IR 05000373/1987018
| ML20235S786 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 07/08/1987 |
| From: | Ring M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235S699 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.E.4.2, TASK-2.K.3.18, TASK-TM 50-373-87-18, 50-374-87-18, IEIN-87-012, IEIN-87-12, NUDOCS 8707210775 | |
| Download: ML20235S786 (13) | |
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O'.S.NUCb?ARREGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-373/87018(DRP); 50-374/87018(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374 Licenses No. NPF-11; NPF-18 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company
Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL Inspection Conducted:
May 19 through June 22, 1987 Inspectors:
M..J. J.ordan
R. Kopriva H
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J.
Malloy I
Approved By:
M. A. Ring, Chie 7-M[
Reactor Projects ection IC Date Inspection Summary Inspection on May 19 through June 22, 1987 (Reports No. 50-373/87018(DaP);
50-374/87018(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection conducted by resident inspectors of licensee actions on previous inspection findings; operational safety; surveillance; maintenance; training; Licensee Event Reports; unit trips; design changes and urMfications; NRR visit; regional request; TMI aci,!on plan requirement' followup; containment integrated leak rate test; information notice fo'llowup;' local leak rate testing; 50.54(f) meeting; and outages.
Results:
Of the sixteen areas inspected, one violation was identified (Paragraph 1 - failure to perform a 50.59 review).
The licensee completed the Unit 2 ref.;aling outage which started on January 3,1987.
The error-free restart program of Unit 2 was very successful with no personnel errors.
This was accomplished with aggressive management attention to the restart program.
8707210775 870714 PDR ADDCK 05000373 G
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l DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)
- +G. J. Diederich, Manager, LaSalle Station i
+R. D. Bishop, Services Superintendent
+J. C. Renwick, Production Superintendent
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D. Berkman, Assistant Superintendent. Work Planning
- W. Huntington, Assistant Superintendent, 9perations
- +P. Manning, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services
- +T. Hammerich, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- +W. Sheldon, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance J. Atchley, Operating Engineer
+D. A. Brown, Quality Assurance Supervisor
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- D. Enright, Quality Assurance Engineer
- M. Richter, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- R. Crawford, Training Supervisor
+C. M. Allen, Licensing Administrator
+D. J.. Scott, Nuclear Safety Division
+R. M. Clark, Quality Control Supervisor
+L. H. Lauterbach, Nuclear Safety Supervisor
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+L. R. Aldrich, Rad Chem Supervisor
+N. Kalivianakis, General Manager, BWRs
+K. Graesser, General Manager, PWRs D. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC}
- +M. J. Jordan, Senior Resident Inspector
- +R, A. Kopriva, Resident Insnector j
+W. L. Forney, Chief, Branch 3
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+M. A. Ring, Section Chief, Branch IC l
- Denotes personnel attending the exit interview on June 23, 1987.
+ Denotes those attending the 50.54(f) meeting held at the site on
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June 18, 1987.
Additional licensee technical and administrative personnel were contacted by the inspectors during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection findings (92701)
(Closed) Violation (373/87004-01):
This Notice of Violation was issued because, during the Unit 1 Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT), the IB21-F065A(B) valve was closed even though it was required to be open i
or the line vented.
A similar valve discrepancy occurred when valve
1E21-F068 was closed even though it was required to be open or the line vented in the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) steam exhaust system.
The inspectors verified that the valve lineup for the Unit 2 ILRT had the l
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i line' drained and vented outboard'of the outboard isolaticn valve'for the
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feedwater system and the'RCIC steam exhaust system.' This item is considered closed.
-(Closed)' Unresolved Item (373/87031-01(DRP)): This' unresolved item concerned a modification where the drywell ventilation system dampers were' wired open without a proper 10 CFR 50.59 review.
The inspectors determined that a Technical Specification change was not warranted due to the modification, however, a proper 50.59 review should have been performed and was not.
This item will now be issued as a Notice of Violation (373/87018-01(DRP)).
(Closed) SER #5 (374/81-00-21) (License Condition 2.C.11):
Prior to startup after the first refueling outage, the licensee installed a second level.of undervoltage protection on Divisions 1 and 2.
(Closed) SER #5 (374/81-00-22) (License Condition 2.C.12 (A & B)):
a.
The. controls' and monitoring instrumentation were removed from the engine and engine skid, except instruments qualified for..this location.
The non qualified control and monitoring instruments were. installed on a free standing floor mounted panel and located on a vibration free floor area.
b.
A heavy duty turbocharger gear drive assembly was installed on the-
' diesel. generator.
(Closed) SER #5 (374/81-00-25):
Modified the diesel / generator lube oit
. system per NUREG/CR-0660.
'One Notice of. Violation was identified in this area.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
The inspector ooserved control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period.
The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of Unit I and 2 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
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During the month of May 1987, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the following systems to verify operability:
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. Unit 2 2A and.28 Diesel' Generators-Unit 2 Standby Gas Treatment System Unit 2. Standby Liquid. Control System-Unit 2.RCIC Systein b.
On M'ay 28, 1987, at 11:59 p'm.-(CDT), with Unit 1 operating at
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approximately 59% power, the licensee was performing operating surveillance.LOS-TG-WI, " Turbine Generator Bypass Valve Cycling."
At this time, the IB Turbine Driven Reactor Feed Pump (TDRFP)
controls failed downscale. When the IB TDRFP ramped rapidly downscale and did not trip, the
'A' TDRFP did.not respond' fast-enough to prevent.the. reactor water level from' decreasing, and the reactor scrammed on low reactor water level. An investigation of the reactor feed pump controls evealed nothing pertinent t'o the
'B' TDRFP ramping downscale.
Some linkage for the TDRFP was found out of tolerance.and corrected.
Also, it was discovered that
" keying" a two way. radio in the immediate area of the TDRFP causes the feedwater controller to ramp downscale.
No other problems were discovered.
c.
On June 2,1987, at 9:20 p.m. (CDT), the control rocm ventilation-system isolated and started the emergency makeup system due to the tape breaking on the 'B' ammonia detector.
The tape was_ replaced and within 30 minutes the control room ventilation was restored to normal.
No further. action was warranted on this event.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation-(61726)
The inspector observed Technical Specification required surveillance.
testing and verified for actual activities observed that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test
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instrumentation was, calibrated, that Limiting Conditions for Operation
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management personnel.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following test activities:
LIS-NB-402 IRM Scram / Rod Block Functional LOS-DG-M2 1A Diesel Generator Operability Test LOS-FP-W2 Diesel Fir'e Pump Weekly Operational Check LTS-900-8 Operation of High/ Low Pressure Water Leak Rate Test Rig LTS-1100-4 Scram Insertion Times LST-87-101 Leak Rate Testing of 2E12-F042C i
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a.
On May 22, 1987, a licensee individual opened a door to a breaker cabinet and the vibration of opening the door caused a relay to trip.
This caused the loss of power to the bus which fed the Division III electrical system.
The unit had been in a refueling outage since January 3,1987, and the Division III diesel was out of service (005) and, therefore, it did nut automatically start.
The Station Auxiliary Transformer (SAT) feed was restored and no other systems actuated due to them being 005.
b.
On June 2, 1987, at 10:30 a.m. (CDT), while performing surveillance LIS-RD-301, " Scram Discharge Volume Hi Rod Block," the instrument mechanic (IM) found the low side instrument stop valve (IC11-F104)
on switch IC11-N013E (SDV Hi Level Rod Block) in the closed position.
This valve was supposed to be open.
The instrument mechanic immediately notified his foreman and the shift engineer.
The shift engineer instructed the IM foreman to check all other similar valves for proper valve lineups.
All other similar valves were in their correct positions.
LIS-RD-301 was being performed as a requirement for followup of a reactor scram from pressure.
Unit I scrammed at 11:59 p.m. on May 28, 1987, following a feedwater transient.
LIS-RD-301 is normally performed monthly. The last time the surveillance was performed was May 20, 1987.
The IM was instructed to complete the surveillance which was accomplished satisfactorily at 1:35 p.m. on May 31, 1987.
An investigation was held pertaining to the previous surveillance and the possibility that the instrument valve was inadvertently left closed.
If the valve had been left closed, the alarm / annunciator would not have cleared.
A review of the alarm printout from May 20, 1987, indicated that the surveillance was done properly and the valve left in its proper position.
The valve was checked to see if the valve seat leaked.
If the valve had been closed, but the valve seat leaked, the alarm in the control room would have cleared. The valve
was tested and did not leak.
This instrument valve was not lock wired due to ALARA concerns, and the valve not being readily accessible for manipulator..
The procedure states not to lock wire the instrument valve.
The licensee has concluded their investigation and has not come up with any possible date of when the valve was closed except that it occurred somewhere between May 20, 1987, and June 2,1987.
Persons performing surveillance and/or second verifications were questioned with no evidence of them positioning the valve in the closed position.
The licensee inspected 50 similar valves per unit for proper lineup.
All valves inspected were in their proper position.
Also, the instrument valve in question is now lock wired.
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Security 'had also participated in'the licensee's: investigation of this event.
They inspected the area where the valve is located, considered the accessibility of the valve and which persons had-access to the area, and reviewed personnel files of the people that had worked on the valve.
There was no evidence of malicious behavior from security's inspection.
The licensee _does not intend to pursue the issue further.
Future surveillance will be monitored for proper valve lineups.-
No violctions or deviations were identified in this area.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)~
l Station maintenance activities listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
During the inspection period, the inspector observed portions of the following maintenance activity:
Unit 2 Control Rod Drives The following observations were noted:
a.
During the hydrostatic test performed on Unit 2 on May 20, 1987, it was noted that one of the Control Rod Drives (CRD) (no. 14-15) which.
had been rebuilt and reinstalled into the Unit 2 reactor was leaking.
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On June 5,1987, the inspector witnessed the control rod drive removal from the reactor.
The reason the CRD was leaking was that the large "0" ring gasket had not seated well and was not capable of sealing.
No obvious damage to the "0" ring was found.
All three
"0" rings were replaced and the CRD installed in the reactor.
As noted in Inspection Report 373/87016 and 374/87016, there had been several problems occurring with the CRD work performed during the Unit 2 refuel outage.
The leaking CRD was one of these problems.
The licensee has implemented corrective measures ranging from procedure changes to having a vendor representative on site during CRD work in order to alleviate the problems encountered on the CRD work.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
6.
Training (41400)
The inspectors reviewed the training conducted on the procedure for i
maintenance and inspection of metal clad breakers recommended by
There were no records as to who received the I
training.
The inspector held a discussion with the mar.ter electrician
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r and one of the electrical foreman.
The foreman indicated he was the person to walk the individuals through the procedure to assure that proper maintenance was done on the breakers.
The workers were contracted employees.
The licensee foreman was the individual who periodically oversaw the contract worker to assure quality in the maintenance being performed.
Since he trained the individuals, he knew who could and who could not work on the breakers.
The inspector indicated that, without proper documentation of the training conducted and who received the training, when the electrical foreman was absent from the site no other individual would know who is or who is not authorized to do breaker maintenance.
The licensee agreed to look into documentation of this training.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Licensee Event Reports (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and retiew of records, the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to' determine that deportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical
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Specifications.
(Clc, sed) 373/87010-01 - Automatic depressurization system low level confirmed switch set point found out of tolerance due to set point drift.
Level switch LS-1821-N0388 was replaced and the new switch was calibrated to within allowable tolerance and placed in service.
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(Closed) 374/87012-00 - Bus 243 4.16 KV feedbreaker auto trip due to failure of degraded voltage relay access door latch.
The latch was sticking'and when the door finally opened, the resulting vibration caused the contacts of the degraded voltage relay to close, tripping the 4.16 KV feedbreaker.
The door latch was repaired.
(Closed) 374/87011-00 - Residual heat removal pump minimum flow bypass differential pressure switch found out of tolerar.ce due to set point drift.
The old switch was replaced with a new switch on May 5, 1987, and
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the old switch sent to the manufacturer for disassembly and inspection.
(Closed) 373/87018-00 - Control room HVAC engineered safety feature
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actuation due to broken ammonia detector chemcassette tape.
The magnets, which hold and rotate the take-up spool in the tape atsembly mechanism, were found weak.
Preventive maintenance was performed and the detector returned to service.
(Closed) 374/87007-00 - Group II isolation due to relay failure.
The primary containment high pressure isolation relay failed resulting in closure of the reactor buildings closed cooling water and primary containment chill water systems' outboard isolation valves.
The relay was replaced prior to the unit startup.
N9 violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
Unit Trips (93702)
a.
At approximately 11:59 p.m. (CDT) on May 28, 1987, with Unit 1 at 59% power, while conducting operating surveillance LOS-TG-W1,
" Turbine Generator Bypass Valve Cycling," the 'B' turbine driven reactor feed pump (TDRFP) controls failed downscale. When the
'B' TDRFP ramped rapidly downscale and did not trip, the 'A'
TDRFP did not respond fast enough to prevent the reactor water level from decreasing and the reactor scrammed on low reactor water level.
All systems operated as expected. Preliminary indication shows that the Static-0-Ring level switches operated within their setpoint range. The unit was expected to be down for approximately 4-5 days.
The licensee planned to replace the 'A'
reactor recirculation (RR) pump seals, work on the 'A' RR pump flow control valve, and some other minor drywell work.
While attempting to go to Cold Shutdown, the licensee had trouble opening the inboard Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling valve (1E12-F009).
The valve was manually moved off its seat, and then the valve worked properly.
b.
The licensee's original plans during the 4-5 day outage were to replace a leaking 'A' recirculation pump seal, fix the problem with the feedwater control system and start up.
Subsequent to the scram, the licensee was unable to close the 'A' recirculation pump discharge valve.
This prevented the licensee from replacing the seals on the ' A' recirculation purrp because they could not isolate the pump.
Therefore, the licensee elected to start a 90-100 day outage on Unit 1 to fix the 'A' recirculation pump seals, the
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recirculation pump discharge valve, the 'B' recirculation pump, replace a limitorque operator on the inboard shut down cooling isolation valve, and other minor work.
Unit 1 startup is presently scheduled for August 31, 1987.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Design Changes and Modifications (37700)
On May 29, 1987, at 10:16 a.m. (CDT), while performing a surveillance test on a newly installed modification on the Unit 2 Division II leak detection system, the unit received one-half of a Group 1 isolation. The unit was preparing for the Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT) and because of this the only system actuation to take place was the closing of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling inboard isolation valve (2E12-F009).
A technician was preparing to install a switchable jumper in the Division II leak detection cabinet to perform the modification test when he accidentally grounded the jumper, blowing a fuse on the Division II leak detection system, causing the Group I isolation.
The fuse was replaced, the valve line up re-established, and the shutdown cooling system restarted by 10:25 a.m..
No violations or deviations were identified.
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10.
MRR Visit (947021
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On June 17, 1987, Mr. Dennis Crutchfield, Director, Division of Reactor
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Projects - III/IV/V and Special Projects, and members of his staff held a meeting with the licensee at the LaSalle site.
The purpose of the meeting was for Mr. Crutchfield and his. staff to introduce themselves to the LaSalle plant management staff and to explain their positions as j
a result of the NRC organizational changes.
The licensee presented an j
overview of the plant staffing, operational history and site goals.
j Mr. Crutchfield's visit was concluded with a control room and plant tour
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conducted by the licensee and a short meeting with the resident inspectors pertaining to headquarters / regional communications and plant operations.
11.
Regional Request (92701)
In March 1986, Region III, Division of Reactor Projects forwarded a memorandum dated March 4, 1986, from Robert L. Eaer, Chief, Engineering and Generic Communication Branch to all the Division Directors of Reactor Projects.
The subject of the memorandum was " Graver RWCU Filter Demineralized Control." The issue concerned Region I identifying a problem with Reactor Water Cleanup Unit (RWCU) filter demineralize 2rs supplied by Ecodyne, Graver Water Division, as a potential generic item.
The design deficiency noted in the Graver automatic controller programs results in high system pressure being applied to low pressure precoat system piping.
This condition has caused radiological problems from reactor coolant and resin spills at Suscuehanna and Limerick.
In response to the above events, Graver transmitted proposed hardware r.hanges to its system users (Hope Creek, LaSalle, WNP-2, Hatch, Susquehanna, and Limerick).
The char.ges, reflected in supplied markup wiring diagrams, allow for isolation of the precoat system before high pressure is applied.
The licensee has initiated a modification for each unit (Unit 1 Mod Number 1-1-86-082, Unit 2 Mod Number 1-2-86-086) to wire the automatic controller in accordance with the manufacturer recommendation to prevent overpressurization of the precoat system piping.
This is considered to be an open item (373/87018-02; 374/87018-01(DRP)) and is considered opened and closed in this report.
One open item was identified in the review of this area.
12.
TMI Action Plan Requirement Followup (25565)
Closed (0 pen Item 374/81-00-04c):
TMI Item II.K.3.180.
SER #5 License Condition 2.C.18D i-iii.
Modification of Automatic Depressurization System Logic - Feasibility for Increased Diversity for Some Event Sequences.
Prior to startup after the first refueling outage, the licensee shall:
(i)
Install modifications to the automatic depressurization system described in the licensee's letter dated July 1, 1983.
The final circuit diagrams and an analysis of the bypass timer time
delay was submitted for NRC staff review and approval prior to I
installation.
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Incorporate into the plant abnormal procedures the usage of the inhibit switch; and (iii)
Modify the Technical Specifications to provide for the bypass l
timer and manual inhibit switch.
Closed (0 pen Item 374/81-00-58):
TMI Item II.E.4.2.(6) SER #5 License Condition 2.C.8.
Containment Isolation System.
Prior to startup after the first refueling outage, the licensee replaced the eight 26-inch and two 8-inch vent and purge isolation valves with valves that can close in 10 seconds or less and that do not require AC power to cicse.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
13.
Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT) (70313)
The inspector followed portions of the ILRT which was performed on Unit 2.
Portions of velve lineups for the following systems were verified correct to ensure that no fluid could enter the containment and that s
proper venting was provided or penalties were taken.
Systems:
Feedwater Residual Heat Removal Reactor Water Cleanup Hydrogen Recombiner High Pressure Core Spray Drywell Pneumatic Nitrogen Supply Conta nment Monitoring i
Reactor Containment Isolation Cooling The inspector witnessed portions of the pressurization, stabilization and the ILRT to assure proper data was being taken and abnormalities that were identified were properly corrected.
The test results will be reviewed by a regional inspector and the results documented in a future inspection report.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14.
Information Notice Followup (92701)
For the IE Information Notice listed below, the inspector verified that the Information Notice was received by licensee management and reviewed for its applicability to the facility and appropriate corrective actions were taken.
(Closed) IE Notice 87-12:
Potential Problems with Metal Clad Circuit Breakers, General Electric Type AKF-2-25.
The licensee incorporated the NRC recommendations provided in the Information Notice into a station procedure for maintenance of the metal clad circuit breakers.
The licensee also trains the individuals on the work before they are allowed to work on ',he breakers.
(See Paragraph 6).
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15.
Local Leak Rate Testing (61720)
The inspector observed testing, reviewed records and independently i
verified calculations concerning the local leak rate program.
The inspector indeper 1ently verified the acceptability of the test results.
The inspector verified that penetration boundaries and isolation valves had been local leak rate cested at the required frequency since the previous integrated leak rate test.
The sum of the local leak rates for all boundaries and valves subjected to local leak rate tests met the acceptance criteria.
The local leak rate procedures were reviewed and found to utilize approved methods for testing penetration boundaries and isolation valves. The test equipment utilized during the local leak rate tests observed was within calibration.
During this inspection period, the inspector observed the following valve being local leak rate tested:
2E12-F042C Also, witnessed was the LLRT on the Unit 2 drywell head using LTS-100-15,
" Type 'B' Local Leak Rate Test."
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
16.
50.54(f) Neeting (30702)
On June 18, 1987, a meeting was hela at the LaSalle site between NRC Region III management and Commonwealth Edison management to discuss the progress the station had made concerning the 50.54(f) letter that was issued to the licensee by Region III on November 22, 1985.
Attendees are identified in Paragraph 1 of this report.
The licensee reviewed the status of the commitments made to resolve long outstanding issues at the site such as reactor water cleanup system isolation, feedwater control at low power, and RHR service water pump failures.
The actions associated with the commitments have been accomplished and the prcblems resolved.
The licensee then reviewed the improvements made in regulatory issues such as high radiation doors being left open, large backlog of procedure changes, control room annunciators, and engineered safety featero actuations.
All parameters that the licensee monitors to indicate improvements in regulatory performance showed a positive trend.
The overall regulatory performance of the station since 1985 has been in a positive direction.
The meeting was adjourned with a caution from the NRC to continue in the improved performance, and a statement that the 50.54(f) letter will be reviewed by regional management for possible removal.
No violations or deviations wero identified in this area.
17. Outages (71707)
a.
On May 28, 1987, the Unit I reactor scrammed and the licensee elected to start their recirculation pump outage at that time.
The
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unit had been operating in single loop operation due to problems with the IB Reactor Recirculation (RR) pump.
Just prior to the unit trip, it was noted that the 1A reactor recirculation pump seals were rapidly degrading. Because of this condition, the licensee was preparing to replace the 1A RR seals by closing the
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Unit 1A RR pump suction and discharge valves.
The 1A RR pump
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suction valve closed with no problems, but when the licensee attempter' to close the 1A RR pump discharge valve, they were unable to fully close the valve.
Several attempts were made to close the discharge valve without succews.
The motor operator and the discharge valve were inspected to see if there were any obvious problems.
None were found.
Without being able to isolate the discharge side of the RR pump, the licensee could not change the deteriorating seals.
The valve manufacturer was contacted but was unable to resolve the problem.
The license finally decided that they would disassemble the reactor vessel (i.e. remove the reactor vessel head, dryer and separator)
and install a suction line plug and jet pump plugs such that they could isolate the 1B RR pump from the reactor so the IB RR pump seal can be replaced.
Subsequent to the decision to disassemble the reactor, the licensee hired a contractor to radiograph the 1A RR pump discharge valve using a Minac (a mini-accelerator) to see if they could determine what may be obstructing the valve closure.
The licensee also tried using the Minac on the 18 RR pump to see if they could determine what the problem with that pump was.
The radiographs were inconclusive as to reasons for the problems with the pump or the valve.
The resident inspectors are monitoring the licensee's progress in the Unit 1 outage.
b.
On June 16, 1987, at 8:22 a.m. (CDT), Unit 2 scent critical after a 164 day refueling outage.
The licensee completed approximately 103 modifications.
The original outage was scheduled to be completed around May 1, 1987.
The delay in the completion of the outage was due to difficulty in pressurizing the containment for the integrated leak rate testing, additional work on two valves in the residual heat removal system that showed leakage during the hyd o test on the unit, completion of the modification to the containment ventilation system, installation of the alternate rod insertion system, testing all the snubbers on the unit and installation of one advanced BWR control rod drive (fine motion control rod drive) for one cycle.
The licensee established a program to assure error free operation during the startup and return of the unit to service.
This included increased management review, increased management and operational people on shift and periodic holds for review during the startup to assure all personnel and equipment were ready for the next evolution.
Through proper planning and good management oversight, the startup of Unit 2 after such a long outage was very successful and no personnel errors were identified.
The station's efforts in this area were very effective.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
18.
Open Items
Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which
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will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action
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on the part of the NRC or licensee or both.
Open items disclosed during the inspection are discusred in paragraph 11.
19.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The licensee acknowledged these findings.
The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as.
proprietary.
!
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