IR 05000354/1981007
| ML20009B786 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 06/26/1981 |
| From: | Bateman W, Greenman E, Reynolds S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009B779 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-354-81-07, 50-354-81-7, 50-355-81-07, 50-355-81-7, NUDOCS 8107170160 | |
| Download: ML20009B786 (18) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-354/81-07 Rfport No. 50-355/81-07 50-354 Docket No. 50-355 CPPR-120 License No. CPPR-121 Priority
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Category A
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Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza -17C Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at:
Hancock's Bridge and Newark, New Jersey Insper. tion conducted: Ma 4 -31, 1981 Inspectors:
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W. H. Bateman, Senior Resident Inspector
' dafe signed Abut o/u/si S. D. Re#nolds, Reactor Inspecto:-
date signed date signed Approved by:
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E. G. Gre'enman, Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section 2A Inspection Summary:
Unit 1 Inspection of May 4 - 31,1981 (Report No. 50-354/81-0_7):
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Ar_e_as Inspec_ted:
Routine announced inspection by the resident inspector (49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br />)
of work in progress including the supplier quality program, safety relief valve (SRV)
piping cold pull checks, upper bioshield weldout, structural steel installation, in-stallation of pipe whip restraints inside containment, housekeeping, equipment main-tenance, hanger installation including welding and component checks, and pipe fitup, handling, welding, and weld repairing.
The inspector also made tours of the site, reviewed licensee action on previous inspection findings, evaluated licensee action on construction deficiency and 10 CFR Part 21 reports, and performed a review at the Newark, N. J. office of licensee audits, supplier quality troubleshooting activities, and the status of NRC Bulletins, Circulars, and Information Notices. Additionally, 8107170160 810629 PDR ADOCF 05000354 G
PDR Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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Inspection Summary
a regionally based specialist inspector performed an announced inspection (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) at Lehigh University to witness destructive testing of defective welds associated with the ACME embed problem discussed in Inspection Report 81-05.
Resul ts:
Noncompliances - none.
Unit 2 Inspection of May 4 - 31 _1981 (Report No. 50-355/81-07)_:
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced inspection by the resident inspector (24.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />) of work in progress including containment erection, housekeeping, and supplier quality program. Additionally, a regionally based specialist inspector performed an announced inspection (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) at Lehigh University to witness destructive testing of defective welds associated with the ACME embed problem discussed in Inspection Report 81-05.
The inspector also made tours of the site, reviewed licensee action on previous inspection findings, evaluated licensee action on construction deficiency and 10 CFR Part 21 re-ports, and performed a review at the Newark, N. J. office of licensee audits, supplier quality troubleshooting activities, and the status of NRC Bulletins, Circulars, and Information Notices.
_Re_sul ts:
Noncompliances - none.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G)
A. Barnabei, Site QA Engineer R. Evans, Manager, QA Audits and Training
- A. E. Giardino, Project 0A Engineer C. Hug, Senior Staff Engineer P. Kudless, Project Construction Manager A. Nassman, Manager, QA Engineering and Construction F. Omohundro, Manager, QA Services G. Owen, Principal Construction Engineer
- Present at exit interview conducted at the conclusion of the inspection.
Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
M. A. Drucker, Lead QA Engineer R. Hanks, Project QC Engineer M. Henry, Project Field Engineer D. Long, Project Superintendent G. Moulton, Project QA Engineer P. Patil, Resident Engineer L. E. Rosetta, Field Construction Manager J. Serafin, Assistant Project Field Engineer A. Yanek, Resident Engineer Pittsburgh - Des Moines Steel Company (PDM)
M. Stiger, Site QA Manager Schneider, Inc.
G. Falk, Site QA Manager J. Rush, Corporate QA Manager Lehigh University Dr. John Fisher, Professor Dr. Ben Yen, Professor R. Mcdermitt, Laboratory Technician 2.
Site Tour Routine tours of the site were made to observe the status of work and con-struction activities in progress. The inspector noted the presence of and interviewed QC and construction personnel. Work items were examined for obvious defects or noncompliance with regulatory requirements or license conditions. Areas observed included:
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Unit 1: Housekeeping, equipment maintenance, pipe whip restraint installation inside containment, structural steel installation, upper bioshield weldout, and hanger and pipe installation.
Unit 2:
Equipment maintenance, housekeeping, containment erection, and structural steel erection.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Li_censee Action on Prev _ious Inspection _ Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (354/80-07-03):
Failure of PX Engineering QC in-spectors and Bechtel shop surveillance inspectors to identify lower bioshield weld defects and missing NDE records. The licensee perfonned a thorough in-spection of accessible areas of the lower bioshield and identified additional problem areas. Additionally, a thorough records review was performed and all welds missing NDE records were identified.
NCR's were generated to track and resolve these problems. The licensee reported this problem in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) (see paragraph 4 of this Inspection Report).
The satisfactory closure of NCR's 755, 770, and 779 resclved the technical aspects of this problem. The other aspect, that of inadequate PX Engineering QC inspection and Bechtel shop surveillance inspection, has been addressed by an increase in the shop surveillance inspection activities at PX Engineering.
This involves the establishment of additional hold points and upgrading of the level of the surveillance inspection. The upper biological shield was received after the identification of the problems with the lower bioshield.
A substantial amount of effort went into identifying and correcting problems with the upper bioshield because it was nearly completely fabricated at the time of the identification of the luer bioshield problems. The Unit 2 bioshield is being fabricated by PX Engineering under the increased sur-veillance inspection program. The increased surveillance inspection of PX and the licensee emphasis of the seriousness of the problems identified have resulted in an improved situation for performance of acceptable quality work by PX.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (354/79-07-02; 355/79-07-02):
Implementation of the licensee system for tracking the status of NRC Circulars was not effective.
During is inspection report period the inspector reviewed the status of NRC Cir'.ars and detennined that the licensee's tracking system is now being effect).ely implemented.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (354/80-04-02):
Torus to drywell vent line bellows corner joint compliance to ASME Code requirements was not clear.
In NRC Inspection Report 80-14 the NRC stated their position regarding the accept-ability of the bellows corner joint. This position was that, in order for the joint to meet ASME III Subsection NE Code requirements, it must either:
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(1) Undergo volumetric examination if the joint remains in its present configuration; (2) Be provided with reinforcement per Code requirements if surface examination is to be the NDE requirement; or (3)
Be analyzed to show that the existing material thickness provides Code required reinforcement if surface examination is to be the NDE requirement.
In PDM letter CLB-152-2637 to Bechtel dated April 29, 1981, PDM presented an analysis by their design agent (NUTECH) which demonstrated that the material thickness at the joint is sufficient to meet the third option stated above, i.e., an analysis was perfomed to show that tne existing material thickness provided the Code required reinforcement.
Based on this analysis and approval of this analysis by Bechtel, Factory Mutual (PDM's Authorized Nuclear Inspec-tor), and the licensee the NRC finds that a surface examination of this weld is acceptable and conforms to Code requirements.
4.
Peview of Non_ routine E_ vents Reported _by the Licensee
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A.
By letter dated January 31, 1980, the licensee reported a potential significant deficiency in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) involving wall thickness problems on two Main Steam pipe spools supplied by General Electric.
By letter dated March 24, 1980, the licensee withdrew this potentially reportable item based on a review conducted by GE and verified by Bechtel that detemined the area of pipe in question had a thickness greater than that required by the ASME Piping Code. The inspector reviewed the following docu-mentation associated with this decision:
GENED FDDR KT1-001, Rev. 0
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GENED FDDR KTl-011, Rev.1
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Bechtel letter BLC 1080 to GENED dated 12/19/79
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GENED letter GB-80-70 to Bechtel dated 3/3/80
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This documentation included wall thickness calculations made according to equation 1 of NB 3641.1 of the 1971 Code which indicated a Code minimum wall thickness of 1.0016". The two pipe spools involved had the following minimum thickness dimensions:
l Spool Minimum _ Thickness Dimension
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PS-1-C2 1.002" PS-1-A2 1.01?"
The question originally arose because the GE drawing requirement called for a minimum thickness of 1.013" which resulted from the use of a conservative corrosion allowance.
Based on the determination that the pipe wall thickness never violated Code minimum and that the two spools discussed above will have weld buildup per-formed to restore minimum wall to the GE drawing requirements, the inspector concurs with the licensee's dacision to withdraw this item and considers the item closed.
(354/79-00-02; 355/79-00-03)
B.
By letter dated December 29, 1980, the licensee reported a potential signifi-cant deficiency in accordat.;e with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) in-volving rerated Westinghouse circuit breakers.
By letter dated March 2,1981, the licensee withdrew this potentially reportable item based on an investiga-tion by Bechtel that revealed, rerated breakers were not.used in motor control centers shipped to this project. The inspector reviewed the par-ticulars of this investigation and determined that Westinghouse breaker types JB, KB, and HKB were rerated for current interrupting capacity as follows:
Breaker Original Rerated T_ype Rating Rating _
JB/KB 22,000 amps 18,000 amps HKB 25,000 amps 18,000 amps The cause of the rerating was a result of routine testing of production run breakers by Westinghouse:
production run breakers between the time period of November,1980 to January,1981 failed to meet Westinghouse testing stan-dards and consequently were rerated.
Production breakers prior to November, 1980 tested satisfactorily and are considered acceptable. Westinghouse made design changes to the JB, KB, and HKB breakers and commenced production of the redesigned breakers in January,1981.
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The redesigned production run breakers have been tested and meet the pre-rerated current interopting capacities. Westinghouse stated in a letter to Eaton Corporation dated January 16, 1901 that they could not determine a cause for the failure of the November,1980 to January,1981 breakers to successfully pass the testing.
Based on the facts that:
1)
Cutler-Hammer's shipments of motor con-trol centers to Hope Creek occurred prior to November, 1980; 2) a commitment has been nade that no future sht;ments from Cutler-Hammer will contain the derated breakers; 3) Bechtel has determined that none of the derated breakers are contained in other electrical equip-ment shipped to Hope Creek; and 4) redesigned breakers do meet testing requirements, the inspector concurs with the licensee that this issue is not rep (ortable for the Hope Creek project and considers the item closed.
354/80-00-06; 355/80-00-06)
C.
By letter dated August 7,1980, the licensee reported a potential significant deficiency in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) involving missing inspection and NDE records for several welds in the lower biological shield fabricated by PX Engineering.
NRC Inspection Reports 80-10 and 80-12 documented followup activity by the licensee that involved UT testing, repair of identified indications, and satisfactory perfonnance of post-repair NDE. By letter dated December 29, 1980, the licensee withdrew this potentially reportable item based on a records search at PX Engineering that resulted in finding many of the missing NDE records, reexamination of those welds for which no records could be located, and conducting engineering evaluations.
The inspector reviewed the records package associated with this issue which included three difference NCR's as follows:
NCR 755:
Documented and resolved problems within the bioshield wall NCR 770: Documented and resolved problems on the bioshield outer surfaces NCR 779:
Documented and resolved the missing NDE records NCR 755 documented the weld defects identified during sn inspection of the accessible areas of the inside of the bioshield wall. This repre-sented approximately 20% of the total number of welds involved. The weld defects identified included undercut, incomplete penetration, undersize fillet welds, and lack of sufficient groove weld reinforcement.
The disposition of the NCR was to accept the defects as is based on an
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engineering evaluation by Bechtel. NCR 770 was similar to NCR 755 but applied to the outside surfaces of the bioshield wall.
NCR 779 identified all the welds for which no NDE records were available and required NDE and repairs as required. The Bechtel engineering eval-uation regarding reportability of the missing NDE records involved performance of a design analysis assuming that the welds for which there were no records were nonexistent. This analysis indicated that had those welds been missing, the bioshield would still have been sufficiently designed and constructed to withstand the design loading.
Based on the above discussion the inspector concurs with the licensee that this issue is not reportable for the Hope Creek project and considers the item closed.
(354/80-00-02)
D.
By letter dated May 26, 1981, the licensee reported a potential significant deficiency in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) involving concrete embedment of embeds with potentially defective welds purchased from ACME Steel Engineering Co.
NRC In-spection Report 81-Ob detailed a noncompliance addressing the weld defects and failure of the ACME QC program and Bechtel Supplier Quality program to identify these defects prior to shipment. During this in-spection report period a regionally based specialist inspector ob-served special destructive testing of portions of these embeds at Lehigh University.
His report is as follows:
Bechtel evaluation of the effect of weld defects on the per-formance of the subject embeds includes destructive testing of selected embeds to determine the maximum load carrying capacity of specific joints. A group of 43 test coupons (shear bar, anchor plate, and anchor bar) were prepared by Bechtel for tensile testing. The coupons were identified by the following symbols:
Visually Acceptable Weld With Worst RT AW
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Visual;r : ceptable Weld With Marginal RT AM
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Visually Acceptable Weld With Good RT AG
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AP Anchor Plate
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Anchor Bar AB
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The coupons went fabricated by welding tabs to sections cut from the embeds to produce rectangular sections to fit the tensile machine grips.
The shear bars are loaded normal to the service loading direction.
The following visually acceptable anchor plate and anchor bar coupons have been prepared.
No. of Sample Coupon I
D. Numbar (1)
44AW3AB (2)
22/W2AB (3)
22AW8AB (4)
103AW3AB (5)
103AW5AB (6)
32AW6AP (7)
60AW4AP (8)
21AW3AP (9)
21AW7AP (10)
45AW6AP (11)
44Af14AB (12)
44AM9AB (13)
8AM7AB (14)
32AM1AP I
(15)
32AM9AP (16)
60AM3AP (17)
45AG1AB (18)
48AG6AB i
(19)
45AG9AP
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(20)
57AG7AP l
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The following visually rejected anchor plate coupons have been pre-pared.
No. of Sample Coupon I._D. Number (1)
119UW3AP (2)
119UW6AP (3)
1190GSAP (4)
50UW9AP (5)
50VM7AP (6)
34UW6AP (7)
34UM8AP (8)
119UG8AP (9)
80VM7AP (10)
16UW7AP ina following visually acceptable shear bar coupons have been pre-pared.
No. of Sample Coupon I. D. Number
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(1)
23AW25/40B SB (2)
115AW25/34 SB (3)
32AW17/18 SB (4)
45AW19/20 SB (5)
57AG19/20 SB (6)
22AW32/40A SB (7)
23AW25/34 SB (8)
32AM27/41A SB (9)
115AW32/40A SB (10)
115AW14/41B SB (11)
32AM19/20 SB (12)
60AM16/418 SB (13)
32AM15/40C SB
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A regionally based NRC inspector witnessed the setup and tensile test of one anchor bar, one anchor plate and one shear bar at the Fritz Engineering Laboratory at Lehigh University in Bethlehem, Pa. The maximum load on these specimens was as follows:
Specimen _
Load (KIPS)
location o_f Failure (4)
10 - 103AW3AB 225 Hole (1)
(6)
10 - 32AW6AP 197.5 Hole (1)
(9)
10 - 115AW32/40A SB 162.5 Weld (2)
Note:
(1) Anchor bar 4" x 1" at weld and 3-3/4" x 1" at location of 1" diameter drilled hole. Coupon broke in grips at a hole. No distress noted on weld at noted load applica-tion. (Wrap around fillet weld)
(2)
Fillet weld in two long sides of 3-3/4" x 1" bar. Failure in shear thru fillet weld. This specimen had the largest amount of subsurface porosity of all the shear bars radio-graphed.
Bechtel will continue to have the specimens tested, but will monitor the results to determine if it is necessary to test all of the coupons that have been prepared.
Following completion of the destructive testing of the worst cases identified, a final report will be written which will include an evaluation of the re-portability of this problem. This item remains open.
(354/81-00-02; 355/81-00-02)
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5.
Status of Bulletins, Circulars, and Information Notices - Units 1 and 2 The inspector reviewed records concerning licensee action on NRC issued Bulletins, Circulars, and Information Notices and discussed these actions and records with responsible licensee personnel. The systems used to track the status of these documents is a combination of a Bechtel generic tracking system and licensee in-house tracking systems in both the engineering and QA departments. As regards NRC Information Notices, licensee engineering personnel track each one in concert with Bechtel until it has a written internal response addressing the issue.
Licensee QA personnel periodically audit engineering to ensure conformance to the system. The inspector verified that NRC Information Notices were being addressed by the licensee system just described.
Bulletins are tracked by the Bect.el generic system and the licensee's in-house systems and, in many cases, require a written response to the NRC. Other Bulletins are sent to the licensee for information only and do not require a written response to the NRC. The inspector verified that Bulletins of both types were tracked by the licensee until satisfactory resolution. The inspector revinied records associated with the below listed Bulletins and determined that it.ensee action was sufficient to warrant closing them out:
Bulletin No.
Descritt on/Closeou_t Act_ ion _
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79-12 Short Period Scrams at BWR Facilities /This Bulletin was for information only. Licensee operations personnel will factor concerns into procedures when they are written.
The "Emer-gency Rod In" switch was evaluated by licensee engineering and determined to differ from switch discussed. Switch also was determined to be suitable for prolonged severe use.
79-13 Cracking in Feedwater System Piping / This Bulletin was for
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information only and was determined by the licensee to not l
apply to a BWR.
79-17 Pipe Cracks in Stagnant Borated Water Systems at PWR Plants /
This Bulletin was for information only. The licensee took action to minimize stainless steel lines and stagnant lines and intends to use "L" grade stainless steel material which is less susceptible to intergranular stress corrosion crack-ing.
(Refer to licensee Interoffice Memorandum from Bast to Schwalje dated 10/11/79).
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Bulletin No.
Description /C_losecut Action 79-24 Frozen Lines /This Bulletin was for information only. The licensee performed a study and identified two safety related pipes subject to freezing (HPCI/RCIC suction lines and con-densate storage tank standpipe). To increase the level of protection against freezing, the insulation thickness will be doubled and redundant heat tracing will be added.
79-25 Fai'ures of Westinghouse BFD Relays in Safety-Related Systems /
This Bulletin was for action by the licensee.
Licensee will not use Westinghouse BFD and NBFD relays in safety related sys-tems. Use of these relays is precluded by a requirement in each purchase specification that they not be used.
79-28 Possible Malfunction of Namco Model EA 180 Limit Switches at Elevated Temperatures /This Bulletin was for action by the licensee. All Namco switches were verified by the licensee to not be from the defective batch or had the defective gaskets replaced.
Instructions were issued to assure that defective gaskets will not be used in the future.
Circulars are tracked by the Bechtel generic system and the licensee's in-house systems.
Circulars do not require a formal written response to the NRC but must be addressed by the licensee. The inspector reviewed records associated with the below listed Circulars and closed them out based on either sufficient licensee action to warrant close out or conditions described not being applicable:
Circular Number Desct iption 77-15 Degradation of Fuel Oil Flow to the Emergency Diesel Generator t
l 79-05 Moisture Leakage in Stranded Wire Conductors 79-10 Pipefittings Manufactured from Unacceptable Material 79-11 Design / Construction Interface Problem 79-13 Replacement of Diesel Fire Pump Starting Contactors 79-17 Contact Problem in SB-12 Switches on General Electric Metalclad Circuit Breakers 79-19 Loose Locking Devices on Ingersoll-Rand Pumps i
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Circular Number Description 79-20 Failure of GTE Sylvania Relay, Type PM Bulletin 7305, Catalog SU12-11-AC with a 120V AC Coil 79-22 Stroke Times for Power Operated Relief Valves 79-23 Motor Starters and Contactors Failed to Operate 79-24 Proper Installation and Calibration of Core Spray Pipe Break Detection Equipment on BWRs 79-25 Shock Arrestor Strut Assembly Interference 80-02 Nuclear Power Plant Staff Work Hours 80-05 Emergency Diesel-Generator Lubricating Oil Addition and Onsite Supply 80-10 Failure to Maintain Environmental Qualification of Equipment 80-11 Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Cooler Failures 80-13 Grid Strap Damage in Westinghouse Fuel Assemblies 80-14 Radioactive Contamination of Plant Demineralized Water System and Resultant Internal Contamination of Personnel 80-15 Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Cooling and Natural Cir-culation Cooldown 80-22 Confirmation of Employee Qualifications 6.
Review of Part 21 Reports A.
On September 5,1979, GE notified the NRC of a condition reportable under 10CFR21 regarding inverters manufactured by Topaz Electronics, San Diego, California.
Since that time, it has been determined that only the Topaz Inverter Model GZ is affected.
These devices are used to supply essential divisional power from station batteries to the ECCS transmitters / trip unit analog sensors. The technical issue is that inverter failure is associated with transient signals such as those generated on the 125 VDC bus from switching relay coils. The
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external line transient signal can blow fuses and turn on Silicone Control Rectifiers (SCR) in the circuit causing them to undergo possible damage.
Inverter failure could prevent the initiation of the Emergency Core Cooling System.
The licensee determined that Topaz Inverter Model GZ will not be used on this project.
B.
On January 26, 1981, Dravo notified the NRC of a condition reportable under 10CFR21 regarding possible defective piping subassemblies.
In particluar, as stated in the Dravo letter to the NRC:
A Dravo inspector was found to be conducting a magnetic particle inspection of a weld on a nuclear piping assembly using a technique not in accordance with the Dravo Magnetic Particle Procedure. The procedure called for the area of interest to be covered in two di-rections 90 degrees apart, whereas the inspector was examining with
- coverage in one direction only.
As a result of this incident, all the magnetic particle and dye-penetrant examinations performed by that inspector on that date were re-examined. No rejectable indications were found.
During the next two weeks, over 200 re-examinations were accomplish-eM on work originally performed by the inspector in question. Four indications (1/16 inch long or less) were found in stainless base material adjacent to welds. These would be acceptable under today's Code but are rejectable under the Code of record for this job. Two rejectable indications in carbon steei base material were found where fitting lugs had been ground off.
A number of rejectable indications were found in stainless welds attaching support plates to a pressure boundary. All of the indications found were minor surface defects.
Piping assemblies inspected by this individual were shipped to the Hope Creek site prior to identification of the problem. Based on l
inspections subsequent to the 10CFR21 report it was determined that no significant defects were overlooked by failure to follow the correct
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MT procedure. However, a potential problem af LP testing stainless l
steel spoolpieces is under investigation.
This item will remain open until resolution of the LP testing question.
(354/81-SB-01; 355/81-SB-01)
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7.
Safety Related Pipe Support and Restraint Systems - Unit __1_
In NRC Inspection Report 80-16 a noncompliance involving uncontrolled cold springing of Safety Relief Valve (SRV) piping was discussed.
As part of the overall investigation to resolve this problem, Schneider, Inc. (SI) disconnected all the SRV piping supports / restraints to check for cold springing. The in-spector witnessed this activity which was conducted in accordance with SI Document NC-SRP-7, Rev.1 entitled "SI Procedure for Verification on Non-Cold Springing." The procedure required installation of dial indicator gauges to monitor vertical and lateral movement of the piping when the supports were removed. The support / restraint system for each line consists of a vertical and lateral rigid bar that connects the piping to the suppression chamber framing.
Pinned connections are used at both ends of the rigid bars. The movement of the piping was monitored by dial indicators when the pins were removed from the end of the bars attached to the SRV piping. The results of this check were compared to allowable values of cold pull that were estab-lished by engineering calculation.
Several readings exceeded the established values thus resulting in an Nonconfomance and Disposition report being issued by SI for resolution of the excessive cold spring.
(354/80-16-01)
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Supplier Quality Program - Units 1 and 2 Based on problems that have resulted from weaknesses in the supplier quality program, e.g., PX bioshield and ACME embeds, the inspector reviewed actions taken by the licensee to identify and correct the cause. The inspector de-termined that the licensee has identified the problem as a combination of weaknesses in supplier QC combined with weaknesses in supplier surveillance inspection.
Supplier surveillance inspection is performed for the licensee by Bechtel under their generic program that applies to all their projects including nuclear. The weaknesses have been identified by the licensee as a result of hardware and softwar? xoblems occurring onsite and as a result
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of their vendor surveillance inspections performed either jointly with l
Bechtel or independently.
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Action taken by the licensee to correct the problem has involved critiquing Bechtel surveillance inspections after performance of a joint audit, notifi-cation of upper levels of management regarding the problem, management meet-ings with Bechtel to discuss and attempt resolutinn of the problem, increas-ing audit staff and number of audits, and requiring Bechtel to increase both their supplier quality staff and coverage as relates to Hope Creek. The net
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results of these actions have resulted in only slight improvement.
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The inspector determined from talking with various licensee and Bechtel personnel that problems include the following:
Licensee requirement to, in most cases, award contracts to
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suppliers based on the low bid system. This results in sup-pliers awarded the contracts having to operate flawlessly to produce the product in order to make money.
If problems a-rise, money may become a concern and corners could be cut, thus increasing the potential for problems.
Caliber and qualification of supplier QC personnel and Bechtel
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shop inspection / surveillance personnel is inconsistent and many times not sufficient to judge the quality of workmanship required for nuclear related work.
Purchase specifications are weak in some areas thus making it
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difficult or impossible for the supplier to meet the intended requi rements.
These problems, though difficult, can be overcome and the inspector feels that the licensee is making an effort to surmount them as evidenced by a review of letters to upper management describing the problem, a review of licensee audits of Bechtel's supplier quality program, and an expressed commitment by licensee management to achieve results.
The inspector expressed his concern to the licensee regarding this problem and his intent to continue to examine purchased material that has been re-leased and shipped to the site for problems that were missed by the sup-plier quality system. Additionally, the inspector will continue to review progress made to surmount the above described causes of the problems.
(354/81-07-01; 355/81-07-01)
9.
Errata A.
In NRC Inspection Report 81-02, the unresolved item closed in the fourth subparagraph of paragraph 3 should be 80-21-02 in lieu of 80-21-01.
B.
In paragraph 5 of NRC Inspection Report 81-02, the date of the February meeting was erroneously stated as February 5,1981.
The correct date for the meeting was February 24, 1981
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I 10.
Exit Interview
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The inspector met with licensee and contractor personnel on each Friday of this inspection report period.
At these times the inspector sumarized the scope and findings of that week's inspection activities.
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