IR 05000382/2020003
| ML20303A312 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/2020 |
| From: | John Dixon NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-D |
| To: | Ferrick J Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2020003 | |
| Download: ML20303A312 (20) | |
Text
October 29, 2020
SUBJECT:
WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2020003
Dear Mr. Ferrick:
On September 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. On October 8, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Branch D Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 05000382 License No. NPF-38
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000382
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-003-0002
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
Location:
Killona, LA 70057
Inspection Dates:
July 1, 2020 to September 30, 2020
Inspectors:
J. Braisted, Reactor Inspector
N. Brown, Project Engineer
D. Childs, Resident Inspector
L. Flores, Reactor Inspector
T.J. Farina, Senior Operations Engineer
S. Graves, Senior Reactor Inspector
S. Makor, Reactor Inspector
J. Mateychick, Senior Reactor Inspector
F. Ramirez Munoz, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Reinert, Reactor Inspector
R. Smith, Nuclear Systems Engineer
C. Speer, Reactor Systems Engineer
Approved By:
John L. Dixon, Jr., Chief
Reactor Projects Branch D
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Establish Documented Work Instructions Appropriate to the Circumstance for the Safety-Related Wet Cooling Tower Fan Motors Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000382/2020003-01 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71111.12 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a for the licensees failure to establish documented work instructions appropriate to the circumstance for the periodic inspection and cleaning of wet cooling tower fan motor support bulkhead drains. Specifically, the work instructions only allowed for observation of standing water in the bulkhead, but did not provide steps for verifying the drains were clear or cleaning the drains if necessary. As a result, standing water in the wet cooling tower 5A fan motor support bulkhead led to water intrusion of the motor casing, motor bearing failure, and inoperability of the fan and ultimate heat sink on May 13, 2020.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
The Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, began the inspection period at 100 percent power.
The licensee initiated a plant shutdown on September 25, 2020, to begin Refueling Outage 23.
The unit remained shutdown for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident and regional inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week, increasing the amount of time on site as local COVID-19 conditions permitted.
As part of their onsite activities, resident inspectors conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities; and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather due to hurricanes Marco and Laura on August 22, 2020, and hurricane Sally on September 13, 2020.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Shield building ventilation train B with train A out of service for planned maintenance on July 15, 2020
- (2) High pressure safety injection train A following planned maintenance on August 6, 2020
- (3) Safety related 480V electrical distribution train B following planned maintenance on August 21, 2020
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (2) Fire area RAB 7-001, relay room on July 17, 2020
- (3) Fire area RAB 39-001, elevation -35 reactor auxiliary building on September 1, 2020
- (4) Fire area RAB 34-001, safeguards valve gallery A and B on September 17, 2020
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
- (1) Emergency feedwater pump rooms A and B on September 2, 2020
71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
- (1) Condenser for refrigeration units on essential chiller system on August 25, 2020
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspector reviewed and evaluated the results of the licensed operator annual requalification operating exam administered from June 15 to July 15, 2020.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during plant protection system testing on August 1, 2020.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the simulator during a training evolution on August 12, 2020.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Controlled ventilation area system on July 29, 2020
- (2) Shutdown cooling system on September 8, 2020
- (3) Wet cooling tower fan motor bearing failures due to water intrusion on September 22, 2020
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed;
- (1) Emergent yellow risk for troubleshooting emergency diesel generator B due to an incomplete start sequence on July 22, 2020
- (2) Planned yellow risk for relay maintenance associated with high pressure safety injection train A on August 3, 2020
- (3) Emergent maintenance on the core operating limit supervisory system due to failed power supply in channel D incore nuclear instrumentation on September 2, 2020
- (4) Planned plant configuration changes during modifications of motor control center 315A on September 9, 2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Emergency feedwater pump A following test failure on August 16, 2020
- (2) Control element assembly ejection analysis incorrect input on August 17, 2020
- (3) Reactor coolant loop 1 hot leg injection flow control valve when an associated relay was found at an inappropriate setting on August 17, 2020
- (4) Airborne radiation monitors error in calculation of particulate concentrations on August 24, 2020
- (5) Emergency diesel generators due to non-conservative Technical Specification surveillance frequency and voltage values on September 24, 2017
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Permanent modification for reactor coolant loop 1 hot leg injection check valve replacement on August 13, 2020
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) Spent fuel pool heat exchanger component cooling water outlet temperature control valve on July 7, 2020
- (2) Shield building ventilation train B following maintenance on the emergency filtration unit on July 21, 2020
- (3) Nitrogen gas regulator valve for accumulator number 5 following valve internals replacement on August 28, 2020
- (4) Shutdown cooling flow control valve train A following planned maintenance on September 2, 2020
- (5) Core operating limit supervisory system following emergency maintenance on a power supply in channel D incore nuclear instrumentation on September 28, 2020
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
(1)
(Partial)
The inspectors evaluated Refueling Outage 23 activities in accordance with Sections 03.01.a, 03.01.b, 03.01.c(5), and 03.01.c(8), between September 25 and September 30, 2020.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Emergency feedwater pump A operability test on July 14, 2020
- (2) Reactor trip circuit breakers 1, 2, 5, and 6 on August 18, 2020
- (3) Emergency diesel generator A integrated test on September 29, 2020
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Auxiliary component cooling water pump A inservice test on July 9, 2020
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) Simulator-based training scenario on July 14,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07)===
- (1) July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2019 through June 30, 2020
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2019 through June 30,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Establish Documented Work Instructions Appropriate to the Circumstance for the Safety-Related Wet Cooling Tower Fan Motors Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000382/2020003-01 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71111.12 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a for the licensees failure to establish documented work instructions appropriate to the circumstance for the periodic inspection and cleaning of wet cooling tower fan motor support bulkhead drains. Specifically, the work instructions only allowed for observation of standing water in the bulkhead, but did not provide steps for verifying the drains were clear or cleaning the drains if necessary. As a result, standing water in the wet cooling tower 5A fan motor support bulkhead led to water intrusion of the motor casing, motor bearing failure, and inoperability of the fan and ultimate heat sink on May 13, 2020.
Description:
The ultimate heat sink consists of two 100 percent capacity loops, each consisting of a dry and wet cooling tower and water stored in the wet cooling tower basins.
Each wet cooling tower consists of two cells, and each cell is serviced by four induced draft fans, for a total of eight fans per wet cooling tower. With a wet cooling tower fan inoperable, the entire wet cooling tower must be declared inoperable, unless the inoperable fan has an approved cover installed. One wet cooling tower fan may be covered, and the ultimate heat sink remains operable per Technical Specification 3.7.4. A vibration switch mounted outside on the wet cooling tower fan motor duct causes an alarm in the control room on high fan motor vibration. During normal plant operations, the wet cooling towers operate to maintain the component cooling water system temperature. During accident conditions, the wet cooling towers operate until the dry cooling towers can dissipate the heat load from the component cooling water system.
In 2004, the licensee instituted required preventive maintenance task 10403 to inspect and clean the A wet cooling tower floor drains monthly. This task also included work instructions to inspect and clean the wet cooling tower fan motor support bulkhead drain in each wet cooling tower fan shroud. The intent of preventive maintenance task 10403, with respect to the motor support bulkheads, was to ensure the drains were clear so that water could not accumulate in the bulkhead after a rainfall event. Water accumulation (or standing water) in any bulkhead could mean partial immersion of that motor. The work instructions were two steps in total: 1) INSPECT bulkhead drain and CLEAN if needed and 2) IF discrepancy present that cannot be resolved by basic cleaning, INITIATE a CR [condition report] to address issue.
In February 2019, the licensee installed new motors for 15 of the16 wet cooling tower fans.
During performances of required preventive maintenance task 10403 between February 2019 and May 2020, the licensee identified eight separate instances of standing water in various A wet cooling tower fan motor bulkheads. Of these instances, the licensee identified standing water seven times in fan motor 5A, five times in fan motor 8A, and three times in fan motor 3A. The licensee identified standing water in all the A wet cooling tower fan motor bulkheads on at least one occasion during this period. Despite the intent of preventive maintenance task 10403 to clean the drains if needed, the licensee did not make any attempts within the performances of 10403 to clean the drains when they identified standing water. In each of these cases, the licensee initiated a new condition report or documented a reference to a condition report, which had previously been initiated in the work order. In all cases, the licensee documented the implementing work order for preventive maintenance task 10403 as complete although the licensee had not performed any cleaning. To address the standing water, the licensee-initiated work requests from each of the condition reports.
However, the licensee had not implemented any of the work requests as they were still in planning as of September 2020.
On May 13, 2020, the control room received an unexpected annunciator alarm indicating high vibrations on wet cooling tower fan motor 5A, which was one of the motors replaced in February 2019. The licensee collected vibration data on the fan motor and determined it indicated motor bearing damage. Subsequently, the licensee secured wet cooling tower fan 5A and opened its breaker due to the condition. The licensee then declared both the wet cooling tower fan 5A and the A ultimate heat sink inoperable. The plant entered Technical Specification 3.7.4 and cascading technical specifications, resulting in entry into an unplanned 72-hour shutdown limiting condition of operations. The following day, the licensee installed a cover over fan motor 5A and declared the A wet cooling tower and A ultimate heat sink operable, exiting the affected limiting conditions of operation.
The licensee sent wet cooling tower fan motor 5A to the motor vendor to perform a failure analysis. In its preliminary report, the vendor documented that water intrusion of the motor casing had caused the high vibration. Specifically, standing water on the exterior of the water, due to the clogged bulkhead drain, resulted in water entering the grease drain plug and stator cavity drain plug. The motor drains were designed to allow moisture to exit the motor. Consequently, water displaced the grease lubricant in the bearing, resulting in poor lubrication characteristics and bearing failure.
In a review of required preventive maintenance task 10403, the inspectors noted that it had numerous inadequacies. For example, the inspection of the bulkhead drains was limited to looking through a 3-inch viewport and identifying any standing water, but it does not permit actual viewing of the drain to ensure it is clear nor the ability to see inside the bulkhead for debris, which might migrate toward the drain and clog it. Additionally, the inspectors noted that no cleaning, even basic cleaning, could be performed using the instructions in preventive maintenance task 10403 given that access to the bulkhead is limited to the viewport and that any cleaning would require the licensee to secure the fan motor and erect scaffolding to ensure the necessary access, among other actions. Furthermore, the inspectors noted that the work instructions do not identify any objective criteria for determining the intent of the task is complete. Finally, the inspectors noted that standing water due to a clogged drain can evaporate between performances of preventive maintenance task 10403 (or the drain might be partially clogged, but still retain water while draining slowly), resulting in a condition where the motors could be partially immersed in water unbeknownst to the licensee. This is demonstrated by the identification of standing water in only some of the performances of 10403 without the licensee having performed any cleaning of the drains.
Corrective Actions: The licensee implemented an emergent work order to replace wet cooling tower fan motor 5A on May 27, 2020, and collected vibration data on the remaining wet cooling tower fan motors and determined the data was satisfactory. Additionally, the licensee lowered the alert/alarm limits for wet cooling tower fan motor vibration monitoring and initiated actions to correct the deficiencies in required preventive maintenance task 10403.
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports CR-WF3-2020-02188, CR-WF3-2020-03716, CR-WF3-2020-04493
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to establish documented instructions appropriate to the circumstance for the inspection and cleaning of the A wet cooling tower fan motor support bulkhead drains in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33 was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, as a result of the licensee not completing the intent of required preventive maintenance task 10403 on multiple occasions, the A wet cooling tower fan motors were subjected to periods of standing water in the motor support bulkheads which led to the failure of fan motor 5A and an unplanned entry into a 72-hour technical specification limiting condition for operation.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because
- (1) the finding was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system;
- (2) the degraded condition did not represent a loss of the PRA function of a single train technical specification system for greater than is technical specification allowed outage time;
- (3) the degraded condition did not represent a loss of the PRA function of one train of a multi-train technical specification system for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time;
- (4) the degraded condition did not represent a loss of the PRA function of two separate technical specification systems for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />;
- (5) the degraded condition did not represent a loss of a PRA system and/or function as defined in the PRIB or licensees PRA for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; and
- (6) the degraded condition did not represent a loss of the PRA function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as risk-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 3 days.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, while the licensee initiated corrective actions through work requests to clean the bulkhead drains when standing water was identified during multiple performances of required preventive maintenance task 10403, the licensee did not evaluate the cause of the condition which was, ultimately, inadequate work instructions. Therefore, after the first identification of standing water in the bulkheads, the licensee had the opportunity to correct the work instructions in 10403 to allow completion of the task as intended for every future implementation of the task.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, requires, in part, that procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2. Appendix A to NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 9.a, requires, in part, that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment be properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. The licensee established required preventive maintenance task 10403, in part, to inspect and clean the A wet cooling tower fan motor support bulkhead drains monthly.
Contrary to the above, between 2004 and May 2020, required preventive maintenance task 10403 was not appropriate to the circumstance because inspection and cleaning of the A wet cooling tower fan motor bulkhead drains could not be completed in accordance with the documented instructions. As a result, standing water in the wet cooling tower 5A fan motor support bulkhead between August 2019 and April 2020 led to water intrusion of the motor casing, displacement of grease lubricant, motor bearing failure, and inoperability of the fan and ultimate heat sink.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 22, 2020, the inspectors presented the annual requalification inspection results to Mr. V. Ford, Operations Training Superintendent, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On October 8, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. J. Ferrick, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
EN-FAP-EP-010
Severe Weather Response
Procedures
OP-901-521
Severe Weather and Flooding
334
Miscellaneous
SD-SBV
System Description for Shield Building Ventilation
Procedures
OP-006-001
Plant Distribution (7KV, 4KV, SSD) System
337
Procedures
OP-006-005
Inverters and Distribution
343
Procedures
OP-008-008
Shield Building Ventilation
Procedures
OP-009-008
Safety Injection
Procedures
RAB 7-001
Waterford-3 S.E.S Prefire Strategy Relay Room
Procedures
Waterford-3 S.E.S Prefire Strategy Switchgear Room A
Calculations
ECM15004
Waterford 3 FLEX Internal Flooding Calculation
000
Calculations
MNQ3-5
Flooding Analysis Outside Containment
006
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
20-04162
Drawings
G153
Flow Diagram Feedwater, Condensate & Air Evacuation
Systems
Drawings
G875
Reactor Auxiliary Building Plan EL -34.75 Plumbing &
Drainage
Drawings
G880
Riser Diagrams & Details Plumbing & Drainage
Miscellaneous
Chilled Water (CHW) inlet drain piping downstream of
CHWMVAAA481 for the Air Handling Unit HVRMAHU0038-
B (AH-17-(3B-SB)), was found to be corroded
09/03/20
Miscellaneous
LOU 1564.266
Ebasco Specification - 5kV & 15 kV Power Cables
Procedures
Time Critical Action/Time Sensitive Action Program Standard 003
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
20-02697, 2020-02703
Engineering
Evaluations
Essential Chiller A Degraded (Corroded) Piping Operability
Input CR-2020-3375, CR-2020-3376, CR-2020-3377, CR-
20-3378, CR-2020-3379, CR-2020-3380, CR-2020-3437,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR-2020-3515
Engineering
Evaluations
ER-W3-2001-
25-000
CCW Monitoring Plan
Engineering
Evaluations
ER-W3-2001-
25-001
CCW Monitoring Plan Clarifications
Engineering
Evaluations
SAP-HX-WF3-
001
Generic Letter 89-13 Heat Exchanger Test Basis
001
Miscellaneous
Letter W3P90-
207
WF3 Response to Generic Letter 89-13
01/29/1990
Miscellaneous
SD-CHW
Essential Chilled Water
Work Orders
WO 52522251 01
RFRMCLR0002 A -Evaporator/Condenser Clean/Eddy
Current Tube
Work Orders
WO 52696304 01
RFRMCLR0002 B - Evaporator/Condenser Clean/Eddy
Current Tube
Work Orders
WO 52734218 01
RFRMCLR0002 AB - Clean Evaporator & Condenser/Eddy
Current
Miscellaneous
20 Annual Requalification Operating Exam Results
07/15/2020
71111.11Q Procedures
OP-903-107
Plant Protection System Channel A, B, C, and D Functional
Test
315
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
2019-07661, 2020-01430, 2020-03291, 2020-00618,
20-04190, 2019-06453, 2019-08317, 2020-00123,
20-00575, 2020-02188, 2020-02267, 2020-03267,
20-04493
Miscellaneous
WEG Motors and Drives, Installation and Maintenance
Manual for Electric Motors
Miscellaneous
SD-CC, Component Cooling Water
Procedures
EN-DC-313-01
Procurement Engineering - Item Equivalency Evaluation
Procedures
Corrective Action Program
Work Orders
2915865
Calculations
Replacement and Relocation of Motor Control Center (MCC)
315A
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
20-03359, 2020-03612
Miscellaneous
Protected Equipment List 1PE-1
07/22/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
On Line Risk Assessment
Procedures
ME-003-410
Motor-Operated Valve Thermal Overload Channel
Calibration
310
Procedures
ME-003-410
Motor-Operated Valve Thermal Overload Channel
Calibration
311
Procedures
OI-037-000
Operations Risk Assessment Guideline
Work Orders
00517391, 52554711, 00530423
Calculations
19365
High Pressure Safety Injection System Capacity
001
Calculations
EC-M98-068
LPSI System Performance Surveillance Requirement Basis
Corrective Action
Documents
20-03271
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
20-3655, 2020-3698, 2020-03629, 2017-8982, 2018-4043
Miscellaneous
0000047119
Upgrade to Regulatory Guide 1.9 Revision 4 for Emergency
Diesel Generators
000
Miscellaneous
FSAR Section
2.3.4.2.3.1
Containment Airborne Radiation Monitor
Miscellaneous
FSAR Section
5.2.5.1.2
Containment Airborne Particulate Radioactivity Monitoring
Miscellaneous
Regulatory Guide
Pressurized-Water Reactor Control Rod Ejection and
Boiling-Water Reactor Control Rod Drop Accidents
June 2020
Miscellaneous
TD G080.0095
General Electric Switchgear Magne Blast Circuit Breakers
Miscellaneous
Technical Specification 3.4.5.1
Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Instrumentation
Miscellaneous
License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 Surveillance Requirements
10/23/2019
Miscellaneous
Response to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request
for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment
Request to Revise Technical Specification 3/4.8.1, "A.C.
Sources Operating"
05/29/2020
Miscellaneous
WSES-FSAR-
UNIT-3
Waterford 3 FSAR Section 15.4 Reactivity and Power
Distribution Anomalies
309
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Operability
Evaluations
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
20-4019
Procedures
Operability Determination Process
Procedures
ME-003-327
4.16KV G.E. Magne-Blast Breaker
20
Procedures
ME-004-115
4.16/6.9 KV G.E. Magne-Blast Breaker Overhaul
Procedures
OP-903-115
Train A Integrated Emergency Diesel Generator/Engineering
Safety Features Test
2
Procedures
OP-903-116
Train B Integrated Emergency Diesel Generator/Engineering
Safety Features Test
053
Engineering
Changes
Replace SI-512A with a Swing Check Valve
Miscellaneous
Specification
SPEC-15-00002-
W
Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Injection Check Valve SI
MVAAA512 A/B Replacement
Procedures
OP-903-008
Reactor Coolant System Isolation Leakage Test
Procedures
OP-903-108
SI Flow Balance Test
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
20-03195, 2020-03335, 2020-03338, 2020-03347,
20-04190, 2020-04168
Engineering
Changes
Temporary Incore Channel D Chassis Power Supply
Engineering
Changes
Target Rock Regulating Valve for use in NG-811
Miscellaneous
FSAR Section
9.39 Nitrogen
Systems
ASME allowable Stress Values, S, For Ferritic Steels For
Class 2 and Class MC Components
Miscellaneous
System Design
Description SD-
Core Operating Limit Supervisory System
Procedures
OP-008-008
Shield Building Ventilation
Procedures
OP-903-118
Primary Auxiliaries Quarterly IST Valve Tests
Procedures
OP-903-119
Secondary Auxiliaries Quarterly IST Valve Test
Procedures
OP-903-121
Safety Systems Quarterly IST Valve Tests
031
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Work Orders
2706788, 52775106, 53713
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
20-3207
Miscellaneous
SD-EFW
System Description for Emergency Feedwater System
Procedures
OP-903-006
Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker Test
Procedures
OP-903-046
Emergency Feed Pump Operability Check
23
Procedures
OP-903-050
Component Cooling Water and Auxiliary Component Cooling
Water Pump and Valve Operability Test
Work Orders
2927052
71151
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-WF3-YYYY-
NNNN
2019-07833, 2020-00276
71151
Miscellaneous
ECH-NE-09-
00036
Waterford 3 mitigating System Performance Index Basis
Document
71151
Miscellaneous
PSA-WF3-06-05
WF3 PSA Input to MSPI Basis Document
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - 3rd Quarter ROP
Data
10/17/2019
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data -4th Quarter 2019
ROP Data
01/16/2020
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - CR (Change Report)
ROP 4th Quarter ROP 2019 - PRA Change
01/22/2020
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - CR (Change Report)
ROP 4th Quarter ROP 2019 - Software change and MSPI
correction (CR-WF3-2020-00276)
2/24/2020
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - QR (Quarterly
Report) ROP 1st Quarter 2020
04/20/2020
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - QR (Quarterly
Report) ROP 2nd Quarter 2020
07/16/2020
71151
Miscellaneous
NRC Performance Indicator (PI) Data - CR (Change Report)
ROP 2nd & 3rd Quarter ROP 2019 (Emergency
Preparedness DEP)
07/17/2020
71151
Procedures
Regulatory Performance Indicator Process
Miscellaneous
LOU 1564.249W
Penetration Radiation Shields, Fire Stops and Air Seals For
Electrical, Mechanical, and HVAC Systems - Interface
09/13/1984
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Material, Non-Seismic
Miscellaneous
W3-DBD-
18_0_003-1
CFR 50.48 (a) & (c)/NFPA 805/FIRE PROTECTION
UPPER LEVEL DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT
Miscellaneous
WF3-FP-10-
00008
WF3 Code Compliance Report for NFPA 10 Portable Fire
Extinguishers 1978 Edition
001
Procedures
ME-003-006
Fire Barrier Penetrations Seals
315
Procedures
ME-003-009
Fire-rated Walls, Floors, and Ceilings
309