IR 05000397/1993032

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Insp Rept 50-397/93-32 on 930809-13.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Fire Protection & Prevention Program
ML17290A621
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 09/09/1993
From: Ang W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML17290A620 List:
References
50-397-93-32, NUDOCS 9309290065
Download: ML17290A621 (12)


Text

U.S.

NUCLEAR'EGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V

Report No.

Docket No.

License No.

50-397/93-32 50-397 NPF-21 Licensee:

Washington Public Power Supply System P.O.

Box.968 Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name:

Inspection at:

Washington Nuclear Project No.

(WNP-2)

WNP-2 Site near Richland, Washington W. J.- Wagner, Reactor Inspector g

Approved by:

.

P.

ng, C ie Engineering Section Inspection Conducted:

August 9-13, 1993 Inspector:

ate sgne Ins ection Summar

Ins ection durin the eriod of Au ust 9 13 1993 Re ort No. 50-397 93-32 Areas Ins ected:

This routine announced inspection evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's fire protection/prevention program.

Followup of Appendix

"R" compliance concerns identified by NRR during a November 1991 visit was also performed.

Inspection Procedures 64704 and 92701 were used as guidance for this inspection.

Results:

General Conclusions and S ecific Findin s:

Fire brigade performance during live fire practice sessions indicated preparedness and readiness to fight plant fires.

9'309'O'&065 9309'1 0 PDR ADOCK 05000397

PDR

Safet Issues Mana ement S stem SIMS Item:

None Si nificant Safet Matters:

None Summar of Vio1ation or Deviations:

None.

0 en Items Summar

Non DETAILS Persons Contacted Washin ton Public Power Su l

S stem

  • J. Benjamin, guality Assessment Manager K.- Bleiler, Senior Fire Protection Training Specialist R. Catlow, Fire Protection System Engineer
  • D. Coleman, Regulatory Services Supervisor J. Derryberry, Fire Protection Specialist
  • C. Fies, Licensing Engineer
  • J. Gearhart, Director, 'guality Assurance
  • D. Graham, Senior Fire Protection Specialist
  • L. Harrold, Maintenance Division Manager A. Hosier, Licensing Manager
  • R. Koenigs, Design Engineering Manager
  • K. Meehan, Emergency Planning Supervisor
  • K.'ewcomb, Fire Marshal
  • S. Peck, Equipment Engineering Manager
  • K. Pisarcik, Licensing Assistant
  • J. Rhoads, Operating Events and Resolution Manager
  • J. Sampson, Maintenance Division Manager
  • G. Sorensen, Regulatory Programs Manager
  • G. Smith, Operations Division Manager
  • J. Swailes, Plant Manager
  • D. Swank, Licensing Engineer B.

Van Erem, Procurement Engineering Supervisor D. Walker, Manager, Health, Safety, and Fire Protection

  • R. Webring, Technical Division Hanager
  • J. Wiles, guality Assurance Engineer U. S. Nuclear Re ulator Commission
  • R. Barr, Senior Resident Inspector The inspector also held discussions with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection.
  • Denotes those attending the exit meeting on August 13, 1993.

A endix "R" Com liance Concerns Identified B

NRR Durin November 1991 Visit During an NRR fact finding visit of WNP-2 Thermo-Lag fire barrier issues conducted on November 6 and 7, 1991, three concerns were identified.

One concern involved Appendix "R" compliance and was resolved in NRC Inspection Report 50-397/93-11.

The remaining two concerns were reviewed during this inspection and are discussed belo Vendor Interface Pro ram Backcaround A fire barrier material vendor had informed the NRC of ampacity derating test results performed at the Underwriters Laboratories by means of a mailgram dated October 26, 1986.

The vendor informed the licensee that the mailgram was sent to the licensee's purchasing organization.

The NRR visit identified an apparent weakness in the licensee's vendor interface program in that the mailgram had apparently not been forwarded to the licensee's design engineering organization for evaluation and applicability to WNP-2.

Generic Letter 83-28,

"Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events," required the licensee to establish a program to ensure that vendor information received is complete, current and controlled throughout the plant's operating life.

Generic Letter 90-03, "Relaxation of Staff Position in Generic Letter 83-28, Item 2.2 Part 2 Vendor Interface for Safet-elated Com onents

"

provided guidance on what an adequate vendor interface program should include.

Ins ector Review of Licensee Vendor Interface Pro ra The inspector reviewed the adequacy of the licensee's program for receiving and dealing with vendor supplied information.

In addition, licensee, staff awareness of their responsibilities for dissemination and processing of information received from vendors was assessed during discussions with the licensee.

Plant Procedures Manual (PPM) 1.6.3, Revision 11,

"Vendors'perating and Haintenance Manuals" provided the requirements for the licensee's vendor interface program.

PPH 1.6.3 required that vendor manuals be received, reviewed, and distributed in a controlled manner.

Section 5. 1,

"Vendor Interface Program," of PPM 1.6.3, contained provisions for annual contact with vendors of key safety-related components, as required by Generic Letter 90-03.

An example of annual vendor contact was reviewed by the inspector.

The licensee sent a letter to Limitorque Corporation, dated September 29, 1992.

This letter specifically asked if there had been developments or updates in recommended maintenance and operation practices which had been made in the time frame since their equipment was initially placed in service.

The letter attached an "Annual Vendor Contact Reply Form" giving specifics about the equipment originally supplied.

Limitorque's reply of October 21, 1992 informed the licensee that they were on distribution for periodic updates to maintenance publications a'nd revisions to critical component PPM 1.6.3 also required the use of a "Manual Criteria Sheet" to confirm the completeness and technical adequacy of vendor supplied information. If the vendor information was other than a manual change, for example the vendor mailgram of October 26, 1986, then the vendor information was required to be reviewed by the Nuclear Safety Engineering (NSE) Department.

After their initial review, NSE was required to discuss pertinent issues with affected departments, provide recommendations to the Plant Manager, and if practical, initiate changes to implement the recommended action.

NSE also tracked actions or commitments generated by their review of vendor information.

Conclusion The inspector concluded that the licensee's vendor interface program, implemented subsequent to Generic Letter 90-03, had adequate provisions for proper processing and tracking of vendor supplied information.

Licensee personnel appeared knowledgeable in their responsibilities for dealing with vendor supplied information.

The implementation of the licensee's vendor information program for Thermo-Lag material will be further reviewed in a future inspection.

The subject of the mailgram, ampacity derating test results, will be resolved by NRR as a result of the NRC Thermo-Lag action plan.

No violations or deviations of NRC requirements were identified.

Procurement Pro ram Back round Procurement Requirements Evaluations (PREs)

were performed by the licensee's engineering staff to assure that design requirements were met in the procurement of materials.

PRE 615, dated July 9, 1991, was inconsistent with its associated Purchase Order (PO)

218915 of July 9, 1991.

Specifically, the PO included provisions for shelf-life requirements for Thermo-Lag material whereas the PRE did not address shelf-life requirements.

Ins ector Review of Procurement Process The inspectors'eview of the procurement process revealed that the PRE process resulted in a list of standard procurement, clauses.

These clauses were then included in the associated PO and receipt inspection documents.

The inspector reviewed one of the initial POs for Thermo-Lag, PO 085732, issued October 30, 1986.

PO 085732 specified shelf-life requirements for Thermo-Lag material.

PRE 615 Revision 0 was issued on March 3, 1987, four month after issuance of PO 085732, and did not include shelf-life until the issuance of Revision 3 on December 3,

1991.

The inspector noted that the initial and subsequent purchase orders

P

specified shelf-life.

The basis for the initial PO shelf life specification was not apparent.

The inspector also reviewed Receipt Inspection Plan (RIP) 0239 generated as a result of PRE 615, Revision 3.

The inspector found that RIP 0239 specified shelf-life and temperature limitations as characteristics to be inspected, and also provided adequate acceptance criteria.

The inspector reviewed three PREs of recent purchases of items dedicated for safety-related application.

The purpose of this review was to verify ev'idence of consistency between the PRE

,requirements, the PO clauses, and the receipt inspection documents.

PREs selected were numbers 4233 (8/12/92),

3656 (12/28/92)

and 4234 (4/21/93).

The inspector found that the procurement clauses and receipt inspection requirements specified on the PREs were appropriately included on the associated POs and RIPs.

Conclusion Fire The inspector concluded that the current procurement process was adequately assuring that specific attributes of the PREs were included in the purchase orders and receipt inspection documents.

The licensee's evaluation of the adequacy of the shelf life of Thermo-Lag material purchased in accordance with PO 218915 without a corresponding PRE specified shelf life will be reviewed during a

future inspection.

No violations or deviations of HRC requirements were identified.

Protection Prevention Pro ram 64704 a ~

Fire Bri ade Readiness The inspector observed practical training sessions that were in progress during this inspection.

Training observed by the inspector included the proper methods for search and rescue in smoked filled confined spaces, hose and hose movements, ventilation, radiological controls, and a live fire exercise in the burn building.

These training sessions were performed using personal fire protective equipment, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs)

and personal alarm safety system (PASS) devices.

The burn building drill scenario involved two fires in the building. The fire brigade was required to extinguish the first fire, in a safe and effective method, prior to proceeding to the second fire.

The inspector's evaluation of this drill was that the fire brigade performed in a satisfactory manner under strenuous conditions representative of situations encountered in fire fighting.

The inspector also observed that the pre-drill instructions provided valuable information on how to fight the particular fire scenario in a safe and efficient manner.

The post-drill performance evaluation was helpful in,providing the

post-drill performance evaluation was helpful in providing the fire brigade with an objective critique by pointing out weaknesses as well as strengths.

The inspector reviewed the fire brigade drill records and found that drills were conducted at the prescribed intervals, with participation by each fire brigade member.

The inspector concluded, based on the above observations, that the fire brigade was well prepared and ready to respond to similar fire situations encountered in the plant.

Plant Tour and Ins ection of Plant Fire Protection Features The inspector performed general area walkthrough inspections in the following plant areas:

turbine generator building, diesel generator room D62, reactor building and the cable spreading room.

Good housekeeping practices were observed in all areas, and hazardous chemicals and combustible materials were properly

'ontrolled.

The inspector also verified that the following systems were operable in those areas:

fire detection, hose stations, portable fire extinguishers, and the automatic fire suppression system.

During the inspection of the turbine building, the inspector observed that a directional water spray nozzle for the turbine bearing fire suppi ession system was not properly aimed at the main turbine generator bearing assembly.

The licensee responded immediately to correct the nozzle misalignment.

Further observations by the inspector revealed this to be an isolated case indicating that directional alignment of spray nozzles was not a

programmatic concern.

The inspector observed a weekly operability test being performed to determine the operability of Diesel Fire Pump FP-P-110.

This test was required by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes standard NFPA 20, "Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps."

The inspector observed that the equipment operator satisfactorily performed the operability test in accordance with the detailed instructions provided in Plant Procedures Manual (PPH) procedure number 15. 1.4,

"FP-P-110, Meekly, Operability Test."

The inspector questioned licensee personnel whether the carbon dioxide fire suppression system hoses were hydrostatically tested as specified by NFPA 12,

"Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems."

Section 1-10.2. 1 of the 1993 Edition of HFPA 12 required that all system hoses be tested every five years.

The inspector was informed by the licensee that this test had not been performed.

This carbon dioxide system was designed to automatically provide fire protection for the turbine generator exciter housing; the exciter housing was not classified as being safety-related.

The

carbon dioxide system was designed to the 1973 Edition of NFPA 12 which, at that time, did not require the hoses to be tested.

The licensee acknowledged that the current 1993 Code would provide a

higher degree of fire protection assurance.

Consequently, Maintenance Work Request AP4991 was initiated to hydrostatically test the carbon dioxide hoses.

c.

Conclusion The inspector concluded that the licensee's fire protection program was being adequately implemented in the areas addressed in this inspection re'port.

No violations or deviations of NRC requirements were identified.

~Ei M ti The inspector met with the licensee management representatives noted in paragraph 1 on August 13, 1993.

The scope of, the inspection and the inspector's findings were discussed.

Licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's findings.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspector during this inspectio