IR 05000358/1981030
| ML20040A088 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1982 |
| From: | Axelson W, Pagliaro J, Paperiello C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20040A086 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-358-81-30, NUDOCS 8201200325 | |
| Download: ML20040A088 (19) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-358/81-30 Docket No. 50-358 License No. CPPR-88 Licensee:
Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company Cincinnati, OH 45201 Facility Name:
Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Inspection At:
Zimmer Site, Moscow, OH Inspection Conducted: November 16-19, 1981
.d hct)
L Inspectors:
J!.A. Pagli
/ 2.f 5//[/
Approved By:
'Axelso ief (
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8 ~L-Emergency Planning Section h
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ap o, Chief l );
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Emergency Preparedness and Program Support Branch Inspection Summary Inspection on November 16-19, 1981 (Report No. 50-358/81-30)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of Zimmer Nuclear Power Station emergency exercise involving observations by ten NRC representa-tives of key functions and locations during the exercise.
The iospection involved 218 inspector-hours onsite by seven NRC inspectors (two resident inspectors) and three consultants.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8201200325 820113 PDR ADOCK 05000358
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pETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed L. Garcia, NRC Consultant,W. Christianson, SRI, Re
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oom Physics Teams Inplant and Onsite (Out of-Plant) Health S. C. Hawley, NRC Consultant, Operational ST r
enter Health Physics Team R. J. Marabito, Region III, Joint Public InfoM pport Centers M. J. Oestmann, Region III, Offsite "onitorin rmation Center J. A. Pagliaro, Region III, Technical Su g Team C. J. Paperiello, Region III, Control Roo pport Center Emergency Operations Facility P. P. Psomas, Headquarters NRC, Technical Sam, Tech Operations Facility pport Center and Emergency 2.
General An exercise of the licensee's emergency plan Zimmer Nuclear Power Station on November 18 was con integrated responses of t
, 1981, testing the to a simulated emergency.he licensee, State and local organizations major release of noble gases and iodineability to r scenario involving a emergency.
integrated with a test of the States of OhiAttachment I d The exercise was County, Ohio; Pendleton County, Kentucky; o and Kentucky; Campbell emergency plans.
and Bracken County, Kentucky 3.
General Observations-a.
Procedures This exercise was conducted in accordanc Appendix E requirements using the Zimmer N e with 10 CFR 50 used by the station. Emergency Plan, and the Emergency Plan ementing Procedures b.
Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated
instances timely; however, the Emergency, Oorderly and in most should have been activated in a more timelyperations Facility sufficient to permit the States and local autho manner.
If the u
ave been appropriate action for protection of the public.
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Observers Licensee representatives observed and critiqued this exercise well as ten NRC observers and approximately twenty Federal Emer-
, as gency Management Agency (FEMA report regarding the responses) of the States and Local observers. FEMA will provide a d.
Critique
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The licensee held a critique following the exercise the afternoon of November 18, 1981.
deficiencies which are discussed in the exit interv
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4.
Summary of Areas for Improvement Problems identified by the NRC observers and discussed during th interview included areas in which action is needed and will e exit prior to licensing and areas in which additional attention should be en given.
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The areas in which action is needed prior to licensing include:
Plan and a notification protocol developed.The Coast a.
The licensee has agreed to do this (358/81-30-01).
b.
A number of problems identified in the onsite personnel injury case will require additional training of onsite and response personnel and improved communications with the hospital.
tional practice drills will be run (358/81-30-02)
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Coordination with and training of local fire departments must c.
be improved.
Additional practice drills will be run (358/81-30-03)
Other items which should be given attention include:
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health physics technicians in several areas as noted in this rep (1) tr (2) communications between persons in respirators ort, the TSC, (4) information handling through briefings and st t(3) noise level in
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and (5) improvements in the Joint Public Information Center and th a us boards, of information.
e flow These areas will be reviewed during the Emergency Preparedness
Implementation Appraisal.
5.
Specific Observations a.
Control Room with information flowing into and out of the control r
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I without difficulties.
It was noted however, that the exercise did not focus on the identification and isolation of the primary leak causing the release.
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A weakness was noted in the area of keeping the control room operators fully aware of all operator actions.
Information and operator actions directed from the TSC pass through the control room communicator. The communicator then relays the information to the Shift Supervisor. Operators do not hear the information passed to the Shift Supervisor and they rely on the ability of the communicator to accurately transmit information.
The Shift Supervisor can not monitor the accuracy of information transmitted by the communicator to the TSC.
Discussions with the Shift Supervisor and operators indicated a telephone speaker would be desirable which would let the Shift 4pervisors and operators hear direct transmission from the TSC.
The exercise condition required the control room operators to wear cannister face masks. The masks lack devices to amplify voice transmission and are unacceptable to communicate directions to the operators by the Shift Supervisor.
b.
Technical Support Center The Technical Support Center (TSC) operated efficiently and e f fectively.
The Technical Support Center coordinator directed the TSC team effectively. The TSC team showed that they could handle problems that arose, e.g., the Kentucky Communicator could not reach the counties by the dedicated lines, he then turned to a
" soft land line" and established communications by this alternate method until the dedicated line was repaired.
The noise level of the TSC occasionally interfered with effective communications. Headsets given to communicators were not used because they considered them inadequate.
The TSC Station Communications Engineer's console has five stations and two speakers. The volume control on one speaker could not be totally turned down, thus interfering with the Station Communications Engineer (SCE) functions. The SCE was at times overwhelmed by the number of incoming calls and noti-fications that he had to make.
Steps should be taken to reduce the effects of noise level in the TSC by providing more comfortable headsets and reducing background noise level for the communicator (s) (i.e., telephone booths).
The Emergency Director conducted one briefing at 0741 hours0.00858 days <br />0.206 hours <br />0.00123 weeks <br />2.819505e-4 months <br />.
Briefings should be conducted at least once every hour.
The TSC staff determined that a General Emergency could be declared at 0921 hours0.0107 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.504405e-4 months <br />; however, a General Emergency was not declared until 0946 hours0.0109 days <br />0.263 hours <br />0.00156 weeks <br />3.59953e-4 months <br />. The TSC lacked an overall event status board.
Evacuation maps at times were not always kept up to date; however, this area is the lead responsibility of the EOF.
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The U.S. Coast Guard was contacted but was reluctant to perform in the exercise because they were not trained in the Zimmer energency plan and lacked special procedures and communications forms.
It is the responsibility of the licensee to ensure that all offsite support groups are trained and have the equipment necessary to support an emergency. The U.S. Coast Guard must be trained prior to licensing.
Revisions to several of the licensee's procedures were approved the day before the exercise and were received by the Resident Inspector's office 15 minutes prior to the start of the exercise.
This action precluded review of these procedures prior to the exercise. This is unacceptable and must not happen in the future.
Rad / Chem Operation Support Center c.
The Rad / Chem Supervisor controlled the functions assigned to him by:
(1) responding promptly to requests for monitoring data that were indicated by the TSC; (2) initiating contacts with the TSC periodically to transmit and receive status information; (3)
effectively setting priorities for tasks; and (4) communicating the nature of problems and appropriate activities to teams dis-patched from Rad / Chem OSC.
d.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Visual displays were complete and included a plant status board, radiological status board, and a supplemental information board.
A variety of EPZ maps for displaying licensee recommended pro-
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tection actions were utilized and included actual response by authorities and radiation measurements for onsite and offsite locations.
The Emergency Director periodically provided updates on plant / protective action status, Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
e.
The main criticism of the JPIC was that pertinent information should have been given to the news media in the joint press information center in a more timely manner.
l The Site Area Emergency was declared at 9:10 a.m. and the General Emergency at 9:40 a.m., but the media was not informed until 10 a.m.,
and then only by the state representatives from Kentucky and Ohio. CG&E did not make themselves available to the JPIC until 10:20 a.m.
The CG&E public relations representa-tive was not accompanied by a technical expert and therefore would not have been able to answer specific, detailed and complicated questions about nuclear power, Zimmer Plant and the accident.
Other examples of this time lag included:
(1) An evacuation was recommended by CG&E at 10 a.m.
Both Ohio and Kentucky responded by about 10:25 a.m.
The media, however, was not informed until-5-
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11:00 a.m.
(2) A release of radioactivity was announced in the EOF at 11:05 a.m.
The news media was not informed until 11:56 a.m.
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The amount of the release, wind direction, and other important facts were not made known. This press briefing was the first to have a CG&E technical expert available.
The 1:10 p.m. briefing was an improvement compared to the others, with knowledgeable people from the licensee and the states fielding the questions.
It was the first bciefing that appeared to be pro-fessionally done.
Other observations: The JPIC was a temporary facility, so the availability of only two phones for the media was excusable.
Typewriters for media use also would have been helpful.
F'nally, news releases by CG&E were dispatched, for the most
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part, in the same time-delayed manner as the briefings themselves.
The first news release was presented to the media at 11:05 a.m.,
almost two hours after the Site Area Emergency was declared.
The overall evaluation of the JPIC indicated that performance was marginal with the following specific recommendations:
Turn over of information should be more timely
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There should be more telephones available in the JPIC
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Information should be coordinated with technical people g
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f.
Onsite (Out-of-Plant) Radiological Surveys (Procedure No. EI.EPP.10.1--Site Boundary Emergency Survey)
The activities of the site boundary survey team were observed starting at the Rad / Chem OSC and continuing through the second set of field readings. The principal weakness observed was that the procedure involved too much on-the-spot planning, which caused undue delay. For example, emaipment should be in pre-packaged kits (bags) and ready for easy transport by the team members at the maintenance OSC supply cabinet. The survey procedure should be re-written to eliminate unnecessary on-the-spot decisions, and it should state that team members should use their inititive to keep their exposures ALARA, and caution them not to rely solely on such instructions from the TSC.
g.
Offsite Monitoring Surveys Two offsite monitoring teams were dispatched from the Radiation Chemistry OSC to Kentucky and Ohio. The team members were assembled and were initially briefed by the Rad / Chem Foreman regarding actions for monitoring the plume in accordance with the offsite Emergency Survey Procedure (EI.EPP.10.2). The team members were aware of the location of the emergency kits and conducted an inventory of supplies and operationally checked the survey instruments. However, they took an inordinate amount of l
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time (about 25 minutes) to get prepared to leave the site after receiving orders to dispatch. The team members found high and low range pocket dosimeters cnd TLD's in the emergency kit but chose not to use them during the exercise. They did not simulate determining their individual doses received as they monitored the plume centerline. Personnel dosimetry practices should be improved through additional training.
The team had good clear communications with the Radiation Pro-j e
tection Manager (RPM) in the TSC; however, there was no test of j
communications with the team member using a full face gas mask.
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The members were aware of when to use the masks. The RPM in the TSC kept the team members informed relevant to existing plant conditions; however, they were not kept informed of projected dose rate levels in the plume. This should be improved through additianal training.
The team members adequately determined the location and extent of the plume using appropriate radiation survey equipment during different phases of the exercise. The teams determined whether exposure results were due to direct radiation from an overhead plume or from actually being in the plume. This was done to ensure that air samples collected actually represent samples of the plume, especially for elevated releases. Air samples were properly labeled, however, techniques in avoiding contamination of the air sampling equipment should be improved.
Grass and soil samples were collected and brought to the chemistry laboratory for gamma analysis. However, improper sample handling techniques were used in transferring the samples to Marinelli beakers. A hood was not used for transferring the samples. The technician used a paper towel to record his data. The sample handling techniques and documentation are indicative of inadequate health physics training in the laboratory.
h.
Command and Control The inspectors observed command and control aspects of this exercise in the control room, the onsite Technical Support Center and the near-site Emergency Operations Facility. This aspect of the exercise was observed to ensure that as the exercise scenario developed each facility performed its assigned tasks, was activated in a timely manner and, overall control over the licensee emergency response passed to that individual assigned responsibility in the emergency plan.
(1) Control Room The exercise was initiated at about 7:19 a.m.
At 7:22 a.m.
an alarm indicated a leak in the drywell in excess of 50 GPM.
A controlled shutdown was ordered and at 7:27 a.m. and an Alert was declared. At 7:33 a.m. the NRC Emergency Operations
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Center was contacted using the red phone. The Shif t Supervisor exercised command and control during this period as required
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by the licensee's emergency plan. The declaration of an Alert
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required the activation of the Technical Support Center.
(2) Onsite Technical Support Crater The NRC inspector arrived in the TSC at about 7:40 a.m.
Most of the TSC staff had arrived in the TSC and the station Superintendent, who was in charge of the TSC, was being briefed by tbc control room and TSC staff. After being
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briefed, the Station Superintendent at 7:48 a.m. declared that the TSC was assuming command and control of the emergency response. During this phase of the exercise the Station Superintendent directed both plant operators to bring the facility under control and established communi-cations with offsite emergency response organizations. At 9:10 a.n. the TSC declared a Site Area Emergency. This declaration required the licensee to activate the nearsite Emergency Operations Facility.
(3) Emergency Operations Facility The NRC inspector arrived at the EOF at 9:30 a.m. and the State of Ohio emergency response personnel arrived about the same time by helicopter. A number of licensee personnel had arrived at the EOF by 9:30. The EOF was not yet fully staffed. At 9:40 EOF personnel were informed that on the basis of core damage and high containment pressure the accident was being classified as a General Emergency. The TSC still had command and control over the licensee's emergency response. At 10:30, the Emergency Director, the Assistant Vice President for Nuclear Operations, announced that he was assuming command and control over the licensee's emergency response and that the EOF was staffed and activated.
As of 10:18, there were 23 licrosee personnel participating in the EOF and 5 at local government Emergency Operations Centers.
After activation, the EOF performed those functions described in NUREG-0696. These included management of overall licensee emergency response, coordination of radiological and environ-mental assessment, determination of recommended protective actions for the public and coordination of emergency response activities with Federal, State, and local agencies. The EOF functioned in an orderly manner. Representatives of the States of Ohio and Kentucky were present and discussed with the licensee's Emergency Director recommended protective actions and which protective actions were being taken by local government agencies. There appeared to be an orderly flow of information to the Emergency Director and a orderly flow of instructions from him. Essential information, instruction and messages were written on prepared forms. At times status-8-
boards and maps were not updated in timely fashion. However, the Emergency Director received essential information in a timely fashion.
The licensee activated the EOF about 80 minutes after the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. This meets the 90 minute goal in the licensees Emergency Plan, however, it does not meet the regulatory position of NUREG-0696 which indicates a 60 minute goal. The NRC inspector judged that the licensee could have activated the EOF about 20 minutes All other aspects of command and control were sooner.
judged acceptable.
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Accountability Accountability was completed within 12-13 minutes for all station personnel except visitors and contractors / crafts persons. The latter two groups were specifically excluded for the purposes of this exercise.
The unexpected (i.e., not in scenario) discovery of three missing persons was handled rapidly and efficiently and they were found within an additional four minutes.
Accountability was implemented at the Central Alarm Station (CAS).
Good record keeping was evident and the guards performed ef fi-ciently both for accountability and initial offsite notifications.
These tasks were performed successfully.
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Personnel Monitoring Decontamination and Exposure Control Observation posts of these functions included the maintenance and Rad / Chem OSC's Assembly area, several radiological control points, and a limited portion of the evacuation routes (i.e.,
from assembly area to guard house).
No personnel decontamination was observed. No monitoring equipment was observed at the assembly area although evacuees would pass through a portal monitor which was inactive at the time of the exercise at the guard house.
The primary control point, located outside the Rad / Chem OSC, was not functioning as a control point during the early part of the exercise. All control points were equipped with a shielded G-M probe and a portal monitor. Two tungsten shielded G-M probes were utilized effectively for swipe counting.
It is recommended that the licensee install other tungsten shielded probes at strategic control points, e.g.,
control point on turbine generator floor.
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Personnel Injury Observation areas included the location of accident, the trans-
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portation of victim and the offsite hospital.
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l When the Emergency Response Team (ERT) arrived to treat the contaminated victim, they had no protective clothing and only one instrument (ion chamber). Based on the contamination levels (25 mR/hr @ l') of the victim, the instrument and monitoring
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technique would probably not have indicated these readings if actual contamination was present. The stretcher requires four persons to carry it; the ERT consisted of only three people.
a The ERT leader solved this problem by conscripting the " worker" who reported the injury.
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The controller told the ERT that they had become contaminated due to their handling of the victim. The team did not perform any decontamination of the victim or themselves nor did they have the supplies to do so.
The team and the contaminated " victim" were monitored prior to departure from the accident site. When the victim expressed his
" pain," the Health Physicist (HP) decided to forego delaying the
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team until shoe covers could be put on.
I Rad / Chem personnel met the team at the egress point from the
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plant, a control point with a portal monitor and frisker.
l Protective clothing and contamination control were proper.
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The HP personnel did not recover or read dosimeters from ERT members or the " victim".
I No decontamination was performed at the control point. Ambulance
personnel had appropriate dosimeters and protective clothing.
l Medical treatment of " victim" by ambulance personnel appeared to
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be done in an effective manner.
l During the ambulance ride to the hospital, contamination control
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measures were implemented effectively (e.g., sufficient changes
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of gloves, waste bags, changes of protective clothing). The I
hospital staff were in anti-contamination clothing and equipped I
with an ion chamber and G-M meter when the contaminated patient arrived. The patient and ambulance was surveyed and information
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recorded by hospital staff member. The transfer of patient to radiological treatment rooms was accomplished effectively.
The
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hospital treatment rooms were appropriately and adequately equipped to accomodate multiple patients. The inspector had two concerns:
(1) the possibility of tlushing contaminated water down sanitary drains (although sufficient canisters for waste water were available, there was no means to divert or stop the water flow from the sinks); and (2) the potential of contaminating the carpet material covering the floors in the rooms. Tarpaulines were laid down for major pathways but substantial areas were exposed.
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l No personnel decontamination was simulated although the physican
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gave an oral presentation that demonstrated his knowledge of the proper accomodation of radiologically contaminated individual.
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The physican had not been notified that a contaminated patient was
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enroute to the hospital due to an error in internal communications.
There was confusion over the location and responsbility for de-contamination of the ambulance and responding personnel.
The hospital and plant each expected the other to perform this task.
Overall, additional training and practice on the part of all participants must be provided.
1.
Effluent Sampling A team dispatched to take effluent samples of noble gases, iodines, and particulates was observed including: dressing in anti-C's; getting outfitted with instruments and equipment; and
taking of the samples. All aspects of the sample taking procedure
j appeared acceptable except for the following:
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(1) There was inappropriate handling of the particulate filter j
sample which could have contaminated the sample. The sample j
woulJ not be representative of the particulate radioactivity concentration in the effluent. Health physics practices
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j should be improved in sample handling.
(2) The samples taken were not surveyed immediately after removal from the sampling stream.
(3) Emergency radiation exposures did not appear to be controlled by use of a work procedure or other method to control exposures prior to entry into a radiation area.
A recorder was assigned at the Rad / Chem OSC to keep track of doses received by persons operating out of that center. The recorder also kept track of the location of persons and teams by monitoring a status board. The observer was informed that these activities were also in effect at the other OSCs and that they exchanged information.
m.
Fire Fighting Observation posts were the access to the plant (main gate) and the scene of fire. The fire department did not bring all the necessary equipment needed to the fire scene because they were
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not familiar with the plant and its equipment. Unnecessary hoses j
were brought down to the scene. The fire department was to retrieve equipment specific to the type of fire (foam for an oil fire) but the material was unavailable at the time of the exercise.
The fire brigade and fire department resolved the problem by utilizing additional water hoses which in the opinion of the fire personnel would have extinguisted the fire. More training must be i
provided to all fire fighters including the offsite fire department who may respond to a fire at the plant.
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Fire Drill (Health Physics Aspects)
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The health physics aspects of the fire drill were observed. As i
per plant procedure, the ERi leader evaluates the nature of the
l situation and calls for necessary support.
He evidently felt there was no need for health physics coverage at the scene of i
l this fire because none was observed. Upon arrival of the offsite j
fire fighting unit, a plant guard brought personnel dosimeters to j
the firemen, in accordance with plant procedure. After the fire
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was extinguished, a realistic and well organized check for con-
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tamination was made by Health Physcis on all participating firemen l
(plant and offsite) and on all their equipment and gear.
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6.
Previous Inspection Findings
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Closed (358/79-02-10): Emergency Plan Drill Prior to Fuel Loa _d
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As a result of new rule making in emergency preparedness, Appendix E
J to 10 CFR 50 requires an intergrated exercise with State, local and
licensee personnel one year prior to licensing.
This exercise ful-filled that requirement. However, if one year pasees from the date j
i of this exercise and the license is not issued, another fully scale
joint exercise must be conducted.
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7.
Exit Interview
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j The inspectors held an exit interview with Messrs. Borgman, Schott, and others of the CG&E staff. The concerns of the NRC observers, as denoted j
l in Paragraph 4, were discussed with CG&E management. Many of the problems j
noted by the NRC observers had also been noted by CG&E observers.
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Attachment: Exercise Scenario i
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. Page 1 AESTRACT OF ZPS-1 EXERCISE SCENARIO At a few minutes before 0715. a crimary system recirculation line begins leaking at a rate of approximately 10 gpm. At 0720 this leak has increased to approximately 75 gpm. An ALERT should be declared about 0730.
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At 0745, the increase in drywell pressure causes a reactor trip. Main steam line isolation occurs as expected on low reactor water level at 0753. At 0815, a switchyard failure results in a loss of offsite electrical power. The two available diesel generators start and the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) operates automatically.
At 0830, the High Pressure Core Spray starts again on low reactor water le"el however, its diesel generator trips out and cannot be restarted. Reactor level continues to drop to low-3 level and the automatic depressurization system is activated at 0900 c As the reactor pressure drops, the Low Pressure Core Injection and Residual Heat Removal pump isolation valves fail to operate properly and no makeup water is available to the reactor vessel. A SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared.
The reactor water level continues to drop uncovering active fuel which begins to fail. The drywell pressure increases to about 50 psig and the drywell radiation level is increasing. About 0930 a GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared. At 0945, offsite power is restored and ECCS pumps refill the reactor vessel preventing further fuel damage, however, drywell radiation levels continue to increase.
At 0950 a worker in the Radwaste Building is injured and contaminated requiring offsite medical assistance.
About 1100 an ECCS pipe splits open and its associated primary containment isolation valves fail to close thus causing a large porJion of the suppression pool to spill into the reactor building. By 1L15 the ruptured ECCS pipe r.as been isolated after leaking thousands of gallons into the reactor building.
A fraction of the iodine in the suppression pool water becomes airborne and is exhausted through the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)
filters.
At the exhaust rate of the SGTS it would take many hours to remove the radioactivity, but n.atural processes inside the reactor building remove iodine much more rapidly.
By 1330 the release rate of iodine is terminated and the SGTS is secured.
At approximately 1400, de-escalation to a SITE AREA EMERGENCY is possible and recovery operations can begin.
At 1430 a fire in the turbine building is
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discovered requiring offsite assistance.
At 1530 the fire has been
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extinguished. The exercise is closed out at 1600.
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It:ITIAL CO!!DITIO!!S:
Station is operating at 781 1:We, 93% of gross electrical output and has been operating base loaded since a 38 day (breaker to breaker) geqpeling outage ended 16 weeks age. The nuclear...d steam power systems are opdrating normally
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except that condensate Pu:ap A motor current has been slightly' higher than normal for the last two days.
Standby safety equipment is all operable except that standby diesel generator 1A is out of service due to low charging air pressure.
Repairs cannot be completed until the necessary parts arrive in 3 days. This diesel generator powers one Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump and the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) pump.
METEOROLOGICAL DATA:
The meteorclogical conditions assumed for the excercise ares l
Wind speed: 11 mph (5 m/sec)
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Wind direction: elevated from 115'
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ground from 343*
Stability class: C
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NOTE:
This highly unlikely combination of wind directions is specifically chosen to require protective actions in all four counties. The above wind speed results in releases being divided equally between elevated and ground plumes.
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DETAILED SCENARIC
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The following times for the detailed scenario are approximate.and are determined by the lead referee based on actual exercise participant responses.
T=0700 Plant conditions normal.
T=0715 Drywell equipment drain sump pump starts.
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T=0730 Drywell equipment drain sump pump continues to run, sump level is increasing and a power reduction is started.
- ALERT should be declared.*****
(Primary coolant leak rate is greater than 50 gpm).
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T=0745 Drywell pressure increases to 2 psig and reactor trips. The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) operates normally.
In approximately 2 minutes, high reactor water level occurs and the feedwater pumps trip, the high pressure core spray (HPCS) in]ection valve closes and the RCIC pump trips.
T=0748 MODE SELECTOR switch is left in RUN position. Operators elect not to maintain high reactor water level manually. Main steam bypass valves to main condenser fail to close properly resulting in a reduction of reactor pressure and water level.
T=0753 Reactor water level drops to minus 40 inches and main steam line isolation (MSLI) occurs. HPCS flow restarts to supply water to the reactor.
Reactor pressure is about 930 psig. RCIC turbine starts and then shuts down on overspeed and there is a failure to reset.
T=0800 Reactor water level is at plus 60 inches and the HPCS flow shuts off on high level. Reactor pressure is 900 psig. Peactor pressure begins to increase due to decay heat.
T=0815 Reactor pressure reaches approximately 1100 psig and the steam relief valve begins cycling to limit reactor pressure.
Suppression pool temperature and drywell temperature increasing. Reactor water level begins to drop. Switchyard failure causes loss of offsite pcwer.
Standby diesel generators 1B and 1C start.
T=0830 The reactor coolant system leakage continues and the reactor steam is being discharged to the suppression pool to limit reactor pressure.
The reactor water level drops to minus 40 inches which automatically starts the HPCS flow. The pump overloads.the diesel generator, which trips out and cannot be restarted. The one available RHR pump is in the suppression pool cooling mode. There is no makeup available to the reactor because two diesel generators are out of service.
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T=0845 The reactor coolant system leakage continues and the reactor water level drops to minus 90 inches, The reactor pressure is limited to 1100 psig by steam relief to the suppression pool removing the decay heat.
The drywell pressure is about 38 psig and the drywell temperature is about 265 F.
The drywell radiation level at the location of the post accident high range in-containment Monitor A (Detector 1RE-CM086) is about 5 R/hr.
T=0900 The reactor water level falls to low-3 level at minus 130 inches on level / pressure recorder IB21-R623B, panel 1H13-P601 and continues falling. At this level the automatic depressurization system (ADS) is activated however, RHR pump B discharge valve to suppression pool remains open.
The reactor pressure drops rapidly to 300 psig in 5 minutes. At reactor pressure of 900 psig, the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) pump C injection valve fails to open automatically.
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- SITE AREA EMERGEUCY should be declared.*****
l (Known loss of coolant accident j
greater than makeup pump capacity).
I Drywell radiation level at location of Monitor A is now 8 h/hr Reactor coolant sample taken between 0900 and 0930 would show coolant
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activities as folicws:
I-131 = 450 uti/gm
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i Kr-88 = 190 uCi/gm i
Xe-133 = 270 uCi/gm l
l T=0915 The reactor water level indication is pegged at minus 150 inches on the 1B21-h623B and is minus 10 inches on the reactor fuel zone level instrument indicating that active fuel is exposed.
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Reactor pressure 100 psig (approx)
Drywell pressure 45 psig (approx)
Suppression pool pressure 40 psig (approx)
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Drywell radiation level 10 R/hr T=0930 The reactor water level is minus 30 inches on the reactor fuel zone level instrument.
Reactor pressure 50 psig (approx)
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Drywell pressure 50 psig (approx)
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Suppression pool pressure 45 psig (approx)
Suppression pool temperature 200F (approx)
Drywell radiation level 150 R/hr and increasing
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Pegn 5
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Containment hydrogen monitor indicates 3 volume percent hydrogen in the suppression chanber air space.
- GENERAL E!!ERGENCY should be declared *****
(Loss c: ruel integrity and loss of reactor coolant pressure boundary has occured and there is a potential loss of reactor containment
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integrity).
T=0945 The drywell radiation levels are increasing significantly and are now
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at 59,000 R/hr on the high range in-containment Monitor A.
The reactor water level is minus 40 inches on the reactor fuel zone level instrument. The reactor pressure is 50 psig.
Offsite power is now rectored to ZPS-1.
Available ECCS are assumed to operate refilling reactor vessel.
T=0950 Radwaste tank has overflowed and a worker performing inspection falls, becomes contaminated, and sustains compound fracture of the leg.
T=1000 Very dramatic increase in drywell radiation level (Monitor A) with
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readings at:
T = 1000 700,000 R/hr T = 1015 1,150,000 R/hr T = 1030 1,900,000 R/hr
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Note:
These excessive readings are for exercise purposes to ensure j
that offsite doses will require evacuation as a protective action.
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Reactor building drains start indicating a leak somewhere in the
building.
The radioactivity release rates are provided to the operators at the times indicated and will readout on the Rad / Met computer.
Radioactivity releases are estimated to continue for a duration of 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />.
Gross radioiodine release rate 1x10-9 Ci/sec
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Gross noble gas release rate
, 1.5x10-8 Ci/Sec Note: D'irect readout of this information is assumed for the purpose of expediting the progress of the exergis __.
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Pagt 6
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The release rates that began at 1000 remain constant to 1100.
Radiation levels at area monitors in the reactor building have increased indicating very high activity levels in the suppression pool. The reactor vessel and steam lines have been filled with makeup water to permit recirculation through the suppression pool.
The reactor pressure is 125 psig.
T=1055 An ECCS pipe splits open and its associated primary containment valves fail to close.
T=1100 There is a rapid and uniform increase in reactor building radiation levels. Exhaust monitors on the standby gas treatment system indicate large radioactivity releases are beginning.
The drywell spray system is initiated reducing drywell pressure and temperature.
The following radioactivity release rates occur at the times indicated. Radioactive releases are estimated to continue for a duration of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
T=1100 Gross radioiodine release rate 5.5 C1/sec Gross noble gas release rate 72 Ci/sec T=1130 Gross radioiodine release rate 16 Ci/sec Gross noble gas release rate 275 Ci/sec T=1130 The damaged ECCS pipe is isolated ending the discharge of radioactivity from the primary containment to the secondary containment.
It is estimated that the discharge of radioactivity by the SGTS will continue for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and the release rate will decrease only slightly over that period.
Suppression pool level decrease indicates total leakage of about 60,000 gallons.
Reactor building releases are 275 Ci/sec of noble gas and 16 Ci/see of radioiodine.
T=1200 Airborne radioactivity levels in the reactor building are:
1-131 = 240 uCi/cc j
I-133 = 500 uCi/cc Xe-133 = 7 uCi/cc Cooling of the primary containment and reactor coolant system continues and drywell pressure is now slightly above atmospheric.
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T=1300 Radioactivity release rates continue at the same level as 1130.
Tine is now compressed to allow more facets of the emergency procedures to be exercised (hypothesized time ic placeo in parentheses).
T=1330 Apparently airborne radiciodine in the reactor building (1930) has been chemically fixed by organic materials and surfaces.
Airborne iodine levels are now negligible. Xe-133 concentration has increased to 20 uti/cc. Since filtration of reactor building releases is no longer essential, reactor buildir,g ventilation should be secured, thereby ending all releases above normal limits.
T=1400 The drywell pressure and suppression chamber pressure (2000) are subatmospheric by.1 to.2 psig.
Control of radioactivity release permits de-escalation to SITE AREA EMERGENCY level and recovery operations can begin.
T=1430 Fire alarm indicates fire in the feedwater hydraulic (2030) oil storage area in the turbine building.
T=1445 Fire is serious and spreading. Lube oil leaks (2045)'~have~ spread-the fire to other areas and offsite assistance is necessary.
- If no SITE AREA EMERGENCY existed,*****
this condition would result in a declaration of an UNUSUAL EVENT (Fire has lasted more than 10 minutes after initial use of fire extinguishing equipment).
T=1500 Fire is still burning, but not spreading.
(2100)
- It no SITE AREA EMERGENCY existed,*****
this condition would result in a declaration of an ALERT (Fire has lasted more than 20 minutes after initial use of fire extingushing equipment).
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T=1530 Fire has been extinguished with offsite assistance.
(2130)
T=1600 Long-term recovery actions are discussed and (2200) the exercise will be terminated.
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