IR 05000395/1989024
| ML20006A944 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1990 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Modenos L, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20006A943 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-89-24, NUDOCS 9001310004 | |
| Download: ML20006A944 (12) | |
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- [O EfC jo NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION UNITED STATES
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REGloN 11 n
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101 M ARIETT A STRE ET, N.W.
- ATLANTA, oEoRGI A 30323 t.
50-395/89-24 Licensee:
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Jenkinsville, SC 29065 Docket No.:
50-395 License No.: NPF-12 Facility Name:
V. C. Summer Inspection Conducted:
December 1 - 31, 1989 Inspectors :
M t-A I - 'I'90 e
pt.RichardL.Prevatte Date Signed
& A wi
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1/4D ht.LeoP.Modenos Date Signed Approved by :
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M Floyd S. Cantrell,'f(ction Chief Date Signed Division of React (r Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors onsite in the areas of monthly surveillance observations, monthly maintenance obcervation, operational safety verification, ESF system walkdown, onsite follow-up of events at operating power reactors, installation and testing of modifications, and fitness for duty of licensee personnel.
Selected tours were conducted on backshift or weekends.
Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on ten days during this inspection period.
Results:
The unit was operated at 100 percent power for the majority of the reporting period.
The unit tripped due to the failure of an electro-hydraulic _ control system card on December 2, and was restarted on December 3, 1989 (paragraph 6a).
Two licensee identified non-cited violations were identified.
The first resulted from the failure to perform all required primary coolant specific activity analysis (paragraph 6d).
The second incident involved an unqualified person being assigned to the plant fire brigade (paragraph 6c).. The licensee is making procedural changes to station procedures for the fire brigade to clarify fire brigade member qualification, disqualification, and requalifica-tion.
These changes will be reviewed by the inspectors when completed.
They will be tracked as an inspector follow-up item IFI 89-24-02.
The areas of
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surveillance and maintenance continued-to perform well (paragraph's 2 and 3)~.
'The inspectors attended three licensee training sessions on the-new fitness for=
duty program (paragraph 8).-
This training appeared to; be well' organized and comprehensive.
The unit was shutdown for a period of approximately.-18 hours on December 29 and 30,- 1989 to modify the relay that caused the December 2,1989, unit trip.
This relay and 100 others were modified to reduce the ' probability of future-failures (paragraph 6a). -The licensee is commended for taking this approach rather than risk a future plant transient and potential: challenge to safety systems.
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REPORT-DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted L
Licensee Employees
- W. Baehr, Manager, Chemistry and Health Physics C. Bowman, Manager, _ Scheduling and Modifications
- 0. Bradham, Vice President, Nuclear Operations M. Browne, Manager, Systems Engineering & Performance l
W. Higgins, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
- S. Hunt, Manager, Quality Systems t-l
- A. Koon, Manager, Nuclear Licensing l
G. Moffatt, Manager, Maintenance Services l-
- D. Moore, General. Manager, Engineering Services
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- K Nettles, General Manager, Nuclear Safety
- C. Price, Manager, Technical Oversite M. Quinton, General Manager, Station Support
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J. Shepp, Associate Manager, Operations
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- J. Skolds, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations y
G. Soult, General Manager, Operations and Maintenance
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- G. Taylor, Manager, Operations l
l D. Warner, Manager, Core Engineering and Nuclear Computer Services
M. Williams, General Manager, Administrative & Support Services l
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K. Woodward, Manager, Nuclear Operations Education and Training Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
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Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
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2.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety related systems l
I and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in
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accordance with license requirements.
The inspectors observed portions of i
five selected surveillance tests including all aspects of Refueling Water-j.
Storage Tank Level. Calibration, STP 375.003.
The inspectors verified that y
required administrative approvals were obtained prior-to initiating the H
o test, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, required test-
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instrumentation was properly calibrated, data met TS requirements,. test
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discrepancies were rectified, and the systems were properly returned to service.
No major deficiencies were identified during the above
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observations.
l-No violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
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The inspectors observed maintenance activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, TS, industry codes and standards.
The inspectors determined that the procedures used were adequate to control the activity, and that these activities were accomplished.by-
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qualified personnel.
The inspectors independently verified that the equipment was properly tested before being returned to service.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed several outstanding job orders to determine _ that the licensee was giving priority to safety related maintenance and not developing a backlog which might affect a given system's performance.
The following specific maintenance activities were observed:
MWR 9010001 Remove designated 125VDC_ relay cards, test relay cards
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and contacts, and reinstall relay cards MWR 216930001 Install diodes across coils of XK relays per MRF 21693 MWR 8910336 Check calibration on OG A fuel cil day tank level indicator ICI 05410 PMTS P0123458 Calibrate pressurizer group 2 back-up heater ampere-meter PMTS P0129874 Perform equipment qualification inspection on hydrogen
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recombiner power supply cabinet XPN0049A Some minor procedural deficiencies were. identified while observing PMTS P0129874.
These were immediately corrected by the discipline supervisor.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Operational Safety Verification-(71707)
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The inspectors conducted daily _ inspections in ; the following areas:
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control room staffin0, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, TS, and limiting conditions for operations; examination of panels containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are operable; and review of control room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedures.
The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component (s), and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation. or performanc.
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Plant' tours included observation' of general plant / equipment conditions, fire protection and preventative. measures, control of activities in
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progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions / cleanliness, and missile hazards.
The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety related tagout(s) in effect; review of sampling program- (e.g., primary and secondary coolant samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples); observation of control room shif t turnover;- review of implementation of tiie plant problem identification system; verification of selected portions of containment isolation lineup (s); and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 19.
Twenty-one reactor building electrical penetrations were inspected to verify that they were operational.-
Local pressure indicator readings indicated that all penetrations were pressurized and were capable of performing their design functions.
Selected tours were conducted-on backshifi. or weekends.
Inspections included areas in the cable vaults, vital battery rooms, safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, containment, cable penetration areas, service water intake structure, and other general plant areas.
Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from j
the system was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate
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actions were taken, if required.
On a regular basis, RWP's were reviewed and specific work activities,were monitored to assure they were being conducted per the RWP's.
Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration frequency were verified.
In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of
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the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of various-l shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include:
protected and vital areas access controls; J
searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory posts.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
ESF System Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors verified the operability of an ESF system by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the emergency diesel generator and diesel generator fuel oil system.
The inspectors ' confirmed that the licensee's system line-up procedures matched plant drawings and the
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as-built configuration.
The inspectors looked for equipment conditions
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and items that might degrade performance (hangers and supports were operable, housekeeping, etc.) and inspected the interiors of electrical and instrumentation cabinets-for debris, loose material, jumpers, evidence of rodents, etc.
The inspectors verified that valves, including instrumentation isolation valves, were in proper position, power was available, and valves were locked as appropriate.
The inspectors compared both local and remote position indications.
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Only a few minor deficiencies were identified during _- these system walkdowns.
These items were immediately corrected when identified to the licensee.
This system appears to be well maintained.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Onsite Follow-up of Events at Operating Power Reactors (93702)
a.
On December 2,1989, a reactor trip occurred while the plant was reducing load to 90 percent for turbine valve testing.
The load was being reduced in two percent increments.
During the second incremental decrease, an automatic turbine runback to two percent occurred at a rate of 133 percent per minute.
This load reduction resulted in automatic actuation of the eight condenser steam dump valves, the three atmospheric dump valves, the three steam line power-operated relief valves and automatic rod insertion.
The operator attempted to take control of the turbine and manually control the turbine load.
The turbine control system did not respond.
Reactor power was decreased through rod insertion.
When the rod insertion limits were reached, the-operator manually borated as required by procedures.
When reactor power decreased below"P-9 (50 percent) the operator manually tripped the turbine.
The operator then noted that'
the generator exciter field breaker had failed to _ open.
After-repeated attempts to open the breaker from the main control board, an operator was dispatched to perform this function locally. _ During the system transient, condensate pump A tripped on a high DA tank level.
The EF pumps were manually started to provide steam generator feedwater.
After filling and venting, the condensate pump was restarted.
The operator then attempted to restore main feedwater flow to the steam generators.
The increase in feedwater flow caused-steam generator levels to shrink, resulting in a reactor trip from lo lo steam generator level.
Reactor power was at five percent when the trip occurred.
The plant was then cooled down and stabilized in Mode 3.
Investigations into the above incident revealed that a relay card in the turbine EHC system.had failed and caused the turbine runback.
l This card. is part of a group of "high reliability" cards that GE had
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recommended as replacements in 1987.
Since installation of these new L
cards the licensee has experienced several similar failures.
After consultation with GE the card was replaced and tested satisfactorily.
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Inspection of the failed exciter breaker revealed that certain moving
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parts were binding.
The breaker was lubricated, tested and
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reinstalled.
This is the second recent failure of this breaker.
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Based on this incident and the other recent breaker malfunctions, the
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l licensee is reviewing the current maintenance requirements.for this-
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l component to determine if changes are required.
The unit was restarted on December 3, and, returned to power on December 4,1989.
The licensee is' currently preparing a LER on this item.
' Extensive evaluation and testing by the licensee determined the root cause of the EHC relay card failure to be welding closed of relay-card contacts caused by arcing across the contacts.
This arcing was the result of an inductive spike generated when the relay coil was
deenergized.
This information was supplied to the vendor (GE) who agreed with the evaluation.
The. vendor will issue a letter to utilities who use these relay cards recommending installation of l
diodes to -provide a discharge path for the induction voltages generated during relay operation.
Based on the above, the licensee made a decision to shut the unit down on December 29, 1989,'and modify the turbine control' relays that caused the above unit trip.
This relay and 100 other similar relays were modified and the unit
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was restarted on December 30, 1989.
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b.
The unit experienced a reactor trip on December 2,1989, at 8:23 p.m.,
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TS 3.4.8 requires that'the specific activity of the primary coolant be limited to less than or equal to 1.0 microcurie per gram. dose i
equivalent I-131 while in Modes 1-5.
TS Table 4.4-4 requires that a RCS sample be taken between two and six. hours. following a power
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change of greater than 15 percent within one hour.
After the trip
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STTS M17342 was generated and the sample was taken at 1:45 a.m.. on December 3, 1989.
Analysis completed at 3:40 a.m.
showed RCS'
concentration at 1.04 microcuries per gram dose equivalent I-131.
TS Table 4.4-4 item 4(a) required that additional-samples be taken every four hours.
This was not done.
Supervisory review of'the above data discovered this deficiency.
A resample' was taken at 1:30 p.m. on-December 3, 1989.
The analys' 3 of this sample revealed I-131 dose-equivalent as 2.6 x 10-1 microcuries per gram which is within acceptable limits.
Based upon the above, it is apparent that the licensee failed to take two samples, one at 5:45 a.m. and one at 9:45 a.m.'on December 3, 1989.
The cause of this event is personnel error and procedural weaknesses.
The licensee has taken interim measures to prevent recurrence of this item and is preparing a LER which will address long-term corrective action.
A review of the licensee's OIL reveals that a similar event (NCV 89-17-01) occurred where the licensee's chemistry and health physics personnel failed to correctly analyze the contents of a WGDT
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In that instance an insufficient sample volume was counted.
This instance was also due to weak procedures' and the ability of-sampling / count room personnel to understand TS requirements.
The corrective actions taken on this previous violation have been completed and the actions taken would.not have prevented-this item from occurring.
This licensee-identified
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violation will not be cited because of the criteria specified in Section V.G of the NRC Enforcement Policy was satisfied.
This item will be tracked under' Failure to Sample RCS For Specific Activity After Plant Trip, NCV 89-24-01.
c.
On December 14, 1989, the licensee issued an Off-Normal Occurrence i
89-10' when they determined.that a member of the fire brigade stood watches for several days in December.when he was not qualified.
On September 19, 1989, a fire' drill was performedLthat received an unsatisfactory rating by the fire protection coordinator.
Appendix R,Section III.I.3.c requires that an unsatisfactory drill be followed by a repeat drill within 30 days.
The licensee failed to meet this requirement on October 19, 1989.
A QA audit identified this deficiency.
The QA audit interpreted the Appendix R statement that the members of the fire brigade team that took part in the drill on September.19, 1989, be disqualified until they were retrained.
The fire protection supervisor concurred with QA and issued letters to training and the supervicors of each member of the team that they were ineligible to stand watch until they requalified.
Requalifica-tion required each member to attend training classes and participate in a training drill.
On December 5, 6, 7, 11, and 12, 1989, a disqualified fire brigade individual was assigned to the fire brigade.-
This individual had taken the required retraining classes but had not participated in a-training drill, he was therefore not fully qualified to stand these duties.
When the fire protection supervisor issued a letter stating that this individual was no longer qualified, the training fire brigade distribution list was revised for December to reflect that this-person was not qualified.
However, his supervisor failed to detect this and his name was submitted for the duty roster to the fire brigade leader.
Discussions with the supervisor indicated that the schedule was made for-two months in advance due to' the _ upcoming holidays and that he had failed to verify all the names he submitted for the month of December were qualified.
The affected individual thought his class training was sufficient to requalify him as a -
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qualified fire brigade member and therefore did not mention anything to his supervisor.
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The fire protection supervisor is revising procedures to clarify what-
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constitutes fire brigade disqualification, member requalification and improved coordination and communications with other departments.
These modifications and improvements to fire brigade procedures will
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be tracked as-an Inspection Follow-up Item, 89-24-02.
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The failure to follow procedures that allowed an unqualified member to stand _ duty as a fire brigade member is a violation.
This LIV is not being cited because the criteria specified'in Section V.G of the NRC Enforcement Policy was satisfied... This will be tracked as NCV 89-24-03 Failure to Follow Procedures on Fire Brigade Qualifications, i
d.
On December 18,-1989, while performing the quarterly Train A Service Water Valve Operability Test, STP 123.003, an inadvertent ' ESF actuation occurred.
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The service water system at Summer consists of two trains with three pumps.
The C swing pump is considered to be an installed spare and-can be aligned to replace either the A or B pump if they become inoperable or are taken out of service for testing.
The normal procedure for testing is to align the C pump to A train and start the C pump with A still running.
The A pump is then stopped and restarted to check the stroke time of the discharge valve.
The discharge valve is interlocked with the pump to autumatically close when the pump is stopped and open when it is started.
Following the above test sequence, the A pump was stopped and restarted to check the close and open valve stroke times.
After completing this portion of the test, the C pump was then stopped.
When the C pump was stopped, it automatically restarted.
This was-interpreted by the licensee as.an ESF actuation.
Further investiga-tion revealed that a comparator card in the control logic circuitry had failed while performing this test.
The failure of this ~ card actuated the low pressure interlock which starts a backup pump;if loop pressure falls below 20 PSI.
This resulted in.the automatic start of the C pump.
Since this failure occurred during the performance of a surveillance. test, the licensee considered this an inadvertent ESF actuation.
This item was reported to the NRC via the emergency notification system on December 18, 1989, and a follow-up call to clarify this item was made on December 19, 1989, i
The failed card was replaced and the licensee is currently preparing a LER on this item.
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On December 23, 1989, XFN-28A controlled access fan tripped.
Electrical maintenance investigated this event and found the breaker '
A and C phase thermal overloads tripped.
The motor was megged and
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bridged with satisfactory results.
When the fan was restarted to
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obtain ampere readings the fan breaker fault tripped the ' upstream feeder' breaker for MCCIDA2X at switchgear IDA2.
Power was lost to A'
train radiation monitors, containment isolation valves, pressurizer block valves, the A battery charger and other safety related components.
The faulty fan breaker was removed, the MCC bus and all installed breakers were inspected and a spare breaker was installed.
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No other deficiencies were identified and the MCC was returned-to j
service.
The MCC was out of service for 54 minutes,
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i Investigation and analysis of the damaged circuit breaker' revealed that a mounting screw located between pnases B and C at_the line side-of the breaker was melted directly at the point of connection of the breaker rear frame and the front cover.
The tripping of A and C overloads combined with the melted screw at phase B, indicates that phase B was not supplying rated current to the motor, thereby causing overload at phases A and C.
The high current at phases A and C is attributed to a high resistance connection at phase B line side of the breaker.-
This caused overheating and dielectric breakdown over an unknown period of time.
The licensee concluded that when the fan attempted to restart, phase
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B tracked over to. the mounting screw (ground) resulting in arcing
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which ionized the air causing' phase to phase faults across all three
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phases and to the ground.
The fan MCC breaker did not trip because l
the fault currents at the line side of the MCC brecker were not seen by the breaker magnetic trip coils.
Therefore, the upstream breaker (MCCIDA2X feeder at switchgear 10A2) tripped as-is designed, protecting other loads on switchgear IDA2.
i No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
Installation and Testing of Modifications (37828)
The inspectors continued a review of recently-performed plant modifications to ascertain that activities which' are not submitted for-I approval to the NRC are in conformance with the requirements of the TS, 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria III, Design Control.
MRF-21693, Modification to the XK relays in the EHC logic was reviewed and I
work was observed to assure that it was' performed in accordance with approved instructions, procedures and drawings.. _The modification was a i
result of an investigation and analysis performed by the. licensee i
following a turbine runback and reactor trip earlier this month.
The modification was reviewed and concurred with by the manufacturer of the j
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relays.
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The original design did not provide voltage suppression for the XK relays
which resulted in an inductive spike welding of the contacts on the 125VDC
relays.
The corrective measures taken were to add two diodes-across the coil of the XK relay.
The diodes will reduce the inductive spike from the q
relay when it is de-energized.
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The inspectors will continue to follow the work activities associated with
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L this modification until the work package is closed.
L No violations or deviations were identified.
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Fitness For Duty:
Inspection of Initial Training Program (TI 2515-104)
On December 13 and 14, 1989, the inspector attended three licensee FFD training sessions and evaluated the training sessions in accordance with.
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TI 2515-104.. The three sessions attended.were:
FFD Policy Awareness
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Training; FFD. Training For Supervisors; and FFD Escort Training.
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inspector verified that the training sessions covered the ' licensee's
'i policy according to their written instructions and procedures.-
i The FFD Policy Awareness Training covered the personal and public health
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and safety hazards-associated with drug abuse and misuse of alcohol, the effect of prescription drugs and the role of the Medicai Review Officer.
The licensee's procedures were reviewed for the consequences employees face if they-fail to adherence to the policy.
The FFD Training For Supervisors described the role and responsibilities
of the supervisor; techniques for recognizing drugs and indications of the
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use, sale, or possession of drugs; behavioral observation techniques for detecting degradation in performance, or change in employee behavior; and l
procedures for initiating appropriate corrective actions including referral to the Employee Assistance Program.
Video presentations used during the FFD training were considered appropriate and effective.
The FFD Escort Training discussed techniques for recognizing drugs and indicators of use, sale, or possession and procedures for reporting
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9.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 2,1990, with-those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings.. The two NCV's and-one IFI identified in the area of onsite follow-up of events at operating power reactors were discussed in detail.
The licensee was made aware of the information needed to close IFI 89-24-02.
The inspectors.noted-the licensee's extensive and thorough search for the root cause of the EHC.
relay card' failure and resulting reactor trip.
The licensee's conservative o
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approach in shutting the plant down and modifying the affected relay and 100 other similar relays was acknowledged.
No dissenting' comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
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Acronyms and Initialisms DA Deserating DG Diesel Generator EF Emergency Feedwater EHC Electro-Hydraulic Control ESF Enginected Safety Feature FFD Fitness For Duty GE General Electric LER Licensee Event Reports LIV Licensee Identified Violation MCC Motor Control Center MRF Modification Work Form MWR Maintenance Work Request NCH Non Conformance Notice NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation OIL Dutstanding Items List QA Quality Assurance PMTS Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet PSI Pounds Per Square Inch RCS Reactor Coolant System RCSLK9 Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate RWP Radiation Work Permits SAP Station Administrative Procedure SPR Special Reports STP Surveillance Test Procedures STTS Surveillance Ter,t Task Sheet TS Technical Specifitations WGDT Waste Gas Decay Tank
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