IR 05000354/1981004
| ML20005B251 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 05/11/1981 |
| From: | Bateman W, Greenman E, Reynolds S, Varela A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20005B249 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-354-81-04, 50-354-81-4, 50-355-81-04, 50-355-81-4, NUDOCS 8107070018 | |
| Download: ML20005B251 (16) | |
Text
'
.
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 50-354/81-04 Report No. 50-355/81-04 50-354 Docket No. 50-355 CPPR-120 License No. CPPR-121 Priority Category A
--
Licensee: Public Service Electric & Gas Company 80 Park Plaza - 17C
,
Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Hope Creek Generatina Station. Units 1 and 2 Inspection at:
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey Inspection conducted: pMarc 2 - April 5, 1981 Inspectors:
k4 I !l7 )O)
,
W.
B tema, eni r Resident Inspector date s' gned I.f l -
($W Nf Whdl
.
AVA'. Va' rela, Reactor Inspector d
s/igned f 21l8 /
h A
S'. D. Re nolds, Reactor Inspector date signed
- M//cf'/
Approved by:
~
.
E. G. Greenman, Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section 2A Inspection Summary:
Unit 1 Inspection of March 2 - April 5, 1981__(Report No. 50-354/81-04):
_
_
_
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced inspection by the resident inspector (81 hours9.375e-4 days <br />0.0225 hours <br />1.339286e-4 weeks <br />3.08205e-5 months <br />)
and one region based specialist inspector (5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />) of work in progress including installation of reactor vessel internals, installation of pipe hangers, structural steel erection, pipe installation and repair, upper bioshield fitup and welding, batch plant material storage, storage of material and equipment, mechanical splicing of rebar, and concrete placement. The inspector also made tours of the site on a regular basis, reviewed licensee action on previous inspection findings, investigated repair welding, reviewed weld procedure specifications and associated procedure qualifications, and witnessed various types of NDE in progress.
Results: Of the fif teen areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in thirteen areas and one item of noncompliance was identified in two areas (Failure l
%
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77} Q 7 Q $ 8 g G
P
.. _. _
- ~
__
-.
.
.
of weld procedure specification to comply with ASME Section IX requirements, Datail 3.A and failure to perform radiography in accordance with an approved procedure, Detail 3.B;)
Unit 2 Inspection ofs March. 2 5,1981' (Reports No. 50-355/81-04):
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced inspection by the resident inspector (39 hours4.513889e-4 days <br />0.0108 hours <br />6.448413e-5 weeks <br />1.48395e-5 months <br />)
and two region based specialist inspectors (29 hours3.356481e-4 days <br />0.00806 hours <br />4.794974e-5 weeks <br />1.10345e-5 months <br />) of work in progress including containment erection, batch plant materia st6 rage, structural steel erection, and rebar installation. The inspector also maos site tours on a regular basis, raviewed licensee action on a 10.CFR 50.55(e) reportable item (containment drywell bulging),
and evaluated licensee action on previous inspection findings.
Results: Noncompliances - none.
.
-
!
<
!
.
y-
y g,
-y-
-
- w w
--y+-
en y
,w
,+4----w-s&g-
- ~ -
-m-p-w-mm9y w
~- -
T+
t y;-~s
..
.
-
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Public Service Electric and__ Gas Company (PSE&G)
A. Barnabei, Site QA Engineer A. E. Giardino, Project QA Engineer P. Kudless, Project Construction Manager G. Owen, Principal Construction Engineer Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)_
B. Bain, Lead Field Welding Engineer R.,Barclay, Assistant Lead Civil QC Engineer W. Dorman, Assistant Project Field Engineer R. Hanks, Project QC Engineer M. Henry, Project Field Engineer D. Long, Project Superintendent G. Moulton, Project QA Engineer J. Serafin, Assistant Project Field Engineer D. Stover, Project Superintendent - Contract Administration Pittsburgh - Des Moines Steel Company (PDM)
D Davis, Eastern Division QA Manager M. Stiger, Site QA Manager General Electric Installation and Services Engineering (GEI&SE)
R. Burke, Site Project Manager F. Harmaker, Site QC Supervisor Schneider, Inc.
G. Davidson, Construction Superintendent G. Falk, Site QA Manager J. Rush, Corporate QA Manager
-
..
-
-
.
.
-.
-
.
_
.
.
2.
Site Tour Routine tours of the site were made to observe the status of work and con-struction activities in progress. The inspector noted the presence of and interviewed QC and construction personnel. Work items were examined for obvious defects or noncompliance with regulatory requirements or license conditions. Areas observed included:
Unit 1:
Installation of pipe hangers, structural steel erection, batch plant material storage, equipment storage, cadwelding, and concrete placement.
Unit 2:
Rebar and fonn erection, batch plant material storage, structural steel erection, and containment drywell and torus fabrication.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Reactor Vessel Internals - Review jof_ Work Procedures and Quality Records - Unit 1
_
The inspector performed a review of work procedures and quality records associated with work in progress. The following documents were reviewed:
Bechtel Technical Specification M-098, Rev.1, " Reactor Pressure Vessel
-
Internals Installation" GEI&SE HC 160A71203, Rev. 1, " General Welding Procedure"
-
--
l GEI&SE HC 160A01203, Rev. O " Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals
--
l Access and Cleanliness Control"
!
GEI&SE 18XA9407 Rev. 2, " Liquid Penetrant Examination ' Color Contrast-
--
l Solvent Removable' "
'
GEI&SE Weld Procedure Specification HC 5001 D, Rev. 1, " Detailed Weld
--
Procedure" GEI&SE Procedure No. ISE - PQ - 504, Rev. O, " Procedure Qualification"
--
GEI&SE HC 5001 W, Rev. 1, " Record of Welder Performance Test"
--
GEI&SE Radiographic Report on welder performance test for welder H 1006.
--
GENED Document No. 21A8567, Rev. 3 " Reactor Vessel and Internals -
-
Cleaning Instructions" l
GENED Document No. 21A8626, Rev. 1, " Miscellaneous Materials for Use in
!
--
the Fabrication of Reactor Pressure Vessel Components"
-
_
,., _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _.... _ _ _. _ _ _ _ - - _ _. _...
.__ _ _ _ _. _..
.
.
GENED Document No. 21A8650, Rev. 8, " Quality Assurance Records"
--
GENED Document No. 22A6639, Rev. O, " Reactor Assembly - Installation
--
Assembly":
Section 7, "Installction of Jet Pump Riser and Adapter Assemblies"; Section 22, " Cleaning and Cleanliness Control" GENED Document No. 22A4202, Rev. 6, " Reactor Assembly, Welding, Cleaning,
--
Examination, and Storage" These documents were reviewed to ensure that the many requirements from the different source documents were incorporated into the final GEI&SE procedures that control the work in process. Additionally, where ASME Section III and IX Codes applied, the inspector verified procedure conformance to the Code requirements.
Unacceptable conditions identified as a result of this review were as follows':
.A.
A review of Weld Procedure Specification (WPS) HC 5001D, Rev.1 by the in-spector af ter review and approval by GEI&SE, Bechtel, and GENED resulted in the finding that the WPS was not in accordance with ASME Section IX requirements in that a total of four nonessential variables were not specified and the thickness range qualified was not substantiated by the Procedure Qualification Record (PQR).
In particular ASME Section IX requires in paragraph QW-201.1 that the WPS shall list in detail for each process the essential and nonessential variables.
WPS HC 5001D did not address nonessential variables QW-410.1 (a change from stringer bead technique to weave bead or vice versa)
and 410.5 (a change in the method of initial and interpass cleaning)
!
for the SMAW process nor did it address QW-410.5 and QW 410.3 (cup size) for the GTAW prccess. Additionally, PQR ISE - PQ 504, Rev. 0
'
per the rules of paragraph QW-452 of ASME IX, did not qualify the
!
WPS to permit SMAW up to a thickness 1".
This PQR permitted SMAW up to a thickness of only 3/4".
(It should be noted that no SMA4 in excess of 3/4" thickness had been performed up to the time of this finding.)
The failure of WPS HC 5001D, Rev. I to list in detail all non-essential variables required by ASME IX, the failure of the WPS to stste the correct thickness range qualified for SMAW, and the failure of three different review organizations to identify these omissions and errors is an item of noncompliance relative to
,
l Criterion IX of Appendix B of 10 CFR 50.
(354/81-04-01)
'
\\
l L
.
.
B.
Qualification of procedures and welders is required prior to making production welds. Normally these qualification requirements are
'
totally addressed by the ASME codes. However, because of the accessibility problem associated with making the welds between the jot pump adapters and the shroud support plate, a supplementary qualification requirement was imposed upon GEI&SE by their contract document.
In particular a mockup weld was required duplicating the actual physical position the welder would be in while making these welds. The welds resulting from this mockup required acceptable radiographs prior to start of production welding. The inspector reviewed the radiographs of the mockup welds and observed that penetrameter placement was not in conformance with paragraph 6.6.2 of GEI&SE's approved radiography procedure 18XAg603, Rev. 2.
Spe-cifically, because the mockup base metal was carbon steel and the filler metal was inconel, paragraph 6.6.2 of the radiography pro-cedure required that the penetrameter be placed on the weld metal.
Contrary to this requirement, as viewed on the radiograph, the penetrameter was placed on the base metal adjacent to the weld seam.
Failure to perform radiography in accordance with an approved procedure results ii. questionable ability to identify indications in weld metal and is an item of noncompliance relative to Criterion V of Appendix B of 10 CFR 50.
(354/81-04-02)
4.
Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee i
On the mor;.ing of March 5,1981, the licensee made a telephone report of a potential significant deficiency in accordance with the requirements of
.-
10 CFR 50.55(e). The deficiency reported involved distortion of a portion-of the Unit 2 drywell that occurred at the end of a concrete placement
!
underneath the'drywell. A followup written report was made by
-
l the licensee on April 6,1981,which states that this event was considered reportable under the rules of 10 CFR 50.55(e). The followup report also stated that investigations irjicated that the distortion was
- ~
caused by local overpressurization during the concrete placement.
In-spections performed by NRC personnel involved detailed review of the con-f crete placement procedures and drawings and batch plant records.
NRC in-spectors also observed partial removal of concrete from under the distorted areas, removal of distorted drywell steel, and NDE of welds ar.d base metal in highly stressed areas.
Paragraph 4.A that follows is a detailed review of inspection activities involving concrete concerns and paragraph 4.B is a detaiied review of part of the exploratory NDE conducted to determine the extent of the damage.
.
_
_ _.
-
..
_
__.
.
.
..
.
_
_-
_.
. -_.
.
.
i
A.
On March 4, 1981, a concrete placement of approximately 100 yds utilizing nonshrink cement and bounded by the bottom of the drywell and the inner and outer drywoll support skirts apparently generated the forces required to distort a portion of the drywell steel. A regional based inspector arrived at the Hope Creek Unit 2 construction site on March 5,1981, to investiguts the cause of the c'eficiency, to evaluate if materials in the concrete caused the liner altte to bulge, to detemine if a generic potential to the deficiency exists and to review licensee proposed corrective action. The inspector fouat at the site that Management Corrective Action Report (MCAR) #20 aated March 5,1981, had-l been issued by Bechtel. The MCAR contained the following infomation:
Immediately after concrete placement within the inner and outer skirts under the Unit 2 drywell, it was observed
,
that the drywell shell plate had bulged toward the interior of the drywell. The area of the bulge is approximately from
,
azimuth 40 to azimuth 680 and is six feet wide. The rec-ommended action for Construction is:
- 1)
Detemine the cause and extent of problem cited
above.
Report results to Project QAE by April 3,
--
1981.
.
2) Complete corrective actions established by Project l
Engineering.
Provide PQAE with scheduled completion l
date.
!
Engineering 1)
Furnish necessary corrective action requirements to construction.
2) Detemine if condition could have adversely affected safe operation of the plant. Advise PQAE by March 13, 1981 of' schedule date for assessment completion.
l As part of the initial corrective action, it was decided to remove l
the concrete from under the distorted areas to pemit NDE of the gusset plates attached by welds between the drywell steel and the r.
inner support skirt. To accomplish this operation three ections l
l
.
- w,-
y gww~---
-
y
--m
,-rwe----=-g---mp++
--eg v t fr+er-w'r1-y--
ww'==-p'-.-ar ewc e w-wwwwr-weeM.-e--m-+ - -, -
r--
e*
m e
=T-w-w ww
. -
-. - - -
.
.
._
= = _
--
.
.
.
of steel plate were removed from the drywell outer support skirt to pemit access to the concrete. Concrete removal by around-the'-
clock crews started on March 5,1981 and was in progress when the regionally based inspector arrived onsite.
The inspector perfomed these activities in his investigation /in-
spection to evaluate the significance of the reported construction 1'
deficiency, its cause, and to determine its generic implications.
Reviewed and verified concrete materials' qualifications and
--
proof /urifomity tests of the mixture.
Observed two separate adjacent bulges in the spherical drywell
-
l bottom between the inner and outer support skirts and between U
azimuths 40 and 68. The bulges were characterized by a maxi-mum protrusion of approximately 7" beyond the normal contour of the drywell in this area and were each the same approximate size.
,
'
Observed removed liner bulges after excavation of concrete
--
between the outer and inner skirts.
Observed concrete removal during excavation by chipping, drilling,
!
-
l and splitting.
Evaluated concrete soundness and possibility of i
concrete expansion prior to initial set.
Reviewed engineering drawings and approved c'.anges regarding
--
sequence and placement method of concrete pours beneath and above the liner plate.
Interviewed construction, engineeting and QC personnel on pre-
--
planning and controls for pumping of 3/4" aggregate high slump concrete.
,
l Interviewed project field engineer, construction engineer, QC
--
l inspector, batch plant operators, QC inspection personnel, and l
concrete test inspectors to ascertain their observations during the placement.
Reviewed in process and proposed corrective action.
-.
The results of the above inspection activities were as follows:
The apparent cause of the liner plate bulges was attributed to
--
overpressurization resulting from concrete pumping beneath the i
_,, -. -
...,.. _., _. -<.
.,...m.--,.m_
_. -. - -, - - -. - -.. _, - _,. = -, -. _ _.,,,, _ - -
- _,... -, _..
,--m_,
, -, - - _ -, - -. w
.
.
spherical liner plate. This occurred at the last interval of concrete pumping when pressure relief vents (to prevent over-pressurization) became blocked by concrete aggregate.
Engi-neering drawing C-0935, " Reactor Drywell Vessel Supports and Construction Sequence" states in note 8 that pumping pressure when the area is filled shall not exceed 7 psig.
The in-spector was informed that QC criteria to satisfy this re-quirement was over-ruled by project engineering based on confidence that the scheme of bleed holes and removed plate above the concrete pump line would prevent overpressurization.
The waiver of the 7 psig requirement was not documented.
Quality control and engineering performed inspections during
--
concrete excavation and verified the soundness of concrete during its removal. Test specimens were obtained at each 12" depth of the excavation. Seven day strength compressive test cylinders cast during the placement tested out above 4,000 psi, which is the minimum requirement for 90 day cylinder strength.
No evidence was found that for the concrete materials a generic
--
problem existed.
The special nonshrink cement required by spec-ifications was silo tested and user (composite of truck delivery grab-samples) tested and found in conformance to ASTM C-845 (1980) required by specification C-101, revision #9. This is expansive hydraulic cement which is essentially a portland cement with small amounts of expansive compounds introduced during manufacture interground with cement clinker. No evidence was found that the cement ingredient caused expansion which re-sulted in the liner bulges.
Evidence was presented that sound
!
concrete was in contact beneath the liner at the bulges.
Corrective action confomed to codes, standards, specification
--
requirements and good engineering practice.
Suggestions made
by the inspectors were incorporated into the corrective action.
B.
An NRC region based inspector visually examined the work in progress to detemine the boundaries of the plate distortion discussed above. Two window sections were removed by air carbon
,
.
.
.
arc cutting (AAC) to eliminate the plate bulge. Additional por-tions of the shell plate will be removed upon completion of the engineering evaluation.
In the opinion of the NRC inspector, the most highly stressed areas were the apex of the gusset stiffeners at the two points closest in line with the maximum strain (maximum bulgedeflection).
Visual inspection of these areas showed localized plastic deformation and probable linear tearing in the plate material adjacent to the gusset welds.
PDM conducted a magnetic particle testing (MT) examination of all of the gusset welds and other welds adjacent to the bulged area.
PDM conducted the MT in accordance with specification MT-01, Issue A dated 11/4/77 ard CMT-01 Rev. C dated 2/7/78 utilizing a 10# AC yoke magnet (YS), 3-6 inch surface spacing,100% transverse and longitudiaal weld axis yoke orientations, red powder and flashlight illumination. PDM reported no rejectable indications in any of the weld areas except for the two high stressed gusset (apex of gusset) weld areas. The NRC inspector requested a liquid penetrant test (for information only) of one of these gusset (apex) weld zones.
Tears in the plate material were verified and vividly indicated more than just surface tears. A special repair weld procedure wi' I be initiated by PDM to repair these areas or the gussets will be removed and the affected drywell steel removed.
Future plans for the repair involve additional NDE of potentially over-stressed areas, removal of the balance of the affected drywell steel, and reinstallation of new steel plate.
( 355/81-00-01 )
.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
.
l l
l l
l
. - -
-
.
.
5.
Review of Repair Welding - Unit 1 On 3/3/81 the inspector examined activities associated with a piping subcon-
-tractor repair weld operation scheduled for the following morning. The loca-tion, size, and status of an in process weld repair to a joint in the contain-ment lower spray header was examined to determine if the subcontractor was having trouble making the re,n:ir and to examine potential for fashioning two pieces of weld wire into a configuration matching the root opening caused by the repair. efforts. The inspector examined licensee activities regarding possible placement of the weld wire into the opening and then welding over.
Preliminary action by the inspector involved verification of the in process repair and notification of the licensee of this possibility. Work on the joint weld repair was stopped by the piping subcontractor, thus preventing any activity from occurring. Subsequent investigation by the inspector resulted in the determination that the joint involved was in an ASME Section III Class 2 piping system and, therefore, required a satisfactory radiographic examination prior to final acceptance. The probability of detecting a
" slugged" weld during final acceptance radiography is extremely high.
During initial discussion with subcontractor construction and QC personnel, it became obvious to the inspector that a misunderstanding existed regarding in process weld repairs. Construction personnel stated that the repair could be effected without a repair procedure. Based on the dimensions of the exca-vated repair area, the inspector pointed out that the original fitup tolerances for the joint (as specified in the weld joint fitup details drawing STD-SK-3 4,
Rev. 1) were exceeded and that a repair procedure was required.
Subcontractor QC personnel agreed and issued N & D 520-F176 which stated:
During in process removal of a crater crack in the root pass on Field
,
Weld No. 7 (LAl-6-11 to penetration) excessive base metal was removed.
i The area affect 2d was opened by approximately 1/2" - 9/16" wide and 4-b" long...
l Because of the misunderstanding by construction personnel of t'he limits to in process repairs, the inspector reviewed the QA program for definition of thee boundaries on in process weld repairs. The following documents were l
reviewed:
General Weld Procedure For ASME Piping, SP-PDM-100, Rev.10 l
--
i Weld Technique Sheet SP-PDM-115A
'
--
Nuclear Site QA Manual, Rev. 1
--
..
e
+n
.
-
<
4,
- -
., - -,,,,.
.
--
- - -
,,.. - -
-
.___ __ _ _
_
_ _ _.
__
__
. _ _
.. _ _
_ ____
,
.
.
10
,
l
.This review indicated that when repair or rework is required it must be documented. on ASME repair weld data sheets and must be accomplished using the same weld procedure technique sheet. For this particular case, because
.
the dimensions of the original weld procedure technique shee.' were exceeded,
I a repair procedure was required to effect a repair to the base metal to i
bring it back to within the original dimensional requirements.
,
l The. inspector reviewed ASME Repair Weld Data Sheets for specific repairs
'
in an attempt to verify that, if repairs similar to this one had been made,
<
j they were mde using approved repair procedures. This verification was in-conclusive due to the fact that information as to defect size was incomplete
l as recorded on the data sheets.
The inspector questioned the subcontractor as to the incomplete recording of defect size infomation. The subcontractor
,
!
responded that recent audit findings of their own had revealed documentation l
problems and that a task force consistit.g of between three and five people
'
were attempting to identify and disposition all documentation problems.
This particular problem of incomplete defect size information was added to L
their list for disposition.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
!
6.
Containment (Steel Structures an_d Supports) - Observation of Work and Work
- Activities - Unit 1 The inspector examined bolted connections in the containment drywell structural
'
steel. During this examination it was noted that the centerline of a number of 1 " diameter bolts was skewed relative to an imaginary centerline perpen *
'
i dicular to the plane of the bolted connection.
(This was detected by observing j
that the face of the nut did not bear up against the washer except at one
!
point.) The amount of skewing in worst case conditions exceeded the AISC
.
pemissable tolerances of a 1:20 slope between the face of the nut and the
-
bearing surface. Other cases were either at or less than -the AISC slope l
l requirement.
(AISC requ!res the use of a beveled washer if the 1:20 slope
'
criteria is exceeded. At the time of this observation no beveled washers
.were in use, however, the connections had not been final inspected by QC.)
The inspector questioned how, with the clearances permitted by AISC for bolt hole diameter, this amount of skewing could occur without damaging the bolt L
hole and the bolts during installation of the bolts. The Bechtel response contended that the threads and holes were not damaaed based on earlser inspections to close out an NRC noncompliance involving jack 1ng of 001ts through mis performed l
aligned holes (see NRC item 80-19-01 in Inspection Report 80-19), however, a satisfactory answer as to the cause of skewing was not offered.
The in-spector felt that removal of two bolts that were typical of the skewing problem should be accomplished to verify that threads and hcles were not
.
damaged.
!
two bolts ensued. posal was agreed to by the licensee and disasscembly of the This pro
-
!
L
!
!
!
_, _. _,,.. _. - - _., _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _. _ _ _... _ __._._ _._ _._. _._
,
.
The nuts on the two bolts were removed and the bolt threads were found to be damaged. The extent of the damage to the bolt threads varied but extended nearly the complete thread length thus discounting any possibility that the thread damage may have occurred as a result of movement of the structural steel after the bolt had been inserced in the hole. Another as yet un-explained observation was that the threads at the end of the bolt (approximately 2cto 4 threads extending beyond the nut prior to disassembly of the bolt) did not appear damaged. The condition of the holes from which the two bolts were removed indicated they had sustained varying amounts of damage. The observation was made during disassembly of these two bolts that the nuts backed away with very little effort. This was surprising because the bolts had been tensioned (by turn-of-nut method) to establish a required bolt tension in excess of 100,000 psi.
As a result of this finding, other skewed bolts were removd for investi-gation. Approximately 50% of those checked indicated thread damage to the bolts extending to that portion of the threading that engages the nut when the bolt is tensioned. Additionally, based on the ease of removal of,the nuts, bolt tensioning the cause of thread damage to skewed bolts,pending licensee determination of was que::tionable.. This item is unresolved how tne bolts became skewed, and the apparent relaxation of bolt tension after firal tensioning operations.
(354/81-04-03)
7.
Safety Related Pipe Su port and Restraint Systems - Unit 1 The inspector examined the torus piping supports during installation to verify compliance with drawings and specification requirements. One of the critical ccmponents of each piping support is the pin used to trancfer loads at the pinned connections from the support to the suppression chamber. The inspector recorded the numbers etched on three different diameter pins and
-
attempted to review the certified material test report (CMTR) for the pin material.
Schneider, Inc. (SI), the installer of the piping supports, determined from a review of their records that this information was not available. Their review also determined that: (f.) many of the pins had been placed on hold at the time of receipt inspection because of inadequate traceability records; (2) pins on hold had been inadvertently issued to the field for use; and (3) the SI
,
Control Traveler was not updated to reflect heat number traceability verifica-l l
Because of this unsatisfactory situation, SI issued N & D 520-F175 l
which, in part, requested that PDM, the original suppler of the pins, provide adequate traceability records for these pins.
i I
i
-
-
-
- -.
. -.
.
- -, - -.. -
.-.,.
,
r The records supplied by PDM to SI in response to the N & D did not relate the identification on the pins to the heat numbers on the CMTR. However, the CMTR did contain three different heat numbers each corresponding to
'
different diameters of bar stock. The inspector requested additional traceability records which were ultimately supplied and incorporated into the final CMTR.
Resolution of the remainder of the problems identified on the N & D
was in progress at the end of this inspection report period.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Reactor Vessel Internals - Observation of Work and Work Activities - Unit i
_
During this inspection report period the resident inspector and a regionally based inspector observed activities relating to the installation of the jet pump adapter to the shroud support plate.
In particular, the inspectors wit-nessed mockup welding prior to the start of production welding and determined that the neckup did duplicate the limited accessibility of the location of production welding.
Cleanliness of and access into the vessel work area were verified to be controlled through a control checkpoint manned to ensure that individuals had access clearance and that coveralls and shoe covers were donned prior to entry. The inspectors spoke with craft and QC personnel in-volved to determine their knowledge of special requirements, e.g., use of oil free air, use of stainless steel brushes, use of calibrated equipment, and restrictions on eating, drinking, or smoking inside the vessel.
Per-farmance by QC personnel of required liquid penetrant examination was ob-served to ensure confonnance with procedure requirements. All of the aforementioned areas were found to be in conformance with established pro-cedure requirements and good engineering practice.
The welding of the jet pump adapter to the shroud support plate is accomplished by welding a joint which, due to the geometry of the parts, is required to have the root of the weld on the OD rather than the ID. The welding technique utilizes a rectangular cross section consumable insert for the root pass.
The base metals and filler metals are (P43; F43) Ni-Cr-Fe type. The 2G position (vertical pipe axis) welding procedure requires the root pass and the first two layers above the root pass to be welded by the GTAW process with an argon gas backing. The first two GTAW layers above the insert are split layers with the second pass in each layer being the bottom pass. The remainder of the joint is welded using the SMAW process except for a final cap that is added by the GTAW process.
Prior to and during welding operations the inspectors observed the establish-ment and maintenance of the argon purge in the clear plastic gas back plenum chamber surrounding the OD of the weld joint in the jet pump adapter and verified that the oxygen analyzer in use exhibited an up to date calibration
,
sticker. Additionally, the inspector observed GTAW and SMAW welding in progress and visually inspected partially completed weld joints as follows:
..
.
__
._
_ _, _
.
._
.
..
,
.
Jet pump Adapter No. (1)
Status of Joint _
- 7 2nd pass 1st SMAW layer
- 8 CIW(2)
- 9 CIW
- 10 CIW
- 15 2nd GTAW layer
- 16 CIW
- 18 2nd pass 1st GTAW layer (1) GE dwg. 117CH355G003 (2) Consumable insert weld completed. No GTAW " hot" passes deposited.
The visual appearance of the root pass (from the 00 side) was good for all welds except #10 which had a fair appearance indicative of difficult 1y in control of the wetting characteristics possibly due to too long a time from tack welding to insert fusion.
No items of nocnompliance were identified.
.
9.
Safety Related Structures (Weldjng) - Observation of Work and Work Activities - Unit 1 The NRC inspectors visually inspected the fitup problems on the upper bi-ological shield and discussed findings with the licensee. This subject is not a new discovery, but is well documented by NCR documents. The inspector discussed the possible potential for lammellar tearing of rectangular spacer pieces utilized to bridge the gap of some of the grossly mismatched joints.
The licensee indicated that the material of construction for the biological shield and spacer pieces was arc remelted steel (ESR process) which the inspector agreed should prec ~ ' non-metallic inclusions and other lamination type defects.
No items of noncompliatae were identified.
.
. -, -,
. _ _
.
_
=.
- -
.
,
.
10.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items or items of non-compliance.
An unresolved item identified during the inspection is dis-cussed in paragraph 6.
11.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee and contractor personnel on each Friday of this inspection report period. At these times the inspector summarized the scope and findings of that week's inspection activities.
<
t
t
~
,... -.
.
.