Deviations:

None 0 en Items Summar

Two Licensee Event Reports were closed by onsite review.

Six open items were closed.

TI 2515/Ill, "Electrical Distribution System Followup Inspection,"

was also close e

DETAILS Persons Contacted Washin ton Public Power Su l

S stem

  • J
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  • L

+A.

  • K.
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  • D S.
  • R.

Benjamin, Manager, guality Assessments Davidson, Manager, guality Assurance Flasch, Director of Engineering Fies, Licensing Engineer Gearhart, Director, guality Assurance Grumme, Manager, Nuclear Safety Assurance Hosier, Manager, Licensing Lewis, Licensing Engineer Moon, Operating Event Review Engineer Parrish, Assistant Managing Director Peters, Manager, Plant Administration Rhoads, Manager, Operating Events Analysis and Resolution Sampson, Manager, Haintenance Sorensen, Manager, Regulatory Programs Swailes, Plant Manager Swank, Licensing Engineer Washington, Manager, Nuclear Safety Engineering Webring, Manager, Technical Division US Nuclear Re ulator Commission

  • R. Barr, Senior Resident Inspector
  • K. Johnston, Project Engineer
  • Denotes those attending the exit meeting on September 3,

1993 The inspectors also held discussions with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection.

ualit Verification 35702 The inspector reviewed areas of concern discussed in previous NRC Inspection Reports 50-397/92-33 and 50-397/93-08 regarding timeliness of issue of quality assurance (gA) surveillance audits and technical assessments, the depth of the findings, and review by gA to ensure the finding resolutions were adequate.

The inspector also reviewed preparations for an ongoing audit and recent licensee evaluations of operating events information received from other industry sources.

The licensee performed three types of gA audits: audits, surveillance audits and technical assessments.

The licensee performed audits to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B and Technical Specification requirements.

The licensee performed surveillance audits to review compliance with a variety of requirements, where a short performance based review of a narrow subject was desired.

The licensee performed technical assessments to review program compliance in specific areas of concern.

The licensee used technical assessments to perform thorough, in-depth reviews of the area of concern selecte Surveillance Audits The inspector reviewed five recently completed surveillance audits:

Report Number 293-0028,

"R-8 ASNE XI 10 Year Hydrostatic Testing;" Report Number 293-0019,

"Plant Housekeeping and Hose Control;" Report Number 293-0022,

"HSRV Setpoint and Solenoid Testing;" Report Number 293-0031,

"RWCU High DP Flow Channel Calibration;" and draft Report Number 293-0038,

"August 1993 Forced Outage

& Startup Oversight Activities."

The licensee had a guideline for issuing surveillance audits within 14 days of completion of the audit period.

The inspector determined that the audits were issued within the licensee guidelines and contained a

number of in-depth findings.

In addition, the inspector noted that all significant findings were issued when they were found, in lieu of waiting for the report to be issued.

The inspector reviewed the responses to the audit findings.

All responses accepted by the audit organization appeared adequate.

The inspector reviewed the planning for and a draft copy of Surveillance Audit Report Number'93-0031:

The inspector considered that this surveillance was well focused and had in-depth findings.

The inspector concluded that licensee quality assurance personnel were still identifying problems, while improving the focus and timeliness of the surveillance audits.

The inspector concluded that the policy of issuing findings as they were developed enhanced the timeliness of the reports.

Technical Assessments The inspector reviewed two recently completed technical assessments and a draft copy of a technical assessment of the licensee's setpoint program.

The inspector also reviewed the timeliness of issue for other technical assessments.

The licensee performed Technical Assessment TAA292-015,

"Setpoint," in December 1992, however, the report had not been issued at the time of the inspection.

A review of the draft findings indicated over 30 findings, including many with numerous items grouped into one finding.

Several of the draft findings questioned Technical Specification compliance, however, no advance quality finding reports had been issued.

The inspector considered that none of the draft findings reported an immediate safety concern.

The licensee did not issue Technical Assessment TAA293-001,

"Verification of Cycle 9 Reload Design Review," until August 13, 1993, after unit startup for Cycle The licensee initiated Technical Assessment TAA292-017,

"HOV Program Implementation,"

in 1992 but did not complete the report until September 7,

1993.

TAA292-017 and other technical assessments were stopped, so that the assigned employees could perform other tasks, and started again at a later date.

The licensee then changed the assessment period and the report issue date.

Therefore, the inspector was not always able to clearly determine the timeliness of technical assessments.

The licensee performed Technical Assessment TAA293-004, "Design Review of Selected R-8 Outage Hodifications," and issued the report in July 1993 with no findings.

Independent NRC review of two of the modifications reviewed by TAA293-004 identified procedure and procedure compliance problems as noted in Inspection Report 50-397/93-25.

The inspector concluded that the timeliness and depth of technical assessments had not improved over previous inspections and was still a gA weakness.

The inspector discussed this conclusion with the licensee.

The licensee noted several reasons for untimely technical assessments, but agreed with the inspector that TAA293-004 and TAA292-015 had not been issued in a timely manner.

In addition, the licensee agreed to expedite issue of TAA292-015.

Audits The inspector reviewed the preparation and performance of the on-going audit of technical specification compliance, Report Number 93-642,

"WNP2 Technical Specification Compliance Audit."

The inspector determined that the licensee had initiated detailed checklists for performance of this audit.

The inspector also reviewed the scope and preparation for this audit with the licensee's new guality Assessment Hanager.

The inspector considered that the preparation for the technical specification audit was improved over audits reviewed in previous inspections.

The inspector also considered that the checklists for the audit were more detailed than previous audits, and were receiving greater management emphasis.

The inspector concluded that licensee gA management was initiating actions which would aid in ensuring consistently adequate audits.

Review of 0 erational Event Re ort OER Information The inspector reviewed the backlog of unreviewed OER information, the backlog of corrective actions, and a sample of recently completed OER packages.

The licensee's goal was to review all generic information within 30 days of receipt, maintain their backlog of unreviewed items below 50 and maintain the number of incomplete corrective actions below 5 The licensee had 28 unreviewed items.

Two of the items were over a year old; OER 91031A,

"Solenoid Valve Operating Experience,"

and OER 83004H, "Potter Brumfield HDR Rotary Relays Hisapplication."

NRC Inspection Report 50-397/92-33 had previously listed OER 91031A as an example of untimely licensee OER review.

During the inspection the licensee completed review of OER 91031A.

The licensee stated that an initial evaluation of OER 83004H had been made and action deferred as being routine, however, the initial review was not documented.

Engineering personnel were working on OER 83004H during the inspection.

The inspector reviewed OER 81012V, "Limitorque Actuator Hotor Torque vs Temperature."

The inspector determined that the licensee had issued a problem evaluation report (PER) to resolve this item.

However, the OER was not included on the list of outstanding OER action items.

The licensee reviewed OER 81012V and determined that this OER should have been included in their listing of outstanding OER action items.

The licensee stated that the OER was omitted due to a data entry omission and that they would change the data entry method so that all PERs issued to resolve an OER would be tracked with the OER.

Including OER 81012V, the licensee had 25 items with outstanding actions.

The inspector reviewed a sampling of completed OERs.

The licensee's review of OER 82042N, "Fire Endurance Tests," stated that no action was required.

The inspector noted that OER 82042N described inadequacy of the initial acceptance test for 3-H E-50 one hour fire barrier material.

The licensee's response was that there was no action required because they didn't have 3-H E-50 one hour fire barriers, they had 3-H E-50 three hour fire barriers.

The inspector considered that the licensee's review was weak, since it did not question if problems with acceptance testing of the 3-H E-50 one hour barriers was also applicable to the 3-H E-50 three hour barriers.

The licensee acknowledged the inspector's concern and stated that this OER would be reopened for additional review.

No other problems were noted with the OERs sampled.

The inspector concluded that the licensee was meeting their goals for timeliness of OER review, backlog of unreviewed items, and backlog of uncompleted items, subject to completion of OER 83004H discussed above.

The inspector considered the licensee goals to be reasonable and sufficiently responsive to industry experienced problems.

Overall Conclusion The inspector concluded that the licensee gA organization was improving in the performance of surveillance audits and audits but that technical assessments still needed to be improved.

The licensee acknowledged the inspector's concerns and noted that

pending organizational changes would include new performance standards for technical assessments.

No violations or deviations were noted in the areas inspected.

Onsite Followu of Mritten Re orts 92700 a 0 Closed Licensee Event Re ort 50-397 90-06-00:

A endix R Cable Fire Protection Deficiencies Licensee's Re ort During design reviews the licensee identified that separation problems existed for 12 cables which could prevent an orderly plant shutdown in the unlikely event of a Design Basis Fire.

Host of the problems involved potential failures to isolate control room electrical circuits from external shutdown circuits during a

postulated control room fire.

The licensee concluded that the root cause for the problem was an inadequate analysis during the original

CFR 50 design review.

Licensee's Actions Pending correction of the problems, the licensee instituted hourly fire watches of the areas containing the 12 cables.

The licensee then made design and procedure changes to ensure compliance with

CFR 50 Appendix R cable separation criteria.

Ins ector's Actions Durin the Present Ins ection The inspector determined by onsite review that most of the design changes were accomplished in accordance with Basic Design Change (BDC) 90-0081,

"Appendix R Design Hodifications."

The inspector determined that Plant Procedures Hanual (PPH)

Procedures 4. 12.4. 1, Revision 11, "Fire;" and 4. 12. 1.1, Revision 19, "Control Room Evacuation and Remote Cooldown," contained revised procedures to match BDC 90-0081.

The inspector reviewed selected parts of BDC 90-0081, PPHs 4. 12.4. 1, and PPH 4. 12. 1. 1; reviewed associated wiring plans; discussed the changes with the licensee; and walked down equipment using the revised PPHs.

Discussion and Conclusion The inspector determined that the sample of the design changes reviewed were technically adequate to meet

CFR 50 Appendix R

criteria.

The inspector determined that the procedures were adequate to support the design changes and matched the field installations.

The inspector concluded that the licensee's actions had adequately resolved this problem.

This item is close b.

Closed Licensee Event Re ort 50-397 93-03-00:

Inade uate Coordination of Primar Undervolta e

Bus Transfer Lo ic and Overcurrent Protection Licensee's Re ort During design reviews made in response to questions raised by the NRC's Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection team the licensee identified that an electrical fault coordination problem existed.

The licensee determined that under certain electrical distribution system alignments that a fault on either 4. 16 kilovolt (kV) vital bus could have resulted in unavailability of both offsite power sources and delayed powering of the nonfaulted 4. 16 kV vital bus from its associated emergency diesel generator (EDG).

Briefly, when both vital busses were powered from one transformer secondary winding, undervoltage relays would operate prior to overcurrent relays on certain vital bus faults.

However, only the overcurrent relays were designed to provide adequate separation of the faulted bus and ensure timely energization of the unfaulted bus by its associated EDG.

Licensee's Actions Pending correction of the problems, the licensee modified the electrical distributional alignment to ensure adequate fault isolation.

The licensee then modified the relay coordination to correct the problem.

Ins ector's Actions Durin the Present Ins ection The inspector determined by onsite review that the design changes were accomplished in accordance with Basic Design Change (BDC) 93-0021-0A,

"SM-7 and SM-8 Relay Coordination;" Calculation E/I-02-92-09,

"Short Circuit Current Calculation for 4. 16 and 6.9 kV Buses;"

and Calculation E/I 02-92-017,

"Medium Voltage (4. 16 kV 5 6.9 kV) Electrical Distribution System (EDS)

Phase Overcurrent Relay Settings."

The inspector reviewed the calculations.

The inspector determined that BDC 93-0021-OA had been reviewed and determined to be technically adequate in NRC Inspection Report 50-397/93-25.

The inspector reviewed the data for setting the relays.

Discussion and Conclusion The inspector determined that the calculations provided adequate coordination between 4. 16 kV vital bus undervoltage and overcurrent relays.

The inspector determined that the relays were set within the calculation criteria and that these new settings were included in maintenance instructions.

This item is closed.

No violations or deviations were noted in the areas inspecte P

4.

Followu 92701 and TI 2515 111 a 0 Closed Followu Item 50-397 92-01-03:

Service Water Coolin to Emer ence Diesel Generators Ori inal NRC 0 en Item The NRC Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection team identified that licensee testing had shown that service water (SW)

flow to each of the tandem pair of emergency diesels driving a common generator was not balanced and that surveillance tests and calculations were not sufficiently accurate to properly evaluate the heat exchanger (HX) performance for the diesel with the lower SW flow.

The NRC Service Water Inspection team followed up on this item in Inspection Report 50-397/93-201.

After review of revised licensee calculation and test data, the team concluded that performance of the HX on the emergency diesel with the lower SW flow was adequate but marginal.

Licensee's Actions in Res onse to the 0 en Item The licensee committed to install a. design change to balance SW flow to the emergency diesel generator (EDG) HXs.

Ins ector's Actions Durin the Present Ins ection The inspector reviewed the licensee's design change, Plant Modification Record 91-0309-0,

"Diesel Service Water Orificing,"

and subsequent test data.

Discussion and Conclusion The test data indicated that SW flow imbalance between the two EDG HXs had been reduced to approximately 25 gallons per minute (gpm),

with a flow of at least 850 gpm to each EDG HX.

Prior to the modification the imbalance had been as high as 300 gallons per minute, with flows as low as 725 gpm to one of the EDG HX.

Based on the conclusion of the NRC Service Water team that the licensee's revised SW calculations were adequate, and the subsequent design change to balance flow to EDG HXs, the inspector concluded that this item was adequately resolved.

This item is closed.

b.

0 en Followu Item 50-397 92-01-04:

Emer enc Diesel Generator Room and Diesel Generator Electrical E ui ment Room Tem eratures Ori inal NRC 0 en Item The Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection team determined that calculations for the emergency diesel generator (EDG)

room and diesel generator electrical equipment room maximum

temperatures were non-conservative.

The team determined that the calculations did not use the heat input from a fully loaded EDG, did not consider the heat input from the EDG room into the diesel generator electrical equipment room, and did not consider the heat input from large dropping resistors located in the electrical equipment room.

The team noted associated errors in the UFSAR.

The team was unable to conclude that the licensee had determined the most limiting room temperatures.

Licensee's Actions in Res onse to the 0 en Item The licensee performed new EDG and diesel generator electrical equipment room maximum temperature calculations and updated the UFSAR.

NRC Followu Ins ections NRC inspection report 50-397/93-16 reviewed the licensee's new temperature calculations and the licensee's temperature qualification records, for selected electrical'quipment.

The inspector reviewed the UFSAR, Chapters 3 and 9.

Calculation HE-02-92-43, Revision 1,

"Room Temperature Calculation for DG building, Reactor building, Radwaste building, and SW Pump-house Under Design Basis Accident Conditions,"

contained the licensee's room temperature calculations.

the NRC Service Water Inspection team (IR 50-397/93-201)

had reviewed the licensee's room temperature calculations, including Calculation HE-02-92-43, and had concluded that the licensee had determined the most limiting room temperatures and that maximum safety equipment temperatures were within design requirements.

The inspector independently reviewed the licensee's temperature qualification records for selected electrical equipment and determined that the established temperature limits were technically adequate.

The inspector reviewed the UFSAR and determined that the errors noted by the EDSFI team had been adequately resolved.

However, the inspector noted that Calculation HE-02-92-43 assumed worst case heat exchanger cooling coil efficiency of SON.

Recent testing, after completion of Calculation HE-02-92-43, had determined that actual heat exchanger cooling coil efficiencies were as low as 68K.

The licensee again performed room temperature calculations using a heat exchanger cooling coil efficiency of 60%

and determined that calculated worst case room temperatures were above electrical equipment temperature ratings.

Licensee's Actions After Followu Ins ections The licensee was reviewing the problem to determine what minimum level of heat exchanger cooling coil efficiency they could maintain and the effects of this efficiency rating on existing

room worst case temperature calculations.

The licensee stated this review was not complete.

Discussion and Conclusions This item will remain open for NRC review of the worst case heat exchanger cooling coil efficiency chosen by the licensee for room temperature calculations, the methods the licensee will use to maintain actual heat exchanger cooling coil efficiency above the calculated worst case efficiency, and the final room temperature calculations.

This review will include other vital equipment room temperatures.

Closed Followu Item 50-397 92-01-11:

B assed Mana ement Review and Control of Maintenance Ori inal NRC 0 en Item The NRC Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection team determined that craft personnel were marking maintenance steps as NA, with no management review.

In addition, maintenance records indicated that procedures were complete, even though parts of the procedures had been marked NA and were not performed.

Licensee's Actions in Res onse to the 0 en Item The licensee changed their procedures for performing maintenance to ensure that a maintenance supervisor or engineer reviewed maintenance procedures with steps marked NA.

The licensee changed their record keeping methods, to indicate when a procedure had not been completely performed.

Ins ector's Actions Durin the Present Ins ection The inspector reviewed the licensee's revised instructions and maintenance records requirements as documented in, "Policy Decision Regarding Documentation of Partially Complete PM Tasks,"

of May 5, 1993.

Discussion and Conclusion The inspector concluded that the licensee had an adequate system for controlling and documenting partially completed maintenance tasks.

This item is closed.

Closed Followu Item 50-397 93-08-04:

Motor 0 crated Valve Thrust Limits Ori inal NRC 0 en Item An inspector noted that the licensee's engineering evaluation of Limitorque Technical Update ¹92-01,

"Kalsi Engineering Document

"

¹1707-C, Rev.

0 (11-25-91) Thrust Rating Increase SMB-OOO, SMB-OO, SHB-0

& SHB-1 Actuators,"

appeared to allow HOV thrust limits beyond the limits specified within the Update.

The licensee's engineering evaluation of the Limitorque Technical Update was contained in OER 81012S.

Limitorque Technical Update ¹92-01 stated:

"Maximum developed total thrust should not exceed 140 percent of the currently, published actuator rating...

Thrust values which exceed 140 percent of the currently published actuator rating will require the utility to contact Limitorque for an assessment of continued operability."

The licensee's action on OER 81012S, for Limitorque Technical Update ¹92-01, was to incorporate a thrust limit of 162 percent of the currently published actuator rating, based on the licensee's review of the Kalsi test.

The inspectors determined that this limit of 162 percent had not yet been incorporated into the licensee's associated engineering standards.

The licensee stated that preliminary calculations had not identified any actuator with a thrust over 140 percent.

In the absence of additional analysis, the inspectors concluded that the proposed licensee action to exceed the Limitorque specified thrust limit was not appropriate.

Licensee's Actions in Res onse to the 0 en Item The licensee contacted Limitorque and obtained Limitorque's concurrence that the licensee could use the 162 percent limit.

The licensee issued their engineering standards which allow use of the 162 percent limit, on a case by case basis.

Ins ector's Actions Durin the Present Ins ection The inspector reviewed licensee thrust calculations, their engineering standards and discussed the 162 percent limit with the Limitorque technical personnel who had concurred to the licensee's use of the 162 percent limit.

Discussion and Conclusion The inspector concluded that Limitorque's position was that Limitorque would certify their actuators to 140 percent.

Limitorque agreed that the licensee could certify their actuators to 162 percent, based on Kalsi test data, but that the licensee would have to provide the technical justification for any thrust values above 140 percent.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's motor operated valve thrust data and calculations and did not identify any actuators where

measured or calculated thrust exceeded 140 percent.

The inspector concluded that no further action was warranted on this open item since the licensee had not yet rated any of the site HOVs for thrust values above the 140 percent limit recommended by Limitorque.

No violations or deviations were noted in the areas inspected.

Followu of Violations and Deviations 92702 and TI 2515 111 a ~

Closed Violation 50-397 89-06-06:

Pi e

Su orts Outside Plan Re uirements Ori inal NRC Enforcement Item This item reported that pipe supports were found outside the installation drawing requirements.

Licensee's Actions in Res onse to the Enforcement Item In their response to the Notice of Violation the licensee committed to correct the installation and make process improvements.

The licensee completed these actions.

Subsequent staff followup inspections questioned the correct location of other pipe supports.

During October, 1992, an inspector checked on the progress of the licensee's action on this item, as documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-397/92-33.

The inspector found that the licensee's records for this item showed the item was closed in 1989.

The licensee could not find any records which addressed the NRC's concerns about other pipe support problems raised by NRC Inspection Reports 50-397/90-11 and 50-397/90-27.

The inspector observed that the licensee's review of the original problem did not fully assess the potential for the original problem to exist at other locations in the plant.

The licensee acknowledged the inspector's concern and agreed to review the problem and provide the results of their review to the inspector as noted in Inspection Report 50-397/93-08.

The licensee determined that the original problem involved a pipe support that was moved as part of a design modification.

The licensee reviewed their design modification records, selected approximately 30 moved pipe supports, and compared the plan requirements to the actual pipe support installations.

The licensee determined that the pipe supports sighted were within plan requirements.

The licensee documented their results in a memorandum to file, "Provide information on why WNP-2 does not have a generic problem with pipe support installations,"

dated August 31, 199 S

Ins ector's Actions Durin the Present Ins ection The inspector reviewed the licensee's memorandum on pipe supports, discussed the results with licensee personnel and reviewed sample pipe support plans.

Discussion and Conclusion The inspector concluded that the pipe supports sighted by the licensee were installed at the locations required by licensee plans.

The inspector concluded that 30 pipe supports was an adequate sample to address the generic issue of the original pipe support problem.

This violation is closed.

Closed Violation 50-397 92-01-13:

Failure to U date Procedures for Installed Desi n Chan es Ori inal NRC Enforcement Item The NRC Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection team determined that the licensee had accomplished design changes which changed thermal overload models, however, the associated surveillance procedures still contained testing acceptance criteria for the original thermal overload models.

The team determined that surveillances had been performed using the wrong acceptance criteria.

The licensee reviewed the surveillance procedure data and concluded that the recorded data was within the acceptance criteria for the new thermal overload models.

The team agreed.

Licensee's Actions in Res onse to the Enforcement Item The licensee, in their written response to this violation, dated July 10, 1992, committed to correct the associated procedures, train personnel on this issue and develop a word searchable computer program.

The licensee stated that the computer program would aid design personnel in determining all the procedures affected by a design change.

The licensee subsequently obtained a

word searchable computer program titled, "Plant Procedures System,"

and loaded their plant procedures into this program.

The licensee reported that this item was ready for closing.

NRC Inspection Report 50-397/93-16 reported review of this item.

The inspector concluded that:

The thermal overload surveillance procedures had been properly updated to match actual installed models.

The computer search program would aid in identifying procedures effected by plant change l

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The licensee had adequate training material available for proper use of the program.

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There was no evidence that design engineering personnel were required to use the program, or that they were even aware its existence.

The inspector provided this conclusion to the licensee.

The licensee added training on use of the computer search capability to engineering training.

Ins ector's Actions Durin the Present Ins ection The inspector reviewed the training plan and outline.

Discussion and Conclusion The inspector concluded that the training was adequate to ensure that engineering personnel were knowledgeable on use of the computer search program.

Based on a satisfactory review of other licensee actions on this item in Inspection Report 5Q-397/93-16 and the new training, the inspector considered this item adequately resolved.

This violation is closed.

Closed

. Violation 50-397 92-01-18:

Procedure Com liance Problems Involved with Technical S ecification Surveillances Ori inal NRC 0 en Item The NRC Electrical Distribution, System Functional Inspection team found numerous examples of failure to comply with licensee procedures involving Technical Specification surveillances.

Licensee's Actions in Res onse to the 0 en Item The licensee, in their written response to this violation, dated July 10, 1992, committed to:

Perform a self-assessment of procedural compliance within WNP2.

Revise appropriate procedures to clarify use of "NA."

Write and adopt a conduct of maintenance procedure with provisions for procedure adherence/professional conduct.

Discuss conduct of procedure concepts with supervisors and workers.

Train all mai'ntenance personnel on "self-checking" practice Introduce a "personally preventable" approach to maintenance.

Assign a supervisor or engineer to surveillances performed by electrical maintenance to ensure managements expectations are met.

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Apply lessons learned by the electrical maintenance shop to other organizations.

Ins ector's Actions Durin the Present Ins ection The inspector reviewed the documentation provided by the licensee to support each of the above commitments.

The inspector discussed procedure adequacy and procedure compliance with licensee personnel.

Discussion and Conclusion The inspector concluded that the licensee had completed the committed actions.

However, the inspector determined that these actions had not been effective in eliminating procedure compliance problems at WNP2.

NRC Inspection Reports 50-397/93-18 and 93-24 documented continuing procedure compliance problems as apparent violations.

Since the licensee actions taken as the result of this violation were completed, this violation is closed.

However, since the actions were not effective, continuing NRC review of procedure compliance issues will be followed under more recent items identified in Inspection Reports 50-397/93-18 and 93-24.

No violations or deviations were noted in the areas inspected.

~Ei N

The inspector conducted an exit meeting on September 3,

1993, with members of the licensee staff as indicated in Section 1.

During this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in this report.

The licensee acknowledged the concerns identified in the report.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information provided to the inspector.