IR 05000358/1981022
| ML20031H407 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1981 |
| From: | Daniels F, Gwynn T, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031H387 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-358-81-22, IEB-80-21, IEB-81-02, IEB-81-2, IEB-81-2-S1, NUDOCS 8110270453 | |
| Download: ML20031H407 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-358/81-22 Docket No. 50-358 Licensee No. CPPR-88 Licensee: Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company 139 East 4th Street Cincinnati, OH 45201 Facility Name:
Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station Inspection At:
Wm. H. Zimmer, Moscow, OH Inspection Conducted: August 3-7, 10-14, 17-21, 24-28, 1981
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Inspectors:
F. T. Daniels Date NlL9/8\\
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Approved By:
R. F. Warnics, Chief Zimmer Projects Date Inspection Summary Inspection on August 3-7, 10-14, 17-21, 24-28, 1981 (Report No. 50-358/81-22)
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of Previously Identified Items, Followup on IE Bulletins, Fuel Receipt and Storage, Review of Valve Packing Leak Detection Inside Containment, Review of Remote Shutdown Capability, and Plant Tours. This inspection involved a total of 145 inspector-hours onsite by two h7C inspectors, including 22 inspector-hours onsite during offshifts.
Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were ident-ified.
8110270453
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DETAILS 1.
Personnel Contacted
- J. R. Schott, Plant Manager-P. E. King, Assistant Station Superintendent
- S. C. Swain, CG&E Construction Project Manager M. Albertin, HJK Construction Project Manager M. F. Rulli, CG&E Quality Engineer D. J. Schulte, CG&E QC Inspection Manager
- J.
J. Wald, Station Quality Engineer F. Lautenslager, Station Security Supervisor H. C. Brinkman, GED Principle Mechanical Engineer W. O. Puckett, HJK Weld Engineer and others of the construction project and plant staffs.
- Denotes those attending monthly exit interview.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Open Item-73-01-04 - CG&E was informed by General Electric Co. that all required valves will have documentation to verify that measurements have been taken to determine that the valve wall thick-ness meets the design requirements.
The inspector reviewed documentation packages for GE supplied valves 1B21-F028A, B, and IB21-F022C and found that measurements of valve wall thickness had been made and compared to the minimum calculated.
(Closed) Open Item 73-01-05 - With regard to the reactor pressure vessel the effects of the 10 CFR 50.55(A) ruling for upgrading code requirements on a component is under discussion by GE and S&L but no decision has been made.
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The inspector observed that the licensee, in Section 5.2.1.3 of the l
Final Safety Analysis Report, has documented a request for exemption from upgrading code requirements on the reactor vessel and other
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specific components in a letter to NRR, Division of Licensing. The
inspector verified that this exemption has been granted by NRR, Division
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of Licensing in a letter from Mr. John Stolz, NRC, to Mr. Dickhoner, CG&E, dated March 13, 1975.
l (0 pen) Open Item 77-07-03 - Screenhouse housekeeping was poor.
The inspector made a tour of the screenhouse (Service Water Pump-Structure) and observed several housekeeping deficiencies. These were i
brought to the attention of.the licensee who stated that the specific l
deficiencies would be addressed as well as the general cleanliness of l
the service water pump structure. This item-will be followed up in a
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future inspection.
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(Closed) Open Item 71-02-13 - Incorporation of changes to the CG&E QA Manual.
The inspector verified that the QA Manual was issued without " penciled in" additions, corrections and/or deletions.
(Closed) Open Item 73-04-06 - Review of the security and site storage procedures for the Reactor Pressure Vessel.
The inspector verified the Reactor Pressure Vessel was installed.
(Closed) Open Item 81-01-03 - Review of Zimmer Master Procedure Index.
The inspector completed the review.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 78-11-01 - Reactor Engineer does not meet minimum requirements as stated in FSAR and ANSI 18.1.
The inspector verified the Reactor Engineer had a fully qualified backup engineer.
(Ciosed) Unresolved Item 75-03-05 - CG&E audit of Inland-Ryerson on October 31, 1974, contained four deficiencies which were not followed up by the QA&S Department.
The inspector reviewed two subsequent audits conducted by CG&E of Inland-Ryerson Company and verified the items found during the October 31, 1974 audit were adequately corrected.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 73-01-01 - Equipment storage instructions are not available at the site for the equipment as it is received.
The inspector verified by discussion with the warehouse supervisor that this item was solved by having the construction engineers review equip-ment storage requirements.
(Closed) Open Item 73-04-04 - Prepr,
.a of a weld procedure which would eliminate the issuance of an
.or in-process pipe welds.
The inspector verified that the current revision of welding procedures did not require an NR be written for in process pipe welds.
(Closed) Open Item 76-04-05 - Potential areas of concern identified during observation of receipt inspection of Diesel Generator Unit IC.
The construction tests have been completed which verified adequacy of DG Unit IC.
3.
IE Bulletin Followup For the IE Bulletins listed bclow the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated ia the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be-3-
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reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presentation in the bulletin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded.
copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.
(Closed) IE Bulletin 80-21: Valve Yokes Supplied By Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc.
The inspector verified by document review that none were supplied to the Zimmer project.
(Closed) IE Bulletin 81-02, Supplement No. 1: Failure of Gate Type Valves To Close Against Differential Pressure.
The inspector has previously verified that none of these valves were supplied to the Zimmer project.
4.
Fuel Receipt and Storage The inspector verified the integrity of the security controls for the new fuel storage area, and that provisions for control of the new fuel storage environment were in effect.
a.
Findings (1) The cleanliness of the refueling floor area, and the pro-visions for material accountability on the refueling floor have improved substantially. The watchman at the entrance barrier was well aware of procedural controls and require-ments. All items questioned by the inspector were controlled under the material accountability program.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.
5 '.
Review of Remote Shutdown Capability The remote shutdown panels, 1PL67JA and IPL67JB, are provided to permit.
cold shutdown of the reactor from outside the control room in the event the control room becomes inaccessible during operations. The inspector performed a partial review of the routing of cabling for these panels, and the capability of initiating shutdown cooling from these panels in the event of a loss of control room.
a.
Documentation Reviewed (1) General Electric Company Design Specification No. 22A-2817, Revision 03, Residual Heat Removal System dated November 27, 1973.
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(2) General Electric Company Design Specification No. 22A2817AJ, Revision 05,' Residual, Heat Removal System dated May 6,:1980.
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-(3) General Electric Company Design Specification No. 22A3752, Revision 03, Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System dated July 19, 1979.
(4) Cable Tabulation Sheets and/or Cable Pull-Cards for the following cables: RI187, NB733, NB789, RH281, Rh348, NB420, CM102, RI182, RI169, RI170, RH130, RH724, RH719, NB343, NB442, NB395, RR055, and NB410.
(5) P&ID M-51, Residual-Heat Removal System (a) Sheet _1, Revision AD dated March _5, 1981 (b) Sheet 2, Revision AB dated March 5, 1981 (c) Sheet 3, Revision T dated April 16, 1981 (d) Sheet 4, Revision W dated May 6, 1981 (6) E1010 Electrical Schematic Diagrams (a)
Pg. NB18, Revision L dated Octo'oer 22, 1979 (b)
Pg. NB23, Revision S dated March 31, 1981 (c)
Pg. NB29, Revision T dated May 19, 1981 b.
Findings (1) Of the cables reviewed, cables NB420*, NB442*, NB405*, NB395*,
NB410*, RI169*, RI170, RH281, and HR348 all run through the control room and cable spreading room in their routing path.
Cables marked with an asterisk (*) all pass through a common cable tray and riser in the control room area. Among these cables, NB405 and NB410 supply control signals from the two pt.nels (IPL67JA and IPL67JB, respectively) to redundant shut-down cooling injection valves (IE12FG53A and IE12F053B).
Although these valves may be locally operated (i.e.,~they are located outside the primary containment), the routing of these and the other aforementioned control cables through the control room defeats the purpose of having the remote shutdown-panels. This item nas brought to the attention of licensee
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i personnel who stated that this item will be addressed in the i
performance of a_ review being conducted by the architect engineer to verify conformance with the requirements of
10 CFR'50, Appendix R.
This item remains unresolved.pending
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completion of that' review-(50-358/81-22-01).
(2) The RH System P&ID drawings differed from the General Electric Design Specification (accepted by Sargent and'Lundy with no exception taken) in the fc,11owing respects:
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(a) Paragraph 4.2.5.2.4 of the design specification states, l
" Manually-operated gate valves, which are normally open, may be provided for maintenance.
If maintenance valves 1 f
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are provided within the primary containment, position indicating lights shall be supplied in the control room."
RH Valve IE12F306, the shutdown cooling suction valve, is a manually-operated gate valve located inside containment but no position indication is provided in the control room. The licensee stated that a locking device is used on this valve'in lieu of position in-dicating lights. This item remains unresolved pending verification that a physical locking device is installed and sufficient administrative controls are in place to ensure it will be locked in the correct position prior to reactor operation.
(50-358/81-22-02)
(b) Paragraph 4.2.5.3.7 of the design specification states,
"All valves over two inches located inside the primary containment shall be of the double packing type with leakoff connection to provide for leak detection pur-poses." RH Valve 1E12F306, the shutdown cooling r,uction valve, is an 18 inch gate valve located inside contain-ment but has neither the special packing nor the leak detection connection. Refer to Section 6 of this inspection report for further details.
(c) Paragraph 4.2.5.5 of the design specification states,
" Pipe connections with blind flanges shall be provided on the RHR System to permit supplemental fuel pool cool-ing in the event that reactor servicing should require an unusually large number of fuel elements to be trans-ferred to the fuel storage pool." Actual construction of this pipe connection was a welded in place 12" line, separated from the fuel pool by Valves 1E12F335 and 1FC029. The P&ID drawing does not require that these valves be locked. This item is of concern since mis-placement of these valves could result in low pressure coolant injection flow diversion to the spent fuel pool.
This item is unresolved pending clarification by the licensee.
(50-358/81-22-03)
(3) The P&ID drawings differ from the E1010 Schematic drawings with respect to the power supplies for the following instruments:
(a)
1E12AS066A, control switch for valve IE12F099A labeled ESS-1 on the P&ID but powered from ESS-2.
(50-358/81-22-04)
(b)
1E12AS014B-1, control switch at IPL67JB for IE12-F017B labeled ESS-1 on the P&ID, but powered from ESS-2 (Note:
control switch IE12AS014B for the same valve is labeled ESS-2).
(50-358/81-22-05)
(c)
IB21HS023 and IB21HS023-1, control switches for 1E12F053B labeled ESS-2 on the P&ID but powered from ESS-1.
(50-358/81-22-06)
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(4) The following labeling discrepancies were noted on the E1010 schematic drawings:
(a) E1010/Pg.NB23, auxiliar; relay K-80 is labeled "Close RU2 Head Spray, Suction and Shutdown Cooling Injection Valves."
's relay actually operates only the inboard RHR shutdowu cooling suction isolation valve.
(50-358/81-22-07)
(b) E1010/Pg.NB29, auxiliary relay K29 and K30 logic includes contacts from 1E31-N012A and B which are labeled "0 PENS ON HI WTR LEV."
These contacts actually represent a hi flow rate containment isolation signal for the RER shut-down cooling suction line.
(50-358/81-22-08)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.
6.
Review of Valve Packing Leak Detection Requirements Inside Containment The inspector reviewed the plant design with respect to provision for identification of valve packing leakage inside the primary containment.
This included review of regulatory requirements, FSAR commitments, design specificc. ions, design drawings, and the as built condition of the plant. This review was initiated in response to Section 5.b(2)(b)
of this inspection report.
a.
Documentation Reviewed (1)
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Criterion 30 (2)
Wm. H. Zimmer FSAR (3) GE Design Spec!!ication 22A2817, Revision 03, Residual Heat Removal System (4) GE Design Specification Data Sheet 22A2817AJ, Revision 05, Residual Heat Removal System (5) E&L Piping and Instrument Detail Drawings (various)
b.
Findings (1)
10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Criterion 30 requires, " Components which are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary shall be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to the highest quality standards practical. Means shall be provided for detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the location of the source of reactor coolant leakage." The Wm. H. Zimmer FSAR, Paragraph 5.2.7.1.2.j states, " Valve Packing Leakage - Valve stem packing leaks of power-operated valves in the nuclear boiler system, high pressure core spray, low pressure core spray, reactor core isolation cooling system, residual heat removal system, and recirculation system are detected by monitoring packing leakoff for high temperature and are annunciated by an alarm in the control room."
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The inspector reviewed the aforementioned system P&ID drawings and identified the following discrepancies:
P&ID M-21, Main Steam System
P&ID M-49, High Pressure Core Spray
P&ID M-50, Low Pressure Core Spray
P&ID M-51, Residual Heat Removal System
P&ID M-52, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
P&ID M-83, Nuclear Boiler System I
P&ID M-84, Leak Detection System (a) RHR System Head Spray Inboard Containment Isolation Check Valve IE51F066 is provided with leak-detection capability but no provision has been made to utilize it.
(b) Main Steam Line Drain Inboard Containment Isolation Valve IB21F016 (nuclear boiler system) is identified on Drawing M-21, Sheet 4 as being provided with leak detection capability (line ILD49A 3/4 referenced to M-84 Sheet 3).
Review of M-84 Sheet 3 revealed that no provision had been made for leak detection on this valve. A field check of the as-built condition ver-ified that line ILD49A 3/4 was not installed.
(c) Main steamline vent (head vent and vent to radwaste)
Valves IB21F001, F002, F005 and RCIC steamline drain Valve 1E51F076 are reactor coolant pressure boundary valves, power-operated, and located inside the primary containment which are not provided with leak detection capability.
These items are unresolved pending review by the licensee and by the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Licensing.
(50-358/81-22-091 No items of noncompliance or deviativas were noted.
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7.
Plant Tours The inspectors conducted frequent plant tours throughout this inspec-i tion period. The below listed items were identified and the licensee
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is taking or has taken appropriate corrective action:
A diesel generator building roof drain was plugged, cr asing water a.
to fall on safety-related cable trays in the
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dia el generator rocm. This drain was immediately cleared by licensee personnel.
b.
The following items were noted during a tour of the service water pump structure:
(1) Scaffold being supported by ESS Division I and II boxes JBPB56 and JBPB57.
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(2) Argon and Acetylene cylinders freestanding between ESS Division III and I boxes JBPB55 and 56 (3) A heavy accumulation of dirt, beer bottles, and general debris on top of IVH03AC and IVH03AD vhich were turned over for pre-operational testing.
(4) Fire protection hoses were either missing or removed from cabinets for non-fire use.
(5) The entire building was generally cluttered with dirt and debris.
c.
The inspector observed the following violations of cable separa-tion criteria (refer to IE Inspection Report No. 50-358/81-13 for citation):
(1) Cable CW-056 (associated ESS Division II) in an ESS Division I cable tray above 480VWSMCCIA.
(2) Nondivisional Cables HC 136 through 139 pass through ESS Division I cable tray below 480VWS-MCC1A.
(3) Conduit containing Cable WS027 (ESS Division II) was in direct contact with Cables WS048, 050 (ESS Division III)
above 480VUSMCC1C.
(4) Nondivisional Cable DM027 passes through an ESS Division III cable tray above 480VWSMCCIC.
d.
The inspector observed a deenergized portable weld rod oven con-taining approximately one pound of E7018 low hydrogen weld rod on the first platform above the 473' elevation in RHR heat exchanger Room A.
The oven and weld rod were both cool. The licensee, upon notification by the inspector, immediately re-trieved the oven, weighed the weld rod and determined that none of the rod had been used since issue. The problem was caused by a lack of power to 115 Va. electrical outlets in the RHR heat exchanger Room A.
e.
Cable NB402 (ESS Division I) to Valve 1E12F053A had a broken flexible conduit. This item was turned over to the electric production department.
8.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of non-compliance, or deviations. Nine unresolved items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 5.b(1), 5.b(2)(a), 5.b(2)(c),
5.b(3)(a), 5.b(3)(b), 5.b(3)(c), 5.b(4)(a), 5.b(4)(b), and 6.b(1).
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Management Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Para-graph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on August 28, 1981. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
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