IR 05000373/1987019
| ML20237K890 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 08/20/1987 |
| From: | Ring M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237K864 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-87-19, 50-374-87-19, IEB-79-26, NUDOCS 8708270334 | |
| Download: ML20237K890 (11) | |
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L U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
REGION'III
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Report Nos. 50-373/87019(DRP); 50-374/87019(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374 Licenses No. NPF-11; NPF-18 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office' Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
LaSalle County. Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL
Inspection Conducted: June 23 through July 27, 1987 Inspectors:
M. J. Jordan R. Kopriva J.
Malloy Approved By:
M. Ring, Chief M
h Sho[77 Reactor Projects Section 1C Date l-Inspection Summary II.spection on June 23 through July 27, 1987 (Reports No. 50-373/87019(DRP)1 50-374/87019(DRP))
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection conducted by resident inspectors of licensee actions on previous inspection findings; operational safety; surveillance; maintenance; training; Licensee Event Reports; security; radiation controls; unit trips; and electrical maintenance.
Results: Of the ten areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. The licensee has been working on the reactor recirculation pump outage since the beginning of June.
Preplanning and outage coordination have been executed well to date. Unit 2 has been operating at or near full power for over a month without incurring any problems.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted G. J. Diederich, Manager, LaSalle Station
- R. D. Bishop, Services Superintendent
- J. C. Renwick, Production Superintendent D. Berkman, Assistant Superintendent, Work Planning
- W. Huntington, Assistant Superintendent, Operations
- P. Manning, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services
- T. Hammerich, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor W. Sheldon, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance J. Atchley, Operating Engineer
- D. A. Brown, Quality Assurance Supervisor D. Enright, Quality Assurance Engineer
- M. Richter, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor i
- Denotes personnel attending the exit interview on July 28, 1987.
Additional licensee technical and administrative personnel were contacted by the inspectors during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) Violation (373/87017-01(DRP)):
Primary Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices. On May 7, 1987, no records were available to demonstrate that the surveillance requirements specified in Technical Specification Table 3.8.3.2-1 for five 480 VAC breakers were met when Unit i entered Mode 2 of operation in 1982, or subsequently. The five 480 VAC breakers and their companion backup breakers were inspected per applicable portions of LES-GM-109 on May 8, 1987. All inspection results were satisfactory and the data sheets were filed in central file under LES-GM-109. The inspector finds these actions adequate.
(Closed) Violation (373/87016-01(DRP)): Missed Surveillance for Exercising Control Rod Drives.
Between March 27, 1987, and April 10, 1987, control rods 6-39, 14-15, 14-31, 14-47, 18-19, 18-43, 22-07, 22-23, 22-31, 22-39 and 22-55 were not demonstrated operable by moving each control rod at least one notch at least once per seven days. As noted in Inspection Report 373/87016, after the discovery of the incomplete surveillance, it was verified that the surveillance had been reperformed since the incomplete test, and that all Technical Specification requirements were satisfied.
The procedure used to document the control rod surveillance testing had been revised.
The individuals involved in the completion and review of this surveillance have been counselled on the weaknesses noted, i.e.,
imprecise turnover, poor documentation of difficulties encountered, and inadequate review of the completed surveillance.
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(Closed) SER (374/81000-26) Section 4.2.3.14 (License Condition NPF-18 2.C.6.): Surveillance of Control Blades.
IE Bulletin No. 79-26, Revision 1, " Boron Loss from BWR Control Blades," described certain actions to be taken by licensees to determine boron loss from BWR control blades. The licensee was to comply with items 1, 2 and 3 of this bulletin and submit a written response on item 3 within 30 days after plant startup following the first refueling outage. The inspector has reviewed the licensee's response to IE Bulletin 79-26 and the report which the licensee submitted and finds them adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable l
logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of Unit I and 2. reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maint nance. The inspector, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
During the month of June 1987, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the following systems to verify operability:
Unit 2 High Pressure Core Spray System Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water System b.
On June 30, 1987, at approximately 9:45 a.m. (CDT), Unit 2 experienced a Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) isolation due to high differential temperature.
The outboard RWCU isolation valve closed and tripped the RWCU pump. The trip setpoint of the differential temperature switch is 140 degrees F and the actual temperature differential was approximately 80 degrees F.
Investigation of the isolation revealed a bad temperature switch.
The switch was temporarily jumpered until the switch was replaced. The isolation valve was reopened and the system restarted.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspector observed Technical Specification required surveillance testing and verified for actual activities observed that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instruments-tion was calibrated, that Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished,
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r that test results conformed with Technical Specification and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following test activities:
LIS-NR-209 Unit 2 APRM Gain Adjustment LIS-MS-401 Unit 2 Main Steam Line Low Pressure MSIV Isolation Functional Test LIS.-LP-202 Unit 2 Low Pressure Core Spray Minimum Flow Bypass Calibration LIS-HP-105 Unit 1 High Pressure Core Spray Minimum Flow Bypass Calibration LOS-DG-SA2 Unit IA Diesel Generator - Semi-Annual Operability Test With Response Time a.
On July 13, 1987, the licensee reported that the Static-0-Ring (SOR)
differential pressure switch for the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)
minimum flow control valve failed its surveillance testing. The switch would not maintain a differential pressure which indicates the internal baffle of the switch was damaged. The valve was taken out of service, closed and the LPCS system was declared inoperable.
The licensee replaced the switch and returned LPCS to operation.
The unit was at approximately 100% power.
The switch was sent to the manufacturer to determine the cause of the failure. The switch was disassembled and the internal baffle inspected. A preliminary report received by the licensee was that the a tear of approximately 1/2 inch long was found in the internal baffle. The tear appeared to be the result of fatigue.
The licensee has sent the baffle to their own laboratory for analysis to determine the cause of the failure. The results of the analysis
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will be documented in a Licensee Event Report (LER) at a future date.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
During the inspection period, the inspector observed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Unit 1 Reactor Disassembly
Unit 1 Jet Pump Plugging l
Unit 1 Reactor Recirculation Motor Removal i
The following observations were noted:
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a.
On May 30, 1987, the licensee attempted to close the Unit 1 'A'
reactor recirculation pump discharge valve in preparation for replacing the reactor recirculation pump seal. The discharge valve l
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motor operator stopped prior to the valve becoming fully closed.
Further attempts to fully seat the valve were unsuccessful.
The licensee had already planned an outage to inspect and replace
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parts of the Unit 1 'B' reactor recirculation pump. To accomplish j
inspection and repair on the 1A discharge valve, the reactor head,
dryer and separator were removed and the 1A recirculation loop jet
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pump plugs and 1A recirculation suction line plug were installed l
to facilitate the draining of the 1A recirculation loop piping.
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Once the 'A' loop had been drained, the 1833F0 67A discharge valve
was disassembled. The valve was a split wedge type valve. Upon disassembly, it was noted that the male disk insert was laying in the bottom of the valve. This was possibly the obstruction preventing the valve from seating fully. The female disk insert is missing. The female disk insert is approximately three inches in diameter by one inch high and weighs approximately three to five pounds.
The licensee is continuing their efforts to locate the missing disk insert.
Further inspection of the valve revealed damage on the pump side valve disk where the disk insert is located. The reactor vessel side of the valve disk where the disk insert is located was found not damaged. The licensee plans to replace the valve stem and refurbish the valve disks and disk guides.
The manufacturer of the valvc and General Electric are working with the licensee in trying to determine why the valve failed.
While inspecting the valve, a worker dropped a pen and believed it fell into the valve. The licensee has been unsuccessful in locating the pen, but is continuing the effort in locating it. Continued followup by the resident inspector will take place as further work on the valve progresses.
b.
The inspector has been following the work activities and progress of the Unit i reactor recirculation pump outage.
It has been obvious that preplanning of the outage has been beneficial to the licensee.
The jet pumps were plugged, the recirculation loop drained, the recirculation pump motor removed and stored, and the recirculation pump disassembled. The pump internals were decontarainated and inspected. The bolts holding the upper wear ring had been sheared off and the upper wear ring had fallen down. There has been a search for the missing pieces of the bolts, but the licensee has been unsuccessful in locating any of the pieces to date. The new replacement impeller and pump internals are slightly different than the original parts. These differences are being evaluated such that proper operation and flow rates can be attained.
The old internals are to be disassembled, refurbished and reassembled for potential
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future use.
The inspector has witnessed various portions of the work activities for proper use of procedures, radiation controls, planning of
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activities and communications within the different work groups.
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l The inspector has found no concerns to date with these activities.
c.
During the recent Unit 1 outage, the resident inspector witnessed several of the evolutions necessary to disassemble the reactor vessel. Once the reactor vessel dryer and moisture separator had been removed and the reactor cavity flooded up, the inspector
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observed several shifts of recirculation jet pump plugging and a portion of the recirculation suction line plugging.
Items observed-were use of procedures, communications with the control room, proper i
radiation protection practices, and the interface between the
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licensee and the contractor installing the jet pump plugs.
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I No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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Training (41400)
I On July 15, 1987, the inspector witnessed a portion of the licensee's l
training of maintenance personnel on Control Rod Drive (CRD) removal, j
installation and rebuilding. Specific interest as to the licensee's i
training, particularly on CRD's, stemmed from the problems mechanical I
maintenance personnel encountered during the CRD work during the Unit 2
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refueling / maintenance outage (reference IR 374/87016). To enhance the training, the instructor used visual aids, an actual CRD and tools needed to perform the various tasks. The lesson plans used were up-to-date and appeared thorough.
In discussions with the training instructors, they
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indicated positive feedback from the personnel taking the training.
i Also available for review was equipment used for training of electrical and instrument maintenance personnel on some particular components. The training is generally concluded with a written examination and documentation of the training received.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Licensee Event Reports (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine that deportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to
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prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
(Closed) 373/87025-00 - Mechanical snubber not functionally tested during surveillance due to preservice error in documentation. The cause of this event was the omission of the snubber from the safety-related snubber list generated to define the snubber population for Technical Specification 3/4.7.9 for plant initial operation. The snubber was replaced by a new snubber which had test documentation meeting Technical Specification operability limits, and has been added to station
surveillance.
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(Closed) 374/87013-00 - Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling Isolation due to personnel error during modification test. The cause of this event was inattention to detail by
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the electrician who grounded the energized conductor of the closed switch against the wall of the panel.
Valve movement only occurred in the RHR system since the RWCU system was already in an isolated condition. The blown fuse was replaced one RHR system was restored to operation.
(Closed) 374/87011-01 - Residual Heat Removal pump minimum flow bypass differential pressure switch found out-of-tolerance due to setpoint
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drift. Since the Reject Limit had been exceeded, the subject flow switch l
was replaced with a new, qualified switch on May 5, 1987.
The old switch
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was sent to its manufacturer, SOR, Inc., for disassembly and inspection.
(Closed) 373/87021-00 - Engineering Safety Feature Actuation due to f
an unanticipated equipment interaction between an out-of-service card I
and cabinet door latch. The apparent cause of this event was the i
unanticipated entanglement of an out-of-service card (already hanging in the cabinet) with the circuit breaker and cabinet door latch. After detennining the source of the problem, the circuit was re-energized (by closing breaker 23) and the "B" VC HVAC system was returned to its normal configuration.
(Closed) 373/87022-00 - Reactor scram due to failure of the Turbine I
Driven Reactor Feed Pump (TDRFP) control valve. With both TDRFPs in l
three element automatic control, a licensed operator was cycling the l
number one turbine bypass valve. The bypass valve was ramping closed l
when the "B" TORFP discharge flow decreased initiating a decrease in reactor water level. Control of the "B" TDRFP was not obtained prior to i
the reactor scramming on low level.
The cause of the loss of the "B" TDRFP is not known. Additional testing will be performed on the "B" TDRFP prior to unit stcrtup.
(Closed) 373/87023-00 - Scram discharge volume level switch found valved out.
The inlet root valve for the scram discharge volume high level switch was found in the closed position; it is normally open. After notifying the Shift Engineer and an Instrument Maintenance Foreman, the technician verified correct position of the other scram discharge volume level switch root valves and correctly re-positioned the subject valve.
(Closed) 373/83039-02 - Inoperable residual heat removal system mechanical snubber.
During the performance of a Snubber Visual Inspection, I
mechanical snubber RI41-1060S was found to be locked between its hot and
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cold settings. The effected piping was analyzed by the Architect
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Engineer as a rigid restraint and no adverse effects were found to adjacent piping or supports. The snubber was dismantled and the cause of j
failure was determined to be a transient caused by water flashing to steam. The snubber was replaced.
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(Closed) 373/87024-00 - Spurious ammonia detector trip due to design l
deficiency in the chemcassette tape mechanism. The chemcassette tape was l
found broken in the makeup spool.
The chemcassette tape was readjusted
and the detector was reset.
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(Closed) 374/86019-01 - Reactor vessel low level confinned ADS permissive switch out-of-tclerance due to setpoint drift.
LS-2B21-N038A was replaced and the new switch was recalibrates to within allowable tolerances and placed in service.
Unit 2 was in Operational Condition 1 (power operation) at 74.3% power at the time of this event.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Security (71381)'
a.
On June 24, 1987, the licensee security administrator contacted the residents and informed them of a possible drug use on site. An alleger reported to the security administrator that a contractor individual made statements to other individuals about sniffing cocaine on site and smoking marijuana while on the way to work.
The contractor employee was escorted off site and sent to the local hospital for testing. Access to the site was denied until the results of the testing was complete. On July 1,1987, the results of the testing came back positive for both cocaine and marijuana and access to the site has been permanently denied to the individual.
The individual was a laborer involved in cleanup type activities and did not perform any work on. safety-related equipment.
b.
On June 29, 1987, the licensee identified a service water leak into the evaporator vapor body room which caused some flooding in the room. An operator was dispatched to'the room to secure the leak.
The operator closed the service water inlet valve to the evaporator (0WS112) approximately 1/4 to 1/2 turns which stopped the leak.
This valve was taken out-of-service previously to allow work on the evaporator.
Due to the potential that someone may have mispositioned-the valve, the licensee Acting Security Administrator (ASA) initiated an investigation into the cause of the valve being mispositioned.
The ASA interviewed all personnel involved.
This included the contractor working on the heat exchanger, the contractor personnel assisting, and the operator who found the valve cracked open. The room was posted as a high-high radiation area and had an electrical card reader for access.
A printout of the times accessed was authorized, obtained and used to confirm the statements of the individuals.
The inspector sat in on some of the interviews which were conducted. The licensee determined that, based on interviews, card history, and key logs, there was no evidence that tampering was involved in this event. The remoteness of the valve and the difficulty of gaining access to the room using a high-high radiation key or key card also substantiates the finding that tampering was probably not the cause of the valve movement.
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The licensee speculated either the valve operating chain was inadvertently bumped or that vibration of the system caused the valve to come off its seat. The inspectors reviewed the results of the licensee's investigations and also could not determine the cause of the valve movement, but agrees it probably was not due to misconduct of personnel.
This item is considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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9.
Radiation Controls (83526)
On July 11, 1987, a contractor received a head injury while waiting te enter the drywell for Unit 1.
A plank of wood leaning against a wall was bumped, fell and struck the individual in the head.
He was transported to the local hospital via ambulance in anti-contamination clothing (anti-c's). He was admitted to the hospital for observation.
The anti-c's were cut off the individual at the hospital. The ambulance, hospital and the individual were surveyed and no contamination was detected. An unusual event was declared at 8:27 a.m. (CDT) and terminated at 9:33 a.m. after the release of the ambulance, individual and the hospital with no contamination. The individual was released from the hospital the next day and readmitted two days later for another week of observations.
He was then released and is recovering at home.
10. Unit Trips (93702)
On June 23, 1987, at approximately 12:53 p.m. (CDT), Unit 2 experienced a turbine trip and reactor scram. The unit was operating at approximately 68% power at the time of the scram.
The main turbine tripped due to stop valve closure caused by a signal from the main turbine thrust bearing wear detector. The turbine trip caused the reactor scram. Because the unit had only been operating for one week and the unit was only at 68%,
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there was not a lot of decay heat and water level was easily controlled on the reactor scram.
All systems functioned as expected. The licensee investigated the cause of the turbine trip and concluded that the main turbine thrust bearing wear detector did, in fact, cause the turbine trip.
Inspection of the wear detector revealed a buildup of debris (sludge, dirt) in the piston area of the wear detector and also in some of the pressure switches for the wear detector. The pressure switches f
sensed a pressure surge caused by the debris build up, thus causing the false signal from the thrust bearing wear detector which caused the turbine to trip.
Some of the pressure switches were replaced and the wear detector cleaned, inspected and tested satisfactorily.
The wear detector had not been inspected for approximately four years prior to this turbine trip. The maintenance department has placed the wear detector on their preventive maintenance schedule.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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i 11.
Electrical Maintenance (62705)
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On July 13, 1987, the licensee reported that the electrical connections for the A, B, and C motors to the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pumps for Unit I did not meet environmental qualification (EQ) requirements. The
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4160 volt electrical connections were made in the 1984 and early 1986 time
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frame, but were not in accordance with the environmental qualification
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binder requirements established on these connections.
The unit was in a maintenance outage and was in Cold Shutdown. The licensee has performed an analysis to assure that the pumps would meet the environmental qualification with the plant in its current mode of operation.
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The licensee performed an inspection on Unit 2 pump motor connections-and the final' results for both units were:
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Unit 1
'1.
High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Pump and Low Pressure Core Spray'
(LPCS) Pump motors both had a Kerite Kit splice in a 'Y'
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configuration.
Kerite had not qualified a 'Y'. configuration in
their Environmental; Qualification program. The 'Y' configuration was due to two wires from the pump motor being terminated into one.
j phase.of the power supply. The configuration was' correct, but the qualification of the termination needed evaluation.
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A - Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump motor had records that the
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Kerite Kit used for installation in February 1986 was T-4018 in lieu of the required qualified kit number DT-8019.
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B - RHR pump motor had Okonite termination tape installed in February 1984 in lieu of the Kerite Kit DT-8019. The Okonite tape
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for 4160 volt connections had not been qualified.
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C - RHR pump motor had a layer of Kerite air seal plus four layers
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of Okonite tape, plus one layer friction tape and one outer layer of
. glass tape. This termination was also not in accordance with the EQ binder. The terminations were made in October 1984.
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HPCS and LPCS pump motors had the same 'Y' connection problem as
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Unit 1.
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A, B, and C - RHR pump motors were installed in accordance with the EQ binder and drawings except the binder and drawing reference the
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Kerite Kit for a post terminal to a wire connection and the as-installed connection was a " pig-tail" to wire connection.
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use of the Kerite Kit for termination to wire in the licensee's application was not EQ qualified.
Due to Unit 2 operating, a telephone conference was held on July 24, 1987, j
between Commonwealth Edison site and corporate offices, and NRC Region III and headquarters. The conference call clarified the configuration of the pHees.
It was agreed that Unit 2 could continue operating due to:
(1) The same material was used in the Kerite Kit for a butt splice as a terminal splice so the protection from the material was the same for both kits; (2) The area that the splices were located in only contained a high radiation environment. High humidity and temperatures were not part of the environment; (3) The licensee was to complete an engineering evaluation on the splices to assure operability; and (4) The licensee was to provide the Region with a schedule for replacement of the splices for both units.
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I This item will remain open as an unresolved item for a future inspection
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by a regional based inspector (373/87019-01(DRS); 374/87019-01(DRS)).
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One unresolved item was identified in this area.
12. Unresolved Items l
An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required
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in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, an open item, a
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deviation, or a violation. An unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 11.
13.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and sunmarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged these findings.
The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as i
proprietary.
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