IR 05000354/1981016
| ML20039E448 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/1981 |
| From: | Bateman W, Greenman E, Varela A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039E444 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-354-81-16, 50-355-81-16, NUDOCS 8201070301 | |
| Download: ML20039E448 (10) | |
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U.S. HUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-354/81-16
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Report No. 50-355/81-16 50-354 Locket No. 50-355 CPPR-120 License No. cpfg__191 Priority Category A
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Licensee: 1P_ublic_Serxice_ Electric and_ Gas _ Company 80 Park Plaza - 17C Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name: H_opf_Craek Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection conducted: November 2 - 30, 1981 fnspectors:
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date figned
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W. H. Batenan,
'or Resident Inspector E
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d te signed A. A. Varela, Reactor Inspector date signed Approved by:
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E. G. Greenman, Chief, Reactor F'rojects flate' signed Section 2A Inspection Summary:
Unit 1 Inspection of November 2 - 30, 1981 (Report No. 50-354/_81-16):
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Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by the resident inspector (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />)
-and one regionally based specialist inspector (17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />) of work in progress including intake structure excavation and' investigation of Vincentown formation, rebar installation, material and equipment storage, housekeeping, and testing of embedded piping. The inspector also made tours of the site, reviewed licensee action on previous inspection findings, evaluated licensee action on construction deficiency reports reviewed fire-protection procedures, and reviewed circumstances involving alleged welding and radiography deficiencies received anonymously.
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Noncompliances - none cited.
Results:
Region I Form 12 820107030: 811222a (Rev. April 77).
POR ADOCK 05000354'
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Inspection Summary
Unit 2 Inspection of November 2 - 30, 1981 (Report No. 50-335/81-16):
Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by the resident inspector (36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />) and one regionally based specialist inspector (21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br />) of work in progress including intake structure excavation and investigation of Vincentown formation, testing of embedded piping, containment erection, preparations for structural integrity test of containment, and pourba:r of concrete under the drywell. The inspector also made tours of the site, reviewed 'ficensee action on previous inspec-tion findings, evaluated licensee action on construction deficiency reports, reviewed fire protection procedures, and reviewed circumstances involving alleged welding and radiography deficiencies, received anonymously.
Results-Noncompliances - none cited.
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2.
Site Tour Routine tours 0T construction ac:
and interviewec observed perfor ledgeable in ti defects or nor i
Areas inspecu
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i Unit 1: Mate-
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Unit 2: Co n '_
fiousekeepint
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Licensee A q (Closed) Ik valve (SRV.,
incorrectl3 reworked t:
welds, re:
followire; addressed SI
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- DETAILS'
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Persons Contacted
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Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G)
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A. Barnabei, Site QA Engineer
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P., Bravo, Principal Construction-Engineer
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'A. E. Giardino, Project QA Engineer P. Kudless, Project Construction Manager
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Bechtel Power CorDoration (Bechtel)
i A. J. Bryan, Assistant Project QC Engineer M. A. Drucker, Lead QA Engineer-R. Hanks, Project QC Engineer M. Henry, Project Field Engineer
D.slong, Project Superintendent R. Mackey, Resident Project Engineer
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K. Mills, Lead QCE Mechanical
.'G. Moulton, Project QA Engineer
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. D. Sakers, Assistant Project QC Engineer
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JJ. Serafin, Assistant' Project Field Engineer A.-Vanek, Resident Engineer S. Vezendy, Lead Welding QC Engineer.
General Electric Installation'and Services-Engineering (GEI&SE)
G. Barberi, Site QC Supervisor-
D. Burke, Site Project Manager-
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. General Electric Nuclear Energy Division (GENED1
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'J.-Cockroft, Site Engineer
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J. Rich Steers (Steers)
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T. Hughes, Project Superintendent-
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M. Russell, Site QC Supervisor J. Saums, Sponser Engineer
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Pittsburah-Des Moines Steel Company (PDM)
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M. Stiger, Site QA Manager i
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2.
Site Tour Routine tours of the site were made to observe the status of work and construction activities in progress. The inspector noted the presence of and interviewed QC and construction personnel.
Inspection personnel were observed performing required inspection and those interviewed were know-ledgeable in their work activities. Work items were examined for obvious defects or noncompliance with regulatory requirements or license conditions.
Areas inspected included:
Unit 1: Material and equipment storage and housekeeping.
Unit 2: Containment erection, material and equipment storage, liousekeeping, and preparations for structural integrity test.
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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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(Closed) Noncompliance (354/80-16-01):
Failure to install safety relief valve (SRV) piping supports in accordance with approved drawings. The incorrectly installed piping that had to be cold pulled into position was reworked to remove the stress. The rewcrk involved cutting the affected welds, repositioning the pipe spcols, and rewelding the joints. The following Schneider, Inc. (SI) Nonconformance and Disposition Reports (N&D)
addressed the problem and its solution:
SI N&D 520-F80 dated 6/24/80
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SI N&D 520-F101 dated 10/22/80 SI N&D 520-F121 dated 11/20/80
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As documented in Inspection Report 81-07, all of the SRV piping was checked for correct installation. This was accomplished by removing the pins from the hinged piping supports and monitoring resultant pipe movement to an unstressed position using dial indicators. SI N&D 520-F214 dated 5/14/81 documented the unstressed SRV pipe positions and accepted the results with no modifications required. This action assured all the SRV piping was installed within design stress tolerances.
Installation of SRV piping in Unit 2 was performed by Bechtel under subcontract to PDM and was verified by the inspector to be satisfactory. The inspector had no further question._.
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(Closed) Noncompliance (354/81-12 01):
Failure of pipefitter personnel. to follow correct installation procedures. The licensee administered classroom instruction on the "Do's" and " Don'ts" of pipe installation. These classes were attended by pipefitter foremen and general foremen. The pipefitter fore-men and general foremen communicated the classroom information to the craft personnel under their supervision. The NRC inspector attended one of the classroom sessions and noted that the material presented addressed correct as opposed to incorrect methods of pipe installation. Additionally, a list of "Do's" and " Don'ts" for correct pipe installation was prepared and given to all pipefitters onsite. This list will be given to new hire pipefitters as they come on the job. No pipe installation problems have been-observed since the corrective action was taken. The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (354/80-14-06; 355/80-14-02):
Size of fillet welds attaching the CRDM housing support brackets to the pedestal liner. The methods established to measure the. fillet weld' throat size involved assuming complete lack of penetration from the apex of the joint out to an imaginary centerline passing thr ;gh the diataeter of a 3/32" welding electrode-(largest size used to make the weld) wedged into the " Vee" joint. The effective
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throat was then determined by measuring the shortest distance from the imag-
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inary electrode centerline out to the finished weld seface.
In all but one
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-case the throat size met ASME code requirements of.707 times the weld size.
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In one case the weld throat was determined to be 28 mils undersize.
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Acceptance of this method of measuring fillet weld size and of the. one under-sized condition was requested by GEI&SE. Bechtel letter FNS-0343 dated 9/31/81 to GENED documented this request.
The disposition to GENED FDDR KT1-042, Rev. 1 dated 10/27/81, accepted the method of detennining throat
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size and the one undersized' weld. The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (354/81-09-01;355/81-09-01):- Lack of a separate test cycle for each Cadweld splicing crew. By letter dated 8/5/81, NRR informed '
the licensee that the licensea's original-commitment to Regulatory Guide 1.10 was considered applicable to Cadwelding on this project and, therefore, periodic testing of Cadweld splicer crews was required. 'In a letter _ dated
9/17/81, the licensee requested that the NRC reconsider this position. This request was based on a historically _ low failure rate of Cadwelds tested and the economic and schedule impact of instituting such a program. By
letter dated 10/30/81, NRR reiterated the position stated in their 8/5/81 letter.
Effective 11/30/81, sampling of Cadweld splices by splicing crew was implemented by the licensee on the Hope Creek project in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.10. The inspector had no further questions.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (354/81-11-01; 355/81-11-01):
Programmatic control to ensure all welds are observed during hydrostatic testing. The licensee has incorporated requirements into SWP/P-P-4, Leak Testing of Piping Systems, and QCI T-1.00, Hydrostatic and Pneumatic Leak Testing, to ensure that all weld joints are uncovered and accessible for inspection during hydrostatic testing. This was accomplished by requiring that both field engineering and quality control personnel walk down the piping system prior to testing and sign that all welds are accessible for inspection. Additional efforts at the design level are in progress to avoid locating hangers over shop welds.
Implementation of this program will be verified at a later date when system hydrostatic testing is in progress. The inspector had no further questions.
Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee A.
By letter dated aanuary 14, 1981, the licensae reported a potential significant deficiency in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) involving incomplete design analysis of loading on beam oracket stiffener plates.
Specifically, shear and compressive forces were considered but the effect of bending on the brc:ket stiffener plates caused by load eccentricity was not. By letter dated October 1,1981, the licensee withdrew this potentially reportable item based on results of an engineering analysis performed at Lehigh University.
The inspector reviewed the results of the Lehigh analysis which contained the following information:
Certain beam bracket webs did require the addition of stiffeners to
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prevent undesirable crippling and plastic deformation during high load conditions; The design deficiencies would not have resulted in collapse of the
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beam brackets.
Additional information contained in the licensee's October 1 letter stated that modification of 278 of a total of 1,115 beam brackets was required.
Based on the licensee's conclusion that failure of beam brackets and subsequent collapse of the supported beams would not have occurred had the brackets not been stiffened, the inspector agrees with the licensee that this issue is not reportable for the Hope Creek project and considers the item closed.
(354/81-00-07; 355/81-00-07)
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By letter dated April 6,'1981, the licensee reported a significant deficiency in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) in-volving distortion of a portion of the Unit'2 drywell that occurred as the result of a concrete placement.underneath the drywell.
Information regarding this problem was discussed in NRC Inspection Reports:81-04, 81-05 and 81-09. During-this inspection report period, the personnel access holes in the drywell outer support skirt were patched and the void space under the drywell was refilled with concrete and grout.
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The inspector reviewed plans and discussed them with Bechtel per-sonnel and participated in planning meetings on the proposed. method, technique, and quality control features for the concrete replacement.
In particular the inspector reviewed and commented on Bechtel's Work Plan / Procedure for Reactor #2 Concrete Pourback No. 2C-XF-911. This
. review indicated that the special techniques, const-Jction details, and QC measures, when implemented, would result in placement of
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sound concrete beneath the drywell bottom.
The inspector witnessed preparation of the construction joint sur-faces prior to starting the pwrback. All concrete surfaces were sand blasted, the volume was cleaned, and all surfaces were wetted down.
The igspector also observed portions of the pourback of approximately 65 yd 'of concrete and a small~ volume of grout. To prevent inadver-tent overpressurization, the concrete and grout were pumped into 3'
standpipes which drained.into the volume. This resulted in never applying more than a 3' pressure head to the filled volume. Con-solidation of the concrete was accomplished by using vibrators attached to lengths of steel pipe and manually manipulating them to ensure consolidation in all locations. The concrete slump was main-tained at the high end of the limit (6") to maximize flow characteristics.
The inspector observed that the controlling procedures were implemented and a suf'!cient number of QC personnel inspected the placement.
Upon yemoval of the standpipes after the concrete had cured, a small void space was observed at the interface of the grout and the steel drywell. This void space was pressure packed with grout, thus assuring a continuous bearing surface for the drywell.
These activities completed the physical portion of the repair. PDM must still complete some design analysis prior to final closecut of this construction deficiency. (355/81-00-01)
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5.
Conteinment Structural Steel Welding As followup to anonymous telephone allegations received by the NRC on October 29 and November 17,1981, the inspector perfomed a review of yelding being perfomed on containment structural steel to verify that:
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Proper preheat requirements were implemented:
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1-Required NDE of field welds and _ weld repair areas was perfomed;
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NDE identified defects were properly analyzed / repaired.
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The inspector observed and interviewed several PDM Engineering helders at the jobsite to verify that correct preheat requirements were implemented.-
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Temperature indicating crayons were not required and were not used in all
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instances. However, preheat was established.
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During routine inspections, the inspector has previously verified that i
welding activities are stopped when it rains or protective covering is provided. A review of NDE records by the resident inspector verified that required magnetic particle testing of surface repairs and radiographing of welds was perfomed. NDE of weld repairs was adequately documented.
Radiographs of the upper and lower field welds joining the knuckle to the dry-
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well 'at the stations where the 24 shop welds intersected with the field welds were reviewed by the inspector. Of the _48 locations where the 24 shop welds
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intersected the field welds, radiograph review indicated only one instance i
where a defect in the shop weld existed (Stations 140-141 at the intersection f
of field weld seam 1E7 and shop weld seam 34A1). This shop defect had been previously identified by field QC personnel and repaired.
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No items of noncomp1hnce were identified.
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Service Water Intake Structure Observation of Post Excavation Foundation
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Studies - Units 1 and 2
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Consistent with requirements of the contract drawings and specifications and commitments made to NRC 'on post excavation studies, verification of the founda-tion material was-undertaken when excavation of the service water intake structure approached expected elevation.. Clamshell excavation within the flooded cofferdam disclosed the green-gray Vincentown foundation material to be deeper than anticipated. This difference necessitated additional
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investigation. The licensee's foundation consultants, Dames and Moore-(D&M),
were observed by the inspector perfoming additional investigations with the j.
cofferdam. Test borings were undertaken for this purpose. The standard pene-tration test and split-barrel sampler were observed being used in the verifica-
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tion studies. The inspector evaluated the work perfomed to be consistent with
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ASTM Designation D-1586-74. Soils interpretation and generated field reports-
by D&M geoscience technician gave evidence'of his qualifications. Further boring investigation and use of undisturbed sampling methods are expected-to
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continue outside the cofferdam. The inspector was infomed by the licensee s.
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these will-be incorporated into a report to be' submitted to NRC/NRR prior l
to placement of tremie concrete on the approved Vincetown foundation.
No' items _of noncompliance were identified.
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7.
Hydrostatic Testing Requirements for Embedded Piping
The inspector observed in PSAR Section 5.35 of ACI318-71,-Building Code Require-ments for Reinforced Concrete would be specified in design and construction of the reactor building.
Bechtel Technical Specification C-103, Rev. 8 for form-ing, placing, finishing and curing of concrete identifies ACI 301 code which invodes the ACI 318 code. As related'to ACI 318 code requirement for conduits and pipes embedded in concrete, Bechtel plant design guidelines and technical specifications requires hydrostatic testing of process piping prior to con-
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crete placement by ASME code Section III Division I Subsections NB, NC, or ND as applicable for nuclear piping and ANSI B31.1 for non-nuclear piping. Tech-nical Specification P-590 for hydrostatic testing of ASME III and ANSI B31.1 piping systems delineates specific test requirements for initial service leak testing. Bechtel plant design guideline identifies that justification for exception to ACI 318, Section 6.3.7(d) should be incorporated in the SAR.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Fire Protection / Prevention - Review of Procedures The inspector reviewed the following procedures and guidelines relating to fire protection:
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Public Service Electric and Gas Co. " Fire Protection Evaluation" for the Hope Creek Generating Station-Bechtel " Safe Practices" manual given to all site employees.
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Memo given to all welders / burners on their responsibilities to control their work activities to prevent fires Bechtel Specific Work Plan / Procedure SWP/_P-100, " Fire Protection and Pre-
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vention," Rev.10
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USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.39, " Housekeeping Requirements for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," Rev. 2
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USNRC Standard Review Plan 9.5.1 with guidelines in Appendix A to NRC Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5.1 dated May 1, 1976 including Enclo-sure 1 dated August 23, 1976 Additionally, the inspector interviewed various individuals with fire protec-tion responsibilities including the Bechtel Fire Brigade Chief, cognizant Bech-tel Safety Department inspectors, and the licensee fire protection representa-tive.
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The results of the procedure review and ir
. views indicated the facility undergoes quarterly fire protection inspections by the licensee's insurance company (Nuclear Mutual Limited), Safety Department personnel make daily tours of assigned areas 'in the power block to observe for fire safety, and security personnel make hourly checks in the power block storage areas during offshift hours for fire safety.
Additionally, welders are issued a 5-pound. fire extinguisher when initially employed and have a responsibility for fire prevention while welding or burning. The Bechtel Fire Brigade Chief and the cognizant licensee representative make weekly tours of the power block to observe construction progress and make appropriate changes to fire protection requirements. During this tour it is decided if welding / burning permits are required in specific areas.
Based on the absence of fire related problem and the results of audits by Nuclear Mutual Limited, the licensees procedures appear adequate. No specific regulatory requirements for fire protection / prevention have been established for the construction phase at the present state of completion of this project.
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Exit Interview The' inspector met with licensee and contractor personnel at periodic intervals during this inspection report period. At these times the inspector summarized the scope and findings of this inspection activities.
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