IR 05000395/1989021
| ML19332E691 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 11/28/1989 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Hopkins P, Modenos L, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19332E652 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-89-21, NUDOCS 8912110211 | |
| Download: ML19332E691 (13) | |
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REotONil NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n ' y " ; s,#.
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. Report.No.. :,50-395/89-21 k;..'i
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. Licensee:
South Carolina. Electric & Gas Company
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Columbia,10 29218
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50-395 License No.: NPF-12 Docket No.:
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Faci 1.1ty;Name:-V.
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Summer.
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. Inspection Conducted: September 30 - October 31, 1989 M
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Inspectors:
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Richard L. Prevatte W / 9 Dat'e Signed
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Leo P. Modenos
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Da'te Signed 7 Approved ay:
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Fid9d S CantreII, Seft.
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. Division of Reactor P~jects
SUMMARY p
LScope:
This routine inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors onsite in the
, areas 'of monthly ' surveillance observations, monthly maintenance observation,
. operational safety _ verification, ESF system walkdown, onsite follow-up of f'
- events and -subsequent written reports,10' CFR Part P1' inspections, action on previous inspection findings, and other areas.
Selected tours were conducted
.on.backshift or weekends..Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on 17 days
.during this inspection period.
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Results:
The plant began the reporting period at 100 percent power.
The plant experienced problems'.with condenser tube leakage which resulted in a power reduction to 30 percent on October 13, 1989 and a shutdown for repairs on
- October-20,-1989 (paragraph 7b). The plant was restarted and returned to power operation. on' October 27, 1989.
Inspections conducted in the surveillance and
' maintenance. areas,-(paragraph 2 and 3), identified no problems.
The maintenance
! observations focused. primarily around work which was accomplished during the forced. outage. Although this work was on non safety equipment, it appeared to
'be welll organized, adequately supervised and completed on or ahead of the projected schedule. The inspection of the licensee's 10 CFR Part 21 program, 8912110211 891128 PDR ADOCK 05000395
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(paragraph.6), shows'that the program had adequate procedural controls i.nd that g
f" the licensee had a high degree of sensitivity for this. program. The ESF system walkdown conducted on the RHR system, (paragraph 5), identified approximately-20 deficiencies, all which. were considered minor in~ nature.
However, the licensee had recently performed a walkdown of this system snd should have identified the majority of these deficiencies noted during this inspection.
This indicates that the oper'ators need to be more observant during system walkdowns or routine watch evolutions. The inspectors followed the low voltage readings for cell' 32 of safety related battery 1A and eventual replacement of =
'the cell. (paragraph 4b). The unit ended the reporting period at 100 percent
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power.
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o REPORT DETAILS
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l-1. -Persons Contacted
' Licensee Employees
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- W. Baehr, Manager, Chemistry and Health Physics
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C. Bowman, Manager, Scheduling and Modifications
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- 0. Bradham, Vice President, Nuclear Operations M. Browne, Manager, Systems Engineering & Performance W. Higgins', Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance S. Hunt, Manager, Quality Systems e
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Koon, Manager, Nuclear Licensing G. Moffatt, Manager, Maintenance Services
- D. Moore, General Manager, Engineering Services K. Nettles, General Manager, Nuclear Safety j
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- C. Price, Manager, Technical Oversite
M. Quinton, General Manager, Station Support
J. Shepp, Associate Manager, Operations
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- J. Skolds, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
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- G. Soult, General Manager, Operations and Maintenance
- G. Taylor, Manager, Operations
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D. Warner, Manager, Core Engineering and Nuclear Computer Services
- M. Williams, General Manager, ~ Administrative & Support Services K~.-Woodward, Manager, Nuclear Operations Education and Training a
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. 0ther' licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, i
operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
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- Attended exit interview j
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~ Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety related systems and components to ascertain that these activities' were conducted in accordance with' license requirements. The inspectors observed portions of
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'13 selected surveillance tests including all aspects of Reactor Trip
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Breaker Shunt and Undervoltage Trip Verification, STP 506.009.
The inspectors verified that required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the test, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, required test instrumentation was properly calibrated, data met TS requirements, test discrepancies were rectified, and the systems were
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properly returned to service.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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.3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities of safety related systems
"g and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with. approved procedures, TS, industry codes and standards.
The inspectors determined that the procedures used were adequate to control the' activity, and that these activities were accomplished by
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qualified personnel.
The inspectors independently verified that.the equipment was properly tested before being returned to service.
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Additionally, the inspectors reviewed-several outstanding job orders to determine that the licensee was giving priority to safety related maintenance and not developing a backlog which might affect a given
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system's performance. The following specific maintenance activities were
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observed:
MWR 8901011=
Replace discharge pressure gauge on charging pump B MWR 8901828 Investigate and repair boric acid tank B level i
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indicator MWR 8900207 Open and inspect for leaking tube in condenser water MWR -8900208 boxes
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MWR-89D0210 Open'and inspect condenser MWR 8900211 MWR 89D0212 Perform weld and structural repairs inside main condenser and plug leaking tubes identified by QC i
NRF 21661
. Install impingement plate in LP A condenser to prevent-
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insulation damage i
MWR 89E0132 Install single cell battery charger on battery 1A, cells 31 through 45 MWR 8901852 Jumper out cell 39 on battery 1A
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MWR 89T0099
. Calibrate pressure transmitter (IPT02250)
PMTS P0124318 Main generator turbine valve testing PMTS 0124355 Restart hydraulic fluid pump MWR 89E0051 Test size 2 contactors and 100VA transformers for pick up and drop out voltages
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PMTS P0124431 Control access board supply analysis smoke detection system operability test and calibration MWR 8910303 Repair HVAC control board (XPN 7122)
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PMTS P0118299-Calibration of SG A heat exchanger pressure
transmitter-PMTS P0119119-Perform SG A heat exchanger loop calibration i
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-PMT.S P0123248 Perform SG C heat exchanger pressure transmitter calibration
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'PMTS P0112266 Perform FW heater exchanger supply header pressure transmitter calibration MWR 89C0221 Repair caustic neutralizing pump suction valve position indication MWR 8910058 Repair drain line valve-(ILT 07356)
PMTS P0124002 Repair refueling water heat tracing control panel B A major portion of the maintenance-activities observed during the month
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. involved repairs to non-safety components associated with the forced outage from condenser. tube leaks.
The work activities performed in this.
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area appeared to be well organized and supervised.
Special efforts by support organizations to obtain outside services-and repair parts were timely and responsive to the plant's. planned schedule.
All activities were completed either on or ahead of schedule.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control room staffing, access, and operator behavior; operator adherence to approved procedures, TS, and limiting conditions for operations; examination of panels containing instrumentation and other reactor protection system elements to determine that required channels are operable; and review of control room operator logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved procedures.
The inspectors conducted weekly inspections in the following areas:
verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or component (s),
and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to system actuation or performance.
The inspectors observed control room activities during the power reduction on October 14, 1989 and unit restart on October 26, 1989.
Plant tours included observation of general plant / equipment conditions, fire protection and preventive measures, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls, plant housekeeping conditions / cleanliness, and missile hazard ~
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The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following areas:
verification review and walkdown of safety related tagout(s) in i*
effect;" review of - sampling program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant: samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous i
samples); observation of control room shift turnover; review of J
implementatia of the plant problem identification system; verifica-
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tion of selected portions of containment isolation lineup (s); and verification that notices to workers are posted as required by 10 CFR 19.
Selected. tours were conducted on taakshifts or weekends. Inspections-p included areas in the cable vaults, vital battery rooms, safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms, diesei generator rooms, control room, auxiliary buildins, containment, cable penetration areas, j
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service water intake structure, and other general plant areas.
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Reactor coolant system leak rates were reviewed to ensure that
detected 'or suspected leakage from the system was recorded,
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investigated, and evaluated; and that apropriate actions were taken, j
. if required. On a regular basis, RWP's were reviewed and specific
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work -activities were monitored to-assure they were being conducted i
per. the.P,WP 's.
Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked, and equipment operability and calibration l
frequency were verified.
In the. course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review i
of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of various shifts of the security fcrce was observed in the conduct of
,1 daily-activities to include:
protected and vital areas access i
controls;. searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge 1ssuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and compensatory posts, b.
On October M, 1989, the licensee identified that individual cell voltage on cell 32 of safety related battery 1A was reading 2.10
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-volts. This is less than the Category A requirement of 2.13 volts specified in TS Table 4.8.2.
The licensee entered the Action Statement-of TS 3.8.2.1 and connected the installed single cell battery charger-across cells 31 - 45 in an attempt to correct this-low cell voltage. TS allows 6 days to return the ICV to above - 2.13 volts. The licensee continues to charge these cells and monitor the voltage on a twice per day basis.
On October 20, 1989 at 10 a.m.,
the electrician took a reading and discovered that cell 39 was reading
1.05 volts, which is below Table 4.8.2 Category A and B minimum requirement of 2.07 volts. At that time the A battery was declared inoperable, and the licensee entered the two hour Action Statement of
- TS 3.8. 2.1.
This Action Statement requires that the battery be returned to an operable status within two hours or the plant be placed in hot standby within the next six hours. The cell was jumped
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out and'the battery was restored at 2:15 a.m.
This exceeded the time limit by 5 minutes; however, the plant was at 30 percent power and
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the. licensee had adequate time to reach hot standby within the
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allotted 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. A spare cell was charged and the cell was replaced
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while'the unit was shutdown during the week of October 23, 1989.
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i No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
~ ESF System Walkdown (71710)
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-The inspectors verified the operability of an ESF system by performing a walkdown-of the accessible portions of the RHR. The inspectors confirmed that the licensee's system line-up procedures matched plant drawings and the as-built configuration.
The inspectors looked for equipment conditions 'and items that-might degrade performance (hangers and supports were operable, housekeeping, etc.) and inspected the interiors of i
electrical and instrumentation' cabinets for debris, loose material,
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jumpers, evidence of rodents, etc.
The inspectors verified that valves, including. instrumentation isolation valves, were in proper position, power
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was. available, and valves were locked as appropriate.
The inspectors-
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. compared both local and remote position indications.
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The inspectors identified approximately 20 minor deficiencies such as burned out space lights, missing identification tags on valves, mislabeled components, procedural typographical errors and small leaks on several valves and/or-components.
The licensee took immediate corrective action
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to correct those items which would be done during plant operation and
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submitted MWR's to correct those which could not be presently worked.
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The overall condition of the system was satisfactory. However, it should be noted that ' the licensee had recently conducted a walkdown of this system. -The majority of these-items identified by the inspectors should
have been found during that walkdown, This indicates that operators need
to be more observant during system walkdowns and routine watch evolutions.
This' item was discussed with the manager and associate manager for-j
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-operations on October 26, 1989 and they indicated that additional l
attention will be directed to this area.
No vio'lations or deviations were identified.
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6.
10 CFR Part 21 Inspection (36100)
The inspectors conducted an inspection to determine whether the licensee had established and implemented controls and/or procedures to insure that defects.and non-compliances identified in basic components are reported to
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the NRC. As part of the inspection, a detailed review of the licensee's
procedures used to implement this program was conducted.
The following
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procedures were reviewed:
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. Nuclear Licensing Procedure, Processing and Disposition of 10
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CFR Part 21 Items (NL-111), Revision 7 N
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-Engineering Services Procedure, Structures, Systems, and Equipment Classification (ES-411), Revision 1
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Engineering Services Procedure, Receiving Inspection (ES-361),
Revision 1 d.
Engineering Services' Procedure, Substantial Safety Hazards-(ES-406), Revision 1 f"
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Engineering Services Procedure, Disposition of Site Non-Conformances (ES-407), Revision 1 s
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Engineering Services Procedure, Procurement of Materials and
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Services (ES-321), Revision 0
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Quality Systems Procedure, Non-Conformance Control (QSP-201),
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Revision 5
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Station' Administration Procedure, Off-Normal Occurrences Evaluation, Reporting and Resolution (SAP-132), Revision 9
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Station Administration Procedure, Records Management and
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Document Control (SAP-150), Revision 5-j.
Nuclear Operations Management Directive 41, Control of Bulletin Boards, Revision 0 To ensure that all station personnel are aware of the rules and reporting
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requirements for 10 CFR Part 21, the licensee has posted copies of the
- Part 21 requirements on glass enclosed bulletin boards at three locations on the site. These postings are in the nuclear operations engineering and administration building, the security building, and the service building, Management Directive 41 covers the maintenance of the permanent postings.
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,The inspectors verified that the postings were in place but noted that the
directive did not provide a listing of what items are to be posted 'on these boards. To correct this item, the licensee has agreed to revise the directive to provide a listing of which items, such as NRC Form 3, Part 21 Notifications, and other permanent notices, will be posted and maintained.
Periodic audits will be taken to ensure these postings are maintained.
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The inspector found this commitment to be acceptable and will verify
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implementation as a part of the ongoing inspection program.
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Defects and deviations may be identified in many ways at the Summer Plant, a
They will generally be initially documented through off-normal occurrence documentation, work or inspection activities, or engineering reviews.
Once the items are initially identified, a NCN is prepared and forwarded L
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. to; engineering for review.
One exception to this item is of f-normal
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occurrence. reports.
In this case nuclear licensing conducts a review of
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all 'off-normal reports and identifies to the Manager of Design r
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Engineering, any potential Part 21 deficiencies that requires engineering evaluation.
Once an item has been evaluated by engineering to be a potentially
reportable item, a substantial safety hazard tracking sheet will be filled out and nuclear licensing will track this item through the evaluation for reportability' process.
If an item is determined by engineering to be reportable'.it will then be forwarded to the Vice President, Nuclear Operations for a final' determination of reportability.
His approval is
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considered the final determination that the deviation is a substantial safety hazard which requires reporting under _Part 21. Licensee procedures then requires a report to the NRC within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or a written report within 5 days if the initial report was by other than a letter. If the licensee has positive-assurance that this item had been previously reported by a vendor, manufacturer or others to the NRC, then no report is required.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee procedures items (a through 1) and determined that these _ procedures provide adequate controls and direction I
to ensure that deviations are identified,- entered into a tracking system,
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receives proper engineering evaluation af ter identification, a responsible
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, company director or officer is informed, and that reports are made within
the terms specified:in 10.CFR Part 21.
This procedural review also determines' that ES-321 requires and provides Attachment IV for inclusion in each purchase order to specify when Part 21 is applicable to a purchase
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order. SAP-150 'provides guidelines to ensure the adequate maintenance and disposition of records on which 10 CRF Part 21 is applicable.
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I The. inspectors _ reviewed three current purchase orders now being processed for procurement of safety related parts and verified that the purchase j
orders contained ES-321 Attachment IV's stating that Part 21 was
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applicable on these purchases.
i The inspectors also selected three recent NCN's, 3462, 3465, and 3475, f
which required a Part 21 evaluation,.for review.
In'each case each of the
deviations had received an engineering review which determined that they l
were not reportable.
A review of the non-conformances, the engineers
technical work record, and the evaluation demonstrated that the licensee's l
procedures for identification and documentation of deviations were being
followed. The engineers technical work record appeared to be factual and
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complete and supported his conclusion that a substantial safety hazard did not exist.
Based on the above, it appears that the licensee has a well developed and practical program which addresses the requirements for identification and reporting of defects and non-compliances.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Onsit'e Follow-up of Events and Subsequent Written Reports
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'(92700,93702)
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The: inspectors reviewed the following LER's to ascertain whether the
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licensee's review, corrective action and report of the identified
' event or deficiency was in conformance with regulatory requirements, l
V TS, license conditions, and licensee procedures and controls, p-(Closed) LER.89-14, Waste gas decay tanks release with inadequate sample..This item was reported to Region II in a letter-dated L
September 21, 1989.
It was the result of a personnel error when a
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technician used too small a sample to receive a correct count for LLD on waste. gas storage tank samphs. The inspectors verified that the corrective actions for additional personnel training and computer software changes had been completed.
The computer software was modified ' on September 12, 1989 and the-training was completed on September 27, 1989. These actions should prevent repetition of this event.
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b.
On October 13, 1989, chemistry reported an upward trend of sodium and e
This put the plant in a chemistry
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action level 1 as described in SAP-401, Secondary Water Chemistry Program and the EPRI guidelines. In addition, oxygen content in the condenser was reported to be 15 ppb, above the specification limit of F
10 ppb. The-plant commenced a power reduction to 30 percent power to allow isolation of half the condenser water boxes and permit inspections for tube leaks.
During the reduction of power, oxygen increased to 100 ppb and eventually leveled off to about 60 ppb.
-This level of oxygen placed the plant in a chemistry action level 2.
Utilizing helium and SF6 detectors, the licensee, with the help of their consultar.ts, discovered on October 15, 1989 one tube leaking in the HP condenser outer loop. The tube had been originally plugged with a wooden plug. All wooden plugs were, however, supposed to be replaced during the third refueling outage.
Leak testing was performed on the inner loop of the HP and LP condensers and no other leaks were detected.
On October 16, 1989, the euter CW loop was returned to service. At this time oxygen concentrations increased to 77 ppb.
The licensee continued searching for oxygen leaks while remaining at 30 percent power.
On October 18, 1989, chemistry reported a large increase in chlorides and sodium in all three SG's, putting the plant in action level 1.
At the same time tSe exciter slip rings on the main generator were arching and a decision was made that they would have to take the generator off line in order to " stone" grind the rings.
Inspections of the condenser tubes revealed one tube leaking and seven adjacent
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tubes idiich could not pass as eddy current probe.
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plugged all eight tubes
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On October 20, 1989, the licensee decided to repair the generator slip rings.- The plant commenced turbine load reduction while maintaining 30 percent reactor power. They completed the slip rings repair and started reloading the generator.
At this time chemistry reported
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another condenser tube _ leak due to the high-sodium and chloride readings. The licensee, with the assistance of.their consultants, commenced SF6 testing on both sides of the condenser. and confirmed leaks in the HP outer box. At 5:35 p.m. the licensee decided to shut
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down the reactor, break condenser vacuum, and inspect the steam side of the condenser.
Inspection inside the condenser, after unit shutdown, revealed that three tubes in the HP condenser exhibited thin wall cracks. Two of these tubes had been previously plugged.
Investigation by a consultant determined the cause of this cracking to be metal fatigue caused by vibration. Further inspection revealed loose insulation on
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5A and 6A heaters from steam impingement; loose insulation due to loose pop rivets in the LP condenser; cracks in the expansion joint weld on the outside west wall of the HP condenser; cracks in a vertical weld on the,utside east wall of the LP condenser; cracks on
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the east wall inside the LP condenser; welds broken loose on the sparger line from 2A heater; broken welds on 2B heater drain sparger in the hot well; broken welds at the support legs for the false bottom in the LP' condenser; and oxygen leaks around the condenser -
. pedestal feet.
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The licensee repaired the above discrepancies and'. performed eddy current testing in the condenser as directed by engineering.
The results of the above inspections, eddy current testing and engineering
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evaluation resulted in plugging 52 condenser tubes.
Engineering's evaluation of this tube vibration problem has resulted in temporarily j
plugging approximately 2400 upper row tubes with rubber plugs. The
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licensee intends to leave these rubber plugs installed until the next refueling outage in March of 1990, while engineering performs further
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evaluation of the tube vibration problem.
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The condenser repair work was completed on October 26, 2989.
The secondary system was cleaned, the reactor was restarted and returned to power operation on October 27, 1989.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
(Closed) Violation 88-19-01, Failure to establish fire watch with fire detection equipment inoperable. The licensee provided a response to this
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violation in a-letter to-Region II dated November 19,-1988. This item was the result of inoperable equipment and the ability of the fire protection officer to use and interpret computer provided information. The inspector j
reviewed the corrective actions stated. in the above response, verified
that procedures had been improved and a training program had been
implemented to upgrade the skill and knowledge of the fire protection
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personnel in this area.
This and other improvements implemented in this area in the past year should reduce the probability of a recurrence of this event.
9.
Other Areas-Mr. Russell Irish of the NRC's Office of Inspection General visited the site on October 19, 1989, He met with the resident inspectors in the morning and licensee personnel' in the afternoon to discuss Region II and site handling of the 10 CFR Part 21 program.
10. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 1,1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings. _ The plant operations for October, the forced outage problems associated with the condenser tube-leaks and oxygen leakage into condenser, the 10 CRF Part 21 review, the follow-up of the safety. related battery voltage cell
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degradation and cell replacement, and the ESF system walkdown conducted on
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the RHR system was discussed in detail.
The.. licensee acknowledged the a
. concern that operators should be more observant and that they will (
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instruct their operators on what is fully expected of them when they are
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performing their walkdowns and their rounds. No dissenting comments were i
received.from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary l
any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the j
inspection.
11. Acronyms and Initialisms
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j CW Circulating Water EPRI Electric Power Research Institute ESF Engineered Safety Feature l
HP High Pressure HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning ICV Individual Cell Voltage LER Licensee Event Reports
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LLO Lower Limits of Detection
.LP Low Pressure
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MRF Modification Request Form
MWR Maintenance Work Request
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. Nuclear-Regulator 3! Commission
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