IR 05000369/1990006
| ML20042G994 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 05/04/1990 |
| From: | Cooper T, Son Ninh, Shymlock M, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20042G993 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-90-06, 50-369-90-6, 50-370-90-06, 50-370-90-6, NUDOCS 9005170009 | |
| Download: ML20042G994 (12) | |
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p %t0; UNITE 3 STAT ES
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' q, NUCLEAH REGULATORY COMMISslON
f REGION ll o
101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
~5.,.... /[
I AT LANT A, GLORol A 30323
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Report Nos. 50 369/90-06 and 50-370/90-06 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2 Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.:
NPF-9 and NPF-17 Inspection Conducted: M rch 27, 1990 - April 24, 1990 Inspectors-.
M.drj f/JNM P.~K. ' Van Doorn, Sepor Resident inspector 9att Signed
$~ T.'Colper, ResidenpInspector
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duho ddhu Dht( Signed f'5.Ninh~,ResidentMAuwk rsho spector.
Dste 5'gned r
Approved by:
IdM gN!70 M vision @l#c Shy ection-Chief Dste Signed i
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of R torProjects j
SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, resident inspection was conducted on site, inspecting in the areas of plant operations safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, followup-on previous inspection findings, licensee plans for coping with strikes, and followup of event reports.
Results:
In the areas inspected, one additional example of a previous violation involving fire doors was identified (paragraph 2.b),
additional examples of a weakness involving documentation of Diesel Generator surveillances were identified (paragraph 3.b.) and two Non-Cited Violations (NCVs) were identified.
One NCV involved a failure to follow procedure for operations special orders (paragraph 2.f.) and another NCV involved failure of radiation protection personnel to follow procedure for flow estimates (paragraph 5.b.).
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i REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted I
i Licensee Employees
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G. Addis, Superintendent of Station Services
- D. Baxter, Support Operations Manager
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- J. Boyle Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling l
D.-Bumgardner Unit 1 Operations Manager
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J. Foster, Station Health Physicist,
- D. Franks, QA Verification Manager.
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- G. Gilbert, Superintendent of Technica1' Services C. Hendrix, Maintenance Engineering Services Manager
- T, Mathews, Site Design Engineering Manager
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- T. McConnell, Plant Manager i
R. Michael, Station Chemist
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D. Murdock, McGuire Design Engineering Division Manager i
R. Pierce, IAE Engineer
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W. Reeside, Operations Engineer
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k. Rider, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer
- M. Sample, Superintendent of Maintenance
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- R. Sharp Compliance Manager
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J. St?ver, Unit 2 Operations Manager A. Sipe, McGuire Safety Review Group Chairman-J. Snyder, Performance Engineer
- B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members,.and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview NRC Resident Inspectors
- P.
K. VanDoorn
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- T. A. Cooper
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- S.
Ninh
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l 2.
PlantOperations(71707,71710)
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The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the: report period to verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements.
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Control room logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records
and squipment rsmoval and restoration records wars routinely perussd.
l Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance,
chemistry, health physics, and performance personnel.
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Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at shift changes.
Actions and/or activities observed were conducted-l as prescribed in app 1_icable station administrative directives.._The.
complement.of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the t
minimum required by Technical. Specifications (TS).
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- plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not
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limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building. electrical
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equipment rooms.- cable; spreading rooms, and the: station yard zone
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inside the protected area.
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During -the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security.
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equipment status anc radiation control practices were observed i
On March 28,.1990, while touring' the Auxiliary Building, :the i
inspector noted a frisker located on 750 elevation near_ a Unit 2 -
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Component ~ Cooling (KC) pump was reading at 220-240 counts per minute
(cpm) and was alarming. This' problem was brought to the attention of.
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the Health Physics Supervisor. As a result, a station problem report
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was being written to address the issue.
The problem was apparently.
l high background radiation.
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On April 10, 1990, while touring _the Auxiliary _ Building..the.
inspector noted a frisker located on 733 elevation near 1 Al KC pump
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was reading at 0 cpm because the instrument was set at the wrong
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scale.
This discrepancy was brought to the attention of the Health -
Physics Supervisor.
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On April 17, 1990 the inspector noted that_TS Fire Door No. 701C'was
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left ajar approximately 4 inches on. three; different occasions.
Certain modes of operation of Auxiliary Building Ventilation create
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additional air flow, preventing ~ the. closure mechanism from
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automatically closing the door.
Previous problems have occurred with
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fire doors and violation 370/90-04-03 was issued. This violation has
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not yet been responded to by the licensee. - Therefore, this is considered another example of failure to follow procedure for control of a fire door and another violation is not being issued.
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previous violation was only applicable to Unit 2, however, the
licensee is expected to implement generic corrective actions
affecting both units.
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Unit 1 Operations l
The unit started the inspection period in Mode 6, with the core.
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Major activities included steam generator repair, turbine -
I repairs and miscellaneous valve work.
Steam generator work was
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complete at the.end of the period. The on-line date is scheduled for
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May 23, 1990.
The unit is currently in Mode 5 with the vessel head i
in place.
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I On April 11,1990, at 9:30 a.m., with Unit 1-in Mode 5,' the unit experienced a Reactor Coolant System; (NC) level decrease of-l approximately 2 inches to approximately 81/2" above centerline over-l a 15 minute time span.- This occurred while Radwaste Chemistry.
i Personnel were sluicing resin on Chemical and Volume Control (NV)'
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system "1B"l mixed bed demineralizer.
Upon investigation, control j
D room operators determined that the' NC level decrease was. due to a
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1eak on the mixed bed demineralizer outlet isolation valve,1NV-372.
Total NC leakage ~into the NV system was estimated around 600-B00-gallons during the course of. the event.
Control room operators i
immediately-initiated makeup water to the NC system from the
'l refueling water, storage tank.and. Subsequently isolated the NV system to secure the leakage.. The. inspector noted that there is a potential
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weakness in procedure OP/0/B/6200/57, Radwaste Chemistry Procedure
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for Sluicing Demineralizer to Spent Resin Storage Tank, because there-l is no step that requires notification of operations ipriorL to
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sluicing.
The inspector determined that this event could have been
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avoided by selecting other flow paths.for sluicing'the demineralizer
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.if control room operators were. aware that the valve had been.
-l previously, identified as being inoperable and sluicing was being performed. A Problem Investigation Report is being issued to address a
this event.
The leak was isolable via multiple valves.and there did not appear to be any imminent danger to the Residual' Heat Removal-d System.
.Further followup inspection will. be performed of ~ the
licensee evaluation, d.
Unit 2 Operations The unit remained on-line the entire period.
Several small power
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decreases from 100% were initiated for routine testing. The-unit was
on a licensee record run for Westinghouse units at the end of the
period. On April 4,1990 the inspector noted that the Turbine Driven
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump had been innediately shut down upon: an
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attempted test run.
Control Room operators indicated that ' a
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non-licensed operator (NLO) at the. pump.had noticed that the bearing oil sling ring which is supposed to rotate to direct oil to the.
bearing was not rotating, he immediately notified a control room
operator via radio who shut the pump down.
The evolution took less t
than a minute and prevented serious bearing damage.
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considered to be a commendable timely observation and actions by the -
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NLO and operator in preventing serious pump damage and subsequent
extended equipment outage.
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On March 22, 1990 the licensee was completing fuel reload and noticed
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that an assembly to be reloaded was not present' in Spent Fuel Pool
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(SFP) location B-7.
The licensee had been moving permanently discharged fuel assemblies the previous three days from SFP Region 1
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to Region 2 and had inadvertently moved the assembly from B-7..The inspector reviewed the licensee' evaluation of this avent. While this
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situation was not significant and was discovered vic the licensees
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reload program, errors of this type. can be more serious.
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licensee appeared to have done a thorough evaluation of this problem, i
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l Personnel-erred in moving the wrong assembly and did not properly i
sign off.the procedure.
Contributing to the event was a human l~
engineering deficiency withfthe procedure.
The procedure attachment
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for SFP bridge and trolley index locations uses a numbering system L
which includes the Region, i.e. location B-7 would be B-I-7 where "I"-
L is used to designate Region 1.
The licensee was not using Region
designators on the data sheet used for documenting locations for
.c tr6nsfers within the SFP,.i.e.
B-I-7 would. be listed as B-7 and
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B-I-17 would be - listed as B-17.
Personnel had" erroneously moved
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l B-1-7 instead of B-i-17 as intended.
Since index locations are
l unique in all locations of the pool the ' licensee is deleting the i
Region designator from the-enclosure, e.g.
"I" will no longer be'
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used.
The. licensee also counselled personnel involved.
These
actions appear appropriate for the circumstances
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During a review of Special Orders (50) the inspector 'noted that-SO
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l 90-04 provided instructions to operators -egardhng a possible loss of l
the Residual Heat Removal System (ND).
The 50 provided directions i
relative to various valve operations. This 50 was issued in_ response:
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to a situation described in NRC Information Notice 90-06:
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for loss of. Shutdown Cooling While. at Low Reactor. Coolant Levels.
The situation involves the possible failure of the. heat exchanger flow control valve'to full open upon loss of instrument air.
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could increase ND flow causing vortexing of the ND pump. While it is comendable that the: licensee responded to a possible problem in a
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timely manner, use of-the 50 for this purpose was inappropriate.
Licensee Operations. Management Procedure OMP 2-1 states in'Section 8-
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to the shifts for items that are not covered by current procedure and'
cannot be covered by changing. existing procedures" and "Special t
Orders shall not conflict with -or be used as a. replacement for j
operating procedures."
These restrictions are to assure that proper reviews / evaluations are i
accomplished for instructions involving operating of equipment important to safety.
The ' licensee indicated ' that.the Abnormal
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Procedure for loss of ND would be changed. to incorporate the.
requirements and this change was issued before at the end.of the
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inspection period.
The 50 did appear to have included the appropriate operator actions which should be taken.
This NRC i
identified violation is not being cited because _ criteria specified in
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Section V. A. of the NRC Enforcement. Policy were satisfied.
This is identified as a non-cited violation, 369,370/90-06-01:
Failure to Follow Procedure for Special Orders.
One Non-Cited violation was identified.
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3.
SurveillanceTesting(61726,61700)
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Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the
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' inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.
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Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain' that current. written
approved procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in~
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i use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, that system restoration was completed and acceptance criteria were met.
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Listed below are selected tests which were witnessed:
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PROCEDURE EQUIPMENT / TEST PT/1/A/4200/20A Unit 1 Airlock Operability. Check I
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PT/1/A/4403/00 RN Train IB Flow Balance-
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i The inspectors reviewed a large sample of surveillance test -.
procedures and completed surveillance test procedures to-determine whether the surveillance of safety-related systems and components is'
being conducted in accordance with approved procedures as required by i
Technical Specifications; and Inservice Inspection and Inservice
Testin0 program for pumps and valves.
.The following completed i
surveillance test procedures were reviewed:-
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t PROCED'!RE EQUIPMENT / TEST PT/1/A/4450/14 VP Valve lsolation Verification.
PT/2/A/4208/01A Containment Spray Pump 2A
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Performance Test PT/1/A/4401/01B Component Cooling Train IB Perfonnance Test j
PT/2/A/4209/01A Centrifugal Charging Pump 2A j
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Performance Test
PT1/A/4452/02A VE Train A Valve Stroke L
Timing-Quarterly l
PT/2/A/4255/03B SM Train B Valve Stroke Timing-'
Shutdown
PT/1/A/4403/02A RN. Train A Valve Stroke Timing-
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Quarterly PT/2/A/4209/928 NY Train B Valve Stroke Timing-t Quarterly
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PT/1/A/4208/02A NS~ Train A Valve Stroke Timing-
Quarterly PT/1/A/4206/02A NI Train A Valve Stroke Timing-I'
Quarterly PT/1/A/4401/02A KC Train A Valve Stroke Timing-Quarterly PT/2/A/4204/028 ND Train B Valve Stroke Timing-Quarterly:
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PT/1/A/4751/02A NC Train A Valve Stroke Timing.
. Quarterly.
PT/2/A/4204/018 ND 2B Performance Test i
PT/2/A/4252/01
, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #2 Performance Test, PT/2/A/4252/01B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B Performance Test
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PT/1/A/4403/01A.
Nuclear Service Water Train 1A'
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Performance Test j
PT/1/A/4206/01A Safety Injection Pump 1A Performance Test
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PT/2/A/4350/02B Diesel Generator "2B"
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Operability Test
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PT/0/A/4457/01B Control Room Chilled Water Pump #2 Performance Test
PT/2/A/4207/02B NM Train B Velve Stroke Timing-Quarterly PT/2/A/4977/01B MI: Train B Valve Stroke Timing-
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PT/2/A/5600/03A Semi-Daily Surveillance Items f
PT/2/A/4600/03B Daily Surveillance Items
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PT/2/A/4600/03C Weekly Surveillance items i
PT/2/A/4600/03D Monthly Surveillance items PT/2/A/4600/03E Quarterly Surveillance items
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Diesel Generator The inspector reviewed the Diesel Generator (D/G) surveillance f
program, primarily in the area of start attempt classifications, as
i part of a followup of corrective actions of IFI 369,370/89-37-01, Development of Diesel Generator Technical Specification 3.8.1.1
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Guidance,- and the subsequent weakness in Reg Guide 1.108 usage
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identified in inspection report 369,370/89-41.
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a During the review of-licensee procedure. OMP 2-6, Diesel Generator Logbook, the inspector noted that the guidance provided by Attachment i
1. D/G Start Classification Guide is that-any test intentionally terminated without being loaded greater than 2000 KW for greater than
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I hour is an invalid test. However, Regulatory Guide 1~.108.. Periodic
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Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power SystemsatNu'elearPowerPlants,-PositionC.2.E(6)statesthattests that are terminated intentionally before completion of the loading
requirements because of an alarmed abnormal condition that would have
resulted in diesel generator damage or failure is considered a valid-
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failure.
Ut.ing the licensee procedure, the potential exists to misclassify valid failures as'ir. valid tests.-
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i The inspector reviewed the draft -revision 'of OMP 2-6, that is currently being reviewed and determined that this same weakness
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exists in it.
This was brought to the licensee's attention and steps
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are being-taken to correct this.
The inspector reviewed the D/G start classifications'for the past six months to determine if-any starts had; been. misclassified.
Test
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number 779 on D/G 1A had been classified-'as -an' invalid test because the requirements of the periodic test had not been. met.
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after discussions with-the inspector, it was. decided to reclassify
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this start as a-valid success, since the Reg Guide criteria for a valid success had been met, even though the periodic test' had not
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been completed.
P There were multiple examples of tests that were terminated prior to the completion of the loading requirements,; because of equipment
problems.
These were classified as: invalid. tests.
Inadequate
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L documentation was present on the logbook sheet'to'tell if this was an
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accurate classification.
At the request of the inspector, these
tests were reevaluated.
All of the : tests were determined to be '
a invalid tests and supporting documentation was added to the' logbook i
sheets.
The existing procedure had.a weakness in not including a~
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requirement to fully document supporting data for classification decisions.
The draft revision is being modified. to include this
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requirement.
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On April 2,1990, a Special Report Concerning Diesel Generator 1A Invalid ' Test Failures during starts was issued by corporate:
licensing.
Several inaccuracies exist 1.n the report.
Start number
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i 786 is addressed as both an Invalid Test and an Invalid Test Failure, i
The D/G logbook has start number 786 as an Invalid Test.
" tart number 785 is logged as an Invalid failure.
The summary paragraph at the end of the report states that'there have been 56 valid failures in the last 100 valid tests, on a unit basis, i
There have been five valid failures _in_ the last 100 valid tests,
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based on a review of the D/G logbook.
The inspector notified the licensee of the inaccuracies in the
Special Report.
A copy of the draf t report supplied the corporate:
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licensing was given to the inspector and he noted that the errors in
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the issued report were not present in the draft.
The station personnel stated that they were not provided the fir 31 draft for r
review prior to issuance and were not aware of the problems in the -
report.
These problems demonstrate the continuing weaknesses in the D/G evaluation program,-both at the station, as noted eerlier, and at the corporate level.
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The corrective actions for these weaknesses will be monitored by the existing item, 369,370/89-37-01.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
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MaintenanceObservations(62703)
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Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the l
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resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance
adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.
The selected activities witnessed'were examined to ascertain that,
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where applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use, that prerequisites were met. that equipment restoration l.
was completed and maintenance results were adequate.-
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Perform preventative 05392B PM l
maintenance (PM) on Y F
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strainer on "B" Compressor.
y Repair Valve No. 1WG-240, 301119 CHM i
Implement NSM-12316 to replace 97435 NSM i
the 1 D/GB speed switches and l
some of the control wiring.
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Repair problem causing jacket 142025 OPS water temperature alarm on IP/GB.
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Perform PM/PT on IEDGB.
057978 PT
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Repair / replace IB D/G 138517 OPS t
thermocouple No IVDRD9150.
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Perform PM on main steam flow 07283A PT S/G B channel 1 instruments, t
Perform PM functional test 04068A PT
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and calibration of Containment l
Hydrogen Analyzer #1 train A.
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Perform PM on 28 D/G jacket 04176B PM l
water pressure. instruments.
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Perform PM on 2B D/G surge 04706A PM tank level instruments.
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i Visually check level switch 02686B PM on 2B D/G for corrosion buildup on contacts.
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Troubleshoot and seal 89241 PRJ.
Control Room leakage, b.
During observation of work request (WR) # 97435 NSM, to replace the Diesel Generator (D/G) B speed switches and some of the control wiring, the inspector noted that not all required procedures for
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performing ' the work were referenced on the WR and - procedure IP/0/A/3090/04 referenced on Section 11 of the WR was not available at the work place.
The inspector also noted that the work crew failed to document the QC notification prior to job start as required
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by Section VII of the WR; however, Instrument and Electrical stated-I that a QC inspector was notified by a phone call. The inspector felt that this was a lack of attention to detail on using the. WR and referenced procedures. Later observations of the work showed that no I
significant procedure deviations occurred, appropriate drawings which
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had wiring details were at the job site at all times, procedures were
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made available at the job site shortly after the inspector questioned the workers, and workers were counseled.-
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During the present Unit 1 outage the licensee has discovered containment corrosion on the internal surface at the upper / lower
containment interface.
The upper containment floor was originally constructed with an-approximately 2" gap between it-and the containment wall.
The floor is 2'- 3' thick and the gap is filled
with a cork type material.
The containment wall area within the gap
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was not coated during original construction.
This plus the fact that
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the cork material tends to retain moisture from leaks and t
condensation has led to the corrosion.
The containment nominal wall
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thickness in this area is.750" and the maximum corrosion is.045".
Initial design evaluation has shown that min.imum wall thickness would not be encroached for at least 49 months with no corrective action;
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Therefore the' licensee is not taking corrective action this outage j
and is presently evaluating long term corrective actions.
Unit 2 appears to.have.the same' problem although the depth has not been measured.
Additional inspections will be conducted on Unit 2 during.
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the next outage.
The licensee indiceted that a detailed report of this problem would be submitted to the NRC.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
LicenseeEventReport'(LER) Followup (90712,92700)
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The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to
determine if the 'information provided met NRC requirements.
The determination included:
adequacy of description, verification of
compliance with Technica1' Specifications and regulatory requirements.
- corrective action taken, existence of
>otential generic problems,.
reporting requirements satisfied, anc the relative safety significance of each event.-
Additional inplant reviews and i
discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports' indicated by an (*)..The following LERs are closed:
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369,89-22 Reactor Trip Occurred Because of a Failed Universal Board. in the Solid State Protection System Cabinet Train "A".
l 369/90-04 Holes Were Left in the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel in
Violation of Technical Specifications Because of
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Unknown Reasons.
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- 369/90-05 Technical Specification Required Flow Rate Verification and Equipment. Staging Building
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Ventilation System Samples Not Performed Properly 370/90-01 Containment Isolation Valve was Inoperable Due to l
Unanticipated Interaction of Components and Erroneous l
Documentation i
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LER 369/90-05 describes a situation whereby Radiation Protection-(RP)
personnel were supposed to obtain a radioactive gas sample every 12 i
hours and perform an estimation of flow through the alternate
continuous sampler every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> until the equiptr.ent staging building-
radiation monitor was declared operable.
RP personnel performing the
12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> sample failed to realign the sample. valve and left the pump.
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off.
The next two four hour flow estimates were both performed and'
signed off improperly.
The licensee corrective actions include i
procedure improvements, implementation of. requirements to carry procedure enclosures to the job site, personnel training, and
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counseling of involved personnel.- Licensee corrective actions appear l
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I appropriate, however, this'is-the second LER-(see LER 369/89-16 datedi j
August 21,~1989) involving _ missed-flow estimates by RP. personnel..
Therefore, this is considered'alviolation. This licensee identified-
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. violation is' not.being cited because criteria specified in.section z V.G.1'of the-NRC Enforcement Policy;was satisfied..This?is Non-Cited?
Violation ' 3694 370/90-06-02: - Failure to Follow Procedure for -TS Required Gas Flow Estimates i0ne Non-Cited: Violation;was identified..
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6.: -LicenseePlans?ForCopingWithStrikes:(92709)
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SeveralE Reginn.II facilities.recently experienced a vendor Radiation
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Protection (RP) workers 'strikeJ Subsequently. - the 4 inspector reviewed ~
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. procedures? to determine whether the : licensee has prepared-contingency.
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. plans covering an imminent or impending' strike to assure:
1) the minimum'
a number of qual 1fied: and proficient personnel ~ are-available to; ensure
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proper plant operation and safety;. 2) plant security is maintained at. a -
level consistent with' proper plant integrityiandJoperation;c and :3)-the-
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contents of: plant strike plans are consistent 1with regulatory requirements.
and that-these requirements are met.
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- Based 'on review of the licenseet s approved ' strike' contingency' plans and-
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discussions = with the licensee management, thel inspector < concluded 3that h
plant staff Lis capable of meeting regulatory requirementss duringithe!
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strike if it were to occur. A; strike did 'not.. occur.during the inspection
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ExitInterview(30703).
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The inspection scope and findings'. identified. below~ were tsummarized on April 24,1990,. with those persons indicated in paragraph :1: above. :The-
following items were discussed in detail-
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Non-Cited. Violation 369,370/90-06-01: Failure to Follow' Procedure for Special~ Orders (paragraph 2.f.).
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Non Cited Violation 369,370/90-06-02:. Failure to Follow; Procedure for TS L
Required Gas Flow Estimates '(paragraph 5.b.)
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t The-licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor~'
l did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by tha t
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inspectors during-the course of their-inspection ~.
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