IR 05000369/1990005
| ML20034A963 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 04/09/1990 |
| From: | Jape F, Matt Thomas NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034A962 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-90-05, 50-369-90-5, 50-370-90-05, 50-370-90-5, NUDOCS 9004250138 | |
| Download: ML20034A963 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES og'o,,
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NUCLEAR C.EGULATORY COMMisslON
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101 MARitTTA STREET,N.W.
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ATL ANT A, GEORGI A 30323 t,
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Report Nos.:
50-369/90-05 and 50-370/90-05 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 26242 Docket Nos.:
50-309 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17 Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: March 19-23,1990 1nspector: h k ttsl o ~$kmnM, N-9- 9()
M. Thomas O
Date Signed.
Approved by:
fM M
v[M[U F. Jape, Section Chief (/
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Date Signed Quality Performance Section Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of operations safety verification, f acility modifications, surveillance testing, and maintenance activities.
Results:
Activities observed by the inspector were performed in accordance with approved procedures in a controlled and orderly manner.
The communications and coordination between the control room and the other fuel handling
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locations during core reloading were considered good.
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees G. Addis, Superintendent of Station Services
- A. Beaver, Operations Coordinator J. Boyle. Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling R. Broome, Project Services Manager D. Bumgardner, Unit 1 Operations Manager T. Deese, Unit 2 Engineering Supervisor, Project Services G. Gilbert Superintendent of Technical Services R. Jackson, Unit 1 Test Supervisor F. Karimi azad, Associate Engineer, Project Services M. Raines, Unit 1 Engineering Supervisor, Project Services M. Sample, Superintendent of Maintenance S. Seo, Nuclear Production Engineer, Project Services R. Sharpe, Compliance Managar G. Small, McGuire Safety Review Group J. Snyder, Performance Manager D. Trapp, Nuclear Maintenance General Supervisor
- B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors T. Cooper, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
PlantOperations(71707)
The inspector reviewed plant operations to verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements.
Control room logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records were routinely reviewed.
Interviews were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, and performance personnel.
Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at shift changes.
Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as prescribed in applicable station administrtive directives.
The complement of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required by TS.
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Plant tours taken included, but were not limited to, the' turbine buildings, auxiliary building, and Unit 1 D/G rooms.
During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation control practices were observed, a.
Unit 1 Operations The unit was shutdown in a refueling outage during the inspection.
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with the fuel unloaded from the reactor core. The unit entered mode six and core reloading began on March 22, 1990, b.
Unit 2 Operations Unit 2 operated at 100 percent power during the inspection period.
The train A control room AHU-1 motor amps and casing temperatures were being monitored after the AHU operated abnormally noisy for a short period of time.
The noise was followed by a slight increase in motor amps and temperature.
Train B of the control room ventilation system was out of service because the RN system Train IB was out of service for Unit 1 outage work.- The RN system Train IB was in a seven day TS LC0 while the outage modification work was being completed. The TS LCO was cleared for the RN system Train B on March 21, 1990.
The Train B of the control room ventilation system was returned to service and Train A was taken out of. service in order for licensee personnel to inspect the Train A AHU-1 motor.
While inspecting the fan, maintenance personnel found that the fan shaft coupling had f611ed.
This problem is discussed further in paragraph 5 of this report.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Surveillance Testing (61726) - Units 1 and 2 Selected surveillance tests were witnessed by the inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance to applicable TS.
Selected tests were witnessed to verify that current' written approved procedures were available and in use, test equipment in use was calibrated, test pr6 requisites were met, initial system ' conditions were established, system restoration was completed as required, and acceptance criteria were met. The inspector witnessed the following tests in part:
PT/0/A/4150/33 Total Core Reloading PT/1/A/4204/01A, Residual Heat Removal Pump 1A Performance Test PT/1/A/4209/03A, NV Train A Valve Stroke Timing - Shutdown PT/1/A/4209/03B, NV Train B Yalve Stroke Timing - Shutdown
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The inspector observed core reloading activities from the control room on
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March 22-23, 1990.
The inspector verified that the requirements for flux monitoring from the control room, communications with fuel handling personnel, and performance of ICRR analysis were in accordance with t
procedures.
The inspector considered the communications, coordination,
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and instructions provided by the control room personnel to the various
fuel handling stations to be good.
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Core reloading was delayed briefly March 22, 1990, when a fuel assembly designated to be reloaded in the reactor was not in the proper location in the SFP.
The fuel assembly was found at another location in the SFP
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af ter approximately 20-30 minutes.
When questioned by the inspector,
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licensee personnel stated that it appeared the fuel assembly had been mistakenly relocated in the SFP.
After finding the fuel assembly licensee personnel verified that the fuel assembly was the correct assembly before installing 1t in its designated l
reactor core location.
Licensee personnel stated that their investigation to determine the cause of the fuel assembly being mistakenly moved from its designated SFP location was still ongoing. The results of the licensee's investigation will be reviewed by the resident inspectors.
Thirty five fuel assemblies had been reloaded into the core at the conclusion of this inspection.
Thirty three of the fuel assemblies were in their designated core locations. ' Two of the fuel assemblies were temporarily installed in different core locations because they could not be installed in their designated core locations.
Licensee personnel
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stated that an evaluation to determine the acceptability of temporarily installing the fuel assemblies in different core locations had been performed and determined that it was acccptable.
Licensee personnel stated that further attempts to install the fuel assemblies in their designated core locations would be performed at a later time during core reloading.
The licensee's resolution of this item will also be reviewed by the resident inspectors.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
a.
Maintenance Observations (62703)
Maintenance activities were witnessed by the inspector.
The selected activities were witnessed to ascertain that, where applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use, prerequisites were met.
The inspector observed maintenance personnel during removal of the fan shaft from tha AHU of the Train A control room ventilation system.
I The fan shaft had to be replaced because the coupling for the two piece fan shaft failed, causing damage to the threaded ends where the two piece fan shaft was coupled together.
Maintenance personnel were removing the fan shaft under WR 142005 OPS and maintenance procedure MP/0/A/7450/06, Control Room Air Handling Unit Corrective Maintenance.
The licensee stated that a replacement shaft was available onsit.
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i The inspector questioned licensee personnel concerning whether the two piece shaft design would be modified as a result of the coupling failure.
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.icensee personnel stated that the fan shaft would be modified slightly.
i A pin would be added to the coupling in order to reduce the stresses on the coupling and thus reduce the likelihood of future failures.
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change to the fan shaft design was being implemented under exempt change
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MEVN 2284 The work to replace the fan shaf t was still ongoing at the i
conclusion of this inspection.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Design Changes and Modifications (37700,37828)
The inspector reviewed the NSM packages listed below to verify that the
packages were prepared in accordance with regulatory requirements and
applicable industry codes and standards.
The inspector also verified that the NSMs were reviewed and approved in accordance with the licensee's administrative controls.
The inspector verified that the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations and the PMT requirements for the NSMs were adequate.
The following NSMs were reviewed.
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NSM MG-12129, Replacement of KC Heat Exchanger Inlet Isolation Valves IRN86A and 1RN1878.
The previcus valves were electric motor operated butterfly valves with weld ends.
The valves had proven to
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be unreliable for isolation and the weld ends caused,a problem with maintainability.
The replacement valves are high performance
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butterfly valves with wafer ends to make the valves more easily i
maintainable, b.
NSM MG-12243 Replacement of Valves IRN89A and 1RN190B; Redesign
Valve Controls; and Replace Adjacent Flange and Piping.
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modification involved replacing the previous valves, which were 20-inch butterfly valves with air-to-open, air-to-close piston actuators.
The valves were unable to provide adequate isolation to
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the KC heat exchangers.
The replacement valves are 16-inch high performance butterfly valves.
The valve actuators are an air-to-close, spring-to-open design, in addition, the previous carbon steel valve bodies and adjacent piping are being replaced with stainless steel to reduce erosion / corrosion damage in the future.
I In addition to reviewing the above NSM packages, the inspector also
observed field installation activities for valves IRN187B~ and IRN190B.
The inspector verified that the work activities were performed in accordance with approved work procedures.
Procedural steps which
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required the presence of QA/QC personnel during performance were adhered to.
No violations or deviations were identified, i
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Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on March 23, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector dtscribed the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were-not received from the licensee.
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Acronyms and Initialisms AHU Air Handling Unit'
CFR-Code of Federal Regulations-D/G Diesel Generator.
ICRR Inverse Count Rate Ratio-KC Component Cooling Water System LC0 Limiting Condition of Operation MEVN McGuire Exempt Change Variation Notice NSM Nuclear Station Modification PMT Post Modification Testing QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control RN Nuclear Service Water System SFP Spent Fuel Pool TS Technical Specifications WR Work Request
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