IR 05000373/1987006

Insp Repts 50-373/87-06 & 50-374/87-06 on 870128-0309.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Surveillance,Maint Training,Lers,Unit Trips,Outages,Generic Ltr Followup & Info Notices

ML20205B776
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	03/19/1987
From:	Ring M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205B737	List: IR 05000373/1987006 ML20205B733
References
50-373-87-06, 50-373-87-6, 50-374-87-06, 50-374-87-6, GL-84-23, GL-85-03, GL-85-06, GL-85-3, GL-85-6, IEIN-86-106, IEIN-87-008, IEIN-87-8, NUDOCS 8703300042
Download: ML20205B776 (12)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report Nos. 50-373/87006(DRP); 50-374/87006(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374 Licenses No. NPF-11; NPF-18 Licensee: Connonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690  :

Facility Name: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, IL Inspection Conducted: January 28 tnrough March 9, 1987 Inspectors: M. J. Jordan R. Kopriva J. Malloy s

Approved By: . f J/f/c7 Reactor Projects Section 1C Date Inspection Summary Inspection on January 28 through March 9, 1987 (Reports No. 50-373/87006(DRP);

50-374/87006(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection conducted by resident inspectors of licensee actions on previous inspection findings; operational safety; surveillance; maintenance; training; Licensee Event Reports; unit trips; outages; generic letter followup; regional requests; Information Notices; allegation; and enforcement conferenc Results: Of the 12 areas inspected, no violations were identified. The licensee had a problem while returning systems to operation in failure to recognize the consequences of removing a jumper before resetting an isolation signal during a surveillance. Also, a scram occurred which could have been prevented if proper scheduled maintenance had been performe .,% ..M G7033OOO42 870320 PDR ADOCK 05000373 G PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)

• +G. J. Diederich, Manager, LaSalle Station

• R. D. Bishop, Services Superintendent J. C. Renwick, Production Superintendent D. Berkman, Assistant Superintendent, Work Planning

• +W. Huntington, Assistant Superintendent, Operations P. Manning, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services T. Hammerich, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor W. Sheldon, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance

+J. Atchley, Operating Engineer

+R. W. Stobert, Quality Assurance Supervisor D. Enright, Quality Assurance Engineer

+L. O. De1 George, Assistant Vice-President

+K. L. Graesser, Divinion Vice-President

+L. F. Gerner, Regulatory Assurance Superintendent

+B. B. Stephenson, Manager, Department of Nuclear Safety

+ L. Trubatch, Staff Attorney

+ J. Scott, Operations' Manager

+ M. Allen, LaSalle Licensing Administrator

+ S. Turbak, Licensing Director, Operating Plants

• D. A. Winchester, Senior Quality Assurance Inspector

• M. H. Richter, Technical Staff

• L. G. Soth, Nuclear Station Division Operations Staff U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission (USNRC)

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+ E. Norelius, Director, Division of Reactor Projects

+ C. Wright, Chief, Test Programs Section

• +M. J. Jordan, Senior Resident Inspector, LSCS

+M. A. Ring, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1C

+R. A. Kopriva, Resident Inspector, LSCS

+B. A. Berson, R:gional Counsel

+B. Stapleton, Enforcement Specialist

+P. D. Milano, Reactor Engineer

+H. J. Wong, Senior Enforcement Specialist

• J. A. Malloy, Resident Inspector, LSCS

+Denotas those attending the Enforcement Conference at RIII on February 13, 198 * Denotes those attending the exit meeting held on March 9, 198 Additional licensee technical and administrative personnel were contacted by the inspectors during the course of the inspectio . _ _ _ _ -

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2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)

(0 pen) Open Item (373/85033-02(DRP); 374/85034-04(DRP)): This open item tracked spurious spiking problems with the Standby Gas Treatment System Wide Range Gas Monitors. The licensee has replaced the power supply and spiking indications have decreased. The inspectors will continue monitoring this item for an additional three months.

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(0 pen) Open Item (373/86042-01(DRP); 374/86042-01(DRP)): This open item concerned control of the Plant Specific Technical Guideline (P-STG). The P-STG has been added to the Library Index and controlled in a manner similar to a design reference document. A procedure to control changes to the emergency procedures, LGA-PGP-1 has been drafted and should be approved by April 1,198 No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Operational Safety Verification (71707) The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of Unit 1 and 2 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector, by observation and dirv,t interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection control Curing the month of February 1987, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the following systems to verify operability:

Unit 1 Diesel Generators 0, 1A, and 2A Unit 1 A and B Residual Heat Removal System Unit 1 RCIC and Low Pressure Core Spray Systems Unit 1 has been in single loop operation since the occurrence of a problem with the Unit 1B Reactor Recirculation pump on February 4, 198 (See Outage-Paragraph 9)

On February 24, 1987, the licensee informed the Senior Resident Inspector that Unit I had potentially exceeded a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) while in single loop operation. The LC0 required core flow greater than 39% when operating above certain power levels which ensures hydraulic stability in the core. The licensee, when evaluating

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jet pump operability data, determined that the core flow was indicating higher than actual core flow. Therefore, if the core flow reading was indicating 39%, the actual flow was less than 39%, which would exceed the Technical Specification LCO. The licensee increased core flow sufficiently to exit the LC0 limit (based on jet pump operability data) at approximately 12:30 on February 24, 198 On March 1, 1287, the licensee reperformed single loop core flow measurements at lower flows to generate more accurate core flow curves for operational guidance using more sensitive differential pressure instrumentation across the jet pumps. When evaluating this data, the licensee determined that core flow had not decreased below 39%; therefore, the Technical Specification LC0 had not been exceeded. The inspector reviewed this data and agreed the unit did not operate beyond the LC0 limi The inspectors reviewed the method the licensee used for implementing the Technical Specification which allowed removing the 2A Diesel Generator for up to 30 days to install a prelube modification. The inspector identified no problems with the metfad by which the licensee implemented the Technical Specification requirement No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed Technical Specification required surveillance testing and verified for actual activities observed that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumen-tation was calibrated, that Limiting Conditions for Operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected' components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specification and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspector witnessed portions of the following test activities:

LOS-RR-SR1 Unit 1 Thermal Hydraulic Stability Surveillance LIS-NB-103 Unit 1 SOR Switch Calibration LOS-FP-W2 Units 1 and 2 Diesel Fire Pump Surveillance LST-87-035 Unit 1 Recirculation System Data for Single Loop

Operability LST-87-042 Unit 1 Recirculation System Data for Single Loop Operability Test No. 2 (High Rod Line) On February 17, 1987, at 3:18 p.m., with Unit 1 at 55% power and Unit 2 shut down, the licensee was performing the Unit 2 " Response Time Testing of the Secondary Containment Radiation Monitors

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' l Surveillance," Procedure LIS-VR-03. The procedure specifies the use of jumpers to prevent a Group IV isolation which would normally be generated by the surveillance. .Upon completion of the surveill- !

ance, the instrument technicians informed the control room unit operator that the surveillance was complete and that they were going to remove the jumper. Upon removing the jumper, the unit

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received a Group IV isolation. This was due to the unit operator not resetting the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic

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prior to removing the jumpers. The surveillance had caused a Group IV isolation signal to be generated and was still present at the i

time the jumper.was removed so the isolation occurred. The isolation signal causes the isolation of secondary containment on both units and starts both Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGT)-

trains. The control room personnel responded promptly by taking actions necessary to prevent a scram on Unit 1 from a Main Steam

' Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure-that would have been caused by high steam tunnel temperature or high differential-temperature. The

isolation was reset at 3:25 p.m.. The isolation occurred as a result of having an inadequate procedure in that the procedure does not contain guidance to reset'the PCIS logic prior to removing the jumpers. There appears to be other procedures for control room ,

personnel which, if implemented correctly, would have prevented i this isolation.- The inadequacy of procedure LIS-VR-03 may not be

the complete cause of this isolation.- Further review of this

event is required. This item will remain as an unresolved item (374/87006-01(DRP)). On March 2, 1987, with Unit 1 at approximately 53% power, the

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. licensee reported that while testing one of the low level Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) permissive Static-0-Ring (SOR)

switches (1821-N0388), the " reject limit" was exceeded. The switch was declared inoperable and the required Technical Specification i

seven day Limiting Condition for Operation (LC0)-was entered. The switch tripped at 62.8" of Water Column (WC) and the Technical Specification limit was 64.84" WC. Tha switch met the Technical

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Specification requirements for actuation; however, it was reported i and replaced as agreed to as part of the ongoing evaluation in the '

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use of the SOR switches. The switch was replaced and tested the evening of March 2,1987.

i- One unresolved item was identified during review of this functional

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are . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

L During the inspection period, the inspector observed portions of the

! following maintenance activities:

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Unit 2 Diesel Generator Lube Oil Modification Unit 2 Fine Motion Control Rod Drive Installation The following observations were noted:

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... At 5:50 p.m. on January 28, 1987, while in an outage on Unit 2, a contractor worker was reported injured when an angle iron struck the worker's head causing a gash. At 6:00 p.m., the station informed security, an . ambulance service, and St. Mary's Hospital of Streator. At 6:20 p.m., the station declared an unusual even The radiological technician surveyed the injured worker and found a contamination reading of approximately 1000 counts from a nostril swipe. The injured worker was then transported to the hospital via

. an ambulance accompanied by a radiological technician. The worker admitted into the-hospital and the radiological technician decon-taminated the worker. The worker was kept in hospital overnight for observation and released on January 29, 1987, from the hospita i' At 7:30.p.m.', the station secured from the unusual even On January 28, 1987, at approximately 7:47 a.m., the licensee reported the actuation of the Emergency Control Room Ventilation System. The paper jammed on the ammonia detector causing the detector to trip and isolate the control room ventilation. The normal control room ventilation was restored by 8:50 a. No other systems actuate No violations or deviations were identifie . . Training (41400)

I The inspector,-through discussions with personnel and a review of training records, evaluated the licensee's training program for operations and maintenance personnel to determine whether the general e

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knowledge of the individuals was sufficient for their assigned task In the areas examined by the inspector, no items of concern were identifie No violations or deviations were identified.

' Licensee Event Reports (92700)

i Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and

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review of records, the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were j reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification (Closed) 373/87006-00 - Division II DC inoperable due to personnel

error. Unit 2. Division II batteries were discharged and prior to being

fully recharged, the Unit 1/ Unit 2 Division II crossties were opene Consequently, the Unit 2 Division II electrical distribution was rendered

, inoperable, but had not been declared inoperable. This event was documented in Inspection Report 373/86046 and a Notice of Violation was issued at that tim '

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(Closed) 373/87001-00 - Instrument surveillance procedure deficienc ! A Quality Assurance audit revealed deficiencies involving the method in l 4 which the slope of the rod block and scram lines were verified and the '

i fact that the 113.5% high flow clamped trip was not-included in the

functional test. As a r*sult of the audit the procedures have been j revised. The functional test procedure now includes verification of

the 113.5% clamp. The calibration procedure now verifies flow biasing rod block and scram setpoints at two (2) different flow values to verify j- correct slope. There were no safety consequences of this occurrence in

that the clamped value of.113.5% was found to be correct for both unit <

(Closed) 373/87007-00 - Personnel error caused ESF actuation. A contractor pulling cable on Motor Control Center (MCC) 236X-2 apparently bumped the handle to compartment D3 causing the breaker to move to the

- off position.- This deenergized all 120/208 circuits powered by this MCC

causing auto initiation of the 08 HVAC Emergency Make-up Train. A half

scram on the B Reactor Protection System also occurred when the power was

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lost to the scram discharge volume redundant level sensors and analog '

trip units. Unit 2 was in refueling and no core alterations were taking 3 place at the time. The breaker was re-energized and a11'affected systems

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were returned to proper status. The resident inspector is satisfied with the licensee response and followup on this item.

! (Closed) 373/87004-00 - A jammed chemcassette tape in the ammonia detector caused an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation closing minimum outside air dampers and starting the "B" VC Emergency Make-up

unit. The IM department investigated the event and found that the

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chemcassette was jansned in the make up spool. The problem was corrected

, and the detector was reset. The licensee has implemented a program to

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i mitigate a repeat of this occurrence, and considerations are being given to increase the work; scope of a modification to the ammonia detector g system. The licensee's response is adequate.

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(0 pen) 374/87001-00 - The 2A Diesel Generator (D/G) did not automatically

i start upon deenergizing Bus c'42Y which was done to simulate loss of off site power.- The DG not starting was caused by a lube oil pressure switch that is connected in series with the air start solenoids of the 2A D The purpose of this switch is to prevent the DG air start motors from

engaging the DG flywheel before the DG has stopped rotating. The DG had

. just been shutdown and there was still enough residual oil pressure to have the cir start motors' locked out. The licensee has taken the i appropriate steps to identify this problem. This item has been turned

over to the Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) for followu (Closed) 374/87002-00 - A. Local Leak Rate Test was performed on the i

feedwater check valves (both inboard and outboard) and the motor cperated valve in the line and the summation of leakage observed was in excess of 0.6 La limits. The exact cause of failure is unknown at i this time. A complete inspection of these valves will be made prior

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to repairs such that the mode of failure can be determined. These valves will then be repaired and a local leak rate test performed on

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I each valve during this refueling outage. A supplemental report will be submitted at the end of the refueling outage. The inspector i satisfied with the licensee's action .

-(Closed) 373/87002-00 - The "0" Diesel Generator would not synchronize with Bus 241Y and would not close the "0" D/G output breaker to Bus 241Y. The cause is believed to be a limit switch in the breaker

, .close circuitry. Further testing is continuing. The safety consequences

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of-this occurrence are minimal because at the time of the occurrence the required Unit 2.ECCS's were available if needed. The emergency DG surveillance program will reflect increased testing frequency of the Unit 2 DG. A supplemental report will be issued. The inspector is satisfied with the licensees actions on this item.

. (Closed) 373/87003-00 - Reactor scram from main generator lockout due

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to failed potential transformer contacts. A relay tripped due to a

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bad set of secondary contacts and a high roller wheel on the breaker

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cubicle which caused a main generator lockout while the unit was at 89%

power. The event was documented in the unit trip paragraph in both

!- Inspection Reports 373/86046; 374/86046; and Inspection Reports

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373/87006; 374/8700 ,

No violations or deviations were identifie i 8. Unit Trips (93702)

i This is a followup to the Unit I reactor scram which took place on January 26, 198/. The reactor, which was operating at 89%~

, power, scrammed due to a main turbine trip. Investigation into the turbine trip revealed loose connectors on the generator lock-out relay, which, due to vibration possibly from the motor i driven reactor feedwater pump, caused the lock-out relay to trip, esulting in the generator / turbine trip. All systems functioned

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as expected. There were no ECCS actuations.

!- On January 31, 1987, at 11:18 a.m. (CST) while Unit I was at approximately 55% power, the unit scramed on a turbine trip. A

breaker tripped on loss of generator excitation field which caused L the turbine trip and the reactor scram. A second scram due to low i

reactor water level was received while returning the reactor vessel level to normal. All other systems functioned as expected. The 1 licensee determined that the excitation problem was due to two

failed exciter brushes and wear in the collector ring. The wear t

in the collector ring caused electrical arcing between the brushes and the ring, and tripped the breaker, indicating failure in the exciter field. The licensee failed to perform preventive maintenance

procedure LES-GM-126 on the exciter which would have included inspection of the brushes for wear. The preventive maintenance procedure required the inspections to be performed weekly on the

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brushes. The procedure was issued in June 1985 and the last time

the inspection was performed was October 20, 1986. The licensee

is in the process of' reviewing outstanding non-safety related

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preventive maintenance work activities and ensuring they are perfomed in a more timely manner. The licensee repaired the generator and returned the unit to powe No violations or deviations were identifie . Outages (71707) On February 4,1987, while Unit I was at approximately 80% power, the licensee identified a hydraulic leak in the unit drywel The leak was from the hydraulic control system to the IB-Reactor Recirculation (RR) pump flow control valve. The licensee also identified at that time an abnormal noise in the B-RR pump. The licensee took the unit to Cold Shutdown and entered the drywel The inspection of the hydraulic system identified a cracked weld in the hydraulic piping. On February 9, 1987, the licensee repaired the hydraulic leak, cleaned up the hydraulic fluid (Fyguel) and checked for corrosive type damage to equipment in the drywell from the hydraulic fluid. Recirculation pump 1-B was tested to determine the cause of the noise identified while operating, but nothing of significance was found. The unit was returned to service and, while coming up in power, the noise in the 18-RR pump returned, however, not as noticeably. The licensee tripped the IB pump and continued to operate in single loop operatio No violations or deviations were identifie . Generic Letter Followup (92703) (0 pen) Generic Letter 84-23, " Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumenta-tion in BWRs".

This letter required that all BWR operating plants furnish the NRC with a description of plans for improving reactor water level instrumentation. The licensee addressed the plans in a December 4, 1984 letter, G. Alexander to H. R. Denton. The licensee planned to install new reference legs with condensing chambers in the drywell for the level instrumentation and to limit the maximum vertical drop in the drywell of the reference leg system piping to less than four feet. The licensee had not planned to replace mechanical level indication equipment with analog level transmitters because operat-ing experience with mechanical level indication equipment had confirmed high reliability. However, due to increased operational restrictions that resulted from a June 1,1986, feedwater transient event at LaSalle Unit 2, the licensee committed, by a letter dated December 22, 1986, to replace all reactor water level instruments with an analog trip system. The licensee scheduled completion of reactor water level instrumentation improvements between July 1988 and February 199 Implementation of these improvements will provide the instrumentation to detect inadequate core cooling required by NUREG-0737, Items II.F.2 and satisfy that requiremen This will be followed by open item (373/87006-01(DRP);

374/87006-02(DRP)).

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. (0 pen) Generic Letter 85-03,." Clarification.of Equivalent Control-

, . Capacity for Standby Liquid Control. Systems." The letter states,

" Paragraph (c) (4) of 10 CFR 50.62 states in part: Each boilin water reactor must have a Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS) g with 'a minimum flow capacity and boron content equivalent in-control capacity to 86 gallons per minute of 13 weight percent sodium pentaborate solution."

The licensee has addressed this issue and presently cannot meet this requiremer.t. The licensee can and does meet the requirements listed in Technical Specif_ications and has outlined potential modifications such that the SLCS will be able to meet the. require-ment of 10 CFR 50.62 (c)(4). This is scheduled to be completed during the second refueling outage of each unit. This will be followed by open item 373/87006-02(DRP);374/87006-03(DRP)). (0 pen) Generic ~ Letter 85-06, " Quality Assurance For ATWS Equipmen That Is Not-Safety Related". This generic letter and methods for-implementation of required modifications to meet the 10 CFR 50.62 requirements were discussed with the licensee. This review determined that the QA program was applied to the Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) modification which is currently being installed on Unit 2. The modification package was handled as a safety related package which implements the existing QA program to the package. The new component will be added to- the Q-list for the station and will be handled under the existing QA program. The remaining modification for Unit 1 and 2 will be completed by the second refueling outage for both units as committed to in licensee's letter dated October 10, 1985. Implementation of a QA program for these modifications has not been described yet. This item will be tracked an'an open item (373/87006-03(DRP);-374/87006-04(DRP)).

Three open items were identified during review of this functional are . Regional Requests (92705) A memorandum from E. G. Greenman, dated February 2, 1987, requested the inspectors to determine what actions are being taken'by licensees to assure similar problems do not exist as those identified in IE Information Notice 86-106, "FEEDWATER LINE BREAK."

The request was to answer-four questions on the thinning of the piping wal LaSalle County Station has not established a program for their large-diameter steam, feedwater, condensate, and connected system piping subjected to thinning of the piping wall. The licensee established a corporate committee to evaluate the actions necessary to address this problem at each of their facilities. The licensee is scheduled to inspect four nozzles in the Feedwater Suction System during the current Unit 2 outage. The licensee stated that a program will be established by next year for the LaSalle County Statio .

. The inspectors received a request to obtain information regarding unqualified AMP electrical splices. The. request was dated February 20, 1987, from C. J. Paperiello to C. E. Norelius. The inspectors reviewed the request and detennined that it was an Environmental Qualification (EQ) issue. The inspectors contacted the Regional EQ Specialist who had completed an EQ inspection on February 1, 1987, at Lc.Salle and asked if he had looked at this issue at that time. The Regional Specialist stated that he had examined this issue and found no problem with the station's actio This item is considered closed at this time. No further action will be taken, The inspectors received a request to review with the licensee an issue identified in a morning report of an occurrence on January 16, 1987, at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant. The issue concerned the use of General Electric HGA relays which are not seismically qualified in safety applications. This concern was brought to the attention of the station's Technical Staff Supervisor and he reported back to the inspectors that HGA relays are not used in safety equipment at this site. HFA relays are used. This open item is considered closed (373/87006-04(DRP);

374/87006-05(DRP)).

No violations or de iations were identifie . Information Notices (92703)

IE Information Notice 87-08, " Degraded Motor Leads in Limitorque DC Motor Operators." This notice, dated February 4, 1987, was provided to alert recipients of potentially defective DC motors installed in limitorque motor operators. The motors are fitted with Nomex-Kapton insulated leads that are susceptible to insulation degradation and subsequent short circuit failure. The licensee has indicated that they had received seven limitorque DC motors susceptible to this failure. Upon initial receipt inspection, the insulated leads already appeared to have been degraded and the motors were returned to be repaired. The licensee believes that the insulated leads that were replaced are not susceptible to the degradation and subsequent short circuiting. The licensee has undertaken the task of verifying the wiring of the motors and anticipates the completion of their review in the next couple of weeks. This item will be tracked as an open item (373/87006-05(DRP);374/87006-06(DRPP).

One open item was identified during review of this functional are . Allegation (99003)

The resident inspector received an allegation by a contractor employee concerning modification activities on Unit 2 during the current refueling outage. This item will be reviewed and addressed in a separate inspection report; however, it will be tracked as open items 373/87006-06(DRP);374/87006-07(DRP).

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One open item was identified during review of this functional are . Enforcement Conference (30702)

On February 13, 1987, an Enforcement Conference was held in Region III between the licensee and the USNRC to cover two main issues: (a)

failure to properly perform second verification; and (b) failure of operators to recognize off-normal conditions. These issues had been documented in previous inspection reports and the schedule for the conference was documented in the cover letter to Inspection Report 373/86040; 374/86040 dated January 21, 1987. The conference covered six occurrences on September 27, 1985, March 19, 1986, July 22, 1986, October 21, 1986, November 25, 1986, and January 17, 198 The occurrences all involved a second verification that a component was in the proper orientation when actually it was not. In three of these events, indication of the error was identifiable from the control room and they were not identified in a prompt manner. In all cases, the occurrences were identified by the licensee and corrective actions were taken. The resultant enforcement action will be taken under separate correspondence referencing the appropriate inspection report in which the event occurred. The attendees to the conference are listed in paragraph 1 of this repor . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, open items, e deviations, or violations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph . Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 1 ,

17. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period l and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitie l The licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _