IR 05000354/1981015
| ML20033B503 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 11/12/1981 |
| From: | Bateman W, Greenman E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20033B498 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-354-81-15, 50-355-81-15, NUDOCS 8112010475 | |
| Download: ML20033B503 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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i Region I
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I 50-354/81-15
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Report No. 50-355/81-15
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50-354 Docket No. 50-355 CPPR-120 Category A
License No. CPPR-121 Priority
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Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza - 17C Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name: Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection at: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey
Inspection conducted: October 5 - November 1, 1981 Inspectors: b ll 9 $)
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4-W. H. Bateman, Senior Resident Inspector
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date signed date signed Approved by:
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E. G. Gree'nman, Chief, Reactor Projects dat'e signed i
Section 2A l
Inspection Summary:
Unit 1 Inspection of October 5 - November 1, 1981 (Report No. 50-354/81-15):
_ Routine unannounced inspection by the resident inspector (45 hours5.208333e-4 days <br />0.0125 hours <br />7.440476e-5 weeks <br />1.71225e-5 months <br />)
Areas Inspected:
of work in progress including pipe and hanger installation, material and equipment storage, housekeeping, service water pipe backfill, installation of reactor pressure vessel internals, excavation of service water intake structure, installation of flued head penetrations, and preplacement, placement, and curing of concrete. The inspector also made tours of the site, reviewed licensee action on previous inspection findings, discussed ASME III NF jurisdictional boundaries with the licensee, reviewed the J. Rich Steers QA program, and examined licensee action on Construction Deficiency Reports.
Results: Noncompliances - none ci ted.-
8112010475 811113 PDR ADOCK 05000354'
o PDR Region -I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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Inspection Summary 2-
'Jnit 2 Inspection'of October 5 - November 1,1981 (Report No. 50-355/81-15)-
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection by the resident inspector (35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br />) of work in progress including containment erection, service water pipe backfill, excavation of service water intake structure, housekeeping, installation of containment piping, and material.and equipment storage.
The inspector also made tours of the site, reviewed licensee action on previous inspection findings, discussed ASME III NF jurisdictional boundaries with the licensee, reviewed.the J. Rich Steers QA program, and examined li-censee action on Construction Deficiency Reports.
Results: Noncompliances - none cited.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Public Service Electric and__ Gas Company (PSE&G)
A. Barnabei, Site QA Engineer
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R. Bravo, Principal Construction Engineer A. E. Giardino, Project QA Engineer P. Kudless, Project Construction Manager G. D. Owen, Principal Construction Engineer Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
A. J. Bryan, Assistant Project QC Engineer M. A. Drucker, Lead QA Engineer R. Hanks, Project QC Engineer M. Henry, Project Field Engineer D. Long, Project Superintendent R. Mackey, Resident Project Engineer
.R. McCoy, Lead QCE Contracts K. Mills, Lead QCE Mechanical G. Moulton, Project QA Engineer D. Sakers, Assistant Project QC Engineer J. Serafin, Assistant Project Field Engineer A. Vanek, Resident Engineer S. Vezendy, Lead Welding QC Engineer General Electric Installation and Services Engineerino (GEI&SE)_
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G. Barberi, Site QC Supervisor D. Burke, Site Project Manager General Electric Nuclear Energy Division (GENED)
J. Cockroft, Site Engineer J. Rich Steers (Steers)
T. Hughes, Project Superintendent M. Russell, Site QC Supervisor-J. Saums, Sponser Engineer
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Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company (PDM)
M. Stiger, Site QA Manager
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2.
Site Tour Routine tours of the site were made to observe the status of work and construction activities in progress. The inspector noted the presence of and interviewed QC and construction personnel.
Inspection personnel were observed perfonning required inspection and those interviewed were know-ledgeable in their work activities. Work items were examined for obvious
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defects or noncompliance with regulatory requirements or license conditions.
Areas observed included:
Unit 1:
Excavation of service water intake structure, pipe and hanger installation, material and equipment storage, service water pipe backfill, RPV internals installation, and housekeeping.
Unit 2: Excavation of service water intake structure, ' containment erection, containment piping installation, service water pipe backfill, material and equipment storage, and housekeeping.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Noncompliance (354/81-04-02):
Failure to follow radiography pro-cedure.
Radiographs of the mockup welding were independently reviewed and found acceptable. Licensee comitment to perfonn radiography in accordance with approved procedures was restated in their response-letter (September 21, 1981) to the item of noncompliance. No dissimilar metal welding has been perfonned since the noncompliance. The inspector had no further questions.
(Closed) Noncompliance (354/81-05-01; 355/81-05-01): Failure.of ACME Steel Engineering Company to weld embeds in accordance with procurement document requirements. This problem resulted in the licensee making a potential Construction Deficiency Report (CDR) in' accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e). This potential CDR was eventually withdrawn by the licensee.
NRC concurrence of withdrawal was presented in NRC Inspection Report 81-14 and it, in part, justified closing this finding. The balance of the justi-fication for closing this item involved corrective action to improve the supplier quality program. Onsite inspections in this area indicated that vendor surveillance activities have increased, attempts have been made to improve communications, additional training of involved personnel has taken place, and the importance of the problem has been escalated to higher levels of management. ACME Steel Engineering Company is no longer supplying material for this project.
Followup of improvement in the area of supplier quality is being documented in various inspection reports as an inspector follow item 81-07-01.
The inspector had no further questions.
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4.
Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee _
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A.
By letter dated April 6,1981,.the licensee reported a significant deficiency in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e).
involving distortion of a portion of the Unit 2 drywell that occurred as the result of a concrete placement underneath the'drywell.
In-formation regarding this problem was discussed in NRC Inspection Reports 81-04, 81-05, and 81-09.
During this inspection report period, grouting of the gap between the concrete and the drywell shell bottom was accomplished. This gap, which measured approximately " maximum, resulted from removal and replacement of the distorted portion of the shell. The gap extended approximately 75% of the interface between the inner and outer drywell support skirts on both sides of the excavated volume. The inspector witnessed cleanup and wetting down of the concrete surfaces to prepare them for grouting. The grout was packed into the gap using various tools to ensure complete filling of the void space.
Additional work performed to complete the overall repair included tack welding into place two of three place sections to cover the access holes in the outer support skirt and preparation of a procedure to control the replacement of the excavated concrete.
Work activity to complete repairs is continuing satisfactorily.
(355/81-00-01)
B.
By letter dated January 21, 1980, the licensee reported a potential significant deficiency in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) involving a surface indication on the Unit 2 reactor pressure vessel (RPV).
In NRC Inspection Report 80-07 investigation of the extent of the surface indication was documented.
In a letter dated January 27, 1981, the licensee withdrew this item as not reportable and in NRC Inspection Report 81-02 the inspector questioned the licansee's rational for withdrawal of this item. Additional corres-poi.aence between the RPV designer (GENED) and Bechtel subsequent to the licensee's January 27, 1981 letter to the' NRC, justifies withdrawal of this surface blemish as not reportaMe. GENED letters GB-81-104 and GB-81-155 to Bechtel's H. E. Morris dated May 29, 1981 and August
11, 1981, respectively, state that the stainless steel vessel cladding is not included in the design thickness and that Code required wall thickness in the area of the blemish is 4.07" not 6.101" as reported in the January 27, 1981 letter. The measured wall thickness of 6.558 inches at the low point of the blemish minus the cladding thickness is well within the code required thickness.
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Based on this additional information this item is closed.(355/79-00-02)
C.
By letter dated November 12, 1980, the licensee reported a potential significant' deficiency in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) involving insufficient NDE of weld buildups on process piping supplied by Dravo. This letter explained that two of the pipe spools were embedded in concrete and four others were buried and backfilled.
In a letter dated July 14, 1981, the licensee withdrew this item as not reportable. The bases for the withdrawal were as follows:
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The inaccessible weld buildups on all spools passed a MT examination by Dravo.
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All spools are ASME III Class 3 and as such do not require volumetric examination of welded joints.
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All spools were satisfactorily hydrostatically tested in accordance with ND-6000 prior to embedment or burial.
This CDR resulted from an item of noncompliance that was opened in NRC Inspection Report (IR) 79-04 and closed in IR 81-05. The NRC position stated in IR 81-05 was "... it is the intention of the ASME Code to consider weld buildup as a repair and to require as a minimum the level of NDE required for the circumferential weld joint." Be-cause the ASME III Class 3 NDE requirement for circumferential weld joints was performed on the affected areas of the involved spools, the withdrawal of this item as not reportable is justified.
(354/80-00-05; 355/80-00-05)
D.
By letter dated June 22, 1981, the licensee reported a significant construction deficiency in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) involving an overstressed safety relief valve line that resulted from uncontrollably cold pulling it into position. The licensee's corrective action included reworking the piping. to remove the stress. This rework involved cutting a weld, repositioning the pipe spool, and rewelding the joint. The original overstressed condition occurred at the weld. Because the weld was removed and a new weld made, no residual stress remained.
Installation of Unit 2 SRV piping was by Bechtel and observed by the inspector to be correct. The inspector had no further questions. (354/81-00-03)
5.
Structural Concrete - Observation of Work and Work Activities The inspector observed preplacement and placement activities involved with reactor building cylindrical wall pour 18-R/V-W001, 002, 003, 004 from elevation 162" to 192'.
In particular completeness of rebar installation, formwork integrity and shoring, chute location, preparation of construction
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joint, cleanliness of formwork and rebar, consolidation, QC inspector coverage, and concrete sampling were observed to ensure conformance with jobsite requirements.
Several locations were heavily congested with rebar and others were blocked out making consolidation by vibration difficult. The inspector paid. par-ticular attention to vibration of concrete in these areas.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Safety Related Structures - Review of 0A Program - Units 1 and 2 The inspector reviewed the quality assurance program that will be implemented for the construction of the service water intake structure. The purpose of the review was to ensure the requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 are incorporated into the QA program.
J. Rich Steers (Steers) is the contractor responsible for the construction of the intake structure. Because Steers does not have a company QA program they hired United States Testing Company, Inc. (UST) to provide and implement the QA program. The following documents were reviewed:
Project Quality Assurance Manual for the Service Water Intake Structure,
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Rev. 1 Quality Assurance Procedure (QAP)-2, QAP for Identification, Status,
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and Control, Rev. 0 QAP-2.2, QAP for Qualification of Inspection, Test, and Audit
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Personnel, Rev. 0 QAP-3, QAP for Receiving Inspection, Rev. 1
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.QAP-4, QAP for Design Control Rev. 0
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QAP-5, QAP for Procurement of Materials and Equipment, Rev. 0
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QAP-6, QAP for Storage Control, Rev. 0
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QAP-7-1, QAP for Drawing, Specification and Document Control, Rev.0
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QAP-8-1, QAP for Control of Offsite Contractors, Rev. 0
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QAP-9-1, QAP for Concrete Inspection, Rev. 0 l
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QAP-10-1, QAP for Final Acceptance Inspection, Rev. O
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QAP-11-1, QAP for Tremie Batch Plant Inspection, Rev. 0
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QAP-16-1, QAP for Noncomformance Reports, Rev. O l
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QAP-17-1, QAP for Internal Corrective Action Requests, Rev.1
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QAP-18-1, QAP for Records Retention and Filing System, Rev.1
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QAP-19-1, QAP for Audit Performance, Rev. O
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Some of these documents were still in various stages of review and approval l
by Bechtel.
In addition to the QA program review, the inspector also questioned Steers and UST personnel to detemine their understanding of QA program implementation.
Because Steers personnel have not previously worked under a QA program, the inspector stressed the importance of effective program implementation and interfacing with UST personnel.
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The results of the QA program review. disclosed sone areas both in the QA program and in implementation that required additional attention (1) Document control system implementation; (2) Definition of responsibility for approval of various procedures; (3) Subcontractors' QA programs approval; (4) Source inspection and audit of subcontractors requirements:
(5) Tagging system requires further definition for implementation; (6) Definition of witness / hold points and incorporation into appropriate documents; (7)
Inspection track status is required; (8) QA Manual requires rework of nonconfomance section;
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(9) Revision of QA Manual to establish QA Superintendent responsibility for personnel training requirements; (10) Definition of storage and periodic maintenance requirements; (11) NDE and welding programs; The inspector noted that at the time of the review development of the program was in progress and no safety related work had been perfonned. The above areas were discussed with Steers, Bechtel, and licensee personnel and will be followed up in a subsequent inspection. (354/81-15-01; 355/81-15-01)
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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7.
Containment Penetrations - Observation of Work and Work Activities - Unit 1 The inspector reviewed the following documentation associated with the fabrication, installation, and NDE of triple flued head penetrations 1-BC-014-S18, 1-BC-021-S15, and 1-BC-015-S16:
NRC Bulletin 80-08 dated 4/7/80, " Examination of Containment Liner
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Penetration Welds" PSE&G response letter to NRC Bulletin 80-08 dated July 2,1980
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Bechtel Drawing P-3001-1, Rev. 6, " Flued Head Details"
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Bechtel Drawing P-3002-1, Rev. 6, " Flued Head Assembly and Anchor
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Details" Bechtel Drawing C-0851, Sht. 2, " Pipe Whip Restraints"
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ASME Code Data Sheets and hydrostatic test records contained in Bechtel
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Files MRR 67182 and MRR 67176
-- Bechtel Form 84 for flued head NDE requirements The documentation review confirmed that RT of the containment penetration welds is planned as required per NRC Bulletin 80-08 and as committed to by
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the licensee in their Bulletin response letter.
Discussions with Bechtel
and licensee personnel disclosed that there were no particular plans to perform an overpressure test of the containment penetration welds but that the integrated leak rate test (ILRT) pressure would be used instead.
Because the ILRT pressure is less.than that required by the ASME III Code overpressure test, the inspector has requested that the licensee resolve the-apparent discrepancy. The inspector will followup on this question during a future inspection.
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Handling and fitup of the triple flued head penetrations was observed. No problems were noted.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee and contractor personnel at periodic intervals during this inspection report period. At these times the inspector summarized the scope and findings of his inspection activities.
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