IR 05000373/1987030
| ML20236Q826 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 11/12/1987 |
| From: | Ring M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236Q787 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-87-30, 50-374-87-29, NUDOCS 8711200307 | |
| Download: ML20236Q826 (12) | |
Text
__
- _ - _
- -
.
' t. ;*
,
b U.
S.' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-
-REGION III:
Report Nos.
50-373/87030(DRP); 50-374/87029(DRP)
Docket Nos.
50-373; 50-374-Licenses No. NPF-11; NPF-18 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post.0ffice Box 767 Chicago,:IL. 60690 Facility'Name: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
'
Irspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL Inspection Conducted:
September 22 through November 3, 1987 Inspectors:
M. J. Jordan R. Kopriva
////7/r7 Approved By:
M. A. Ring, Chief
.
Date Reactor Projects Section C Inspection Summary
. Inspection on' September 22'through November 3, 1987 (Reports No.
50-373/87030(DRP); 50-374/87029(DRP))
Areas Inspected:. Routine, unannounced inspection conducted by resident inspectors of licensee actions on previous inspection findings; operational safety; surveillance; maintenance; training; Licensee Event Reports; cold weather preparation; receipt of new fuel; general site emergency plan drill; regional requests; and headquarters requests.
Results: Of the eleven-areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in ten areas; one violation was identified 'in the remaining area j
(failure to follow procedures - Paragraph 5).
During this month, several personnel errors and procedural errors (Paragraphs
!
5.a. 5.e, and 5.f) occurred, indicating a reduction in the attentiveness to detail by the plant _ workers. This was brought to-the attention of the plant management during the inspection period and at the exit meeting. Plant management stated action has been taken to appraise station workers of these events, as well-as some other minor events, to increase their attention to detail. The inspectors will monitor the results of these actions.
h2ggobk h
(
G l
o
_
- - _ -
_ _ _ -
. - _ - - - - - - _ - _ - - - - - - - - - _ _ - -
_
f
.
e
,
DETAILS 1.-
Persons Contacted
- G. J. Diederich, Manager, LaSalle Station
,
- R. D. Bishop, Services Superintendent
- J. C. Renwick, Production Superintendent
'
D. Berkman, Assistant Superintendent, Work Planning L
W. Huntington, Assistant Superintendent, Operations P. Manning, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services T. Hammerich, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor W. Sheldon,.- Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance l
J. Atchley, Operating Engineer D. A. Brown, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- D. Winchester, Quality Assurance Engineer
- M. Richter, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- Denotes personnel attending the exit interview on November 3,1987.
Additional licensee technical and administrative personnel _were contacted by the inspectors during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) Open Item (373/86046-02; 374/86046-04): Controls of scaffolding around safety related equipment. Administrative procedure' LAP-900-28,
" Erection, Inspection and Use of Scaffolding," was revised to address the controls of scaffolding erection around safety equipment and/or the engineering evaluation as to the effects of the scaffolding failure during a seismic event.
(Closed) Open Item (373/85032-02; 374/85033-02):
Lubrication controls program. Procedure LAP 1400-2, " Withdrawal and Return of Materials From the Storeroom," has been revised to reflect the additional requirements for issuing of lubricant products. Also, improved identification of lubricants in the storeroom and improved access control to the operations lubricant storage area are completed.
(Closed) Open Item (373/85033-02; 374/85034-04):
This open item has two parts. The first part deals with the Reliance Motors used for Residual Heat Removal, service water, fuel pool cooling, etc., which experienced shorting of the motor windings caused by a buildup of concrete dust from original construction combined with a moist pump room environment. All the Reliance Motors have been rewound and tested satisfactorily. Part 2 pertains to Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) radiation monitors.
Replacement of the power supplies and detectors has resolved the spurious spiking experienced by the SBGT radiation monitors.
(Closed) Open Item (374/87006-06): Verifying the wiring in the limitorque motors was in accordance with IE Notice 87-08. This item, for both Unit 1 and Unit 2, was closed in IR #373/87022; 374/87022, but the i
Unit 2 open item number had been left out of the report.
i No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
,
2
_
_ _ _
. _ _ _
.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
The inspector observed control room-operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified
,
proper return to service of affected components. Tours of Unit 1
'
and 2 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations, and to verify that
maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of j
maintenance. The inspector, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
During the month of October 1987, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the following systems to verify operability:
Unit 1 & 2 Standby Liquid Control Unit 1 & 2 Standby Gas Treatment Unit 1 & 2 Auxiliary Electric Room b.
On October 6, 1987, at 7:35 a.m., the Instrument Mechanics (IMs)
were performing surveillance LIS-NR-303, " Unit 1 Average Power Range Monitor Rod Block and Scram Functional Test." At 8:45 a.m., the unit operator noticed that control rod 46-15 had drifted in from position 28 to position 24. The IMs ceased work on their surveill-ance while operations was evaluating the cause for the rod drift.
No cause for the rod drift was found, so the licensee attempted to reproduce the conditions existing at the time the rod drifted in.
Reactor power was reduced per the Nuclear Engineer, and rod 46-15 was withdrawn to position 28. Surveillance LIS-NR-303 was recommenced, and this time no rod movement occurred.
The licensee tried several times to reproduce the rod drift.
No control rod motion occurred.
All the unit operators were informed of the control rod drift.
Operations hypothesized that there'possibly was a small piece of debris under the valve seat of the control rod insertion valve, thus allowing some leakage past the valve seat and slowly inserting the control rod drive.
The inspector has been routinely checking the control room operations, and over the last month of observations there have been no control rods drifting.
}
c.
On October 17, 1987, at approximately 6:15 a.m. (CDT), the control room ventilation intake radiation monitor spuriously spiked high,
!
causing an automatic start of the
'A' control room ventilation
emergency make up (EMU) train.
The radiation monitor was reset, and l
the EMU train was secured. A temporary system change was installed
~
to defeat the spurious radiation monitor trips.
The spurious trip (
was caused by a problem located in the 'D' process radiation monitor
(PRM).
Instrument mechanics performed a functional calibration and j
l
!
l
_ - _ _ -
_
__ _ - - _-__
__-___ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ - - _ - - _ _. _ _ _ _ _
._
__
.
.
source check calibration of the detector and made the necessary adjustments.
The 'D' PRM was then placed back in service. No other spurious actuations of the PRMs have been observed to date.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
l 4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspector observed Technical Specification required surveillance testing and verified for actual activities observed that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specification and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following test activities:
LIS-NR-303 Unit 1 Average Power Range Monitor Rod Block and Scram Functional Test LIS-RH-212 Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal (Shutdown Cooling Mode) High Suction Flow Isolation Calibration LIS-R1-201 Unit 2 Steam Line High Flow Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Isolation Calibration LIS-MS-406 Unit 2 Condenser Low Vacuum Main Steam Isolation Valves Isolation Functional Test LIS-NB-403 Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Low Low Water Level Recirculation Pump Trip Functional Test LIS-RD-401 Unit 2 Scram Discharge Volume Level Alarm, Rod Block and Scram Functional Test LIS-RI-206 Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump Suction Pressure Indication Calibration LIS-NB-108 Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Low Low Water Level HPCS Initiation Calibration On October 21, 1987, at 2:50 a.m., the licensee reported a failure of a Static-0-Ring (SOR) differential pressure switch in the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system. The purpose of the switch is to provide an isolation signal to the outboard isolation valve on high steam flow to the RCIC turbine. The failure was detected during normal surveillance testing. The initial indication was a major failure of the internal baffle such that the switch would not function. The isolation valve was manually closed, the licensee replaced the switch, and the isolation valve was returned to service.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
During the inspection period, the inspector observed portions of the following maintenance activities:
-
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
_
_
__ - _
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-.
,
.
Unit 1 Hydraulic Control Unit Accumulators Unit 2 Reactor Core: Isolation Cooling System Mainsteam Isolation Hi Flow Switch Replacement Unit 1 & 2 Diesel Fire Pumps a.
On October 6, 1987, two jobs were in progress in the spent resin tank room; one was testing the ' A' spent resin pump motor, the other was rigging an air driven " sandpiper" pump to take the place of the inoperable motor driven pump in order to pump spent resin beads to a High Integrity Container (HIC) located in the radwaste truckbay for shipment to a burial site. The crew working on the air driven pump proceeded to remove the suction and discharge spool pieces from the motor driven pump and connect in the air driven pump. The crew had connected a discharge hose to the discharge piping, but needed a part to complete the suction hose cranection. The job was turned over in this condition for the next shift to complete.
At 4:00 p.m. on October 6, 1987, another crew working on the motor driven pump was informed of the progress of the jobs in the spent resin tank room. This second crew was told that the motor driven pump was ready to test run and that all the crew had to do was temporarily lift the two out-of-service cards on the air operated valves and run the pump. At 5:25 p.m., the crew called the radwaste foreman to temporarily lift the outage cards and run the pump.
Due to interlocks for starting the motor driven pump, the motor driven pump suction and discharge valves needed to be opened. At this time, the second crew didn't realize that the motor driven pump piping system was disconnected, and the crewmen believed that opening the valves would not cause a problem.
There was an existing Caution Card on the radwaste control panel which indicated the upstream manual valve to the air operated suction and discharge valves was closed, giving both the radwaste foreman and the construction engineer added assurance that no resin beads would be spilled. The Caution Card was actually an old card that had been authorized for clearance, but had not been cleared. The valve had been closed to prevent resin beads from entering the pump on August 24, 1987, while testing. The valve was now, however, in fact open. The out of service cards were then temporarily lifted, the valves opened, and the pump motor was started.
At 5:30 p.m., the station construction field engineer called the radwaste control room and told radwaste personnel to turn the pump motor off and close the valves. The contractors entering the room had found water and resin beads pouring out of the suction pipe onto the floor.
The motor was stopped and the valves reclosed.
The spent resin tank level had dropped several inches. By 5:35 p.m.,
the out of service card was rehung, and radiation technicians were called to resurvey the area. The dose rate in the room (which had been approximately 30 mrem /hr) was now 1.5 to 2.0 rem /hr at the knees, and the room floor was 4 to 10 inches deep with resin beads. The Radiation Work Permit was terminated, and entry to the room was controlled as a Hi Rad area.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
.
.
By October 16, 1987, the spent resin pump room was cleared of spent resin beads and brought back to its original status before the event. The root causes of this event were:
(1) Poor communications between the two different crews concerning the jobs that were in progress.
(2) The out of service procedure (LAP 900-4).was not followed by the crew foreman (working on the_ air driven pump) in that he allowed his crew to start work on a system that was not out of service. The afternoon station construction engineer (working on the motor driven pump) also allowed his outage to be temporarily lifted without checking the condition of the equipment to verify no work was being performed on it.
(3) There were two jobs going on in the room by two different crews, but the station construction field engineers were only aware of one, the testing of the motor driven pump. Control of the disassembly of the piping to the motor driven pump was lost.
(4)
Inadequate outage - the out of service was inadequate in that the out of service cards were on the control switches in the-radwaste control room, not on the air lines to the air operated valves (fail closed), and the manual valve upstream of the air operated valves was not out of service.
Due to the numerous problems (i.e. personnel errors, poor communications, not following procedures, etc.), and the fact that corrective actions are still taking place, this item is considered an unresolved item (373/87030-01; 374/87029-01) requiring additional inspection by the inspectors, b.
On October 16, 1987, at approximately 12:00 p.m. (CDT), the licensee voluntarily took the plant fire suppression system out of service.
The licensee took this action to perform needed repairs on the 'A'
diesel fire pump oil supply line. The licensee was unable to supply diesel fuel oil from the supply tank to the day tank.
Per the Technical Specifications (3.7.5.1), the licensee established a backup fire suppression water system, informed the NRC within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and confirmed in writing the inoperability of the fire suppression system. The repairs to the 'A'
diesel fuel oil pipe line from the supply tank to the day tank were completed by 4:00 p.m. on October 16, 1987. There appears to have been an obstruction in the pipe line.
The licensee proceeded to test the transfer capability of the diesel fuel oil and declared the fire suppression system operable at 4:45 p.m. (CDT) on October 18, 1987.
l c.
On October 17, 1987, at approximately 5:35 a.m. (CDT), Unit 2 received an isolation of the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system outboard isolation valve (Group 5).
Electricians had lifted a lead to repair a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) isolation relay for area
__
- __
- _ _ _ _ _ _
__-
___
_ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - _.
-. _ - _ - -. -
. - - - - - -.
-_-
.
.
temperature and differential temperature. The work instructions failed to recognize an RWCU relay in series with the RHR relay. When the lead was lifted, the power was interrupted, which caused a loss of power to the RWCU leak detection power monitor relay, and the RWCU outboard isolation valve actuated. The electricians relanded the leads, the isolation was reset, and the RWCU system was restarted by 6:00 a.m.
Following further review of this event with the licensee, the inspector found that the majority of the work in preparation for removing the RHR relay was done using " Electrical Schematic" drawings in lieu of the " Electrical Wiring Diagrams." The schematic drawings did not give sufficient details as to the proper " daisy-chain" effect of lifting or moving a lead, which the Electrical Wiring Diagrams did. The need to use Electrical Wiring Diagrams in lieu of Electrical Schematics was recognized due to previous events at LaSalle. This situation is reflected in LAP 100-30, " Independent Verification,"
step F.3.e.1 which states, "When lifting leads, always use the wiring diagram and wire color indication if it is available."
The need to use electrical wiring diagrams is also addressed in LAP 240-6, " Temporary System Changes," paragraph E.5: "All Temporary System Changes will be installed using the wiring diagrams and all terminal wires will be verified to be correct according to the color code of the wires per the wiring diagram and physical installation at the terminal board."
Had the temporary system change and the independent verification of the system change been accomplished in accordance with the above administrative procedures, this isolation could have been prevented.
This issue is considered to be a violation of Technical Specifica-
'
tion 6.2 for failure to adhere to written procedures (374/87029-02).
d.
On October 22, 1987, an electrical maintenance person was preparing to start work on the Unit 1 main condenser water box vacuum pump valve in order to repair a solenoid.
Upon arrival at the work station, the worker noticed an out of service (005) card hung on the condenser water box vacuum pump breaker, but did not find any 00S cards hung on the water box vacuum pump seal water injection valve or the condenser water box vacuum pump control switch, all of which were to be 00S.
After further investigation, it was found that when the 00S card was originally hung, the control switch and seal injection valve had been taken 00S on Unit 2 instead of Unit 1.
The equipment on Unit 2 was placed back in service and the equipment on Unit I was properly taken 00S.
The condenser water box vacuum pump is not a safety-related piece of equipment, nor is it required during operation of the unit. The inspectors are concerned that this is another example of personnel error where an action is performed on the wrong unit. Corrective
_ - - _ - _
_ _ _ _ _
e
..
(
.
measures were taken by the licensee to mitigate further occurrences of personnel error and wrong unit error.
The inspectors are con-tinuing to monitor the licensee's actions in these areas.
One unresolved item and one violation were identified in this area.
6.
Training (41400)
The inspector, through discussions with personnel and a review of training records, evaluated the licensee's training prograrr, for operations and maintenance personnel to determine whether the general knowledge of the individuals was sufficient for their assigned tasks.
In the areas examined by the inspector, no items of concern were identified.
i No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Licensee Event Reports (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with' licensee personnel, and review of records, the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine that deportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective _ action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
(Closed) 374/87017-00 - Special report not submitted within required time frame due to personnel error. Technical Specification 3.7.7.1 requires that a Special Report be submitted to the NRC within 30 days of occurrence if the drywell temperature exceeds a 150-degree limit for more than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. The licensee failed to recognize the 150 degree limit had been exceeded, and a report was not issued until the offsite review of the data revealed the drywell had readings of 153 degrees in one area where safety equipment was located. Subsequent analysis revealed no degradation to the environmental qualification of the equipment around the sensor. All involved personnel were briefed on the event and proper reporting requirements in order to prevent recurrence.
(Closed) 373/87028-00 - Spurious ammonia detector trip of the control room ventilation due to tape breaking in the chemcassette tape mechanism.
The tape was replaced and the ventilation returned to normal.
(Closed) 373/87029-00 - Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) outboard isolation valve closure due to personnel error and procedural error. A jumper was being removed in accordance with a surveillance procedure when the jumper was accidentally grounded, causing the RWCU outboard isolation valve to close. The cause was attributed to the procedure requiring the jumper installation in an inaccessible location.
The procedure was changed to install a jumper to prevent the isolation at a more accessible location in the logic circuit.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
_
l
.
l l
8.
Cold Weather Preparation (71714)
On September 2, 1987, the licensee initiated work on LOS-ZZ-A2,
" Preparation for Winter Operation." This procedure. fulfills the concerns that were addressed in IE Bulletin 79-24, " Frozen Lines."
The inspector periodically monitored the licensee's progress toward completion of the procedure. The licensee completed the work required by the procedure on October 31, 1987.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
!
9.
Receipt of New Fuel (81403)
The inspector verified prior to receipt of new fuel that technically-adequate, approved procedures were available covering the receipt, inspection, and storage of new fuel; observed receipt inspections and storage of new fuel elements and verified that these activities were performed in accordance with the licensee's procedures; and followed up resolutions of deficiencies as found during new fuel inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
10. General Site Emergency Plan (GSEP) Drill (82205)
On October 28, 1987, at 12:35 p.m.,
the licensee held a GSEP assembly drill. During the last site drill there were several problems (both personnel and equipment) due to the changed location of some card readers and assembly areas.
This recent drill was announced and everyone was prepared. There was a slight problem with one of the card readers this time, but that appeared to be the only problem. All site personnel were accounted for, and the drill was terminated at 1:05 p.m..
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
l 11. Regional Requests (92701)
a.
The inspector received a request to followup on the reliability of non-safety related breakers during an Anticipated Transient Without
]
Scram (ATWS). The memorandum was dated September 24, 1987, from q
C. E. Norelius to the LaSalle resident inspector, regarding the
!
following:
)
(1) Does your facility currently use GE AKF-2-25 field breakers to l
trip the recirculation pump (RPT)?
j Answer: No, LaSalle does not use any AKF-2-25 breakers in the
RPT. There are only two AKF relay breakers at LaSalle and they are on generator exciter field breakers.
There is one on each
unit.
j
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
_-
.
~6 (2) Has your assigned facility'had any RPT breaker failures, which have not been reported?
Answer: One possible failure (WR L67822) on May 7, 1987, for Unit 2.
This failure was not reported because it was found during a surveillance test and because the
' backup breaker did not fail.
(3) What action,.if any, did the licensee take in response to IN 87-127
,
Answer: The licensee has incorporated the recommendations of
,
IN 87-12 into the breaker surveillance programs and into LES-GM-105, " Inspection of 480V (600 Amp) Circuit Breakers."
J
!
This request is considered complete and closed (373/87030-02;
!
374/87029-03).
]
b.
On October 29, 1987, the Region III Director for Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), Branch Chief for DRP, and Section Chief for DRP conducted a routine site visit. During the time spent on site, they
!
participated in a plant tour, attended the licensee's weekly error k
free operations meeting, and participated in a presentation by the i
site management pertaining to Quality Assurance interface at the site and balance of plant equipment problems contributing to reactor scrams. A synopsis of the plants' recent operating history, presented by the plant manager, concluded the meetings and the site visit.
j No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
12. Headquarters Request (92701)
a.
During the recent Unit I maintenance outage for repair of the IB Reactor Recirculation (RR) pump and the 1A Reactor Recirculation pump discharge valve, several parts were found missing from the internals of equipment, and some external equipment became lost into the internals of the reactor systems.
The specific lost parts were:
Sixteen stainless steel cap screw heads and ten cap screw
-
shanks from a recirculation pump upper wear ring (5/8" diameter by 1-1/2" long, type 304 stainless steel cap screws).
Twelve carbon steel cap screws and three cap screw shanks from
)
-
a feedwater pump)(3/4" diameter by 2" long, type A193-B7 carbon steel cap screws.
'
-
One stainless steel disc insert from a recirculation discharge block valve (3.123" diameter by 7/8" thickness, A276 type 410 stainless steel from valve F067A).
I
_ _ -
__-_ _-_-
_
_ _ _
_ _ _
_-. _
-
- _. _.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -.
.
'
't Ii
.
,<
One felt-tip marker (" Sharpie" model #3000, water resistant
-
fine point pen' manufactured by Sanford).
One circular sheet of 20" diameter, 1/4" thick plexiglass.
l
-
A Panasonic TLD dosimeter personnel badge.
-
The licensee had General Electric analyze the safety significance of these lost parts in an operating reactor. The licensee then l
l-performed an onsite review of this analysis and concluded it would
!
be safe to restart the reactor. A review was conducted by.the site
'
residents of this analysis with the same conclusion.
However, the analysis was also forwarded.to Region III for review. Region III j
requested a review of the analysis by NRC Headquarters via
'
memorandum to D. R. Muller, Director, Directorate III-2, NRR, from l
C. E. Norelius, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, dated
!
-October 1, 1987. Telephone conversations on this subject were then conducted on October.2 and October 5, 1987, between the licensee, NRC Region III and NRC Headquarters. As a result of these conver-sations, the licensee addressed additional questions in correspondence to Region III dated October 9, 1987. This response is currently being reviewed by NRC personnel in headquarters. This item will remain as an open item until completion of this review by the NRC (373/87030-03).
b.
On October 15, 1987, the licensee conducted a site visit by members of the Soviet Union. The delegation was also accompanied by the Director, Office of Governmental and Public Affairs, and a member of his staff.
The Director, Division of Reactor Projects from Region III and the Senior Resident Inspector gave a presentation on the USNRC regional inspection program with primary emphasis on the day-to-day activities of the Resident Inspector. Following the presentation, the Division Director and Senior Resident Inspector accompanied the group on a tour of the LaSalle facility with the
Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Committee on Supervision of
,
Nuclear Power Safety (the NRC equivalent).
i One open item was identified during review of this functional area.
13. Unresolved Items j
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
.
order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, open items, i
deviations, or violations. An unresolved item disclosed during the
)
inspection is discussed in Paragraph 5.
^
14. Open Items i
Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which l
'
will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. One open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 12.
.
1
_ - _ - - - -
_ - _ _ - _ - -
.
..
15. Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational contents of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _