IR 05000341/2025003
| ML25352A054 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 12/22/2025 |
| From: | Sanchez Santiago E NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2 |
| To: | Peter Dietrich DTE Electric Company |
| References | |
| IR 2025003 | |
| Download: ML25352A054 (0) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2025003
Dear Peter Dietrich:
On September 30, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2. On November 20, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Due to the temporary cessation of government operations, which commenced on October 01, 2025, the NRC began operating under its Office of Management and Budget-approved plan for operations during a lapse in appropriations. Consistent with that plan, the NRC operated at reduced staffing levels throughout the duration of the shutdown. However, the NRC continued to perform critical health and safety functions and make progress on other high-priority activities associated with the ADVANCE Act and Executive Order 14300. On November 13, 2025, following the passage of a continuing resolution, the NRC resumed normal operations. However, due to the 43-day lapse in normal operations, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation granted the regional offices an extension on the issuance of the calendar year 2025, third quarter integrated inspection reports normally issued by November 15, 2025, to December 31, 2025. The NRC will resume the routine cycle of issuing inspection reports on a quarterly basis beginning with the calendar year 2025, fourth quarter integrated inspection reports, which will be issued 45 days after the fourth quarter ends on December 31, 2025.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2.
December 22, 2025 If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Elba M. Sanchez Santiago, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000341 License No. NPF-43 Enclosure:
As stated cc: Distribution via LISTSERV Signed by Sanchez Santiago, Elba on 12/22/25
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Ensure Acceptance Criteria for Maintenance on Air Compressor Inlet Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000341/202500301 Open/Closed
[P.3] -
Resolution 71111.12 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, occurred when the licensee did not have procedures with appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.
Specifically, the maintenance procedure for the safety-related air compressors lacked sufficient detail to ensure proper clearances existed in the compressor inlet valves.
Inoperable Division of Control Room Ventilation System due to Incorrect Post-Maintenance Testing Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000341/202500302 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71111.24 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instruction, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for the failure to include instructions appropriate to the circumstance for performing post-maintenance testing on the division II control center heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (CCHVAC)system following replacement of a static pressure controller. This resulted in the system being inoperable due to its inability to perform its function in the recirculation mode.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 2 began the assessment period at or near 100 percent power. On August 10, 2025, a planned downpower to approximately 90 percent was performed to investigate elevated turbine building steam tunnel temperatures. Power was restored to 100 percent on August 13, 2025. On September 26, 2025, a planned downpower to approximately 90 percent was performed for maintenance on the hydraulic controls for a high pressure stop valve. Power was restored to 100 percent the same day.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Division II standby gas treatment system (SGTS) while division I in maintenance on August 5, 2025
- (2) Electric driven fire pump while diesel driven fire pump in maintenance on September 23, 2025
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire zone 7, reactor building first floor control rod drive and railroad bay area, completed during the week ending September 6, 2025
- (2) Fire zone 52, emergency diesel generator (EDG) 11 switchgear room, completed during the week ending September 6, 2025
- (3) Fire zone 53, EDG 12 switchgear room, completed during the week ending September 6, 2025
- (4) Fire zone 50, residual heat removal (RHR) complex division I pump room, completed during the week ending September 27, 2025
- (5) Fire zone 54, RHR complex EDG 13 switchgear and switchgear ventilation room, completed during the week ending September 27, 2025
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room and in the field during a planned surveillance of the high pressure coolant injection system, a heightened-risk activity, on August 21, 2025
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a portion of the annual operating exam in the control room simulator on September 10, 2025
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Core spray system, completed during the week ending August 16, 2025
- (2) Non-interruptible air supply system, completed during the week ending September 27, 2025
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
- (1) Warehouse A and B walkdowns and qualification test report review of safety-related control relays, completed during the week ending July 19, 2025
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Elevated turbine building steam tunnel temperatures approaching main steam isolation valve isolation setpoint, completed during the week ending August 23, 2025
- (2) Troubleshooting associated with a low voltage from reactor protection system motor-generator set 'B' and water leakage into hydraulic oil for high pressure turbine control valve 3, completed during the week ending September 13, 2025
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples 1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Smoke from EDG 12 exhaust piping area during a surveillance on July 10, 2025
- (2) Reactor building stationary particulate iodine and noble gas (SPING) flow issues, completed during the week ending August 2, 2025
- (3) Division II primary containment monitoring system pump repairs, completed during the week ending August 9, 2025 (4)
(Partial)
Review of degraded load tap changer for technical specification transformer 64
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Containment high range radiation monitors modifications, completed during the week ending July 19, 2025
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
- (1) Testing and replacement of safety-related air regulators associated with division I of the standby gas treatment system, completed during the week ending August 9, 2025
- (2) Replacement of division II control center heating, ventilation, and air conditioning static pressure controller T41K414, completed during the week ending August 30, 2025
- (3) Testing the diesel driven fire pump following the drain, clean, inspect of the diesel fire pump fuel oil tank, completed during the week ending September 27, 2025
- (4) Division II emergency equipment service water (EESW) motor testing and piping replacement, completed during the last week of September, 2025
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) Review of fire suppression water system flow test, completed during the week ending September 6, 2025
- (2) Observation and review of Surveillance Testing for "SLC Pump and Check Valve Operability Test" 24.139.02, completed during the week ending September 27, 2025
71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.0102.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system:
- Annual siren inspection and maintenance records for the period of August 1, 2024 through July 31, 2025
71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.0102.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the emergency preparedness organization
71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Required Emergency Preparedness Drill (1 Sample)
- (1) Multi-facility drill (emergency operations facility/simulator observed) on July 1,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:
- (1) Portable friskers stored ready for use
- (2) Portable ion chambers stored ready for use
- (3) High range extendable GM dose rate instruments stored available ready for use
- (4) Personnel contamination monitors in the drywell entrance and exit building
- (5) Tool contamination monitors in the drywell entrance and exit building
Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (10 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:
- (1) Mirion FASTSCAN
- (2) Containment area high range radiation monitor division II
- (3) Ludlum 12 Frisker serial number 341398 with 4392 alpha probe
- (4) MGPI telepole serial number 6618066
- (5) Canberra Tennelec alpha/beta counting system detector 3
- (6) Gamma spectroscopy system 2 serial number 09079301
- (7) Thermo Eberline AMS4 serial number 1058
- (8) Ludlum model 93 serial number 343169
- (9) MGP DMC2000 serial number 912915
- (10) Cronos serial number 1611283 Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:
- (1) Turbine building vent exhaust PRM
- (2) Circulating water system decant line rad monitor
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing & Radioactive Material Handling, Storage,
& Transportation
Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 03.01)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance in controlling, labeling and securing the following radioactive materials:
- (1) Warehouse G satellite radiologically controlled area
Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors walked down the following accessible portions of the solid radioactive waste systems and evaluated system configuration and functionality:
- (1) Solid radwaste system with RDS1000 portable system connected
Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following characterization and classification of radioactive waste:
- (1) Spent resin liner L24012
- (2) Condensate resin
Shipment Preparation (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed the preparation of radioactive shipment EF225-038 of an 8120B cask containing a spent resin liner on September 10, 2025.
Shipping Records (IP Section 03.05) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted radioactive material shipments through a record review:
- (1) EF224-005, 8120B cask with dewatered powered/bead resin, Type B
- (2) EF224-044, AVANTech Skids in SeaLand, LSA-II
- (3) EF224-074, 8120B cask with dewatered powered/bead resin, Type B
OTHER ACTIVITIES-BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07)===
- (1) July 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025 EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025 EP04: Emergency Response Facility and Equipment Readiness (ERFER) (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
- (1) January 1, 2025 through June 30,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Ensure Acceptance Criteria for Maintenance on Air Compressor Inlet Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000341/202500301 Open/Closed
[P.3] -
Resolution 71111.12 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, occurred when the licensee did not have procedures with appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.
Specifically, the maintenance procedure for the safety-related air compressors lacked sufficient detail to ensure proper clearances existed in the compressor inlet valves.
Description:
On May 23, 2025, during a surveillance test of the division II non-interruptible air system (NIAS), a safety-related system, the licensee noted the division II control air compressor was slow to load compared to the division I compressor and prior experience. As a result, the licensee performed the capacity test and found the acceptance criteria were not met. The licensee considered the air compressor nonfunctional and cross-tied division I NIAS to serve division II loads. As a result, several technical specification limiting conditions for operation (LCO) actions were entered for division II NIAS loads, such as the reactor building to torus vacuum breakers (72-hour shutdown action), and the standby gas treatment system and control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems (7day shut down actions).
Troubleshooting revealed binding in the inlet valve was the cause of the reduced capacity.
The inlet valve consists of slots, through which fingers, driven by a yoke, slide thru to open and close the inlet during operation. The license discovered a lack of clearance between the fingers and the slots due to manufacturing imperfections of these cast-components. This caused the fingers to hang up and allowed the valve to remain partially open during compression, allowing air to escape. While some imperfections would not appear to pose a problem on initial fit up, they could cause binding with the fingers over time.
The same type of failure occurred on the division II compressor on February 9, 2023. At the time, the cause was determined to be imperfections that could impede the smooth operation of the fingers. Following the 2023 failure, the replacement valve slots were machined prior to installation to ensure proper operation throughout the slot. Additional corrective actions were to enhance the procurement process and add details to maintenance procedure 35.622.003, Control Air Compressor Maintenance, for inspection and installation of the valves. The valves remained installed until the next planned inspection/replacement period in September of 2024. However, the valves installed during the preventative maintenance activity did not have all of the casting imperfections removed. No direction existed to check for, or ensure, the surface was machined on the entirety of slots. While the procedure had added steps to inspect for and remove (as necessary) slag and other material or imperfections, there was no direction to machine the surfaces to remove all the imperfections. Additionally, a 1/32" clearance requirement from the vendor manual (recognized following the 2023 failure) was not incorporated into the procedure. As a result, binding occurred again, resulting in the failure on May 23, 2025. The NRC became aware of the issue on May 23, 2025, and performed a review of the licensee's corrective actions as part of a maintenance effectiveness sample in the third quarter of 2025. Part of the review included the past operability evaluation for the failed compressor. While degraded, the compressor maintained adequate capacity to fulfill its safety functions given the as-measured leakage in the system was less than assumed in design (amongst other conservative factors assumed in the design used to determine capacity).
Corrective Actions: The licensee replaced the suction valve that was binding and entered the issue into the corrective action program.
Corrective Action References: CR 202547768
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to ensure procedure 35.622.003, Control Air Compressor Maintenance, included appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished, as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, Section 5.5.7 of maintenance procedure 35.622.003 provided direction for inspecting the inlet valves. While steps existed to check for and remove foreign material, slag, and casting imperfections that could result in binding, and to remove such material as necessary, specific tolerances and the need to remove imperfections via machining from the entire surface area of the slots was not provided.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, multiple TS LCO actions were entered for division II systems such as CCHVAC, SGTS, and the reactor building to torus vacuum breakers. While a review of the technical evaluation supporting past operability determined the control air compressor would have maintained operability of the supported components in its degraded state, reasonable doubt existed for the as-found condition. Multiple examples in IMC 0612 Appendix E support a more-than-minor determination, such as 3.h and 3.i.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding screened to Green, or very low safety significance, based on the questions in Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609 Appendix A. Specifically, the past operability evaluation demonstrated the air compressor could still fulfill its required safety functions.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.3 - Resolution: The organization takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, corrective actions from the May 2023 failure were not effective, in that the same failure occurred after preventative maintenance was performed.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that procedures shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. The licensee established procedure 35.622.003, Control Air Compressor Maintenance, Revision 30, as the implementing procedure for maintenance on the safety-related control air compressors.
Contrary to the above, since September 16, 2024, a procedure did not include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, procedure 35.622.003 did not contain criteria to ensure adequate clearance existed between the valve guides and unloader fingers, which caused binding and degraded capacity on the division 2 control air compressor.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Inoperable Division of Control Room Ventilation System due to Incorrect Post-Maintenance Testing Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000341/202500302 Open/Closed
[H.4] -
Teamwork 71111.24 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instruction, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for the failure to include instructions appropriate to the circumstance for performing post-maintenance testing on the division II control center heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (CCHVAC)system following replacement of a static pressure controller. This resulted in the system being inoperable due to its inability to perform its function in the recirculation mode.
Description:
On July 22, 2025, the licensee performed maintenance on the division II CCHVAC system.
One of the planned activities was to replace static pressure controller T41K414, which acts to maintain a positive pressure in the control room (relative to the surroundings outside) while in the recirculation mode of operation. The recirculation mode performs a safety-related function of minimizing radiation doses to control room personnel during design basis events. During the recirculation mode, the normal air intakes are shut, and air is brought in through an emergency filtration train. The controller senses pressure in the control room and sends a signal to modulate the emergency intake modulating dampers and recirculation pressure control dampers to ensure the proper positive pressure is maintained in the control room. The maintenance was completed on July 23, 2025, and the system was returned to service. Later that night, a routine surveillance was performed which placed the system in the recirculation mode of operation. When the system was placed in recirculation mode, control room pressure dropped low out of specification. Instead of modulating to control pressure, the emergency air intake dampers were found closed. Division II of CCHVAC was declared inoperable.
Licensee investigation revealed that the T41K414 controller had been installed in the 'manual' mode of operation. The new controller had been bench-checked in the manual mode prior to installation, and no work order steps existed to place it in the 'auto' mode during the maintenance activity. Had the controller been installed in the 'auto' mode, appropriate pressure control would have occurred. In the weeks leading up to the maintenance, comments had been logged as part of the work order review process stating the post-maintenance testing (PMT) was inappropriate. Specifically, it was noted that the controller should be tested in the recirculation mode. However, the comments were never addressed, as WO 69381742, Replace electrolytic Capacitors in Div II CCHVAC Instruments, only stipulated that the normal mode should be utilized for PMT. In the normal mode, another controller is utilized to control pressure. Assumptions were made during finalization of the work order that the prior controller replacement in 2010 contained the proper PMT (instead of reviewing all of the work order processing comments). The 2010 replacement work order only stipulated using the normal mode for PMT. An issue was not detected then as the controller happened to have been installed in the correct configuration (auto). Therefore, any subsequent testing or operation in the recirculation mode with the prior controller resulted in satisfactory pressure control. The NRC became aware of the issue on July 24, 2025.
Corrective Actions: The licensee changed the controller setting to 'auto' and tested the controller in the recirculation mode satisfactorily.
Corrective Action References: CR202549030
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to include instructions appropriate to the circumstance for performing a PMT on the CCHVAC in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, was a performance deficiency. Additionally, the licensee failed to follow procedure MMA11, Post Maintenance Testing Guidelines, step 3.2.1, which stated a satisfactory PMT is one that ensures the system or component can perform its intended function. Specifically, the licensee failed to include instructions in WO 69381742 to perform a PMT in the recirculation mode (required to demonstrate operability) following replacement of controller T41K414, which resulted in the CCHVAC system being inoperable due to its inability to perform it safety function in the recirculation mode.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the division II CCHVAC system was found to be inoperable in the recirculation mode, whose function is to protect control room operators from the radiological effects of design basis events. The inspectors informed their decision by referencing IMC 0612 Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, examples 1.a, 1.b, and 12.d.
Examples 1.a and 1.b refer to issues regarding questionable equipment testing being more-than-minor if it is later determined the equipment was inoperable as a result of the test issues. Example 12.d refers specifically to the barrier integrity cornerstone and states a minor issue would involve no impacts to the function of equipment, while a more-than-minor issue would involve a performance deficiency that impaired the function of one or more channels of instrumentation.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.
Specifically, utilizing Exhibit 3 for the barrier integrity screening questions, Section 'D' was used as the performance deficiency affected the control room barrier. The finding screened to Green, or very low safety significance, because it only affected the radiological barrier function for the control room, therefore question 1 was answered 'yes.' A review of the circuitry revealed the toxic and smoke barrier functions would not have been impacted.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.4 - Teamwork: Individuals and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, during the development of the work order, multiple departments had opportunities to check and/or emphasize that the correct PMT was incorporated.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and be accomplished in accordance with these procedures. The licensee established WO 69381742 as the implementing procedure for performing a post-maintenance test after maintenance on the CCHVAC system, an activity affecting quality.
Contrary to the above, on July 23, 2025, the licensee failed to have a procedure of a type appropriate to the circumstances for the performance of the post-maintenance test following maintenance on the CCHVAC system. Specifically, following replacement of controller T41K414, WO 69381742 did not include instruction for performing a PMT in the recirculation mode of CCHVAC, resulting in an inoperable division II CCHVAC system.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On November 20, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to P. Dietrich, Senior VP and CNO, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On August 29, 2025, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness inspection results to P. Dietrich, Senior VP and CNO, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 11, 2025, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to C. Domingos, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
M21351
Diagram Fire Protection System
Drawings
M5737
Standby Gas Treatment System Functional Operating
Sketch
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR202550220
DCR request FPRHR150
09/25/2025
FPRB17b
Reactor Building South Control Rod Drive (CRD) and
Railroad Bay Area Zone 7
FPRHR150
RHR Complex, Division I Pump Room, Zone 50, El. 590' 0"
FPRHR252
RHR Complex, EDG11, Switchgear and Switchgear
Ventilation Room Zone 52, EL 617'0"
FPRHR253
RHR Complex, EDG12 Switchgear and Switchgear
Ventilation Room Zone 53, EL 617'0"
Procedures
FPRHR254
RHR Complex, EDG13 Switchgear and Switchgear
Ventilation Room, Zone 54, EL 617' 0"
CR202548817
MDCT Fan 'A' Found Inoperable
07/12/2025
CR202548820
Shift 3 CLO for Division I UHS Inoperability
07/13/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202549600
E4100F029 Stroked Open Faster Than IST Limit
08/21/2025
6M7212035
Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI)
Reactor Building
6M7212043
Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System Barometric
CNDR (HPCI) Reactor Building
AJ
Drawings
6M7212045
Diagram Cooling Power Fan Overspeed Protection RHR
Complex
G
EF2PRA005.20
Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System
Information Notebook
Miscellaneous
SSOP9042588
Evaluation Scenario
23.205
Residual Heat Removal System
151
23.601
Instrument Trip Sheets
Procedures
29.100.01
Primary Containment Control
Work Orders
69500666
24.202.01 HPCI Pump/Flow Test & Vlv Stoke at 1025 PSIG
08/21/2025
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Calculations
DC4931 Vol I
Non-Interruptible Control Air System (NIAS) Calculations
28665
Leaking Valve
09/04/2023
29589
Excess Flow Check Valve Open Indication Lightbulb Socket
Broken
09/04/2023
230060
Procedure Enhancement 24.321.03
09/04/2023
231557
DP Extension for CFD E for Maintenance Activities
09/04/2023
20619
Div II NIAS Pressure Switch Found Outside APT, Calibrated
within ALT
08/14/2023
21395
Div II Dryer Solenoid Buzzing
08/15/2023
CR202330937
Buzzing Solenoid on NIAS Div. II Dryer
06/14/2023
CR202331963
Serveron WIFI Node Issues
07/28/2023
CR202332411
Incomplete Part Number in CECO for E21R001C
08/19/2023
CR202335258
Condensate Filter Demin Pushbutton Collars Need
Replaced
2/24/2023
CR202435455
Received 7D52 Div2 Control Air System Trouble Multiple
Times During Shift
01/09/2024
CR202436996
Incorrect Critical Complete Dates for PM Events 3304,
3304A, 3304B
03/19/2024
CR202438768
SRV Tailpipe Press Switch AsFound UNSAT
04/24/2024
CR202438785
SRV Tailpipe Pressure Switch Failure History
04/24/2024
CR202439089
Revise Documents to Show Abandoned Instruments
05/01/2024
CR202441189
There are no Instrument Spec Sheets (ICSS's) in
Documentum for E21R001A thru D
07/26/2024
CR202441243
E21N006B-S Revision Required
07/30/2024
CR202441493
2D5 Testability Div 2 ECCS Power Failure
08/10/2024
CR202441501
Evaluation of E21K601A/B (Div 1/2 CS DC & AC INVERTER
PWR SPLY) Component Criticality is Needed
08/12/2024
CR202441639
Request Review of PM Frequency for Replacement of 2KVA
Inverters
08/17/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202441641
Delay in Replacing E21K601B (Nova Inverter)
08/17/2024
CR202441644
Delay in Executing E21K601B Inverter Replacement PM
May have Contributed to Inverter Failure
08/17/2024
CR202442168
WO Not Scheduled Goes Critical on 9/15/24
09/12/2024
CR202442192
Blown Fuse E41F2B in H21P081 Panel
09/12/2024
CR202442239
Stray Wire Strands at Terminals Found in P50P401B
Terminal Box - NIAS
09/16/2024
CR202442278
Leak Identified During Leak Check on P50F514B
09/17/2024
CR202442300
Poor Fitting Choice Causing Unnecessary Extended LCO
Durations during NIAS System Outage and Challenges to
Plant
09/18/2024
CR202443746
P50F411 H21P420 NIAS Regulator Low in Band but
Acceptable
11/14/2024
CR202444514
Implement Solutions Such as a Different Packing Material or
Work Practice Changes to Prevent Recurring Core Spray
System Packing Leaks on AOVs E2100F006A/B and
E21F026A
2/16/2024
CR202545011
E21N007B (CS PUMPS DISCHARGE PRESS HI ALARM
DIV2 PRESS SW) Found Outside APT during Performance
of WO 64128338
01/14/2025
CR202545473
Div I Core Spray Pump Discharge Flow Loop Spec Sheets
Are Incorrect (E21N003A-SS)
2/25/2025
CR202547227
Close Contactor Failed AsFound Pick up Voltage Testing
04/30/2025
CR202547765
Div-2 Control Air Compressor (CAC) Loading Very Slowly
05/23/2025
CR202548978
WW2532 WO 64696460 (CHECK CALIBRATION OF DIV I
NIAS TO INSTRUMENT RACK H21P440A MAROTTA
REGULATOR) Needs to be Rescheduled due to M&TE
Constraints
07/22/2025
CR202549154
Div I Core Spray Pump Discharge Flow Loop Spec Sheets
Are Still Incorrect After Revision (E21N003A-SS)
07/30/2025
CR202549246
Failed AsFound Pressure for P50F491 CA DIV1 NIAS to
SGT SOLENOID VLVS PRESSURE CONTROL VLV.
Suspect Test Method is the Cause
08/05/2025
CR202549298
AFCC4 on P50F491 (CA DIV1 NIAS TO SGT SOLENOID
VLVS PRESSURE CONTROL VLV) during the Performance
of WO 70297792
08/06/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202549303
AFCC 4 P50F431 (CA DIV I NIAS INSTRUMENT RACK
08/06/2025
H21P440A PRESSURE CONTROL VLV) Found out of Spec
Low during the Performance of WO 64696460
CR202549582
Leak Detection Walkdown
08/20/2025
CR202549762
Center Station Air Compressor Failed to Start
08/29/2025
CR202549766
TBCCW from E SAC Outlet Temp Low OOS
08/30/2025
CR202549778
East Station Air Compressor Unleaded, Causing Auto Start
of West Station Air Compressor
09/01/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
29590
NRC Identified: Excess Flow Check Valve Open Indication
Light Out
09/04/2023
Engineering
Changes
20009
Remove Testable Function from Check Valve E2100F006A
04/17/2022
Engineering
Evaluations
TEP5025-014
Division II Control Air Compressor Past Operability
Evaluation
1082108
Tyco Electronics Agastat Relay: Performance
Characteristics
B
4890656
EGP Agastat Relays: Performance Characteristics
A
501 529
Model EGP, EML, and ETR Control Relays Test Report
E
501 536
E7000 Series Timing Relay Qualification Test Report
D
IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for
Nuclear Power Generating Stations
A
MMM08
Material Shipping Handling and Storage
Miscellaneous
VMB114.1
Vendor Manual, Joy Manufacturing 5" Stroke Oil Free Air
Compressor
B
68328933
Replace RPS Channel 'A2' Reactor Vessel Level 1 & 2
Agastat Relays
07/08/2025
Work Orders
68328942
Replace RPS Channel 'A1' Reactor Vessel Level 1 and 2
07/03/2025
2549808
RPS MG set B Voltage Low Out of Spec
09/02/2025
CR202549373
Rising Steam Tunnel Temperatures Identified
08/09/2025
CR202549379
EQ Impact Assessment for CR202549373: Rising Steam
Tunnel Temperatures Identified
08/10/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202549380
Investigation Long Term MTG First Stage Pressure
Modification
08/10/2025
Engineering
Evaluations
TEB2125-024
Justification for Adding Fans in TB2 Steam Tunnel for
Replacement Air Flow
Operations Evolution Order for Adjusting Voltage on RPS B
MG Set
09/05/2025
Miscellaneous
Risk Management Plan for WO 950044299 Bleed and Feed
Oil Swap #3 HPCV
09/04/2025
20.300.RPSB
Loss of RPS B
Procedures
23.601
Instrument Trip Sheets
Work Orders
950044240
RPS MG set B Online Voltage Adjustment
09/03/2025
Calculations
DC6447 Volume
I
Auxiliary Power System Analysis
G
CR2024-39536
Transformer 64 Load Tap Changer Not Maintaining Voltage
in Automatic
05/13/2024
CR202548079
EDG 14 Small Oil Leak Causing Exhaust Gas Plumes by
06/09/2025
CR202548317
Div. I Bus Voltage Low after Starting CWP 4
06/17/2025
CR202548432
Received 3D44 for RB SPING Flow Low
06/22/2025
CR202548621
43.408.001 (Division I Primary Containment Monitoring
System Leakage Test) Exceeded Acceptance Criteria
07/01/2025
CR202548621
43.408.001 (DIV I Primary Containment Monitoring System
Leakage Test) Exceeded Acceptance Criteria
07/01/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202548704
RP SPING Low Flow Failure
07/05/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR202548791
NRC Identified Leak on EDG 12
07/10/2025
Engineering
Evaluations
EFA-R1421-002
Engineering Functional Analysis: Degraded Voltage
Performance During LOCA Transient in DC6447, Vol I
TRM Volume II
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
VMC1147.1
Eberline, Model SPING3/SPING4
Miscellaneous
VME81.1
Emergency Diesel Generators [Proprietary-Confidential]
23.320
Balance of Plant Auxiliary Electrical Distribution System
43.408.001
Division I Primary Containment Monitoring System Leakage
Test
Procedures
43.408.001
DIV I Primary Containment Monitoring System Leakage Test
MES 28
Leakage Reduction and Primary Containment Leakage Rate
Programs
MES 28
Leakage Reduction and Primary Containment Leakage Rate
Programs
EDP 70198.004 /
I218302
Gas Monitor Assembly
C
Drawings
I216104
System Diagram-Process Radiation Monitoring
50365779
Implement EDP 70198
01/04/2023
256293
Perform 66.000.409 CCHVAC Emergency Air South Inlet
Radiation Monitor Division I Cal-License Renewal
01/07/2022
Work Orders
67447555
Division I Control Center Emergency Air (CCEA) South
Radiation Monitor Fails Calibration
08/04/2023
Calculations
DC5713
Hydraulic Evaluation of the Upgraded Fire Distribution Loop
Calibration
Records
Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) Exhaust Fan T4600C001
Division I
F
CR202545358
Revise 28.50404 Underground Flow Test Procedure
01/30/2025
CR202549030
Div II CCHVAC Failed to Modulate MCR Pressure during
24.413.03
07/24/2025
CR202549094
Requesting a WO to Change T41K414 Controller
Programming
07/28/2025
CR202549214
Equipment Cause Evaluation Product for CR202548573
Failed the FBP66 EQRT Review
08/01/2025
CR202549264
Failed AsFound Pressure for P50F491 CA Division I NIAS
to SGT Solenoid Valves Pressure Control Valve Suspect
Test Method is the Cause
08/05/2025
CR202549304
Request Revision to 46.000.119 Marotta Pressure Regulator
Bench Test to Clarify Bench Testing Requirements
08/06/2025
CR202549370
Ops Shift 3 CLO Div 2 CCHVAC Failed to Modulate MCR
Pressure During 24.413.03
06/08/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202550028
EESW Motor Has UNSAT PI Readings P4500C002B
09/15/2025
5I7212612-80
Connection Diagram Auto Temp Control System for Control
Center - Reactor Bldg. Pneumatic Piping PNL H21P296B
L
5I7212612-B1
Auto Temp Control System for Control Center Reactor Bldg.
Pneu Piping Conn. Dia. PNL-H21P296B
G
Drawings
5I7212613-62
Auto Temp Control System L/D for Static Pressure Cont.
Control Room Panel H21P296B
P
5I7212615-06
Control Diagram - Ventilation System for Control Center
Reactor Bldg. H21P296A and P296B
P
5I7212615-7
Control Diagram - Ventilation System for Control Center -
Reactor Bldg. H21P296A, P296B, P296E, and P296G-F
CI
6I7212611-13
Schematic Diagram Rx Bldg. Main Control Room A/C Mode
Selection Div II
Y
6I7212611-52
Reactor Building Main Control Room A/C Isolation Dampers
Div II
CI
6I7212868-41
Wiring Diagram Fire Detection System Panel H11P916B1 &
PNL H11F916B2
L
6I7212868-45
Wiring Diagram Fire Detection System Reactor Building 2nd
Floor (Zone 10)
E
6M7212082
Diagram Standby Liquid Control System
6M7215733-1
Fire Protection Functional Operating Sketch
6M7215736-3
Control Center A/C Air System Functional Operating Sketch
K
M57303
Non-interruptible Control Air System Division I and II
Functional Operating Sketch
Engineering
Evaluations
FPEE250003
Evaluation of the Fire Protection Underground Water Supply
Criteria
700051
T41K414 CCHVAC Static Pressure Controller
DBD-T4600
Purchase Order
Change
Purchase Order 4701895450
06/11/2025
Miscellaneous
TER1425-026
EESW Div 2 Motor Did Not Meet Acceptance Criteria during
PDMA Testing
24.139.02
SLC Pump and Check Valve Operability Test
28.504.06
Fire Suppression Water System - Flush
46.000.119
Marotta Pressure Regulator Bench Test
Procedures
ARP 16D27
Fire Alarm
64696460
Check Calibration of Division I NIAS to Instrument Rack
H21P440A Marotta Regulator
08/05/2025
67328194
License Renewal-Drain, Flush, Refill Diesel Fire Pump Fuel
Oil Tank
09/22/2025
Work Orders
205300
PDMA Testing (Motor Tagged) of P4500C002B
08/29/2025
293649
Perform 24.139.02 SLC Pump and Check Valve Operability
Test
04/15/2025
69073584
Perform 24.139.02 SLC Pump and Check Valve Operability
Test
06/29/2025
69381742
Replace Electrolytic Capacitors in Div II CCHVAC
Instruments
07/21/2025
69948343
Perform 24.139.02 SLC Pump and Valve Operability Test
09/25/2025
297792
Check Calibration of Division I NIAS to SGTS Solenoid
Valves Marotta Regulator
08/05/2025
70420752
Replace Thin Section of P4400 Piping Near P4500F205B
09/09/2025
70420752
Replace Thin Section of P4400 Piping Near P4500F205B
09/09/2025
249085
Perform 28.504.04 Fire Suppression Water System
Functional Flow Test - License Renewal
06/30/2025
Work Orders
950030525
Reperform the PMT Steps of WO 69381742
07/24/2025
Calculations
N/A
Fermi 2 Alert and Notification System Design Report
Miscellaneous
N/A
Current RTU Status Report
August 1,
24 through
July 31,
25
Calculations
N/A
DTE Energy Fermi Unit 2 Power Plant OnShift Staffing
Analysis Report
2/20/2012
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202545441
JIC Team Member Failed to Respond to the ECOS Weekly
Call-Out as Required
2/04/2025
Miscellaneous
EP570
ECOS Test Review
10/07/2024
through
08/19/2025
Calculations
KLD TR-251496
Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant 2025 Population Update
Analysis
08/12/2025
241002
Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit of the Radiological
Emergency Preparedness Plan Program
09/26/2024
250105
Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit of the Radiological
Emergency Preparedness Plan Program
08/04/2025
Miscellaneous
N/A
MOU/LOA with Corewell Health; Frenchtown Fire
Department; Monroe Community Ambulance; Monroe
County Community College; Ontario, Michigan & DTE;
Pro-Medica Monroe Regional Hospital; et al.
Various
CR202548374
TSC HVAC Not Operating as Expected
06/19/2025
CR202548794
TSC HVAC System Startup Failures
07/11/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202548805
During the July 1 RERP Drill, the Technical Support Center
(TSC) Did Not Meet the Timeliness Requirement for the First
Follow-up Notification Following the Announcement of a
Radiological Release at 0915, EP290 Section 7.1
07/11/2025
Shift Manager Daily Alignment Meeting Notes
07/24/2025
Blue Team Drill Guide (Green Controllers) for July 1, 2025
Drill
07/01/2025
Miscellaneous
RERP Plan
Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan
EP101
Classification of Emergencies
Procedures
EP580
Equipment Important to Emergency Response (EITER)
11.1
AMS4 Serial
Number 1058
AMS4 Calibration Form
07/22/2025
OPS3725
Calibration of the Mirion FASTSCAN' WBC System
2/11/2024
Serial No. 341398
Ludlum 12 Frisker with 4392 Alpha Probe Calibration
08/06/2025
Calibration
Records
Serial No.
6618066
Telepole Calibration Form
05/01/2025
Miscellaneous
NPRP250012
Evaluation of Impact of Current Radionuclide Mix on RP
Instruments
03/25/2025
65.000.156
Radiological Instrumentation Source Checking
66.000.205
Calibration of Portable Ion Chamber Survey Instruments
8A
66.000.220
Calibration of the Radiation Protection/Chemistry Gamma
Spectroscopy System
66.000.248
Calibration of Self Reading Dosimeters
66.000.251
Calibration of the MGPI Telepole Instrument
66.000.253
Calibration of the Canberra Tennelec
Procedures
66.000.255
Calibration of the Canberra Cronos Series Monitor
Self-Assessments 0801.26
NRC 71124.05 Self-Assessment Report-Radiation
Monitoring Instrumentation
2/23/2023
60495674
Perform 64.120.041 Containment Area High Range
Radiation Monitor Div 2 Elec Cal
2/27/2024
Work Orders
63858492
Perform 64.080.110 Circ Water System Decant Line Rad
Monitor Calibration
05/03/2023
66524470
Perform 64.120.041 Containment Area High Range
Radiation Monitor Div 2 Rad Cal
04/17/2024
Work Orders
67337384
Perform 64.080.214 Turbine Bldg Vent Exhaust PRM SYS
Calibration
06/26/2024
CR202436255
Incoming Radioactive Material Shipment exceeds
Department of Transportation (DOT) Regulations
2/13/2024
CR202440048
Radwaste Decon and Radwaste Operators Running Out of
Room to Store Water
06/04/2024
CR202546785
RP Question on Shipping Requirements during Emergencies
04/09/2025
CR202548591
Sources Incorrectly Input Into Sentinel as, Leak Test
Required
06/30/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202548643
OSSF Liner is Near Full Capacity
07/02/2025
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR202549943
The Waste Stream Analysis Report for NPRP 250027
Showed Abnormal Comparisons between the Independent
Lab and In-house Sample Results
09/10/2025
Sealed Source Inventory
08/20/2025
NPRP230048
Att. 1
CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and
Evaluation for Condensate Resin
06/13/2023
Miscellaneous
NPRP250020
Att. 4
CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Sample Screening and
Evaluation for liner L24012 Batch 1
05/13/2025
65.000.519
Radioactive Material Receipt/Source Control
67.000.103
Survey of Outgoing Radioactive Material Shipments
67.000.505
Survey and Movement of Waste Liners in the OSSF
Procedures
MRP15
Controlling Radioactive Material Outside the Plant
Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA)
Radiation
Surveys
P-M202408029
Liner L24012
08/02/2024
Audit 240106
Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit of the Radiation Protection,
Radiological Effluents Monitoring, And Radioactive Material,
Transfer & Disposal Programs
08/15/2024
Self-Assessments
NPRP240041
Quick Hit Self-Assessment (QHSA): Radioactive Solid
Waste Processing, and Radioactive Material Handling,
Storage and Transportation: 71124.08
07/05/2024
EF224-005
20B Cask with Dewatered Powered/Bead Resin, Type B
03/20/2024
EF224-044
AVANTech Skids in SeaLand, LSA-II
08/08/2024
Shipping Records
EF224-074
20B Cask with Dewatered Powered/Bead Resin, Type B
11/07/2024
71151
Corrective Action
Documents
CR202548374
TSC HVAC Not Operating as Expected
06/19/2025
Fermi 2 - RHR Performance Indicators
Various
Fermi 2 - RCIC Performance Indicators
Various
MSPI Derivation Report - Cooling Water System
Unavailability Index
08/07/2025
MSPI Derivation Report - Residual Heat Removal System
Unavailability Index
08/07/2025
MSPI Derivation Report - Heat Removal System
Unavailability Index
08/07/2025
MSPI Derivation Report - Cooling Water System Unreliability
Index
08/07/2025
MSPI Derivation Report - Heat Removal System Unreliability
Index
08/07/2025
MSPI Derivation Report - Residual Heat Removal System
Unreliability Index
08/07/2025
Narrative Logs: July 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025
Various
71151
Miscellaneous
EP540015
Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicator Results
10/01/2024 -
03/31/2025