IR 05000369/2010008

IR 05000369-10-008, 05000370-10-008, on 09/20/2010 - 09/23/2010; McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Follow Up Inspection

ML102950608
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	10/22/2010
From:	Bartley J NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB1
To:	Repko R Duke Power Co
References
IR-10-008
Download: ML102950608 (18)

Text

UNITED STATES ctober 22, 2010

SUBJECT:

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC FOLLOW UP INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2010008 AND 05000370/2010008

Dear Mr. Repko:

On September 23, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a follow up inspection for three Severity Level (SL)-IV violations identified between January 1, 2009, and December 31, 2009, at your McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2. The NRC was informed on August 23, 2010, of your staffs readiness for this inspection. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed at the exit meeting on September 23, 2010, with you and other members of your staff.

The objectives of this follow up inspection were to provide assurance that: (1) the cause(s) of multiple SL-IV traditional enforcement violations were understood by the licensee; (2) the extent of condition and extent of cause of multiple SL-IV traditional enforcement violations were identified; and (3) licensee corrective actions to traditional enforcement violations were sufficient to address the cause(s). The inspection consisted of examination of activities conducted under your license as they related to safety, compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and the conditions of your operating license, and the objectives stated above. Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors determined that, in general, the causes of the violations were understood by the licensee, the extent of condition and extent of cause of the violations were identified, and the corrective actions were adequate.

DEC 2 In accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000369/2010008 and 05000370/2010008 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17 Report Nos.: 05000369/2010008, 05000370/2010008 Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Huntersville, NC 28078 Dates: September 20, 2010, through September 23, 2010 Inspectors: E. Stamm, Project Engineer J. Brady, Senior Resident Inspector Approved by: Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Inspection Report (IR) 05000369/2010008, IR 05000370/2010008; 09/20/2010 - 09/23/2010;

McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Follow up Inspection This report covered a one week period of inspection conducted by a senior resident inspector and a project engineer. No findings of significance were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4.

The inspectors concluded that, in general, for these violations, the causes were understood by the licensee, the extent of condition and extent of cause was identified, and the licensees corrective actions were sufficient to address the identified causes. However, the inspectors identified additional missed opportunities by the licensee to identify the cause, noted weaknesses in the licensees administrative procedures regarding how to address multiple violations, and noted that the scope of corrective actions in one area was expanded based on questions raised during the inspection.

REPORT DETAILS

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Inspection Scope

This follow up inspection was performed in accordance with Inspection Procedure (IP)92723, Follow Up Inspection for Three or More Severity Level IV Traditional Enforcement Violations in the Same Area in a 12-month Period, to assess the licensees evaluation of three Severity Level (SL)-IV violations in the traditional enforcement area of impeding the regulatory process from January 1, 2009, to December 31, 2009. These violations were documented in NRC Inspection Reports (IRs) as:

(1) Non-cited violation (NCV) 05000369,370/2009002-02;

(2) NCV 05000369,370/2009003-03; and

(3) NCV 05000369,370/2009004-01, and were associated with inaccurate or incomplete UFSAR content. The inspection objectives of IP 92723 were to:

• provide assurance that the causes of these violations were understood by the licensee

• provide assurance that the extent of condition and extent of cause of these violations were identified

• provide assurance that licensees corrective actions for these violations were sufficient to address the identified causes.

In addition to these three violations, the licensee evaluated ten other violations related to the traditional enforcement area of impeding the regulatory process identified since January 1, 2004. These violations are listed in the Attachment. In addition, the lists inspection reports which documented a trend involving UFSAR inadequacies.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees cause evaluations associated with PIPs M-10-0166 and M-10-4808. PIP M-10-0166 addressed the three SL-IV violations which prompted the IP 92723 inspection. PIP M-10-4808, which captured the results from G-SAG-SA-10-11, NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 92723 Readiness Assessment, addressed all identified SL-IV violations involving the traditional enforcement area of impacting the regulatory process covering the period of January 1, 2004, through June 1, 2010. This included a total of 13 violations. The inspectors reviewed corrective actions that were identified to address the causes. The inspectors also held discussions with licensee personnel to ensure that the causes were understood and corrective actions were appropriate to address the causes. Although the inspectors were aware of two pending traditional enforcement NCVs documented in IR 05000369,370/2010004, the scope of this inspection did not include those violations.

.2 Evaluation of the Inspection Requirements

2.01 Review Problem Identification a. Determine that the licensees evaluation identifies how each of the issues were identified, how long each issue existed, and prior opportunities for identification The inspectors determined that the licensees evaluation identified how the issues were identified, how long the issues existed, and the prior opportunities for identification.

The licensees readiness assessment stated that all of the violations were NRC identified. In addition, most of the violations were due to latent errors that went undetected for several years, some dating back to initial plant licensing while two violations were related to a failure to take adequate and timely corrective action. An Organizational and Programmatic Evaluation was performed and the licensee determined that there were inadequate controls in place to identify the latent errors at the precursor level. The licensee considered these failures to identify the errors at the precursor level to be missed opportunities.

As a result of these violations, as well as an UFSAR deficiency trend identified by the NRC, the licensee had multiple opportunities to identify this issue. Trend PIP M-08-4383 identified that a lack of guidance necessary to assure UFSAR content accuracy had been previously identified and had not been adequately corrected.

The inspectors reviewed a selected list of UFSAR deficiencies to determine which organizations had identified problems. The inspectors determined that most deficiencies were identified by a contract organization which conducted a UFSAR review project. In addition to the missed opportunities identified by the licensee, the inspectors identified another missed opportunity by the Independent Nuclear Oversight (INOS) group. As part of ongoing quality assurance performance assessments and periodic audits required per 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVIII, Audits, the group did not appear to fully recognize or address the UFSAR deficiencies being found. Interviews with INOS indicated that there were missed opportunities since 2006 for INOS to identify and address the UFSAR deficiencies, however, programmatic changes and recent results from the 2009 McGuire TS and Licensing Audit suggest that the team is headed in the right direction.

The inspectors identified an additional missed opportunity in a review of how the licensee addressed a period of NRC enforcement discretion related to UFSAR content from 1996 to 2000. It appeared that the initial UFSAR review performed by the licensee was not an accuracy and content review. This is evidenced by the fact that Regulatory Guide 1.70, Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, was not referenced in the review. This missed opportunity allowed latent UFSAR deficiencies to exist after the period of enforcement discretion. It resulted in the multiple NRC violations discussed in Section 4OA5.1. The licensee implemented corrective actions to address the latent UFSAR deficiencies.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2.02 Evaluate Cause, Extent-of-Condition, and Extent-of-Cause Evaluations a. Determine that the group of SL-IV violations received an evaluation at an appropriate level of detail using a systematic method(s) to identify the cause(s)

The inspectors determined that the group of violations received an evaluation at an appropriate level of detail using systematic methods to identify the causes.

The licensee wrote PIP M-10-0166 to address these three SL-IV violations. The licensee performed a problem evaluation to evaluate the three violations and identify any commonalities, the extent of condition, and the appropriateness of corrective actions.

The licensee determined that the three violations were not related; therefore, no additional corrective actions were identified. However, the licensee identified a common theme in that the three violations represent a failure to appropriately maintain the current licensing basis (CLB). There was no programmatic process that required the licensee to perform a common cause analysis and an extent of condition and extent of cause review for the group of violations similar to existing procedural guidance for cross-cutting issues. As a corrective action, Administrative Procedure Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 107, NRC Inspection Preparation and Response, will be revised and PIP M-10-6070 has been written to address this issue.

In addition, the licensee conducted a readiness assessment in order to facilitate an overall evaluation of traditional enforcement violations received between 2004 and 2010.

The assessment was conducted using a number of systematic methods appropriate to the evaluation. Some of these methods included use of an Organization and Programmatic Evaluation matrix, a Human Errors and Inappropriate Actions chart, and common cause analysis guidelines contained in Administrative Procedure NSD 212, Cause

Analysis.

The licensee determined the causes of the collection of traditional enforcement violations were primarily due to human errors and inappropriate actions stemming from organizational and programmatic weaknesses in the areas of procedures, oversight and monitoring, training, and corrective action. Corrective actions for these causes are discussed in Section 2.03.a.

The inspectors also noted that Administrative Procedure NSD 208, Problem Investigation Program, required a root cause for an NRC-identified substantive cross-cutting issue, but provided no guidance related to multiple SL-IV violations in the same traditional enforcement area. Instead, the readiness assessment was the tool used to address the problem.

b. Determine that the evaluation included a consideration of how prior occurrences in the same traditional enforcement area (willfulness, regulatory process, or consequences)were addressed by the licensee The inspectors determined that the licensees evaluation included a consideration of how prior occurrences in the area of impeding the regulatory process were addressed.

Table 1.11 of the licensees readiness assessment listed major corrective actions associated with each specific violation received from 2004 to 2010. In addition to the individual actions, the readiness assessment also addressed the cumulative actions for the overall trend of UFSAR deficiencies. The licensee initially documented the trend in PIP M-06-0080, but the problem evaluation from the PIP determined that no trend existed. Following additional NRC violations, the licensee again documented this trend in PIP M-06-2889, which identified additional administrative and procedural weaknesses to be addressed. This was also confirmed by an external review that was initiated in late 2006.

Following the 2006 external review, the licensee re-opened the problem evaluation from PIP M-06-0080 to include information from later PIPs. The licensee determined that a comprehensive set of corrective actions were already being taken from the later trend PIPs to resolve the weaknesses. Following additional NRC violations in 2008, the scope was expanded in PIP M-08-4383 and the licensee contracted a separate external organization to perform a review of the UFSAR. Other corrective actions included additional training, communications, and providing operating experience. After additional NRC violations outside the scope of the external review were identified, the licensee wrote trend PIP M-09-0473 which considered the programmatic actions in PIP M-08-4383 sufficient to address the cause of the expanded scope. In 2010, as preparation for this inspection, the licensee wrote PIP M-10-4808 to summarize programmatic actions identified collectively in the previous PIPs. The inspectors determined that this progression of trend PIPs and expansion of scope indicated that the licensee was slow to identify the full extent of condition of the underlying UFSAR deficiencies.

c. Determine that the evaluation addresses the extent of condition and the extent of cause of the problem The inspectors determined that the licensees evaluation adequately addressed the extent of condition and extent of cause of the problem. The inspectors also determined that the scope of these reviews was sufficient to address the UFSAR deficiencies and to address similar problems that could exist in other programmatic areas.

Through review of the readiness assessment and discussions with the licensee, the inspectors determined there were four general areas that the licensee considered when evaluating the extent of condition:

• Original Final Safety Analysis Report content under 10 CFR 50.34(b) - The licensee-contracted external review performed a 100% review of the UFSAR against safety evaluation reports (SERs) issued since the time of licensing. It should be noted that the licensee did not perform a complete review of the UFSAR against NUREG-0422, "SER for McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, and its supplements which were specifically issued for NRCs review of the Final Safety Analysis Report for issuance of the operating licenses. The inspectors conducted a scoping sample of the external reviews to validate the scope of the review and determined the process was adequate.

• License Amendment Requests (LARs) - The licensee-contracted external review performed a review of 18 LARs to ensure they were adequately incorporated into the UFSAR. Following the review, the licensee conducted a review of the remaining LARs, which was documented in PIP M-10-0665. The inspectors conducted a scoping sample of selected LARs and determined the process was generally adequate. The inspectors noted that one LAR review was not adequate, but was already documented as NCV 05000369,370/2009004-01.

• Changes, tests, and experiments under 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2) - As a result of questions raised by the inspectors, the scope of the licensees efforts in this area evolved and PIP M-10-0665 was enhanced to address the results following the review. The licensee now plans to perform a scoping review by selecting ten risk-significant systems and conducting a review of each systems design basis documents (DBDs), 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations, and system operating procedures against the UFSAR content recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.70 to identify potential changes to the UFSAR. Following these reviews, the licensee will perform a common cause review of identified deviations to evaluate the results and implement additional corrective actions. In addition, the licensee will update the readiness assessment as appropriate following the completion of this review. This review had not been initiated by the licensee; therefore, the inspectors did not perform a scoping sample.

• New Safety Issues - The licensee-contracted external review performed a review of selected Generic Letters (GLs) and Bulletins (BLs) to ensure adequate incorporation into the UFSAR. In addition, the licensee performed a review of Orders to ensure adequate incorporation into the UFSAR as necessary. The inspectors performed a scoping sample of selected GLs, BLs, and Orders to ensure the actions taken were adequate.

The inspectors determined that the licensee provided adequate oversight and adequately addressed the results of these reviews. The inspectors performed a scoping sample of PIPs involving recommendations that were not implemented and determined they were adequately addressed.

In addressing the extent of cause, the licensee performed an extent of cause review of the violations grouped into different areas. The primary area of UFSAR-related NCVs showed that most UFSAR-related errors were due to a lack of a UFSAR revision process, an inadequate revision process, and insufficient training. In addition, there was no written UFSAR update procedure prior to 1997. Administrative Procedure NSD 220, UFSAR Revision Process, was created in 1997 and provided sufficient guidance to ensure accuracy but lacked appropriate guidance to ensure completeness. NSD 220 revisions since 2007, which included a requirement to use Regulatory Guide 1.70 as a reference for UFSAR content and completeness, as well as changes to the UFSAR feeder processes, such as NSD 227, Communicating with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and NSD 228, Applicability Determination, were some of the changes made to improve USFAR completeness. The licensee also initiated classroom training on CLB and the UFSAR process.

One observation in this area is that the inspectors determined that the licensees readiness assessment did not identify that INOS was not active in identifying the problem.

d. Findings

No findings were identified.

2.03 Evaluate Corrective Actions a. Determine that appropriate corrective actions are specified for each cause identified for the group of violations or that there is an evaluation indicating that no corrective actions are necessary The inspectors determined that appropriate corrective actions were specified for the causes identified for the group of violations.

The licensee determined that most of the violations involved latent errors primarily due to human errors and inappropriate actions stemming from organizational and programmatic weaknesses in four areas:

(1) procedures;

(2) oversight and monitoring;

(3) training; and

(4) corrective action. The licensee determined that corrective actions had been taken and were sufficient to address the organizational and programmatic weaknesses. The inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective actions taken by the licensee to address these weaknesses and determined that they were adequate.

Following the readiness assessment, the licensee identified three additional corrective actions:

(1) recommend an evaluation of NCVs involving failure to take adequate and/or timely corrective actions to confirm that the causes are understood and that corrective actions are sufficient to address the causes;

(2) consider revising administrative controls to require both extent of condition and extent of cause reviews for violations of NRC requirements; and

(3) consider additional changes to the UFSAR Change Form or other actions that would improve performance.

As noted in Section 2.02.c, the scope of the licensees planned corrective actions related to changes, tests, and experiments under 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2) expanded during the inspection as a result of pending violations and questions from the inspectors.

b. Determine that corrective actions have been prioritized with consideration of the regulatory compliance The inspectors determined that corrective actions were adequately prioritized with consideration of the regulatory compliance.

The licensee stated that all corrective actions were prioritized in accordance with Administrative Procedure NSD 208, Problem Investigation Program, and actions were taken to restore compliance. During a previous INOS Audit, the licensee identified that some UFSAR corrective actions had been improperly prioritized as elective or enhancement rather than actions to correct conditions adverse to quality. A sample review indicated that corrective actions were appropriately prioritized.

c. Determine that a schedule has been established for implementing and completing the corrective actions The inspectors determined that a schedule was established for implementing and completing the corrective actions.

The licensee stated that all corrective actions were scheduled and assigned in accordance with Administrative Procedure NSD 208, Problem Investigation Program. A sample review of completed and planned corrective actions was conducted by the inspectors and they were determined to be adequate.

d. Determine that measures of success have been developed for determining the effectiveness of the corrective actions The inspectors determined that measures of success were developed for determining the effectiveness of the corrective actions.

The licensee determined that most of the corrective actions did not stem from root cause evaluations and; therefore, did not include actions to prevent recurrence. However, there were ongoing processes to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions including: Administrative Procedure NSD 208, Problem Investigation Program; Compliance Functional Area Manual (CFAM) 3.3, Process for Assuring Regulatory Product Quality; and Administrative Procedure NSD 223, PIP Trending Program.

The inspectors reviewed the results of a UFSAR Mindset Survey and determined that the results showed that corrective actions related to programmatic changes, increased training, and communication have provided an adequate understanding of how to prevent future UFSAR deficiencies.

The inspectors also reviewed the implementation of the UFSAR Health Report which was performed per CFAM 3.3. A review of Health Reports from 2006 through 2009 showed that McGuires UFSAR rating improved from Red in 2006 to Yellow in 2007-2009. The inspectors discussed the measures of success used in determining the rating and determined that they were adequate and comprehensive. The licensee considered that a future rating of Green would indicate that corrective actions were effective. The inspectors noted that this was the only measure of success available in determining whether corrective actions have been effective.

e. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the results of the follow up inspection to Mr. Repko and members of his staff on September 23, 2010. The inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

B. Anderson, Nuclear QA & Oversight Manager

K. Ashe, Regulatory Compliance Manager

D. Brewer, Safety Assurance Manager

J. Burgess, INOS Performance Manager

S. Capps, Station Manager

K. Crane, Regulatory Compliance

C. Curry, Engineering Manager

J. Jenkins, INOS Performance

P. Nardoci, Fleet Regulatory Compliance and Licensing

J. Nolin, Mechanical and Civil Engineering Manager

R. Repko, Site Vice President

S. Snider, Reactor and Electrical Systems Engineering Manager

C. Thomas, Fleet Regulatory Compliance Manager

T. Welch, Fleet QA & Oversight

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED, CLOSED, AND REVIEWED

Opened and Closed

None

Closed

None

Discussed

None