IR 05000373/1987014

Emergency Preparedness Exercise Insp Repts 50-373/87-14 & 50-374/87-14 on 870428-30.No Violations,Deficiencies or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Observations by Four NRC Representatives of Key Functions & Locations

ML20214L677
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	05/21/1987
From:	Foster J, Hironori Peterson, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214L618	List: IR 05000373/1987014 ML20214L615
References
50-373-87-14, 50-374-87-14, NUDOCS 8706010051
Download: ML20214L677 (19)

Text

. . _ _

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 373/87014(DRSS);-50-374/87014(DRSS)

Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374 Licenses No. NPF-11; NPF-18 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Power Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: LaSalle Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

-

Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL Inspection Conducted: April 28-30, 1987 Inspectors: James Foster @ [ i Q 7 g 6/2_//37 Team Leader Date Hironori Pete son' -

O Of/W/87

.A 2 fa-hlfWB Date Approved By: Wi L S.Jt'

am Snell, Chief rds/87 Emergency Preparedness Section Date t

Inspection Summary Inspection on April 28-30, 1987 (Reports No. 50-373/87014(DRSS);

No. 50-3/4/8/0014(DR55))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the LaSalle Station emergency preparedness exercise involving ob'servations by four NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise. The inspection involved three NRC inspectors and one consultan Results: No violations, deficiencies, or deviations were identified. One exercise weakness was identified as summarized in the enclosure to the report's transmittal letter.

'

Ngoggg@{ f50 G

(

f

- - . , , , . . , . . .- , - . -. . . _ - . . - . . _ _ , . _ . , , - , , . _ , ,e . . , ,y, , , , ,

~

.

,

DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed

.

James Foster, Emergency Control Room Operations Facility(CR),(Technical E0F) Support Center (TSC),

Hironori Peterson, Operations Support Center (OSC), In plant Teams, High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS)

Richard Traub, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

Jamie Malloy, Control Room (CR) Commonwealth Edison Company C. Reed, Vice President, Ceco (JPIC)

D. Galle, Assistant Vice President, CECO (E0F)

• T. Gillman, Corporate Emergency Planning,$upervisor

• K. Klotz, GSEP Coordinator, LaSalle Station (TSC)

• C. Sargent, Technical Support Manager (E0F)

• StationDirector(TSC)

• Renwick,ft Sly, Shi Engineer (CR)

5. Seaborn, Shift Control Room Engineer (CR)

D. Leggett, Controller, Control Room (CR)

T. Scheaffer, Controller, Control Room (CR)

• P. Manning, CECO LaSalle

• L. Aldrich, Rad / Chem Supervisor, LaSalle Station

• T. Markwalter, Controller, TSC

• P. Vitalis, CECO EPC

• T. Lechton, CECO EPC

• J. Bowman, Controller, TSC

• L. Duchek, CECO EPC, Mazon E0F

• O'Neill, HP Controller, OSC

• T. Greene, Controller, E0F A. Mosel, Environs Controller, E0F G. Spedl, NARS Communicator (E0F)

K. Petrowski, DNS Communicator (E0F)

D. Scott, Advisory Support Manager (E0F)

D. Adam, Health Physics Director (E0F)

• Denotes those personnel listed above who attended the exit interview on April 30, 1987.

I

-

.

2. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Open Items (Closed)OpenItem 50-373/86001-03; 50-374/86001-03: During the previous Emergency Exercise, certain E0F staff failed to follow adequate procedure guidance when formulating the initial offsite protective action recommendation (PAR) following the General Emergency declaration. The licensee adequately demonstrated and followed procedural guidance on PARS during this exercise. This item is close (0 pen) Open item 50-373/86001-04 50-374/86001-04: During the previous Emergency Exercise, the licensee i s E0F and JPIC staffs failed to adequately coordinate the timing of messages to State officials via the NARs with press briefings regarding the initiation and termination of the release. The JPIC was not observed during this exercise due to limited staffing of the inspection team. This item will remain open, pending observation in a future exercis . General An exercise of the licensee's Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP)

was conducted at the LaSalle County Station on April 29, 1987. The exercise tested the applicant's capabilities to respond to a simulated accident scenario resulting in a major release of radioactive effluen Attachment 1 to this report describes the Scope and Objectives of the exercise and Attachment 2 describes the exercise scenari This was a licensee-only exercis . General Observations Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the Generating Station Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely. If the events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and safet Observers The licensee's observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with four NRC observer ___

'

. Exercise Critiques A critique was held with the licensee and NRC representatives on A)ril 30, 1987, the day after the exercis The NRC discussed the o) served strengths and weaknesses during the exit intervie . Specific Observations Control Room The control room staff demonstrated effective coordination and utilization of the plant emergency plan and procedures. Tl;e teamwork between the Shift Engineer (SE), Station Control R'oom Engineer (SCRE), and Nuclear Station Operators (NS0) was more than adequate. They were able to respond promptly and correctly to scenario event With multiple scenario events occurring, the SE was able to maintain a perceptiveness of overall plant status while responding to secondary events. For example, the SE advised operators to pay attention to rising reactor coolant conductivity while he was involved in responding to the Hydrogen Explosio The SE was clearly in control of plant emergency operation He effectively directed the priorities for response action When the Hydrogen Explosion occurred (an Unusual Event) he promptly had the Fire Brigade muster and directed that the OSC be activate Throughout the exercise the SE demonstrated correct and timely decision There was a minor delay in commencing an orderly reactor shutdown due to high reactor coolant conductivity as required by Technical Specifications. This delay was due to a scenario problem which createddisjointedinformationonreactorcoolantconductivit This item is further discussed in report Section 6 (Scenario)y. .

The Control Room Staff adequately classified the emergency events ranging from Unusual Event to Alert. During their span of command and control, one less Alert classification than provided for in the scenario was declared. This was because the scripted 0815 and 0830 Alerts were " combined" into a 0834 Alert (per EALs 13 and 14). This was considered acceptable, but classification timeliness could be improved. The licensee did adequately inform the State and NRC of changing conditions which warranted new emergency classification Throughout the exercise there was adeguate communication formality and methodology, e.g., the use of "This is a drill / exercise" statement Communications between CR, OSC, and TSC were adequate, but there were minimal or no Public Address system announcements of emergency conditions or plant statu .

F

_ _ . _ _

.

Notifications to the offsite authorities were accurate, timely and performed in accordance with procedure. The initial Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) calls to State / Local and NRC were made within the time requirements of 15 minutes and one hour by the S These initial NARS calls should have been delegated to an operator not directly involved in the operation of Unit 1, to allow the SE to direct all his attentiveness on plant activitie Subsequently, it was observed that two operators were both completing separate NARS forms for the same event. The SE recognized that two duplicate forms had been created, and properly discarded one for Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was adequate; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:

• The licensee should evaluate the increased use of the plant PA announcement system to actively keep plant personnel aware of changing plant conditicn TechnicalSupportCenter(TSCl The TSC activation began upon declaration of the Alert, and the TSC was fully staffed within 45 minutes. It was manned, fully functional, and the staff well briefed on plant conditions when the Station Director (50) assumed command and contro All TSC personnel, upon arrival, began assigned tasks in a quiet, expeditious and professional manner. Status boards were effectively utilized, including those displaying significant events, plant conditions, environmental and maintenance activities. Trending was performed on seven important reactr.,r parameters. Particular attention was paid to containment aadiation levels, and TSC personnel were aware of 2000 R/hr as a trigger, point in further escalating to a General Emergency (CE) classificatio Good command and control was deolonsteated by the 50 throughout the exercise. He provided the TSC staff with periodic briefirgs and updates of plant activities to good effect. He also discussed priorities for various actions, e.g., equipment repairs, with the-S The TSC staff was actively assisting the S It was noted that, at times, the Operations Director was not aggressive in recommending actions to the SD, but would wait to be asked for nption . _.-_ ~ _ -_ - _ _ _ - _ ._ . _ _ _

.

Procedures and forms were used extensively. GSEP message forms (green copies) were collected and transcribed at the TSC. Typed copies were then available in a short period of time. Log-keeping was adeguately performed and accident reconstruction could have been accomplished in acceptable detai The TSC communicator was using an untitled form which definitely appears to have some merit. Although numerous forms can and are being used to manage accidents, these forms should be reviewed and proceduralized as necessary to formalize their us During the critical moments of the exercise, when the consideration of venting the reactor containment was being discussed, there was considerable confusion. As the TSC personnel were reviewing 3rocedure LOA-VP-03(R6), " Emergency Primary Containment Pressure Relief" which provides for venting of containment at 60 psi

- (per procedure LGA-ATWS-03[R1]), venting occurred at approximately 57 psi without approval. This was not due to operator action, but due to a scenario flaw. The scenario allowed no time variance on venting, as the data was pre programmed into the SPDS display Noise levels in the TSC were at an acceptable level. A habitability survey was )erformed expeditiously and a Continuous Air Monitor (CAM) was o) served to be in operatio The Technical staff demonstrated their knowledge and ingenuity while reviewing system lineups and in formulation of repair option Piping and Instrumentation (P&ID) drawings were well used and were made available from a library of drawing aperture card Communications between the staff, OSC, E0F and field teams appeared to be adequate. The Security Director conferred with the Dose Assessment personnel prior to determining an acceptable evacuation route. Also, while a failure of one field team radio was being diagnosed as a failed fuse and corrected, an alternate communication method of calling one field team via phone and relaying messages was discussed. Assembly and accountability was almost entirely simulated due to ongoing refueling operations of Unit 2. The absence of an adequate demonstration of assembly and accountability will be tracked as an Open Item (No. 50-373/87014-01; 50-374/87014-01).

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was adequate.

6

- . - - - - . . -. . - --- -- . ~ . . .-

. OperationsSupportCenter(OSC)

The OSC was activated, manned, and placed into operation expeditiously within 15 minutes after the CR had declared two

. notifications of Unusual Events (N0VEs), due to a Hydrogen Tank Farm explosion and high reactor coolant conductivity. The SE made a good

-

decision to establish the OSC early at the NOVE to enable him to better cope with the multiple emergencies in progress The logistics of the OSC included two separate rooms. One part of the OSC was located in the plant lunchroom, near the shift

!

engineer's office, and the other was a small room located across the hallway. The lunchroom was utilized as the Control Center and the small room was used as a staging / waiting are Throughout the exercise the OSC Director provided frequent and adequate briefings to the OSC staff. Status boards were quickly

'

setup and utilized. One status board was placed in the Control Center and one in the waiting area. Both boards were maintained adequately by one person designated by the OSC Director. These status boards were of a flip-chart type and only listed a chronology of significant events. There were no boards displaying plant

'

conditions, maintenance activities, or equipment status.

The OSC communicator did utilize a good plant status update for This form was the same form utilized by the TSC communicator.

) 0SC habitability surveys were conducted promptly and habitability was periodically assessed throughout the exercise. RAD / CHEM

'

personnel quickly arrived at the OSC and efficiently began organizing their equipment. Radiation survey meters, frisking stations, dose history and tracking were adequately set u Frisking stations were established in logical and ap3ropriate locations for OSC access control. It was observed tlat several

people failed to demonstrate proper whole body frisking techniques, some allowing the probe to touch their clothing and soles of the shoes, and some failing to frisk their face and hea Due to the lack of scenario magnitude, e.g., low levels of radiation and contamination, an adequate demonstration of the use of anti-contamination clothing was not observed. In plant teams documented their surveys, and survey maps were posted in the OS The survey maps were adequate, but were taped over the vending machines in an unorganized and cluttered fashion. As a result, it was sometimes difficult to find the most recent survey for an area.

.

_, . . _ - - - - - , - .. _ . . , - _

, _ , , . . - - - -

.

RAD / CHEM personnel adequately controlled task assignments and tracking through the use of a checklist review prior to dispatching in plant teams. This checklist included such items as dose rate, survey map review, expected duration (time), expected dose, type of task, personnel assigned to the task, time log, task location, dose a) proval and OSC Director review and signature. This was a well t1ought out checklist, and it was used well. However, this checklist utilized was not the approved )rocedural checklis A aroceduralized form, "0SC Task Tracking orm," Attachment C of LZP-1120-2 (Revision 1) March 6,1986, existed, but was not utilized. It was also noted that not all of the checklist items were filled in. There were no OSC Director signatures indicating review on both ongoing or completed task assignments. Although there was no signature on the form, it was apparent that the OSC Director was quite aware of the status of in plant teams and activitie All OSC personnel were accounted for by use of personnel lists from each division which were also used for the purpose of dose trackin This method was adeguate, but throughout the exercise it was difficult to determine who was a participant due to the lack of

" player" identificatio The OSC Director had good command and control of OSC activities. He was knowledgeable of his duties and responsibilities. It was apparent that the OSC Director was almost totally occupied assessing in plant activities. He had some assistance but lacked the aggressive support of his foremen. The OSC Director manages and supervises all activities dispatched from the OSC. Therefore, information should be automatically relayed to him of all activities in progress and their results, instead of his asking for status report Communications between OSC, CR, TSC, and in plant teams were generally adecuate. The OSC has three telephone communication lines, one decicated line to the CR and two regular lines. On several occasions the OSC experienced line difficulties which delayed information flow. Portable radios were used by in plant teams to maintain a communications link, but not all the teams were issued radios. The High Radiation Sampling System Team did not take a radio to the HRSS roo Throughout the exercise, no Public Address announcements were heard in the OSC, and it appeared that the PA speakers were inoperative in that area. All emergency updates were relayed via telephone communications from the C *

.

The designated communicator maintained an adequate communications log. The GSEP log, maintained by the OSC Director, was considered sufficient to allow for accident reconstructio Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was adequate; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:

• The licensee should evaluate the increased use of status boards for the OSC, e.g. , ec uipment status, maintenance status etc. ,

and evaluate a methoc in updating and organizing plant radiation survey map * The licensee should evaluate the formalized use and proceduralization of new forms as necessar * The licensee should evaluate and improve the effectiveness of emergency worker training on proper frisking technique d. High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS)

The HRSS team was dispatched from the OSC early after the onset of an ALERT condition (loss of a 125 V DC Bus and ATWS). The sampling team consisted of three individuals. One functioned as the primary olerator and another as an assistant. The third individual was a HlSS chemist, and he functioned as a supervisor and procedure reade The licensee adequately demonstrated the use of the HRSS under simulated post-accident conditions. However, the scope of the scenario was limited and it did not incorporate high radiation or possible airborne contamination conditions. Therefore, the scenario did not necessitate the team to adequately demonstrate the use of protective clothing or communications capability with respiratory protection equipment. This will be tracked as Open Item l No. 50-373/87014-02; 50-374/87014-02.

!

l low at the j Although onset of the theaccident, radiationanti-contamination levels were (per the scenario)

clothing and /or

) respiratory contingency. protection equipment should be taken along as a During the post-accident sampling activities, the HRSS team demonstrated adequate teamwork and procedural complianc The procedure LZP-1330-24 (Initial Sampling of Reactor Coolant and Containment Air Following Reactor Accidents) was formulated so that on the onset of an accident a complete HRSS sample was to be taken, e.g., diluted reactor coolant, stripped gas, hydrogen and

_ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _

-

.

containment air. Apparently, this one procedure, LZP-1330-24, must be com)leted even if only a diluted RCS liquid sample is neede When tie operators were questioned as to the existence of other procedures to allow se)arate sampling, they stated they were unaware of the procedures, suc1 as rocedure LZP-1330-25 (Sampling of Containment Air at the HRSS .

The HRSS team did not review the )rerequisites and 3recautions of the )rocedure at the OSC, but ratler did so at the iRSS room. Due to tie extreme length of the procedure (LZP-1330-24), in an actual event this could lead to unnecessary dose accumulatio All personnel demonstrated adequate familiarity with the HRSS panels. Communications with the OSC was periodically established using a regular telephone in the HRSS room. The telephone was unnecessarily located on the Liquid Samaling Panel (LSP) itsel This could lead to interference on the 'SP and unnecessary exposure

_

to the person using the telephone. The telephone should be relocated to be further away from the panels. The HRSS team relied solely on the phone communications for information, as there were no PA announcements, and the team did not have a radio. It was apparent that the information flow from the OSC to the HRSS team was inadequat The HRSS team was unaware of the upgrading of the emergency to a Site Area Emergency and General Emergenc Throughout the exercise, the HRSS chemist remained in positive control of the team's activitie The HRSS team demonstrated improved Health Physics practices compared to the last exercise. Even with the marked increase in

)erformance, several inconsistencies did occur. One operator used lis personal knife to cut apart the iodine particulate filte Another operator laid the procedural attachment sheet on top of a potentially contaminated syringe. The particulate filter was improperly placed upside down in it's plastic container for counting. The iroet side should be facing the detector. There was also some inconsistency in the use of protective gloves, touching items with and without gloves, indicating a lack of concern for aotential contamination spread. The above items depict the need for

)etter operator awareness for contamination control, and this was considered an Exercise Weakness. (No. 50-373/87014-03; 50-374/87014-03)

_ . - - _ _ ,

_ __ _ _ _ . __ _ _ _ _ _ _

-

.

In addition to the. Exercise Weakness above, the following items should be considered for_ improvement:

• The licensee should evaluate the need for the HRSS team to take along protective clothing and/or respiratory protection equipment to the HRSS room as a contingency against possibly increasing radioactive contamination levels or airborne concentration * The licensee should evaluate the use of procedures LZP-1330-24, LZP-1330-25, LZP-1330-26 and direct HRSS teams to review procedural prerequisites and precautions at the OSC prior to dispatching, to minimize dos * The licensee should evaluate a method to improve communication and information flow to the HRSS team during sampling activities, e. Offsite Radiological Monitoring Teams No NRC observers were assigned to offsite radiological monitoring teams for this exercis f. Emergency Operations Facility-The E0F was activated in a timely manner at approximately 1016 hours0.0118 days <br />0.282 hours <br />0.00168 weeks <br />3.86588e-4 months <br />, and personnel began their tasks in a professional manne Status boards were filled in as data became available. Good use was which were updated frequently. The E0F was made providedof with status boards,lity surveys, dosimeters and had electronic habitabi

-

surveillance activated in a timely manne The E0F Emergency Director was clearly in charge of the facility and provided the entire E0F staff with periodic updates on the emergency status. The EOF Emergency Director also held periodic meetin his immediate staff to assess the overall accident situation.gsGood with information flow was observed during these meetings. It was noted that some important scenario events ( such as the cessation of containment venting) took place during these meetings, and consequently were not immediately communicated to the E0F Manage Discussion indicated that a procedure for )assing on important information during such meetings existed, aut was not utilized.

.

The noise level in the E0F was low. The Emergency Director used a microphone / speaker to make all announcements which were clearly heard by all E0F staff.

.

The EOF log and recordkeeping was very good, and would have allowed detailed reconstruction of E0F actions during the accident.

11

. - . - - - - - , . .

- . - - - - . ~ . - _ - - - - . _ . -

.

The Emergency Exercise Controllers implemented their roles in an effective manner and no prompting was observe NARS forms were communicated to the state promptly after each change in the recommended protective action The Offsite field team coordinator had information on the cumulative radiation exposures of the field team members (exposure data for the year,, quarter,andweek). Also,cumulativeexposures(forthe exercise) were obtained from team members and the data was properly logge The advisory Support Manager recognized that a release would occur at1030 hours (perprocedures),andrequestedoffsitedose projectionssothatprotectiveactionrecommendationscouldbemad The Health Physics Director announced that environmental samples would be brought in and that the counting lab would be classified as a radiation zone due to the potential for radioactive contaminatio The discussions concerning whether to upgrade the protective action recommendations were goo These discussions were based on dose rate projections for 2 and 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> releases as well as consideration of plant conditions that would require an u,pgrade of recommendation Some of the environmental team data (obtained at approximately 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br />) was misinterpreted. The field team data was interpreted to meanthateitheranunmonitoredreleasewasingrogressorthata large unmonitored )uff had been released. The large puff" was later believed to 3e confirmed by subsequent field team data (or interpretation of later field team data). However, no puff had been released. The apparent misinterpretation of data was primarily caused by changing wind directions (the timing of samples was also involved), and more experience in interpreting this type of data may be necessar There were times when the status boards were not up to date, in particular, the board labeled "10 mile radius map". The 10 mile radius map showed " shelter" of the three affected sectors from 0-2 and 2-5 milesA whereas it should have been " shelter" 0-2 miles (360 degrees) and shelter" the 3 affected sectors 2-5 miles. At 1337 hours0.0155 days <br />0.371 hours <br />0.00221 weeks <br />5.087285e-4 months <br /> the board had correct recommendations but incorrect times e.g., 1020 hours0.0118 days <br />0.283 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.8811e-4 months <br /> should have been 1137 hour0.0132 days <br />0.316 hours <br />0.00188 weeks <br />4.326285e-4 months <br /> Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was adequat *

. Exercise Scenario and Control

~The exercise scenario was adequate. Although the scenario included multiple eguipment failures, High Radiation Sampling Team, and meteorological changes, it did not incorporate high inplant radiation levels or potential airborne contamination to require utilization of protective clothing or respiratory protection equipment. The exercise did not incorporate assembly and accountability due to ongoing Unit 2 refueling activities. The exercise escalated to the General Emergency classificatio Minor scenario problems were noted:

• The control room needed more time to assimilate the initial conditions presented. The SE was still inquiring as to the " time clock" associated with the Division 1 125 VDC cross-tie when the Hydrogen explosion occurre * Better identification is needed for players, controllers, and evaluator * Some confusion resulted from not having a controller at the lab where an initial conductivity sample was requested. As a result, an actual sample was taken, and actual results reported. The sample had to be retaken with a controller present

• As noted in the TSC Section. Containment venting was programmed (to the minute) into the scenario, and caused some confusion when initiated, and terminated, without approval. Scenario actions should have more flexible timeframes to ensure realism. An alternativeisacontingencymessagejustprecedingtheprogrammed action, such as "you have considered venting and approved venting to start at 9:30 a.m. (this action is taken to preserve the scenario timeline)".

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptabl . Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview the day after the exercise on April 30, 1987, with the representatives denoted in Section 1. The NRC Team Leader discussed the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee was also asked if any of the information discussed during the exit was proprietary. The licensee responded that none of the information was proprietar ' Attachments: LaSalleCountyStation1987ExerciseObjectivesandScopeofParticipation LaSalle County Station 1987 Exercise Scenario Timeline and Summary

,

.

.

. .

LA SALLE COUNTY STATION GSEP EXERCISE April 29, 1987 08JECTIVQ PRIMARY OBJECTIVE:

Demonstrate the capability to implement the Connonwealth Edison Generating Station's Emergency Plan in cooperation with the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents to protect the public in the event of a major accident at the La Salle County Statio SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES 1) Incident Assessment and Classification Demonstrate the capability to assess the accident conditions, to determine which Emergency Action Level (EAL)

has been reached, and to classify the accident level correctly in accordance with GSE (Control Room, TSC, and EOF.)

2) Notification and Connunication Demonstrate the capability to notify the principal offsite O

-

or9anizatioas via NAas within is mia tes of classification. (Control Room, TSC and EOF.) Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC within one hour of the initial incident occurence. (Control Room, TSC or EOF.) Demonstrate the capability to contact organizations that v;uld normally assist in an emergency, but are not participating in this exercise (i.e., Sargent & Lundy, General Electric, INPO.) (TSC and EOF.) Demonstrate the ability to notify state agencies with hourly plant status followup information. (TSC and EOF)

3) Radioloaical Assessment Demonstrate the capability to calculate offsite dose projections. (TSC and EOF) Demonstrate the capability of Environmental Field Teams to conduct field radiation surveys, collect air, liquid, vegetation and soil samples when needed. (Environs Team.)

O

~

'

(2846A/1/kam)

,

_= _

.

.

. .

LA SALLE COUNTY STATION GSEP EXERCISE

<3 s1 April 29, 1987 08JECTIVES 3) Radiological Assessment (cont'd) Demonstrate the capability to conduct in-plant radiation protection activitie (OSC/ Health Physics Teams.) Demonstrate the ability to collect and conduct analysis of air and liquid samples on-site via HRSS. (OSC/ Rad. Chem.) Demonstrate the ability to perform calculations with radiological survey information, trend this information, and make appropriate recommendations concerning protective actions utilizing procedure E024 and table 6.3.1 and figure 6.3-1. (TSC and EOF)

l 4) Emeraency Facility Manning Demonstrate the ability to activate the emergency organization and staff the nuclear station Emergency  ;

Response Facilities in accordance with procedures, t (Control Room, TSC, EOF and OSC/ General Plant.) With the limitation that the refuel outage is completed by the Exercise date, demonstrate the capability to provide timely and accurate on-site personnel accountability in accordance with procedure (TSC)

5) Emergency Direction and Control

, Demonstrate the ability of the Directors to manage the emergency organizations in the implementation of the GSE (TSC and EOF)

6) Recovery and Reentry Demonstrate the capability of the emergency response personnel to identify requirements, programs, policies governing damage assessments and implementation of procedures for recovery and reentr (TSC and EOF)

!

l ()

(2846A/2/kam)

- - , . . , . _ -

- _- - - . _ _ . - - _ . - - - __

- _ - -

.

.

. .

SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION ,

!

(} Commonwealth Edison will participate in the La Salle County Station exercise by activating the on-site emergency response organization and the EOF as appropriate, subject to limitations that may become necessary to provide for safe efficient operation of the Station and other CECO nuclear generating station Activation of the TSC and other on-site participants will be conducted on a real time basis during the daytime hour The shift on '

duty will receive the initial scenario information and respond accordingl The Nuclear Duty Person and the balance of the Recovery Group will be prepositioned close to the La Salle Station EOF to permit use of Recovery Group personnel from distant location The Corporate Command Center will not be activate The La Salle County Station, April 29, 1987, Exercise is a daytime event to test the integrated capability of the Commonwealth Edison emergency preparedness plan and to assure adequate resources to verify the capability to respond to a simulated emergenc Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the capability to make contact with contractors, whose assistance would be required by the simulated }.

accident situation, but will not actually incur the expense of using '

. g--

contractor services to simulate emergency response except as prearranged -

\ specifically for the exercis Commonwealth Edison will arrange to provide actual transportation and communication support in accordance with existing agreements to the extent specifically prearranged for the exercise. Commonwealth Edison will provide unforeseen actual assistance only to the extent the resour;es are available and do not hinder normal operation of the compan ;

,

.

'

()

(2846A/3/kam)

. - - - - -- _ - -

.

.- --. - _ _ - _ _ .

. - . - _ - ._ . . *

. LA SaLLE COUNTY STATION 1987 EXERCISE TIME LINES OF EVENTS

. .

'

Ground unusual * Site General Rules Event A1;rt Emergency Emergency Recovery T:minate l I (45 min.) I (60 min.) l (75 min.) I (225 min.) I (60 min.) l I I I I I I l l 1

~' l i I I I I I I I I (VPrior T=0 I T = 45 1 = 60 1 = 105 1 = 100 T = 255 1 = 405 1 = 465 to (0730) I (0615) (0840) (0915) (1030) (1145) (1415) (1515)

1 . -5 I t = 30 l I"3" i I I I To I (0800) l I I I I i 10 l I I I I I I Time i I I I I I I Ja,

' I Alert Alert I EAL f4 I EAL EAL EAL #15 EAL #15 I I #12/14 #13)2 I I I Release EAL #14 Release Pathway initiated Teminated Samary of Events:

Prior to i = -5 * Ground Rules discusse T = -5 * U-2 is in Refuel with all fuel removed from reactor

• U-1 is at 73% power, derated due to leaking fuel rods

• Division !!! ECCS (HPCS) and the PORFP are DOS

• Division 1 125VDC cross-tied to U-2, carrying both units T=0 *H2 tank fam explosion: This is an U.E. per E.A.L. #4 ,

T = 30 * Reactor water conductivity >10 unho; this is an U.E. per E.A.L. #14 i = 45 * 125VDC Bus 111Y trips and cannot be re-energized; this is an Alert per E.A.L. #12/1 T = 60 * Station air conpressor trips and control rods start to drift in

• The reactor scrams on 3X nonnal Main Stemilne Radiation, however several rods fall to scram and the reactor is not fully shutdow * Division !! 125VDC ADS Logic Power Supply is shorted out and TRIPS from a startled instrument mechanic who heard the reactor scr = 90 * SRV "U" sticks open and additionally has a leak in it's talipipe; this causes reactor steam to be relieved into both the suppression pool and the drywell simultaneousl * Drywell pressure and radiation level increas = 105 * Drywell radiation increases to >400 R/ hour; this is a S.E. per E.A.L. #1 * Stand-by Liquid Control injection is proceeding slower than desig T = 165 * Debris from the H2 explosion has damaged the U-2 CY Tank; the tank is leaking onto the ground and into a stonn sewe = 180 * Drywell radiation increases to 2000 R/ Hour; this is an G.E. per E.A.L. #1 * The release is initiated when the drywell is emergency vented to preserve it's integrit T = 255 * SRV "U" closed; the release pathway is terminate T = 405 * A 2 week time jmp has occured.

• Exit General Emergency and begin the Recovery Phrase T = 465 * Teminate the Exercise (2852A/4)

. __. - . __ _ _ _ _ _

_- -_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - - . - - - - - _ - - _ - _ - -

'

.

. .

. .

'

LA SALLE EXERCISE APRIL 29, 1987 -1

' ~I NARRATIVE SUMARY l INITIAL CONDITIONS (PRIOR TO T=0) T=0 = 0730 l

Unit I is operating at 025 MWE, derated by 305 MWE due to high off gas levels J caused by leaking fuel rods. Unit II is shutdown in Refuel mode with all fuel i removed from the reactor vessel. The Division-II ECCS pumps were returned to service on midnights, following motor oil changeout. The HPCS pump has been taken 005 to change its oi Division-1125VDC is cross-tied to Unit II and

- carrying both units to facilitate a battery discharge test on Unit II. U-1

"CY" Tank usage has been high for the last several days. Tech Staff efforts to locate the leak (s) have proven fruitless. The MORFP is 00S and construction is cleaning the motor winding UNUSUAL EVENT T=0 to T=45 (0730 - 0815)

,

While attempting to changeout hydrogen trucks at the hydrogen tank farm, a relief valve lifts causing a hydrogen fire. The driver and Equipment Operator run to safety, however, the hydrogen tank farm explodes, shattering windows in f the Service Building and damaging the doors to the radwaste truckbay. This is an unusual Event per EAL #4. Reactor water conductivity begins a sharp r increase and by T=30 the conductivity is at 10.5 yaho. This is an Unusual l Event per EAL #14 due to Technical Specification 3.4.4.a.3 and requires the i unit to be in Hot Shutdown in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Cold Shutdown as rapidly as the l

'

'

O cooldown rate permits. Conductivity continues to increase and MSL radiation levels also begin to trend upward,

r e

! ALERT T=45 to T=105 (0815 - 0915)

, '

'

ems ground a terminal of the U-2 Division I battery while preparing for the discharge test. The current surge trips the feed breaker to 111Y, PCIS Outboard Isolation Groups II-VII occur. The breaker cannot be reset. This

.

.

i

constitutes an Alert per EAL #12/14 and a Tech Spec 3.0.3 shutdown is '

!

required. The U-1 station air compressor trips, causing a loss of instrument t 4 air to the plant. Several control rods begin to drift in. The reactor scrams

!

on MSL High Radiation. An IM in the vicinity of the HCus is startled by the l

noise of the scram, shorts some wires on a switch he is working on and 4 disables Division II ADS. A group of control rods near the center of the core does not fully insert, an Alert per EAL #13)2. Reactor water level is i

decreasing, pressure is being controlled by SRV cycling. Drywell pressure and radiation levels are slowly increasin l ll

O (2852A/2)

--___._ _ _ ___.._ _ _ *

.

. .

SITE EMERGENCY T=105 to T-180 (0915 - 1030)

Drywell radiation levels are > 400 R/ hour and increasing, a Site Emergency per O EAL #15. Level decreases below -129". '8" and 'C' RHR pumps trip and cannot be restarted. Investigation of the RHR pumps reveal no oil present in the .

upper motor bearings and a burnt smell in the room. Some level indication is  !

lost, drywell pressure and radiation levels continue to increase. A guard reports a leak on the Unit 2 CY tank, punctured by a piece of the H2 tank farm. RCTs report a large amount of some organic substance in the U-l waste sample tan i GENERAL EMER6ENCY T=180 to T=405 (1030 - 1415)

The drywell must be emergency vented to preserve integrity, therefore a controlled radiation release begin A General Emergency per EAL #15 exists due to Containment Radiation Level

>2000 R/ Hour The radiation release continues, maintaining a constant brimary containment pressure until the stuck-open SRV closes. The release is terminated when  !

drywell pressure begins to decrease. 58LC begins to inject, causing reactor power and pressure to decrease. Water level begins to be restored by CR0 flow to the RP lily is restored, enabling Div. I ADS and Div. I ECCS. Reactor pressure drops to the shut-off head of the condensate booster pump RECOVERY T=405 to T=465 - DAYS LATER (2 WEEKS LATER)

A time jump occurs. The plant conditions are stabilizing. The reactor water level is being maintained at normal level, the reactor is fully shutdown due to SBLC Injection. TOC chemistry problems are under control, and containment >

radiation levels are decaying of .

'

O f (2852A/3) i

'

- ,,-- -- .-.-..-_ ----_-- - ,.,.--,,. -_,--- ._..- .--,- - .-,_.--- - - -...-.- ----_- -.- - - . . .,,--