IR 05000341/2025004
| ML26041A034 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 02/10/2026 |
| From: | Sanchez-Santiago E NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2 |
| To: | Peter Dietrich DTE Electric Company |
| References | |
| IR 2025004 | |
| Download: ML26041A034 (0) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2025004
Dear Peter Dietrich:
On December 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2. On January 29, 2026, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2.
February 10, 2026 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Elba M. Sanchez Santiago, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000341 License No. NPF-43 Enclosure:
As stated cc: Distribution via GovDelivery Signed by Sanchez Santiago, Elba on 02/10/26
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Bearing Failure on Division II Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) Ventilation Unit Due to Improper Storage Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000341/202500401 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.12 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XIII, "Handling, Storage, and Shipping," was identified when the licensee failed to store the fan bearings for the safety related division II EECW pump room cooler in accordance with manufacturer and industry recommendations. As a result, the bearings failed approximately one week after they were installed.
Failure to Identify Inoperable Load Tap Changer on Offsite Power Transformer Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000341/202500402 Open/Closed
[H.11] -
Challenge the Unknown 71111.15 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, was identified for the failure to promptly identify a nonconformance regarding a degraded load tap changer (LTC) associated with transformer 64. Specifically, after a low voltage alarm was received on safety related 4160V buses 64B and 64C when starting a circulating water pump on June 17, 2025, the licensee's investigation revealed that the LTC for transformer 64 was degraded since February of 2024. Despite multiple instances of the LTC failing to automatically adjust voltage in that timeframe, the impact on the design and licensing bases was not recognized at those times, resulting in the failure to perform required technical specification (TS) actions or compensatory measures.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000341/2025001-00 LER 2025001-00 for Fermi 2 Power Plant, Division 1 Transformer 64 Load Tap Changer Failure Potentially Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Potential Loss of Safety Function 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 2 began the inspection period at or near rated thermal power. On October 10, 2025, the plant performed a planned power reduction to approximately 80 percent for surveillances and rod pattern adjustments. Power was restored to 100 percent on October 11, 2025. On November 21, 2025, a planned power reduction to approximately 90 percent was performed for rod pattern adjustment. Power returned to 100 percent later that day. On November 23, 2025, an unplanned power reduction to approximately 95 percent was performed for degrading condenser vacuum (marine life conditions). Power was restored to approximately 100 percent on November 24, 2025.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures for the following systems, completed the week ending December 13, 2025:
- General service water pumphouse
- Residual heat removal/service water complex
- Circulating water pumphouse
- North cooling tower
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Emergency diesel generator (EDG) 14 following surveillance testing, completed the week ending October 25, 2025
- (2) Division 2 core spray system while division 1 was in maintenance, completed the week ending December 6, 2025
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire zone 17a, Reactor building standby liquid control system, completed during the week ending on December 6, 2025
- (2) Fire zone 17b, Reactor building recirculation system motor generator area, completed during the week of December 6, 2025
71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
- (1) EDG 12 lube oil, air cooling, and jacket water heat exchangers, completed the week ending November 15, 2025
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure rates for the requalification annual operating exam administered between September 9, 2025 and October 10, 2025, and the biennial written examinations completed on October 10, 2025.
71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) Biennial Requalification Written Examinations The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination administered on September 19, 2025.
Annual Requalification Operating Tests The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees annual requalification operating test.
Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the facility licensee in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2) and that the facility licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives.
Requalification Examination Security The inspectors evaluated the ability of the facility licensee to safeguard examination material, such that the examination is not compromised.
Remedial Training and Re-examinations The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee, and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who did not pass a required requalification examination.
Operator License Conditions The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators meet the conditions of their licenses.
Control Room Simulator The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees control room simulator in modeling the actual plant, and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a planned reduction in power to support rod pattern adjustments and valve testing, completed on October 10, 2025
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a simulator training session covering seismic events, loss of feedwater, and a loss-of-coolant-accident on December 17, 2025
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Ventilation units serving safety related rooms and equipment, completed the last week of December
Aging Management (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the aging management program for the following SSCs that did not meet their inspection or test acceptance criteria:
- (1) Jacket cooling expansion tank coating for EDG 12, inspection failure on May 5, 2025, Jacket cooling expansion tank coating for EDG 11, inspection failure on April 7, 2025, Condensate storage tank insulation jacketing missing, inspection failure on June 4, 2025
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Troubleshooting control circuit issues associated with combustion turbine generator 111 and the 120kV switchyard, completed the week ending October 18, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Automatic depressurization system valve B21F013R circuit continuity lights out, completed the week ending November 1, 2025
- (2) Potential non-conservative assumptions from diagnostic testing of E1150F017A low pressure coolant injection isolation valve, completed the week ending November 8, 2025
- (3) Review of degraded load tap changer for technical specification transformer 64, completed the week ending December 13, 2025
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Replacement of high pressure coolant injection pump controller with new design, completed the week ending October 20, 2025
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
- (1) Replacement of relays associated with 'A' reactor recirculation pump on/off circuit for low pressure injection loop select logic, completed the week ending October 18, 2025
- (2) T4600F402 and T4600F411, drywell purge valves actuator maintenance in the division 2 standby gas treatment system, completed the week ending November 1, 2025
- (3) Desiccant replacement and valve refurbishment on the division 1 control air system dryer, completed the week ending November 8, 2025
- (4) Replacement of auxiliary contactor for E4150F012, high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) minimum flow valve, completed the week ending November 29, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Observation and review of EDG 12 start and load test, completed the week ending December 6, 2025
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.0102.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following submitted Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes:
- RERP Plan Fermi 2 Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan, Rev. 51
- RERP Plan Implementing Procedure, Rev. 44 This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) Tabletop training drill in the technical support center on October 14, 2025
- (2) Multi-facility drill conducted on October 21, 2025
OTHER ACTIVITIES-BASELINE
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Programmatic issues with the Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) program documented in CR 202437005, "Gaps in M&TE compliance over last 4 years resulting in presumed lost test equipment and other issues," completed the week ending November 22, 2025
- (2) Review of operating experience associated with NRC Information Notice 200315, Importance of Followup Activities in Resolving Maintenance Issues, and related NRC NCV 05000263/202500101 associated with motor operated valve motor pinion issues, completed the week ending November 22, 2025
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue. A focused review was completed regarding challenges experienced with the general service water intake, such as a fish/debris intrusion event and response during lowering lake level events (seiches).
Further, the inspectors reviewed organizational survey results focused on employee engagement completed in the fall of 2025, and a sampling of corrective actions associated with observations in biennial problem identification and resolution inspection report 05000341/2025010.
71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000341/2025001-00, Division I Transformer 64 Load Tap Changer Failure Potentially Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Potential Loss of Safety Function (ADAMS Accession No. ML25226A116)
The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71111.15. This LER is Closed.
Reporting (IP Section 03.05) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensees event reporting determinations to ensure it complied with reporting requirements.
- (1) Retraction of LER 05000341/2025001-00, Division I Transformer 64 Load Tap Changer Failure Potentially Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Potential Loss of Safety Function (ADAMS Accession No. ML25272A007)
This LER was submitted and subsequently retracted by licensee correspondence titled Cancellation of Licensee Event Report (LER) 25001-01, Div. 1 Transformer 64 Load Tap Changer Failure Potentially Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Potential Loss of Safety Function, dated September 26, 2025 (ADAMS Accession No. ML25226A116). This LER is Closed.
- (2) On July 7, 2025, Event Notification57804 described the failure of ventilation dampers for the division II residual heat removal/service water (RHRSW) complex pump room and the impact on the high pressure coolant injection system. The issue was documented in CR202548722. EN 57804 was retracted on July 22, 2025 based on a review of the design and licensing basis associated with the RHRSW ventilation systems. The event was reviewed to determine if reporting requirements were met and should have been reported by the licensee.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Bearing Failure on Division II Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) Ventilation Unit Due to Improper Storage Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000341/202500401 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.12 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XIII, Handling, Storage, and Shipping, was identified when the licensee failed to store the fan bearings for the safety related division II EECW pump room cooler in accordance with manufacturer and industry recommendations. As a result, the bearings failed approximately one week after they were installed.
Description:
During routine vibration monitoring on June 9, 2025, two points were discovered above the administrative limit on the division II EECW pump room cooler. The cooler is designed to maintain EECW equipment in the area below design temperatures such that the equipment remains operable. An adverse condition monitoring plan was generated and vibration measurements were taken at a heightened frequency pending further investigation and/or repair. The supported EECW equipment remained operable throughout the period of heightened monitoring, as vibration levels remained below the operability limit.
On September 15, 2025, the licensee elected to replace the fan bearings. Previous operating experience and the specific vibration readings indicated the fan bearings were most likely the cause of the elevated vibrations in the cooler. The old bearings were replaced with ones from stock, and the cooler was returned to service with vibration levels back below the administrative limit.
On September 24, 2025, excessive vibrations were visibly and audibly noted on the cooler by the licensee, and the NRC also became aware of the issue. The cooler was shut down and supported components associated with division II EECW were declared inoperable, resulting in a 72-hour technical specification shutdown action statement. A subsequent risk informed completion time evaluation concluded the equipment could remain inoperable for over 20 days.
Investigation revealed fan bearing failure and a fan imbalance (which was later determined to be caused by the bearing failure) had caused the high vibrations. Additional bearings from stock were retrieved from the same purchase order as the failed bearings. When checked, they were not rotating freely, indicating an issue with the proposed replacement bearings. New bearings were then ordered and installed on the cooler, followed by a successful post maintenance test and restoration of the inoperable equipment on September 28, 2025.
The failed bearings were purchased in 2014 and added to stock. A technical evaluation performed per procedure MMM03, Technical Evaluation of Procurement Documents, stipulated a 25-year shelf life for the bearings. However, investigation revealed that several manufacturer and industry recommendations for bearing storage were not incorporated into the evaluation. The original equipment manufacturer noted their catalog specified their bearings should remain in original packaging, with a temperature range of 32104 degrees F, and humidity below 60 percent. Another bearing manufacturer was contacted for shelf life guidance and indicated a five-year shelf life for similar bearings. In contrast, licensee storage conditions allowed temperatures up to 140 degrees F with no humidity restrictions, and contained a periodic activity to open the bearings for addition of light oil, without an assessment on the specific type or compatibility of the oil with the installed grease.
Additionally, while the evaluation referenced EPRI NP6408, Plant Engineering: Guidelines for Establishing, Maintaining, and Extending the Shelf Life Capability of Limited Life Items, it failed to account for a note in the EPRI report which stated initial recommendations of indefinite bearing shelf lives had been updated to approximately 10 years with proper storage and periodic testing, with some manufacturer data indicating that only a 26 year shelf life was achievable.
Corrective Actions:
The licensee ordered new bearings and installed them in the cooler. The licensee is also taking actions to ensure components are stored in accordance with manufacturer recommendations.
Corrective Action References: CR202550193
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency:
The licensees failure to store the fan bearings for the safety related division II EECW pump room cooler in accordance with manufacturer and industry recommendations as required by MMM03, Technical Evaluation of Procurement Documents, MM13, Storage Maintenance Program, was a performance deficiency.
Screening:
The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the safety related room cooler was rendered nonfunctional, resulting in supported division II EECW equipment being declared inoperable.
Significance:
The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.
Specifically, all questions in Exhibit 2 for mitigating systems were answered 'no.' With the failed cooler, EECW components (namely the pump) maintained their PRA functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect:
Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance. Specifically, the technical evaluation was performed in 2014.
Enforcement:
Violation:
8 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XIII, Handling, Storage, and Shipping, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to control the storage and preservation of material and equipment in accordance with work and inspection instructions to prevent damage or deterioration. When necessary for particular products, special protective environments, such as specific moisture content levels and temperature levels, shall be specified and provided.
Contrary to the above, from August 26, 2014 until September 28, 2025, measures were not established to control the storage and preservation of material in accordance with work and inspection instructions to prevent damage or deterioration. Specifically, instructions provided for the EECW fan bearings did not align with manufacturer and industry guidance regarding storage requirements to prevent damage and deterioration. Further, specific moisture content levels and temperature levels were not specified in accordance with manufacturers recommendations. As a result, deterioration occurred on bearings in storage which resulted in failure of the safety related division II EECW pump room cooler approximately one week after they were installed.
Enforcement Action:
This violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Identify Inoperable Load Tap Changer on Offsite Power Transformer Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000341/202500402 Open/Closed
[H.11] -
Challenge the Unknown 71111.15 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, was identified for the failure to promptly identify a nonconformance regarding a degraded load tap changer (LTC) associated with transformer 64. Specifically, after a low voltage alarm was received on safety related 4160V buses 64B and 64C when starting a circulating water pump on June 17, 2025, the licensee's investigation revealed that the LTC for transformer 64 was degraded since February of 2024. Despite multiple instances of the LTC failing to automatically adjust voltage in that timeframe, the impact on the design and licensing bases was not recognized at those times, resulting in the failure to perform required TS actions or compensatory measures.
Description:
On June 17, 2025, the licensee started circulating water pump 4. As expected, the start of such a large motor caused voltage to go down on the associated electrical buses, including safety related buses 64B and 64C. However, an alarm condition was not expected. Buses 64B and 64C are supplied through transformer 64, which is one of the credited offsite power sources per the technical specifications. The transformer steps down 13.2 kilo-volts from the division I switchyard to 4160 volts (V) for use in the plant. The transformer has an LTC which is normally aligned to automatically adjust voltage on the 4160V safety buses in response to changes in grid conditions or during varying loading conditions. The design and licensing basis for the plant assumes that if division I offsite power is available during a loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA), all of the required safety related loads can simultaneously start and remain running, without the need to utilize the emergency diesel generators onsite. In order to fulfill this function, it is assumed in the supporting design calculations that the LTC will automatically adjust voltage during the LOCA to preclude actuation of the degraded voltage relays on the safety buses. Upon actuation of those relays, the safety buses would lose power while the emergency diesel generators started, after which the safety related loads would be sequenced back into operation. To maintain operability of the offsite power source if the automatic function is not working, the LTC can be placed in manual, but only if grid, 64B, and 64C voltages are maintained in a band specified in the design calculation DC6447, Auxiliary Power System Analysis, Revision H (which would require periodic checks of the voltages and periodic manual adjustments). The requirements for keeping the LTC in automatic during Modes 1,2, and 3 (or within specified voltage bands in manual) are also outlined in procedure 23.320, Balance of Plant Auxiliary Electrical Distribution System, Revision 86, as both a general precaution, and a specific caution statement in the section for manual operation of the LTC.
On May 13, 2024, a condition report (CR) was written after identifying the LTC for transformer 64 was not adjusting voltage in automatic. Operators manually adjusted the LTC to adjust 64B and 64C voltages to clear the alarms, but returned the LTC to automatic. On multiple other occasions between May 13, 2024, and June 17, 2025, voltage was noted to be outside of allowed bands via operator rounds or receipt of alarms in the main control room. Through coordination with the grid operator or further manual adjustments of the LTC, alarms were cleared and/or voltage restored, with the LTC being returned to automatic each time. In some cases, additional CRs were written, in other cases not. In each case, it was not recognized that a failure of the LTC to operate in automatic could impact the operability of the offsite power source, requiring action per the plants technical specifications or manual adjustments/monitoring in accordance with the design calculation. Follow-on site review of the CRs generated and normal system monitoring also did not detect the failed automatic function of the LTC and/or the impact to the design and licensing basis. Initially, following the June 17, 2025 low voltage condition, the potential operability impacts were again not recognized.
However, a subsequent operating shift questioned the condition, and upon further review determined the offsite source was inoperable pending manual adjustments/monitoring per the design calculation (or repair of the LTC). At this time, operators manually adjusted voltage per the design calculation and implemented a compensatory monitoring plan to maintain operability. Recognizing the impact of the failure, troubleshooting was started the next day, and a faulty relay in the control circuit for the LTC was discovered. It was replaced, and the LTC was tested in automatic satisfactorily.
Later investigation by the site revealed the LTC was not working since February of 2024, based on a review of voltage conditions on the safety related buses. Periodic automatic tapping of the LTC in response to grid conditions could be observed prior February 7, 2024, but not beyond. Working with the transmission system coordinator, the licensee performed a technical evaluation to assess the past operability of the offsite source. Utilizing actual grid conditions and safety bus voltages, and accounting for conservatisms in the design calculations, it was determined between February 7, 2024 and June 17, 2025, there were 309 instances where bus voltage would not be maintained during a LOCA with offsite power available to prevent safety loads from losing power and transferring to the EDGs. None of the instances were greater than the TS allowed outage time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and ranged anywhere from a few seconds to approximately 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />. Further, the division II offsite power source remained operable for the period evaluated.
Corrective Actions:
The licensee instituted compensatory measures with only manual control available for the LTC, pending replacement of a degraded relay in the LTC control circuit. An organizational effectiveness causal evaluation was conducted which resulted in actions to revise procedures to highlight operability impacts of the LTC, along with actions to improve monitoring to detect issues with LTC operation.
Corrective Action References: 202549330, 202548317
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency:
The licensees failure to promptly identify a nonconformance regarding a degraded LTC associated with transformer 64, a condition adverse to quality, was contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and therefore was a performance deficiency. Despite evidence on multiple occasions the LTC was not functioning automatically, the licensee failed to recognize the operability impacts on the TS-required offsite power source.
Screening:
The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the operability impacts of the LTC failing to automatically operate were not recognized.
Significance:
The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.
Specifically, in accordance with Exhibit 2, the condition resulted in a loss of the PRA function of one train of a multi-train TS system for greater than its TS allowed outage time. The cumulative amount of time the LTC could not perform its function of maintaining power to divisional electrical loads was approximately 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br />, versus a TS allowed outage time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (or less when an EDG happened to be out of service concurrently).
A senior reactor analyst (SRA) performed a detailed risk evaluation using SPAR model version 8.81 with SAPHIRE version 8.2.12. The SRA applied a bounding assumption that the performance deficiency resulted in a degraded condition that would render transformer 64 unavailable to perform its required function as an offsite power source for safety buses 64B and 64C during any event that would require the use of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) equipment to mitigate a LOCA.
Based on historical reviews of grid voltage conditions, the SRA assumed an exposure time of 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> associated with this degraded condition. Using the events and condition assessment workspace, the SRA set the basic event ACP-TFM-FC-64 (Failure of Transformer 64 During Operation) to TRUE. The SRA also set the basic event FLX-XHE-XE-ELAP (Operators Fail to Declare ELAP When Beneficial) top a value to 1.0E2 to reflect credit for the use of diverse and flexible (FLEX) coping strategies. With these modeling adjustments, the SRA quantified the SPAR model for all internal events not involving a loss of offsite power and obtained a total increase in average annual core damage frequency (delta-CDF) of 3.17E8/yr. Dominant sequences included a loss of AC Bus 301 with:
a) failure of the standby feedwater, reactor core isolation cooling, high pressure coolant injection (HPCI), core spray, low pressure coolant injection, suppression pool cooling, shutdown cooling, containment spray cooling, and containment venting functions; or b) failure of the emergency diesel generators with failure of the HPCI and emergency depressurization functions.
Based on total delta core damage frequency (delta-CDF) for all internal events being bounded to less than 1.0E7/yr, the SRA determined that risk associated with external events did not need to be analyzed to determine the safety significance of this finding. The SRA also determined that risk attributable to large early release frequency was not a dominant metric in the significance determination for this finding. Based on a total delta-CDF of less than 3.17E8/yr, the SRA concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect:
H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Per IMC 0310, Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas, aspect H.11 relates to NUREG 2165, Safety Culture Common Language trait 4.9, Questioning Attitude. Specifically, throughout the corrective action and work screening processes, lack of a questioning attitude across the organization led to a lack of understanding of the impact of the degraded LTC.
Enforcement:
Violation:
10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as nonconformances, are promptly identified.
TS 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, requires, in part, that while the plant is in Modes 1, 2, and 3, two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution system shall be operable.
Contrary to the above, from May 13, 2024, until June 17, 2025, the licensee failed to promptly identify a nonconformance with the design and licensing basis requirements associated with the LTC for transformer 64. Specifically, despite multiple instances of the LTC failing to automatically adjust voltage, the licensee did not recognize this was a design and licensing basis requirement affecting operability of the associated TS-required offsite power source.
Also, going back to February 7, 2024, while in Modes 1, 2, and 3, there were instances where the division I qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the associated onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution system was inoperable. As a result, of the failure to identify the nonconformance, the required TS actions or compensatory measures were not taken to address the inoperable power source.
Enforcement Action:
This violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On January 29, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to P. Dietrich, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 18, 2025, the inspectors presented the biennial licensed operator requalification program inspection results to P. Dietrich, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On December 23, 2025, the inspectors presented the emergency action level and emergency plan changes inspection results to A. Mann, Emergency Preparedness Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
27.000.04
Freeze Protection Lineup Verification
27.000.04,
Implementation of Freeze Protection Measures
2/04/2025
Procedures
27.000.04,
Monthly Owner Controlled Area Freeze Protection Check
2/04/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202551615
MCR Alarm 9D32 Division I EDG 11 Not Ready For Auto Start
Did Not Clear When Taking MPO to Remote. Local Alarms
Clear
11/25/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR202551746
NRC Identified B CS Source Insulation Cover Loose
2/02/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR202551747
E2100F020D & F001D Labels Need Replaced - NRC
Identified
2/02/2025
6M7212034
Diagram Core Spray System CSS Reactor Building
6M7215734
EDG System Functional Operating Sketch
Drawings
6M721N2052
RHR Service Water System Division I RHR Complex
23.203
Core Spray System Division 2 Initial Valve Lineup
23.208
RHR Complex Service Water Systems
137
Procedures
23.307
Emergency Diesel Generator System
139
FP-RB417a
Reactor Building SLC System Zone 17 El. 659'6"
Fire Plans
FP-RB417b
Reactor Building Recirculation System Motor Generator Area,
Zone 17, El. 659'6"
69356763
EDG 12 Jacket Coolant Hx
69356763
Miscellaneous
69356765
EDG 12 Air Coolant Hx
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
ARP 9D52
EDG Serv H2) Pump C Water Flow Low
Miscellaneous
Table 03.031
Examination
Results
Email from Fermi 2 Power Plant Program Supervisor-
Simulator/NRC Exam Development
10/14/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202443705
Operator License Termination 30-day Notification to NRC Was
Missed
11/13/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR202550020
NRC FORM 398 Sent to Region without All Signatures
09/15/2025
AR-JP4101.192
AR-JP4101.408
AS-JP4101.426
AS-JP4101.531
Biennial
Comprehensive
LOR Written Exam
LOR 2025 - Exam 2 - Full Key
DTC: TPMMNT
DSN: MNT16010
Remediation Record 00112628
11/08/2024
DTC: TPMMNT
DSN: MNT16010
Remediation Record 00154073
11/08/2024
DTC: TPMMNT
DSN: MNT16013
Training Attendance Record
08/01/2025
DTC: TPMMNT
DSN: MNT16013
Training Attendance Record
06/20/2025
Miscellaneous
DTC: TPMMNT
DSN: MNT16013
Training Attendance Record
03/28/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Instruction 5.12
Nuclear Training
Work Instruction
Conduct of
Simulator
Assessments &
Evaluations
Crew 2 Performance Evaluations and Individual Crew 2
Members Performance Evaluations for Week 2
09/17/2025
LOR 2025 Written
Overlap Plan
LOR 2025 Written Overlap Plan
NANT240119
Level 4 Evaluation Report on Voltage Found During Live Dead
Live - Revised
11/14/2024
ODE8;
4;
Return to Shift
Checklist
Five Records of Licensed Operators Completing the
10CFR55.53(f) Requirements to Restore Their Licenses to
Active Status, Dated 04/15/2024; 03/31/2024; 11/15/2024;
8/5/2022; and 03/12/2021
P-JP0104.001
P-JP0272.401
P-JP2001.216
S-JP0105.181
S-JP0127.191
S-JP0158.402
Shift 2 Active
License Required
Hours
Shift 2 Active License Required Hours, 1st QTR of 2025, 2nd
QTR of 2025, and 3rd QTR of 2025
09/14/2025
SS-OP9042580
Fermi 2 - Evaluation Scenario
SS-OP9042587
Fermi 2 - Evaluation Scenario
SS-OP9042591
Fermi 2 - Evaluation Scenario
Miscellaneous
SS-OP9042594
Fermi 2 - Evaluation Scenario
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Fermi 2 Nuclear
Training Work
Instruction
Section 5.0
Implementation of
Training Instruction
5.12
Conduct of Simulator Assessments and Evaluations
MNT18
Conduct of Operations Training Manual
Procedures
ODE8
Operations Department Expectation; Administrative Guidelines
and Desk Instructions
Audit 220109
Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit of the Training and
Qualification of Unit Staff (Operations) Program
09/12/2022
Self-Assessments
NANT250056
Formal Self-Assessment Report (Licensed Operator
Requalification Program)
07/09/2025
Miscellaneous
Night Order-
Mispositioning
Event
Review of Peer Checker Responsibilities And Lessons-Learned
from EDG12 Mispositioning Event
2/07/2025
2.000.03
Power Operation 25% to 100% to 25%
109
24.307.17
Emergency Diesel Generator 14Start and Load Test
29.100.01
RPV Control
EP101
Classification of Emergencies
Procedures
MGA24
Human Performance Program and Field Worker Tools
26696
Degraded Coating Identified EDG 12 Expansion Tank During
License Renewal Inspection
09/07/2023
20548
FBHVAC East Exhaust Fan Discharge Damper Closed with
Fan Running
08/14/2023
21408
South Steam Tunnel Cooler Unable to Maintain Max Design
Temp Limit
08/15/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202333278
Abnormal Noise Coming from Div II EECW Pump Room Cooler 09/23/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR202442275
Replace EDG JC Expansion Tanks
09/17/2024
CR202443367
8D3 North Steam Tunnel Cooling Unit No Air Flow
10/31/2024
CR202545766
T4100B043 (Div I Battery Room CLR) Vibrations Above
Investigative Limit of 0.314 IPS
2/20/2025
CR202546699
Center Train of RBHVAC S/D Due to Rising RB D/P
04/04/2025
CR202548008
Condensate Storage Tank Missing Insulation Jacketing
Requires Repair
06/04/2025
CR202548070
T4100B035 (Div II EECW RM CLR_Above Vibration Admin
Limit of 0.314 IPS but Below Shutdown Limit of 0.628 IPS
06/09/2025
CR202550193
Div II EECW Pump Room Cooler Abnormal Vibrations
09/24/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202551193
Deviation in ACMP 25008 Data Collection
11/05/2025
Engineering
Evaluations
17378
Bearing Shelf Life
09/04/2014
ACMP 24005
ACMP 25008
Div II EECW Pump Room Cooler
TE100290401
Technical Evaluation - Bearing
Miscellaneous
Generic License Renewal Inspection Report - Condensate
Storage Tank
06/04/2025
Procedures
MMR Appendix E
Maintenance Rule SSC Specific Functions
Shipping Records
4700779621
07/18/2014
63562822
EDG 12 JC Exp Tank License Renewal - Perform Inspection of
Internal Galvanized Coating
04/27/2025
67340803
EDG 11 JC Exp Tank License Renewal - Perform Inspection of
Internal Galvanized Coating
04/02/2025
Work Orders
950047007
Div II EECW Pump Room Cooler Abnormal Vibrations
09/25/2025
CR202550496
PO 4702015517 Potential Counterfeit Parts
10/03/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202550502
Received 11D42 SWYD DCS Trouble in the MCR for Loss of
OCS Communications to 120KV Switchyard and CTGs
10/04/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR202550508
CTG11 Position A2 Manual Close Permissive Bypass Occurred
with no Operator Action
10/05/2025
CR202550509
Division I RHR Tagging and LCO Entry Will Not Be Performed
as Scheduled due to Conservative Ops
10/05/2025
CR202550510
CTG 111 Startup with No Operator Action
10/05/2025
Supervisory and Telemetering Control Block Diagram
Miscellaneous
One-line Diagram - Alternative Shutdown System
Procedures
MMR Appendix H
On-Line Core Damage Risk Management Guidelines
950063374
Received 11D42 SWYD DCS Trouble in the MCR for Loss of
DCS Communications to 120KV Switchyard
10/08/2025
Work Orders
950066461
Reseat Analog Output Modules in S14P003
10/07/2025
Calculations
DC6447
Auxiliary Power System Analysis
H
29969
Lights DS1R and DS2R for D21F013R on Panel H11P626
Were Found Not Dimly Lit
09/08/2023
CR202439536
Transformer 64 Load Tap Changer Not Maintaining Voltage in
Automatic
05/13/2024
CR202548317
Div I Bus Voltage Low after Starting CWP #4
06/17/2025
CR202549330
System Service Transformer 64 Load Tap Changer Past
Operability Investigation
08/06/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202550746
25 MOV Focused Self-Assessment Deficiency -
E1150F017A Potentially Non-Conservative Assumption Made
During Diagnostic Thrust Testing
10/16/2025
6I7212095-02
Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System SOL
Valves B2104F0131, P & R
R
Drawings
6I7212095-06
Schematic Diagram Automatic Depressurization System
Control Logic A
J
Miscellaneous
EFA-E1125-002
E1150F017A Potentially Non-Conservative Assumption Made
During Diagnostic Thrust Testing
Procedures
23.320
Balance of Plant Auxiliary Electrical Distribution System
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
DECP700026
Replacement of E41K615 HPCI Flow Controller
Procedures
24.202.04
HPCI System Offline Auto Initiation Time Response Test
Work Orders
63474659
Replace Electrolytic Capacitors in HPCI Pump Discharge Flow
Controller
11/08/2024
CR202550817
During WO 43526441 Rebuild of T4600F411 SGTS DW Purge
Line ISO BYP AOV a Bolt Was Ripped Out of the Flange
Adapter
10/21/2025
CR202550871
Drywell Penetration X25 - Unable to Pressurize During LLRT
10/22/2025
CR202551343
E4150F012 HPCI Min Flow Valve, Failed to Open
11/12/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202551708
During EDG 12 24.307.15 Step Missed
2/01/2025
6I7212221-07
Schematic Diagram HPCI System Bypass to Suppression Pool
and Lube Cooling Valves E4150F012 & E4150F059
Z
6M7212709
Diagram Standby Gas Treatment and Primary Containment
Purge System Reactor Building
Drawings
6SD7212522-12A
Interconnection Diagram 260V DC 2PB1 (Div II) Positions 1 -6 P
23.404
24.202.01
HPCI Pump and Valve Operability Test at 1025 PSI
28
24.307.15
Emergency Diesel Generator 12 - Start and Load Test
35.318.017
Inspection and Testing of Multi-Contact Auxiliary Relays
54A
35.BET.001
Assembly and Disassembly of Bettis Valve Actuators Series
T3xxSRx and T4xxSRx
Procedures
44.030.071
ECCS - Reactor Recirculation Pump A DP, Division II
Functional Test
35A
43526420
Perform Valve Actuator Overhaul
10/20/2025
43526441
Perform Valve Actuator Overhaul
10/20/2025
Work Orders
47156690
Calibrate and Inspect Div 2 SGTS Exhaust Fan Control Loop
10/24/2025
66524409
Check Desiccant and Rebuild Inlet/Exhaust Valves
10/21/2025
Work Orders
70100498
Replace ECCS Trip Cabinet Div II Recirc Pump C001A Agastat 10/16/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Relay
70100727
Replace ECCS Trip Cabinet Div II Recirc Pump C001A Agastat
Relay
10/16/2025
70369515
Perform 24.202.01 HPCI Pump Flow Test & Valve Stroke at
25 PSIG
11/12/2025
70741725
Perform 24.307.15 SEC5.1 EDG 12 Start and Load Test -
Slow Start
2/01/2025
2499707
Replace Desiccant in Division I NIAS Dryer
2/06/2026
95009188
E4150F012 HPCI Min Flow Valve, Failed to Open
11/13/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202441127
Revision 51 of the RERP Plan Was Not Submitted to the NRC
by the Required Date
07/23/2024
Miscellaneous
TPMMLS (MLS08)
Licenses, Plans and Programs
EP101
Classification of Emergencies
Procedures
RERP Plan
Fermi 2 Radiological Emergency Response Plan
CR202550732
Blue Team Tabletop Drill DEP Failure
10/16/2025
CR202551024
Request Adobe Form Signature Removal From EP290 Forms
10/29/2025
CR202551052
Performance Criteria E.1.1 - 10Minute Administrative
Guideline Not Met for Notifications during DEP Opportunities
on October 21, 2025 RERP Drill
10/30/2025
CR202551053
Incomplete Notification Process During October 2025 RERP
Drill - TSC
10/30/2025
CR202551054
Industry Notifications Not Completed during October 21, 2025
10/30/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202551073
Follow-up Notification Issues during October 21, 2025 RERP
Drill
10/30/2025
Drill Gold Players - Red Drill Team
10/21/2025
Miscellaneous
October-November Tabletop (Blue)
10/14/2025
EP101
Classification of Emergencies
Procedures
EP530
Assembly and Accountability and Onsite Protective Actions
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
22185
MOV Found with Loose Handwheel and Declutch Lever Not
Staying Engaged; AFCC 4
10/29/2023
24862
Degraded Grease, Declutch Lever Not Working
10/19/2023
23873
MOV Clutch Trippers Inoperable
09/17/2023
20398
Review Limitorque Maintenance Update 1301 for Applicability
to Fermi
09/17/2023
21330
MOV Would Not Stay in Manual Mode
09/17/2023
21658
Manual Declutch Lever Will Not Stay Engaged; WO 46187458
09/14/2023
CR1521892
Failed Calibration of Pressure Reference Standard Mass from
Mass Set, RS325M, on Work Completed by an Approved
Vendor
09/16/2023
CR202437138
M&TE: Assumed Failure of Flow Calibration Control Unit
(RS547M), due to No As-Found Date Being Obtainable
03/23/2024
Cr-202443353
NQA Surveillance 241003 Gap - New and Revised MET/CAL
Instructions Not Validated as Required
10/30/2024
CR202443421
NQA Surveillance 24.1003 Gap - Non-Compliance with M&TE
Extensions
11/01/2024
CR202443422
NQA Surveillance 241003 Gap - M&TE Calibration Schedule
Not Properly Maintained and Implemented to Control M&TE
11/01/2024
CR202443424
NQA Surveillance 241003 Gap - Insufficient Actions to
Investigations and Adverse Trend for Failed and Assumed
Failed M&TE
11/01/2024
CR202443425
NQA Surveillance 241003 Recommendation - Enhance
Elements and Urgency of 3Year M&TE Recovery Plan
11/01/2024
CR202545066
NQA - Response to NQA Elevation for Deficiencies in
Oversight of the Measuring & Testing Equipment Program is
Off-Track
01/15/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202545232
Failed Calivration of M&TE, PG957M, Model 160534100,
100 PSIG Teledyne Presure Tranducer Used on "Q" Work
Performed between 6/17/2019 and 9/17/2019 on AOV Systems
01/24/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Work (No Work Order #s Provided)
CR202545238
Failed Calibration of M&TE, PG956M, Model 160534100,
100 PSIG Teledyne Pressure Transducer Used on "Q" Work
Performed between 2/1/2022 and 3/1/2023 on AOV Systems
Work (59577505q, 59344705q, 58760619Q)
01/24/2025
CR202545317
Failed Calibration of M&TE, RS326M, Model 3220. Troemner
Class 1 Mass Set Used on Work Performed Between 5/7/2021
and 5/7/2024 on Metrology Lab Work
01/29/2025
CR202545362
Failed Calibration of M&TE, RS624M, Model 5522A, Fluke
Calibrator Used on Work Performed Between 8/11/2023 and
8/11/2024 on Metrology Lab Work
01/30/2025
CR202546600
N&TE Considered Lost IAW MA04 Section 5.5.4: M&TE is Not
Received or its Location Determined by 30Days after its
Calibration Due Date, Consider the Recalled M&TE Lost.
Evaluation of "Q" Uses Required to Assess Impact
04/01/2025
CR202547399
M&TE Considered Lost AW MMA04 Section 5.5.4: M&TE is
Not Received or it Location Determined by 30Days After its
Calibration Due Date, Consider the Recalled M&TE Lost.
Evaluation of "Q" Uses Required to Assess Impact
05/07/2025
CR202547695
Implications of Lost M&TE & Failed Calibrations
05/20/2025
CR202547862
25 PI&R FSA Deficiency Associated with Downgrading CRs
Associated with Lost or Assumed Failed M&TE
05/29/2025
CR202548727
Failed M&TE Calibrations Causing Rework Among Other
Potential Negative Consequences
07/08/2025
CR202549360
Failed Calibration of Reference Standard Class 1 Mass Set,
RS325M, on Work Completed the Metrology Lab between
2/21/2017 to 2/21/2018
08/07/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202549505
Review of Loose Paperwork in Fermi Metrology Lab Produced
Several Failed Calibration Documents That Had Not Been
Entered Into the Met Team Database. Many of These Also
Need CRs to Evaluate Uses
08/14/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR202549868
Failed Calibration of M&TE Asset RC067M, "Q" Work
Performed Between 9/11/2023 to 8/08/2025, Under
WO 66492356, by IANDC
09/05/2025
CR202550803
M&TE Considered Lost IAW MMA04 Section 5.5.4: M&TE is
Not Received or its Location Determined by 30Days after its
Calibration Due Date, Consider the Recalled M&TE Lost.
Evaluation of "Q" Uses Required to Assess Impact
10/20/2025
CR202550804
M&TE Considered Lost IAW MMA04 Section 5.5.4: M&TE is
Not Received or its Location Determined by 30Days After its
Calibration Due Date, Consider the Recalled M&TE Lost.
Evaluation of "Q" Uses Required to Assess Impact
10/20/2025
35.LIM.003
Limitorque SMB0 Through SMB4 & 4T Operator -
Maintenance
35.LIM.004
Limitorque SMB000 Operator - Maintenance
35.LIM.011
Motor, Motor Pinion, Torque Switch and Limit Switch Rotor
Installation/Replacement
MMA04
Measuring and Test Equipment Program
Procedures
MMA05
Tool and M&TE Issue, Control and Return
51147830
Valve Repack (P4400F603B)
04/02/2023
289473
Perform Maxi Periodic MOV Inspection (E1150F021B)
03/29/2024
B349060100
Perform Mini Periodic MOV Inspection and MPM Stroke Test
11/22/2004
Work Orders
E605090100
Perform Maxi Periodic MOV Inspection and MPM Stroke Test
06/20/2009
CR202437367
GSW Backwash Screen Damage
03/27/2024
CR202438179
P4100F601 - RF22 Scope Add Needed for Motor-Directional
Check
04/11/2024
CR202441478
Standing Water in GSW Switchgear Room Due to Overflow
08/09/2024
CR202443046
USA NSCA 2024 Weakness in Respectful Work Environment
(WE) - Trust and Respect is Not Evident in Leadership
10/18/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202444609
Partially Closed GSW Diving Work Order
2/18/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR202544893
GSW Backwash Traveling Screens Plugged Nozzles
01/08/2025
CR202545281
Scheduled Work Not Performed GSW Traveling Screens
01/28/2025
CR202546287
Request WO to Replace Splice Plate Bolts on Upstream Side
of Traveling Screens
03/17/2025
CR202546850
25 WANO Peer Review AFI LF.1 - Leading Change
04/11/2025
CR202547431
GSW Backwash Screen Clogged
05/09/2025
CR202549754
GSW Intake Silt Inspection Delays
08/29/2025
CR202550600
Recommend Performing SM Event P242 Perform GSW Intake
Channel Dredging
10/09/2025
CR202551084
GSW Backwash Not Keeping up with Input to Flume
10/30/2025
CR202551668
Evaluate GSW Intake Canal
11/28/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR202444240
NRC Identified: Flooded Pit and Submerged Insulated Piping at
GSW Pump House
2/10/2024
2155685
Bad Motor on MOV P4100F01
07/05/2023
67336385
Perform GSW Intake Channel Silt Inspection
2/16/2025
68819873
Perform GSW Intake Channel Dredging
10/18/2023
237746
Inspect/Clean GSW Seals, Intake Silt, Mussel, T. Racks
2/06/2024
Work Orders
70021488
Degraded Piping on P4100F001B
2/16/2025
DTS: CMEMO
Memorandum to Michael Ciko from Eric Frank - Regulatory
Assessment of Requirements Pertaining to Operability of
Systems Supported by the RHR Ventilation Systems
07/17/2025
Event Notification: Residual Heat Removal Complex Pump
Room Damper Fully Closed - Retracted EN
07/23/2025
LER 2025001-01
Div. 1 Transformer 64 Load Tap Changer failure Potentially
Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Potential Loss of
Safety Function
08/14/2025
Miscellaneous
NRC250038
Cancellation of Licensee Event Report (LER) 25001-01, Div. 1 09/26/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Transformer 64 Load Tap Changer Failure Potentially
Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Potential Loss of
Safety Function